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10.1177/1046496403251933
ARTICLESMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003Henningsen, Henningsen / NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE
EXAMINING SOCIAL INFLUENCEIN INFORMATION-SHARING
CONTEXTS
DAVID DRYDEN HENNINGSEN
MARY LYNN MILLER HENNINGSEN
Northern Illinois University
Research on hidden profiles has found that groups tend to make decisions reflecting the
informationsharedamonggroupmembers prior to discussion. However, shared information
is confounded with individual prediscussion preferences in hidden profile situations. In this
article,the authors manipulate information distributionto examinehidden,ambiguous (i.e.,
prediscussion preferences favor no alternative), and clear (i.e., prediscussion preferences
support the decision alternative favored by the total information) profiles. They examinethe
influence of profile type on group decisions, use of shared and unshared information, and
perceptions of normative and informational influence. Results indicate that groups make
superior decisions and rely more on unshared information in clear and ambiguous profiles
than in hidden profiles. In addition, perceived social influence is most prevalent in ambigu-
ous profiles.
Keywords:normative influence; informational influence; information sharing; hidden pro-
file; group decision making
There is a growing body of research focusing on theimportance of
information exchange in decision-making groups (Brodbeck,
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schultz-Hardt, 2002; Cruz, Boster,
& Rodriguez, 1997; Cruz, Henningsen, & Smith, 1999; Dennis,
1996; Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams,
& Neale, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996a, 1996b; Kameda, Ohtsubo, &
Takezawa, 1997; Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996;
391
AUTHORS NOTE: Address correspondence concerning this article to David Dryden
Henningsen, Department of Communication, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, IL
60115.
SMALL GROUP RESEARCH, Vol. 34 No. 4, August 2003 391-412
DOI: 10.1177/1046496403251933
2003 Sage Publications
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Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Larson, Foster-
Fishman, & Granz, 1998; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994;
Lavery, Franz, Winquist, & Larson, 1999; Mennecke, 1997;
Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Propp, 1997; Savadori, Van
Swol, & Sniezek, 2001; Schittekatte, 1996; Schittekatte & Van
Hiel, 1996; Shaw & Penrod, 1962; Stasser & Stewart, 1992;
Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna,
1989; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stasser, Vaughn, & Stewart,
2000; Stewart, 1998; Stewart, Billings, & Stasser, 1998; Stewart &
Stasser, 1995, 1998; Van Hiel & Schittekatte, 1998; Winquist &
Larson, 1998; Wittenbaum, 1998, 2000; Wittenbaum, Hubbell, &
Zuckerman, 1999; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1998; Wittenbaum,Stasser, & Merry, 1996). This research consistently has demon-
strated thatshared information(i.e., information held by all group
members) tends to be pooled in discussion more than unshared
information(i.e., information held by only one group member).
Overall, past research has indicated that shared information tends
to have a greater influence on group decision making than does
unshared information.
An overreliance on shared information is problematic for groups
when shared information favors a suboptimal decision alternative
but the information as a whole favors the best decision alternative.
Under these circumstances, relying on shared information at the
expense of unshared information could lead to faultydecisionmak-ing. The negative influence over reliance on shared information can
have on decision making is clearly demonstrated in research using
hidden profiles (Stasser, 1988). In a hidden profile, the information
held by each individual group member favors a suboptimal deci-
sion alternative. However, the total information held by all group
members favors a better decision. If group members pool all of the
unshared information, the bestalternative should become apparent.
Unfortunately, groups withhidden profiles select the suboptimal
decision alternative more frequently than they select the best deci-
sion alternative. In contrast, groups in which all information is ini-
tially shared select the best alternative more than hidden profile
groups (e.g., Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Kelly & Karau,
1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Stasser and Titus (1985) showed that
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group discussion decreased the percentage of group members mak-
ing optimal decisions under hidden profile conditions. This indi-
cates that social influence occurs in decision-making groups deal-
ing with hidden profiles. In the present study, we will examine how
social influence works under different information profiles.
SOURCES OF INFLUENCE
Researchers have identified two types of social influence in
decision-making contexts (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaplan &
Miller, 1987).Normative influenceoccurs when individuals make
decisions to gain approval from other group members. Informa-tional influence, on the other hand, occurs when individuals make
decisions to reach the best possible decision.
Based on thesedefinitions, normative influence occurs in groups
when discussion content presents the positions favored by other
group members (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). If normative influence is
effective, change their positions to the position favored by the
majority in order to fit in with the group. In contrast, informational
influence should occur when facts, evidence, or other forms of
information pertinent to the decision are discussed by group mem-
bers and cause them to reevaluate their positions (Kaplan & Miller,
1987). Researchers have operationalized normative influence as
the statements in discussion that indicate the positions supportedby other group members. Informational influence has been
operationalized as statements revealing relevant facts or evidence
(e.g., Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux,
1997). In any decision-making group, both normative and informa-
tional influence can occur. Next we examine how normative and
informational influence may occur in hidden profiles.
SOURCES OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
In the context of hidden profiles, the initial starting positions
adopted by group members represents a possible source of norma-
tive influence. Statements that indicate the position favored by a
majority of group members should provide normative pressure on
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other group members to shift toward that position. Numerous stud-
ies have indicated that prediscussion positions favored by the
majority or a plurality have a strong influence on group decisions
(e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Kameda et al.,
1997; Larson et al., 1994; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stewart
et al., 1998; Winquist& Larson, 1998).Basedon previous research,
we argue that normative influence will be strongest when a clear
consensus exists among group members.
We argue that normative influence will be stronger in consensus
groups than in groups without initial consensus. In essence, when
there is an initial consensus, group members should face strong
normative pressure to maintain the group harmony by not disagree-ing with the clear group preference. Very little group discussion
may be necessary for group members to feel this normative pres-
sure. Evidence of normative pressure in groups with initial consen-
sus is evidenced by the fact that such groups are less likely to
change to the position most favored by the information (e.g.,
Hollingshead, 1996b). In addition to the prevalence of normative
influence in hidden profiles, informational influence should also
occur when group members rely on decision-relevant information.
In the next section, we examine informational influence in hidden
profiles.
SOURCES OF INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE
Unshared information raised during discussion is a clear source
of informational influence. Unshared information represents new
facts or evidence for most of the group members that may be rele-
vant to the group decision. If the information is deemed accurate
and relevant, it has the potential to cause group members to reevalu-
ate their positions to account for the new information. A variety of
studies have found that the presence of unshared information in the
group discussion can increase group decision-making accuracy
(Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Kelly et al., 1997; Larson et al., 1998;
Winquist & Larson, 1998).
In addition to unshared information, shared information in dis-
cussion should also exert informational influence. Mayer, Sonoda,
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and Gudykunst (1997) found that groups with more decision-rele-
vant information made better decisions than groups with less infor-
mation in a context where all information was shared. This indi-
cates that, like unshared information, shared information can serve
as a source of informational influence. Consistent with past
operationalizations of informational influence (e.g., Kaplan &
Miller, 1987), raising an item of shared information in discussion
creates the potential for informational influence. When informa-
tion is shared prior to discussion, it can be incorporated into each
group members prediscussion decision preferences (Winquist &
Larson, 1998). However, when a shared item is mentioned or repeated
by another group member, that item has the potential to take ongreater weight in the decision-making process. When a group
member mentions an item of shared information, it can verify for
the other group members that they accurately recalled that item.
Furthermore, it can indicate that other members also consider that
item important and relevant to the decision-making process (see
Wittenbaum et al., 1999). This verification process may increase
the weight that group members assignto shared items of information
and cause the members to readjust their preferences accordingly.
Evidence of shared information serving as a source of informa-
tional influence is available in several studies. Recall that Stasser
and Titus (1985) found that discussion decreased the percentage of
correct decisions among group members in hidden profile condi-tions. They also found that group members recalled more shared
than unshared information after discussion when dealing with hid-
den profiles, indicating a preference for shared information in dis-
cussion. Larson, Christensen, et al. (1998) found that repetition of
shared information during discussion increased bias in decisions.
These studies indicate that the discussion of shared information
may have had an influence above and beyond the informations
impact on group members initial preferences.
We have discussed how shared starting positions can create nor-
mative pressure in decision-making groups and how discussion of
shared and unshared information can create informational pres-
sure. In the next section, we will consider how sources of normative
and informational influence are confounded in hidden profiles.
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A CONFOUND IN HIDDEN PROFILES
In hidden profiles, the initial starting positions adopted by group
members and the information shared by group members are con-
founded. Each individual starts out with more shared than unshared
information. Shared and unshared information support different
decision alternatives, with shared information always favoring a
suboptimal decision alternative. Thus, both shared information and
the balance of prediscussion information support the inferior deci-
sion alternative. This sets up a situationin which it is difficult to dis-
tinguish the impact of shared information from the impact of initial
starting positions.
In addition, both informational and normative sources of influ-
ence favor the inferior decision alternative in hidden profiles,
whereas only the potential informational influence in the form of
unshared information favors the best alternative. In this study, we
attempt to extend hidden profile research by examining situations
in which the confound between shared information and initial start-
ing positions are reduced and reversed. We propose to do this while
maintaining a key aspect of hidden profiles. Specifically, in this
study, overall shared information and unshared information always
favor different alternatives.
In contrast to a hidden profile, an ambiguous profileis created
when information distribution does not create an initial preference
for either the best or the suboptimal decision alternative. In an
ambiguous profile, each group member starts with the same num-
ber of items favoring high- and low-quality decision alternatives.
The balance of shared information favors the less desirable deci-
sion alternative, and the balance of unshared information favors the
more desirable decision alternative. Therefore, in an ambiguous
profile, initial starting positions should be no more likely to favor
the position supported by shared information than the position sup-
ported by unshared information.
In a clear profile, the initial information distribution creates a
preference for the superior decision alternative. Opposite to the
classic hidden profile, in a clear profile, each group member startswith more information favoring the superior than the inferior deci-
sion alternative. Consistent with hidden and ambiguous profiles,
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the balance of shared information favors the inferior decision alter-
native and the balance of unshared information favors the superior
decision alternative in clear profiles. In the next sections, we pres-
entourhypothesesconcerning hidden, ambiguous, andclear profiles.
GROUP DECISION HYPOTHESIS
In conjunction with past research, we predict that under hidden
profile conditions, groups will choose the inferior decision alterna-
tive more frequently than the superior decision alternative (e.g.,
Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Stasser & Titus, 1985).
This reflects the fact that both initial starting positions and sharedinformation favor the incorrect decision, whereas only unshared
information favors the correct decision.
With ambiguous profiles, we anticipate that groups will be more
likely to select the best decision alternative than under hidden pro-
file conditions. Here, shared information favors the poor decision
alternative and unshared information favors the best decision alter-
native. Initial starting position is neutral, thus reducing its potential
to influence decisions one way or the other.
In clear profile conditions, unshared information and initial
starting positions favor the best decision alternative. This reverses
the bias created in hidden profile conditions. Under these circum-
stances, we would expect groups to make the correct decision morefrequently than in theambiguous or thehidden profile conditions.
Hypothesis 1: Groups with clear profiles will be more likely toselect the best alternative than groups with ambiguous profiles;groupswith ambiguousprofileswill be more likelyto selectthe bestalternative than groups with hidden profiles.
NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE HYPOTHESES
The stronger the initial preferences are for a given position, the
more that initial starting positions will influence group decisions.
There are many examples of research indicating that the initialstarting positions of group members significantly predict group
decisions (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld et al., 1996;
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Kameda et al., 1997; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stewart et al.,
1998). Social influence generated by the shared initial starting
positions of group members should take the form of normative
influence. The nature of hidden and clear profiles should lead
groups to more prediscussion consensus than will occur in ambigu-
ous profiles. Thus, we feel that normative influence will be more
prevalent in hidden and clear profiles than in ambiguous profiles.
In contrast, when there is less initial support for a specific deci-
sion alternative, the use of normative influence should be reduced,
creating an opportunity for group members to use informational
influence. Some support for this contention is provided by research
that shows increased use of information by decision-makinggroups with conflicting starting positions (Brodbeck et al., 2002;
Propp, 1997; but see also Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Stasser & Titus,
1985). Overall, we predict that groups will rely more on informa-
tional influence under ambiguous profiles than under clear or hid-
den profiles. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2:Group members will perceive more normative influ-ence in hidden and clear profile conditions than in ambiguous pro-file conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Group members will perceive more informationalinfluence in ambiguous profile conditions than in hidden and clear
profile conditions.
Various studies have shown that shared information is discussed
more than unshared information during group discussions of hid-
den profiles (e.g., Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Savadori
et al., 2001). As noted previously, in hidden profiles, shared infor-
mation and initial starting positions favor the suboptimal decision
alternative. When a clear profile exists, the advantage of shared ini-
tial starting position should augment the position favored by
unshared rather than shared information. Dennis (1996) found that
groups were more likely to discuss information supporting their
initial positionsthan information that was negative or neutral to that
position (see also Schittekatte, 1996). Kelly and Karau (1999)found that group members were more likely to discuss information
that favored the best decision alternative if they initially preferred
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that alternative. These studies indicate that initial preferences tend
to promote discussion of items supporting those preferences. In
clear profiles, that should lead to increased discussion of the
unshared information.
We have discussed how initial preferences lead to increased dis-
cussion of preference-consistent information. In addition, Boster
and Mayer (1984) found that arguments presented supporting the
majority position were considered to be stronger than arguments
offered supporting the minority position. Initial preferences seem
to add weightto shared information in hiddenprofile conditions but
should augment unshared information in clear profile conditions.
Thus, we propose our 4th hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4:Groups will favor shared information over unsharedinformation in hidden profile conditions, will equally favor sharedand unshared information under ambiguous profile conditions, andwill favor unshared information over shared information in clear
profile conditions.
Finally, because we are interested in social influence, we want to
determine whether perceptions of normative and informational
influence are accurate predictors of actual social influence in
groups. To that end, we propose to examine how group members
perceptions of normative and informational influence predict the
actual social influence that occurs during group decision making.
We propose the following hypothesis to examine this issue:
Hypothesis 5: Perceptions of normative and informational influ-ence will be positive predictors of shiftsin group membersdecision
preferences from pre- to postdiscussion.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred eleven undergraduates at a large midwestern uni-versity (63 females, 43 males, 5 unreported) were randomly assigned
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to three-person groups (N= 37) to take part in the study. Partici-
pants were volunteers who received extra course credit for their
participation.
DESIGN
The design of the experiment was a three-group, one-way inde-
pendent groups design with random assignment to experimental
condition. The independent variable was the type of profile to
which groups were assigned: hidden profile, ambiguous profile, or
clear profile.
DECISION MATERIALS AND MEASURES
Decision materials from Cruz et al. (1997) were modified for use
in this study. The materials included the descriptions of two job
applicants for the position of assistant professor. Each description
focused on 14 characteristicsof each professor (the same character-
istics for each). A criterion expressing the desired qualifications on
each of 14 items for the job applicant also was provided. Each item
of information either satisfied a criterion for a preferred candidate
(i.e., supporting information) or failed to satisfy a criterion for the
preferred candidate (i.e., opposing information). One additional
item was added to the Cruz et al. materials to accommodate three-person groups.
Each group member received both shared and unshared infor-
mation representing a proportion of the total information about
each candidate. For each condition, the balance of shared informa-
tion favored the inferior decision alternative and the balance of
unshared information favored the superior decision alternative.
The information was distributed so that initial starting positions
favored (a) the suboptimal alternative in the hidden profile condi-
tion, (b) neither the optimal nor the suboptimal alternative in the
ambiguous profile condition, or (c) the optimal alternative in the
clear profile condition.
The amount of shared information in the information sets varied
slightly across conditions. We varied shared information so that we
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would not have to add items or subtract items to/from any of the
conditions. In essence, to modify the number of unshared items of
information distributed to each group member, a net change of
three items of information was needed, whereas changing shared
information allowed for a change of only one item. Shared items
that were changed were randomly selected. The distribution of
shared and unshared items supporting or opposing either candidate
is presented in Table 1.
To measure social influence, sixteen 7-point, Likert-type items,
derived from Henningsen, Henningsen, Cruz, and Morrill (2002),
were used to measure perceived normative influence (e.g., People
used their opinions to change other peoples minds, My behaviorwasguided by a desire for group harmony) with= .71. Sixteen 7-
point, Likert-type items derived from Henningsen et al. were also
used to assess perceived informational influence (e.g., I thought
the group members used information to sway my decisions, Peo-
ple used their information to change other peoples minds) with
= .72.
PROCEDURES
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly
assigned to three-person groups and to one of the three experimen-
tal conditions. Individuals were seated separately and were eachprovided with a packet of information. The packet described a
hypothetical job search in which the participants were instructed to
role-play the part of a member of the search committee. A list of 14
criteria was explained in the packet. In addition, each person
received a description of two job candidates, including information
about how each candidate fit some of the 14 established criteria for
the position. Each group member received five items about each
candidate that was shared with all other group members and three
items that were held uniquely in the members group. After reading
the information contained in the packet, each group member indi-
vidually recorded his or her initial decision preference. Individuals
were then seated with their group members and instructed to dis-
cuss the decision task until they arrived at a consensus decision.
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Following recording of the group decision, group members were
asked to list the items of information they felt were most important
to the decision that they made. Then, group members were again
separated, recorded their individual preferences, and filled out the
normative and informational influence questionnaires. On com-
pleting the questionnaires, participants were debriefed and
released.
RESULTS
MANIPULATION CHECKS
To ensure that the profile manipulation was successful, a series
of2 tests were performed using individual prediscussion prefer-
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TABLE 1: Shared and Unshared Information Favoringthe Optimal and Suboptimal
Decision Alternatives
Applicant Shared Information Unshared Information
Optimal alternative
Hidden profile
Items supporting 0 9
Items opposing 5 0
Ambiguous profile
Items supporting 1 9
Items opposing 4 0
Clear profile
Items supporting 2 9
Items opposing 3 0
Suboptimal alternativeHidden profile
Items supporting 5 0
Items opposing 0 9
Ambiguous profile
Items supporting 4 0
Items opposing 1 9
Clear profile
Items supporting 3 0
Items opposing 2 9
NOTE: All shared items are held by all group members. Unshared items are divided equallyamong group members.
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ences. Under hidden profiles, we expected group members to pre-
fer the inferior decision alternative. For the hidden profile condi-
tion,2 (1) = 11.11, p < .01. Of 36 individuals provided with thehidden profile, 28 chose the inferior decision alternative, indicating
that the hidden profile successfully biased initial preferences in
favor of the suboptimal decision alternative.
We expected individuals under ambiguous profiles to show no
clear preference for the superior or the inferior decision alternative.
For the ambiguous profile conditions,2 (1) = 2.08,p= .11. Of 39individuals provided with the ambiguous profile, 15 selected the
best decision alternative and 24 selected the inferior decision alter-
native. The finding that this difference is not significant supportsour contention that the ambiguous profile condition didnot provide
a clear bias for either candidate.
Finally, we anticipated that groups under clear profile conditions
would initially favor the best decision alternative over the lesser
decision alternative. For the clear profile conditions,2 (1) = 7.11,p< .01. Of 36 individuals with a clear profile, 26 selected the best
decision alternative and only 10 selected the lesser decision alter-
native. Again,this supports our contention that the clear profile cre-
ated a bias favoring the best decision alternative.
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that groups would be most likely
to make thecorrect decision in theclear profile groups, less likelyto
make the correct decision in the ambiguous profile groups, and
least likelyto make thecorrect decision in hiddenprofile groups. To
test these predictions, we used a one-way ANOVA design using
type of profile (hidden, ambiguous, or clear) as the independent
variable and group decision (correct decision = 1; incorrect deci-
sion = 2) as the dependent variable. To test the hypothesis, we
examined a planned contrast model that tested the linear contrast
(see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). We conducted a
contrast analysis because it allowed us to test the specific pattern of
means predictedin Hypothesis 1. A significant contrast model indi-
cates that our hypothesis did accurately predict our findings. A
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nonsignificant residual variance indicates that we did not overlook
any nonhypothesized significant effects.
The linear contrast model was significant,F(1, 37) = 15.02,p .10, 2 < .01, was significant.Therefore, we conclude that Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that group members would per-ceive more informational influence in the ambiguousprofile condi-
tion than in the hidden or clear profile conditions. A planned con-
trast analysis of the hypothesized quadratic effect wasperformedto
test this prediction (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations).
The contrast model was significant,F(1, 37) = 3.94, p = .05,2 =.10, whereas the residual variance was not significant,F(1, 37) =
.03,p > .10,2 < .01. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. Groupmembers perceived more informational influence under ambigu-
ous profiles than under either of the other conditions.
We predicted in Hypothesis 4 that reliance on shared informa-
tion would be highest in hidden profiles and would be reduced as
groups moved to ambiguous and clear profiles. Conversely, we pre-
dicted that reliance on unshared information would steadily
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TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Group Decision Contrast Model
M SD n
Hidden profile 1.92 .29 12
Ambiguous profile 1.62 .51 13
Clear profile 1.25 .50 12
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increase from hidden profiles to ambiguous profiles to clear pro-
files. A planned contrast model was designed to test the linear
effects proposed in Hypothesis 4 (see Table 5 for means and stan-
dard deviations). To determine how much reliance groups placed
on shared or unshared information, each group recorded the items
of information they felt were most influential to their groups in
makingthe decision.These items were coded as shared or unshared
based on the distribution of information in each group. The number
of items of shared and unshared information each group reported
they relied on were used as a measure of that groups reliance on
each type of information. Type of information (shared or unshared)
is a within-group variable, and the decision condition (hidden,
ambiguous, or clear profile) is a between-group variable. Overall,
the contrast model was significant, F(1, 37) = 13.57,p< .01,2 =.26, and the residual was not significant,F(1, 37) = .09,p > .10,2 .10, thepartial regression coefficient for informational influence was posi-
tive and significant, = .65,p< .01. This indicates that the socialinfluence that occurred in the group decisions tended to be per-
ceived as more informational than normative and provides partial
support for Hypothesis 5.
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TABLE 5: Means and Standard Deviations for Shared and Unshared Information
Contrast Model
M SD
Shared information
Hidden profile .50 .90
Ambiguous profile 1.46 1.26
Clear profile 1.83 1.83
Unshared information
Hidden profile 2.25 1.13
Ambiguous profile 1.38 1.19
Clear profile .66 .65
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DISCUSSION
In this study, we began with the proposition that the effect of
shared information and initial starting positions are confounded in
hidden profiles because both favor a suboptimal decision alterna-
tive. We proposed that groups would make significantly better deci-
sions under ambiguous and clear profiles than under hidden pro-
files. Overall, we found support for this position. Groups moved
from inferior to superior decisions as they moved from hidden pro-
files to clear profiles.
We also predicted that normative influence would be more prev-
alent in groups with hidden and clear profiles than in groups withambiguous profiles. This hypothesis was not supported. No signifi-
cant differences existed across conditions for perceptions of nor-
mative influence. In contrast, as hypothesized, significantly more
informational influence was perceived in the ambiguous profile
condition than in the hidden and clear profile conditions. This find-
ing was consistent with our predictions.
We also found support for our hypothesis that groups reliance
on shared information was greatest in hidden profile conditions and
lowest in clear profile conditions, while the reverse held true for
reliance on unshared information. It appears that coupling shared
starting positions with either shared or unshared information tends
to increase the weight that information has in group decisions. Thisis consistent with Boster and Mayers (1984) finding that argu-
ments from majorities are perceived as stronger than arguments
coming from minority positions within groups. When the
prediscussion majority favorsthe best decision, the group members
are more likely to rely on information that supports that decision
(i.e., unshared information). However, when the prediscussion
majority favors the inferior decision, the group members are more
likely to rely on the subset of information favoring the inferior deci-
sion (i.e., shared information). Thus, the weight accorded to items
of information is influenced by prediscussion support for the posi-
tion that information supports.
Perhaps the most intriguing result from this study is the finding
that perceptions of informational influence are a better predictor of
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overall influence than perceptions of normative influence. This
seems counter to the findings of Cruz, Henningsen, and Williams
(2000), in which normative statements had a greater influence than
informational statements on individual decisions. One reason for
this may be due to how Cruz et al. operationalized normative influ-
ence. Cruz et al. used recastingstatements to manipulate normative
influence. Recasting occurs when a group member either discounts
(i.e., diminishes the importance) or bolsters (i.e., emphasizes the
importance) an item of information. Thus, a person engages in
recasting in a group when he or she discusses the importance (or
lack thereof) of an item of information rather than simply mention-
ing the item. In essence, recasting reflects how group members tryto influence how much weight an item of information should hold
for the group decision.
As Cruz et al. (2000) noted, recasting could serve as a source of
normative or informational influence. By addressing the weight
that should be given a piece of information, a group member indi-
cates the position he or she supports and thus may apply normative
influence. However, inferences drawn about information are indi-
cated when information is recast. For instance, Cruz et al. (1997)
offered the following example of discounting. A group member
argues that the high teaching ratings of a job candidate are more an
indicator that the candidate was an easy grader than an indicator
that the candidate was a good teacher. In this example, anothergroup member may recognize the speaker opposed a specific can-
didate (the candidate with better evaluations). However, the other
group members also may consider the claim that good teaching rat-
ings are the result of easy grading as information relevant to the
decision. Thus, recastingmay be perceivedas informational or nor-
mative influence.
It may also be that normative influence was reduced in the pres-
ent study because we used three-member groups. Asch (1955)
found a substantial increase in social influence for individuals fac-
ing a 3-to-1 majority compared to a 2-to-1 majority. It is possible
that in using smaller groups, we reduced the potential for group
members to successfully exert normative influence. In Cruz et al.
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(2000), individuals potentially could face consistent pressure from
all four members of the hypothetical group.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
How recasting is interpreted by individuals in decision-making
groups presents a limitation of this study. Namely, we did not
record group discussions and so we were unable to look at the rela-
tionship between statements of information, statements of prefer-
ence, and recasting statements and our perceptual measures of nor-
mative and informational influence. Clearly, such data would be
beneficial to a fuller understanding of normative and informationalinfluence and is a clear direction for future research.
As it is, we feel that we have made a significant contribution to
the hidden profile literature. For the first time, to our knowledge, an
information distribution in which initial preferences coincided
with unshared rather than shared information was examined. The
creation of a clear profile offers conditions under which reliance on
unshared information exceeds reliance on shared information in
decision-making groups. This provides a clearer understanding of
why shared information is favored in hidden profile conditions. We
havefound that the nature of a profile has a strong effect on (a) deci-
sions made by group members, (b) perceptions of informational
influence, and (c) reliance on shared and unshared information dur-ing group decision making.
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David Dryden Henningsen (J.D., 1992; Ph.D., 1999, University of Wisconsin) is
assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Northern Illinois Uni-
versity. He has active lines of research looking at both group decision making andinterpersonalrelationships. Across bothlines of researchhe is interestedin hownor-
mative and informational processes influence human behavior. His research has
touched on decision making, flirting, and deception.
Mary Lynn Miller Henningsen (Ph.D., 2001, University of Wisconsin) is assistant
professor in the Department of Communication at Northern Illinois University. Her
research focuses on message evaluation in social influence and interpersonal con-
texts. In particular, it has focused on small group decision-making interactions and
date initiation.
412 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003