Famft powerpoint 2013 (1)
School Choice 1. Today’s Class So far, have discussed different approaches to solving non-monetary allocation problems. Finding stable outcomes: DA algorithm.
Matching Theory 1. Two-Sided Matching Statement of the problem Two sides of the market to be matched. Participants on both sides care about to whom they.
© 2008 Robert H. Smith School of Business University of Maryland A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium By Edmans, Gabaix,
Steven T. Shipman, 1 Justin L. Neill, 2 Matt T. Muckle, 2 Richard D. Suenram, 2 and Brooks H. Pate 2 Chirped-Pulse Fourier Transform Microwave Spectroscopy.
Matching Markets
Global Constraints
