An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders.
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Joint work with Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira.
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions Kevin Leyton-Brown Yoav Shoham.
Winner Determination in Combinatorial Exchanges Tuomas Sandholm Associate Professor Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University and Founder,
Search I Tuomas Sandholm Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science Department Read Russell & Norvig Sections 3.1-3.4. (Also read Chapters 1 and 2 if.
LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC DESIGN PRESENTED BY TOM WILKENING 18 SEPTEMBER 2014.
Parallel computing for large-scale transportation network design problems
Mechanisms with Verification
Computational Challenges in E-Commerce By Joan Feigenbaum, David C.Parkes, and David M.Pennock Presented by Wu Jingyuan.
CPS 296.1 Preference elicitation/ iterative mechanisms Vincent Conitzer [email protected].
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
Multi-unit auctions & exchanges (multiple indistinguishable units of one item for sale)