Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Based on joint works with Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira.
Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders – An Overview Speaker: Michael Schapira Based on joint works with Shahar Dobzinski & Noam Nisan.
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Jon Lerner, Silas Xu, Wilfred Yeung CS286r, 3 March 2004.
Mechanisms with Verification Carmine Ventre Teesside University.
ARCS Presentation 2008
CPSC 455/555 Combinatorial Auctions, Continued… Shaili Jain September 29, 2011.
An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions An Internet Mathematics paper by Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar and Éva.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions Written by: Presented by: Ron Holzman Rica Gonen Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz.
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra (2000)
E-Commerce Lab, CSA, IISc 1 The Core and Shapley Value Analysis of Cooperative Formation of Supply Chain Networks Y. Narahari Computer Science and Automation,
The MAS Course (notes created by Ulle Endriss, used with permission) A multiagent system (MAS) is a system consisting of several autonomous entities, called.
The Submodular Welfare Problem Lecturer: Moran Feldman Based on “Optimal Approximation for the Submodular Welfare Problem in the Value Oracle Model” By.