8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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Trustees of Princeton University
International Regimes: Problems of Concept FormationAuthor(s): Oran R. YoungSource: World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 331-356Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010108 .
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8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
Problems
f
Concept
Formation
By ORAN R. YOUNG*
E
live n a world of international
egimes.
ome of them
deal
with
monetary
ssues
(for example,
he
BrettonWoods
sys-
tem); others overn nternational
rade n
commoditiesfor example,
the coffee
greement).
ome
regimes
erve
o
manage
the use
of
nat-
ural
resources
t
the
nternationalevel
for
example,
he nternational
arrangements
or
whaling) or to advance
he
ause
of
conservationfor
example, he agreement n polar bears). Still otherregimes ddress
problems ertaining o the control f armaments t the nternational
level
for example,
he
partial
est-ban
ystem)
r to the
management
of
power
within he
nternational
ommunityfor
example,
he neu-
tralization
greement
or
Switzerland).And
there re
some
interna-
tional
regimes
hat
encompass
everal ssues
within
well-defined
eo-
graphical
areas
(for example,
the
Spitzbergen
greement
nd
the
arrangement
or
Antarctica).
Internationalegimes ary reatlynterms f functionalcope, real
domain,
nd
membership.unctionally,hey ange
from he
narrow
purview
f
the
polar
bear
agreement
o the
broad concerns f the
treaties
n
Antarctica
nd outer
space.
The
area covered
may
be as
smallas
the
highly
estricted
omain f the
regime
orfur
eals
n
the
NorthPacific
r as
far-flung
s that
of
the
global
regimes
or
nter-
national ir
transportthe ICAO/IATA system)
r for he
control f
nuclear esting.
similar
iversity
ccurswith
respect omembership:
therange unsfrom wo orthreemembersas in theregime orhigh-
seas
fishing
stablished nder
he
nternational
orth
Pacific isheries
Convention)
o well
over
hundred
members
as
in
the
partial uclear
test-ban
ystem).
What
s
most
triking,owever,
s the
sheer
number
of
international
egimes.
ar from
being unusual,
hey
re
common
throughout
he nternational
ystem.
It
is
therefore
urprising
hat
cholars ave
not focusedmore
nten-
sivelyn internationalegimes,ndthatmuch f theexistingiterature
on
the
subject
s
weak, particularly
n
analytic
erms.
uring
the
ast
several
years,
here
has
been
a
noticeable
psurge
f
interest
n
the
*
This paperwas prepared
or
the
annual
meeting
f
the
nternational
tudiesAsso-
ciation,oronto,
arch
979.
?
i980
by
The Trusteesf
Princeton
niversity
World olitics
043-887I/8o/03033I-26$oI.30/I
For
opyingnformation,
eecontributor
age.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
3/27
332 WORLD POLITICS
study
f
nternationalegimes.' e
now
havefairly
xtensive
escrip-
tiveaccounts f some pecific egimes2nd some speculativedeas
about
henomena
uch s
regime hange.3
utthefundamentalhar-
acter f internationalegimes emains lusive. onsideringhe per-
vasivenessnd
importance
f
regimes
t the nternational
evel,
he
underdeveloped
tate f
the
existing
iteraturen them onstitutes
serious
eficiency.n this ssay, hen, propose o take omeprelimi-
nary teps oward illinghis apbydrawingn the tudiesfresource
regimes
havebeen
onductingver
number f
years,
nd
making
useof some ormulationsam currentlyevelopingt greaterength
elsewhere.4
THE CORE CONCEPT
Regimes
re
social
nstitutions
overning
he
ctions f those nter-
estedn
specifiable
ctivities
or meaningfulets f ctivities).s such,
they re ecognizedatternsfpracticeround hich xpectationson-
verge.
t follows
hat
egimes
re
ocial
tructures.
t
is
importantot
to
mistakehem
or
functions,hough
he
operation
f
regimes
re-
quentlyontributesothefulfillmentf certainunctions.ikeother
structures,egimes ay
e more
r ess
formallyrticulated,
nd
they
1
See, amongothers, ichardN. Cooper, Prolegomena o the Choice of an
Inter-
nationalMonetary ystem, nternational
Organization, xxix,
No. I
(I975),
63-97;
ErnstB. Haas, On Systemsnd International
egimes, World olitics,
xvii
January
I975);
I47-74;
JohnGerardRuggie nd
ErnstB. Haas,
eds.,
International
Responses to
Technology,
special ssueof nternational
Organization, xxix, No. 3 (1975); Robert .
Keohane nd Joseph .
Nye,
ower and Interdependence Boston:Little, rown,
977);
Oran R. Young, Resource Management
at
the
International
Level:
The
Case
of the
NorthPacific London and
New
York:
Pinter
nd Nichols,
977);
Seyom
Brown nd
others,Regimes for the Ocean, OuterSpace, and Weather Washington: The Brookings
Institution,
977);
and EdwardL. Morse, Global nd Other nternationalommons
n
the
980S
(mimeo.,
Council on
ForeignRelations,
976).
In
addition,
nternational
lawyers ave talked bout nternational
egimes or ome time.To illustrate,ee
L.F.E.
Goldie,
The
Management
f Ocean Resources:
egimes
or
Structuring
he
Maritime
Environment,nCyril .
Black
and Richard
A.
Falk, eds.,
The Future
f
the
nterna-
tional Legal Order, IV: The Structure
of the
International
Environment
Princeton:
Princeton
niversityress,
972), I55-247.
2
For a
range
of
examples,
ee
WilliamM.
Ross,
Oil Pollution as an
International
Problem:
A
Study of Puget
Sound
and
the
Strait
of Georgia (Seattle: University
of
Washington ress,973); M. M. Sibthorp,d.,
The North Sea: Challenge
and Oppor-
tunityLondon: Europa,
975);
Kenneth am, Oil ResourcesChicago:Universityf
Chicago Press,
976);
and
Arild
Underdal,
The Politics
of
Internationalisheries
Management:
he
Case
of the
Northeast
tlantic
unpub.,
978).
3
For
example,
eohane and
Nye (fn.
),
Part
I.
4
See
Young,
Internationalesource egimes,
n
Clifford
. Russell, d., Collective
Decision
Making:
Applicationsfrom
Public Choice
Theory (Baltimore:
The
Johns
Hop-
kinsUniversityress,979), 24I-82,
and
Young,
Resource
egimes:
Natural
Resources
and
Institutionalesign,
n
progress.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES: CONCEPT
FORMATION
333
may
or
may
notbe
accompaniedy explicit
rganizational
rrange-
ments.
Internationalegimes ertain
o activitiesf
nterestomembersf
the nternationalystem.ypically,hese ctivitiesakeplace ntirely
outside
he
urisdictional
oundariesf
sovereigntatesfor xample,
deep eabed
mining), r cut
crossnternationalurisdictional
ound-
aries for
example, igh-seas
ishing), r involve ctions
aving
direct
mpact n the
nterests
ftwo r moremembersf the
nterna-
tional ommunityfor
xample, ajor
djustmentsn exchangeates).
In
formalerms,hemembers
f nternational
egimesre lways ov-
ereign tates,hough
he
parties
arryingut
the ctions overnedy
internationalegimesre often rivatentitiesfor xample, ishing
companies,anks,rprivate
irlines).
mplementing
he
ermsf nter-
national egimeshereforenvolves
two-step
rocedure,featurehat
is not
haracteristic
f
regimes
t the
domestic
evel.5
The
mere
xistence
f a
regime
ill end n element
f
orderliness
tothe
ctivity
t
governs.
ut
heres no reason
o
assume hat
egimes
will
guide
human ctions
oward
well-defined
ubstantive
oals
uch
as
enduringeace,
conomic
fficiency,
r
maximum
ustained
ields
from enewableesources.heconceptregime ontainsointrinsic
metaphysical
r
teleological
rientation,hough
ctorsnvolved
n
the
creationr
reformf
anygiven
egime
illoften
ttempt
o
shape
ts
contents
ith learcut
oals
n
mind.6
t
is,however,ossible
o enu-
merateeveral
omponents
hat
verynternational
egime
ill
possess.
i. The
substantive
omponent.
he core
of
every
nternational
e-
gime
s a
collection
f
rights
nd rules.
heymay
be
more r less
extensiverformallyrticulated,ut ome uch nstitutionalrrange-
ments
ill tructure
he
pportunities
f
he
ctors
nterested
n
a
given
activity,
nd their xact
ontent illbe a
matterf
ntense
nteresto
these
ctors.
A
right
s
anything
o which n actor
individual
r
otherwise)
s
entitled
y
virtue f
occupying
recognized
ole.
The
role
of
human
being,
or
xample,
s often aid o
carry
ith t
a
right
o ife. n
the
system
f
theUnited
tates,
he ole fcitizen arries ith t the
ight
5Among
other hings,t will
often rove
necessaryo relyon
domestic ourts
o
enforceherights
nd
rules ncorporatedn international
egimes. ee
RichardA. Falk,
The Role of Domestic
Courts
n the
International
egal
Order
(Syracuse,
.Y.: Syracuse
Universityress,
964).
6
Actors
will
virtually
ever
perate
ehind
Rawlsian veil of
ignorance
n
real-
world ituations.
ee John
awls,
A
Theoryof Justice Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
971), chap.
II.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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334 WORLD POLITICS
to
vote
n
elections,
he
right o speak
freely, nd the right o move
about
at will.
We
arenow witnessing igorous ampaigns
o clarify
and,
n
somecases, o redefine he rights
f women, hildren,
ospital
patients,nmatesn prisons, nd animals.Many roles arrywiththem
bundles
f
rights
hat
may
be moreor less
extensive
nd
whoseprecise
contents
subject
o changeovertime.7 f course,
he
possession
f a
right
n
no
way
guarantees hat an
actorwill actually eceive hose
things o which
he
is entitled nder
he terms f the right.
Although
rights
re often espected,ven acknowledged ights re
violated
with
considerable
requency
n real-world
ocialcontexts.
Severaldifferentiableategories f
rights re prominentn interna-
tionalregimes. roperty ightsmay take theform f private roperty
rights for
example, ights o
commodities raded nternationally)r
commonproperty
ights for example, ights
o
airspace
r high-seas
fisheries).8
Because of the
prevalence
f common propertyrrange-
ments
t
the nternational
evel,
nternationalegimes
ften mphasize
the
development
f use-and-enjoyment
ights. hese may be
exclusive
in nature
for
example,
he
right
o exploit given
tract
n
the
deep
seabed),
or
they
may
be
explicitly
ormulated
n non-exclusiveerms
(for example, heright o use certain nternationaltraits).9 ut all
such
rights
re
designed
o
ensure he
availability
f
key
resources
o
actors nder onditions
n
which
private
wnership
s infeasible.nter-
national egimesmay
also
encompass
n
assortment
f other
ypes f
rights,ncluding
he
right oprotectiongainst
ertain orms f
aggres-
sion, he right o
receive
pecified
enefits rom
nternational
ransac-
tions
or
productive perations,
he
right o
tradeon favorable
erms
withothermembersf the nternationalommunity,nd theright o
participate
n
making
ollective ecisions nder
the terms f
a
given
regime.
In contrasto
rights,
ules
re well-defined
uides
o action r
stand-
ards
setting
orth ctions that
members f
some
specified ubject
group re expected
o
performor
to refrain rom
erforming)
nder
appropriate
ircumstances.'0
ny given
rule will exhibit he
following
7On
the notion f bundles f rights,ee CharlesA. Reich, The New Property,
Yale
Law
Journal,
Vol.
73
(April 964), 733-87.
8
Consult,
mong
thers,
irik
Furubotn
nd Svetozar
ejovich,
Property
ights
nd
Economic
Theory:
A
Survey
f Recent
Literature,
ournal
of
Economic
Literature,
x, No. 4
(1972), I137-62.
9
The result
might
be described
s a
system
f
restricted ommon
property:
ee
J.
H. Dales,
Pollution,
roperty,
nd
Prices
Toronto:
University
f
Toronto
Press,
I968), 6i-65.
10My
use of the
concept
rules
differsomewhat romthat
prevalent
n
recent
contributionso
jurisprudence.
ompare
H.L.A.
Hart,
The
Concept f
Law
(Oxford:
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
CONCEPT FORMATION
335
features:
a)
an
indicationf the
relevant
ubject
roup, b) a
be-
havioral
rescription,nd
(c) a specification
f
the ircumstances
n-
derwhich herule
s
operative.n
some
ocieties,or
nstance,
here
arenear-universalules njoiningndividualsotell he ruth nd to
keeppromises
n their
ealings
with
thermembers
f
the
society.
A
rule may be
directed
oward ome
clearly
esignated
roup,
s
in
the
case
of
ethicalprescriptions
elating
o thebehavior f
teachers,
doctors,
r
lawyers.
r
a rule
may
focus n
some
specific
ctivity,
s
in the case
of
prescriptions
ertaining
o civil aviation
or
maritime
commerce. f
course, he
existence f an
acknowledged
ule does
not
guarantee hat he
members f the
subject roup
will always
comply
with tsrequirements.ven in well-orderedocieties, on-compliance
withrules s a
common
ccurrence.
Among the numerous
ules
associatedwith
nternationalegimes,
three
general
categories re
particularly
rominent.
irst,thereare
use
rules.For
example,
members f the
ICAO/IATA
system
re re-
quired to follow
certain
afety ules n
using
nternational
irspace;
those
ngaged
n
high
seasfishing hould
bide
by
rules
pertaining
o
the
conservation
f
fish
tocks;
nd those
using
nternationalea
lanes
are subjectto rulesdesignedto maximizesafety nd to minimize
marine
pollution.
requently,uch use
rules
take the
form f
limita-
tions n the
exercise f
rights.
ust
s
rights
ommonly
afeguard
he
freedom f
actors o behave
n
certainways,rulesoften
pell
out re-
strictionsn the
freedom
f
actors
o do as
they
wish.1
iability
ules
constitute
second
category.
hey spell out
the
locus
and extent f
liability
n
casesof
(usuallyunintended)
njury
o others
rising
rom
theactions f individualparties nderthe terms f a regime.They
range rom ules
oncerning
ompensationor
xpropriationf
foreign
investments
ndervarious
ircumstances
o rules
pertaining
o
respon-
sibility
or
cleaningup
maritime
nvironments
n
the
wake of
acci-
dents.12
inally, nternational
egimes
ften
pecify variety
f
proce-
dural
rules,
which
deal with
he
handling
f
disputes
r the
operation
of
explicit
rganizations ssociatedwith
the
regimes.
At the
domestic
evel,
ollections f rights nd
rulesare
commonly
supplementedy extensiveets of regulationsnd incentiveystems.
Oxford
UniversityPress,
i96i),
and
Ronald
Dworkin,
Taking
Rights
Seriously
(Cam-
bridge:
Harvard
University
ress,
977),
esp.chaps.
and 3.
1
See G.
H. von
Wright,
orm and
Actions
New
York:
Humanities
ress, 963).
12
On liability
ules
and their
ignificance,
ompareR. H.
Coase,
The
Problem
f
Social
Cost, Journal of Law and
Economics,
iii
(October
960),
I-44,
and
Guido
Calabresi nd A.
Douglas
Melamed,
Property
ules,
Liability
ules,
nd
Inalienabil-
ity:One View
of
the
Cathedral,
arvard
aw
Review, ol.
85
(April 972),
I089-II28.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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336
WORLD
POLITICS
Regulations
re
dministrative
irectives
manating
rom
ublic
gen-
cies
nd pecifying
onditionsnder
which ertainctorsre
ooperate
on a
day-to-dayasis.
Theyare
widely
sed to
translate
ights
nd
rules ormulatedngeneralermsntoworkingmanagerialrrange-
ments
pplicable o real-worldituations.13ncentive
ystems,
n the
other
and, re
penaltiesnd rewards
mployed
y public
gencies
for he
urpose
f lteringhe
behaviorf dentifiablectors
n
desired
directions.14
erhaps he
lassic ases f ncentive
ystems
re
axes nd
subsidies.
Obviously,egulations
nd ncentive
ystemsill
be
used ess xten-
sively
n
conjunction ith
nternationalegimes hanwith
regimes
operatingt thenational rsubnationalevel. heyrequirehe xist-
ence of
some
public
gency
ossessing measure f
authority
nd
power; uch
genciesrefar
ess haracteristicf
highly
ecentralized
social
ystemsikethe
nternational
ystem
han f
the
more entral-
ized
systemshat re ommon
t the
national
evel.
Nevertheless,
nter-
national
egimes
ccompanied y
explicit
rganizations
an and
sometimes
o
employ
hese evices. or
example,
he
nternational
Monetary
und has
promulgated
xtensive
egulationsertaining
o
thedrawingightsf ndividual embers,nd theproposednterna-
tional
eabed
Authority
ould e
able
to regulate
roduction
fman-
ganese
nodules o implement
ore
general
ules
concerning
uch
matterss the
mpact f
deep
seabed
mining n
the
world
nickel
market. 5
2.
The
procedural
omponent. lthough
ollectionsf
rights nd
rules orm he
ubstantiveore
f nternational
egimes,
hey re not
the nly omponentsf uch egimes. proceduralomponentncom-
passes
ecognizedrrangements
or
esolving
ituations
equiringocial
or
collective
hoices. ituations
f this
ype risewhenever
t s neces-
sary
r
desirableo
aggregate
he
non-identical)
referencesf two
or
more
ndividualctors
nto
group
hoice.'6 uch
problemsccur
in
most ocial
ystems;hey
ange
rom
he
electionf
ndividualso
13
J
use the concept
regulation
n a somewhat
ifferentense
than t is used in
discussionsoncerningublicregulation f privatendustries.or a clear example f
this
lternativesage,
ee George tigler, he
Citizen nd
theState:Essays n
Regula-
tion
Chicago: niversityf
Chicago ress,975).
14Incentive
ystemsan
also
be used to
raise
or
disburse evenue.
rdinarily,
ow-
ever,
heir
rimary urpose
s to structure
hebehavior
f certain
roups f actors.
15
See, for
example,Robert .
Aliber,
The
International oney
Game
(New
York:
Basic
Books, 976).
16
For
a general
nalysis
f social
hoice, ee A.
K.
Sen,
Collective hoice nd
Social
Welfare
San Francisco:
reeman,
g7o).
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 337
filltop positions
o
establishing
he terms f tradefor
exchange
ela-
tionshipsnd deciding n
thedistribution
f valued
goods
and
services.
Several ypes f problems equiring
ocialchoices
an
be
expected
o
arisewithin the framework f an operativenternationalegime.17
Some
of
these
will involve he allocation
f factors f
productionfor
example, eep seabedmining racts,
otal
llowable atches
n the fish-
eries, nd segments f
the
global
radio
spectrum).
uch
problems
will
be
especially
ifficult
o solve t the
nternationaleveldue to the
preva-
lence
of
common
rather han
privateproperty.
ther social choice
problems ill relate o ssueswith xplicit istributivemplicationsfor
example, ecisions elating o adjustments
n
exchange
ates
r
royal-
ties n connectionwithdeep seabed mining).Collective hoiceswill
also be required n settling isputes. ypically,
hesewill arise
from
effortso apply generalrights nd rules to
the
complexities
f
real-
world ituations. or does this xhaust
he
range
of
problems
f social
choice
that
an be
expected
o
emerge ontinually
nder
the
terms f
internationalegimes. hus,
therewill be cases n which
group
deci-
sions
re
necessary
o
determinehe orts f
research ctivitieso
permit
in
an area
ike
Antarctica,
o resolve onflictsetween
ifferentses of
the ame
resource,nd
to
organize
ollective anctions
imedat obtain-
ing compliance
with the
rights
nd
rules
of an
international
egime.
Social choicemechanisms re institutionalrrangementspecialized
to
the
resolution f problems
f
socialchoice risingwithin
he
frame-
work
of
particular egimes.
ike other
omponents
f
regimes,
hese
mechanisms
may
be more or less
formalized, nd it is typical or a
regime o
make use of
several t
the
same time.The range of these
mechanismss wide, encompassinguchdevices s the law of cap-
ture, markets,
oting systems, argaining, dministrativeecision
making, djudication,
nilateral
ction
backed
by coercion, nd organ-
ized violence.18ertain onditions
re required orthe effectiveper-
ation
of
each of these
mechanisms;
we
may thereforessume that
individualmechanismswill be associated
primarilywith particular
types f social systems. he most triking eatures f the nternational
system
n
this
connection
re its
relatively mall number f formal
members nd itshigh level of decentralization ithrespect o the
distributionf
power
nd
authority.
ocial choice
mechanisms
harac-
teristic
f
systems
f this
type
re the law of
capture, argaining,
17
Problems f social choicepertainingo the selection nd reform f international
regimes er se are discussedn a later ection f this ssay.
18
The classic tudy focusing n voting ystems) s
KennethArrow, ocial Choice
and
ndividual
Values
2d
ed.; New
York:
Wiley,
963).
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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338
WORLD
POLITICS
various orms f
coercion, nd,
to
a lesser egree,
markets.
We
should
thereforexpect
mportant roblems f social
choice arising
n inter-
national egimes
o be handledthrough hese
procedures.19till,
pro-
cedures nvolving oting nd administrativeecisionmakingwill not
be
altogetherbsent n
internationalegimes.
Voting,
or
example,
s
of some
significancen
cases like
the InternationalMonetary
und
and the
CAO/IATA
system. utthere an be no doubt
hatunilateral
claims, argaining,nd coercion
re central o the
processes
f reach-
ing
socialchoiceswithin
most nternational
egimes.
It
is also worth oting hat ome
regimes o not
possess ocialchoice
mechanisms f their wn. They
may relyupon
the institutionalr-
rangements f larger ocial structuresn dealingwith problems f
socialchoice, r theymay share
mechanisms ithother egimes.
uch
situations re common n
cases
where adjudication r voting s em-
ployed
n
reaching
ollective
hoices.
For
example,
he
same
courts
may resolve
onflictsf interest
ertaining o civil liberties, usiness
activities,nd land
use. n
principle,
he
nternational
ourtof
Justice
or the General
Assembly f
the United Nations could
be
employed
to deal withmany
ocial choice
problems rising nder pecificnter-
nationalregimes. n practice, owever, ariouscombinations f bar-
gaining
nd
coercion eared o the
problems
f
specific
egimes
onsti-
tute he norm t the
nternationalevel.
3.
Implementation.moothly unctioning
nternationalegimes re
difficulto achieve.20
ights
re not
always
respected,
nd even
widely
acknowledged ules
re
violatedwith ome
frequency.
or
is it
reason-
able
to
assume
hat herelevant ctorswill
simply
ccept
he
outcomes
generated y socialchoicemechanisms s authoritative,nd abideby
them.
Accordingly,
t is
important
o
think bout the effectivenessf
international
egimes,21nd this
uggestsn
examination f
compliance
mechanismss
a thirdmajor
component
f these
egimes.
Any
discussion
f
compliance
must
deal
with he
ssueof
ncentives.
What
are the
benefits
nd
costs f
complying
ith
rights
nd
rules,
n
contrast o
violating
hem?How
do individual ctors ecide whether
to
comply
with the substantive
rovisions
f
international
egimes?
There s a tendencyo assume hatthetypical ctorwill violate uch
19
Young, Anarchy nd Social Choice: Reflectionsn the International olity,
World Politics,
xxx
(January
978),
24I-63.
20
That is, reality eldom approximateshe condition f perfect ompliance is-
cussed n
Rawls
fn. 6), 35L.
21
For a similar bservation
bout
domestic roblems,ee A. Myrick reeman, En-
vironmental anagement s a Regulatory rocess, iscussion aper D-4, Resources
for
the
Future,
January
977.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
CONCEPT
FORMATION
339
provisions
o long
as the
probability f
being
caught n specific
n-
stances s
low-a lineof
reasoningwhich mplies
hatthe availability
of
effectivenforcementrocedures
s
essential o the
achievement
f
compliance. ut this rgumentppears o be quitewideof themark
in
many
real-world ituations.t
is not difficult
o identify
ircum-
stances
n which
onsiderations
f
self-interestill ead
to compliance,
especially
n
conjunction
with
long-run erspectives
n iterative
e-
havior.Further,
here
s
no
reason to assume
that
ndividual ctors
make large numbers
f
discrete enefit/cost
alculations
elating
o
compliance
with the
provisions
f international
egimes.
Actorswill
often evelopgeneral
ules
or
policies
n
this
realm,
nd
it seemsrea-
sonableto expectthat ong-termocialization s well as feelings f
obligation
will
play
an important
ole
in
the articulation
f these
rules.22
A
compliance
mechanisms
any
nstitutionr
setof nstitutions
ub-
licly
uthorized o
pursue
ompliance
with
the
substantive
rovisions
of
a
regime,
r with
theoutcomes
enerated
y
ts social
choice
mech-
anisms.
The
image
that omes
to mind
here s one of formal
overn-
mental
gencies,
nd
such
agencies
re
no
doubt
heclassic
nstitutions
specializingn the achievementf compliance.But less formal om-
pliance
mechanisms
re
common,
nd
highly
ecentralized
ocial
sys-
tems,
uch as
the international
ystem,
ypically ely
upon
them.23
The
result s
apt
to be
a
heavy
emphasis
n self-interest
alculations
coupled
with
publicly
ecognized
rocedures
or
elf-help
n
the
redress
of
wrongs.24
lternatively,
he outcome
may
involve
reliance n
ar-
rangements
n which
xplicit
gencies
re
employed
o
gather
nforma-
tionand to inspect heactions f individual ctors, ut decentralized
procedures
re
retained
orthe
application
f sanctions
for
example,
the
CAO/IATA
system
nd
many
f the
regional
isheries
egimes).25
From
the
point
fview
of
themembers f a
regime,
he
development
of
compliance
mechanisms
oses
n investment
roblem.
ny
expendi-
ture
f
resources
n such
mechanisms ill
generate
pportunity
osts,
and
declining
marginal
eturns
rom
uch investments ill
virtually
always
become
pronounced
efore
erfect
ompliance
s reached.
Ac-
22
For an
intriguing
mpirical
xample,
ee
Abram Chayes,
An Enquiry
nto
the
Workings
f Arms Control Agreements,
arvard LIw
Review,
Vol.
85,
No.
5
(975),
905-69.
23
Young,
Compliance
nd
Public Authority,
Theory
with
nternational
pplica-
tions Baltimore:
he Johns
opkins
University
ress,979),
esp.
chaps.
and
5.
24
For
empirical
xamples,
eeLucy
Mair,
Primitive overnmentBloomington,
nd.:
Indiana
University
ress,
977), esp.
chap.
.
25 Ronald
S. Tauber,
The Enforcement
f IATA
Agreements,
arvard
nterna-
tional
aw
journal,
,
No.
I
(i969),
I-33.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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340
WORLD
POLITICS
cordingly,
t s safe oassume
hat hemembersf
regime
ill
rarely
attempt
o
develop ompliance
echanisms
apable
f
eliminating
io-
lations
ltogether.xactly
here
quilibrium
illoccur
with
espect
o
thesenvestmentecisionsependsn the ssumptionsade bout he
membersf nternational
egimes.
n viewof thedecentralization
f
responsibility
hat
oes
with
hedecentralizationf
power nd author-
ityn the nternationalystem,
owever,t seems afe o conclude hat
underinvestmentn
compliance
echanisms
ill
be
characteristic
f
internationalegimes.26till, ariousypes f compliance echanisms
do occur t the nternationalevel,27
nd suchmechanisms ust e
accepteds a
third
major omponentf nternationalegimes.
Several larifyingbservationsre n ordern closing his ection.
It is possible o argue hat ome
egimemust lways e present ith
respecto anygiven ctivity:egimes
an vary reatly
n
extent,nd
extreme
ases an imply e treateds
nullregimes.hus, he rrange-
ment or
high-seasishingrior o
WorldWar
I
might e described
as a
regime
ased n
unrestricted
ommon
ropertynd
the
procedure
known s the law of
capture,
atherhan s a situation
acking ny
operativeegime.28
ut
his ine f
reasoning
eads o serious
roblems.
Sometimesctivitiesre nitiatede novon the bsence fprior xpe-
rience
for xample,nternationalatelliteroadcasting
r
deep
eabed
mining).
n
such
ases,
we would
have
o
develop ome ictionsbout
latent r
tacit
egimes
o
avoid
he
onclusionhat
here
re ituations
in
which
no
regime
s
present.urther,xistingegimes
ometimes
break
own,eaving confusednd nchoateituation ith especto
some
ctivityfor xample,he
currentituationegardingheterri-
torial
ea).29
Here too, he oncept ouldhave o be stretchedxces-
sivelyo ssert
he
ontinuedxistencef regime. dditionally,void-
ing
he
emptation
o
assume hepresence
f
some
egime
n
conjunc-
tionwith
verypecifiablectivityill
facilitateater iscussionsfthe
origins
f
regimesnd ofregime ransformation.
26
Internationalegimes,
ike
other social
institutions, ill
ordinarily xhibit
he
attributesf
collective
oods (that s,
non-excludability
nd jointness f
supply)
to a
high
degree. or
furtheriscussion
f the
problems f
supplying
ollective oods, ee
Mancur
Olson,
Jr.,
he Logic of
Collective
Action
(Cambridge:
Harvard University
Press,
i965).
27
For
a variety
f examples, ee
William
T. Burke,Richard
egatski,
nd William
W.
Woodhead,National
and
International
Law
Enforcement
n
the Ocean
(Seattle:
Universityf
Washington ress,
975).
28Francis
T.
Christynd
Anthony cott, he Common
Wealth
in
Ocean
Fisheries
(Baltimore:
he
Johns opkins
University
ress,
965).
29 For
the
background f earlier
ffortso
reach agreement
n a
regimefor the
territorial
ea, consult
hilip C.
Jessup, The United
Nations
Conference
n
the Law
of the
Sea, in Essays on
International Law
from
the
Columbia Law Review
(New
York:
Columbia
University
ress,965), I -23I.
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
CONCEPT FORMATION
341
In
analyzing
nternationalegimes,here
s a
tendencyofocus n
highly oherentnd
internally
onsistentonstructs.
et,
real-world
regimesre typically
nsystematic
nd ambiguous,
ncorporatingle-
ments erivedrom everalnalyticonstructs.hisdivergencee-
tween
he deal
ypesrticulated
y
tudents
fregimesnd the
more
inchoate
egimes
n
operation
n
real-worldituationss
partly
ttribut-
able
o
misunderstandingsy hosewho
make
ecisionsbout egimes.
Much
f
t,
however,rises
rom
wo ther
actors.he
developmentf
an
international
egime
suallynvolves
ntense
argainingnd the
hammering
ut of critical
ompromises
mong he nterested
ctors.
A
dramaticurrent
llustration
f thisphenomenon
s the
ongoing
bargainingelatingo theproposednternationaleabedAuthority.
Furthermore,nternational
egimes
enerallyvolve
nd
change ver
time n
response
o
various conomic
nd political
ressures.
his s
true
ven
f
regimes
nitiallyormulated
omprehensively
n
some ort
of
constitutionalontract. ith
he
passage f
time, egimes
en-
erally cquire
dditional
eatures
nd
become
ess
onsistent
nternally.
The
point
f
these emarks
s
neither
o
criticize
xistingegimes
or
to
argue
hat he
xaminationf deal
ypes
s
unimportant
n
conjunc-
tionwith hedevelopmentf nternationalegimes. uta failure o
bear
n mind he
distinctionetween
deal
types
nd
reality
s
bound
to
eadto
confusion.30
Finally,
here
s
a
difference
etweenhe
onditions
equired
or he
effective
peration
f an
international
egime
nd
the
consequences
resulting
rom
ts
peration.
o illustrate,
onsider
regime overning
internationalrade
n
some
ommodity
ased n
privateroperty
ights
anda competitivearket.heconditionsecessaryoensure ffective
operation
f
such
a
regime
nclude
he
availability
f
information
about
otential
rades,
willingness
o
accept
he
erms f
trade ic-
tated
y
he
market,
nd an absence f
natural
monopolies.31
he
con-
sequences
f
the
operation
f
the
regime,
ycontrast,
elate
o the
extent
o
which
t
yields
conomically
fficient
utcomes;
he
degree
o
which t
produces
ocial
osts
r
neighborhood
ffects;
he
ttractive-
ness
f
the
results
n distributive
erms;
nd so forth.
oth
he
ondi-
tions or perationndthe onsequencesfoperationre entralssues
in the
nalysis
f
nternational
egimes.
ut t s
important
o
differ-
entiate
learly
etween
hem,
s
well s tobear n
mind hat
oth
hese
300n the relationshipetween
deal
types nd reality, ith pecialreferenceo
the
theory f games, ee AnatolRapoport,
wo-Person Game Theory
(Ann
Arbor:
Univer-
sity f Michigan ress,
966),
i86-2I4.
31
For a succinct nd clearlywritten iscussion f such conditions,ee RobertHave-
man,
The Economics of the Public Sector
(New York: Wiley,
976),
22-27.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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342 WORLD POLITICS
issues re eparable
rom
ffortsocharacterizehe nstitutionalontent
of
n nternational
egime.
REGIMES IN OPERATION
Having xamined
he
nalyticontentf
the
onceptregime,
ith
special eferenceothe nternationalystem,etmeturn osome fthe
major eaturesfregimess they ccur n real-worldituations.
I.
Varieties f regimes. ariety ith especto extent,ormality,i-
rection,ndcoherences a prominenteaturef nternationalegimes.
Sometimeshese ifferencesreattributableo underlyinghilosophi-
cal orientations.orexample,egimesestingn socialistremises ill
encompass ore xtensiveollectionsfrules s wellas more xplicit
efforts
o
direct
ehavioroward he chievementfgoals han
aissez-
faire egimes
hat
mphasize ecentralizedecisionmaking nd au-
tonomyor ndividualctors.n other ases, ariationsrise rom
he
characterf specific argains truckn the processesf setting p
regimes,
r
from he particularatterns f institutionalvolution
over ime.
The
extentfa
regime
s
a
matterfthenumbernd
restrictiveness
of ts
rightsnd
rules. t
one
extremes the aseofunlimitedaissez-
faire,
n which he
ctorsre ompletelyree o do as they leasewith-
out
ven he
onstraints
f
a
system
f
property
r use
rights.32
t the
other xtremere
rrangementsmphasizing
entral
lanning
nd de-
tailedrulesgoverninghe actions f individualmembers. etween
these xtremesie
variousmixed
ases hat redifferentiable
n
terms
ofthe xtento whichheynclude ightsndrules estrictinghe u-
tonomy
f
the
ctors.nternational
egimes
end o
be
lessrestrictive
than
omestic
nes,
ut
hey
o not
generallypproximate
he
xtreme
ofunlimited
aissez-faire.
Internationalegimes ary reatly
n
the
extent o which hey re
laid out
n
formal
greements,onventions,
r
treaties.
or
example,
thecurrent
egime orAntarcticas formalized
o a
greater egree
than heneutralization
rrangements
or witzerland.s
in
domestic
settings, oreover,t s commonornformalnderstandingso arise
within heframeworkstablished
y
theformaltructuref an inter-
nationalegime.
uch
nderstandingsay
erve ithero
provide
nter-
pretations
f
mbiguousspects
f he ormal
rrangementsfor
xam-
32
A
regime
or ome natural esource
with no
private ropertyights,
o
liability
rules,
nd
allocation ased on the
principle
nown as the
law
of
capture might
approximatehis
extreme ase.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
CONCEPT
FORMATION
343
ple,
the
notion f
maximum
ustained
ield
n
conjunction
ith
he
marine
isheries),
r to
supplement
ormal
rrangements
y
dealing
with ssues hat
hey
ail o
cover
for
xample,
he
reatmentf
nu-
cleartechnologynderthe terms f thepartialnuclear est-ban
regime). hough t
may e
helpful,
ormalizations
clearly ot
nec-
essary ondition
or he
effective
perationf
international
egimes.
There re
nformal
egimeshathave
been
generally
uccessful,
nd
therere
formal
rrangementshat
ave
roduced
nimpressive
esults
(for
xample,
everal f the
ommodity
greements).
Regimesredirected
o
the
xtenthat
hey
xert
ressure
n
their
memberso
act
n
conformityith ome
lear-cutocial
oal.
Various
goalsarefeasible-includingconomicfficiency,hepreservationf
ecosystems,
istributive
ustice,nd
o
forth.venwhere
heres
agree-
ment
n
principle
bout
he
pursuit
f some
ocial
goal,
however,
t
may rove
ifficulto
meet nder
eal-worldonditions.
or
example,
the
goal
of
optimum
ieldwith
respect
o the
marine
isheriess
notoriouslyifficult
o
fulfill
n
reality.34
dditionally,hen
regime
is directed
oward
he chievement
f everal
oals
t
once,
lose tten-
tion
mustbe
paid
to the
determinationf
trade-offs
mong
hese
goals.35n the bsence f ystematicffortso constructrade-offunc-
tions,
ny pparentirectedness
f
regime
ncompassing
wo r
more
distinct
oals
willbe an illusion.
Coherence
eferso the
degree
o
which
he
elementsf an
inter-
national
egime
re
internally
onsistent.
evere
nternal
ontradic-
tions
re ommonn
real-world
egimes,
ven n
cases
where
hey ave
been
rticulatedn more
r ess
xplicit
constitutional
ontracts.
or
example,herere ftenontradictionsetweenserightsormarine e-
sourcesnd
rights
estedn
adjacent oastal tates
o
exclude
utsiders.
Similarly,
onflicts
ommonly
rise
etweenhe
lleged
equirements
f
indivisibletate
overeignty
nd
the
obligations
mposed
y
the
rules
of nternational
egimes.
t is
nothard
o
account or
hese
lements
of ncoherence
n
termsf
the
ompromises
ecessary
o
achieve
nitial
acceptance
f a
regime,
r
in
terms
f
the
piecemealvolution
f
regimes
ver ime
n
response
o
changing
olitical,
conomic,
nd
social orces. ut hewidespreadccurrencef ncoherenceeans hat
33United
Nations,
International
Compensation
for
Fluctuations
n
Commodity
Trade
(New
York:
United
Nations,96i).
34
P.
A.
Larkin,
An
Epitaph or
the
Concept
f
Maximum
ustained
ield,
Trans-
actions
of
the
American
Fisheries
Society,
Vol. io6
(January
977), I-II.
35
On
the
economic
pproach o
such
trade-offs,
ee
Richard
eckhauser nd
Elmer
Shaefer, Public
Policy
nd
Normative conomic
Theory,
n
Raymond
A.
Bauer
and
Kenneth
.Gergen,
ds.,
The
Study
f
Policy
ormation
New
York:
Free Press,
968),
27-101.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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344 WORLD
POLITICS
we must eware f relying
oo
heavily n
neat nalyticonstructs
n
interpreting
eal-world
ituations,
nd
thatwemust earn o cope
with
the
xistencef contradictions.
2.
Explicit rganization.ll regimes,venhighly ecentralizedri-
vate-enterprise
rrangements,
re ocial
nstitutions,
ut hey
eed
not
be accompanied
y explicitrganizational
rrangements
iththeir
own personnel,
udgets,
hysical acilities,
nd so forth.
ffective
regimes
acking
xplicit
rganizational
rrangements
recommon
o
primitive
ocieties,3
ut
heyre by
no means
onfined
o societies
of
this ype.
or
example,ree-enterprise
ystems aking
se ofcom-
petitive arketsreclassic ases f socialnstitutionserformingital
functions
n societyn
the absence
f explicit
rganization.
any
other
ocial nstitutions-such
s those
overning
anners,
ress,
nd
intergenerational
elations-serve
o structure
ehavior
ffectively
ith
little eedfor
xplicit
rganization.
lthough
t is undoubtedly
rue
that nternational
egimesharacteristically
nvolve
ewerxplicit
r-
ganizational
rrangements
handomestic
egimes,
t
s
important
ot
to carry
his
generalization
oo far.
The explicit rganizations
sso-
ciatedwith he nternationalonetaryegimerecertainlyot rivial,
and the
organizational
rrangements
ontemplated
n
conjunction
with
he
proposed
nternationaleabedAuthority
re quite
omplex.
Even
where needfor
xplicit
rganization
s
apparent,egimes
may
make
use
oforganizational
tructures
reated
or
ther urposes,
or
associated ith
more omprehensiveublic
uthority,
n
prefer-
ence o establishing
utonomous
rrangements
f
their
wn.
Such
it-
uationsre
ommont
thedomestic
evel:
egimes
egularlyurn
ver
tasks hat nvolvenformationathering,nspection,ispute ettle-
ment,
nd nforcementoagencies
pecializing
n
these
matters,o
that
they
illnot equireourt
ystems
rpolice orces
f
their wn.
At the
international
evel,
his ractice
ppearso be
far
ess ommon.
itua-
tions
n which
ubstantiveegimes
ould
benefit
rom
uch rrange-
ments ccur
frequently
nough. or
example,
rms-control
egimes
could
make se
ofmore eneralnspection
rocedures,
ndthe
CAO/
IATA
system
ould ely
n some
arger
uthorityo
enforce
tsrules.38
Butcomprehensiverganizationalapabilitiesre either acking r
severely
nderdeveloped
n the nternational
ommunity.hus,
the
UnitedNations
s
hardly apable
f inspecting
ctivities
arried
ut
36
Mair (fn.
4), Part .
37
See Haveman fn.
31), 21,
for
a descriptionf
marketsn precisely hese
erms.
38
See Richard
A. Falk and RichardBarnet, ds.,
Security n Disarmament (Prince-
ton: Princeton
niversityress,
965),
as
well
as Tauber fn.
5).
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:
CONCEPT FORMATION 345
under
he
regime
orAntarcticar
resolvingisputes ertaining
o
deep
eabed
mining.
n
the
nternational
ystem,herefore,
ndividual
regimes
renot
ightlyinked,
ven
hough hey
ftenack extensive
organizationalrrangementsn theirwnright.
Perhaps
hemost bvious
nd
compelling
eason
o endow
egimes
with
xplicitrganizationalrrangements
s to resolve
roblems
f n-
terpretationnd dispute
ettlement.39
utthere re
several ther asks
that
re
difficulto accomplish ithout
uch
organizations.
or in-
stance,
t
may e desirable
o
conduct
esearch
nd
to
monitorarious
activities
n
order o determine
hether
ights
nd
rulesneedto be
adjustedodealwith hangingonditions.uchproblems
re ommon
with espectothemanagementf fisheries,he tabilizationf com-
modityrade, nd thehandling f oil spills.Wheneverevenues ust
be collectednd
disposedf,
ome
rganizationalrrangements
illbe
required.or example, regime or eep eabedmining hat equires
leaseholders
o makeregular oyaltyayments
an
hardly
unction
withoutome
rganization
o handle heresultant
unds.
Moreover,
explicitrganizationalrrangements
ften ecome
mportant
n
deal-
ing
with
roblemsf ocial
hoice nd
compliance
hat reoutside
he
realm f disputeettlement.he exploitationf fish tocks urely n
thebasis fthe law ofcapture equires
o
explicitrganization,
ut
the
needfor rganizationrises
s
soon
as
regulationsimiting
ar-
vests,uotas,
r
entry
chemes
re ntroduced.
he
sameholds rue f
compliance.
ome
regimesfor xample,
he
partial
est-ban
egime)
are ble oresolveheir asic
roblems
f
compliance
ithout
reating
explicitrganizations.
utwith
he
ntroduction
f
systematic
urveil-
lanceor formalanctions,heestablishmentfexplicit rganizations
becomes
necessity.
The
emergencef explicit rganizationalrrangementsaises
range
f
lassic
uestions
hat re
ust s pressingtthe nternationals
at the
domestic
evel.
How
much utonomy,
is-a-vis
ther entersf
authority
n
the ocial ystem,hould he rganizationsossess?What
sorts
f
decision
ules nd
procedures
hould
e adoptedn conjunction
with
hese
rganizations?
ow much iscretion
hould heorganiza-
tions ave o make hangeshat ffecthe ubstantiveontentr the
procedural
haracterf
theregimetself? ow should heorganiza-
tions
e financed:
here
hould heir
evenuesomefrom,nd how
should
hey
e raised?
ow
should
he
rganizationse staffed? hat
39
This
is, for
example, he
classic
rgument
eveloped y
Locke and
similar on-
tractariansoncerning
heorigins f
government.ee
John ocke,
The
Second
Treatise
of
Government,
aragraphs23-131.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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346 WORLD POLITICS
sorts
f
physicalacilitieshould heorganizations
ave,
nd where
should hese
acilitiese located? he answers
o
all these
uestions
can affecthe mpacthat
nygiven egime
as
on
its
members.
t is
thereforeobe expectedhat hesessueswillbefoughtver igorously
-not only t the utset,ut lso during he
whole eriod verwhich
theregimes effective.o theextent hat
xplicit rganizationalr-
rangementsre ess mportantn nternational
egimeshan n domes-
ticones, his ort
f contentionill be less
pervasivet the nterna-
tional evel.Nevertheless,t s impossibleo
make ense utof recent
negotiationselating o internationalonetary
rrangements,eep
seabed
mining,r
the llocationf thebroadcastrequencypectrum
withoutaying arefulttentionothese uestionsf organizational
design.
3. Policy
nstruments.olicy nstrumentsreelementsf regimes
that re ubject odeliberater planned
manipulationn the nterests
of
chieving
ocial
oals.
uch
nstruments
an
operate
t different
ev-
els
of
generality.
hus, hanges
n
bundles
f
propertyights,
he
n-
troductionf
restrictiveegulations,
nd decisions
oncerning
ndivid-
ual applicationsor oansor miningicensesmayall be treated s
matters
nvolving
he
use of policynstruments,
ut
they bviously
address
roblemsccurring
t differentevels f
generality.olicy
n-
strumentsre
also apt to
be
articulated
n terms hat re
specific
o
individual
egimes
r
types
f
regimes. hus,
the
determination
f
allowable atches,s well as decisions
oncerning
he
opening
nd
closing
f harvest
reas,
re standard
ssuesnvolvingolicy
nstru-
ments n fisheries
egimes. djustments
f
exchange
ates r
the s-
suance f broadcasticensesrecommon olicynstrumentsnother
regimes.4
At the
nternational
evel, keydistinctiononcerns
heextent
o
which heuse
of
policy
nstruments
equires
he
xistencef
explicit
organizational
rrangements.
or
example,
t s
possible
o
redefinehe
contents
f
rights
nd
rules t occasional
ssembliesf
themembers
of
a
regime;
t
may
venbe
possible
o do so
by
means f unilateral
actionsn the
art f omemembersf
regimeo
which
thers
ubse-
quentlyonformna de
facto
asis. olicynstrumentsf his ortwill
have
an
obvious
ppeal
n
highly
ecentralizedocial
ystems.
his
40
See, for xample, rown fn. ),
and MichaelHardy, The
Implicationsf Alter-
native
Solutions or Regulating heExploitation f Seabed
Minerals, nternational
Organization,
xxi,
No.
2
(I977),
3I3-42.
41For further
iscussion,ee
GiandomenicoMajone, Choice among Policy nstru-
ments
or
Pollution ontrol, olicyAnalysis,
i
(Fall
i976),
589-6I3.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT
FORMATION
347
appealmay
ccount or he
urrent
endencyo respond o problems
relatingo nternationalaritimeegimes
yredrawingurisdictional
boundariesthat s, hiftingrom hedomain
f nternationalommon
propertyo thedomain fnational roperty)atherhan yagreeing
to specificules or heuseofcommon roperty
esourcest the
nter-
national evel.42
urisdictionalhanges
an be pursued nilaterally;
they o notgenerateequirementsor ew
nternationalrganizations.
The creation
fuse rules
or
ommon
roperty
esources,y
contrast,
is
apt
o
require
he
developmentfexplicit
rganizations,hough he
results
roduced
ay
e more
quitable
han
hose rising
rom hifts
in
urisdictional
oundaries.43
Nonetheless,olicynstrumentsuitableoruse by explicitrgani-
zations re
not
altogetheracking
n connection ith nternational
regimes.
he Internationalhaling ommission
as the
uthority
o
adjust nnual
harvest
uotas
for ndividual
pecies
f
great
whales.
The Internationalonetaryund
can
ay
down
pecific
onditions
n
grantingoans ocountries
xperiencing
urrencyroblems.he
Inter-
national offee greement
llows
or
he llocationf
export
hares
among
tsmembers.
ndthe
proposed
nternational
eabed
Authority
wouldbe ableto makeuse of a relativelyomplex ystemfpermits
and
licenses oregulate
he
production
f
manganese
odules rom
thedeep
seabed.
he
ability
f
these
rganizations
o reach
utono-
mousdecisionsbout
he
use of
such
nstruments
ay
be
severely
limited.
oreover,
ompliance
anbecome
major roblem
n theuse
of such
nstruments
for example, xport uotas
for
offee).4
ut
these acts o not uggest qualitative
istinction
etweenheuse of
policy nstrumentsn
international
egimes
nd their
se n domestic
regimes.45n short,houghheuse of thesenstrumentss limitedy
the
haracteristiceaknesses
f
explicitrganizations
ssociated ith
international
egimes,
he
nstrumentsre
by
no means
rrelevant
t
the nternationalevel.
42
Recent
hanges
n regimes or
marine
isheriesrising
rom
unilateral xtensions
of urisdiction
n the
partof coastal
tates
xemplifyhis
prospect.
n the case
of the
United States,
he
transition as
accomplished
hrough
he passage
of the
Fishery
Conservationnd
Management
ct of
1976 (PL
94-265).
43
For a case in point, onsult he analysis f the proposed nternationaleabed
Authority,
n
Young,
International
esource
egimes
fn.
4).
4Bart
S.
Fisher,
Enforcing
xportQuota
Commodity greements,
arvard
nter-
national aw
journal,
ii,
No. 3
(1971),
401-35.
45
It
is
not
necessaryo
subscribe
o
Marxian
recepts
o
realize
thatdomestic s well
as internationalegimes
may
be
heavily
nfluenced
y
actors
who
are,
in principle,
subject o
regulation
nder heterms
f these
egimes.
n fact,
his
s thecentral
nsight
of
the
capture
heory
f
regulation.
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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348
WORLD POLITICS
REGIME
DYNAMICS
Like other ocial nstitutions,
nternational
egimes
re
productsf
humannteractions
ndthe
onvergencef xpectations
mong roups
of nterestedctors. hey renotautonomousntities aiting obe
discovered
y
ctors
earching
or
nstitutional
rrangements
o
govern
their ctivities.orare heyike
natural
ights,ossessingomenorm-
ative tatusndependentfthe
valuations
f
the ffected
ctors.
It
is
significant
hat
egimes
rise
from he actions f groups f
actors.46
ometimes
ocial nstitutionsf
this
ype
mergendfunction
effectivelyithoutnydeliberateffortn thepart f ndividualar-
ticipants.hat sthe deaunderlyinghe invisible and onception
of markets,
n which
t
s
suggested
hat
roups
f ndividuals-each
vigorouslyursuing
is
own
self-interest-willnteract
n
such way
as
to produceocially
esirableutcomes
for
xample,conomic
ffi-
ciency).
ut nvisible-handechanisms
annot
enerally
e counted
on to
yield
ffectiventernational
egimes.
he conditions
ecessary
o
produce
uchoutcomes
re
highly pecialized
ven n
the
realm f
straightforwardconomic
ransactions.47n the
nternational
rena,
thepursuitf ndividualelf-interestommonlyeads o outcomeshat
are
socially
ndesirable
in
the ense
f beingPareto-inferior);
ven
conscious ffortso coordinate
he actions
f
individual
ctors
re-
quently
un
foul
f
evere
onflictsf nterest.48
Since
egimes
rehuman
rtifacts,
here illbe
no
physical
arriers
to their
reationnd
reform.
ut
change-especially
uided hange-
is
not
necessarilyasy
o
achieven
this
ealm.
ocial nstitutionsre-
quently rove
esistant
o
change,
venwhen
hey
enerateutcomes
that re widely egardeds undesirable.xistingnstitutionsrefa-
miliar
onstructs,
hile
new
arrangementsequire
ctors o learn
unfamiliarroceduresnd to accept initially) nknown utcomes.
Further,uided hange equires
ot
only
he
destructionf existing
institutions,ut lso he oordinationf xpectations
round
ome ew
focal
oint.
n view
f
the
prevalence
f
conflicts
f
nterest
egarding
problemsf nternationaloordination,
t
s fair
o
assume hat con-
vergence
f
expectations
round ew
nstitutional
rrangements
ill
often e slow ncoming.What smore,ocial nstitutionsrecomplex
entities,
hich
ypicallyncompass
number
f
informals well as
46
Compare his
view with the analysis f conventionsn David K.
Lewis, Conven-
tion:A Philosophicaltudy Cambridge:Harvard
Universityress,
969).
47
For
a more
ptimisticssessment
f
nvisible-hand echanismsee Robert
Nozick,
Anarchy,tate,
nd Utopia New York: Basic Books, 974), 18-25.
48
Thomas C.
Schelling, On the Ecology of
Micromotives, he Public Interest,
No. 25
(Fall
i'7i
), 6i-98.
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT
FORMATION
349
formal
lements.
onsequently,
eliberate
ffortso
adjust
a
regime
runtherisk f doingmoreharm
han
good; theymayproduce isrup-
tive consequences hat
were
neither oreseen or intendedby those
advocatinghe pecifichanges.Although otall initiativeslongthese
lines
are doomed
to
failure,
aive
hopes concerning
he
efficacy
f
social ngineeringn
this ealm bound
amongpolicy
makers
nd
stu-
dents
f
nternational
elations
like.49
i. Origins
f
regimes.t
is
helpful o differentiate
hree
hannels r
tracks
n the
emergence f internationalegimes.
here
is,
to
begin
with,
hecontractarianrack.
he
actors
nterested
n
some
ctivityor
their uthorized epresentatives) aymeetfor heexplicit urpose f
negotiating constitutional ontractayingout a regime o govern
the
activity
n
question.50
he
regime or
Antarctica hat
was
agreed
upon
in
i959 exemplifies
his
track;the
current fforto
work out
a
comprehensiventernationalegimefor the oceans constitutes
far
more
ambitious
ttempt
o
engage
n
regime
onstruction
n
a con-
tractarianasis.51
An alternative
pproach
an be described s the
evolutionary
rack:
social nstitutionsometimesrise ither romwidespread ractice ver
time r as
a
consequence f
dramatic nilateral ctions
hat re
subse-
quently ccepted y others n
a
de
facto
asis.
n
general, egimes ov-
erning
heuse
of
marine esources
ave
traditionallyriginated
n
this
fashion.More specifically,he
post-I945
egimefor
the
continental
shelves
xemplifies
his
pattern.52
In an intermediate
rocess f regime onstruction,
hich
mightbe
labeledthe
piecemeal rack,
ctors ometimes each
greement n one
ormorecomponentsf a regimewithout nteringntoa comprehen-
sive
social
contract
egarding
he
activity
n
question.
A
common
us-
tificationor
this
approach
ests
n
the
(dubious) argument hatthe
introduction
f
one or
several
egime omponents
ill nitiate
process
of
task
expansion
r
spillover
hatwill lead
over
time
to
the
emer-
49
This
point f view may eem
conservativein the
Burkean ense),but surely t is
more than that.
There are similarthemes n
many
of
the anarchist
riticisms f
Marxianor
authoritarian
ocialism, s
well as in many contemporary
xpressionsf
libertarianism.kepticismbout the efficacyf socialengineering,herefore,s not a
good
indicator f ideological rientation.
50
On the
concept
f
a constitutional
ontract,ee JamesM.
Buchanan, he Limits
of Liberty
(Chicago:
University
f
ChicagoPress, 975),
esp. chap. 4.
51
Howard Taubenfeld,
A
TreatyforAntarctica,
nternational
Conciliation,
No.
531 (i96i),
and Edward Miles, The Structure
nd
Effects f
the Decision
Process n
the
Seabed Committeend the Third United
NationsConferencen the
Law of
the
Sea,
nternational
Organization, xxxi,
No.
2
(1977),
159-234.
52
Note
that t was formalized r
codified
n
the
1958
Geneva Convention
n
the
OuterContinental
helf.
or
relevant ackground,
ee
Jessupfn.
9).
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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350 WORLD POLITICS
genceof a more omprehensivend coherent
egime.53rominent x-
amplesofthispiecemeal rack t the
nternationalevel ncludemany
of the regionalfisheries egimes for
example,
CNAF or
INPFC),
as well as the nstitutionalrrangementselating o marinepollution.
There can be no
doubt hat he
evolutionaryrackwill be followed
moreoften hanthe
contractarian
rack
n highly ecentralizedocial
systemsike
the
nternationalystem.
hese
systemsack authoritative
procedures ordealingwithregimes;
t is often ifficultven to deter-
mine
the
pertinent
et of actors
o deal with the
development
f
a
regime.At the same time, roup ize undoubtedlymakes a difference
within
he class of
highly ecentralizedystems.
t is
possible o iden-
tify ases in whichsmall groupsof actorshave been able to reach
contractarian
argains
ven n
highly
decentralized
ystems, ut such
bargains
re
extremely
ifficulto reach n
systems
hat
re
both
highly
decentralized
nd
large
with
respect
o number f members. o illus-
trate,
he
2 original ignatorieso theAntarctica reaty
f
959
were
able
to
reach
agreement
n a
relatively omprehensiveegime
for
Antarctica,ut n
the
UnitedNations Conference
n the Law of the
Sea
(UNCLOS)
the
combination f
decentralization
nd
large
num-
bers
has led to fundamental ifficultiesn
working
ut a
meaningful
''constitutional
ontract
overing
he
oceans.
Does it make a
difference hether
he institutional
rrangements
governing given activity merge along
one or anotherof
these
tracks?
Contractarianrocesses
ffer he
distinctdvantage
f
produc-
ing explicit rrangements
hat re
incorporated
nto documents
such
as treaties r
conventions)
which become
part
of
the
public
record
availablefor consultation. ut the articulationn a constitutional
contract
s
not
always
n
unmixed
lessing,
ven when t
is
politically
feasible
o
persuade
he
ctors o
accept
t.
Agreements
f
this ypemay
be
explicit,
ut
they
re
frequently
ouched
n
ambiguous anguage
de-
signed
o obscure
rreconcilableonflicts
f
nterestmong
the
actors.54
Moreover,
ctors
frequently
ndicate
superficial cquiescence
n ar-
rangements
o which
theydo not ntend o abide n practice.
n
such
cases,
the
promulgation
f a
constitutional
ontract
urporting
o
spellout a regime or omeactivity ill notonly generate onfusion;
it
is
also
apt
to breeddisillusionment
nd
cynicism mong
the mem-
bers
of the relevant
ocial
system.
espite
their bvious nitialdraw-
53
Leon
Lindberg nd Stuart
Scheingold, ds., Regional ntegration:
heory nd
Practice
(Cambridge:
HarvardUniversityress,
971).
54
On the resulting roblems f treaty
nterpretationn international
aw, see Myres
S. McDougal,Harold D.
Lasswell, nd James .
Miller,The Interpretation
f
Agree-
ments
and
World
Order
(New
Haven: Yale UniversityPress,
i967).
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:
CONCEPT FORMATION
351
backs,
nternationalegimes merging
rom volutionary
rocesses
may
yield
esultshat
re
preferable
o those
rising
rom
contrac-
tarian
pproach
one
our.
In thepiecemealpproach,he riticalssue oncernshe ikelihood
that he
ntroduction
f one or several egime omponents
ill ac-
tually enerate
ubstantialaskexpansion
r
spillover.
lthough
theapproach
eems
o
offer
pportunities
ordeliberate
r
planned
development
f
nternational
egimes
here ontractarian
rocedures
are
politically
nfeasible,55
ctual
xperience
s not
eassuring.
ith e-
spect
o regional
conomic
nd
political
ntegration,
here he
notion
has
been
nvestigated
ost horoughly,
he
available
vidence ffers
no assurancehat he ogic ffunctionalismanbe countedn to yield
significant
esults.56hat
s
more,
he
piecemeal
rackmay ead
to
severe
roblems
f incoherence
hen ittle
pillover
ccurs:
t
may
leave trail
f half-formed
egimes
ith
ittle
f
anything
o recom-
mend
hem.
2.
Regime
ransformation.
nternational
egimes
o not become
static
onstructsven fter
hey refully eveloped.
hey
undergo
continuousransformationnresponseo shiftsn their olitical,co-
nomic,nd ocial
nvironments.
ignificantlterations
ay
ccurwith
respecto
the ontentf regime's
ights
ndrules,
he
haracter
f
ts
social
hoice
mechanisms,
r
thenature f ts
ompliance
echanisms.
It would
be
arbitrary
oidentify
ome
ritical oint
f transition
t
which uch
lterations
ield qualitative
hange
n
the ense f one
regime
isappearing
nd
anotherne taking
ts
place.
Rather, y
ob-
jective
n
thisdiscussion
s to identify
he
processes
hrough
hich
internationalegimeshange,nd tocommentninstitutionalroce-
dures or
andling
hese hanges.
It s
possible
o
differentiate
everalypes
fpressure
or
ransforma-
tion
n
internationalegimes.
n some ases,
here re fundamental
changes
n thenature
fthe elevantctivity.
orexample,
hiftsrom
light
o
heavy sage
have
generated
ajor
problems
ortraditional
regimes
n
themarine
isheries;nd the advent f
communications
satellitesas raised ignificantroblemsffectinghepre-existing
regime
or nternationalroadcasting.57
n other ases, ressures
or
change
rise rom
he
dissatisfaction
f some ctor
r class
of actors
55
The classic
arly xpressionf thisreasoning
ppears n David
Mitrany,
Work-
ing Peace System London: Royal nstitutef nternationalffairs,
943).
56
Leon Lindberg
nd StuartScheingold, urope's
Would-BePolity (Englewood
Cliffs, .J.:Prentice-Hall,970).
57
See
Brown
fn. ).
8/18/2019 YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation
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352
WORLD POLITICS
with hedistributive
onsequences
f a
prevailing
egime.
he unilat-
eral mposition
n recent ears
f200-mile isheryurisdictions
n
the
part f numerous
oastal
tates onstitutesdramaticllustration
f
this ype fregime hange. thirdype fpressureormajor ltera-
tionss a
desire o
ntroduce
systematic
r coherent
egime
o
replace
a
chaotic
r inchoate
egime.
hebasic dea here s to
streamline
r
rationalize
regimehat
asgrown mbiguous
r contradictory
n
the
course
fevolution.58
his
objective
s
undoubtedly
neofthemotivat-
ing
forces ehind
urrent
ffortso work ut a
new
constitutional
contract
or he ceans.
Regimes
requently
nticipateressuresor hange hrough
he
r-
ticulationf ransformationules. hese re nstitutionalrrangements
specifying
ow
pressures
or hange re
o
be treated,
hat
teps
must
be
taken
o
bring
bout lterations
n a
regime,
ndwhat ecision ule
is
to be
employed
s a
standard
or
determining
hen
proposed
changes
re to be
accepted.
ransformationules
may
varygreatly
with
espect
o
their
tringency
the
xtento
which
hey
make
t
easy
ordifficultoget lterations
ccepted),nd
heres no reason oassume
that hosewishingochange regime illalwaysbidebythe erms
of
suchrules.
Nevertheless,
he
existencef a
set of transformation
rules-even f
they
re not
always
ollowedn
practice-is
ikely
o
structure
ffortsoalter egimes. egardless
f
the
precise
ontentf
the ules,hey illnotbe
neutraln theirmpact
n the nte
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