YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation

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1/27

Trustees of Princeton University

International Regimes: Problems of Concept FormationAuthor(s): Oran R. YoungSource: World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 331-356Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010108 .

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2/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

Problems

f

Concept

Formation

By ORAN R. YOUNG*

E

live n a world of international

egimes.

ome of them

deal

with

monetary

ssues

(for example,

he

BrettonWoods

sys-

tem); others overn nternational

rade n

commoditiesfor example,

the coffee

greement).

ome

regimes

erve

o

manage

the use

of

nat-

ural

resources

t

the

nternationalevel

for

example,

he nternational

arrangements

or

whaling) or to advance

he

ause

of

conservationfor

example, he agreement n polar bears). Still otherregimes ddress

problems ertaining o the control f armaments t the nternational

level

for example,

he

partial

est-ban

ystem)

r to the

management

of

power

within he

nternational

ommunityfor

example,

he neu-

tralization

greement

or

Switzerland).And

there re

some

interna-

tional

regimes

hat

encompass

everal ssues

within

well-defined

eo-

graphical

areas

(for example,

the

Spitzbergen

greement

nd

the

arrangement

or

Antarctica).

Internationalegimes ary reatlynterms f functionalcope, real

domain,

nd

membership.unctionally,hey ange

from he

narrow

purview

f

the

polar

bear

agreement

o the

broad concerns f the

treaties

n

Antarctica

nd outer

space.

The

area covered

may

be as

smallas

the

highly

estricted

omain f the

regime

orfur

eals

n

the

NorthPacific

r as

far-flung

s that

of

the

global

regimes

or

nter-

national ir

transportthe ICAO/IATA system)

r for he

control f

nuclear esting.

similar

iversity

ccurswith

respect omembership:

therange unsfrom wo orthreemembersas in theregime orhigh-

seas

fishing

stablished nder

he

nternational

orth

Pacific isheries

Convention)

o well

over

hundred

members

as

in

the

partial uclear

test-ban

ystem).

What

s

most

triking,owever,

s the

sheer

number

of

international

egimes.

ar from

being unusual,

hey

re

common

throughout

he nternational

ystem.

It

is

therefore

urprising

hat

cholars ave

not focusedmore

nten-

sivelyn internationalegimes,ndthatmuch f theexistingiterature

on

the

subject

s

weak, particularly

n

analytic

erms.

uring

the

ast

several

years,

here

has

been

a

noticeable

psurge

f

interest

n

the

*

This paperwas prepared

or

the

annual

meeting

f

the

nternational

tudiesAsso-

ciation,oronto,

arch

979.

?

i980

by

The Trusteesf

Princeton

niversity

World olitics

043-887I/8o/03033I-26$oI.30/I

For

opyingnformation,

eecontributor

age.


3/27

332 WORLD POLITICS

study

f

nternationalegimes.' e

now

havefairly

xtensive

escrip-

tiveaccounts f some pecific egimes2nd some speculativedeas

about

henomena

uch s

regime hange.3

utthefundamentalhar-

acter f internationalegimes emains lusive. onsideringhe per-

vasivenessnd

importance

f

regimes

t the nternational

evel,

he

underdeveloped

tate f

the

existing

iteraturen them onstitutes

serious

eficiency.n this ssay, hen, propose o take omeprelimi-

nary teps oward illinghis apbydrawingn the tudiesfresource

regimes

havebeen

onductingver

number f

years,

nd

making

useof some ormulationsam currentlyevelopingt greaterength

elsewhere.4

THE CORE CONCEPT

Regimes

re

social

nstitutions

overning

he

ctions f those nter-

estedn

specifiable

ctivities

or meaningfulets f ctivities).s such,

they re ecognizedatternsfpracticeround hich xpectationson-

verge.

t follows

hat

egimes

re

ocial

tructures.

t

is

importantot

to

mistakehem

or

functions,hough

he

operation

f

regimes

re-

quentlyontributesothefulfillmentf certainunctions.ikeother

structures,egimes ay

e more

r ess

formallyrticulated,

nd

they

1

See, amongothers, ichardN. Cooper, Prolegomena o the Choice of an

Inter-

nationalMonetary ystem, nternational

Organization, xxix,

No. I

(I975),

63-97;

ErnstB. Haas, On Systemsnd International

egimes, World olitics,

xvii

January

I975);

I47-74;

JohnGerardRuggie nd

ErnstB. Haas,

eds.,

International

Responses to

Technology,

special ssueof nternational

Organization, xxix, No. 3 (1975); Robert .

Keohane nd Joseph .

Nye,

ower and Interdependence Boston:Little, rown,

977);

Oran R. Young, Resource Management

at

the

International

Level:

The

Case

of the

NorthPacific London and

New

York:

Pinter

nd Nichols,

977);

Seyom

Brown nd

others,Regimes for the Ocean, OuterSpace, and Weather Washington: The Brookings

Institution,

977);

and EdwardL. Morse, Global nd Other nternationalommons

n

the

980S

(mimeo.,

Council on

ForeignRelations,

976).

In

addition,

nternational

lawyers ave talked bout nternational

egimes or ome time.To illustrate,ee

L.F.E.

Goldie,

The

Management

f Ocean Resources:

egimes

or

Structuring

he

Maritime

Environment,nCyril .

Black

and Richard

A.

Falk, eds.,

The Future

f

the

nterna-

tional Legal Order, IV: The Structure

of the

International

Environment

Princeton:

Princeton

niversityress,

972), I55-247.

2

For a

range

of

examples,

ee

WilliamM.

Ross,

Oil Pollution as an

International

Problem:

A

Study of Puget

Sound

and

the

Strait

of Georgia (Seattle: University

of

Washington ress,973); M. M. Sibthorp,d.,

The North Sea: Challenge

and Oppor-

tunityLondon: Europa,

975);

Kenneth am, Oil ResourcesChicago:Universityf

Chicago Press,

976);

and

Arild

Underdal,

The Politics

of

Internationalisheries

Management:

he

Case

of the

Northeast

tlantic

unpub.,

978).

3

For

example,

eohane and

Nye (fn.

),

Part

I.

4

See

Young,

Internationalesource egimes,

n

Clifford

. Russell, d., Collective

Decision

Making:

Applicationsfrom

Public Choice

Theory (Baltimore:

The

Johns

Hop-

kinsUniversityress,979), 24I-82,

and

Young,

Resource

egimes:

Natural

Resources

and

Institutionalesign,

n

progress.


4/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES: CONCEPT

FORMATION

333

may

or

may

notbe

accompaniedy explicit

rganizational

rrange-

ments.

Internationalegimes ertain

o activitiesf

nterestomembersf

the nternationalystem.ypically,hese ctivitiesakeplace ntirely

outside

he

urisdictional

oundariesf

sovereigntatesfor xample,

deep eabed

mining), r cut

crossnternationalurisdictional

ound-

aries for

example, igh-seas

ishing), r involve ctions

aving

direct

mpact n the

nterests

ftwo r moremembersf the

nterna-

tional ommunityfor

xample, ajor

djustmentsn exchangeates).

In

formalerms,hemembers

f nternational

egimesre lways ov-

ereign tates,hough

he

parties

arryingut

the ctions overnedy

internationalegimesre often rivatentitiesfor xample, ishing

companies,anks,rprivate

irlines).

mplementing

he

ermsf nter-

national egimeshereforenvolves

two-step

rocedure,featurehat

is not

haracteristic

f

regimes

t the

domestic

evel.5

The

mere

xistence

f a

regime

ill end n element

f

orderliness

tothe

ctivity

t

governs.

ut

heres no reason

o

assume hat

egimes

will

guide

human ctions

oward

well-defined

ubstantive

oals

uch

as

enduringeace,

conomic

fficiency,

r

maximum

ustained

ields

from enewableesources.heconceptregime ontainsointrinsic

metaphysical

r

teleological

rientation,hough

ctorsnvolved

n

the

creationr

reformf

anygiven

egime

illoften

ttempt

o

shape

ts

contents

ith learcut

oals

n

mind.6

t

is,however,ossible

o enu-

merateeveral

omponents

hat

verynternational

egime

ill

possess.

i. The

substantive

omponent.

he core

of

every

nternational

e-

gime

s a

collection

f

rights

nd rules.

heymay

be

more r less

extensiverformallyrticulated,ut ome uch nstitutionalrrange-

ments

ill tructure

he

pportunities

f

he

ctors

nterested

n

a

given

activity,

nd their xact

ontent illbe a

matterf

ntense

nteresto

these

ctors.

A

right

s

anything

o which n actor

individual

r

otherwise)

s

entitled

y

virtue f

occupying

recognized

ole.

The

role

of

human

being,

or

xample,

s often aid o

carry

ith t

a

right

o ife. n

the

system

f

theUnited

tates,

he ole fcitizen arries ith t the

ight

5Among

other hings,t will

often rove

necessaryo relyon

domestic ourts

o

enforceherights

nd

rules ncorporatedn international

egimes. ee

RichardA. Falk,

The Role of Domestic

Courts

n the

International

egal

Order

(Syracuse,

.Y.: Syracuse

Universityress,

964).

6

Actors

will

virtually

ever

perate

ehind

Rawlsian veil of

ignorance

n

real-

world ituations.

ee John

awls,

A

Theoryof Justice Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

971), chap.

II.


5/27

334 WORLD POLITICS

to

vote

n

elections,

he

right o speak

freely, nd the right o move

about

at will.

We

arenow witnessing igorous ampaigns

o clarify

and,

n

somecases, o redefine he rights

f women, hildren,

ospital

patients,nmatesn prisons, nd animals.Many roles arrywiththem

bundles

f

rights

hat

may

be moreor less

extensive

nd

whoseprecise

contents

subject

o changeovertime.7 f course,

he

possession

f a

right

n

no

way

guarantees hat an

actorwill actually eceive hose

things o which

he

is entitled nder

he terms f the right.

Although

rights

re often espected,ven acknowledged ights re

violated

with

considerable

requency

n real-world

ocialcontexts.

Severaldifferentiableategories f

rights re prominentn interna-

tionalregimes. roperty ightsmay take theform f private roperty

rights for

example, ights o

commodities raded nternationally)r

commonproperty

ights for example, ights

o

airspace

r high-seas

fisheries).8

Because of the

prevalence

f common propertyrrange-

ments

t

the nternational

evel,

nternationalegimes

ften mphasize

the

development

f use-and-enjoyment

ights. hese may be

exclusive

in nature

for

example,

he

right

o exploit given

tract

n

the

deep

seabed),

or

they

may

be

explicitly

ormulated

n non-exclusiveerms

(for example, heright o use certain nternationaltraits).9 ut all

such

rights

re

designed

o

ensure he

availability

f

key

resources

o

actors nder onditions

n

which

private

wnership

s infeasible.nter-

national egimesmay

also

encompass

n

assortment

f other

ypes f

rights,ncluding

he

right oprotectiongainst

ertain orms f

aggres-

sion, he right o

receive

pecified

enefits rom

nternational

ransac-

tions

or

productive perations,

he

right o

tradeon favorable

erms

withothermembersf the nternationalommunity,nd theright o

participate

n

making

ollective ecisions nder

the terms f

a

given

regime.

In contrasto

rights,

ules

re well-defined

uides

o action r

stand-

ards

setting

orth ctions that

members f

some

specified ubject

group re expected

o

performor

to refrain rom

erforming)

nder

appropriate

ircumstances.'0

ny given

rule will exhibit he

following

7On

the notion f bundles f rights,ee CharlesA. Reich, The New Property,

Yale

Law

Journal,

Vol.

73

(April 964), 733-87.

8

Consult,

mong

thers,

irik

Furubotn

nd Svetozar

ejovich,

Property

ights

nd

Economic

Theory:

A

Survey

f Recent

Literature,

ournal

of

Economic

Literature,

x, No. 4

(1972), I137-62.

9

The result

might

be described

s a

system

f

restricted ommon

property:

ee

J.

H. Dales,

Pollution,

roperty,

nd

Prices

Toronto:

University

f

Toronto

Press,

I968), 6i-65.

10My

use of the

concept

rules

differsomewhat romthat

prevalent

n

recent

contributionso

jurisprudence.

ompare

H.L.A.

Hart,

The

Concept f

Law

(Oxford:


6/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

CONCEPT FORMATION

335

features:

a)

an

indicationf the

relevant

ubject

roup, b) a

be-

havioral

rescription,nd

(c) a specification

f

the ircumstances

n-

derwhich herule

s

operative.n

some

ocieties,or

nstance,

here

arenear-universalules njoiningndividualsotell he ruth nd to

keeppromises

n their

ealings

with

thermembers

f

the

society.

A

rule may be

directed

oward ome

clearly

esignated

roup,

s

in

the

case

of

ethicalprescriptions

elating

o thebehavior f

teachers,

doctors,

r

lawyers.

r

a rule

may

focus n

some

specific

ctivity,

s

in the case

of

prescriptions

ertaining

o civil aviation

or

maritime

commerce. f

course, he

existence f an

acknowledged

ule does

not

guarantee hat he

members f the

subject roup

will always

comply

with tsrequirements.ven in well-orderedocieties, on-compliance

withrules s a

common

ccurrence.

Among the numerous

ules

associatedwith

nternationalegimes,

three

general

categories re

particularly

rominent.

irst,thereare

use

rules.For

example,

members f the

ICAO/IATA

system

re re-

quired to follow

certain

afety ules n

using

nternational

irspace;

those

ngaged

n

high

seasfishing hould

bide

by

rules

pertaining

o

the

conservation

f

fish

tocks;

nd those

using

nternationalea

lanes

are subjectto rulesdesignedto maximizesafety nd to minimize

marine

pollution.

requently,uch use

rules

take the

form f

limita-

tions n the

exercise f

rights.

ust

s

rights

ommonly

afeguard

he

freedom f

actors o behave

n

certainways,rulesoften

pell

out re-

strictionsn the

freedom

f

actors

o do as

they

wish.1

iability

ules

constitute

second

category.

hey spell out

the

locus

and extent f

liability

n

casesof

(usuallyunintended)

njury

o others

rising

rom

theactions f individualparties nderthe terms f a regime.They

range rom ules

oncerning

ompensationor

xpropriationf

foreign

investments

ndervarious

ircumstances

o rules

pertaining

o

respon-

sibility

or

cleaningup

maritime

nvironments

n

the

wake of

acci-

dents.12

inally, nternational

egimes

ften

pecify variety

f

proce-

dural

rules,

which

deal with

he

handling

f

disputes

r the

operation

of

explicit

rganizations ssociatedwith

the

regimes.

At the

domestic

evel,

ollections f rights nd

rulesare

commonly

supplementedy extensiveets of regulationsnd incentiveystems.

Oxford

UniversityPress,

i96i),

and

Ronald

Dworkin,

Taking

Rights

Seriously

(Cam-

bridge:

Harvard

University

ress,

977),

esp.chaps.

and 3.

1

See G.

H. von

Wright,

orm and

Actions

New

York:

Humanities

ress, 963).

12

On liability

ules

and their

ignificance,

ompareR. H.

Coase,

The

Problem

f

Social

Cost, Journal of Law and

Economics,

iii

(October

960),

I-44,

and

Guido

Calabresi nd A.

Douglas

Melamed,

Property

ules,

Liability

ules,

nd

Inalienabil-

ity:One View

of

the

Cathedral,

arvard

aw

Review, ol.

85

(April 972),

I089-II28.


7/27

336

WORLD

POLITICS

Regulations

re

dministrative

irectives

manating

rom

ublic

gen-

cies

nd pecifying

onditionsnder

which ertainctorsre

ooperate

on a

day-to-dayasis.

Theyare

widely

sed to

translate

ights

nd

rules ormulatedngeneralermsntoworkingmanagerialrrange-

ments

pplicable o real-worldituations.13ncentive

ystems,

n the

other

and, re

penaltiesnd rewards

mployed

y public

gencies

for he

urpose

f lteringhe

behaviorf dentifiablectors

n

desired

directions.14

erhaps he

lassic ases f ncentive

ystems

re

axes nd

subsidies.

Obviously,egulations

nd ncentive

ystemsill

be

used ess xten-

sively

n

conjunction ith

nternationalegimes hanwith

regimes

operatingt thenational rsubnationalevel. heyrequirehe xist-

ence of

some

public

gency

ossessing measure f

authority

nd

power; uch

genciesrefar

ess haracteristicf

highly

ecentralized

social

ystemsikethe

nternational

ystem

han f

the

more entral-

ized

systemshat re ommon

t the

national

evel.

Nevertheless,

nter-

national

egimes

ccompanied y

explicit

rganizations

an and

sometimes

o

employ

hese evices. or

example,

he

nternational

Monetary

und has

promulgated

xtensive

egulationsertaining

o

thedrawingightsf ndividual embers,nd theproposednterna-

tional

eabed

Authority

ould e

able

to regulate

roduction

fman-

ganese

nodules o implement

ore

general

ules

concerning

uch

matterss the

mpact f

deep

seabed

mining n

the

world

nickel

market. 5

2.

The

procedural

omponent. lthough

ollectionsf

rights nd

rules orm he

ubstantiveore

f nternational

egimes,

hey re not

the nly omponentsf uch egimes. proceduralomponentncom-

passes

ecognizedrrangements

or

esolving

ituations

equiringocial

or

collective

hoices. ituations

f this

ype risewhenever

t s neces-

sary

r

desirableo

aggregate

he

non-identical)

referencesf two

or

more

ndividualctors

nto

group

hoice.'6 uch

problemsccur

in

most ocial

ystems;hey

ange

rom

he

electionf

ndividualso

13

J

use the concept

regulation

n a somewhat

ifferentense

than t is used in

discussionsoncerningublicregulation f privatendustries.or a clear example f

this

lternativesage,

ee George tigler, he

Citizen nd

theState:Essays n

Regula-

tion

Chicago: niversityf

Chicago ress,975).

14Incentive

ystemsan

also

be used to

raise

or

disburse evenue.

rdinarily,

ow-

ever,

heir

rimary urpose

s to structure

hebehavior

f certain

roups f actors.

15

See, for

example,Robert .

Aliber,

The

International oney

Game

(New

York:

Basic

Books, 976).

16

For

a general

nalysis

f social

hoice, ee A.

K.

Sen,

Collective hoice nd

Social

Welfare

San Francisco:

reeman,

g7o).


8/27

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION 337

filltop positions

o

establishing

he terms f tradefor

exchange

ela-

tionshipsnd deciding n

thedistribution

f valued

goods

and

services.

Several ypes f problems equiring

ocialchoices

an

be

expected

o

arisewithin the framework f an operativenternationalegime.17

Some

of

these

will involve he allocation

f factors f

productionfor

example, eep seabedmining racts,

otal

llowable atches

n the fish-

eries, nd segments f

the

global

radio

spectrum).

uch

problems

will

be

especially

ifficult

o solve t the

nternationaleveldue to the

preva-

lence

of

common

rather han

privateproperty.

ther social choice

problems ill relate o ssueswith xplicit istributivemplicationsfor

example, ecisions elating o adjustments

n

exchange

ates

r

royal-

ties n connectionwithdeep seabed mining).Collective hoiceswill

also be required n settling isputes. ypically,

hesewill arise

from

effortso apply generalrights nd rules to

the

complexities

f

real-

world ituations. or does this xhaust

he

range

of

problems

f social

choice

that

an be

expected

o

emerge ontinually

nder

the

terms f

internationalegimes. hus,

therewill be cases n which

group

deci-

sions

re

necessary

o

determinehe orts f

research ctivitieso

permit

in

an area

ike

Antarctica,

o resolve onflictsetween

ifferentses of

the ame

resource,nd

to

organize

ollective anctions

imedat obtain-

ing compliance

with the

rights

nd

rules

of an

international

egime.

Social choicemechanisms re institutionalrrangementspecialized

to

the

resolution f problems

f

socialchoice risingwithin

he

frame-

work

of

particular egimes.

ike other

omponents

f

regimes,

hese

mechanisms

may

be more or less

formalized, nd it is typical or a

regime o

make use of

several t

the

same time.The range of these

mechanismss wide, encompassinguchdevices s the law of cap-

ture, markets,

oting systems, argaining, dministrativeecision

making, djudication,

nilateral

ction

backed

by coercion, nd organ-

ized violence.18ertain onditions

re required orthe effectiveper-

ation

of

each of these

mechanisms;

we

may thereforessume that

individualmechanismswill be associated

primarilywith particular

types f social systems. he most triking eatures f the nternational

system

n

this

connection

re its

relatively mall number f formal

members nd itshigh level of decentralization ithrespect o the

distributionf

power

nd

authority.

ocial choice

mechanisms

harac-

teristic

f

systems

f this

type

re the law of

capture, argaining,

17

Problems f social choicepertainingo the selection nd reform f international

regimes er se are discussedn a later ection f this ssay.

18

The classic tudy focusing n voting ystems) s

KennethArrow, ocial Choice

and

ndividual

Values

2d

ed.; New

York:

Wiley,

963).


9/27

338

WORLD

POLITICS

various orms f

coercion, nd,

to

a lesser egree,

markets.

We

should

thereforexpect

mportant roblems f social

choice arising

n inter-

national egimes

o be handledthrough hese

procedures.19till,

pro-

cedures nvolving oting nd administrativeecisionmakingwill not

be

altogetherbsent n

internationalegimes.

Voting,

or

example,

s

of some

significancen

cases like

the InternationalMonetary

und

and the

CAO/IATA

system. utthere an be no doubt

hatunilateral

claims, argaining,nd coercion

re central o the

processes

f reach-

ing

socialchoiceswithin

most nternational

egimes.

It

is also worth oting hat ome

regimes o not

possess ocialchoice

mechanisms f their wn. They

may relyupon

the institutionalr-

rangements f larger ocial structuresn dealingwith problems f

socialchoice, r theymay share

mechanisms ithother egimes.

uch

situations re common n

cases

where adjudication r voting s em-

ployed

n

reaching

ollective

hoices.

For

example,

he

same

courts

may resolve

onflictsf interest

ertaining o civil liberties, usiness

activities,nd land

use. n

principle,

he

nternational

ourtof

Justice

or the General

Assembly f

the United Nations could

be

employed

to deal withmany

ocial choice

problems rising nder pecificnter-

nationalregimes. n practice, owever, ariouscombinations f bar-

gaining

nd

coercion eared o the

problems

f

specific

egimes

onsti-

tute he norm t the

nternationalevel.

3.

Implementation.moothly unctioning

nternationalegimes re

difficulto achieve.20

ights

re not

always

respected,

nd even

widely

acknowledged ules

re

violatedwith ome

frequency.

or

is it

reason-

able

to

assume

hat herelevant ctorswill

simply

ccept

he

outcomes

generated y socialchoicemechanisms s authoritative,nd abideby

them.

Accordingly,

t is

important

o

think bout the effectivenessf

international

egimes,21nd this

uggestsn

examination f

compliance

mechanismss

a thirdmajor

component

f these

egimes.

Any

discussion

f

compliance

must

deal

with he

ssueof

ncentives.

What

are the

benefits

nd

costs f

complying

ith

rights

nd

rules,

n

contrast o

violating

hem?How

do individual ctors ecide whether

to

comply

with the substantive

rovisions

f

international

egimes?

There s a tendencyo assume hatthetypical ctorwill violate uch

19

Young, Anarchy nd Social Choice: Reflectionsn the International olity,

World Politics,

xxx

(January

978),

24I-63.

20

That is, reality eldom approximateshe condition f perfect ompliance is-

cussed n

Rawls

fn. 6), 35L.

21

For a similar bservation

bout

domestic roblems,ee A. Myrick reeman, En-

vironmental anagement s a Regulatory rocess, iscussion aper D-4, Resources

for

the

Future,

January

977.


10/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

CONCEPT

FORMATION

339

provisions

o long

as the

probability f

being

caught n specific

n-

stances s

low-a lineof

reasoningwhich mplies

hatthe availability

of

effectivenforcementrocedures

s

essential o the

achievement

f

compliance. ut this rgumentppears o be quitewideof themark

in

many

real-world ituations.t

is not difficult

o identify

ircum-

stances

n which

onsiderations

f

self-interestill ead

to compliance,

especially

n

conjunction

with

long-run erspectives

n iterative

e-

havior.Further,

here

s

no

reason to assume

that

ndividual ctors

make large numbers

f

discrete enefit/cost

alculations

elating

o

compliance

with the

provisions

f international

egimes.

Actorswill

often evelopgeneral

ules

or

policies

n

this

realm,

nd

it seemsrea-

sonableto expectthat ong-termocialization s well as feelings f

obligation

will

play

an important

ole

in

the articulation

f these

rules.22

A

compliance

mechanisms

any

nstitutionr

setof nstitutions

ub-

licly

uthorized o

pursue

ompliance

with

the

substantive

rovisions

of

a

regime,

r with

theoutcomes

enerated

y

ts social

choice

mech-

anisms.

The

image

that omes

to mind

here s one of formal

overn-

mental

gencies,

nd

such

agencies

re

no

doubt

heclassic

nstitutions

specializingn the achievementf compliance.But less formal om-

pliance

mechanisms

re

common,

nd

highly

ecentralized

ocial

sys-

tems,

uch as

the international

ystem,

ypically ely

upon

them.23

The

result s

apt

to be

a

heavy

emphasis

n self-interest

alculations

coupled

with

publicly

ecognized

rocedures

or

elf-help

n

the

redress

of

wrongs.24

lternatively,

he outcome

may

involve

reliance n

ar-

rangements

n which

xplicit

gencies

re

employed

o

gather

nforma-

tionand to inspect heactions f individual ctors, ut decentralized

procedures

re

retained

orthe

application

f sanctions

for

example,

the

CAO/IATA

system

nd

many

f the

regional

isheries

egimes).25

From

the

point

fview

of

themembers f a

regime,

he

development

of

compliance

mechanisms

oses

n investment

roblem.

ny

expendi-

ture

f

resources

n such

mechanisms ill

generate

pportunity

osts,

and

declining

marginal

eturns

rom

uch investments ill

virtually

always

become

pronounced

efore

erfect

ompliance

s reached.

Ac-

22

For an

intriguing

mpirical

xample,

ee

Abram Chayes,

An Enquiry

nto

the

Workings

f Arms Control Agreements,

arvard LIw

Review,

Vol.

85,

No.

5

(975),

905-69.

23

Young,

Compliance

nd

Public Authority,

Theory

with

nternational

pplica-

tions Baltimore:

he Johns

opkins

University

ress,979),

esp.

chaps.

and

5.

24

For

empirical

xamples,

eeLucy

Mair,

Primitive overnmentBloomington,

nd.:

Indiana

University

ress,

977), esp.

chap.

.

25 Ronald

S. Tauber,

The Enforcement

f IATA

Agreements,

arvard

nterna-

tional

aw

journal,

,

No.

I

(i969),

I-33.


11/27

340

WORLD

POLITICS

cordingly,

t s safe oassume

hat hemembersf

regime

ill

rarely

attempt

o

develop ompliance

echanisms

apable

f

eliminating

io-

lations

ltogether.xactly

here

quilibrium

illoccur

with

espect

o

thesenvestmentecisionsependsn the ssumptionsade bout he

membersf nternational

egimes.

n viewof thedecentralization

f

responsibility

hat

oes

with

hedecentralizationf

power nd author-

ityn the nternationalystem,

owever,t seems afe o conclude hat

underinvestmentn

compliance

echanisms

ill

be

characteristic

f

internationalegimes.26till, ariousypes f compliance echanisms

do occur t the nternationalevel,27

nd suchmechanisms ust e

accepteds a

third

major omponentf nternationalegimes.

Several larifyingbservationsre n ordern closing his ection.

It is possible o argue hat ome

egimemust lways e present ith

respecto anygiven ctivity:egimes

an vary reatly

n

extent,nd

extreme

ases an imply e treateds

nullregimes.hus, he rrange-

ment or

high-seasishingrior o

WorldWar

I

might e described

as a

regime

ased n

unrestricted

ommon

ropertynd

the

procedure

known s the law of

capture,

atherhan s a situation

acking ny

operativeegime.28

ut

his ine f

reasoning

eads o serious

roblems.

Sometimesctivitiesre nitiatede novon the bsence fprior xpe-

rience

for xample,nternationalatelliteroadcasting

r

deep

eabed

mining).

n

such

ases,

we would

have

o

develop ome ictionsbout

latent r

tacit

egimes

o

avoid

he

onclusionhat

here

re ituations

in

which

no

regime

s

present.urther,xistingegimes

ometimes

break

own,eaving confusednd nchoateituation ith especto

some

ctivityfor xample,he

currentituationegardingheterri-

torial

ea).29

Here too, he oncept ouldhave o be stretchedxces-

sivelyo ssert

he

ontinuedxistencef regime. dditionally,void-

ing

he

emptation

o

assume hepresence

f

some

egime

n

conjunc-

tionwith

verypecifiablectivityill

facilitateater iscussionsfthe

origins

f

regimesnd ofregime ransformation.

26

Internationalegimes,

ike

other social

institutions, ill

ordinarily xhibit

he

attributesf

collective

oods (that s,

non-excludability

nd jointness f

supply)

to a

high

degree. or

furtheriscussion

f the

problems f

supplying

ollective oods, ee

Mancur

Olson,

Jr.,

he Logic of

Collective

Action

(Cambridge:

Harvard University

Press,

i965).

27

For

a variety

f examples, ee

William

T. Burke,Richard

egatski,

nd William

W.

Woodhead,National

and

International

Law

Enforcement

n

the Ocean

(Seattle:

Universityf

Washington ress,

975).

28Francis

T.

Christynd

Anthony cott, he Common

Wealth

in

Ocean

Fisheries

(Baltimore:

he

Johns opkins

University

ress,

965).

29 For

the

background f earlier

ffortso

reach agreement

n a

regimefor the

territorial

ea, consult

hilip C.

Jessup, The United

Nations

Conference

n

the Law

of the

Sea, in Essays on

International Law

from

the

Columbia Law Review

(New

York:

Columbia

University

ress,965), I -23I.


12/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

CONCEPT FORMATION

341

In

analyzing

nternationalegimes,here

s a

tendencyofocus n

highly oherentnd

internally

onsistentonstructs.

et,

real-world

regimesre typically

nsystematic

nd ambiguous,

ncorporatingle-

ments erivedrom everalnalyticonstructs.hisdivergencee-

tween

he deal

ypesrticulated

y

tudents

fregimesnd the

more

inchoate

egimes

n

operation

n

real-worldituationss

partly

ttribut-

able

o

misunderstandingsy hosewho

make

ecisionsbout egimes.

Much

f

t,

however,rises

rom

wo ther

actors.he

developmentf

an

international

egime

suallynvolves

ntense

argainingnd the

hammering

ut of critical

ompromises

mong he nterested

ctors.

A

dramaticurrent

llustration

f thisphenomenon

s the

ongoing

bargainingelatingo theproposednternationaleabedAuthority.

Furthermore,nternational

egimes

enerallyvolve

nd

change ver

time n

response

o

various conomic

nd political

ressures.

his s

true

ven

f

regimes

nitiallyormulated

omprehensively

n

some ort

of

constitutionalontract. ith

he

passage f

time, egimes

en-

erally cquire

dditional

eatures

nd

become

ess

onsistent

nternally.

The

point

f

these emarks

s

neither

o

criticize

xistingegimes

or

to

argue

hat he

xaminationf deal

ypes

s

unimportant

n

conjunc-

tionwith hedevelopmentf nternationalegimes. uta failure o

bear

n mind he

distinctionetween

deal

types

nd

reality

s

bound

to

eadto

confusion.30

Finally,

here

s

a

difference

etweenhe

onditions

equired

or he

effective

peration

f an

international

egime

nd

the

consequences

resulting

rom

ts

peration.

o illustrate,

onsider

regime overning

internationalrade

n

some

ommodity

ased n

privateroperty

ights

anda competitivearket.heconditionsecessaryoensure ffective

operation

f

such

a

regime

nclude

he

availability

f

information

about

otential

rades,

willingness

o

accept

he

erms f

trade ic-

tated

y

he

market,

nd an absence f

natural

monopolies.31

he

con-

sequences

f

the

operation

f

the

regime,

ycontrast,

elate

o the

extent

o

which

t

yields

conomically

fficient

utcomes;

he

degree

o

which t

produces

ocial

osts

r

neighborhood

ffects;

he

ttractive-

ness

f

the

results

n distributive

erms;

nd so forth.

oth

he

ondi-

tions or perationndthe onsequencesfoperationre entralssues

in the

nalysis

f

nternational

egimes.

ut t s

important

o

differ-

entiate

learly

etween

hem,

s

well s tobear n

mind hat

oth

hese

300n the relationshipetween

deal

types nd reality, ith pecialreferenceo

the

theory f games, ee AnatolRapoport,

wo-Person Game Theory

(Ann

Arbor:

Univer-

sity f Michigan ress,

966),

i86-2I4.

31

For a succinct nd clearlywritten iscussion f such conditions,ee RobertHave-

man,

The Economics of the Public Sector

(New York: Wiley,

976),

22-27.


13/27

342 WORLD POLITICS

issues re eparable

rom

ffortsocharacterizehe nstitutionalontent

of

n nternational

egime.

REGIMES IN OPERATION

Having xamined

he

nalyticontentf

the

onceptregime,

ith

special eferenceothe nternationalystem,etmeturn osome fthe

major eaturesfregimess they ccur n real-worldituations.

I.

Varieties f regimes. ariety ith especto extent,ormality,i-

rection,ndcoherences a prominenteaturef nternationalegimes.

Sometimeshese ifferencesreattributableo underlyinghilosophi-

cal orientations.orexample,egimesestingn socialistremises ill

encompass ore xtensiveollectionsfrules s wellas more xplicit

efforts

o

direct

ehavioroward he chievementfgoals han

aissez-

faire egimes

hat

mphasize ecentralizedecisionmaking nd au-

tonomyor ndividualctors.n other ases, ariationsrise rom

he

characterf specific argains truckn the processesf setting p

regimes,

r

from he particularatterns f institutionalvolution

over ime.

The

extentfa

regime

s

a

matterfthenumbernd

restrictiveness

of ts

rightsnd

rules. t

one

extremes the aseofunlimitedaissez-

faire,

n which he

ctorsre ompletelyree o do as they leasewith-

out

ven he

onstraints

f

a

system

f

property

r use

rights.32

t the

other xtremere

rrangementsmphasizing

entral

lanning

nd de-

tailedrulesgoverninghe actions f individualmembers. etween

these xtremesie

variousmixed

ases hat redifferentiable

n

terms

ofthe xtento whichheynclude ightsndrules estrictinghe u-

tonomy

f

the

ctors.nternational

egimes

end o

be

lessrestrictive

than

omestic

nes,

ut

hey

o not

generallypproximate

he

xtreme

ofunlimited

aissez-faire.

Internationalegimes ary reatly

n

the

extent o which hey re

laid out

n

formal

greements,onventions,

r

treaties.

or

example,

thecurrent

egime orAntarcticas formalized

o a

greater egree

than heneutralization

rrangements

or witzerland.s

in

domestic

settings, oreover,t s commonornformalnderstandingso arise

within heframeworkstablished

y

theformaltructuref an inter-

nationalegime.

uch

nderstandingsay

erve ithero

provide

nter-

pretations

f

mbiguousspects

f he ormal

rrangementsfor

xam-

32

A

regime

or ome natural esource

with no

private ropertyights,

o

liability

rules,

nd

allocation ased on the

principle

nown as the

law

of

capture might

approximatehis

extreme ase.


14/27

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

CONCEPT

FORMATION

343

ple,

the

notion f

maximum

ustained

ield

n

conjunction

ith

he

marine

isheries),

r to

supplement

ormal

rrangements

y

dealing

with ssues hat

hey

ail o

cover

for

xample,

he

reatmentf

nu-

cleartechnologynderthe terms f thepartialnuclear est-ban

regime). hough t

may e

helpful,

ormalizations

clearly ot

nec-

essary ondition

or he

effective

perationf

international

egimes.

There re

nformal

egimeshathave

been

generally

uccessful,

nd

therere

formal

rrangementshat

ave

roduced

nimpressive

esults

(for

xample,

everal f the

ommodity

greements).

Regimesredirected

o

the

xtenthat

hey

xert

ressure

n

their

memberso

act

n

conformityith ome

lear-cutocial

oal.

Various

goalsarefeasible-includingconomicfficiency,hepreservationf

ecosystems,

istributive

ustice,nd

o

forth.venwhere

heres

agree-

ment

n

principle

bout

he

pursuit

f some

ocial

goal,

however,

t

may rove

ifficulto

meet nder

eal-worldonditions.

or

example,

the

goal

of

optimum

ieldwith

respect

o the

marine

isheriess

notoriouslyifficult

o

fulfill

n

reality.34

dditionally,hen

regime

is directed

oward

he chievement

f everal

oals

t

once,

lose tten-

tion

mustbe

paid

to the

determinationf

trade-offs

mong

hese

goals.35n the bsence f ystematicffortso constructrade-offunc-

tions,

ny pparentirectedness

f

regime

ncompassing

wo r

more

distinct

oals

willbe an illusion.

Coherence

eferso the

degree

o

which

he

elementsf an

inter-

national

egime

re

internally

onsistent.

evere

nternal

ontradic-

tions

re ommonn

real-world

egimes,

ven n

cases

where

hey ave

been

rticulatedn more

r ess

xplicit

constitutional

ontracts.

or

example,herere ftenontradictionsetweenserightsormarine e-

sourcesnd

rights

estedn

adjacent oastal tates

o

exclude

utsiders.

Similarly,

onflicts

ommonly

rise

etweenhe

lleged

equirements

f

indivisibletate

overeignty

nd

the

obligations

mposed

y

the

rules

of nternational

egimes.

t is

nothard

o

account or

hese

lements

of ncoherence

n

termsf

the

ompromises

ecessary

o

achieve

nitial

acceptance

f a

regime,

r

in

terms

f

the

piecemealvolution

f

regimes

ver ime

n

response

o

changing

olitical,

conomic,

nd

social orces. ut hewidespreadccurrencef ncoherenceeans hat

33United

Nations,

International

Compensation

for

Fluctuations

n

Commodity

Trade

(New

York:

United

Nations,96i).

34

P.

A.

Larkin,

An

Epitaph or

the

Concept

f

Maximum

ustained

ield,

Trans-

actions

of

the

American

Fisheries

Society,

Vol. io6

(January

977), I-II.

35

On

the

economic

pproach o

such

trade-offs,

ee

Richard

eckhauser nd

Elmer

Shaefer, Public

Policy

nd

Normative conomic

Theory,

n

Raymond

A.

Bauer

and

Kenneth

.Gergen,

ds.,

The

Study

f

Policy

ormation

New

York:

Free Press,

968),

27-101.


15/27

344 WORLD

POLITICS

we must eware f relying

oo

heavily n

neat nalyticonstructs

n

interpreting

eal-world

ituations,

nd

thatwemust earn o cope

with

the

xistencef contradictions.

2.

Explicit rganization.ll regimes,venhighly ecentralizedri-

vate-enterprise

rrangements,

re ocial

nstitutions,

ut hey

eed

not

be accompanied

y explicitrganizational

rrangements

iththeir

own personnel,

udgets,

hysical acilities,

nd so forth.

ffective

regimes

acking

xplicit

rganizational

rrangements

recommon

o

primitive

ocieties,3

ut

heyre by

no means

onfined

o societies

of

this ype.

or

example,ree-enterprise

ystems aking

se ofcom-

petitive arketsreclassic ases f socialnstitutionserformingital

functions

n societyn

the absence

f explicit

rganization.

any

other

ocial nstitutions-such

s those

overning

anners,

ress,

nd

intergenerational

elations-serve

o structure

ehavior

ffectively

ith

little eedfor

xplicit

rganization.

lthough

t is undoubtedly

rue

that nternational

egimesharacteristically

nvolve

ewerxplicit

r-

ganizational

rrangements

handomestic

egimes,

t

s

important

ot

to carry

his

generalization

oo far.

The explicit rganizations

sso-

ciatedwith he nternationalonetaryegimerecertainlyot rivial,

and the

organizational

rrangements

ontemplated

n

conjunction

with

he

proposed

nternationaleabedAuthority

re quite

omplex.

Even

where needfor

xplicit

rganization

s

apparent,egimes

may

make

use

oforganizational

tructures

reated

or

ther urposes,

or

associated ith

more omprehensiveublic

uthority,

n

prefer-

ence o establishing

utonomous

rrangements

f

their

wn.

Such

it-

uationsre

ommont

thedomestic

evel:

egimes

egularlyurn

ver

tasks hat nvolvenformationathering,nspection,ispute ettle-

ment,

nd nforcementoagencies

pecializing

n

these

matters,o

that

they

illnot equireourt

ystems

rpolice orces

f

their wn.

At the

international

evel,

his ractice

ppearso be

far

ess ommon.

itua-

tions

n which

ubstantiveegimes

ould

benefit

rom

uch rrange-

ments ccur

frequently

nough. or

example,

rms-control

egimes

could

make se

ofmore eneralnspection

rocedures,

ndthe

CAO/

IATA

system

ould ely

n some

arger

uthorityo

enforce

tsrules.38

Butcomprehensiverganizationalapabilitiesre either acking r

severely

nderdeveloped

n the nternational

ommunity.hus,

the

UnitedNations

s

hardly apable

f inspecting

ctivities

arried

ut

36

Mair (fn.

4), Part .

37

See Haveman fn.

31), 21,

for

a descriptionf

marketsn precisely hese

erms.

38

See Richard

A. Falk and RichardBarnet, ds.,

Security n Disarmament (Prince-

ton: Princeton

niversityress,

965),

as

well

as Tauber fn.

5).


16/27

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:

CONCEPT FORMATION 345

under

he

regime

orAntarcticar

resolvingisputes ertaining

o

deep

eabed

mining.

n

the

nternational

ystem,herefore,

ndividual

regimes

renot

ightlyinked,

ven

hough hey

ftenack extensive

organizationalrrangementsn theirwnright.

Perhaps

hemost bvious

nd

compelling

eason

o endow

egimes

with

xplicitrganizationalrrangements

s to resolve

roblems

f n-

terpretationnd dispute

ettlement.39

utthere re

several ther asks

that

re

difficulto accomplish ithout

uch

organizations.

or in-

stance,

t

may e desirable

o

conduct

esearch

nd

to

monitorarious

activities

n

order o determine

hether

ights

nd

rulesneedto be

adjustedodealwith hangingonditions.uchproblems

re ommon

with espectothemanagementf fisheries,he tabilizationf com-

modityrade, nd thehandling f oil spills.Wheneverevenues ust

be collectednd

disposedf,

ome

rganizationalrrangements

illbe

required.or example, regime or eep eabedmining hat equires

leaseholders

o makeregular oyaltyayments

an

hardly

unction

withoutome

rganization

o handle heresultant

unds.

Moreover,

explicitrganizationalrrangements

ften ecome

mportant

n

deal-

ing

with

roblemsf ocial

hoice nd

compliance

hat reoutside

he

realm f disputeettlement.he exploitationf fish tocks urely n

thebasis fthe law ofcapture equires

o

explicitrganization,

ut

the

needfor rganizationrises

s

soon

as

regulationsimiting

ar-

vests,uotas,

r

entry

chemes

re ntroduced.

he

sameholds rue f

compliance.

ome

regimesfor xample,

he

partial

est-ban

egime)

are ble oresolveheir asic

roblems

f

compliance

ithout

reating

explicitrganizations.

utwith

he

ntroduction

f

systematic

urveil-

lanceor formalanctions,heestablishmentfexplicit rganizations

becomes

necessity.

The

emergencef explicit rganizationalrrangementsaises

range

f

lassic

uestions

hat re

ust s pressingtthe nternationals

at the

domestic

evel.

How

much utonomy,

is-a-vis

ther entersf

authority

n

the ocial ystem,hould he rganizationsossess?What

sorts

f

decision

ules nd

procedures

hould

e adoptedn conjunction

with

hese

rganizations?

ow much iscretion

hould heorganiza-

tions ave o make hangeshat ffecthe ubstantiveontentr the

procedural

haracterf

theregimetself? ow should heorganiza-

tions

e financed:

here

hould heir

evenuesomefrom,nd how

should

hey

e raised?

ow

should

he

rganizationse staffed? hat

39

This

is, for

example, he

classic

rgument

eveloped y

Locke and

similar on-

tractariansoncerning

heorigins f

government.ee

John ocke,

The

Second

Treatise

of

Government,

aragraphs23-131.


17/27

346 WORLD POLITICS

sorts

f

physicalacilitieshould heorganizations

ave,

nd where

should hese

acilitiese located? he answers

o

all these

uestions

can affecthe mpacthat

nygiven egime

as

on

its

members.

t is

thereforeobe expectedhat hesessueswillbefoughtver igorously

-not only t the utset,ut lso during he

whole eriod verwhich

theregimes effective.o theextent hat

xplicit rganizationalr-

rangementsre ess mportantn nternational

egimeshan n domes-

ticones, his ort

f contentionill be less

pervasivet the nterna-

tional evel.Nevertheless,t s impossibleo

make ense utof recent

negotiationselating o internationalonetary

rrangements,eep

seabed

mining,r

the llocationf thebroadcastrequencypectrum

withoutaying arefulttentionothese uestionsf organizational

design.

3. Policy

nstruments.olicy nstrumentsreelementsf regimes

that re ubject odeliberater planned

manipulationn the nterests

of

chieving

ocial

oals.

uch

nstruments

an

operate

t different

ev-

els

of

generality.

hus, hanges

n

bundles

f

propertyights,

he

n-

troductionf

restrictiveegulations,

nd decisions

oncerning

ndivid-

ual applicationsor oansor miningicensesmayall be treated s

matters

nvolving

he

use of policynstruments,

ut

they bviously

address

roblemsccurring

t differentevels f

generality.olicy

n-

strumentsre

also apt to

be

articulated

n terms hat re

specific

o

individual

egimes

r

types

f

regimes. hus,

the

determination

f

allowable atches,s well as decisions

oncerning

he

opening

nd

closing

f harvest

reas,

re standard

ssuesnvolvingolicy

nstru-

ments n fisheries

egimes. djustments

f

exchange

ates r

the s-

suance f broadcasticensesrecommon olicynstrumentsnother

regimes.4

At the

nternational

evel, keydistinctiononcerns

heextent

o

which heuse

of

policy

nstruments

equires

he

xistencef

explicit

organizational

rrangements.

or

example,

t s

possible

o

redefinehe

contents

f

rights

nd

rules t occasional

ssembliesf

themembers

of

a

regime;

t

may

venbe

possible

o do so

by

means f unilateral

actionsn the

art f omemembersf

regimeo

which

thers

ubse-

quentlyonformna de

facto

asis. olicynstrumentsf his ortwill

have

an

obvious

ppeal

n

highly

ecentralizedocial

ystems.

his

40

See, for xample, rown fn. ),

and MichaelHardy, The

Implicationsf Alter-

native

Solutions or Regulating heExploitation f Seabed

Minerals, nternational

Organization,

xxi,

No.

2

(I977),

3I3-42.

41For further

iscussion,ee

GiandomenicoMajone, Choice among Policy nstru-

ments

or

Pollution ontrol, olicyAnalysis,

i

(Fall

i976),

589-6I3.


18/27

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT

FORMATION

347

appealmay

ccount or he

urrent

endencyo respond o problems

relatingo nternationalaritimeegimes

yredrawingurisdictional

boundariesthat s, hiftingrom hedomain

f nternationalommon

propertyo thedomain fnational roperty)atherhan yagreeing

to specificules or heuseofcommon roperty

esourcest the

nter-

national evel.42

urisdictionalhanges

an be pursued nilaterally;

they o notgenerateequirementsor ew

nternationalrganizations.

The creation

fuse rules

or

ommon

roperty

esources,y

contrast,

is

apt

o

require

he

developmentfexplicit

rganizations,hough he

results

roduced

ay

e more

quitable

han

hose rising

rom hifts

in

urisdictional

oundaries.43

Nonetheless,olicynstrumentsuitableoruse by explicitrgani-

zations re

not

altogetheracking

n connection ith nternational

regimes.

he Internationalhaling ommission

as the

uthority

o

adjust nnual

harvest

uotas

for ndividual

pecies

f

great

whales.

The Internationalonetaryund

can

ay

down

pecific

onditions

n

grantingoans ocountries

xperiencing

urrencyroblems.he

Inter-

national offee greement

llows

or

he llocationf

export

hares

among

tsmembers.

ndthe

proposed

nternational

eabed

Authority

wouldbe ableto makeuse of a relativelyomplex ystemfpermits

and

licenses oregulate

he

production

f

manganese

odules rom

thedeep

seabed.

he

ability

f

these

rganizations

o reach

utono-

mousdecisionsbout

he

use of

such

nstruments

ay

be

severely

limited.

oreover,

ompliance

anbecome

major roblem

n theuse

of such

nstruments

for example, xport uotas

for

offee).4

ut

these acts o not uggest qualitative

istinction

etweenheuse of

policy nstrumentsn

international

egimes

nd their

se n domestic

regimes.45n short,houghheuse of thesenstrumentss limitedy

the

haracteristiceaknesses

f

explicitrganizations

ssociated ith

international

egimes,

he

nstrumentsre

by

no means

rrelevant

t

the nternationalevel.

42

Recent

hanges

n regimes or

marine

isheriesrising

rom

unilateral xtensions

of urisdiction

n the

partof coastal

tates

xemplifyhis

prospect.

n the case

of the

United States,

he

transition as

accomplished

hrough

he passage

of the

Fishery

Conservationnd

Management

ct of

1976 (PL

94-265).

43

For a case in point, onsult he analysis f the proposed nternationaleabed

Authority,

n

Young,

International

esource

egimes

fn.

4).

4Bart

S.

Fisher,

Enforcing

xportQuota

Commodity greements,

arvard

nter-

national aw

journal,

ii,

No. 3

(1971),

401-35.

45

It

is

not

necessaryo

subscribe

o

Marxian

recepts

o

realize

thatdomestic s well

as internationalegimes

may

be

heavily

nfluenced

y

actors

who

are,

in principle,

subject o

regulation

nder heterms

f these

egimes.

n fact,

his

s thecentral

nsight

of

the

capture

heory

f

regulation.


19/27

348

WORLD POLITICS

REGIME

DYNAMICS

Like other ocial nstitutions,

nternational

egimes

re

productsf

humannteractions

ndthe

onvergencef xpectations

mong roups

of nterestedctors. hey renotautonomousntities aiting obe

discovered

y

ctors

earching

or

nstitutional

rrangements

o

govern

their ctivities.orare heyike

natural

ights,ossessingomenorm-

ative tatusndependentfthe

valuations

f

the ffected

ctors.

It

is

significant

hat

egimes

rise

from he actions f groups f

actors.46

ometimes

ocial nstitutionsf

this

ype

mergendfunction

effectivelyithoutnydeliberateffortn thepart f ndividualar-

ticipants.hat sthe deaunderlyinghe invisible and onception

of markets,

n which

t

s

suggested

hat

roups

f ndividuals-each

vigorouslyursuing

is

own

self-interest-willnteract

n

such way

as

to produceocially

esirableutcomes

for

xample,conomic

ffi-

ciency).

ut nvisible-handechanisms

annot

enerally

e counted

on to

yield

ffectiventernational

egimes.

he conditions

ecessary

o

produce

uchoutcomes

re

highly pecialized

ven n

the

realm f

straightforwardconomic

ransactions.47n the

nternational

rena,

thepursuitf ndividualelf-interestommonlyeads o outcomeshat

are

socially

ndesirable

in

the ense

f beingPareto-inferior);

ven

conscious ffortso coordinate

he actions

f

individual

ctors

re-

quently

un

foul

f

evere

onflictsf nterest.48

Since

egimes

rehuman

rtifacts,

here illbe

no

physical

arriers

to their

reationnd

reform.

ut

change-especially

uided hange-

is

not

necessarilyasy

o

achieven

this

ealm.

ocial nstitutionsre-

quently rove

esistant

o

change,

venwhen

hey

enerateutcomes

that re widely egardeds undesirable.xistingnstitutionsrefa-

miliar

onstructs,

hile

new

arrangementsequire

ctors o learn

unfamiliarroceduresnd to accept initially) nknown utcomes.

Further,uided hange equires

ot

only

he

destructionf existing

institutions,ut lso he oordinationf xpectations

round

ome ew

focal

oint.

n view

f

the

prevalence

f

conflicts

f

nterest

egarding

problemsf nternationaloordination,

t

s fair

o

assume hat con-

vergence

f

expectations

round ew

nstitutional

rrangements

ill

often e slow ncoming.What smore,ocial nstitutionsrecomplex

entities,

hich

ypicallyncompass

number

f

informals well as

46

Compare his

view with the analysis f conventionsn David K.

Lewis, Conven-

tion:A Philosophicaltudy Cambridge:Harvard

Universityress,

969).

47

For

a more

ptimisticssessment

f

nvisible-hand echanismsee Robert

Nozick,

Anarchy,tate,

nd Utopia New York: Basic Books, 974), 18-25.

48

Thomas C.

Schelling, On the Ecology of

Micromotives, he Public Interest,

No. 25

(Fall

i'7i

), 6i-98.


20/27

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT

FORMATION

349

formal

lements.

onsequently,

eliberate

ffortso

adjust

a

regime

runtherisk f doingmoreharm

han

good; theymayproduce isrup-

tive consequences hat

were

neither oreseen or intendedby those

advocatinghe pecifichanges.Although otall initiativeslongthese

lines

are doomed

to

failure,

aive

hopes concerning

he

efficacy

f

social ngineeringn

this ealm bound

amongpolicy

makers

nd

stu-

dents

f

nternational

elations

like.49

i. Origins

f

regimes.t

is

helpful o differentiate

hree

hannels r

tracks

n the

emergence f internationalegimes.

here

is,

to

begin

with,

hecontractarianrack.

he

actors

nterested

n

some

ctivityor

their uthorized epresentatives) aymeetfor heexplicit urpose f

negotiating constitutional ontractayingout a regime o govern

the

activity

n

question.50

he

regime or

Antarctica hat

was

agreed

upon

in

i959 exemplifies

his

track;the

current fforto

work out

a

comprehensiventernationalegimefor the oceans constitutes

far

more

ambitious

ttempt

o

engage

n

regime

onstruction

n

a con-

tractarianasis.51

An alternative

pproach

an be described s the

evolutionary

rack:

social nstitutionsometimesrise ither romwidespread ractice ver

time r as

a

consequence f

dramatic nilateral ctions

hat re

subse-

quently ccepted y others n

a

de

facto

asis.

n

general, egimes ov-

erning

heuse

of

marine esources

ave

traditionallyriginated

n

this

fashion.More specifically,he

post-I945

egimefor

the

continental

shelves

xemplifies

his

pattern.52

In an intermediate

rocess f regime onstruction,

hich

mightbe

labeledthe

piecemeal rack,

ctors ometimes each

greement n one

ormorecomponentsf a regimewithout nteringntoa comprehen-

sive

social

contract

egarding

he

activity

n

question.

A

common

us-

tificationor

this

approach

ests

n

the

(dubious) argument hatthe

introduction

f

one or

several

egime omponents

ill nitiate

process

of

task

expansion

r

spillover

hatwill lead

over

time

to

the

emer-

49

This

point f view may eem

conservativein the

Burkean ense),but surely t is

more than that.

There are similarthemes n

many

of

the anarchist

riticisms f

Marxianor

authoritarian

ocialism, s

well as in many contemporary

xpressionsf

libertarianism.kepticismbout the efficacyf socialengineering,herefore,s not a

good

indicator f ideological rientation.

50

On the

concept

f

a constitutional

ontract,ee JamesM.

Buchanan, he Limits

of Liberty

(Chicago:

University

f

ChicagoPress, 975),

esp. chap. 4.

51

Howard Taubenfeld,

A

TreatyforAntarctica,

nternational

Conciliation,

No.

531 (i96i),

and Edward Miles, The Structure

nd

Effects f

the Decision

Process n

the

Seabed Committeend the Third United

NationsConferencen the

Law of

the

Sea,

nternational

Organization, xxxi,

No.

2

(1977),

159-234.

52

Note

that t was formalized r

codified

n

the

1958

Geneva Convention

n

the

OuterContinental

helf.

or

relevant ackground,

ee

Jessupfn.

9).


21/27

350 WORLD POLITICS

genceof a more omprehensivend coherent

egime.53rominent x-

amplesofthispiecemeal rack t the

nternationalevel ncludemany

of the regionalfisheries egimes for

example,

CNAF or

INPFC),

as well as the nstitutionalrrangementselating o marinepollution.

There can be no

doubt hat he

evolutionaryrackwill be followed

moreoften hanthe

contractarian

rack

n highly ecentralizedocial

systemsike

the

nternationalystem.

hese

systemsack authoritative

procedures ordealingwithregimes;

t is often ifficultven to deter-

mine

the

pertinent

et of actors

o deal with the

development

f

a

regime.At the same time, roup ize undoubtedlymakes a difference

within

he class of

highly ecentralizedystems.

t is

possible o iden-

tify ases in whichsmall groupsof actorshave been able to reach

contractarian

argains

ven n

highly

decentralized

ystems, ut such

bargains

re

extremely

ifficulto reach n

systems

hat

re

both

highly

decentralized

nd

large

with

respect

o number f members. o illus-

trate,

he

2 original ignatorieso theAntarctica reaty

f

959

were

able

to

reach

agreement

n a

relatively omprehensiveegime

for

Antarctica,ut n

the

UnitedNations Conference

n the Law of the

Sea

(UNCLOS)

the

combination f

decentralization

nd

large

num-

bers

has led to fundamental ifficultiesn

working

ut a

meaningful

''constitutional

ontract

overing

he

oceans.

Does it make a

difference hether

he institutional

rrangements

governing given activity merge along

one or anotherof

these

tracks?

Contractarianrocesses

ffer he

distinctdvantage

f

produc-

ing explicit rrangements

hat re

incorporated

nto documents

such

as treaties r

conventions)

which become

part

of

the

public

record

availablefor consultation. ut the articulationn a constitutional

contract

s

not

always

n

unmixed

lessing,

ven when t

is

politically

feasible

o

persuade

he

ctors o

accept

t.

Agreements

f

this ypemay

be

explicit,

ut

they

re

frequently

ouched

n

ambiguous anguage

de-

signed

o obscure

rreconcilableonflicts

f

nterestmong

the

actors.54

Moreover,

ctors

frequently

ndicate

superficial cquiescence

n ar-

rangements

o which

theydo not ntend o abide n practice.

n

such

cases,

the

promulgation

f a

constitutional

ontract

urporting

o

spellout a regime or omeactivity ill notonly generate onfusion;

it

is

also

apt

to breeddisillusionment

nd

cynicism mong

the mem-

bers

of the relevant

ocial

system.

espite

their bvious nitialdraw-

53

Leon

Lindberg nd Stuart

Scheingold, ds., Regional ntegration:

heory nd

Practice

(Cambridge:

HarvardUniversityress,

971).

54

On the resulting roblems f treaty

nterpretationn international

aw, see Myres

S. McDougal,Harold D.

Lasswell, nd James .

Miller,The Interpretation

f

Agree-

ments

and

World

Order

(New

Haven: Yale UniversityPress,

i967).


22/27

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:

CONCEPT FORMATION

351

backs,

nternationalegimes merging

rom volutionary

rocesses

may

yield

esultshat

re

preferable

o those

rising

rom

contrac-

tarian

pproach

one

our.

In thepiecemealpproach,he riticalssue oncernshe ikelihood

that he

ntroduction

f one or several egime omponents

ill ac-

tually enerate

ubstantialaskexpansion

r

spillover.

lthough

theapproach

eems

o

offer

pportunities

ordeliberate

r

planned

development

f

nternational

egimes

here ontractarian

rocedures

are

politically

nfeasible,55

ctual

xperience

s not

eassuring.

ith e-

spect

o regional

conomic

nd

political

ntegration,

here he

notion

has

been

nvestigated

ost horoughly,

he

available

vidence ffers

no assurancehat he ogic ffunctionalismanbe countedn to yield

significant

esults.56hat

s

more,

he

piecemeal

rackmay ead

to

severe

roblems

f incoherence

hen ittle

pillover

ccurs:

t

may

leave trail

f half-formed

egimes

ith

ittle

f

anything

o recom-

mend

hem.

2.

Regime

ransformation.

nternational

egimes

o not become

static

onstructsven fter

hey refully eveloped.

hey

undergo

continuousransformationnresponseo shiftsn their olitical,co-

nomic,nd ocial

nvironments.

ignificantlterations

ay

ccurwith

respecto

the ontentf regime's

ights

ndrules,

he

haracter

f

ts

social

hoice

mechanisms,

r

thenature f ts

ompliance

echanisms.

It would

be

arbitrary

oidentify

ome

ritical oint

f transition

t

which uch

lterations

ield qualitative

hange

n

the ense f one

regime

isappearing

nd

anotherne taking

ts

place.

Rather, y

ob-

jective

n

thisdiscussion

s to identify

he

processes

hrough

hich

internationalegimeshange,nd tocommentninstitutionalroce-

dures or

andling

hese hanges.

It s

possible

o

differentiate

everalypes

fpressure

or

ransforma-

tion

n

internationalegimes.

n some ases,

here re fundamental

changes

n thenature

fthe elevantctivity.

orexample,

hiftsrom

light

o

heavy sage

have

generated

ajor

problems

ortraditional

regimes

n

themarine

isheries;nd the advent f

communications

satellitesas raised ignificantroblemsffectinghepre-existing

regime

or nternationalroadcasting.57

n other ases, ressures

or

change

rise rom

he

dissatisfaction

f some ctor

r class

of actors

55

The classic

arly xpressionf thisreasoning

ppears n David

Mitrany,

Work-

ing Peace System London: Royal nstitutef nternationalffairs,

943).

56

Leon Lindberg

nd StuartScheingold, urope's

Would-BePolity (Englewood

Cliffs, .J.:Prentice-Hall,970).

57

See

Brown

fn. ).


23/27

352

WORLD POLITICS

with hedistributive

onsequences

f a

prevailing

egime.

he unilat-

eral mposition

n recent ears

f200-mile isheryurisdictions

n

the

part f numerous

oastal

tates onstitutesdramaticllustration

f

this ype fregime hange. thirdype fpressureormajor ltera-

tionss a

desire o

ntroduce

systematic

r coherent

egime

o

replace

a

chaotic

r inchoate

egime.

hebasic dea here s to

streamline

r

rationalize

regimehat

asgrown mbiguous

r contradictory

n

the

course

fevolution.58

his

objective

s

undoubtedly

neofthemotivat-

ing

forces ehind

urrent

ffortso work ut a

new

constitutional

contract

or he ceans.

Regimes

requently

nticipateressuresor hange hrough

he

r-

ticulationf ransformationules. hese re nstitutionalrrangements

specifying

ow

pressures

or hange re

o

be treated,

hat

teps

must

be

taken

o

bring

bout lterations

n a

regime,

ndwhat ecision ule

is

to be

employed

s a

standard

or

determining

hen

proposed

changes

re to be

accepted.

ransformationules

may

varygreatly

with

espect

o

their

tringency

the

xtento

which

hey

make

t

easy

ordifficultoget lterations

ccepted),nd

heres no reason oassume

that hosewishingochange regime illalwaysbidebythe erms

of

suchrules.

Nevertheless,

he

existencef a

set of transformation

rules-even f

they

re not

always

ollowedn

practice-is

ikely

o

structure

ffortsoalter egimes. egardless

f

the

precise

ontentf

the ules,hey illnotbe

neutraln theirmpact

n the nte

YOUNG - International Regimes - Problems of Concept Formation

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