www.thalesgroup.com OPEN
Communication Based Train Control Systems
IRSTE SEMINAR NEW DELHI
28th AUG 2015
2OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality.
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌Conclusion.
3OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌Introduction- Thales.- CBTC.
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality.
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌Conclusion.
4OPEN
Mission statement
WHEREVER SAFETY AND SECURITY ARE CRITICAL, THALES DELIVERS. TOGETHER, WE INNOVATE WITH OUR CUSTOMERS
TO BUILD SMARTER SOLUTIONS. EVERYWHERE.
5OPEN
Our mission
Get the most out ofour infrastructure
Optimise operational efficiencyIncrease passenger satisfaction
Stand-alone products/solutions: Signalling or Supervision or Telecoms or Ticketingor Road tolling, etc.
Integrated solutions for turnkey projects: Signalling/Supervision/Telecoms/Fare Collection including interfaces with equipment and vehicles
Thales can address 2 different types of customer requests:
6OPEN
Our core values
Going for the long term
Nurturing a partnership approach with customersReliable and trusted trustworthy
Cultivating expertise
In-depth knowledge of customers’ operating parcticesAn international pool of experienced technical specialists
Managing complexity
Ability to design and deliver complex engineering projectsProject management skills and processes to tackle successfully the most complex turnkey implementationsHuman and financial resources
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Thales
Employees
61,000billion euros
Group Revenuesin 2014
13
countries
Global presence
56
Self-funded R&D
675million euros
GROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
A WORLDWIDE PRESENCE
Over
100Customers in more than 50 countries
26Large local centres all over the world
7,000Employees worldwide
5 CAPABILITiES FOR A COMPLETE TRANSPORTATION OFFER
5SIGNALLING FOR MAINLINES
REVENUE COLLECTION SYSTEMS
SIGNALLING FOR URBAN RAIL
SERVICES
INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPERVISION
THALES GROUND TRANSPORTATION MARKETS
URBAN RAIL BUSMAINLINE RAIL TRAMWAY AND LRT ROAD
8OPEN
Thales Ground Transportation Systems by the numbers
60 metro lines over 30 major cities secured by the Thales Seltrac® CBTC systems
3 billion passengers carried annually by the ThalesSelTrac® CBTC systems
Thales supervises more than 100 metro lines in 46 cities throughout the world
16,000 km of track equipped with the Thales AlTrac ETCS solutions .
219,949 Thales rail field equipment installed worldwide.
15% traction energy savings with Thales train management system.
ARAMIS Traffic Management System is currently controlling: 72,000 kms of route, 52,000 trains per day in 16 countries of which 4 are total national networks.
Up to 500,000 control points supervised from a single OCCReal-time video surveillance transmission to OCC from all transport modes.Over 50 million ticketing transactions in 100 cities processed daily by Thales.
9OPEN
Thales worldwide Main Line references
Austria Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Germany Greece Finland France Hungary Italy Latvia Luxembourg Netherlands
Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Switzerland United Kingdom
In Europe Algeria Australia China India Mexico Morocco Nigeria Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Taiwan Turkey Tunisia
Outside Europe
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Urban Transportation References.
Santiago
Panama
Mexico
Vancouver
San Francisco
Las Vegas
Sao PauloSantos
Santo Dominguo
MontrealToronto
New York & JFK
Cairo
Mecca
Algiers
Johannesbourg
Caracas
Dubaï
IstanbulAnkara
MumbaiHyderabadNew DelhiBangalore
Sydney
Auckland
Brisbane
BangkokManila
Kuala LumpurSingapore
Taïwan
Budang, Busan, Incheon
ChinaBeijing
ChongqingGuangzhouHefei
Hong Kong Nanjing
NanchangShanghaiShenzhen
Wuhan
China
USA LRTDetroitNewarkOrlandoTampaWashington & DullesJacksonville
Edmonton
Ottawa
Tokyo
Doha
100 CBTC projects in 46 cities
THALES provides supervision and communications solutions in more than 20 countries
Signalling
Integrated Communicationsand Supervision
Ticketing & Tolling
DublinLondonManchesterNewcastle
BergenOsloCopenhagen
LisbonCoimbraBilbao
MadridMarseille
ParisStrasbourgBrussels
LausanneTurin
Brescia
Palermo
NapoliFlorence MilanThessalonicaIstanbulAnkara
PalermoAthens
DenmarkNetherlands
Mt St MichelLyonNantes
CBTC signalling
Integrated Communications and Supervision
Fare collection
11OPEN
Thales, a trusted partner
12OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌Introduction- Thales.- CBTC.
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality.
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌Conclusion.
13OPEN
Introduction - Public Authorities Challenges
2,5 b.
7 9 28 %
50 %
77 %
Urban population
(billions)
World population
(billions)
Urbanization ratio
Source : UNDESA
Growing urbanisation
1950 2010 2050
Train control for urban rail
14OPEN
Introduction - Metro Operators Challenges
Increase public transport attractiveness
- Offer appealing comfort & design- Increase service quality (punctuality, frequency, reliability and availability) - Highest safety level
Reduce life cycle costs
- Less trackside infrastructure to reduce maintenance costs- Scalable systems and expansion capabilities
Face traffic increase
- Build reliable and efficient new lines- Improve capacity of existing lines
Control & optimise the cost per passenger
- Unattended operations- Reduce labour costs with increased automation
Increase performance, cost effectiveness & Services
Train control for urban rail
Reduce energy consumption
- Optimized braking curves
- Regenerative braking
- Smooth driving mode
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Introduction - Thales SelTrac CBTC
Meets diverse requirements including continuous ATP, cab-signaling, or
driverless operations
Applies to new infrastructures or resignaling
Applicable to any type or size of rolling stock
Incorporates built-in computer redundancy
Can deliver headways of under 60 seconds, safely
Provides high reliability and availability
Optimizes maintenance and life-cycle costs
Energy saving functions
Fully automated integrated and upgradeable Communications Based Train Control solutions
Train control for urban rail
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Introduction - CBTC Applications
Heavy urban rail lines: Dense traffic, dedicated & separate lines
Light rail: Medium traffic, dedicated lines
Automated People Movers (APM)
Urban monorails Tramways :
Semi-dedicated lines with high density traffic Urban & suburban networks:
Shared with main lines traffic.
Train control for urban rail
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Introduction - CBTC: Benefits
Ensure safe train movement with or with out DriverMaximise line throughput/capacity & quality of
service San Francisco’s MUNI Metro: from 23
trains per hour to a sustained 48 with the overlay of CBTC
Train control for urban rail
Reduce overall energy consumption Energy savings of up to 18%
Sky Train in Vancouver delivers 9.5 passenger kilometers for every kilowatt-hour, against the North American average of 5.2
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CBTC: Benefits
Reduce Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 2004 APTA subway per
passenger operating cost data
Average cost per passenger: US $2.39
Vancouver Sky Train costper passenger US $0.86
Train control for urban rail
Facilitate overall metro system operation
19OPEN
Thales CBTC Proven Performance
Vancouver, Detroit, London DLR, Kuala Lumpur, New York JFK Air Train, Las Vegas Monorail, Hong Kong Disney Resort, Dubai Red and Green Line, Mecca, Istanbul , Washington Dulles Airport APM, Seoul Sin Bundang ..
London DLR Revenue 1992 San Francisco Muni Revenue 1992 London Tubes Lines
Jubilee line Revenue 2009 Northern line (phase 1) Revenue 2014
Paris Line 13 Revenue 2015 Paris Lines interlocking replacement (L11, 3bis, 1…) Revenue 2006 Santiago L1 & 5 interlocking replacement Revenue 2009 Edmonton Revenue 2015 Singapore Revenue 2016 New York Flushing line Revenue 2014 Ampang line Revenue 2016 Disney World Florida Revenue 2015
Proven for High Reliability Driverless Operations
Proven Resignaling Experience
Train control for urban rail
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Operational Flexibility: Rolling Stock Independence
Additional rolling stock, with significantly different performance characteristics, can be easily integrated, with no changes to existing infrastructure.
Signal design not constrained by worst-performing train.
Adtranz, Alstom, Ansaldo-Breda, Bombardier, CAF, ChangChun,Cammell, Kawasaki, Kinki Sharyo, Mitsubishi, Rotem, Siemens, Vossloh, Von Roll, etc.
SelTrac CBTC runs each train in accordance with its performance characteristics
SelTrac CBTC Systems are installed on, and control rolling stock from many suppliers:
Train control for urban rail
21OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture, System Components,
- Automatic Train Supervision (ATS), and
- Zone Controller (ZC),
- Solid State Interlocking (SSI) Overview,
- Data Communication Subsystem (DCS)
- Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC),
▌ Operating Modes
▌ CBTC Functionality.
▌ Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌ Conclusion.
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High Level system Architecture - CBTC .
▌High Level Architecture.
DCS - Data communication system, ZC – Zone controller, SSI – Solid state Interlocking, VOBC – Vital Onboard Computer, AP – Access Point, IFB – Interface Board
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System Components
▌Primary Components: Automatic Train Supervision (ATS),
Typical Equipments:• Redundant Central ATS Servers• Redundant Local ATS Servers• ATS Workstations• ATS Timetable Compiler Workstation• ATS Maintenance Workstation• ATS MIMIC Workstation• ATS Datalogger• ATS Playback Server• DCS Backbone (Server, Switch)
ATS Over viewTop level management component performing•Schedule and headway regulation•Automatic and Manual routing•Data logging•Interfacing with external systems•Operator control Responsible for monitoring•System status and display.
Configuration•Redundant Central Servers per Corridor (located in CER)•Redundant Depot Servers (located in DER)•Redundant Local Servers at IXL (located in SER)•Non-redundant Server per Corridor (located in RSS/BOCC)•Workstations (located in OCC, DCC, SCR, RSS/BOCC)
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System Components – Way Side
▌Zone Controller/Solid State Interlocking (ZC/SSI),
▌ Typical Equipments:
• Redundant Zone Controller
• Redundant Solid State Interlocking
• Input/Output Ports
• Changeover Switch
• Interface Board
• ECPC
• DCS Backbone (Server, Switch)
• Field Elements (Signals, Points,
Transponder Tags, Proximity Plates)
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System Components - Zone Controller Over view.
▌ Core component of wayside vital train control performs
▌ Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
▌ Movement Authority determination
▌ Interlocking functions (in CBTC mode)
▌ Responsible for controlling and monitoring:
•Status of field devices in its territory using IFB•Trains in its territory via continuous communication with CBTC on-board equipment and DCS network•Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking area
▌ Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration
•Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs•Notion of Active & Passive ZC (ZCa, ZCb)•Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)
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System Components - Way Side
▌ Solid State Interlocking
▌ SSI Over view
▌ Core component of wayside vital train control performing
•Interlocking functions (in Fallback mode)Responsible for Interlocking Functions:•Route setting, locking, releasing•Point movement, locking, and position monitoring•Flank protection•Approach locking•Others…
▌ Responsible for controlling and monitoring:
•Status of field devices in its territory using Interlocking Module (IM) and Field Element Controller (FEC)•Status of block occupancies using Axle Counter Evaluator (ACE)•Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking
area
▌ 2oo3 Architecture
•IM operates in 2oo3 architecture•Fully operational in case of failure of one unit
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System Components - DCS Overview
▌Core Component of CBTC communication responsible for • Secure, bi-directional, and dependable communication between subsystems• Transfer of data and information between subsystem using wired and/or
wireless means using Security protocol• Utilizing security protocol to protect CBTC equipment from potential attacks
▌DCS Blocks• Wayside Wired Network
• Interconnection of LANs at each station for wayside-to-wayside communication• Provide access to radio network for communication with trains
• On-Board Network• Provide VOBC access to radio network for communication with wayside• Provide VOBC access for on-board to on-board communication
• Radio Network• Consists of Wayside Radio Unit (WRU) on trackside and Mobile Radio Unit (MRU) on-board
train
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System Components - DCS Overview On Board
▌Primary Component: Data Communication System (DCS)
▌Typical Equipments-On Board
• Redundant Mobile Radio Unit (MRU)
• Antenna at each end .
▌Typical Equipments -Track side:
• Access Points (Antenna)
• Wayside Radio Unit (WRU)
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▌Redundancy Architecture• Wayside Radio Unit (WRU) layout provides geographical redundancy
• Onboard radio provides diversity through antenna on each end
System Components - DCS Overview On Board
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System Components - Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC)
Typical Equipments:-Redundant VOBC, Train Operator Display (TOD), Transponder Interrogator Unit (TIU), Local Data Collector (LDC), Speed Sensors, Accelerometers, Proximity Sensors.
VOBC Over view.
Core component of onboard vital train control performs•Driverless Train Operation•ATP & ATO functionality•Safe train movement in Controlled mode•Automatic Turnback•Station stopping
Responsible for•Generating safe stopping location from destination and/or obstruction•Commanding Emergency Brakes for violation of Movement Authority and ATP•Automatic Door Operation.
Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration•Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs•Notion of Active & Passive VOBC•Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)
31OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes CBTC/Fallback)
CBTC/Fallback Switchover,
▌ATP Functionality.
32OPEN
Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback
▌Primary Operating Mode: CBTC (ZC active, SSI inactive)
• ATS used to send commands to ZC, and receive status from ZC
• ATS used to send commands to VOBC, and receive status from VOBC
• ZC responsible for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its territory
• VOBC is responsible for operating according to define route and adhering to ATP & ATO
• Train operation can occur in Controlled / Non-Controlled modes
▌Secondary Operating Mode: Fallback (ZC inactive, SSI active)
• ATS used to send commands to SSI, and receive status from SSI
• ECPC used to send route and point commands to SSI, and receive status from SSI
• SSI responsible for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its territory
• Train operation can occur in Non-Controlled mode only
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Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback Switchover
▌CBTC Fallback Transition Steps
▌Objective: To provide capability of operating the Metro with Primary system down
• Transition is necessary as a result of non-recoverable complete ZC failure (eg. redundancy failure)
• Controlled mode trains are Emergency Braked• Non-Controlled mode trains are requested to stop from OCC• ZC is powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from CBTC to Fallback at
Interlocking station• SSI (IM) is started by powering on the CPUs• After startup, SSI will provide status of field elements to ATS• For previously Controlled trains, Control Operator re-arranges train spacing according to
fixed block operating rules• Control Operator sets the appropriate route and follow Manual Operating procedures to
continue operation in Fallback mode (line-of-sight)
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Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback Switchover
▌Fallback CBTC Transition Steps
▌Objective: To revert System back to Primary mode once failure has been normalized
• Transition is mandatory* once ZC failure has been normalized
• Trains are requested to stop by Control Operator
• SSI (IM) is powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from Fallback to CBTC at Interlocking station
• ZC is powered on
• After startup, ZC will obtain status of field elements from FEC and will provide their status to ATS
• Blocks occupied by Train will be displayed as Non-Communicating Obstruction (NCO) on ATS
• NCO is cleared by driving train in Non-Controlled mode out of the affected block
• Standard Operating procedure is followed to initiate movement in Controlled mode
-* Operation can continue in Fallback mode, but major Operator interventions in Central and Onboard are required. Transition to CBTC mode would eliminate the operator intervention.
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Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality. ATP
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌Conclusion.
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CBTC Functionalities
▌CBTC Functionalities.
▌ATP
▌ATO
▌ATS.
▌This presentation will discuss only the ATP functionality in detail, as the discussions can be useful in adapting the technology for the already dense Sub-Urban Services on metro cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Delhi.
37OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality.
▌Train Speed Determination Functionality.
▌Wheel Diameter Calibration
• Upon VOBC start up, default wheel size (defined in database) is used until wheel calibration is performed
• Successful wheel calibration requires traveling through pair of calibration transponders 100m apart
• VOBC calculates wheel diameter through inputs from two speed sensors (number of pulses measured), distance between transponders and pulse per revolution defined
• Diameter is accepted if it is within tolerance (between 780mm and 860mm)
• Wheel calibration is in effect when VOBC loses position
• Wheel calibration is not in effect when VOBC is powered off, or is reset
38OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality.- (cont’d)
▌Wheel Rotation & Travel Direction
• Direction of wheel rotation is positive or negative, depending on the inputs from speed sensors
• Travel direction is determined to be either:
• Guideway Direction 0 (GD0)• Guideway Direction 1 (GD1)
• Direction is determined once VOBC has established position
▌Zero Speed, Stationary and Position Determination
• VOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200ms
• Stationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400ms
39OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)
▌Traveled Distance, Speed & Acceleration
• Loss of Position causes VOBC to apply Emergency Brakes
• Two speed sensors and two accelerometers are used to:
• Calculate distance travelled• Calculate train speed• Calculate acceleration
• Inputs from speed sensors and accelerometers are compared to previous cycle and with system valid ranges to check plausibility
• Implausible data is logged by VOBC
• Persistent implausible data will result in loss of position
• Slip / Slide is detected by comparing speed from speed sensors and accelerometers
• Accelerometer inputs are used to determine speed for slip/slide
40OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)
▌Zero Speed, Stationary and Position Determination
• VOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200ms
• Stationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400ms
If difference between two wheel speeds is greater than 4km/h, then it will cause loss of position and EB.If difference between two wheel speed is 2km/h for 1s (application cycle being 70ms), then it will cause loss of position and EB.Resolution of speed is 10mm/s. Maximum allowed change in speed in 0.196m/s (based on acceleration of 1m/s^2)Max acceleration defined at 2.8m/s^2
41OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)
▌Position is determined based on
• Location of last transponder read• Number of revolutions crossed since reading last transponder
• Measured distance is compared with distance in database
• Train traversal over Point with “disturbed” status will result in loss of position
• Detection of first invalid transponder not in its path implies crosstalk
• Detection of valid transponder concludes crosstalkWhile the train position is established, if the VOBC detects a transponder and this transponder cannot be found on a possible path for the train that is consistent with its current, calculated position (within a reasonable distance), then the VOBC concludes that it must have detected transponder crosstalk from an adjacent track. Once VOBC concludes crosstalk, any other crosstalk transponders detected later on are ignored. If crosstalk is not concluded, then another additional crosstalk transponder will result in unknown position (EB).
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ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)
▌Train Length and Train Image
• Active Cab determines Forward travel direction
• Vehicle type is determine based on VID plug
• VID is checked with valid ranges in VOBC database
• Train ID is determined based on VID
• Information required for determining train length, front & rear upon entry
• VOBC ID• Stationary status• Coupler status• Orientation• Reference position
Train Integrity must be established and train must be stationary to determine train length. Vital ID (VID) plug is located at back of VOBC rack. Loss of TI after establishing position results in train image being “unknown”. Once TI is restored, the image is restored.
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ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality. (cont’d)
▌Communicating Train (CT) Tracking
• VOBC reports position to ATS & ZC
• VOBC sends front & rear position, rollback distance and positional uncertainty to ZC
• Concept of Extended CT position
• Positional Uncertainty used to determine Extended CT position• Used to represent area that could be occupied by train• Example: exiting a block, traversing over Point
• Concept of Contracted CT position
• Position Uncertainty used to determine Contracted CT position• Used to represent minimum area that must be occupied by train• Example: sweeping a NCO
• Extended/Contracted CT position is transparent to Operator
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ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)
▌Non-Communicating Train (NCT) Tracking
• Secondary train detection is used to detect NCT
• Two main components of NCT tracking:
• Vital tracking by ZC• Responsible for tracking obstructions using NCOs
• Non-Vital tracking by ATS• Responsible for tracking train IDs on ATS line overview
• NCT image timer used to provide capability of VOBC to recover communication with ZC
• Example of NCT
• CT loses communication and last known position becomes NCT position
• NCT timer is run by ZC (60s)• Upon completion of NCT timer, ZC creates NCO on block
occupied by NCT train
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ATP Functionality - Interlocking Functionality
▌ Route Locking
• ZC route reservation provides route locking where guideway elements within route are reserved.
▌ Approach Locking
• Element of the guideway authorized for a train cannot be released if the route is cancelled
• When a route is cancelled, movement authority is pulled back to train front.
• Approach locking will remain until train stops or timer expires
▌ Point Locking
• Point locking is activated based on route reservation over said Point
• Overpoint locking may be activated when CT or NCT overlapping the Point Zone, or NCO overlapping overpoint blocks
• Automatic point movement is prohibited if overpoint locking is activated
• Manual point movement is permitted if overpoint locking is activated (eg: to sweep NCO)
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ATP Functionality - Interlocking Functionality - (cont’d)
▌ Flank Protection
• Locking of point in a particular position to protect the flank of another route to prevent sideswipe hazard with a train
• LMA will not be set if Flank conditions are not satisfied for the route
▌ Point Control & Supervision
• Position and status of Points are always monitored by IFB to ZC/SSI
• ATS provides capability to move Points automatically or manually
▌ Conflict Zone
• Prevents simultaneous routing of multiple trains through a particular area of guideway
• Prevents conflicting train movements at turnbacks and crossovers
• Two configurations
• Single train reservation
• Fleeting train reservation
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Overspeed Protection
• VOBC determines authorized speed based on ATP speed profile and defined speed restrictions
• ATP speed profile is calculated based on:
• ATP speed profile
• Temporary Speed Restriction
• Maximum speed for current train operating mode
• End of movement authority
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Overspeed Protection
• VOBC adheres to ATP speed profile
• Violation of ATP speed profile results in over speed, and a warning alarm is sounded on the TOD
• Violation of EB curve results in application of Emergency Brakes
• Overspeed Alarms
• Overspeed 1 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is approaching Authorized Speed
• Overspeed 2 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is greater than ATO Target Speed
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Rollback Protection
• VOBC supervises movement in opposite direction than commanded travel direction in Controlled and Non-Controlled modes
• Rollback of more than 3m results in application of Emergency Brakes
▌Obstructed Motion
• VOBC detects motion obstruction if train does not travel a minimum of 1m within 5s after propulsion has been commanded
• Emergency Brakes are applied when VOBC detects Motion Obstruction
• Motion Obstruction is cleared when Emergency Brakes are reset
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Departure Interlock and Authorization
• VOBC provides Departure authorization in Controlled mode
• Authorization is provided when the following conditions are met:
• The dwell has expired
• Train Operator has pressed the departure button (for ATO mode only)
• Train doors are detected as being closed and locked and disabled
• PSD conditions are met
• LMA is provided and is greater than zero
• “Train Hold” is not in effect
• Emergency Brake is not commanded
• Emergency Brake is not applied
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Emergency Brake (EB) Control
• Once EB is activated, it can be released only when train is stationary and condition causing EB to be activated has been eliminated
• Conditions resulting in application of EB
• Speed exceeding Target speed plus over speed tolerance
• Train position is unknown in Controlled mode
• Train passes LMA in Controlled mode
• Rollback tolerance is exceeded
• Loss of Train Integrity is detected
• Invalid operating mode is selected
• Unscheduled door opening
• Uncommanded motion in ATO mode
• Obstructed motion
• Crawlback maneuver selected when Crawlback is not authorized
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ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Crawlback Functionality
• Crawlback is a low speed maneuver in Reverse direction to align at platform in case of overshoot
• Overshoot of less than 10m can be complemented with Crawlback. Train operator will be provided with message on TOD
• System prevents Points within Crawlback area from being moved and prevents trains from being routed into Crawlback area
• Train performing the Crawlback maneuver is fully protected by ZC
• Crawlback speed is limited to 10km/h
• Crawlback permitted when position is not established
• Emergency Brakes applied when total distance travelled exceeds 10m
53OPEN
Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality.
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.▌Conclusion.
54OPEN
Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.
▌Thales CBTC System for Signaling.
▌ Project scope – design, supply, install, test and commission, provide training and DLP support for a radio based CBTC train control and signalling system for 3 new Corridors (lines) in Hyderabad India.
▌ Hyderabad Metro Lines 1, 2 & 3
Greenfield project , 72 Km / 3 Lines/ 64 Stations
1 OCC / 1 BOCC / 2 Depots / 1 Stabling
Radio – based CBTC moving block solution with separate interlocking
Design headway 90 seconds
3 car Trains initially – 6 car Trains in future (mixed fleet). 57 Trains in initial fleet
Status of Works in progress, Thales have already demonstrated the successful operational trials of this system over the stage 1of the Hyderabad Metro rail Project between Nagole to Mettagudda, covering 10 Kms and with 7 Stations.
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Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.
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Topics for discussion.
▌ Introduction
▌High Level System Architecture,
▌Operating Modes
▌CBTC Functionality.
▌Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
▌Conclusion.
57OPEN
Conclusion - Communication Based Train Control solutions for IR.
▌Indian Railways will in the future need to explore every technology and techniques in Railway signaling solutions to:
Increase the Line capacity.
Increase the Safety shield at higher speeds.
Centralized control and management of Train operations.
Provide/enhance the online Train running information to a passenger,
Integrate the Signaling, Telecommunication and Fare collection systems.
▌ While IR already have plans to move from the fixed Block signaling to Automatic signaling in dense “A” routes, state of art proven technology will be needed to further increase the Train density and provide Automatic Train Protection
▌ As an overlay system on the existing signaling systems, ETCS Level 1 or Level 2 are available technologies that have been successfully implemented widely.
▌ Radio based CBTC moving block provide an interesting option to consider on the
Mumbai Metro system as an overlay on the existing system.
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Conclusion.
▌Radio based Train Control technologies is a state of art and proven signaling solution for increasing the density (Reduction in headways, and increase in asset utilization capacity).
▌The implementation of such systems for Metro Rail Projects should give the opportunity for the IR main line operators to explore these technologies and adapt it over the IR Mainline networks.
▌Thales looks forward to sharing this knowledge and experience with IR in modeling solutions for the Indian railways.
59OPEN
Get the mostout of your
infrastructure
60OPEN
▌THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
61OPEN
Back up slides
▌Back up Slides
62OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)
▌Non-Communicating Obstructions
• Conditions when NCO is created:
• NCT train enters system where block adjacent to non-CBTC territory becomes occupied
• NCT moves across blocks (a block is occupied and adjacent block has NCO)
• CT loses communication with ZC
63OPEN
ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)▌Train Tracking Functionality
▌CT NCT CT
64OPEN
ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Train Tracking Functionality.
▌NCT Tracking over Disturbed Point
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ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality. – (Cont’d)
▌Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)
• LMA calculation with no Point
• LMA calculation with Point
66OPEN
ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Movement Authority Functionality
▌Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)
• Conflicting bi-directional routing
67OPEN
ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality (cont’d)
▌Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)
• Two trains following each other
68OPEN
ATP Functionality (cont’d)
▌Movement Authority Functionality
▌Limit of Movement Authority (LMA)
• Obstruction within route
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