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POLICYBRIEF
ASYSTEMICCRISISINCONTEXT:
THEIMPEACHMENTOFTHECHIEFJUSTICE,
THEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARYAND
THERULEOFLAWINSRILANKA
NiranAnketell&AsangaWelikala
CentreforPolicyAlternatives
April2013
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www.cpalanka.org2
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-partisan organization that
focuses primarilyonissuesof governanceand conflict resolution.Formed in1996in the firm
belief that the vital contribution of civil society to the public policy debate is in need of
strengthening,CPAiscommittedtoprogrammesofresearchandadvocacythroughwhichpublic
policyiscritiqued,alternativesidentifiedanddisseminated.
Address : 24/228thLane,offFlowerRoad,Colombo7,SriLanka
Telephone : +94(11)2565304/5/6
Fax : +94(11)4714460
Web : www.cpalanka.org,facebook.com/cpasl,twitter.com/cpaslEmail : [email protected]
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................4
2. TheImpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice.....................................................................................................5
2.1 TheConstitutionalandPoliticalBackdrop............................................................................................5
2.2 TheImpeachmentProcess:TheSequenceofEvents........................................................................7
2.3 TheAftermath:ConstitutionalisminCrisis.........................................................................................12
3. PlacingtheImpeachmentCrisisinContext:SystemicFlawsandChallenges..............................15
3.1 AnIneffectiveSeparationofPowers?ThePresidencyandChecksandBalancesunder
the1978Constitution.................................................................................................................................................15
3.2 ParliamentarySupremacyvs.ConstitutionalSupremacy.............................................................22
4. ConclusionandRecommendations..................................................................................................................27
Recommendations:......................................................................................................................................................27
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1. Introduction1
The impeachment ofChiefJusticeDr.ShiraniBandaranayakewasthe singlemost contentious
political issue inSriLankain late 2012and early2013.Fourmonthssinceher removalfrom
officeinviolationofdecisionsbytheSupremeCourtandCourtofAppeal,theissueappearsto
havereceded from the publicsquare.While thegovernmentmayappear tohaveresolved the
political crisisoccasionedby the impeachment, theconstitutional crisis that emerged has not
been resolved, leaving a number of troubling questions for the future of the rule of law
unanswered.Canadecisionofacourtoflawbeconsideredbindingiftheexecutiveopposesand
disregards it?What is the role of the judiciaryvis--vis thevirtually unchecked power of the
executivepresidency?IsthejudiciaryindependentofthePresidentandParliament?Howdoes
theclaimtolegalsupremacybyParliamentaffectthewayinwhichitrelatestothejudiciary?
ThisPolicyBriefseekstoaddresstheseissuesandoutlinetheurgentreformsneededtoarrest
theseriouserosionofpublicconfidenceinthejudiciaryandtheruleoflawthathasresultedfrom
theimpeachment.Section2outlinesthepoliticalcontextandsequenceofeventsrelatingtothe
impeachment.Section 3 examines the structuraldefects of the SriLankan constitution,which
enabled the successful ouster of Chief Justice Bandaranayake, notwithstanding rulingsby the
SupremeCourtandCourtofAppealtotheeffectthattheprocessadoptedwasunlawful.Thetwo
mainconstitutionalclaimsenablingtheimpeachmentpresidentialimmunityandparliamentary
supremacy areexamined,in the contextofhow theyhavedeveloped throughoutSriLankas
recentconstitutionalhistory.Theconclusionsfromthisanalysisrevealtheneedforarangeof
constitutionaland legal reforms, from legislativemeasuresneeded to restore amore credible
frameworkforjudicialindependenceandimpartiality,toothermorefundamentalreformstothe
SriLankanconstitutionitself.
1ThisPolicyBriefwaswrittenbyNiranAnketellwithinputfromAsangaWelikala.CommentsfromDr.Paikiasothy
SaravanamuttuandBhavaniFonsekaareherebyacknowledged.SubhashiniSamaraarachiassistedwithresearchforSection2.
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2. TheImpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice
2.1 TheConstitutionalandPoliticalBackdrop
Dr.ShiraniBandaranayake,thefirstwomanChiefJusticeofSriLanka,tookoathsasthe43 rdChief
Justice beforePresidentMahindaRajapaksaon18th May 2011.While her appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1996 was controversial and unsuccessfully challenged in that court,2her
ascensionto the leadershipoftheapexcourtwasinevitablegivenherseniority.In September
2010beforeDr. Bandaranayakesappointment asChief Justice the governmentrushedan
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution through the Supreme Court and Parliament. The
EighteenthAmendmentstrengthenedthehandsofanalreadypowerfulexecutivepresidencyby
repealingand replacingsalient elements oftheSeventeenthAmendment tothe Constitution
whichlimitedthediscretionarypowerofthePresidentoverappointmentstokeypublicoffices
andremovingthetwo-termlimitonthepresidency.3TheEighteenthAmendmentalsosoughtto
retroactively deem appointments made prior to its passage that were in violation of the
SeventeenthAmendmentwhichincludedtheappointmentsofseveralJusticesoftheSupreme
Courttobelegal.4BecausetheBillwasdeemedbytheCabinetofMinisterstobeurgentinthe
national interest5, the Supreme Courtwas given a mere twenty-four hourswithin which to
communicate its determination on whether the Bill required a referendum before it could
becomelaw.Anumberof petitioners includingCPA and oneof itsdirectors andheadofits
LegalandConstitutionalUnitRohanEdrisinhamadesubmissionsinoppositiontotheBillatthe
pre-enactmenthearing.Thecasewasheardbyafive-judgebenchoftheSupremeCourtpresided
overbythethenJusticeShiraniBandaranayake,whoheldthattheEighteenthAmendmentBill
did not violate any entrenched provisions of the Constitution,6enabling its passage through
Parliamentwithatwo-thirdsmajority,andwithoutareferendum.
In the first year of its functioning, the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Bandaranayake
dismissedanumberof petitions challengingseveralconstitutionallysuspectand authoritarian
executiveactions.TheseincludedCPAspetitionchallenginganumberofregulationsunderthe
PreventionofTerrorismAct(PTA)thatperpetuatedsomeofthemostwidelyusedEmergency
Regulations even after thelapseof thestateofemergency7; petitions challenging compulsory
militarytrainingforuniversityentrants8;andpetitionschallengingtheindefinitepostponement
2SeeEdwardFrancisWilliamSilvavs.ShiraniBandaranayake ,1997(1)Sri.L.R92
3AlsoseeAruniJayakody, The18thAmendmentandtheConsolidationofExecutivePower,inRohanEdrisinha&Aruni
Jayakody(Eds.)(2011)TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution:SubstanceandProcess ,(Colombo:CPA)4Article36(6),ConstitutionofSriLanka5Article122(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka
6InretheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution,SCSpecialDetermination, 1/2010.7CentreforPolicyAlternativesVs.GotabayaRajapakseandothers,SC(FR)Application453/20118CeylonTeachersUnionandfourothersvs.UniversityGrantsCommission ,SC(FR)Application181/2011.
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ofanumberoflocalauthorityelections. 9Thesedecisionsledtoawidespreadperceptionthatthe
SupremeCourtunderChiefJusticeBandaranayakewasingeneralacourtthatcouldbeexpected
tobedeferentialtotheexecutive.However,approachingthelatterhalfof2011,tensionsbetween
theChiefJusticeandtheexecutivebegantoappear.
IntheSupremeCourtsdeterminationontheconstitutionalityoftheTownandCountryPlanning
(Amendment)Billpursuantto achallengebyCPA,thebenchledby theChiefJusticeheldthat
sincethesubjectofprivatelandswasadevolvedmatterintermsoftheThirteenthAmendment
totheConstitution,theBillrequiredpriorreferencetoallProvincialCouncilsbeforebeingplaced
ontheOrderPaperofParliament. 10Similarly,initsfirstdeterminationontheconstitutionalityof
theDivinegumaBill, also challengedby CPA, abenchheaded bythe Chief Justice held the Bill
impingedonanumberofdevolvedsubjects,andthusrequiredpriorreferencetotheProvincial
Councils.11Having referred the Bills to theeight constitutedProvincial Councils, inwhich the
rulingUnitedPeoplesFreedom Alliance (UPFA)has controllingmajorities,the President also
referredtheBilltotheGovernoroftheNorthernProvince(theninthprovinceinrespectofwhich
there is as yet noProvincialCouncil constitutedor elected). The Bill was then placedon the
OrderPaperofParliament a secondtime. Itwaschallengedagainbyanumberof petitioners
includingCPAonthebasisthatthesubstantiveprovisionsoftheBillwereinconsistentwiththe
constitution. Some petitioners also contended that the Governor was not empowered to
substitutehimselfinplaceofaNorthernProvincialCouncil,andthathisconsenttothepassageof
theBillwasinvalid.
TheSupremeCourtsdeterminationinrespectofthesecondchallengeheldwiththepetitioners
argumentthatcertainprovisionsoftheDivinegumaBillwereinconsistentwiththeconstitution
andcouldonlybecomelawuponbeingpassedbyatwo-thirdsmajorityinParliament.TheCourt
alsoheldthattheGovernorcouldnotconsent toaBillby assumingthepowersofaProvincial
Council.12
Parallel to thecourtsdeterminations in these important cases, therewere other events that
demonstratedanattempttointerferewithandintimidatethejudiciary.On19 thSeptember2012,
a statement issuedbyMr.ManjulaTillekeratne, Secretary to the JudicialServicesCommission
(JSC) ofwhich the Chief Justice is theexofficio Chairperson waspublished in the Sinhala
press.The statement alleged that efforts were underway to destroy the independence of the
judiciary,andmadereferencestowhatwaslaterrevealedbythePresidenthimselftobeaneffort
byhimtosummonthemembersoftheCommissiontoameetingatTempleTrees(oneofthe
official residences of the President). The statementwas issued in the context of a campaign9BritoFernandovs.MahindaDeshapriyaandothers,SC(FR)Application296/2011.10InreTownandCountryPlanningOrdinanceAmendmentBill,SCSpecialDetermination3/2011.SeealsoCPA,Noteon
theDivinegumaBill,January2013.Accessedat:http://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Divineguma-
Bill-Basic-Guide-updated-January-2013-E.pdf11InreaBilltitledDivineguma,SCSpecialDetermination1-3/2012.12InreaBilltitledDivineguma,SCSpecialDetermination4-14/2012.
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against theChiefJusticein the statemedia, vilifyingherand thoseopposedto theDivineguma
Bill.13ThecentralmessageanimatingthiscampaignofvilificationwasthechargethattheChief
JusticewasencouragingseparatismbyupholdingtheThirteenthAmendmentwhichdevolveda
measureofpoliticalpowertoProvincialCouncils. 14SubsequenttotheJSCsfirststatement,onor
aroundthe28thofSeptember2012,Mr.Tillekeratnetoldthemediathat(a)situationhasarisen
wherethereis adangerto thesecurityofallofusandourfamiliesbeginningfromtheperson
holdingthehighestpositioninthejudicialsystem.15Hisfearswererealisedwhenon7 thOctober,
Mr. Tillekeratne was seriously wounded after unidentified individuals assaulted him in a
Colombosuburb.16
Attheheartof the tension between theChiefJustice andtheexecutivewasherwillingnessto
applytheprovisionsoftheThirteenthAmendmenttoBillsapprovedbytheCabinetofMinisters
for passage throughParliament. In the prevailing political culture of centralisation, the Chief
Justices insistence on the basic procedural requirements established by the Thirteenth
Amendmentfortheenactmentoflegislationaffectingdevolvedsubjectsappearstohaveevoked
theseveredispleasureofthegovernment.Moreover,theresistancefromtheChiefJusticetothe
DivinegumaBillwhichwasproposedandisnowimplementedbythePresidentsbrotherand
MinisterofEconomicDevelopment BasilRajapaksawasperceived by the governmentas an
affronttoitsauthority.
2.2 TheImpeachmentProcess:TheSequenceofEvents
On1stNovember2012,thedayonwhichtheSupremeCourtcommunicateditsdeterminationin
respectof thesecondchallenge to theDivineguma Bill totheSpeaker, and also on which Sri
Lanka faced the Universal Period Review at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, several
members ofthe governingUPFApresented theSpeakerwitha resolutioncontainingfourteen
allegationsofallegedmisconduct,signedby117MembersofParliament.17
Seriousconcernsabouttheproprietyoftheprocessthroughwhichtheimpeachmentmotionwas
signed,andthetextoftheresolutionitself,haveemerged.Forinstance,onememberoftheruling
coalitionwhodid not sign the impeachment motion revealed that hewasasked to place his
13SeeCPA,StatementonthePosterAttacksAgainstCPAExecutiveDirector,16thOctober2012.Accessedat:
http://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-poster-attacks-against-cpa-executive-director/Theposterattacksreferred
hereattackedCPAsExecutiveDirector,ostensiblyforhisroleinchallengingtheDivinegumaBill,andarereflectiveofthe
anti-devolutionsentimentthatplayedacentralroleinDr.Bandaranayakesimpeachment.Thetextofoneposter,
translatedintoEnglish,istelling.Itstates:Letussavethepro-peopleDivinegumaActthatbuildsthelivesoffifteenlakhs
oflowincomefamiliesfromthePaikiasothygangthataidsandabetstheseparationofthecountry.14SeeAsangaWelikala(2011)DevolutionintheEasternProvince:Implementation oftheThirteenthAmendmentand
PublicPerceptions ,2008-2010(Colombo:CPA)15DailyMirror,JSCSecretarysaysdangertothesecurity,29 thSeptember2012,accessedat
http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/22281-jsc-secretary-says-danger-to-their-security-.html16SeeCPA,StatementontheassaultoftheSecretaryoftheJudicialServicesCommission(JSC),Mr.ManjulaTillakeratne,
10thOctober2012,accessedathttp://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-assault-of-the-secretary-of-the-judicial-
services-commission-jsc-mr-manjula-tillakeratne/ 17OrderPaperofParliament,6 thNovember2012.
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signature on the motion without even being able to peruse the charges.18The motion also
contained a number of elementary factual errors, including in respect of a reference to
Groundviews,CPAscitizenjournalismwebsite.19
Afewdaysafteritwaspresentedtohim,theSpeakerofParliamentpublishedtheimpeachment
motion in the OrderPaperofParliament, pursuant towhich,on 14th November 2012,eleven
members sevenmembersfromthegovernmentcoalitionand four fromoppositionparties
wereappointedtoaParliamentarySelectCommittee(PSC).20
On18thNovember2012,severalpetitionersfiledwritapplicationsintheCourtofAppealseeking
toprohibitthePSCfromcontinuingwithitsproceedings.21Duringtheprocessofhearingthese
applications, the Court of Appeal referred a question of constitutional interpretation to the
SupremeCourt.On22ndNovember2012thedaypriortothefirstscheduledsittingofthePSC
the Supreme Court issued a carefully worded request that the PSC defer impeachment
proceedingsuntiltheCourtcoulddecideontheconstitutionalityofStandingOrder78A(which
sets out the procedure to be followed by Parliament in the removal of senior judges). The
Supreme Courts unprecedented request a departure from the courts traditional and
constitutionalroleofdeterminingtherightsandobligationsofpartieswasanindicationofthe
CourtsawarenessofParliamentssensitivitytojudicialreviewofitsactions.TheCourtsorder
stated:
..this Court whilst reiterating that there has to bemutualrespect andunderstanding
founded upon the rule of law betweenParliament and the Judiciary for the smooth
functioning of both theinstitutions, wishes to recommend to the members of the
SelectCommitteeofParliamentthatitisprudenttodefertheinquirytobeheldagainst
theHon.theChiefJusticeuntilthisCourtmakesitsdeterminationonthequestionoflaw
referred to [it] by the Court ofAppeal.Thedesirability and paramountimportance of
acceding to thesuggestions made by this Court would be based on mutual respect
andtrust and as something essential for thesafe guarding of the rule oflawand the
18RajivaWijesinha,OnsigningtheimpeachmentresolutionoftheincumbentChiefJustice,23December2012,stating
(i)nthefirstplace,Iwassimplyaskedtocomeoverandsigntheimpeachmentresolution,andtolditcouldnotbesentto
metoreadbeforehand.Obviouslyoneshouldnotsign,orcommittosign,whatonehasnotseen.Accessedat:
https://rajivawijesinha.wordpress.com/2012/12/23/on-signing-the-impeachment-resolution-of-the-incumbent-chief-
justice/#more-566619SeeCPA,PressReleaseontheimpeachmentproceedingsagainstChiefJusticeDr.ShiraniBandaranayake,13 th
November2012.Accessedat:http://www.cpalanka.org/press-release-on-the-impeachment-proceedings-against-chief-
justice-dr-shirani-bandaranayake/ 20Ofthe11memberstoParliamentarySelectCommittee,7membersrepresentedtherulingUnitedPeoplesFreedom
Alliance(UPFA);2memberstheUnitedNationalParty(UNP)andoneeachfromtheTamilNationalAlliance(TNA)and
DemocraticNationalAlliance(DNA).SeeColomboPage,AppointmentstoparliamentaryselectcommitteeprobingSri
LankaChiefJusticecomplete,13 thNovember2012.Accessedat
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12B/Nov13_1352792368CH.php21DailyFT,OvertotheSupremeCourt,21 stNovember2012.Accessedat:http://www.ft.lk/2012/11/21/over-to-the-
supreme-court/
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interest of all persons concerned and ensuring thatjustice is not only done but is
manifestlyandundoubtedlyseentobedone.22
When the PSC convened the following day, its Chairman ruled that the Committee would
disregardtheSupremeCourtsrequestdespiteobjectionsraisedbyoppositionmembersofthe
Committee. The Chief Justice appeared before the Parliamentary Select Committee shortly
thereafter.23Onthesameday,theSupremeCourtgrantedleavetoproceedinthreefundamental
rightsapplicationschallengingthelegalityofStandingOrder78A.24
On29thNovember,inresponsetoaquestionofprivilegeraisedbyaseniorgovernmentMinister,
the Speaker issued a ruling rejecting any judicial intervention in Parliaments functionswith
respecttoimpeachment,claimingitwasanunlawfulintrusionintoanexclusiverealmreserved
for Parliament.25With this ruling, it was clear that the judiciary and Parliament were on a
collisioncourse,withParliamentappearingtobeunwillingtorecogniseanyjudicialreviewofits
orthePSCsactions.Aconstitutionalcrisiswasbeginningtoemerge.
On6thDecember2012,theChiefJusticeappearedbeforethePSC.Atapproximately4.30pm,she
washandedover300documentsand askedto respond tothemwithina day.Mr.Romeshde
SilvaP.C., Counselfor the ChiefJustice,requestedfurthertime tostudythesedocuments. The
ChairmanofthePSCrefusedhisrequest.Mr.deSilvathenraisedseveralobjectionswithrespect
tothelackofaprocedureandrequestedthatthePSCadoptaproperprocedureinrespectofthe
productionandadmissionofthedocuments;proofofsuchdocuments;burdenofproof;listsof
witnesses;andadmissionofevidence.TheChairmanofthePSCstatedthatthechargeswouldbe
determinedsolelyonthedocumentsmadeavailabletotheChiefJustice.Sincenoprocedurewas
adopted,Mr.deSilva informedthePSCthattheChief Justice couldno longerparticipatein its
proceedings.26In a letter written to the Speaker, Dr. Bandaranayakes lawyers requested the
Speakerto takeactionagainstcertainmembersof thePSCwho,itwas claimed,usedinsulting
andinappropriatelanguageagainsttheirclient.27
On7thDecember2012,thefouroppositionmembersofthePSCalsoannouncedthattheywould
nolongerparticipateinthePSCproceedings,onthegroundsthatanumberofissuestheyhad
22ColomboTelegraph,FullTextOfTheSupremeCourtRequestToTheParliamentarySelectCommittee,Colombo
Telegraph,23November2012.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/full-text-of-the-supreme-
court-request-to-the-parliamentary-select-committee/23MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.
ShiraniBandaranayake,23November2012.24SC(FR)Applications665/2012,666/2012&667/201225ColomboTelegraph,SpeakerChamalRajapaksasRuling;LegislatureWillNotBowToTheDictatesOfExternal
Bodies,23rdNovember2012.Accessedathttp://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/full-text-of-the-supreme-
court-request-to-the-parliamentary-select-committee/26MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.
ShiraniBandaranayake,6thDecember2012.27DailyFT,CJslawyerscallforSpeakertotakeactionagainstconductofabusivePSCmembers,15 thDecember2012,
http://www.ft.lk/2012/12/15/cjs-lawyers-call-for-speaker-to-take-action-against-conduct-of-abusive-psc-members/,
lastaccessedon25 thFebruary2013.
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raised had not been addressed. These grounds included the absence of a clear direction
regarding the procedure to be followed by the PSC; whether documents were to be made
availabletotheChiefJusticeandherlawyers;thestandardofproofwhichwouldberequired;the
needtoarriveatadefinitionofmisbehaviour;whethersufficienttimewouldbemadeavailable
totheChiefJusticeandherlawyerstostudythedocuments;andwhethertheChiefJusticeand
herlawyerswouldbegivenanopportunitytocross-examinetheseveralcomplainantswhohad
madethechargesagainsther.28
However, theremainingmembers of the PSCcontinued tohold proceedings on7th December
2012and,intheabsenceoftheChiefJusticeandherlawyers,heardsixteenwitnessesincluding
Justice Shirani Tilakawardene, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court with respect to the
allegations made against Dr. Bandaranayake. Incredibly, the PSC submitted a report to
Parliament thevery next day finding the incumbent Chief Justice guiltyof the1st, 4thand5th
charges contained in the impeachment motion.29These charges accused the Chief Justice of
financial impropriety based on non-declaration of assets and a conflict of interest in a case
involvingafailedinvestmentcompany.
On 19thDecember 2012, the Chief Justice also filed a writ application in the Court of Appeal
askingthecourttoissuewritsquashingtheconclusionsandrecommendationsinthePSCreport,
andprohibitingtheSpeakerfromactingonortakinganyfurtherstepsbasedonthePSCreport.30
Meanwhile,beforeParliamenthadresumedsittingsin2013,theSupremeCourtcommunicated
itsdeterminationon thequestionofinterpretationreferredtoit bytheCourtofAppeal.31The
questionreferredbytheCourtofAppealwas:
IsitmandatoryunderArticle107(3)oftheConstitutionfortheParliamenttoprovidefor
mattersrelatingtotheforumbeforewhichtheallegationsaretobeproved,themodeof
proof,burdenofproof,standardofproofetc.,ofanyallegedmisbehaviourorincapacity
in addition to matters relating to the investigation of the alleged misbehaviour or
incapacity?
Article107(3),theinterpretationofwhichwasinquestion,providesthat:
Parliamentshallby lawor byStanding Ordersprovide forall mattersrelating to the
presentation of such an address, including the procedure for the passing of such a
28MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.
ShiraniBandaranayake,7 thDecember2012.29ReportoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.Shirani
Bandaranayake,8thDecember2012.30ColomboTelegraph,ChiefJusticefilesactionagainstPSCReport,19 thDecember2012.Accessedat
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/breaking-news-chief-justice-filed-action-against-psc-report/31ChandraJayaratnevs.AnuraYapaandothers,SCReference3/2012,decided1 stJanuary2013.
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resolution,theinvestigationandproofoftheallegedmisbehaviourorincapacityandthe
rightofsuchJudgetoappearandtobeheardinpersonorbyrepresentative.
In Standing Order 78A, Parliament made provision for a Select Committee of Parliament to
investigate and report on the allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity set out in an
impeachment resolution.However, it did notmake provision for questions of procedure and
evidence pertaining the proof of allegations before it. The Court of Appeals question to the
SupremeCourtevincedsomeconcernwiththisdefault.TheSupremeCourt,whileansweringthe
CourtofAppealsquestionintheaffirmative,wentastepfurther.Thedeterminationsignedby
JusticesAmaratunga,SripavanandDepheldthattheinvestigationandproofofchargesinan
impeachmentmotionmustbeexercisedbyabodyestablishedbylaw.SinceStandingOrdersof
Parliamentarenotrecognisedaslawin termsoftheConstitution,theycouldnotestablish a
bodywith powersto investigateandprovecharges.32Thus,theCourtheldthatanypowersof
investigation and proof must be provided by Acts of Parliament. In short, the Courts
determinationwasaclearaffirmationoftheunconstitutionalityofStandingOrder78A.
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeal issued judgment in the Chief Justices writ petition,
holdingthatinlightoftheinterpretationgiventotherelevantconstitutionalprovisionsbythe
SupremeCourt,ithadnoalternativebuttoissueawritquashingthePSCreport.33
Notwithstanding these judicial pronouncements, it was clear the governmentwould proceed
withtheimpeachment.Onthe10thand11thJanuary2013,amidstdesperateislandwideprotests
bylawyers,tradeunionists,civilsocietyandcitizens34andindefianceoftheSupremeCourtand
CourtofAppeal,ParliamentdebatedandeventuallypassedamotiontorequestthePresidentto
impeachChiefJusticeShiraniBandaranayake.155MembersofParliamentvotedinfavourofthe
motion, and 49 voted against, while twenty members either absented themselves from
Parliament or abstained from voting, following a parliamentary debate characterised by
regrettable partisanship and unparliamentary language, and which demonstrated little
engagementwiththemajormattersofdemocraticandconstitutionalprincipleinvolved.35
Thegovernmentmovedswiftlythereafter.ThemediareportedthatthePresidenthadissueda
proclamationremovingtheChiefJusticefromofficeon13 thJanuary2013andthatithadbeen
subsequentlydeliveredtotheChiefJustice. 36Twodayslater,MohanPeiriswassworninasChief
32ColomboTelegraph,Impeachment:FullTextofTheSupremeCourtDeterminationToday,3 rdJanuary2013.Accessed
at:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/S.C-Referance-No.-358-2012.pdf33ColomboTelegraph,CJsCase:FullTextOfTheCourtOfAppealDeterminationToday,7 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CAwrit-411-2012.pdf34BBCNews,ColomboprotestsopposeChiefJusticeimpeachment,10 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-2097829835ParliamentaryDebates(Hansard),Vol214,No.4,11 thJanuary2013,651.36TheNation,NewCJthisweek?,13 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:http://www.nation.lk/edition/latest-top-
stories/item/14633-new-cj-this-week?.html
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Justice.37IntheSupremeCourt,securityforcesclashedwithlawyerswhileattemptingtosealthe
entrance to the court,38ostensibly to prevent Dr. Bandaranayake from entering the Supreme
Courtcomplex.
2.3 TheAftermath:ConstitutionalisminCrisis
Mr.MohanPeirisP.C.aformerAttorneyGeneral(appointedfromtheprivatebartoheadthe
Attorney Generals department by President Rajapaksa), Legal Adviser to the Cabinet, and
representativeoftheGovernmentofSriLankaatvariousinternationalforaincludingtheHuman
RightsCouncilassumedofficeunderpeculiarcircumstances.WhilethePresidenthadformally
sworn him in, the question of whether Dr. Bandaranayake was lawfully ousted remained
unanswered. If infacther removalwas invalid, it followed that therewasno vacancy forMr.
Peiristooccupy,aquestionpresentlybeforetheSupremeCourt.
Forherpart,Dr.BandaranayakeclaimedthatsheremainedthecountryslawfulChiefJustice.Ina
statementreleasedshortlyaftershevacatedtheChiefJusticesofficialresidenceon15thJanuary
2013,sheassertedthat(i)nthecircumstances,inmycountrywhichisademocracy,wherethe
rule of law is the underlying threshold uponwhich basic liberties exist, I still am the duly
appointedlegitimateChiefJustice.39
Also on 15th January, CPA and its Executive Director Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu filed a
fundamentalrightspetitionseekingtopreventMr.Peirisfromassumingdutiesorfunctioningin
office,onthebasisthattherewasnovacancyintheofficeofChiefJustice.40Thematterispending
beforethe Supreme Court,where counsel forthe petitionershaverequested that thecase be
heardbyafullbenchoftheSupremeCourt.
The Lawyers Collective,a grouping of concerned lawyersinstrumental inorganisingprotests
againsttheimpeachment,statedthatwhiletheycontinuedtoopposetheunlawfulimpeachment
ofChiefJusticeBanadaranayakeandtheappointmentofhersuccessorinprinciple,itwastheir
obligationtoappearbeforeanybenchoftheSupremeCourt(implyingtheywouldappearbefore
Mr. Peiris). They warned of serious threats to the security of lawyers opposed to the
impeachment.41Shortlythereafter,threeseniorlawyerswhowereinstrumentalinopposingthe
37Dailymirroronline,MohanPeirissworninasChiefJustice,15 thJanuary2012,Accessedat:
http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/25007-mohan-peiris-sworn-in-as-chief-justice.html38DailyFT,TwotoTangoasMahindaSwearsMohaninasCJ,16thJanuary2013.Accessedat:
http://www.ft.lk/2013/01/16/two-to-tango-as-mahinda-swears-mohan-in-as-cj/39TheHindu,IamstilltheChiefJustice:Bandaranayake,15January2013.Accessedat:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/i-am-still-the-chief-justice-bandaranayake/article4309817.ece 40TheColomboTelegraph,Dr.SaravanamuttuFilesFRAgainstNewCJAppointment:FullTextOfThePetition15th
January2013.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/dr-saravanamuttu-files-fr-against-new-cj-
appointment-full-text-of-the-petition/ 41ColomboTelegraph,WeWillContinueToCarryOutOurObligationsLawyersCollective,23January2013.Accessed
at:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/we-will-continue-to-carry-out-our-obligations-lawyers-collective/
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impeachment received threatening letters from an anonymous group self-identified as the
PatrioticFront.42
Later,on23rdJanuary2012,aceremonialwelcomeforMr.Peiriswasboycottedbymanylawyers
includingofficebearersoftheBarAssociation,inkeepingwitharesolutionadoptedataspecial
meeting of the Association.43That resolution called onPresident Rajapaksa to reconsider the
impeachmentofDr.Bandaranayakeandstatedthatintheeventshewasremovedwithoutregard
totheruleoflawandnaturaljustice,theBarwouldnotwelcomethepersonappointedtoreplace
her.44The ceremonialwelcome forMr. Peiriswas covered exclusively by the statemedia,but
more than 30 journalists from the privatemedia, both print and electronic, who arrived in
Hulftsdorptocovertheevent,werepreventedfromenteringtheSupremeCourtpremises.
The governmentsuse offorceto enforce the Presidentsdecision toappointMr. Peiristo the
officeofChiefJusticeappearstohavecausedlawyersprotestsandpublicconcerntorecede.A
senseofapathyandinevitabilityispalpable,butisneverthelesspunctuatedbydefiantassertions
ofindependencefromtheBar.45TherecentelectionofMr.UpulJayasuriyaavocalcriticofDr.
BandaranayakesimpeachmentasthePresidentoftheBarAssociationandtheproceedingsat
its39thAnnualConvocationexemplifythisdefiance.Inarevealingsymbolicgesture,Dr.Shirani
Bandaranayake was invited to preside over theevent as ChiefGuest, an honour traditionally
reserved for thesittingChiefJustice.Mr.MohanPeiriswasnot invitedto attend. The keynote
speakerJusticeC.V.VigneswarananoutspokenretiredjudgeoftheSupremeCourtdelivered
aforcefulspeechinwhichhedrewspecificattentiontothequestionofthevalidityofMr.Mohan
PeirissappointmenttotheofficeofChiefJustice,stating:
We must remember that the so-called Impeachment process against Chief Justice
Dr.ShiraniBandaranaikewaslegallyfaulted.BoththeSupremeCourtaswellastheCourt
ofAppealgavedecisionsinthisregard.SolongasCompetentCourtsofLawhaveheld
that the process adopted was faulty, then those who advocated such Impeachment
shouldhavegonetotherelevantCourtorCourtstohavesuchordersordeterminations
quashed.Theydidnotdoso.Bynotdoingsoadilemmaarises.IftheexistingOrdersare
notreversedbyaFullerBenchandinfactdogetconfirmedinthefutureitwouldappear
Thestatementalsoreferredtothreatsagainstlawyerswhoopposedtheimpeachment,statingWearealsogravely
concernedwiththeseveralthreats&actsofintimidationonmembersofourfraternity,suchasdeaththreatsonleading
memberswhocampaignedagainsttheimpeachmentofHonorableChiefJusticeBandaranayaka,theassassination
attemptonMr.Wanninayake,shotsfiredoutsidetheresidenceofBASLPresidentMr.RajapaksePC,andtheattackona
ladylawyer(whowishestoremainanonymous)byunidentifiedmotorcyclistswhoattemptedtostrangleher.42ColomboTelegraph,RomeshdeSilva,JayampathiWickramaratne,MASumanthiranAndJCWeliamunaReceive
ThreateningLetters18 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/romesh-de-silva-
jayampathi-wickramaratne-ma-sumanthiran-and-jc-weliamuna-receive-threatening-letters/43TheBBCNewsAsia,SriLankalawyersboycottchiefjusticeceremony23 rdJanuary2013.Accessedat:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-2115593244TheLawyersCollective,GiveJusticetoourChiefJustice:BarAssociationpassesthreeresolutionsunanimously,15th
December2012.Accessedat:http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/1369045DailyFT,LawyersCollectivecallsBASLConvocationHistoricandUncompromising1 stApril2013.Accessedat:
http://www.ft.lk/2013/04/01/lawyers-collective-calls-basl-convocation-historic-and-uncompromising/
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thatallstepstakensofarbythedefactoChiefJusticewouldbeillegal.Thenirreparable
harmanddamageswouldbesustainedbylitigantswhosecaseswereheardbyaperson
whocannotbedeemedtobetheChiefJusticeofthisCountryundertheLaw.
IfthedefactoChiefJusticecontinuesto actasifhisconductisvalidinLawandhears
Applications, constitute Benches and makes Orders and Determinations so positively
andconfidentlyexpectingaDivisionalBenchtoreversetheOrdersalreadymade,evenif
they do reverse the Orders already made in the future, then the integrity and
impartiality of the Honourable Judges who make such orders would come into
question.46
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3. PlacingtheImpeachmentCrisisinContext:SystemicFlaws
andChallenges
The impeachment of the 43rd Chief Justice was enabled by the swift and unconstitutional
legislativeandexecutiveactionsofanalreadypowerfulgovernment.Thegradualweakeningof
constitutional first principles the separation of powers, constitutional supremacy and the
independenceofthejudiciaryovermanydecadesprovidedthelegalandpoliticaltoolswhich
enabled the government to effect an unconstitutional impeachment. The systemic flaws and
contradictionsintheconstitutionalarchitectureofthestatethatledtotherecentimpeachment
have been features of anessentially illiberal democracy that has been inplace ever since Sri
Lankabecamearepublic,andwhichhavepropelledacoursetowardspopulistauthoritarianism.
3.1 AnIneffectiveSeparationofPowers?ThePresidencyandChecksand
Balancesunderthe1978Constitution
The Second Republican Constitution of 1978 introduced a new system of government, the
dominantcharacteristicofwhichisthelargeconcentrationofpowerintheexecutivepresident. 47
The executive branch is headed by the President, who appoints a Cabinet of Ministers from
amongMembersofParliament.Theprincipalauthorofthe1978Constitutionandfirstexecutive
president,J.R.Jayewardene,hadlongadvocatedapresidentialsystemforSriLanka.In1966,he
expressed his support for theFrenchmodel,which in his view provided a strong executive,
seatedinpowerforafixednumberofyears,notsubjecttothewhimsandfanciesofanelected
legislature; not afraid to take correct but unpopular decisions because of censure from its
parliamentaryparty.48
PowersoftheOvermighty49ExecutivePresident
Under the 1978 Constitution, the President is Head of State, Head of the Executive and of
Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 50 In addition, the President
possesses the power to pardon offenders;51commute sentences;52make appointments to the
higherjudiciary,theofficeofAttorneyGeneral,membersofexecutiveCommissionsincludingthe
ElectionsCommission,BriberyCommission,PoliceCommissionandPublicServiceCommission 53
47JosephA.L.Cooray(1995)ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLawofSriLanka,(Colombo:Hansa),16348J.R.Jayawardene(1993)MenandMemories:AutobiographicalRecollectionsandReflections (NewDelhi:Vikas),91.49AtermcoinedinrespectoftheSriLankanPresidencybyC.R.deSilva, TheOvermightyExecutive?ALiberalViewpoint
inC.Amaratunga(Ed.)(1989) IdeasforConstitutionalReform(Colombo:CouncilforLiberalDemocracy),31350Article30(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.51Article34(1)(a),ConstitutionofSriLanka52Article34(1)(c),ConstitutionofSriLanka53Article41(A)(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka
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andGovernorsofProvinces. 54Besidestheseconstitutionalpowers,thePresidentalsoexercisesa
widerangeofpowersassignedtohimbylegislation,mostnotableofwhichisthepowerinterms
of the Public Security Ordinance to declare a state of emergency andpromulgate emergency
regulations.55
Further,aswehavenotedpreviously,theEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionremoved
existing term limits on the Presidency.56Article 38(2) provides for the manner in which a
Presidentmaybeimpeachedonthegroundsofpermanentincapacityorintentionalviolationof
theConstitution,treason,bribery,misconductorcorruptioninvolvingtheabuseofthepowersof
his office, or any offence under any law, involving moral turpitude. However, a motion to
impeach the Presidentmust besignedby two-thirdsof theMembers ofParliament, or in the
alternative, a simplemajority ofMembers with the Speaker assenting. If the Supreme Court
determinesthatthePresidentispermanentlyincapableofcarryingouthisdutiesorguiltyofany
oneoftheimpeachableoffences,ParliamentmayvotetoimpeachthePresident,butonlywitha
two-thirdsmajority.TheprocedureforimpeachingaPresidentisclearlymoreexactingthatthe
correspondingprovisionsforimpeachingaJusticeoftheCourtofAppealorSupremeCourt.
Moreover,thePresidentmaintainsoverridingcontroloverthelegislativebranchwherehisparty
(usually)holdsa majority inParliament.57Article43(3)empowers the Presidentto appointas
Prime Minister a Member of Parliament who in his opinion commands the confidence of
Parliament.ThePresidentalsoappointsCabinetMinistersfromamongMembersofParliament,
and may consult the Prime Minister on such appointments, if he deems such consultation
necessary.Whatthismeans inpracticeis thatwherethePresidentspartyholdsamajorityin
Parliament, the Presidenthasan almostabsolute discretiononwhohe decides to appoint as
Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers. As Head of Cabinet, members of which control the
legislativeagendainParliament,thePresidentcontrolsParliamentindirectly.Further,sincethe
lossofmembershipinthepoliticalpartyunderwhichaMemberofParliamentwaselectedalso
occasionsthelossoftheMembersseat,58thePresident isableto ensurebackbencher loyalty.
Together,thesefactorscontributetooverridingpresidentialcontroloverParliament.
Even where the Presidents party does notcontrolParliament, his powers ofdissolution and
prorogationprovidesignificantleversofcontrol. 59Moreover,whilethePresidentmustappointa
PrimeMinisterwhoenjoysthesupportofthehouse,heisfreetoassignCabinetportfoliostoany
54Article154B(2),ConstitutionofSriLanka55Section5,PublicSecurityOrdinance,No.25of1947.56SeeRohanEdrisinha&AruniJayakody(Eds.)(2011) TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution:Substanceand
Process,(Colombo:CPA)57Articles43(2),43(3)and44(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.58Article99(13)A,ConstitutionofSriLanka59Article70(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.
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Member of Parliament, or even himself.60Combined, these factors permit heavy presidential
interferencewiththeworkofParliament.
TocomplementthesesweepingpowersoverParliamentarethepowersofappointmentoverthe
entirehigherjudiciarynamelytheChiefJustice,JusticesoftheSupremeCourt,Presidentofthe
CourtofAppealandJusticesoftheCourtofAppeal.ThePresidentalsoenjoysblanketimmunity
ofsuitduringthependencyofhistenure,subjecttotwoexceptions.Thefirstexceptiontothis
immunity,providedbytheConstitution,excludesanyproceedingsinrelationtoactscommitted
bythePresidentinhiscapacityasaCabinetMinister.61Thesecond,developedcautiouslybythe
Supreme Court, permits collateral challenges against anact of thePresident in limited cases
whereasubordinatereliesonthatacttojustifyhisownconduct.62Thebreadthofthisimmunity
issweeping:noproceedingsarepermittedtobeinstitutedorcontinuedagainstthePresidentin
any courtortribunal inrespect ofany acts oromissions,whether committed inhis publicor
privatecapacity.63Moreover,sincetheremovalofthetwo-termlimitthatonepersonmayhold
presidentialofficebytheEighteenthAmendment,thisalsomeansthatthepersonholdingthis
officemayenjoyimmunityforlife,providedhesucceedsingettingelectedcontinuously.
Thus,thePresidentunderthe1978ConstitutionpresidesovertheStateasapowerfulexecutive
head,withcontroloverParliamentandprotectionfromjudicialscrutiny.Thedominanceofthe
President over the executive branch and of the executive over the legislative and judicial
branchesunderminesthenotionalseparationofpowersthatwasintroducedthroughArticle4
oftheConstitution,whichspecifiesthedistributionofsovereignpowersofgovernmentacross
thethreebranches.64Thus,notwithstandingoccasionalassertionsbythejudiciaryofthedoctrine
oftheseparationofpowersoroftheirownindependenceguaranteedbytheConstitution,65the
Presidencyhasloomedlargeoverthejudiciary.
Wewillexaminetworelevantcasesofpresidentialinterferencewiththejudiciaryinamanner
that undermined the judiciarys independence.Thesecasestudies illustratethe point that the
impeachment of the 43rd Chief Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake was only the most recent
symptomofadeeplyflawedconstitutionalstructurethataffordspre-eminencetotheexecutive.
60Article44(2),ConstitutionofSriLanka.61Article35(3)(proviso),ConstitutionofSriLanka62.SeeKarunatilakavs.Dissanayake,1999(1)Sri.L.R157,17663Article35(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.64Article4specifiesthattheexecutivepowerofthePeopleistobeexercisedbythePresident,thelegislativepowerofthe
PeoplebyParliament,andthejudicialpowerofthePeoplebyParliamentthroughcourtandothertribunalsestablished
bylawortheConstitution.65SeeforinstanceInreNineteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution,2002(3)SriLR85,101.
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ImpeachmentproceedingsagainstChiefJusticeNevilleSamarakoon
NevilleSamarakoonQ.C.wasappointedChiefJusticebyPresidentJayewardeneshortlyafterthe
latterassumed presidential officein terms of thenew constitution in1978.The appointment
itselfwasthe subjectof criticismbecause ofMr. Samarakoons close ties to thePresident.66A
number of controversial issues pertaining to the judiciary arose immediately after the
promulgation of thenewconstitution, not least ofwhichwas thenon-appointment of sitting
judgesintheapexcourtundertheprevious1972ConstitutiontothenewlyconstitutedSupreme
Court. However, Mr. Samarakoon did not appear to oppose this dismissal of Judges by the
Constitution.67
By1983,however,thecumulativeeffectsofanumberoffactorsresultedinfrictionbetweenthe
President and the Chief Justice. The first was the Parliamentary Select Committee appointed
pursuant to a petition by Minister Gamini Dissanayake in March 1983 against Justices
WimalaratneandColin-Thom.68ThepetitionwasinstancedbyacomplainttothePresidentby
Mr.K.C.E.deAlwis,ajudgeandmemberoftheSpecialPresidentialCommissionofInquirysetup
by the then United National Party (UNP) government to inquire into the conduct of its
predecessorUnitedFront(UF)government.InawritapplicationfiledbyFelixDiasBandaranaike
(aformerMinisteroftheUFgovernmentbeinginvestigatedbytheCommission)againstMr.de
Alwis,JusticesWimalaratneandColin-Thomwerescathingintheircriticismoftheconductof
Mr.deAlwis,andissuedawritof quowarrantodisentitlinghimfromparticipatingintheworkof
theCommission.69ItwasinresponsetothisjudgmentthatMr.deAlwismadehiscomplaint.70
Later, in June 1983 just onemonthprior to theanti-Tamil pogromof Black July alleged
governmentsponsoredmobsprotestedoutsidethehomesofthreeSupremeCourtjustices.The
attackwasinresponsetoajudgmentissuedbyJusticesColin-Thom,RatwatteandSozaholding
that the Statewasresponsiblefor the unlawful detentionofa seniorleftactivistMs.Vivienne
Gunawardeneandherhusband,andthattheInspectorGeneralofPoliceshouldtakedisciplinary
measures against the officers involved.71Almost immediately thereafter, mobs arrived at the
judges residences. Both the benchandbarresponded angrily tothisbrazenthreat to judicial
66BasilFernando,RememberingNevilleSamarakoonChampionofJustice,(1991)SocialJustice,2:25,22.67BasilFernando,SriLanka:ExecutivePresidentialSystemandtheJudiciaryanoverview ,22ndNovember2012.
Accessedat:http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-237-201268RajanHoole,(2001),SRILANKA-TheArroganceofPower:Myths,DecadenceandMurder,(Colombo:UTHR(J)),
Chapter7.69Bandaranaikevs.deAlwis,1982(2)Sri.L.R66470RajanHoole,(2001),SRILANKA-TheArroganceofPower:Myths,DecadenceandMurder,(Colombo:UTHR(J)),
Chapter7.71Gunawardenavs.Perera,1983(1)Sri.L.R305
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independence.72Yet,noonewasprosecutedfortheseincidents.Instead,theofficersconcerned
werepromoted.73
Later, in the aftermathofthe July pogromand the enactmentof the SixthAmendment to the
Constitutionwhichrequiredjudges,lawyersandotherofficialstotakeanoathswearingthat
theywouldnotadvocatetheestablishmentofaseparatestatewithinSriLankaanissuearose
aboutwhether,pursuanttheAmendment,theJudgesceasedtoholdofficeuntiltheysworethe
SixthAmendmentoath.TheAttorneyGeneralarguedthatthecaseinvolvingthebanningofa
JaffnabasedpublicationTheSaturdayReviewwhichwaspartlyarguedbeforetheenactment
oftheSixthAmendment,mustbeheardanewsince the Judgeshearingthecasehadceasedto
holdofficesincethelasthearing.Infact,thedoorsto theCourtwereshutuntilthejudgeshad
taken the oath. S.Nadesan Q.C. appeared forthe petitionerand contested the position of the
AttorneyGeneral,arguingthattheJudgescontinuedtoholdofficeevenafterthepassageofthe
SixthAmendment, and that Judgescannotceasetoholdofficeunlesstheyareremovedon the
grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. While the Court appeared disinterested in
hearingthematteratfirst,74thejudgmentofSupremeCourtwasanemphaticexpressionofthe
independenceof the judiciary, holdingthatsitting Judgesof the Courtcannotbe removedby
operationofaconstitutionalamendment.75
Inthemidstofthistumult,inJanuary1984,thepressreportedthattheCriminalInvestigation
DivisionofthePolicewasinvestigatingapossibleassassinationattemptontheChiefJustice.76
ItwasinthiscontextofturmoilthatChiefJusticeSamarakoonmadecertaincriticalcomments
againstthePresidentataprizegivingofacommercialtutoryinColombo.ASelectCommitteeof
Parliament was constituted to inquire into the incident, but despite a finding of guilt, the
governmentbelatedlyrecognised the need to framestandingordersfor the inquiry. Thiswas
doneinhaste,andStandingOrder78Aoddlyplacedinachapterdealingwithrulesofdebate
cameintoeffectandanotherSelectCommitteewasconstituted.AfterrigoroussubmissionsbyS.
NadesanQ.C.appearingforChiefJusticeSamarakoon,theSelectCommitteesplitonpartylines.
Nevertheless, the majority UNP members stopped short of holding theChief Justice guiltyof
misbehaviour,butwerehighlycriticalofhisspeech. 77Mr.Samarakoonwaspermittedtoretire
quietly,butaclearmessagehadbeendeliveredtothejudiciary.TheexecutivewithParliament
72TamilTimes,NothingwilldeterussaysSupremeCourtandBarAssociationcallsforindependentcommissionof
inquiry,2:8,June1983,pg.3.Accessedat:http://www.noolaham.net/project/32/3117/3117.pdf73TheLankaGuardian,PavidiHandacase/TheVivienneGoonewardeneAffair,
15thDecember1993.Accessedat:http://www.noolaham.net/project/80/7928/7928.pdf74TamilTimes,OfNadesanandJudges16:2,15 thFebruary1997,pg.15,18.Accessedat:
http://www.noolaham.net/project/36/3550/3550.pdf75SeeInreNineteenthAmendment,note57.AlsoseeVisuvalingamvs.Liyanage,1983(1)Sri.L.R203.76TamilTimes,AssassinationThreatonChiefJustice3:4,February1984,page9.Accessedat:
http://www.noolaham.net/project/32/3124/3124.pdf77Dr.NihalJayawickreme,WhenPresidentJRJayewardeneTriedToImpeachChiefJusticeNevilleSamarakoon,10 th
November2012.Accessedat:http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/12285
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in towwascapable of threateningthe security of tenure, and even thephysical security of
judges.Aprecedentforthetumultuouseventsof2012hadbeencreated.
Non-constitutionoftheConstitutionalCouncil
TheSeventeenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionwascreatedthroughmultipartysupportasa
response to the erosion of the rule of law. The Amendment was a creditable attempt at
depoliticising public sector appointments, as well as establishing transparency and
accountabilityin publiclife.78Its centrepiecewastheConstitutionalCouncil, consistingof the
PrimeMinister,SpeakerofParliament,LeaderoftheOpposition,onepersonnominatedbythe
President,fivepersonsnominatedbythePrimeMinisterandtheLeaderoftheOpposition,and
onepersonnominatedbyagreementbetweenMPsnotbelongingtothegovernmentorthemajor
partyinopposition.ThisCouncilwasthengiventheexclusivepowertomakerecommendations
to the President in respect of appointments to the Elections Commission, the Public Service
Commission, National Police Commission, Human Rights Commission, Bribery Commission,
FinanceCommissionandDelimitationCommission.79
Inrespectofappointmentsto thehigher judiciary theSupremeCourtandCourtofAppeal
members of the Judicial Services Commission, Attorney General, Auditor General, Inspector
General of Police, Ombudsman and Secretary General of Parliament, nominationswere to be
madebythePresidenttotheConstitutionalCouncil,whothenhadtheauthoritytoapproveor
disapprovethePresidentsnomination.
Whiletheschemecontemplatedbytheamendmentappearedtoworkwellforatime,shadowsof
a looming constitutional crisis began to appear when President Kumaratunga rejected the
Councilsnominee asChairmanofthe ElectionsCommission.When this failure toappoint the
ConstitutionalCouncilsnomineewas litigatedin the Courtof Appeal,theCourtdismissedthe
applicationonthebasisthatthePresidentwasshieldedbyblanketimmunityunderArticle35of
theConstitution.80
When the first Constitutional Councils term ended in 2005, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP)andtheIlankaiThamilArasuKadchi(ITAK)disagreedonwhethertheJVPwasentitledto
participate in discussions on nominating the tenth member to the Council. On this basis,
PresidentMahindaRajapaksawhohadbeenelectedinNovember2005refusedtoconstitute
theCouncil.WhileitwasopentothePresidenttoseekanopinionfromtheSupremeCourtunder
Article129oftheConstitutiononwhethertheJVPwasentitledtoparticipateinnominatingthe
tenthmember,and/orwhetherhecouldconstitutetheCouncilintheabsenceofonemember,he78ElaineChan,SriLankasConstitutionalCouncil, (2008)LawandSocietyTrustReview18.1,2.79Article41AH(amendmentssubsequentlyrepealed),ConstitutionofSriLanka.80PublicInterestLawFoundationvs.AttorneyGeneral,2004(1)Sri.L.R169
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didnotdoso.81Instead, thePresidentproceeded tomakedirectappointmentsto anumberof
offices including to the Supreme Court and the Courtof Appeal, despitebeingbound by the
ConstitutiontomakethoseappointmentsinconsultationwiththeConstitutionalCouncil.These
appointmentswere facially unconstitutional, in thatArticles41B(1) and41C(1)provided that
nopersonshallbeappointedbythePresidentotherthanbytheconsultativeprocessbetween
thePresidentandtheConstitutionalCouncil.
The implications of the Presidents actions were grave. On the one hand, the Presidentwas
engaginginacourseofactionthatwasdirectlyinviolationoftheConstitution.Ontheother,if
the appointments he was makingwere in fact unlawful,would the decisions made by those
appointees also be deemed unlawful? Would decisions of the Supreme Court issued by
unconstitutionallyappointedjudgesbevalid?Weretheyjudgmentsatall?
Inevitably, a legal pronouncement on these issues was left to the Supreme Court,82though
ironically,byabenchcomprisingthethenChiefJusticeAsokadeSilva,JusticeP.A.Ratnayakeand
JusticeChandraEkanayake,allofwhomwereappointedtotheirrespectivepositionsdirectlyby
thePresident inapparent violationof theSeventeenthAmendment.TheSupremeCourtheard
arguments in two connected cases. The first was a fundamental rights petition against the
PresidentchallenginghisfailuretoconstitutetheConstitutionalCouncil.Thesecond,filedbyCPA
andMr.Rohan Edrisinha, challengedtheappointment ofthenAttorney GeneralMohan Peiris.
Althoughthecaseswereoriginallyfiledin2008,counselforthepetitionerswerenotheardin
support of the application until late 2010.When the Court eventually issued its judgment in
March 2011, it dismissed the twopetitions on thebasis that the immunity conferred on the
President by Article 35 precluded judicial scrutiny.83The impenetrable veil of immunity had
prevailed,withdisturbingramificationsfortheruleoflaw.
Presentaspastrecurringcrises
The two incidents detailed here demonstrate two specific challenges to constitutionalism
presentedbythe1978Constitutionthatre-emergedduringtherecentimpeachmentcrisisthe
PresidentscontroloverParliamentandappointmentstothejudiciaryandthepreclusionofany
meaningfulchecksandbalancesonpresidentialpowerthroughtheimmunityprovidedbyArticle
35.TheimpeachmentofChiefJusticeBandaranayakewascharacterisedbystrategiesadoptedby
81Foradescriptionofthegamutofdeadlockbreakingmechanismsandalternativearrangementsavailabletothe
Presidenttoresolvetheissueinrespectofthetenthmember,seeAruniJayakody, The18thAmendmentandthe
ConsolidationofExecutivePower,inRohanEdrisinha&AruniJayakody(Eds.)(2011) TheEighteenthAmendmenttothe
Constitution:SubstanceandProcess,(Colombo:CPA),27-29.82AnearlierpetitionCentreforPolicyAlternativesvs.P.RamanathanandothersCA[Writ]Application890/2006filed
intheCourtofAppealintheformofaquowarrantoapplicationagainstthemembersoftheHumanRightsCommission,
challengingtheirappointmentsonthebasisthattheyweremadeinviolationoftheSeventeenthAmendmenttothe
Constitution,waswithdrawnaftertheCommissionersceasedtoholdofficein2009.83SumanasiriLiyanagevs.MahindaRajapaksa,SC(FR)297/2008;CentreforPolicyAlternativesvs.AttorneyGeneral,
SC(FR)578/2008.Judgmententeredon18March2011.
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thegovernment,whichdeliberatelydisregardedboththeconstitutionandthesuperiorcourts.
Theforegoing discussion demonstrateshow the inadequaciesof the constitutional framework
facilitated such action, andmoreover, a history and a political culture of extra-constitutional
behaviouron the part of unchecked executives. It is likely that these factors encouraged the
present government to unconstitutional conduct and even to push the boundaries of
unconstitutionality.
3.2 ParliamentarySupremacyvs.ConstitutionalSupremacy
Thedoctrineofparliamentarysovereignty,championedbytheEnglishParliamentinthecourse
ofitslongstrugglewiththemonarchy,wasdefinedbyDiceytomean:
Parliamentthusdefinedhas,undertheEnglishconstitution,therighttomakeorunmake
any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of
EnglandashavingarighttooverrideorsetasidethelegislationofParliament.84
Thistraditionaldoctrineentailedanumberofpropositions:1)ParliamentcanpassanyActasit
pleases; 2) Parliament cannot bind itself or a successor; 3) Parliament cannot abolish the
limitationonbindingitselforasuccessor4)Parliamentrecognisesnorivallegislativeauthority
and4)thecourtsrecognisethesovereigntyofParliamentinthatthecourtswillnotdeclarean
ActofParliamentinvalidandwillnottakenoticeofhowanActofParliamentwaspassed.85
WhiletheBritishParliamentcontinuedtooperateundertheassumptionthatitwassovereign,
when Ceylon obtained independence in 1948, it did so under a written constitution. That
constitutionprovidedthatParliamentshallhavethepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order
and good governmentof the island.86Thisphrasewould havemeant plenary and unfettered
legislativeauthority87,hadnotsection29(2)imposedcertainrestrictions,primaryofwhichwas
a restrictiononcommunity and faithbased discriminatorylegislation.88Further, section29(4)
providedthatanyamendmentoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutionwouldrequireatwo-thirds
majority. While the question of whether section 29(2) was unalterable, or only imposed
procedural constraints was a key political and constitutional debate at the time, the 1972
ConstitutionwaspromulgatedwiththespecificintentionofinstitutingasovereignParliament.
84A.V.Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution, 1.85L.J.M.Cooray,(1984),ConstitutionalGovernanceinSriLanka,(2ndedition)(Colombo:StamfordLake) 11986Section29(1),Ceylon(Constitutional)OrderinCouncil,1946.(SouburyConstitution)87Note75,ConstitutionalGovernanceinSriLankawhereL.J.M.Cooraynotesthatthephrasepowertomakelawsfor
thepeace,orderanfgoodgovernmentoftheislandwasconstruedwidelytomeanplenarylawmakingpowerasample
astheImperialParliamentintheplenitudeofitspowercanbestow127.88Section29(2)read(2)Nosuchlawshall-(a)prohibitorrestrictthefreeexerciseofanyreligion;or(b)makepersons
ofanycommunityorreligionliabletodisabilitiesorrestrictionstowhichpersonsofothercommunitiesorreligionsare
notmadeliable;or(c)conferonpersonsofanycommunityorreligionanyprivilegeoradvantagewhichisnotconferred
onpersonsofothercommunitiesorreligions,or(d)altertheconstitutionofanyreligiousbodyexceptwiththeconsentof
thegoverningauthorityofthatbody,so,however,thatinanycasewhereareligiousbodyisincorporatedbylaw,nosuch
alterationshallbemadeexceptattherequestofthegoverningauthorityofthatbody:
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Fundamentaltothisprojectwaseliminatingtheprospectofjudicialreviewoflegislation.Asone
ofthe1972Constitutionscreatorsexplained:
Wearetryingtorejectthetheoryoftheseparationofpowers.Wearetryingtosaythat
nobodyshouldbehigherthantheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople,norshouldany
personnotelectedbythepeoplehavetherighttothrowoutthedecisionsofthepeople
electedbythepeople.Whyareyousayingthatajudgeonceappointedshouldhavethe
righttodeclarethatParliamentiswrong.89
AsAsangaWelikalanotesinarecentpublication,amajorsourceofdiscontentwiththeSoulbury
Constitution was on account of the government and opposition labouring under a quasi-
theological obsessionwith the Diceyan orthodoxy in regard to parliamentary sovereignty, in
whichanythingshortofillimitablelegislativeomnicompetenceseemedtodenoteanabsenceor
loss of sovereign independence90 Thus, the impetus for giving effect to the notion of
parliamentarysovereigntywasinfactfuelledbyamisplacedconflationofsovereignstatehoodas
amatterofinternationallaw91,withparliamentarysovereigntyasunderstoodintheorthodox
versionoftheEnglishdoctrine.
This fundamental category errorhaspersisted in theimagination of theSri Lankanpolitical
elite,and continuesto fuel resistanceto enablingmeaningful judicial reviewof parliamentary
action. The 1978 Constitution, which provided for a limited form of pre-enactment judicial
review, anddid not expressly affirm the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the same
manner as the 1972 Constitution, nonetheless seemed implicitly to perpetuate some of the
theoreticalassumptionsabouttheultimatesupremacyofParliament.Itcertainlydoesnotreflect
aclearandunequivocalrejectionofthedoctrine.Inanycase,forthereasonsdiscussedinsection
3.1above,the1978Constitutionsimprovementsontheprovisionsconcerningtheindependence
ofthejudiciarywereonlymarginallybetterthanitspredecessor.92Whilethe1972Constitution
limitedjudicialreviewandjudicialindependenceinthenameofparliamentarysovereignty,the
1978Constitutionunderminedthosevaluesbyengorgingthepoweroftheexecutive,themakers
ofwhichwere rathermoreconcernedwith the searchforexecutivestability.93Asaresult,the
89M.J.A.Cooray, JudicialRoleundertheConstitutionofCeylon/SriLanka,citedinProf.C.R.deSilva, TheIndependence
oftheJudiciaryUndertheSecondRepublicofSriLanka,inC.Amaratunga(Ed.)(1989), IdeasforConstitutionalReform ,
(Colombo:CouncilforLiberalDemocracy),485.90AsangaWelikala,TheFailureofJenningsConstitutionalExperimentinSriLanka:HowProceduralEntrenchmentledto
ConstitutionalRevolution,inAsangaWelikala(Ed.)(2012)Republicat40:ReflectionsonConstitutionalHistory,
TheoryandPractice ,(Colombo:CPA),19891SeeforinstanceArticle2(1),CharteroftheUnitedNations,recognisingthesovereignequalityofstates.92Foranargumentinfavourofthepropositionthatthe1978Constitutionwasmorecompatiblewiththeindependence
ofthejudiciarythanitspredecessor,seeProf.C.R.deSilva, IdeasforConstitutionalReform ,487-489.ProfdeSilva
wherehecitestheentrenchmentoftheapexcourtsthroughtheconstitutionandintroducingtheprerequisiteofproved
misbehaviourtotheimpeachmentofajudgeasexamplesofimprovements.Unhappilythough,therequirementof
provedmisbehaviourappearsnottohavebeenofanymeaningfulsignificance,atleastinrespectofthe43rdChief
Justice.
93Dr.A.J.Wilson,(1980)TheGaullistSysteminAsiaTheConstitutionofSriLanka1978 (London:MacmillanPress),
1.
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1978 Constitution orchestrated what Rohan Edrisinha terms a devaluation of Parliament;94
reducing theMember ofParliamentto amere cog in thepartywheel95in addition toother
formsofcontrolwehavediscussedinsection3.1.Morerecently,thegrowthinthenumbersof
parliamentariansbelongingtotheexecutivewherenearlyeverysinglegovernmentmemberof
ParliamentisasalariedmemberoftheexecutiveunderminesthetraditionalroleofParliament
asacheckontheexecutivebranch.
This undermining ofParliamentwasnot, however, reflected in Parliaments rolevis--vis the
courts.Aswenotedpreviously,the1978Constitutionprovidedforanattenuatedformofjudicial
reviewoflegislation.96Asamatterofdraftinghistorytoo,the1978formulationdescribingthe
exerciseofjudicialpowerdidnotmarkaradicaldeparturefromthe1972formulation.TheFirst
Republican Constitution laid down that the National State Assembly (the legislative body)
exercises judicial power through courts and other institutions created by law...97The 1978
Constitutions formulation, remarkablysimilar, also lays down that the judicialpower of the
Peopleshall beexercisedbyParliament through courts,tribunalsand institutionscreatedand
established,orrecognized,bytheConstitution,orcreatedandestablishedbylaw...98However,
courtshavegenerallyunderstoodthephrasebyParliamentthroughcourtstomeanthatcourts
are subjectto the jurisdictionallimitations imposed onthembythe constitution orstatute as
relevant.99Whilethisappearstobeasomewhatunobjectionabledistributionofcompetences,it
isnotablethatwhileexecutivepowershiftedfromtheNationalStateAssemblytothePresident
in1978,acorrespondingchangedidnottakeplaceinrespectofjudicialpower.
This fundamental continuity of Parliaments position in respect of the judicial branch has
effectively stymied any bold assertion of residual judicial power. Indeed the judiciarys own
understandingofitspowershascontributed,inpart,toadeepconservatisminitsdealingswith
Parliament. For example, the Supreme Court dismissed CPAs arguments in a constitutional
challenge brought in respect of the Monetary Law (Amendment)Bill after the Bill had been
passedbyParliamentwith a numberof significant amendments made only at the committee
stage.Becausepre-enactmentreviewoflegislationtakesplaceimmediatelyafteraBillisplaced
ontheOrderPaperofParliament,amendmentstoBillsmadeatthe(later)committeestageare
notsubjecttothescrutinyoftheSupremeCourt.Thisanomalycreatesaloopholethroughwhich
unconstitutional provisions may be enactedwithout judicial review. CPA argued that where
committeestageamendmentsareincluded,theSupremeCourtmustpreventabuseofprocessby
94RohanEdrisinha,SriLanka:ConstitutionswithoutConstitutionalism.ATaleofThreeandaHalfConstitutions ,inRohan
Edrisinha&AsangaWelikala(Eds.)(2008) EssaysonFederalisminSriLanka ,(Colombo:CPA),3295Gunawardenavs.Abeywardena,SC51/87(Spl.),SupremeCourtMinutesof18January1988.96Article121,ConstitutionofSriLankapermitspre-enactmentjudicialreview,whereacitizenispermittedtofilean
applicationintheSupremeCourtwithinoneweekofaBillbeingplacedontheorderpaperofParliament,onthebasis
thattheBillorselectedprovisionsareinconsistentwiththeConstitution.TheCourtisthengiventhreeweeksinwhichto
makeitsdetermination.InrespectofBillsdeemedurgentbyCabinet,thePresidentrequeststheSupremeCourtto
pronounceonitsvalidity.Thecourthasonlytwenty-fourhourswithinwhichtocommunicateitsdetermination.97Article5(c),FirstRepublicanConstitutionofSriLanka,1972.98Article4(c),ConstitutionofSriLanka99SeeFarookvs.Raymond,1996(1)Sri.L.R217,228.
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assertingpost-enactmentreviewinrespectofthoseamendments.Dismissingthepetition,100the
courtcitedarticle80(3),whichstates; (w)herea Bill becomeslawuponthe certificate ofthe
PresidentortheSpeaker,asthecasemaybe,beingendorsedthereon,nocourtortribunalshall
inquireinto,pronounceuponorinanymannercallinquestionthevalidityof suchActonany
ground whatsoever. The petitioners were, in effect, asking the court to exercise a residual
judicialprerogativetocheckabuseofprocess.Whilethecourtmayhavetakenamoreexpansive
viewoftheirpowertocheckblatantabuseofprocessbytheexecutiveinParliamentbyreading
into article80(3) anexception inrespectofcommitteestage amendments, itinsteadchoseto
adopt a more modest approach, significantly undermining a citizens right to challenge
unconstitutionallegislation.
Thedoctrineofparliamentarysovereignty,havingoutlived the1972Constitution,has alsore-
emergedinmoreexplicitterms.Aswehavenoted,themostrecentassertionofparliamentary
supremacywasmadeindefenceofParliamentsdecisiontoproceedwiththeimpeachmentofthe
43rdChiefJustice,despiteanopinionoftheSupremeCourtandajudgmentoftheCourtofAppeal
deemingtheprocessunconstitutional.Inhisspecialrulingrejectingthenoticesissuedonhimself
andmembersoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamentbytheCourtofAppeal,theSpeakerstated:
NopersonorinstitutionoutsideParliamenthasanyauthoritywhatsoevertoissueany
directiveeithertomeasSpeakerortoMembersoftheCommitteeappointedbyme.This
is amatterwhich falls exclusivelywithin thepurview of Parliaments authority. The
established law in this regard was exhaustively surveyed by my distinguished
predecessor, thelateHon. AnuraBandaranaikein his historic rulingdelivered in this
august Assembly on 20th June, 2001. It is clear from this ruling that the matters
concernedfallwithintheexclusivedomainofParliamentandthatnointerventioninany
formbyanyexternalagencyisconsistentwiththeestablishedprinciplesoflaw,andis
therefore to be rejected unreservedly as an unacceptable erosionof the powers and
responsibilitiesofParliament.101
Therulingcameamidstamediaflurry,withgovernmentministersandapologistsproclaiming
theincompetenceofcourtstopronounceonparliamentaryacts.Eventhemainoppositionparty
theUNPappearedtosupportthisinvocationofparliamentarysupremacy. 102Therulingby
Anura Bandaranaike, alluded to in Speaker Rajapaksas ruling, was made in response to an
interimorderissuedbytheSupremeCourtrestrainingSpeakerBandaranaikefromappointinga
SelectCommitteetoinquireintothechargespresentedbyanumberofparliamentariansagainst
100InreMonetaryLaw(Amendment)Bill,SCSpecialDetermination8/2003,April2003.
101RulingbytheHon.SpeakerontheQuestionofPrivilegeraisedbytheLeaderoftheHouseregardingSupremeCourt
Notices,ParliamentaryDebates(Hansard)Volume213No.9,29November2012,1835.
102Ibid,1836.Iwouldliketomakeparticularmentionoftheview,clearlyexpressedbytheHon.Leaderofthe
Oppositioninthecourseofhisintervention,thatthepurportedNoticesconstituteanunwarrantedinterferencewiththe
powersandproceduresofParliament,andareinvalid.ThiswasstatedwithgreatclaritybytheHon.JosephMichael
Pereraaswell.
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thethenChiefJusticeSarathSilva.ThatordertoowasbasedonanapprehensionthatStanding
Order78Awhichprovidedforinvestigationsandfindingsofguiltagainstasittingjudgebya
PSCwasinconsistentwithArticle4(c)underwhichjudicialpowerwastobeexercisedthrough
courts. Speaker Bandaranaikes ruling in Parliamentrefusing to recognise the validity of the
courtsdecisionwasheavilylacedwithreferencestoEnglishparliamentaryconventionsandwas
acategoricalreaffirmationofthesupremacyofParliament.TheSpeakerdeclared:Ideemita
singularhonourthatfatehasbestoweduponmeasSpeakerofthisaugustAssembly,byaffording
me the historic opportunity of reaffirming the principles underlining the supremacy of
Parliament (emphasis added).103The impending constitutional crisis, on that occasion, was
avertedbythedissolutionofParliamentbythePresident.However,theinternalcontradictions
within the constitutional architecture of the country that recognised the Supreme Courts
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret theconstitutionon theone hand,104whilekeeping alive the
notionofparliamentarysupremacyontheother,hadnotbeenresolved.
Thus,morethanadecadebeforethecontroversysurroundingtheimpeachmentofthe43 rdChief
Justice, Parliament had through its thenSpeaker set itself ona collision course with the
judiciaryby invoking the supremacyofParliamentand refusing to recogniseordersmade by
courts.When that eventuality came, the overmightyexecutiveweighed inagain, affirmingthe
Speakersdecisiontoproceedwiththeimpeachmentindefianceofcourtorders.
103PresInformSpeakerhaspowerappointSelectCommittee,June21.2001.Accessedat:
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200106/20010621power_to_appoint_Select_Committee.htm104SeeArticle125(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.Alsosee Premachandravs.Jayawickreme,1994(2)Sri.L.R90,98-100.
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4. ConclusionandRecommendations
The recent impeachment of the43rd Chief Justicehas revived important questions about the
healthofSriLankasdemocracy.Theviciousassaultontheindependenceofthejudiciarywhich
saw judicial officers being attacked, lawyers threatened and judgments violated was
outrageouswhenit happened,but inthe lightoftheconstitutionalweaknesses, the historyof
executivebehaviourandthecultureofpoliticsoutlinedabove,itwasalmostpre-ordained.The
Rajapaksaregimesintoleranceofdissentandcontemptforvaluesofconstitutionalismhasbeen
welldocumentedelsewhere.However,aswehaveargued,thedeclinedidnotcommencewith
the advent of the present regime. Instead, the regime inherited a constitutional and political
structure that entrenched positions that undermine the independence of the judiciary. Chief
among these are an overmightypresidency, and a political culture that has demonstrated an
enduringattachmenttothenotionofaParliamentthatissovereign.Structurallyanddoctrinally,
therefore,thepresentgovernmentinheritedaframeworkofgovernmentthatcouldreadilybe
deployedandindeedimproveduponastheEighteenthAmendmentdemonstratestoachieve
its own objectives of regime consolidation through the hyper-centralisation of power, and
without anymeaningful constitutional constraints that could prevent the realisation of such
undemocraticaims.
Recommendations
There are a number of reforms that are urgently needed in the light of the numerousviolations of legal and political principles associated with constitutional democracy that
werehighlightedintheunlawfulimpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice.Whilewearefirmly
of theview that a fundamental and thoroughgoing overhaul of Sri Lankasconstitutional
orderisnecessaryinordertoadequatelyaddresstheunresolvedissuesofdemocracyand
pluralism that have bedevilled our post-independence history, the specific matters that
require attention inregard tojudicialindependenceand the ruleoflawarethefollowing,
whichentailbothconstitutionalandstatutoryreforms.
A more robust articulation of constitutional first principles is necessary, including theprinciplesofthesupremacyoftheconstitution,theseparationofpowers,theruleoflawand
theindependenceofthejudiciary.
Thesevaluesneedtobereinforcedbyaproperframeworkanddistributionofconstitutionalpowersandfunctionsbetweenthethreeorgansofgovernment.Inparticular,independently
ofthedebateabouttheabolitionorreformofthecurrentinstitutionalformoftheexecutive
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presidencyandthealternativesthereto,thereneedstobemuchmoremeaningfulchecksand
balancesontheexecutive.
These include a strengthening of the oversight role of Parliament and the provision forcomprehensive judicial review of executive action. It follows that the pervasive legal
immunitycurrentlygrantedto thepresidentmust beabolished, inparticular immunityin
respectofactsoromissionsundercolourofoffice.
ToreinforcetheindependenceofParliament,theremustbeaconstitutionallimitationonthenumberofministers(bothCabinetanddeputies),andalimitationonMembersofParliament
holding any other remunerated office connected with the executive (e.g., as presidential
advisors).While the most appropriate framework on governing crossovers involving a
balance of principles between representation and conscience require further public
discussion,acompleteprohibitiononanyministerialorotherremuneratedexecutiveoffice
beingacceptedby anyMemberofParliamentthatcrossesoverfromtheoppositionto the
governmentbenchesmustbeimmediatelyintroduced.
The much-abused urgent bill procedure, which attenuates parliamentary and judicialsupervisionofthelegislativeprocess,mustbeabolished.
The doctrine of the supremacy of parliamentmust unequivocally be repudiated, and thesupremacy of the constitution reaffirmed. In doing so, both legislation and other
parliamentary action must be subject to comprehensive judicial review. In improving
accessibility to public law remedies and procedures (the writ and fundamental rights
jurisdictions) through repealing time limits and other procedural impediments, the first
instance fundamental rights jurisdictionmust bedevolved on the ProvincialHigh Courts,
withprovisionforappealstotheCourtofAppeal,andtotheSupremeCourtonmattersof
law.Thejudicialpowertoreviewtheconstitutionalityofanylawmustbemadeavailableto
anycourtinanyproceeding,subjecttoanecessaryappealsprocedure.
TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionmustberepealedforthwith,includingbythe
restoration of the two-term limit on presidential office. The framework for key public
appointments that wasestablished under theSeventeenth Amendmentmust be restored,
with necessary amendmentsto ensureoperational effectiveness, which shouldinclude an
expressprovisionprecludinganypresidentialdiscretioninappointmentsrecommendedby
theConstitutionalCouncil.
Theindependenceandimpartialityofjudgesneedtobeconstitutionallyreaffirmed,inlinewith contemporary standards reflected in numerous restatements of best practice in
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internationalandCommonwealthinstrumentsincludingtheBangalorePrinciplesofJudicial
Conductand the LatimerHouse Guidelines. Inaccordancewiththe ordersoftheCourt of
AppealandtheSupremeCourtintheBandaranayakeimpeachmentprocess,legislationmust
beenactedimmediatelytoprovidefortheproceduretobefollowed,themodeofproof,the
burdenofproofandthestandardofproofofanyallegedmisbehaviourorincapacity,andthe
rightoftheChiefJusticeorotherjudgeofthesuperiorcourtstoappearbeforeandbeheard
byanyParliamentarySelectCommitteeinpersonorbyrepresentative.Anyimpeachmentof
asittingjudgeshouldbecontingentonapriorfindingofguiltbyacourtoflaw.Judgesshould
notbeimpeachedonthebasisoffindingsoffactbyMembersofParliament.
The government must constructively engage international mechanisms and UN specialproceduressuchastheUNSpecialRapporteurontheIndependenceofJudgesandLawyers.
Critically,undertakingsandguaranteesmadetointernationalbodiesmustbeimplemented
ingoodfaith.Thisassumesgreaterimportancegiven thatthe governmentrepresentedby
theAttorney General in the cases involvingDr.Bandaranayakes removal objected to the
Supreme Court and Court of Appealexercising judicial reviewover Select Committees of
ParliamentconstitutedintermsofStandingOrder78A.Thispositionstandsinstarkcontrast
totheunequivocalrepresentationsmadebyagovernmentdelegationtotheHumanRights
Committee(thetreatybodyfor theInternational ConventiononCivil andPoliticalRights)
thatSelectCommitteesofParliamentconstitutedintermsofStandingOrder78Adoattract
judicialreview.105
105UNHumanRightsCommittee(HRC),UNHumanRightsCommittee:FourthPeriodicReport,SriLanka,18October
2002,CCPR/C/LKA/2002/4,para.302.Accessedat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/3efb5b894.html
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