Research Line
Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South
Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria: Understanding the Basis for the
Legitimacy of Vigilante Groups
Plangshak Musa Suchi
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers
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Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14
International Center for Violence Research – ICVR A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstraße 25 33615 Bielefeld Germany Project Webpage http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/ Violence Research and Development Project | Papers http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html Contact [email protected] The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s). Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University. If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [email protected] The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14 1
Acknowledgements The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary
results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social
science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of
the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence
research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop
scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.
For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)
entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin
City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic
University of Peru in Lima.
The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:
“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent
and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against
Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at
aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,
violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and
vigilantism.
This paper documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Violence in the
Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South”. Groups carrying out informal
non-state policing such as vigilante groups or gangs take ”the law into their own hands“ and
act in lieu of the state. They thus operate in what has been referred to as a ”twilight zone“: a
zone in which public authority is exercised not exclusively by the state but by a variety of
institutions including informal, non-state groups. For these groups to be able to exercise this
kind of authority, let alone to maintain themselves for a longer period, they have to enjoy at
least some degree of legitimacy with the members of the communities in which they operate.
Thus, this research examines the basis of legitimacy of groups carrying out informal non-
state policing in four countries of the Global South, namely Egypt, El Salvador, Nigeria, and
Peru.
Bielefeld, June 2015
Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14 2
Research Line
Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South
Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria: Understanding the Basis for the Legitimacy of Vigilante Groups
Plangshak Musa Suchi
Abstract
In this paper I analyze community members’ perceptions of two vigilante groups in the
Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State in North-Central Nigeria. The main aim is to
contribute to our understanding the foundations of vigilante groups’ legitimacy, as well as the
specific factors that influence this legitimacy. Primary data was generated from in-depth
interviews with community members, while the hybrid governance perspective provides the
basis for discussion. In the study I found that, despite criticisms of some aspects of vigilante
activities, most community members supported policing by vigilante groups and for two
reasons. First, there’s a feeling among community members that crime and insecurity are on
the increase, and second, vigilantes were easily accessible and responded to distress calls
rapidly. Apart from these two reasons, people also expressed the view that the state police
was either ineffective in preventing crime or completely absent in the communities.
Key words
Non-State Policing, Vigilantism, Legitimacy, North-Central Nigeria
Plangshak Musa Such
Plangshak Suchi is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Bingham University in
Karu and a PhD student at the University of Jos. He holds a Bachelor’s and a Master’s
degree in Sociology from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and the University of Jos,
respectively. He has participated in several research projects on criminal violence and justice
administration in Nigeria and has published some of his findings as research articles in
academic journals. He specializes in Criminology, Research Methodology and Sociology of
Law. His current research interest is private security and policing in Africa.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 3
Outline
1. Introduction
2. The urban context of vigilantism in Karu
3. Conceptual and theoretical framework
3.1. Conceptualizing vigilante groups in Nigeria
3.2. Understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante groups in Nigeria
3.3. Vigilante groups and hybrid governance
4. Sources and methods
5. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante
Group: a comparative analysis
5.1. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group
5.2. Perceptions of Mission Village Vigilante Group
5.3. Comparative analysis of community members’ perceptions of Nyanya
Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group
5.4. Major factors influencing the legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG
6. Conclusion
7. Bibliography
1. Introduction
Vigilantism is a form of informal non-state policing that can be found in many African
societies. In Nigeria the existence of vigilante groups has become increasingly ubiquitous,
particularly in urban communities. While vigilante groups have been integrated into the
official state security system in some southern and northern states1, this is not the case
everywhere. In the central states of Nigeria, such as Nasarawa for instance, vigilante groups 1 Nigeria is a Federal Republic with 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The states are grouped into six geo-‐political zones, three of which are commonly referred to as the South and two as the North. The North-‐Central zone (or middle belt region) forms the third major region of the country.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 4
are neither part of the official state security system, nor are they officially approved by state
governments2. Yet, in many communities where people feel or are actually threatened by
high levels of criminal violence, vigilante groups increasingly assume the role of the state
police. Thus, they not only patrol the communities during the night, but also deploy physical
coercion against citizens to ensure compliance with the norms of the community (Onyeonoru
2003; Agbola and Sobanjo 2003; Olaniyi 2005).
However, these norms of the community are not necessarily the same as the norms on
which Nigerian law is built. As Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974 cited in Plyler, 2007, p.
125) explain, “vigilantism consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal
boundaries of an established socio-political order, which however are intended by the
violators to defend the order from some form of subversion”. However, by applying force
vigilante groups not only (re)produce violence by using criminal means to fight crime
(Kirschner, 2011); they also appropriate state functions in ways that create an unregulated
parallel sovereign power (Nina, 2001). Following Lund (2006), one thus can say that vigilante
groups in Nigeria operate in twilight zones – areas in which public authority is not exercised
solely by the state but by a variety of local institutions, which do not necessarily enjoy legal
recognition.
The question whether vigilante groups have legitimacy is of special relevance. First,
because the vigilante groups depend on the support and collaboration of the community
members in order to be able to operate and maintain themselves for a longer period of time.
This is especially so, since – by using force – vigilante groups constantly violate the rights of
the citizens they purport to protect. Second, understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante
groups is important because, in order to effectively perform their activities, the vigilante
groups need recognition not just by the community but also by the state.
In order to understand why the state and the communities support vigilantism despite its
tendency to violence, it is essential to examine the issue of legitimacy. As Lund (2006, p.
676) argues “when an institution authorizes, sanctions or validates certain rights, the respect
or observance of these rights by people, powerful in clout or numbers, simultaneously
constitutes recognition of the authority of that particular institutions”.
Lastly, so far little effort has been made to understand the basis of the legitimacy of
vigilante groups in Nigeria, or in Africa as a whole (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004). While
Baker (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010) has shown – in various studies – that Africa’s policing
authorizers and providers are numerous and diverse, studies on vigilante groups in
particular, especially by international and human rights organizations have focused largely on 2 An interview with the State Commandant of the Nasarawa State Chapter of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) on March, 2014 at Maraba revealed that the group was still in the process of securing the Governor’s approval.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 5
documenting the experiences of their victims and examining the level of conformity of their
methods of operation to international human rights norms and standards (see e.g. Amnesty
International 2001, HRW & CLEEN 2002).
This paper focuses on two vigilante groups in the Karu area of Nasarawa State in Central
Nigeria. The first, which is known as the Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group (NGVG), is
recognized by the police and the local government authority as a registered voluntary
security provider, while the second, known as the Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG), is
not recognized as such but largely operates like the former. The paper analyses how people
from diverse socio-economic backgrounds that live in the communities where the vigilantes
operate, perceive the groups.
The purpose of the paper is to answer the following questions: (1) how do community
members from diverse backgrounds perceive the vigilante group that operates in their
community? (2) Do they accept the group and therefore consider it to be legitimate, or not?
(3) What are the factors that influence community members’ perceptions of the vigilante
group?
In the section that follows, I discuss the broader socio-economic and political context of
vigilante activities in Nigeria and the specific context within which NGVG and MVVG in Karu
evolved. In the second section, I provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for
understanding the activities of the vigilante groups and how they are perceived in the
communities before proceeding to discuss the value of using qualitative methods. This is
then followed by the presentation and analysis of the findings. Finally, in the conclusion, I
briefly discuss some of the implications of my findings.
2. The urban context of vigilantism in Karu
The involvement of vigilante groups in policing urban communities can only be understood
when placed within the broader context of the country’s political economy and its security
challenges. Nigeria is a vast, multi-ethnic and plural society with an estimated population of
over 170 million people. Economically, the country is a major oil exporter and, following a
rebasing of the economy in April 2014, it now ranks as the biggest economy in Africa3.
This ‘growth’ in the country’s economy is, however, yet to translate into development
throughout the country as Nigeria still grapples with major development challenges, including
unemployment, inequality and poverty. According to Osaze and Oshita (2007, p. 112-3),
3 See http://leadership.ng/business/373087/rebased-‐gdp-‐opportunities-‐capital-‐market (accessed on November 3, 2014).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 6
Nigeria is experiencing “the lure of ‘petro-dollar’, underdeveloped agriculture, narrowing
opportunities for the population, accelerating corruption among elites, and, the increasing risk
of conflict over oil money”. Consequently, there is a huge gap between rural and urban areas
in favor of the latter when it comes to having “access to opportunities to fulfill personal and
societal desires” (Chant and McIlwaine 2009, p. 13). The perceived prospects of
employment, improved security, and available welfare amenities is pulling many to the
capital, Abuja, its satellite towns, and indeed other major cities of Nigeria, while rural poverty,
Boko Haram, and other forms of civil disturbances are pushing many away from the rural
areas (Baker 2002; Alubo 2006).
Karu is a Local Government Area (LGA) in Nasarawa – a state next to the Federal Capital
Territory and the city of Abuja. According to the 2006 National Population Census, the
population of Karu was 216,230, but due to its proximity to the country’s capital, the area is
among the fastest growing urban settlements in the world, with an annual growth rate of 40
per cent (NPC 2010; Peace Works News, 2002). Karu’s rapid urbanization is taking place in
the context of increased efforts by the government to restore the officially approved building
plan for Abuja. In practice, this translates into the systematic demolition of shantytowns – a
measure which so far has rendered hundreds of thousands of people homeless and
necessitated their relocation to satellite settlements, including those in Karu LGA. This
development in turn was not only accompanied by a real and perceived increase in violent
crime such as armed robberies, burglaries, kidnappings, car and motor bike snatchings, as
well as rape, but it has also created a situation in which many minority groups living in
isolated urban areas have been neglected by the police (Baker 2002).
To compound the situation, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has over the years proven to
be corrupt, inefficient, unfriendly and brutal toward citizens, as well as ineffective in
controlling urban and criminal violence (Alemika 1993; Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004).
Worse still, security and the rule of law in Nigeria are weak and vital state institutions are
captured by primordial or sectarian interests, thus subverting the emergence and
sustainability of a capable state (Alemika, 2013, p. 22). In this situation, many ordinary
community members ensure security through local arrangements such as those upheld by
vigilante groups.
Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) both are
of two these groups. Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group (NGVG) is named after the
residential community in which it operates – i.e. Nyanya Gwandara. The community, which is
located in Karu District, is one of the rapidly developing settlements found around the Keffi-
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 7
Abuja expressway4. It was built in three phases or time periods, namely phase ‘A’, phase ‘B’,
and phase ‘C’. Phase A is when the first group of inhabitants built their houses, phase B is
when inhabitants who came to Nyanya Gwandara later built their houses, and phase C is the
latest building phase. Besides the Gwandara and the Gbagi, who are both indigenous to the
area and are largely concentrated in phase A, the residents come from different parts of the
country. In terms of state policing, the area is covered by the Masaka (a neighboring
community) Divisional Police Station. However, due to the distance between Masaka and
Nyanya Gwandara, it is difficult for the police to effectively police the area5.
According to the Chief6 of Nyanya Gwandara community, NGVG was created in 1999 at
the request of all landlords in response to an increase in cattle rustling and goat theft. As the
leader of the community, the Chief played a prominent role in the screening of those to be
engaged as vigilante members. However, other members of the community maintain that
NGVG was created on the initiative of the Chief, who singlehandedly established the
vigilante group7.
At the inception of the vigilante group in Nyanya Gwandara, the vigilantes were few in
number. They used rudimentary weapons such as cutlasses, machetes, as well as bows and
arrows. They barely benefited financially from the work as it was largely regarded as
community service8. As the population of the community grew, and the pattern of crime
became more complex and violent, however, it became increasingly difficult for the vigilante
group to effectively fight crime9. The vigilante group nevertheless increased in size and
members were paid monthly stipends of 5000 to 10,000 Nairas10. Eventually, the group
registered with the police as a voluntary policing group11, and as a branch of the Vigilante
Group of Nigeria (VGN)12. As a branch of the VGN, the NGVG members are now entitled to
4 The Keffi-‐Abuja Expressway is the major road that links the northern part of the country to the Federal Capital Territory. Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village communities are situated along this expressway. 5 Interview with a district police officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 6 Generally speaking, a Chief is a leader of a political system based on kinship. In the cases described in this study, he is an important political figure in the communities and as such, plays a prominent role in the provision of security. 7 Interviews with landlords (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 8 Interview with the Chief of Nyanya Gwandara (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 9 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 10 Naira is the local currency. 5000 to 10,000 Nairas corresponds to approximately US$ 8 to16. 11 Registration with the police usually consists of informing the local police authority about the existence of a vigilante group, and by submitting the names and copies of identification cards of the members to the police for approval. 12 Vigilante Group of Nigeria is an umbrella organization of local vigilante groups founded over 20 years ago with the mission to ensure security and safety for all citizens in Nigeria’s communities. All members of VGN are guided by the organization’s constitution and benefit from its training programs. For details see http://vigilantegroupnig.com.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 8
uniforms, to ID cards, and to basic trainings on security strategies. According to the leader of
NGVG, cooperation with the police and registration with the VGN helped to enhance their
legitimacy and effectiveness, because of the recognition by the police and the training they
received from the VGN13.
Finally, although the list of members of NGVG indicated a total of 47 vigilantes when
fieldwork was conducted, interviews with the leader of the group revealed that only 24
members were active. It’s these members who patrol the three major areas that make up
Nyanya Gwandara with its rapidly growing population.
Unlike NGVG, Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) evolved from a security committee
constituted by members of the community (Mission Village community is also known as
ERCC) almost ten years ago to coordinate the provision of policing in the context of growing
insecurity. According to the Chief of the community, at the inception of the security
arrangement, landlords not only authorized but also provided security in the absence of a
police station in the community. They were directly involved in night patrols on a rotational
basis. However, over time, a number of landlords were no longer comfortable with patrolling
at night and pursuing their basic occupation during the day. Thus, sometime around 2011 the
community decided to form a vigilante group that was paid from monthly contributions of
community members. It started with two vigilantes who were considered to be effective. From
there it kept expanding, until it reached a point where the community started experiencing
funding problems due to the withdrawal of support from some landlords. As a consequence
of these problems, some charismatic members of the MVVG withdrew their services and the
group was no longer considered to be as effective as it used to be in the early period of its
existence14.
Both, VGNG and MVVG, punish minor and major crimes such as gang fights and public
disturbances, drug offenses such as cocaine and marijuana smoking; property crimes such
as theft and shoplifting as well as crimes, such as rape, kidnapping and homicides. However,
VGNG and MVVG also subject certain members of the community to social control and
impose what they consider to be community norms or moral principles. Thus, strolling the
street late at night is prohibited by both.
Incidentally, members of NGVG channel most of their energy into the arrest of marijuana
smokers and not into fighting serious crime. NGVG regards smoking marijuana as well as
dealing with it as dangerous and ‘crimogenic’, which is why they acted against youths who
got involved with it. According to their leader:
13 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 14 Interview with the Chief of Mission Village and the former leader of MVVG (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 9
“When youths smoke ‘wee-wee’15, they behave in dangerous manners. Some of them will
carry axe to fight their parents at home; some will engage in street fights using knives; and
some will use weapons to go and rob. Because when they smoke this ‘wee-wee’, they lost
all sense of judgment”16.
When NGVG hands over alleged drug users to the police and the police release them, the
vigilantes re-arrest them and hand them over to the Nigerian drug law enforcement agency,
the NDLEA 17 . The worst category of people in the community as far as NGVG was
concerned, were cocaine dealers and consumers. According to the leader, “any cocaine
smoker is an armed robber”, which is why:
“Anywhere cocaine jungle [i.e. market for the sale and consumption of cocaine] is, we try
to burn it out. Recently, I organized my boys and we went and burnt the only cocaine
jungle in Nyanya Gwandara. We put petrol, burn the houses and arrested one of the
cocaine dealers who was in possession of a pestle. We sentenced him down to the state
Criminal Investigation Department and they sentenced him to 2 years imprisonment”18.
Despite certain commonalities, there are also major differences between the two vigilante
groups. The differences relate to the size of their membership, their registration status with
the police and the national Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) as well as the urban context of
their vigilante activities. While NGVG has a larger membership, is registered with VGN and
the local police authority, MVVG has only few members and is not registered. Secondly,
Mission Village Community is less urbanized than Nyanya Gwandara. It is a new community
that developed a few years after the demolition of shantytowns in the Federal Capital
Territory in the mid-2000s forced residents to look for an alternative place of settlement. In
summary, it can be said that NGVG is part of a broader informal policing structure that has
wider recognition among stakeholders in Nigeria, while MVVG is at best a local arrangement,
whose scope of recognition is limited to the community of Mission Village.
3. Conceptual and theoretical framework
3.1 Conceptualizing vigilante groups in Nigeria
In this paper vigilante groups are conceptualized as non-state policing organizations,
consisting of individuals drawn from within a particular community or, approved by the
15 ‘Wee-‐wee’ is the local term for marijuana among Hausa speakers in Nyanya Gwandara. 16 Interview with the leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 17 NDLEA stands for the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. 18 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 2, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 10
community to enforce locally defined norms of conduct, directed at preventing and controlling
criminal violence and other social infractions through various measures, including coercion.
This conceptualization draws heavily on Olaniyi’s (2005) definition, which emphasizes the
fact that vigilante groups are largely informal and composed of volunteers, often funded
through communal contributions. The use of non-state policing here basically assumes that
the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the formal conduit through which state authority is
exercised, and that it is therefore the primary agent of formal state policing (Hills, 2000). At
the same time, it implies that policing goes beyond what the police does and includes "any
organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security, and
peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, resolution, and
punishment” (Baker 2010, p. 9). Attention therefore is focused on policing rather than the
police.
3.2 Understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante groups in Nigeria
Legitimacy is “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”
(Hurd 1999: 381 cited in Schmelzle, 2011:8). Following this definition, a vigilante group
enjoys legitimacy when the members of the community in which vigilante groups operate
believe that the rules and decisions implemented by the vigilante group are justified and that
the right to enforce these rules and decisions coercively lies with the vigilante group. As
such, legitimacy is an important explanatory variable, since the belief in the normative
authority of vigilante groups can produce stable compliance without costly enforcement
mechanisms (Schmelzle, 2011).
The literature on vigilante groups in Nigeria indicates that vigilante groups generally enjoy
a high degree of popular support from the local communities in which they operate. Among
scholars who have emphasized the role of violence and those who have stressed the value
of community policing alike, vigilante activities are often portrayed as community responses
to crime (such as an increase in the rate of armed robbery and burglary) that hasn’t been
contained by the state (Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Pratten 2008; Baker 2010; Joseph
and Rothfuss 2014).
As Baker (2002, p. 146) points out, however, although vigilante groups may improve the
protection of people from crime or the threat thereof and are widely popular, their rise also
can lead to “an escalation of violence”. This assertion is confirmed by other authors, such as
Kirschner (2011), who claim that vigilante groups (re)produce violence by using coercion to
ensure compliance. Further, Higazi’s (2008) analysis of the activities of vigilantes and militias
in the lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria, shows that violence can reconfigure social
relations in ways that can transform vigilante groups into militia groups based on ethnic,
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 11
religious and other forms of identities. Thus, even though vigilante groups seem to enjoy a
high degree of support, it is not clear what factors influence their legitimacy.
Joseph and Rothfuss (2014, p. 170) provide us with a theoretical foundation for
understanding the conditions that have prompted ordinary residents in the context of urban
and criminal violence to engage in “profiling the “other”, and social-spatially demarcating their
neighborhoods by means of border narratives and discursive construction of identities”. From
the perspective they offer, many communities in Nigeria form vigilante groups because of the
“fear of repeated violence and consistent failure of the state to deliver on its promise to
guarantee the security of life and property of its citizens” (ibid., p. 168).
All of these studies are valuable in helping us to understand the intersection between
vigilantism and other issues of political struggle in the Nigerian society. However, so far most
studies have focused on southern Nigeria. Studies on the North (e.g. Olaniyi 2005, 2011;
Casey 2007, 2010 and Last, 2008) and on Central Nigeria (e.g. Higazi 2008) haven’t yet
addressed the issue of legitimacy of vigilante groups.
The closest attempt at addressing the question was Alemika and Chukwuma's (2004)
study. It provides a comprehensive understanding of the expectations, priorities and
perceptions of people living in poverty in Nigeria with respect to safety and security in
general and informal policing structures in particular. However, the study didn’t analyze
specific cases of vigilantism, nor did it focus on the factors that influence the legitimacy of the
vigilante groups.
3.3 Vigilante groups and hybrid governance
Following Garland (1996), the pervasiveness of vigilantism in Africa and the increasing
exercise of violence in the ‘twilight zone’ (Lund, 2006) by vigilante groups reveals the “myth
of the sovereign state” (Garland, 1996 cited in Shearing and Wood 2003, p. 403). The
ubiquity of vigilantism is not only evidence of the fact that the state fails to provide adequate
security for its citizens. It also puts in question the notion put forward by classical political
science that there is a state monopoly on the use of legitimate violence.
Thus, state-centric perspectives of policing, which are based on an ideal of autonomous,
territorially bounded nation-states with a monopoly on violence face a number of difficulties
when it comes to explaining vigilantism. The phenomenon raises important questions not just
about the capacity of the state to discharge its primary responsibility of guaranteeing
security, but more importantly, about the legitimacy of vigilante groups, particularly with
regard to the use of violence.
As an alternative perspective to state-centric notions of policing, the hybrid governance
perspective emphasizes the role of informal non-state institutions that exercise public
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 12
authority alongside the state and provide different kinds of services such as security
(Meagher, 2012, p. 1075). Analogous to concepts such as ‘networked governance’
(Crawford, 2006) or ‘nodal governance’ (Shearing and Wood 2003), this perspective claims
that with the (re)involvement of citizens in the provision of security, the state is no longer the
sole actor carrying out policing activities. What is emphasized instead is the “constructive
role of violence in clearing away the wreckage of dysfunctional post-colonial states and
catalyzing more authentic processes of state formation from locally-embedded systems of
order and authority” (Meagher, 2012, p. 1076).
However, the question remains how and for whom informal non-state institutions such as
vigilante groups actually “work”, in the sense of who actually “benefits” from their activities.
Hence, Meagher (2012: 1073) criticized the hybrid governance perspective for
“essentializing” informal regulatory systems, disguising coercion and political capture as
popular legitimacy”. She argues for “a more empirical and comparative approach to hybrid
governance that is capable of distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of
non-state order, and sharpens rather than blurs the relationship between formal and informal
regulation” (Meagher 2012, p.1073). It is in light of this critique that this study empirically
investigates how community members in Karu perceive vigilante groups and which factors
influence their perceptions of these groups.
4. Sources and method
Field research started with a preliminary survey of the number of vigilante groups recognized
by local authorities in Karu, involving interviews with district police authorities, local
government officials and community leaders in the area. The mapping exercise revealed that
vigilante groups operated in all five districts of Karu LGA and that there was virtually no
community that did not have one form of vigilante group or another. Consequently, purposive
sampling (Yusuf, 2003) was used to select two vigilante groups (Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante
Group, and Mission Village Vigilantes) for an in-depth analysis, while utilizing quota sampling
(Yusuf, 2003) in the selection of interview partners from different segments of the
communities. The choice of the vigilante groups/communities was largely influenced by
considerations such as the urban context of the groups’ activities as well as access to
gatekeepers.
Key informants in the study included leaders of the vigilante groups, representatives of
local government and police officials as well as leaders of the communities. Other
participants included women and men from different socio-economic strata, with different
religious backgrounds (Christian and Muslim communities); from different ethnic groups
(indigenous and non-indigenous groups); youths, landlords, and tenants as well as residents
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 13
from various occupational backgrounds such as shop owners, commercial motor cycle riders,
commercial taxi drivers, petty-traders, civil servants, school teachers, and bricklayers.
Primary data was generated using qualitative methods (Bickman and Rog, 1998),
including interviews with vigilante groups and community members as well as participant
observation. Participant observation not only offered a chance to interact with ordinary
community members and participate in the vigilante groups’ activities. It also gave the
researcher the opportunity to observe more closely the practice of vigilantism including the
attitude of vigilante members to vigilantism, the methods of operation of the group, the
attitude of community members toward the group and the relationship of the group with the
police. Interviews afforded the respondents the opportunity to share their perceptions of the
vigilante groups in their own words in as detailed a way as possible, which would not have
been possible with a questionnaire.
From February to May 2014, twelve in-depth interviews with key informants and 44 short
interviews with other participants were conducted. The secondary data consisted of official
records from the Karu Local Government Secretariat. They included records on the number
and distribution of districts/chieftaincies and wards, as well as on the economic activities of
community members, police records on the number of registered vigilante groups and
records of the vigilante groups themselves.
5. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group: a comparative analysis
Community members’ perceptions vary significantly according to their social background.
This variation in perception appears to be associated with the degree to which they felt
involved in the provision of security, and the extent to which they had benefited from the
presence of the vigilantes.
On the one hand, a vast majority of the community members interviewed in both Nyanya
Gwandara and Mission Village regarded the vigilante groups as ‘community police’, created
by the people to enforce communal order and report crimes to the police. For this category of
community members, establishing the two vigilante groups was seen as very positive. This is
why they strongly accepted the groups and their activities, especially because the vigilantes
were perceived as contributing positively to improving the security of people and property.
On the other hand however, there was a small minority of community members who felt
marginalized when it came to decisions taken by the vigilante groups, or felt neglected by the
vigilante group itself because they were defined as non-indigenes or non-natives to the
community. For this category of community members, NGVG and MVVG represented the
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interests of a particular section of the community, which is why they rejected the groups and
their activities.
In what follows, I present in detail what community members perceived to be positive and
negative aspects of NGVG and MVVG and the reasoning behind these perceptions. In a
second step, I then compare and analyze the similarities and differences in perceptions
between the two communities. Finally, I distill the factors that appeared to have a major
influence on the legitimacy of the groups.
5.1 Perceptions of the Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group
According to a district police officer in Masaka, NGVG is a voluntary private security
organization constituted by the community to provide night patrol services within Nyanya
Gwandara and to report any crime to the police19. The police regarded the activities of NGVG
as important and their existence was a source of relief for the police, which is why the district
police in the jurisdiction strongly supported NGVG. In the view of a district police officer:
“Security is everybody’s business, it is not only the police that should secure lives and
property and they can’t do it alone. For the police to be successful in fighting criminal
violence, they need to partner with vigilantes. Police are not magicians; neither are they
prophets who decipher where a crime may be committed or who the criminals within the
community are. But majority of the vigilante members are members of that community
who have formed themselves as a group to check mate crime and criminality in their area,
so they act as informants to the police”20.
It is for reasons such as the gathering of information that the police in Karu also welcomed
partnerships with similar groups such as NGVG. What’s more, the police was quite
instrumental in reinvigorating the practice of vigilantism in other communities of Karu.
According to the police spokesperson and facilitator of a new vigilante initiative in New
Nyanya 21 community, the less than 120 policemen deployed in the area were grossly
inadequate to police the communities. Therefore, the police supported the creation of new
vigilante groups:
“Those victims robbed; whenever they come to us [the police] with reports of robbery
victimization, we educate them on how to form a local vigilante [group]. From April 2013,
almost about 30 units of local vigilante groups […] have been established. The police hold
19 Interview with a district police authority (March 5, 2014, Masaka Police Station). 20 Interview with a district police officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 21 New Nyanya is a neighbouring community south of Nyanya Gwandara that also has a vigilante group.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 15
meetings with these groups twice in every month. Over 120 youths have been jailed as a
result of their [the vigilante’s] activities and the areas have been stabilized from crime due
to this partnership with the vigilante groups”22.
NGVG also enjoyed a strong degree of support from the Chief of Nyanya Gwandara
community. Thus, the Chief explained that members of NGVG were well known and selected
by the community, particularly by himself, and presented to the police for screening. The
Chief not only supported NGVG. He also claimed that the majority of community members
agree with him. Thus, in the Chief’s view, “the people of Nyanya Gwandara accept the
vigilante group completely” because the vigilantes “are always available and accessible.
They are law abiding citizens who do not engage in crimes, nor perpetrate injustice” 23.
The leader of NGVG equally believed that his group enjoys popular support from the
community and claimed that “the average person accepts the vigilante group by 100 per
cent”. The reason for this was that the vigilantes “don’t allow evil to come to the community”
and they “don’t support evil”. According to him, “even though you are my brother, when you
commit an offense, I will deal with you accordingly”24.
Apart from those directly involved in establishing the vigilante groups, a substantial
number of ordinary community members equally indicated acceptance and support for
NGVG. According to the chairman of the association of commercial motorcycle riders, “there
is nothing the police was doing to the community” which is why he “likes and accepts the
vigilante”. He continued by saying that “honestly, I don’t see any fault in the vigilante. I am
happy with them. They only need to be encouraged by employing more hands”25. Similarly, a
trader in the community contended “we [the market traders] don’t have problem with the
vigilante group, we like them” 26 . A member of the Christian community justified his
acceptance of NGVG with the group’s speed of response and their mode of operation: “the
vigilantes are usually rapid in their response to distress call and they have good mode of
operation that is known to the community members” and was convinced that nearly all
members of his neighborhood share similar opinions because “the vigilante group operates
an open door policy and they are accessible to all"27. This view corroborated that of other
community members who mentioned ‘accessibility’ as main reason for supporting the
22 Interview with a district crime officer (March 12, 2014, New Nyanya). 23 Interview with a community leader (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 24 Interview with leader of the vigilante group (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 25 Interview with chairman of the association of commercial motorcycle riders (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 26 Interview with a market trader (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 27 Interview with a member of the Christian community (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 16
vigilante group28. A tenant in Nyanya Gwandara summarized the reasons for endorsing
policing by NGVG as follows: “NGVG is contributing to improving the security situation in the
community. Crime level in Nyanya Gwandara is generally low now largely because of the
presence of the vigilante group"29.
However, there also were residents of Nyanya Gwandara community who either never
supported NGVG from the beginning, or were no longer satisfied with the level of
performance of the group. For example, unlike the chairman of the commercial motorcycle
riders association cited above, some members of the association did not support NGVG.
According to a member of the association, “I am not in a position to tell you whether I like the
vigilante or not. But I think they are more of a problem to us than a solution. They asked us to
stop work from 10pm but I am not comfortable with this because it’s the time we usually
make good business” 30 . Moreover, it was striking that nearly all community members
interviewed in the month of May in Nyanya Gwandara were similarly dissatisfied with the
vigilante group and rejected their activities. According to a landlord in the community:
“We are no longer satisfied with the level of performance of the vigilante group, and as I
speak with you now, we have stopped making use of the vigilante. Last week, there was a
meeting of the association of landlords and it was resolved that the vigilante stands
dissolved due to the fact that they are no longer doing their job well”31.
As the low rate of support in May indicates, support for NGVG largely depends on how the
members of the community perceive the quality of its performance. Thus, an official of the
landlord association in Nyanya Gwandara explained that:
“At the beginning the Gwandara vigilante group was performing its work according to
specifications, and the average person was satisfied, as it became clear to members who
the rate of crime in the community had dropped. However, in most recent time, many
landlords are no longer paying their contribution to support the group due to lack of
satisfaction with their performance. As a result, the vigilante group has not been paid their
monthly allowances for some time now. Therefore the group is no longer working“32.
Support for NGVG was not only shrinking, but its authority to enforce local order was
questioned. The decline in the capacity of the vigilante group to effectively prevent and
28 Interviews with two landlords in Nyanya Gwandara (February 28, 2014). 29 Interview with a tenant (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 30 Interview with a commercial motorcycle rider (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 31 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 32 Interview with an official of the association of landlords (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 17
control crime in the community as well as the resultant loss of confidence in the group among
community members was such that some suspected the vigilantes to be the perpetrators of
criminal violence in the area. For example, a member of the community reported a recent
incident of armed robbery of which many people suspected the vigilante group33. Moreover,
some community members accused NGVG of favoring the indigenous population at the
expense of community members who come from other parts of the country. A landlord in the
community complained that “most of the vigilante members are indigenes or natives of
Gwandara and so they tend to protect the interest of the Gwandara people” 34.
Others alleged that the vigilante group only acted in the interests of the Chief. An official of
the association of landlords in the community thus claimed:
“The vigilantes are only answerable to the community Chief and it is only his bidding that
the group are doing. The Chief is not carrying other people along and most of their
meetings are restricted to Gwandara indigenes that are largely concentrated around the
Chief’s palace”35.
Still others expressed concern over the vigilantes behavior. They criticized them for their
involvement in the harassment and rape of women as well as for drinking alcohol and using
drugs when on duty, which often impaired their judgments and sometimes pushed them into
criminality36. Even the police – despite their preference for partnerships with vigilante groups
– lamented that NGVG was exceeding its boundaries. According to a police spokesman:
“The vigilante group even have an office and a prison cell. Through our investigation and
complaints received from members of the public, we established that the vigilantes have
investigated cases of rape, collected money from suspects and settled a number of cases
without informing us”37.
This allegation was confirmed by other members of the community38.
5.2 Perceptions of Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG)
Unlike NGVG, Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) is not recognized by the police
because the community and in particular the leadership of the vigilante group did not inform
33 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 34 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 35 Interview with an official of the landlord association (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 36 Interview with a landlord (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 37 Interview with a district crime officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 38 Group interview with community members (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 18
the police about their existence39. Neither is the group known to the Nasarawa State chapter
of Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN).
According to the Chief of Mission Village (addressed as Mai-Angwa in Hausa) MVVG is a
security actor that brings about calm and peace in situations of disputes. According to him,
“the vigilante members can tell two fighters to stop fighting or else be arrested and dragged
to the police station and the fighters will stop because the vigilantes are like security men in
the community”40. The order enforced by the vigilante group thus is locally defined and the
Chief plays a prominent role in its definition. It is the Mai-Angwa in consultation with
community members for instance that established the rule that free movement of people and
goods were to be restricted between midnight and 4 am, and it is largely this rule that MVVG
enforces. According to the Mai-Angwa:
“The vigilantes are here for community service. Their duties are to prevent crimes and
restrict movement usually from midnight till daytime. Nobody should conduct any activity.
Anybody found to be moving late at night will be detained by the vigilantes, and if the
person proves stubborn, the vigilantes will tie the person and make sure he or she goes
nowhere”41.
As far as the Chief was concerned, it was in the interests of the average individual and family
that the community be protected by the vigilantes42. Consequently, anybody found outside
his house or walking in the streets of Mission Village late at night was treated as a crime
suspect by MVVG.
Like his counterpart in Nyanya Gwandara, the Mai-Angwa of Mission Village claimed that
MVVG was delivering a great service to the community. He supported the vigilante group
largely because “of the night job they are doing which has drastically lessoned the rate of
crime” and because “the police is very distant to the community and always finds it difficult to
respond rapidly. But the vigilante is prompt in its response to crime because they are within
the community”43.
Other members of the community supported the vigilante group because it contributed to
crime prevention. It was the sole security provider available and was accessible to all
inhabitants of Mission Village. Thus, a middle-age female tenant explained:
39 As the leader of the vigilante group explained, this was largely due to the fact that there was no police station close to Mission Village when the vigilante group was established. However, according to the same person, arrangements were made to seek approval by the police. 40 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 41 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 42 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 43 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 19
“Well, we bless God because when I came to Mission Village newly, within the first few
months, before you know it, you will hear people shouting: “Thieves, Thieves!!!”. There is
one man who is one of the first settlers to this community, I am aware thieves attacked
him not just once but about five times. But since the inception of this vigilante, the people
in the community now sleep like babies”44.
The woman supported the group because in her view, “the vigilantes promote peace in the
community”45. However, even though many members of the community supported MVVG,
support was not unanimous. On the contrary, many saw MVVG’s handling of things and their
activities as well as performance critically. Hence, the chairman of the association of
landlords in Mission Village explained that:
“Everybody down to the last person in Mission Village accepts the vigilante especially
from the inception because of their contribution to crime prevention, but over time, the
people became discouraged due to lack of financial accountability”.46
Expressions of support thus were often followed by one criticism or another. According to a
female shop owner in Mission Village:
“I support the vigilante group and welcome their activities but sometimes I wonder where
the vigilantes are when criminal activities are taking place. There was a time thieves came
to my shop and steal at night, so I wonder where the vigilante was. Sometimes I suspect
the vigilantes to be the criminals in the community”47.
The same shop owner also explained that the vigilante group “sometimes try to extort money
from shop owners by requesting them to pay money twice in a month” which she described
as “unfair”48. Similarly, a female tenant indicated support for MVVG in the community, but
expressed concern about certain aspects of their activities especially “their constant
emphasis on money”49. According to her, “the vigilantes are always disturbing us to pay
monthly contribution and even when we tell them our husbands are not around, they will
insist that we should pay the money from our purse”50. She added:
44 Interview with a tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 45 Interview with a tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 46 Interview with the chairman of the association of landlords (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 47 Interview with a shop owner in the community, (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 48 Interview with a shop owner in the community (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 49 Interview with a female tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 50 Interview with a female tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village,).
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“The other problem is they are often not there to prevent crimes and even to apprehend
criminals. Recently, there was a case of car theft in our neighborhood and during the
incident they were not around. One wonders were the vigilantes were and what kind of
patrol they were doing?”51.
This kind of dissatisfaction with the level of performance of the vigilante group was
widespread among community members in Mission Village. However, at the time of research
they were still willing to entertain the vigilante group rather than being without any security
provider at all.
5.3 Comparative analysis of community members’ perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara
Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group
There are several similarities and differences in community members’ perceptions of Nyanya
Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group. First, in both Nyanya
Gwandara and Mission Village, local authorities, particularly the Chiefs in the community,
strongly support the vigilante groups. The Chiefs were instrumental in establishing the
vigilante groups and therefore believe that they are contributing positively to security in the
communities. However, unlike NGVG, which was supported by the police because it made
itself known and obtained approval right from the beginning, MVVG did not benefit from any
support by state authorities.
Second, in both communities respondents reported a feeling of ambivalence toward the
vigilante groups. This feeling of ambivalence was higher in Mission Village community than in
Nyanya Gwandara. While in Mission Village the ambivalence was mainly linked to the
question of effectiveness of the vigilante group in combating criminal violence, in Nyanya
Gwwandara it was the result of the feeling that the vigilante group only represented the
interests of the Chief and concomitantly the Gwandara. Accordingly there was a higher
tendency among the indigenous community members to support the vigilante group in
Nyanya Gwandara. In Mission Village on the other hand this was not an issue. What
preoccupied community members there was the inability of the vigilante group to apprehend
criminals. Thus, the cases investigated seem to indicate that support for vigilante groups is
influenced by community members’ evaluation of the contribution of the groups to reducing
the rate of crime in the community as well as whether the group was working for the common
good or the good of a section of the community.
Notwithstanding these differences, it is clear that the majority of respondents in both
communities regarded the respective vigilante groups as being the major informal policing
organization available and accessible to them. Despite criticizing some of the activities of the 51 Interview with a female tenant in Mission Village, (March 28, 2014).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 21
vigilante groups, many of the community members who were interviewed supported the
vigilante groups, due to the growing fear of crime and insecurity, satisfaction with the speed
with which the groups responded to distress calls, as well as general satisfaction with their
presence in the communities. Another reason for their support was the ineffectiveness or
absence of a capable state police that could effectively prevent crime.
This finding corroborates and confirms the major result of Alemika and Chukwuma’s
(2004) study on the Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria, in which a majority of respondents
indicated acceptance and support for informal policing and their modus operandi because
they were seen to be effective in the protection of neighborhoods from criminal attacks,
provided speedy safety and security services, and were closer to the people than the state
police. It also gives credibility to Olaniyi’s (2005) major finding on Community Vigilantes in
Metropolitan Kano which says that the emergence of vigilante groups was the result of an
increase in urban forms of crime such as armed banditry, of a lack of confidence in the
police, and of a reduction by the state in social provisioning.
Studies conducted elsewhere in Africa further validate these findings. Buur’s (2005) study
for instance, found that the most important reason the Amadlozi – a vigilante group operating
in the townships of the city of Port Elizabeth – were so successful was because they reacted
to crime instantaneously and in a manner that suited the needs of most of the townships
residents. In the same vein, Baker (2002, p. 160) argues that the crime control element of
vigilantism in South Africa was partly fuelled by “an attraction to vigilantism's criminal justice
framework which upholds the values of compensatory justice, immediate justice and
capital/corporal justice”. Perhaps, it is this value of compensatory justice, immediate justice
and corporal justice that explains why NGVG, for example, has its office and prison cell and
adjudicates on complaints and settles cases without informing the police.
Arguably, the fact that, despite their ambivalent feelings toward their respective vigilante
groups, community members in Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village were nevertheless in
favor of the groups is to be seen against the backdrop of Sen and Pratten’s (2007, p. 3)
observation that vigilantism is a “cheap” form of policing. According to Sen and Pratten (ibid.)
“increasingly, questions of accountability and legitimacy in policing are less important than
'what is available', 'what works best', and 'what can I afford'”. However, the fact that a
substantial number of community members who welcomed the activities of the vigilante
groups in Nyanya Gwandara in the beginning were no longer satisfied with their work at the
end of the fieldwork, shows how volatile vigilante groups are and how easily some of them
can be seen to only represent the interests of a particular section of the community. Vigilante
groups often have a short life span and are often organized as ad-hoc arrangements. The
members may join the groups today and stay till tomorrow, but hardly stay for a longer
period.
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With regard to individual members’ motivation to join a vigilante group, it seems that
Jenson’s (2007) submission that vigilante activities are mainly performed out of self-interest
has some potency. In both communities, the vigilante groups were accepted by community
members in the early period of formation and members supported their activities either
directly or financially. With the passage of time, however, many thought the vigilante groups
made less of an effort or had themselves become the criminals. As the case of Nyanya
Gwandara illustrates, many believed that the vigilante group’s members were primarily
interested in the money and in setting rules for community. According to these community
members, when the vigilantes weren’t paid on time, the crime rate in the community
increased. The group of landlords, which formed the vigilante group in Mission Village on the
other hand, did so to protect their property and families and not necessarily the entire
community.
5.4 Major factors influencing the legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG
From the foregoing analysis of how community members perceive NGVG and MVVG, six
factors can be identified as important for the legitimacy of the groups. First and most
important, are costs and effectiveness. The legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG strongly
depends on whether or not community members can afford the groups’ services and whether
or not the vigilante groups actually reduce the levels of crime and violence in the
communities. As shown in the analysis, when the level of crime in Nyanya Gwandara was
perceived to be low in the first quarter of 2014, people attributed the success to the NGVG
and therefore supported them financially. But, when the rate was perceived to have
increased from April on, the vigilantes were perceived as ineffective and many withdrew their
financial support. Similarly, in Mission Village, respondents complained bitterly about the
inability of the vigilante group to deal with the increasing rate of car thefts and burglary in the
community. Thus, the vigilante groups’ lack of capacity to fight crime and poor performance
contributed to their delegitimization.
Second – and related to the factor mentioned above – is whether the vigilante groups
respond to distress calls of community members regardless of their ethnic group, religion,
class or gender. Despite their inability to deal with increasing rates of car thefts and burglary,
MVVG for example enjoyed relatively high levels of support because it treated community
members equally. Support for NGVG, on the other hand, decreased as the group was seen
to serve particular interests only. NGVG’s tendency to favor community members who are
indigenous to the community and to represent sectional interests at the expense of non-
indigenous community members can thus also be seen as a delegitimizing factor.
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Third, besides the norms themselves, which were the subject of controversy within the
communities, the methods employed by the vigilante groups in enforcing community norms
such as nightly restrictions on freedom of movement of people and goods, as well as the
punishment of behaviors that were seen as breaches of the public order, also influenced the
legitimacy of the vigilante groups. Thus, community members were not just worried about the
methods used by the vigilante groups when suspects, but actually were concerned about the
tendency for the vigilante groups to resort to summary justice when punishing suspected
criminals. In Nyanya Gwandara, concerns about the involvement of vigilante members in the
harassment and even rape of women, as well as the fact that they sometimes operated like a
court of law seemed to indicate that the NGVG’s methods had a delegitimizing effect. In
Mission Village on the other hand, members of the community emphasized the brutality of
the group. According to one member of the community:
“When the vigilantes catch thieves, they mess them up. For instance, there were two
cases of crime involving goat theft and television theft recently. In the case of the TV theft,
the vigilantes beat the hell out of the thief and also in the second case. But for my
intervention, the community would have really messed the two suspects up”52.
These methods were not just criticized by community members, however. The police also
condemned them. Against this background they can be seen as a strong delegitimizing factor
for MVVG, especially since the group hadn’t secured police endorsement in the first place.
Fourth, the level of cooperation between the vigilante groups and state security forces,
especially the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), had an influence on how the groups were
perceived. For example, the fact that NGVG was registered with the NPF as well as the
Vigilante Group of Nigeria seemed to confer a high degree of legitimacy on the group –
something that was lacking at MVVG, which was only recognized by the local Chief in
Mission Village.
Fifth and related to the above, is the internal organization of the vigilante groups. NGVG
had a clear hierarchy, used identification cards, kept records about the background of its
members, coordinated night patrols, and remunerated its members. Apart from the
authorities, which conferred a comparatively higher degree of legitimacy on NGVG due to its
clear internal organization, even newly settled members of Nyanya Gwandara tended to
support NGVG’s activities more than newly settled members in Mission Village did in their
community.
Last but not least, is in the nature of the local order that the vigilante groups promote. This
order is reflected in the locally defined rules of conduct, which the vigilante groups enforce at
52 Interview with a member of the community, (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 24
the behest of the two communities’ respective Chiefs. As described above, the vigilante
groups’ activities are not restricted to crime fighting; they also enforce certain norms. In the
case of NGVG, these norms were what the local police disliked about the group and also
what led some members of the community to reject the group. Most members of the
commercial motorcycle association for instance found the regulation limiting their operations
to the period before 10 p.m. to be unfavorable. What’s more, many residents who worked in
nearby Abuja and often got home late at night indicated that they didn’t like the vigilante
groups for the same reason. In general therefore, when the vigilante groups cross the
boundary between crime fighting and the enforcement of norms, they are criticized or even
rejected by community members.
Looking at the factors that had an influence on the groups’ legitimacy, it can be argued
that Buur’s assertion that the closer vigilante groups come to the state and officially take on
state duties, the more people are willing to tolerate the use of violence by these groups
(2005, p. 215), holds true for the selected cases as well. Interviews with both the police and
the leader of NGVG revealed that, when the group registered with the police and
consequently were allowed to use certain categories of weapons to fight crime, the people’s
trust in their capacity to combat crime increased. It also tended to make the use of violence
appear legitimate because the people believed that NGVG had the support of the police.
In this regard, it is crucial to reflect on Schmelzle’s (2011, p. 11) remark that, “legitimacy is
a necessary prerequisite for effective policing in complex and diverse societies because
sanctions alone are unsustainable and normatively problematic”. In other words, it is more
expensive to punish criminals than to convince people of the value of conformity. In turn, the
endemic use of violence by vigilante groups suggests that their authority is based on a rather
limited form of legitimacy (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). Thus, the probability that a shadow of
violence, as Schlichte (2009) calls it, might descend on the groups, delegitimizing them over
time, seems rather high.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed to what extent members of Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village
communities in the Karu Local Government Area in Nasarawa State in Central Nigeria
perceive the vigilante groups that are active in their communities as legitimate and identified
factors that influence their legitimacy. The analysis shows that, despite some dissatisfaction
with the vigilante groups’ methods and the quality of ‘service delivery’ among some people in
the communities, many others preferred to be policed by a vigilante group than not at all.
Against this background and for reasons such as a growing fear of crime, as well as the
vigilante groups’ availability and affordability, most community members considered them to
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 25
be legitimate. This legitimacy was further influenced by factors such as the degree to which
they responded to distress calls from community members, regardless of differences such as
ethnicity, religion, class and gender; the methods they used to enforce community norms; the
level of cooperation between the groups and state security forces especially the police; the
internal organization of the vigilante groups; and the nature of the local order they promoted.
From the perspective of the hybrid governance approach, community members’ support of
policing by the vigilante groups can easily be understood as an expression of transformations
in the way security is governed in Africa. Although some may see it as a result of the failure
of the state police to effectively prevent criminal violence in the communities and the
apparent resilience of the vigilante groups, the proliferation of vigilantism seems more to be a
demonstration of the emergence of what Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) called global
security assemblages, i.e. assemblages in which a range of different global and local, public
and private security agents and norms interact, cooperate and compete to produce new
institutions, practices, and forms of security governance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, p.
3).
The findings of this study further show that policing by vigilante groups has benefits for
ordinary citizens. These include availability, affordability, accessibility, and effectiveness.
Baker (2008) alludes to this when he observes that vigilante groups provide a broad social
safety net when states lack the capacity (or will) to keep their social contract with citizens.
Vigilantism gives ordinary citizens the opportunity to directly participate in the governance of
their security and vigilante groups complement the services of the state police.
The downside of this development, however, is that the widespread use and support of
policing by vigilante groups, as revealed in this study, not only undermines the legitimacy of
the state police but can also lead community members to believe that the state police and, by
extension, the state itself is irrelevant (Baker 2004). Other negative implications include the
possibility of unequal provision of security to citizens, intolerance of ‘outsiders’, inadequate
accountability, an escalation of violence, facilitation of illegal activities, and a lack of
sustainability (see also Baker 2004, 2008). However, as Baker (2008) observes, all of these
problems also apply to varying degrees to state policing in Africa. It is therefore important to
address the underlying structural causes of urban and criminal violence such as
unemployment, inequality and poverty, if one wants to make genuine improvements to
policing.
Finally, even though this study has generated valuable insights on how community
members perceive vigilante groups in Karu, caution should be exercised in generalizing the
findings to other urban communities in Nigeria because of the local context of policing.
Looking at developments in other part of Nigeria, the question remains under what
circumstances people prefer to invite vigilantes into a community and under what
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 26
circumstances they prefer to invite the police? How do community members perceive other
types of vigilante group such as the civilian Joint Task Force in Maiduguri for example that
supports the Nigerian army in their fight against Boko Haram? These are questions of real
sociological concern that future studies should address.
Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 27
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