Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria ... · Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn,...

Research Line

Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South

Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria: Understanding the Basis for the

Legitimacy of Vigilante Groups

Plangshak Musa Suchi

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Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14

International Center for Violence Research – ICVR A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstraße 25 33615 Bielefeld Germany Project Webpage http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/ Violence Research and Development Project | Papers http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html Contact [email protected] The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s). Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University. If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [email protected] The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14 1

Acknowledgements The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary

results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social

science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of

the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,

Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence

research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop

scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.

For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)

entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin

America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad

Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin

City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic

University of Peru in Lima.

The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:

“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent

and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against

Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at

aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,

violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and

vigilantism.

This paper documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Violence in the

Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South”. Groups carrying out informal

non-state policing such as vigilante groups or gangs take ”the law into their own hands“ and

act in lieu of the state. They thus operate in what has been referred to as a ”twilight zone“: a

zone in which public authority is exercised not exclusively by the state but by a variety of

institutions including informal, non-state groups. For these groups to be able to exercise this

kind of authority, let alone to maintain themselves for a longer period, they have to enjoy at

least some degree of legitimacy with the members of the communities in which they operate.

Thus, this research examines the basis of legitimacy of groups carrying out informal non-

state policing in four countries of the Global South, namely Egypt, El Salvador, Nigeria, and

Peru.

Bielefeld, June 2015

Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 14 2

Research Line

Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South

Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria: Understanding the Basis for the Legitimacy of Vigilante Groups

Plangshak Musa Suchi

Abstract

In this paper I analyze community members’ perceptions of two vigilante groups in the

Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State in North-Central Nigeria. The main aim is to

contribute to our understanding the foundations of vigilante groups’ legitimacy, as well as the

specific factors that influence this legitimacy. Primary data was generated from in-depth

interviews with community members, while the hybrid governance perspective provides the

basis for discussion. In the study I found that, despite criticisms of some aspects of vigilante

activities, most community members supported policing by vigilante groups and for two

reasons. First, there’s a feeling among community members that crime and insecurity are on

the increase, and second, vigilantes were easily accessible and responded to distress calls

rapidly. Apart from these two reasons, people also expressed the view that the state police

was either ineffective in preventing crime or completely absent in the communities.

Key words

Non-State Policing, Vigilantism, Legitimacy, North-Central Nigeria

Plangshak Musa Such

Plangshak Suchi is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Bingham University in

Karu and a PhD student at the University of Jos. He holds a Bachelor’s and a Master’s

degree in Sociology from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and the University of Jos,

respectively. He has participated in several research projects on criminal violence and justice

administration in Nigeria and has published some of his findings as research articles in

academic journals. He specializes in Criminology, Research Methodology and Sociology of

Law. His current research interest is private security and policing in Africa.

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.14 3

Outline

1. Introduction

2. The urban context of vigilantism in Karu

3. Conceptual and theoretical framework

3.1. Conceptualizing vigilante groups in Nigeria

3.2. Understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante groups in Nigeria

3.3. Vigilante groups and hybrid governance

4. Sources and methods

5. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante

Group: a comparative analysis

5.1. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group

5.2. Perceptions of Mission Village Vigilante Group

5.3. Comparative analysis of community members’ perceptions of Nyanya

Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group

5.4. Major factors influencing the legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG

6. Conclusion

7. Bibliography

1. Introduction

Vigilantism is a form of informal non-state policing that can be found in many African

societies. In Nigeria the existence of vigilante groups has become increasingly ubiquitous,

particularly in urban communities. While vigilante groups have been integrated into the

official state security system in some southern and northern states1, this is not the case

everywhere. In the central states of Nigeria, such as Nasarawa for instance, vigilante groups 1 Nigeria is a Federal Republic with 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The states are grouped into six geo-‐political zones, three of which are commonly referred to as the South and two as the North. The North-‐Central zone (or middle belt region) forms the third major region of the country.


are neither part of the official state security system, nor are they officially approved by state

governments2. Yet, in many communities where people feel or are actually threatened by

high levels of criminal violence, vigilante groups increasingly assume the role of the state

police. Thus, they not only patrol the communities during the night, but also deploy physical

coercion against citizens to ensure compliance with the norms of the community (Onyeonoru

2003; Agbola and Sobanjo 2003; Olaniyi 2005).

However, these norms of the community are not necessarily the same as the norms on

which Nigerian law is built. As Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974 cited in Plyler, 2007, p.

125) explain, “vigilantism consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal

boundaries of an established socio-political order, which however are intended by the

violators to defend the order from some form of subversion”. However, by applying force

vigilante groups not only (re)produce violence by using criminal means to fight crime

(Kirschner, 2011); they also appropriate state functions in ways that create an unregulated

parallel sovereign power (Nina, 2001). Following Lund (2006), one thus can say that vigilante

groups in Nigeria operate in twilight zones – areas in which public authority is not exercised

solely by the state but by a variety of local institutions, which do not necessarily enjoy legal

recognition.

The question whether vigilante groups have legitimacy is of special relevance. First,

because the vigilante groups depend on the support and collaboration of the community

members in order to be able to operate and maintain themselves for a longer period of time.

This is especially so, since – by using force – vigilante groups constantly violate the rights of

the citizens they purport to protect. Second, understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante

groups is important because, in order to effectively perform their activities, the vigilante

groups need recognition not just by the community but also by the state.

In order to understand why the state and the communities support vigilantism despite its

tendency to violence, it is essential to examine the issue of legitimacy. As Lund (2006, p.

676) argues “when an institution authorizes, sanctions or validates certain rights, the respect

or observance of these rights by people, powerful in clout or numbers, simultaneously

constitutes recognition of the authority of that particular institutions”.

Lastly, so far little effort has been made to understand the basis of the legitimacy of

vigilante groups in Nigeria, or in Africa as a whole (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004). While

Baker (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010) has shown – in various studies – that Africa’s policing

authorizers and providers are numerous and diverse, studies on vigilante groups in

particular, especially by international and human rights organizations have focused largely on 2 An interview with the State Commandant of the Nasarawa State Chapter of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) on March, 2014 at Maraba revealed that the group was still in the process of securing the Governor’s approval.


documenting the experiences of their victims and examining the level of conformity of their

methods of operation to international human rights norms and standards (see e.g. Amnesty

International 2001, HRW & CLEEN 2002).

This paper focuses on two vigilante groups in the Karu area of Nasarawa State in Central

Nigeria. The first, which is known as the Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group (NGVG), is

recognized by the police and the local government authority as a registered voluntary

security provider, while the second, known as the Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG), is

not recognized as such but largely operates like the former. The paper analyses how people

from diverse socio-economic backgrounds that live in the communities where the vigilantes

operate, perceive the groups.

The purpose of the paper is to answer the following questions: (1) how do community

members from diverse backgrounds perceive the vigilante group that operates in their

community? (2) Do they accept the group and therefore consider it to be legitimate, or not?

(3) What are the factors that influence community members’ perceptions of the vigilante

group?

In the section that follows, I discuss the broader socio-economic and political context of

vigilante activities in Nigeria and the specific context within which NGVG and MVVG in Karu

evolved. In the second section, I provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for

understanding the activities of the vigilante groups and how they are perceived in the

communities before proceeding to discuss the value of using qualitative methods. This is

then followed by the presentation and analysis of the findings. Finally, in the conclusion, I

briefly discuss some of the implications of my findings.

2. The urban context of vigilantism in Karu

The involvement of vigilante groups in policing urban communities can only be understood

when placed within the broader context of the country’s political economy and its security

challenges. Nigeria is a vast, multi-ethnic and plural society with an estimated population of

over 170 million people. Economically, the country is a major oil exporter and, following a

rebasing of the economy in April 2014, it now ranks as the biggest economy in Africa3.

This ‘growth’ in the country’s economy is, however, yet to translate into development

throughout the country as Nigeria still grapples with major development challenges, including

unemployment, inequality and poverty. According to Osaze and Oshita (2007, p. 112-3),

3 See http://leadership.ng/business/373087/rebased-‐gdp-‐opportunities-‐capital-‐market (accessed on November 3, 2014).


Nigeria is experiencing “the lure of ‘petro-dollar’, underdeveloped agriculture, narrowing

opportunities for the population, accelerating corruption among elites, and, the increasing risk

of conflict over oil money”. Consequently, there is a huge gap between rural and urban areas

in favor of the latter when it comes to having “access to opportunities to fulfill personal and

societal desires” (Chant and McIlwaine 2009, p. 13). The perceived prospects of

employment, improved security, and available welfare amenities is pulling many to the

capital, Abuja, its satellite towns, and indeed other major cities of Nigeria, while rural poverty,

Boko Haram, and other forms of civil disturbances are pushing many away from the rural

areas (Baker 2002; Alubo 2006).

Karu is a Local Government Area (LGA) in Nasarawa – a state next to the Federal Capital

Territory and the city of Abuja. According to the 2006 National Population Census, the

population of Karu was 216,230, but due to its proximity to the country’s capital, the area is

among the fastest growing urban settlements in the world, with an annual growth rate of 40

per cent (NPC 2010; Peace Works News, 2002). Karu’s rapid urbanization is taking place in

the context of increased efforts by the government to restore the officially approved building

plan for Abuja. In practice, this translates into the systematic demolition of shantytowns – a

measure which so far has rendered hundreds of thousands of people homeless and

necessitated their relocation to satellite settlements, including those in Karu LGA. This

development in turn was not only accompanied by a real and perceived increase in violent

crime such as armed robberies, burglaries, kidnappings, car and motor bike snatchings, as

well as rape, but it has also created a situation in which many minority groups living in

isolated urban areas have been neglected by the police (Baker 2002).

To compound the situation, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has over the years proven to

be corrupt, inefficient, unfriendly and brutal toward citizens, as well as ineffective in

controlling urban and criminal violence (Alemika 1993; Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004).

Worse still, security and the rule of law in Nigeria are weak and vital state institutions are

captured by primordial or sectarian interests, thus subverting the emergence and

sustainability of a capable state (Alemika, 2013, p. 22). In this situation, many ordinary

community members ensure security through local arrangements such as those upheld by

vigilante groups.

Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) both are

of two these groups. Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group (NGVG) is named after the

residential community in which it operates – i.e. Nyanya Gwandara. The community, which is

located in Karu District, is one of the rapidly developing settlements found around the Keffi-


Abuja expressway4. It was built in three phases or time periods, namely phase ‘A’, phase ‘B’,

and phase ‘C’. Phase A is when the first group of inhabitants built their houses, phase B is

when inhabitants who came to Nyanya Gwandara later built their houses, and phase C is the

latest building phase. Besides the Gwandara and the Gbagi, who are both indigenous to the

area and are largely concentrated in phase A, the residents come from different parts of the

country. In terms of state policing, the area is covered by the Masaka (a neighboring

community) Divisional Police Station. However, due to the distance between Masaka and

Nyanya Gwandara, it is difficult for the police to effectively police the area5.

According to the Chief6 of Nyanya Gwandara community, NGVG was created in 1999 at

the request of all landlords in response to an increase in cattle rustling and goat theft. As the

leader of the community, the Chief played a prominent role in the screening of those to be

engaged as vigilante members. However, other members of the community maintain that

NGVG was created on the initiative of the Chief, who singlehandedly established the

vigilante group7.

At the inception of the vigilante group in Nyanya Gwandara, the vigilantes were few in

number. They used rudimentary weapons such as cutlasses, machetes, as well as bows and

arrows. They barely benefited financially from the work as it was largely regarded as

community service8. As the population of the community grew, and the pattern of crime

became more complex and violent, however, it became increasingly difficult for the vigilante

group to effectively fight crime9. The vigilante group nevertheless increased in size and

members were paid monthly stipends of 5000 to 10,000 Nairas10. Eventually, the group

registered with the police as a voluntary policing group11, and as a branch of the Vigilante

Group of Nigeria (VGN)12. As a branch of the VGN, the NGVG members are now entitled to

4 The Keffi-‐Abuja Expressway is the major road that links the northern part of the country to the Federal Capital Territory. Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village communities are situated along this expressway. 5 Interview with a district police officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 6 Generally speaking, a Chief is a leader of a political system based on kinship. In the cases described in this study, he is an important political figure in the communities and as such, plays a prominent role in the provision of security. 7 Interviews with landlords (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 8 Interview with the Chief of Nyanya Gwandara (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 9 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 10 Naira is the local currency. 5000 to 10,000 Nairas corresponds to approximately US$ 8 to16. 11 Registration with the police usually consists of informing the local police authority about the existence of a vigilante group, and by submitting the names and copies of identification cards of the members to the police for approval. 12 Vigilante Group of Nigeria is an umbrella organization of local vigilante groups founded over 20 years ago with the mission to ensure security and safety for all citizens in Nigeria’s communities. All members of VGN are guided by the organization’s constitution and benefit from its training programs. For details see http://vigilantegroupnig.com.


uniforms, to ID cards, and to basic trainings on security strategies. According to the leader of

NGVG, cooperation with the police and registration with the VGN helped to enhance their

legitimacy and effectiveness, because of the recognition by the police and the training they

received from the VGN13.

Finally, although the list of members of NGVG indicated a total of 47 vigilantes when

fieldwork was conducted, interviews with the leader of the group revealed that only 24

members were active. It’s these members who patrol the three major areas that make up

Nyanya Gwandara with its rapidly growing population.

Unlike NGVG, Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) evolved from a security committee

constituted by members of the community (Mission Village community is also known as

ERCC) almost ten years ago to coordinate the provision of policing in the context of growing

insecurity. According to the Chief of the community, at the inception of the security

arrangement, landlords not only authorized but also provided security in the absence of a

police station in the community. They were directly involved in night patrols on a rotational

basis. However, over time, a number of landlords were no longer comfortable with patrolling

at night and pursuing their basic occupation during the day. Thus, sometime around 2011 the

community decided to form a vigilante group that was paid from monthly contributions of

community members. It started with two vigilantes who were considered to be effective. From

there it kept expanding, until it reached a point where the community started experiencing

funding problems due to the withdrawal of support from some landlords. As a consequence

of these problems, some charismatic members of the MVVG withdrew their services and the

group was no longer considered to be as effective as it used to be in the early period of its

existence14.

Both, VGNG and MVVG, punish minor and major crimes such as gang fights and public

disturbances, drug offenses such as cocaine and marijuana smoking; property crimes such

as theft and shoplifting as well as crimes, such as rape, kidnapping and homicides. However,

VGNG and MVVG also subject certain members of the community to social control and

impose what they consider to be community norms or moral principles. Thus, strolling the

street late at night is prohibited by both.

Incidentally, members of NGVG channel most of their energy into the arrest of marijuana

smokers and not into fighting serious crime. NGVG regards smoking marijuana as well as

dealing with it as dangerous and ‘crimogenic’, which is why they acted against youths who

got involved with it. According to their leader:

13 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 14 Interview with the Chief of Mission Village and the former leader of MVVG (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).


“When youths smoke ‘wee-wee’15, they behave in dangerous manners. Some of them will

carry axe to fight their parents at home; some will engage in street fights using knives; and

some will use weapons to go and rob. Because when they smoke this ‘wee-wee’, they lost

all sense of judgment”16.

When NGVG hands over alleged drug users to the police and the police release them, the

vigilantes re-arrest them and hand them over to the Nigerian drug law enforcement agency,

the NDLEA 17 . The worst category of people in the community as far as NGVG was

concerned, were cocaine dealers and consumers. According to the leader, “any cocaine

smoker is an armed robber”, which is why:

“Anywhere cocaine jungle [i.e. market for the sale and consumption of cocaine] is, we try

to burn it out. Recently, I organized my boys and we went and burnt the only cocaine

jungle in Nyanya Gwandara. We put petrol, burn the houses and arrested one of the

cocaine dealers who was in possession of a pestle. We sentenced him down to the state

Criminal Investigation Department and they sentenced him to 2 years imprisonment”18.

Despite certain commonalities, there are also major differences between the two vigilante

groups. The differences relate to the size of their membership, their registration status with

the police and the national Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) as well as the urban context of

their vigilante activities. While NGVG has a larger membership, is registered with VGN and

the local police authority, MVVG has only few members and is not registered. Secondly,

Mission Village Community is less urbanized than Nyanya Gwandara. It is a new community

that developed a few years after the demolition of shantytowns in the Federal Capital

Territory in the mid-2000s forced residents to look for an alternative place of settlement. In

summary, it can be said that NGVG is part of a broader informal policing structure that has

wider recognition among stakeholders in Nigeria, while MVVG is at best a local arrangement,

whose scope of recognition is limited to the community of Mission Village.

3. Conceptual and theoretical framework

3.1 Conceptualizing vigilante groups in Nigeria

In this paper vigilante groups are conceptualized as non-state policing organizations,

consisting of individuals drawn from within a particular community or, approved by the

15 ‘Wee-‐wee’ is the local term for marijuana among Hausa speakers in Nyanya Gwandara. 16 Interview with the leader of NGVG (February 26, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 17 NDLEA stands for the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. 18 Interview with leader of NGVG (February 2, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).


community to enforce locally defined norms of conduct, directed at preventing and controlling

criminal violence and other social infractions through various measures, including coercion.

This conceptualization draws heavily on Olaniyi’s (2005) definition, which emphasizes the

fact that vigilante groups are largely informal and composed of volunteers, often funded

through communal contributions. The use of non-state policing here basically assumes that

the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the formal conduit through which state authority is

exercised, and that it is therefore the primary agent of formal state policing (Hills, 2000). At

the same time, it implies that policing goes beyond what the police does and includes "any

organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security, and

peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, resolution, and

punishment” (Baker 2010, p. 9). Attention therefore is focused on policing rather than the

police.

3.2 Understanding the basis of legitimacy of vigilante groups in Nigeria

Legitimacy is “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”

(Hurd 1999: 381 cited in Schmelzle, 2011:8). Following this definition, a vigilante group

enjoys legitimacy when the members of the community in which vigilante groups operate

believe that the rules and decisions implemented by the vigilante group are justified and that

the right to enforce these rules and decisions coercively lies with the vigilante group. As

such, legitimacy is an important explanatory variable, since the belief in the normative

authority of vigilante groups can produce stable compliance without costly enforcement

mechanisms (Schmelzle, 2011).

The literature on vigilante groups in Nigeria indicates that vigilante groups generally enjoy

a high degree of popular support from the local communities in which they operate. Among

scholars who have emphasized the role of violence and those who have stressed the value

of community policing alike, vigilante activities are often portrayed as community responses

to crime (such as an increase in the rate of armed robbery and burglary) that hasn’t been

contained by the state (Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Pratten 2008; Baker 2010; Joseph

and Rothfuss 2014).

As Baker (2002, p. 146) points out, however, although vigilante groups may improve the

protection of people from crime or the threat thereof and are widely popular, their rise also

can lead to “an escalation of violence”. This assertion is confirmed by other authors, such as

Kirschner (2011), who claim that vigilante groups (re)produce violence by using coercion to

ensure compliance. Further, Higazi’s (2008) analysis of the activities of vigilantes and militias

in the lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria, shows that violence can reconfigure social

relations in ways that can transform vigilante groups into militia groups based on ethnic,


religious and other forms of identities. Thus, even though vigilante groups seem to enjoy a

high degree of support, it is not clear what factors influence their legitimacy.

Joseph and Rothfuss (2014, p. 170) provide us with a theoretical foundation for

understanding the conditions that have prompted ordinary residents in the context of urban

and criminal violence to engage in “profiling the “other”, and social-spatially demarcating their

neighborhoods by means of border narratives and discursive construction of identities”. From

the perspective they offer, many communities in Nigeria form vigilante groups because of the

“fear of repeated violence and consistent failure of the state to deliver on its promise to

guarantee the security of life and property of its citizens” (ibid., p. 168).

All of these studies are valuable in helping us to understand the intersection between

vigilantism and other issues of political struggle in the Nigerian society. However, so far most

studies have focused on southern Nigeria. Studies on the North (e.g. Olaniyi 2005, 2011;

Casey 2007, 2010 and Last, 2008) and on Central Nigeria (e.g. Higazi 2008) haven’t yet

addressed the issue of legitimacy of vigilante groups.

The closest attempt at addressing the question was Alemika and Chukwuma's (2004)

study. It provides a comprehensive understanding of the expectations, priorities and

perceptions of people living in poverty in Nigeria with respect to safety and security in

general and informal policing structures in particular. However, the study didn’t analyze

specific cases of vigilantism, nor did it focus on the factors that influence the legitimacy of the

vigilante groups.

3.3 Vigilante groups and hybrid governance

Following Garland (1996), the pervasiveness of vigilantism in Africa and the increasing

exercise of violence in the ‘twilight zone’ (Lund, 2006) by vigilante groups reveals the “myth

of the sovereign state” (Garland, 1996 cited in Shearing and Wood 2003, p. 403). The

ubiquity of vigilantism is not only evidence of the fact that the state fails to provide adequate

security for its citizens. It also puts in question the notion put forward by classical political

science that there is a state monopoly on the use of legitimate violence.

Thus, state-centric perspectives of policing, which are based on an ideal of autonomous,

territorially bounded nation-states with a monopoly on violence face a number of difficulties

when it comes to explaining vigilantism. The phenomenon raises important questions not just

about the capacity of the state to discharge its primary responsibility of guaranteeing

security, but more importantly, about the legitimacy of vigilante groups, particularly with

regard to the use of violence.

As an alternative perspective to state-centric notions of policing, the hybrid governance

perspective emphasizes the role of informal non-state institutions that exercise public


authority alongside the state and provide different kinds of services such as security

(Meagher, 2012, p. 1075). Analogous to concepts such as ‘networked governance’

(Crawford, 2006) or ‘nodal governance’ (Shearing and Wood 2003), this perspective claims

that with the (re)involvement of citizens in the provision of security, the state is no longer the

sole actor carrying out policing activities. What is emphasized instead is the “constructive

role of violence in clearing away the wreckage of dysfunctional post-colonial states and

catalyzing more authentic processes of state formation from locally-embedded systems of

order and authority” (Meagher, 2012, p. 1076).

However, the question remains how and for whom informal non-state institutions such as

vigilante groups actually “work”, in the sense of who actually “benefits” from their activities.

Hence, Meagher (2012: 1073) criticized the hybrid governance perspective for

“essentializing” informal regulatory systems, disguising coercion and political capture as

popular legitimacy”. She argues for “a more empirical and comparative approach to hybrid

governance that is capable of distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of

non-state order, and sharpens rather than blurs the relationship between formal and informal

regulation” (Meagher 2012, p.1073). It is in light of this critique that this study empirically

investigates how community members in Karu perceive vigilante groups and which factors

influence their perceptions of these groups.

4. Sources and method

Field research started with a preliminary survey of the number of vigilante groups recognized

by local authorities in Karu, involving interviews with district police authorities, local

government officials and community leaders in the area. The mapping exercise revealed that

vigilante groups operated in all five districts of Karu LGA and that there was virtually no

community that did not have one form of vigilante group or another. Consequently, purposive

sampling (Yusuf, 2003) was used to select two vigilante groups (Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante

Group, and Mission Village Vigilantes) for an in-depth analysis, while utilizing quota sampling

(Yusuf, 2003) in the selection of interview partners from different segments of the

communities. The choice of the vigilante groups/communities was largely influenced by

considerations such as the urban context of the groups’ activities as well as access to

gatekeepers.

Key informants in the study included leaders of the vigilante groups, representatives of

local government and police officials as well as leaders of the communities. Other

participants included women and men from different socio-economic strata, with different

religious backgrounds (Christian and Muslim communities); from different ethnic groups

(indigenous and non-indigenous groups); youths, landlords, and tenants as well as residents


from various occupational backgrounds such as shop owners, commercial motor cycle riders,

commercial taxi drivers, petty-traders, civil servants, school teachers, and bricklayers.

Primary data was generated using qualitative methods (Bickman and Rog, 1998),

including interviews with vigilante groups and community members as well as participant

observation. Participant observation not only offered a chance to interact with ordinary

community members and participate in the vigilante groups’ activities. It also gave the

researcher the opportunity to observe more closely the practice of vigilantism including the

attitude of vigilante members to vigilantism, the methods of operation of the group, the

attitude of community members toward the group and the relationship of the group with the

police. Interviews afforded the respondents the opportunity to share their perceptions of the

vigilante groups in their own words in as detailed a way as possible, which would not have

been possible with a questionnaire.

From February to May 2014, twelve in-depth interviews with key informants and 44 short

interviews with other participants were conducted. The secondary data consisted of official

records from the Karu Local Government Secretariat. They included records on the number

and distribution of districts/chieftaincies and wards, as well as on the economic activities of

community members, police records on the number of registered vigilante groups and

records of the vigilante groups themselves.

5. Perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group: a comparative analysis

Community members’ perceptions vary significantly according to their social background.

This variation in perception appears to be associated with the degree to which they felt

involved in the provision of security, and the extent to which they had benefited from the

presence of the vigilantes.

On the one hand, a vast majority of the community members interviewed in both Nyanya

Gwandara and Mission Village regarded the vigilante groups as ‘community police’, created

by the people to enforce communal order and report crimes to the police. For this category of

community members, establishing the two vigilante groups was seen as very positive. This is

why they strongly accepted the groups and their activities, especially because the vigilantes

were perceived as contributing positively to improving the security of people and property.

On the other hand however, there was a small minority of community members who felt

marginalized when it came to decisions taken by the vigilante groups, or felt neglected by the

vigilante group itself because they were defined as non-indigenes or non-natives to the

community. For this category of community members, NGVG and MVVG represented the


interests of a particular section of the community, which is why they rejected the groups and

their activities.

In what follows, I present in detail what community members perceived to be positive and

negative aspects of NGVG and MVVG and the reasoning behind these perceptions. In a

second step, I then compare and analyze the similarities and differences in perceptions

between the two communities. Finally, I distill the factors that appeared to have a major

influence on the legitimacy of the groups.

5.1 Perceptions of the Nyanya Gwandara Vigilante Group

According to a district police officer in Masaka, NGVG is a voluntary private security

organization constituted by the community to provide night patrol services within Nyanya

Gwandara and to report any crime to the police19. The police regarded the activities of NGVG

as important and their existence was a source of relief for the police, which is why the district

police in the jurisdiction strongly supported NGVG. In the view of a district police officer:

“Security is everybody’s business, it is not only the police that should secure lives and

property and they can’t do it alone. For the police to be successful in fighting criminal

violence, they need to partner with vigilantes. Police are not magicians; neither are they

prophets who decipher where a crime may be committed or who the criminals within the

community are. But majority of the vigilante members are members of that community

who have formed themselves as a group to check mate crime and criminality in their area,

so they act as informants to the police”20.

It is for reasons such as the gathering of information that the police in Karu also welcomed

partnerships with similar groups such as NGVG. What’s more, the police was quite

instrumental in reinvigorating the practice of vigilantism in other communities of Karu.

According to the police spokesperson and facilitator of a new vigilante initiative in New

Nyanya 21 community, the less than 120 policemen deployed in the area were grossly

inadequate to police the communities. Therefore, the police supported the creation of new

vigilante groups:

“Those victims robbed; whenever they come to us [the police] with reports of robbery

victimization, we educate them on how to form a local vigilante [group]. From April 2013,

almost about 30 units of local vigilante groups […] have been established. The police hold

19 Interview with a district police authority (March 5, 2014, Masaka Police Station). 20 Interview with a district police officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 21 New Nyanya is a neighbouring community south of Nyanya Gwandara that also has a vigilante group.


meetings with these groups twice in every month. Over 120 youths have been jailed as a

result of their [the vigilante’s] activities and the areas have been stabilized from crime due

to this partnership with the vigilante groups”22.

NGVG also enjoyed a strong degree of support from the Chief of Nyanya Gwandara

community. Thus, the Chief explained that members of NGVG were well known and selected

by the community, particularly by himself, and presented to the police for screening. The

Chief not only supported NGVG. He also claimed that the majority of community members

agree with him. Thus, in the Chief’s view, “the people of Nyanya Gwandara accept the

vigilante group completely” because the vigilantes “are always available and accessible.

They are law abiding citizens who do not engage in crimes, nor perpetrate injustice” 23.

The leader of NGVG equally believed that his group enjoys popular support from the

community and claimed that “the average person accepts the vigilante group by 100 per

cent”. The reason for this was that the vigilantes “don’t allow evil to come to the community”

and they “don’t support evil”. According to him, “even though you are my brother, when you

commit an offense, I will deal with you accordingly”24.

Apart from those directly involved in establishing the vigilante groups, a substantial

number of ordinary community members equally indicated acceptance and support for

NGVG. According to the chairman of the association of commercial motorcycle riders, “there

is nothing the police was doing to the community” which is why he “likes and accepts the

vigilante”. He continued by saying that “honestly, I don’t see any fault in the vigilante. I am

happy with them. They only need to be encouraged by employing more hands”25. Similarly, a

trader in the community contended “we [the market traders] don’t have problem with the

vigilante group, we like them” 26 . A member of the Christian community justified his

acceptance of NGVG with the group’s speed of response and their mode of operation: “the

vigilantes are usually rapid in their response to distress call and they have good mode of

operation that is known to the community members” and was convinced that nearly all

members of his neighborhood share similar opinions because “the vigilante group operates

an open door policy and they are accessible to all"27. This view corroborated that of other

community members who mentioned ‘accessibility’ as main reason for supporting the

22 Interview with a district crime officer (March 12, 2014, New Nyanya). 23 Interview with a community leader (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 24 Interview with leader of the vigilante group (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 25 Interview with chairman of the association of commercial motorcycle riders (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 26 Interview with a market trader (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 27 Interview with a member of the Christian community (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).


vigilante group28. A tenant in Nyanya Gwandara summarized the reasons for endorsing

policing by NGVG as follows: “NGVG is contributing to improving the security situation in the

community. Crime level in Nyanya Gwandara is generally low now largely because of the

presence of the vigilante group"29.

However, there also were residents of Nyanya Gwandara community who either never

supported NGVG from the beginning, or were no longer satisfied with the level of

performance of the group. For example, unlike the chairman of the commercial motorcycle

riders association cited above, some members of the association did not support NGVG.

According to a member of the association, “I am not in a position to tell you whether I like the

vigilante or not. But I think they are more of a problem to us than a solution. They asked us to

stop work from 10pm but I am not comfortable with this because it’s the time we usually

make good business” 30 . Moreover, it was striking that nearly all community members

interviewed in the month of May in Nyanya Gwandara were similarly dissatisfied with the

vigilante group and rejected their activities. According to a landlord in the community:

“We are no longer satisfied with the level of performance of the vigilante group, and as I

speak with you now, we have stopped making use of the vigilante. Last week, there was a

meeting of the association of landlords and it was resolved that the vigilante stands

dissolved due to the fact that they are no longer doing their job well”31.

As the low rate of support in May indicates, support for NGVG largely depends on how the

members of the community perceive the quality of its performance. Thus, an official of the

landlord association in Nyanya Gwandara explained that:

“At the beginning the Gwandara vigilante group was performing its work according to

specifications, and the average person was satisfied, as it became clear to members who

the rate of crime in the community had dropped. However, in most recent time, many

landlords are no longer paying their contribution to support the group due to lack of

satisfaction with their performance. As a result, the vigilante group has not been paid their

monthly allowances for some time now. Therefore the group is no longer working“32.

Support for NGVG was not only shrinking, but its authority to enforce local order was

questioned. The decline in the capacity of the vigilante group to effectively prevent and

28 Interviews with two landlords in Nyanya Gwandara (February 28, 2014). 29 Interview with a tenant (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 30 Interview with a commercial motorcycle rider (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 31 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 32 Interview with an official of the association of landlords (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).


control crime in the community as well as the resultant loss of confidence in the group among

community members was such that some suspected the vigilantes to be the perpetrators of

criminal violence in the area. For example, a member of the community reported a recent

incident of armed robbery of which many people suspected the vigilante group33. Moreover,

some community members accused NGVG of favoring the indigenous population at the

expense of community members who come from other parts of the country. A landlord in the

community complained that “most of the vigilante members are indigenes or natives of

Gwandara and so they tend to protect the interest of the Gwandara people” 34.

Others alleged that the vigilante group only acted in the interests of the Chief. An official of

the association of landlords in the community thus claimed:

“The vigilantes are only answerable to the community Chief and it is only his bidding that

the group are doing. The Chief is not carrying other people along and most of their

meetings are restricted to Gwandara indigenes that are largely concentrated around the

Chief’s palace”35.

Still others expressed concern over the vigilantes behavior. They criticized them for their

involvement in the harassment and rape of women as well as for drinking alcohol and using

drugs when on duty, which often impaired their judgments and sometimes pushed them into

criminality36. Even the police – despite their preference for partnerships with vigilante groups

– lamented that NGVG was exceeding its boundaries. According to a police spokesman:

“The vigilante group even have an office and a prison cell. Through our investigation and

complaints received from members of the public, we established that the vigilantes have

investigated cases of rape, collected money from suspects and settled a number of cases

without informing us”37.

This allegation was confirmed by other members of the community38.

5.2 Perceptions of Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG)

Unlike NGVG, Mission Village Vigilante Group (MVVG) is not recognized by the police

because the community and in particular the leadership of the vigilante group did not inform

33 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 34 Interview with a landlord (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 35 Interview with an official of the landlord association (May 24, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 36 Interview with a landlord (February 27, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara). 37 Interview with a district crime officer (March 5, 2014, Masaka). 38 Group interview with community members (February 28, 2014, Nyanya Gwandara).


the police about their existence39. Neither is the group known to the Nasarawa State chapter

of Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN).

According to the Chief of Mission Village (addressed as Mai-Angwa in Hausa) MVVG is a

security actor that brings about calm and peace in situations of disputes. According to him,

“the vigilante members can tell two fighters to stop fighting or else be arrested and dragged

to the police station and the fighters will stop because the vigilantes are like security men in

the community”40. The order enforced by the vigilante group thus is locally defined and the

Chief plays a prominent role in its definition. It is the Mai-Angwa in consultation with

community members for instance that established the rule that free movement of people and

goods were to be restricted between midnight and 4 am, and it is largely this rule that MVVG

enforces. According to the Mai-Angwa:

“The vigilantes are here for community service. Their duties are to prevent crimes and

restrict movement usually from midnight till daytime. Nobody should conduct any activity.

Anybody found to be moving late at night will be detained by the vigilantes, and if the

person proves stubborn, the vigilantes will tie the person and make sure he or she goes

nowhere”41.

As far as the Chief was concerned, it was in the interests of the average individual and family

that the community be protected by the vigilantes42. Consequently, anybody found outside

his house or walking in the streets of Mission Village late at night was treated as a crime

suspect by MVVG.

Like his counterpart in Nyanya Gwandara, the Mai-Angwa of Mission Village claimed that

MVVG was delivering a great service to the community. He supported the vigilante group

largely because “of the night job they are doing which has drastically lessoned the rate of

crime” and because “the police is very distant to the community and always finds it difficult to

respond rapidly. But the vigilante is prompt in its response to crime because they are within

the community”43.

Other members of the community supported the vigilante group because it contributed to

crime prevention. It was the sole security provider available and was accessible to all

inhabitants of Mission Village. Thus, a middle-age female tenant explained:

39 As the leader of the vigilante group explained, this was largely due to the fact that there was no police station close to Mission Village when the vigilante group was established. However, according to the same person, arrangements were made to seek approval by the police. 40 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 41 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 42 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village) 43 Interview with the community Chief (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).


“Well, we bless God because when I came to Mission Village newly, within the first few

months, before you know it, you will hear people shouting: “Thieves, Thieves!!!”. There is

one man who is one of the first settlers to this community, I am aware thieves attacked

him not just once but about five times. But since the inception of this vigilante, the people

in the community now sleep like babies”44.

The woman supported the group because in her view, “the vigilantes promote peace in the

community”45. However, even though many members of the community supported MVVG,

support was not unanimous. On the contrary, many saw MVVG’s handling of things and their

activities as well as performance critically. Hence, the chairman of the association of

landlords in Mission Village explained that:

“Everybody down to the last person in Mission Village accepts the vigilante especially

from the inception because of their contribution to crime prevention, but over time, the

people became discouraged due to lack of financial accountability”.46

Expressions of support thus were often followed by one criticism or another. According to a

female shop owner in Mission Village:

“I support the vigilante group and welcome their activities but sometimes I wonder where

the vigilantes are when criminal activities are taking place. There was a time thieves came

to my shop and steal at night, so I wonder where the vigilante was. Sometimes I suspect

the vigilantes to be the criminals in the community”47.

The same shop owner also explained that the vigilante group “sometimes try to extort money

from shop owners by requesting them to pay money twice in a month” which she described

as “unfair”48. Similarly, a female tenant indicated support for MVVG in the community, but

expressed concern about certain aspects of their activities especially “their constant

emphasis on money”49. According to her, “the vigilantes are always disturbing us to pay

monthly contribution and even when we tell them our husbands are not around, they will

insist that we should pay the money from our purse”50. She added:

44 Interview with a tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 45 Interview with a tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 46 Interview with the chairman of the association of landlords (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 47 Interview with a shop owner in the community, (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 48 Interview with a shop owner in the community (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 49 Interview with a female tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village). 50 Interview with a female tenant (March 28, 2014, Mission Village,).


“The other problem is they are often not there to prevent crimes and even to apprehend

criminals. Recently, there was a case of car theft in our neighborhood and during the

incident they were not around. One wonders were the vigilantes were and what kind of

patrol they were doing?”51.

This kind of dissatisfaction with the level of performance of the vigilante group was

widespread among community members in Mission Village. However, at the time of research

they were still willing to entertain the vigilante group rather than being without any security

provider at all.

5.3 Comparative analysis of community members’ perceptions of Nyanya Gwandara

Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group

There are several similarities and differences in community members’ perceptions of Nyanya

Gwandara Vigilante Group and Mission Village Vigilante Group. First, in both Nyanya

Gwandara and Mission Village, local authorities, particularly the Chiefs in the community,

strongly support the vigilante groups. The Chiefs were instrumental in establishing the

vigilante groups and therefore believe that they are contributing positively to security in the

communities. However, unlike NGVG, which was supported by the police because it made

itself known and obtained approval right from the beginning, MVVG did not benefit from any

support by state authorities.

Second, in both communities respondents reported a feeling of ambivalence toward the

vigilante groups. This feeling of ambivalence was higher in Mission Village community than in

Nyanya Gwandara. While in Mission Village the ambivalence was mainly linked to the

question of effectiveness of the vigilante group in combating criminal violence, in Nyanya

Gwwandara it was the result of the feeling that the vigilante group only represented the

interests of the Chief and concomitantly the Gwandara. Accordingly there was a higher

tendency among the indigenous community members to support the vigilante group in

Nyanya Gwandara. In Mission Village on the other hand this was not an issue. What

preoccupied community members there was the inability of the vigilante group to apprehend

criminals. Thus, the cases investigated seem to indicate that support for vigilante groups is

influenced by community members’ evaluation of the contribution of the groups to reducing

the rate of crime in the community as well as whether the group was working for the common

good or the good of a section of the community.

Notwithstanding these differences, it is clear that the majority of respondents in both

communities regarded the respective vigilante groups as being the major informal policing

organization available and accessible to them. Despite criticizing some of the activities of the 51 Interview with a female tenant in Mission Village, (March 28, 2014).


vigilante groups, many of the community members who were interviewed supported the

vigilante groups, due to the growing fear of crime and insecurity, satisfaction with the speed

with which the groups responded to distress calls, as well as general satisfaction with their

presence in the communities. Another reason for their support was the ineffectiveness or

absence of a capable state police that could effectively prevent crime.

This finding corroborates and confirms the major result of Alemika and Chukwuma’s

(2004) study on the Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria, in which a majority of respondents

indicated acceptance and support for informal policing and their modus operandi because

they were seen to be effective in the protection of neighborhoods from criminal attacks,

provided speedy safety and security services, and were closer to the people than the state

police. It also gives credibility to Olaniyi’s (2005) major finding on Community Vigilantes in

Metropolitan Kano which says that the emergence of vigilante groups was the result of an

increase in urban forms of crime such as armed banditry, of a lack of confidence in the

police, and of a reduction by the state in social provisioning.

Studies conducted elsewhere in Africa further validate these findings. Buur’s (2005) study

for instance, found that the most important reason the Amadlozi – a vigilante group operating

in the townships of the city of Port Elizabeth – were so successful was because they reacted

to crime instantaneously and in a manner that suited the needs of most of the townships

residents. In the same vein, Baker (2002, p. 160) argues that the crime control element of

vigilantism in South Africa was partly fuelled by “an attraction to vigilantism's criminal justice

framework which upholds the values of compensatory justice, immediate justice and

capital/corporal justice”. Perhaps, it is this value of compensatory justice, immediate justice

and corporal justice that explains why NGVG, for example, has its office and prison cell and

adjudicates on complaints and settles cases without informing the police.

Arguably, the fact that, despite their ambivalent feelings toward their respective vigilante

groups, community members in Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village were nevertheless in

favor of the groups is to be seen against the backdrop of Sen and Pratten’s (2007, p. 3)

observation that vigilantism is a “cheap” form of policing. According to Sen and Pratten (ibid.)

“increasingly, questions of accountability and legitimacy in policing are less important than

'what is available', 'what works best', and 'what can I afford'”. However, the fact that a

substantial number of community members who welcomed the activities of the vigilante

groups in Nyanya Gwandara in the beginning were no longer satisfied with their work at the

end of the fieldwork, shows how volatile vigilante groups are and how easily some of them

can be seen to only represent the interests of a particular section of the community. Vigilante

groups often have a short life span and are often organized as ad-hoc arrangements. The

members may join the groups today and stay till tomorrow, but hardly stay for a longer

period.


With regard to individual members’ motivation to join a vigilante group, it seems that

Jenson’s (2007) submission that vigilante activities are mainly performed out of self-interest

has some potency. In both communities, the vigilante groups were accepted by community

members in the early period of formation and members supported their activities either

directly or financially. With the passage of time, however, many thought the vigilante groups

made less of an effort or had themselves become the criminals. As the case of Nyanya

Gwandara illustrates, many believed that the vigilante group’s members were primarily

interested in the money and in setting rules for community. According to these community

members, when the vigilantes weren’t paid on time, the crime rate in the community

increased. The group of landlords, which formed the vigilante group in Mission Village on the

other hand, did so to protect their property and families and not necessarily the entire

community.

5.4 Major factors influencing the legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG

From the foregoing analysis of how community members perceive NGVG and MVVG, six

factors can be identified as important for the legitimacy of the groups. First and most

important, are costs and effectiveness. The legitimacy of NGVG and MVVG strongly

depends on whether or not community members can afford the groups’ services and whether

or not the vigilante groups actually reduce the levels of crime and violence in the

communities. As shown in the analysis, when the level of crime in Nyanya Gwandara was

perceived to be low in the first quarter of 2014, people attributed the success to the NGVG

and therefore supported them financially. But, when the rate was perceived to have

increased from April on, the vigilantes were perceived as ineffective and many withdrew their

financial support. Similarly, in Mission Village, respondents complained bitterly about the

inability of the vigilante group to deal with the increasing rate of car thefts and burglary in the

community. Thus, the vigilante groups’ lack of capacity to fight crime and poor performance

contributed to their delegitimization.

Second – and related to the factor mentioned above – is whether the vigilante groups

respond to distress calls of community members regardless of their ethnic group, religion,

class or gender. Despite their inability to deal with increasing rates of car thefts and burglary,

MVVG for example enjoyed relatively high levels of support because it treated community

members equally. Support for NGVG, on the other hand, decreased as the group was seen

to serve particular interests only. NGVG’s tendency to favor community members who are

indigenous to the community and to represent sectional interests at the expense of non-

indigenous community members can thus also be seen as a delegitimizing factor.


Third, besides the norms themselves, which were the subject of controversy within the

communities, the methods employed by the vigilante groups in enforcing community norms

such as nightly restrictions on freedom of movement of people and goods, as well as the

punishment of behaviors that were seen as breaches of the public order, also influenced the

legitimacy of the vigilante groups. Thus, community members were not just worried about the

methods used by the vigilante groups when suspects, but actually were concerned about the

tendency for the vigilante groups to resort to summary justice when punishing suspected

criminals. In Nyanya Gwandara, concerns about the involvement of vigilante members in the

harassment and even rape of women, as well as the fact that they sometimes operated like a

court of law seemed to indicate that the NGVG’s methods had a delegitimizing effect. In

Mission Village on the other hand, members of the community emphasized the brutality of

the group. According to one member of the community:

“When the vigilantes catch thieves, they mess them up. For instance, there were two

cases of crime involving goat theft and television theft recently. In the case of the TV theft,

the vigilantes beat the hell out of the thief and also in the second case. But for my

intervention, the community would have really messed the two suspects up”52.

These methods were not just criticized by community members, however. The police also

condemned them. Against this background they can be seen as a strong delegitimizing factor

for MVVG, especially since the group hadn’t secured police endorsement in the first place.

Fourth, the level of cooperation between the vigilante groups and state security forces,

especially the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), had an influence on how the groups were

perceived. For example, the fact that NGVG was registered with the NPF as well as the

Vigilante Group of Nigeria seemed to confer a high degree of legitimacy on the group –

something that was lacking at MVVG, which was only recognized by the local Chief in

Mission Village.

Fifth and related to the above, is the internal organization of the vigilante groups. NGVG

had a clear hierarchy, used identification cards, kept records about the background of its

members, coordinated night patrols, and remunerated its members. Apart from the

authorities, which conferred a comparatively higher degree of legitimacy on NGVG due to its

clear internal organization, even newly settled members of Nyanya Gwandara tended to

support NGVG’s activities more than newly settled members in Mission Village did in their

community.

Last but not least, is in the nature of the local order that the vigilante groups promote. This

order is reflected in the locally defined rules of conduct, which the vigilante groups enforce at

52 Interview with a member of the community, (February 27, 2014, Mission Village).


the behest of the two communities’ respective Chiefs. As described above, the vigilante

groups’ activities are not restricted to crime fighting; they also enforce certain norms. In the

case of NGVG, these norms were what the local police disliked about the group and also

what led some members of the community to reject the group. Most members of the

commercial motorcycle association for instance found the regulation limiting their operations

to the period before 10 p.m. to be unfavorable. What’s more, many residents who worked in

nearby Abuja and often got home late at night indicated that they didn’t like the vigilante

groups for the same reason. In general therefore, when the vigilante groups cross the

boundary between crime fighting and the enforcement of norms, they are criticized or even

rejected by community members.

Looking at the factors that had an influence on the groups’ legitimacy, it can be argued

that Buur’s assertion that the closer vigilante groups come to the state and officially take on

state duties, the more people are willing to tolerate the use of violence by these groups

(2005, p. 215), holds true for the selected cases as well. Interviews with both the police and

the leader of NGVG revealed that, when the group registered with the police and

consequently were allowed to use certain categories of weapons to fight crime, the people’s

trust in their capacity to combat crime increased. It also tended to make the use of violence

appear legitimate because the people believed that NGVG had the support of the police.

In this regard, it is crucial to reflect on Schmelzle’s (2011, p. 11) remark that, “legitimacy is

a necessary prerequisite for effective policing in complex and diverse societies because

sanctions alone are unsustainable and normatively problematic”. In other words, it is more

expensive to punish criminals than to convince people of the value of conformity. In turn, the

endemic use of violence by vigilante groups suggests that their authority is based on a rather

limited form of legitimacy (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). Thus, the probability that a shadow of

violence, as Schlichte (2009) calls it, might descend on the groups, delegitimizing them over

time, seems rather high.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I analyzed to what extent members of Nyanya Gwandara and Mission Village

communities in the Karu Local Government Area in Nasarawa State in Central Nigeria

perceive the vigilante groups that are active in their communities as legitimate and identified

factors that influence their legitimacy. The analysis shows that, despite some dissatisfaction

with the vigilante groups’ methods and the quality of ‘service delivery’ among some people in

the communities, many others preferred to be policed by a vigilante group than not at all.

Against this background and for reasons such as a growing fear of crime, as well as the

vigilante groups’ availability and affordability, most community members considered them to


be legitimate. This legitimacy was further influenced by factors such as the degree to which

they responded to distress calls from community members, regardless of differences such as

ethnicity, religion, class and gender; the methods they used to enforce community norms; the

level of cooperation between the groups and state security forces especially the police; the

internal organization of the vigilante groups; and the nature of the local order they promoted.

From the perspective of the hybrid governance approach, community members’ support of

policing by the vigilante groups can easily be understood as an expression of transformations

in the way security is governed in Africa. Although some may see it as a result of the failure

of the state police to effectively prevent criminal violence in the communities and the

apparent resilience of the vigilante groups, the proliferation of vigilantism seems more to be a

demonstration of the emergence of what Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) called global

security assemblages, i.e. assemblages in which a range of different global and local, public

and private security agents and norms interact, cooperate and compete to produce new

institutions, practices, and forms of security governance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, p.

3).

The findings of this study further show that policing by vigilante groups has benefits for

ordinary citizens. These include availability, affordability, accessibility, and effectiveness.

Baker (2008) alludes to this when he observes that vigilante groups provide a broad social

safety net when states lack the capacity (or will) to keep their social contract with citizens.

Vigilantism gives ordinary citizens the opportunity to directly participate in the governance of

their security and vigilante groups complement the services of the state police.

The downside of this development, however, is that the widespread use and support of

policing by vigilante groups, as revealed in this study, not only undermines the legitimacy of

the state police but can also lead community members to believe that the state police and, by

extension, the state itself is irrelevant (Baker 2004). Other negative implications include the

possibility of unequal provision of security to citizens, intolerance of ‘outsiders’, inadequate

accountability, an escalation of violence, facilitation of illegal activities, and a lack of

sustainability (see also Baker 2004, 2008). However, as Baker (2008) observes, all of these

problems also apply to varying degrees to state policing in Africa. It is therefore important to

address the underlying structural causes of urban and criminal violence such as

unemployment, inequality and poverty, if one wants to make genuine improvements to

policing.

Finally, even though this study has generated valuable insights on how community

members perceive vigilante groups in Karu, caution should be exercised in generalizing the

findings to other urban communities in Nigeria because of the local context of policing.

Looking at developments in other part of Nigeria, the question remains under what

circumstances people prefer to invite vigilantes into a community and under what


circumstances they prefer to invite the police? How do community members perceive other

types of vigilante group such as the civilian Joint Task Force in Maiduguri for example that

supports the Nigerian army in their fight against Boko Haram? These are questions of real

sociological concern that future studies should address.


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