Media Matters: A Look Into The Use Of Media In Russia At The End Of The Twentieth Century
Jessee Boullion
University of Alaska Anchorage
HIST 477/Senior Seminar (Prof. Dennison)
Fall Semester 2007
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Media Matters: A Look into the Use of Media in Russia at the End of the Twentieth Century
"Liberty sets the mind free, fosters independence and unorthodox thinking and ideas. But
it does not offer instant prosperity or happiness and wealth to everyone. This is something that
politicians in particular must keep in mind."1 Today Russians find themselves living a life more
and more reminiscent of the ones they led during the heydays of communism, even though the
Soviet Union has collapsed. This collapse of the Soviet Union opened doors to the public about
the private matters of the past century, people were taken out from underneath the red
shadow of ignorance and compliance and many were suddenly hungry for answers,
independence and freedoms. Russian historical documents were uncovered and published and
the people wanted to know the intricate details of their past. The period between the years
1989-1999 was a time of discovery and revelation, but by the time President Vladimir Putin
took control in 1999 that feeding frenzy of interest in history had started to be replaced with
apathy and numbness to the past.2 In seven short years President Vladimir Putin has managed
to guide Russian life away from the freedoms so shortly enjoyed under his predecessor back to
a more authoritarian and repressed way of life. This new authoritarianism is especially evident
in Putin’s handling of the briefly thriving industry of independent Russian media.3 Russia was at
a cross roads when it was freed from the Soviet Union's lingering grip; it had the option of
providing for its people democratic freedoms enjoyed by a majority of the industrialized world.
1 Boris Yeltsin. As quoted in Daniel C. Diller ed. Russia and the Independent States. Congressional Quarterly: Washington, D.C., 1993. 2 Catherine Merridale, “Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia.” Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 1 (2003): 18.3 Alex Lupis, "Freedoms Found & Lost." Russian Life 50, no. 1(January/February2007): 29.
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Instead Russia has both evolved and devolved back to an increasingly authoritarian state while
using the idea of its developing democracy to stave off criticisms by the rest of the European
West. Russia's media has been especially hard hit with this increase in strong government
authority. The media went through a period of growth and relative prosperity under the early
rule of Boris Yeltsin. It is currently facing extinction as an independent and unbiased source of
information as Vladimir Putin's swift hand controls the flow and content of any message that
reaches his people's ears. Without freedom of press there can be no hope of a true democracy
in Russia and due to Putin’s silencing of independent media outlets he is leading his country to
democratic failure.
Today in the United States, we currently face many restrictions on the freedoms
guaranteed in the Constitution.4 The most notable restriction on the rights of our people came
in the neutering of the 5th Amendment, the right to due process, by current President George
W. Bush this past June.5 Americans need to take heed of what is happening to the freedoms of
the Russian press. In the age of increasing governmental control over information, its
suppression, and the spin on the news provided by large media conglomerates, we only need to
look to Russia to begin to understand what is happening here. Is it going to take the unlawful
abduction of anti-war journalists here in America, much like the anti-Putin journalists in Russia,
for us to stand up and address the problem? This topic is important because we are
4 Doug Thompson. “Bush on the Constitution: “It’s just a goddamned piece of paper.’ Capitol Hill Blue. http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/article_7779.shtml (accessed November 29, 2007). ““Stop throwing the Constitution in my face. It’s just a goddamned piece of paper!” President Bush reportedly said.5 George W. Bush. “Executive Order: Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq.” The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-3.html?1 (accessed December 1, 2007). This executive order removes the right of a person to keep their property unless due process has been given to them. Due process has been revoked in America for persons the government deems as being potentially undermining of the war effort in Iraq.
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eyewitnesses to the obvious lack of unbiased information by the increasingly government
controlled media outlets in Russia. By the systematic control of media coverage in Russia,
Vladimir Putin has been able to manipulate the public to present the Unity Party and himself as
the head, in the best light. The U. S. government should feel compelled to condemn such cases
as the murder of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the countless other
critical Russian media providers who have disappeared or found murdered.6 Western Europe
and American complacency and unwillingness to call out Russia in situations of human rights
violations and mass censorship in the media has helped to usher in a new era of non-
democratic rule in post Soviet Russia.7 The opportunities for a free and democratic Russia are
slipping away before our eyes as little is being done to stop the decline we are witnessing.
The themes that I will develop in this paper include the examination of the development
and subsequent decline of journalistic and media freedoms, beginning with the ambitious early
rule of Boris Yeltsin. Also important is the public response to the volumes of information
circulating freely, along with the trend of people becoming distraught with the political
situation in Russia. During the past seven years, Putin’s media censorship under his restrictive
rule, the attack on journalists, and the manipulation of television advertisements during
elections have reduced the advances in media freedoms gained in the past to mere footnotes in
foreign journals. Russia’s present struggle over glasnost is not new. This is a society with a long
tradition of censorship and authoritarianism; this is also a society that is slow to evolve. The
6 Lupis 28.7 Sarah Mendelson, "Russians' Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?" International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 41-42.
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Russian “fourth estate” has never reached the level of radicalism or independence that it has in
the rest of the modern world.
There is a vast amount of information on the subject of censorship of the media in
Russia. I will be using a wide variety of sources both primary and secondary covering attitudes
and interpretations from Russian, European and American journalists and their points of view
on the current state of Russian media and rights. There will be discussion on how the situation
in Russia is affecting the global political landscape. I will show the significance that censorship of
media and rights has on a nation and to accentuate the urgency of needing to address these
issues in a world public arena. I will attempt to show how the Russian people were exposed to
an as then unheard of amount of information about their past and current events, how that
might have contributed to the fact that as a people they became almost desensitized and numb
to the situation of the past while their country experienced new hardships.
The Presidency of Vladimir Putin will undoubtedly be seen as another turning point in
Russian history. Russia's return to a more powerful central government, the puppeteering of
media coverage in elections, and the ever increasingly open stance of returning to an
authoritative rule for Russia are all connected to Putin's presidency. There is much to be said
about this man in the late 1990s, and even today, towards the end of his rule, he is still shaping
his country to be something foreign to an authentic democracy. His time in office and influence
over the media is reminiscent of an earlier time in Russian history. Throughout its past Russian
autocrats have had a trend of trying to control what information makes its way to the people.
There have been generations of state censorship of journalists, this continuity of censorship
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reaches back to the times of Peter the Great. The real anomaly of modern Russia is the power
and freedom that leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin allowed their people;
their role in the distribution of information was unprecedented for Russia. Unlike in places such
as America where journalists are considered the "watch dog" for the people or the public
consciousness, Russian journalists have never enjoyed that status. They have always been at
the whim of their government; they report what they are told to report and have a long
tradition of complying with censorship.
“General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev,
open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”8 The symbolic beginning of the end for the
Soviet Union and communism was televised for the world to see, a free press allowed this to
happen on June 12, 1987. The wall dividing East and West Germany, not just a physical
boundary but one of politics, economies, and social ideologies was torn down. The divider
between the ideas of East and the innovations of the West finally started to dissolve. With the
introduction of the policies glasnost (transparency of government) and perestroika (economic
reconstruction) Mikhail Gorbachev created an environment that allowed such revolutionary
actions to occur. This remnant of Cold War isolationism and communism that was erected
during the time of Nikita Khrushchev heralded a time of freedom, however short lived.
In Soviet Russia all types of media were filtered through Communist party censorship,
the resulting sifted information was full of “Ideologically appropriate opinions on every issue,
8 Ronald Reagan. “Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate: West Berlin June 12, 1987” Ronald Reagan.com The Official Site. http://www.ronaldreagan.com/sp_11.html (accessed October 30, 2007).
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and even...ideologically correct wordings.”9 The media outlets were all owned by the state, be it
newspaper, periodicals, radio stations and television stations. All were subject to intense and
stifling State censorship. It wasn’t until 1990 that the Soviet Union saw its first “nongovernment
periodicals in 70 years begin to take shape.”10 A year later the Russian people elected their first
President, Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin took over in a time of turmoil and was expected to be the man
to make changes for the good of Russia; expectations were running very high when he stepped
into office.
Yeltsin was popular in Russia due to his aggressive attacks on the current administration
for not pursuing a more radical and rapid change towards a better government. Shortly after
being elected as President a coup was staged against the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev by
people opposed to the ineffective perestroika reforms. In a picture perfect example of the use
of media in this time of turmoil, Yeltsin makes his way to the top of a tank amidst a mass of
demonstrators and military troops.11 From his heroic position atop the tank Yeltsin solidifies his
popularity both at home and abroad by calling to an end of the revolt for his people to display
defiance against it, he called for the military to not turn upon their own brothers.12 News
stations from around the globe were there to witness this staged speech and recorded the
heroic imagery. Yeltsin’s character was shaped that day and he became a symbol of positive
progress for Russia to many Westerners. Yeltsin also allowed the program of glasnost to
9 Masha Lipman, “Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin’s Russia.”Current History104, no. 684 (October 2005): 319.10 Ibid., 319. 11 See figure 1. 12 BBC. “On This Day 19 August 1991” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/19/newsid_2499000/2499453.stm (accessed November 30).
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continue in his government. Media was free of state censorship and independent journalists
had free reign to put whatever subject they deemed necessary in their sights. This short period
of time between the end of the Soviet Union and the nomination of Vladimir Putin as the
successor to Boris Yeltsin can be considered the golden age of media freedom in Russian
history. Much like a flame though this time of media independence was intense only for a
moment then was smothered out by all the depressing realities Russia was facing.
During Yeltsin’s time as president he tried to reinvigorate the stagnant Russian
economy. He was popular for being somewhat radical and he intended to capitalize off of
that.13 With his election there was an unspoken promise made between the Russian people and
Yeltsin, the people had put him in the position of authority and now he had to ensure the
improvement of conditions in the motherland. Yeltsin surrounded himself with scholarly
western economist and political advisors to help him create a solution to the problems Russia
was currently facing. The idea that was formulated is known as “shock therapy,” rightly so
because it meant trying to rapidly liberate the world’s largest socialist “planned” economies.14
This idea, the implementation, and the results would soon turn disastrous both for Yeltsin and
for his people though. Yeltsin had delivered the “shock” to Russia but the “therapy” never took
hold and the dark cloud of broken promises had started to form on Yeltsin’s reign.
The enthusiasm for information and exercise of media freedom built steam on the back
of the perestroika and glasnost reforms started by Mikhail Gorbachev that stimulated the sense
13 Andrei Tsygankov. “Boris Yeltsin as a Tragic Figure.” Johnson’s Russia List. http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-98-15.cfm (accessed November 30, 2007).14Adi Ignatious. “Boris Yeltsin” Time in Partnership with CNN. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1615184,00.html (accessed November 25, 2007).
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of “change in the air.” Yeltsin chose not to interfere with this surge of free press; it could be
that this was his ultimate sacrifice. For his country, he let the press have near free reign over
headlines and reporting and unfortunately the easiest target seemed to be Yeltsin’s public
blunders.15 He traded Russian freedom of press for his popularity as a revolutionary leader.
Yeltsin would never regain his status as a champion for the people against the oppressive but
crumbling communist regime even though he would manage to win a reelection campaign.
During the time that the press was allowed to report on any corruption, scandal, or
topic they pleased President Boris Yeltsin was in the process of selling out his country. Yeltsin
was selling his countries natural resources to the highest bidders; he effectively created a new
generation of oligarchs that at this present time “control an estimated 70% of the economy.”16
The people started to see Yeltsin not as a leader for tomorrow, but a disgraced traitor to Russia.
Television broadcasters had a great deal of freedom in the early 1990’s to “criticize the many
problems faced by the new Russian government” but as the decade passed by they were
unable to support themselves in this new “market economy” and were faced with the option of
going out of business entirely or becoming more dependant and friendly towards the state for
funding.17 At this time there were six major television channels in Russia and their ownership
was almost equally divided between state and the private sector. The 1990’s continued to have
economic disasters coupled with military blunders that left the people of Russia disgraced and
disgusted to have such an ineffective President. The troubles of real life started to take over the
15Lipman, 321.16 Fred Weir. “The excesses of Russia’s rapid privatization have come back to haunt the nation’s tycoons.” Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1128/p01s03-woeu.htm (accessed November 30, 2007).17 Sarah Oates and Laura Roselle "Russian Elections and TV News: Comparison of Campaign News on State-Controlled and Commercial Television Channels." Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 31.
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every day man, the need to stay alive and out of massive debt started to set in. The need to
keep up to date on political activities, historical discoveries, and watching the evening news
filled with reports of wars, murders, and disaster was no longer something the average person
wanted to keep in their life. Yeltsin had become a disgraced leader; his economic and military
policies had failed. Then in 1993 Yeltsin used television to deliver an address to his nation to
inform them that he would take on special powers in order to better implement his reform
docket, there was a backlash and the 9th Congress of People’s Deputies attempted to impeach
him. This failed attempt lead to another television address, this time to disband his opposition
the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin even went so far as
deploying tanks and troops on the Russian White House in order to shoot down the opposition
in the “September Revolution” of 1993 that was broadcast globally.18 Still, Yeltsin was able to
win reelection in the face of economic disaster, social and political unrest, the aftermath of the
Chechnya debacle, and reports of failing health and increased alcoholic tendencies. How did he
manage do pull off this miracle? He did so by the use of spin. Yeltsin’s reelection campaign had
to adhere somewhat with the national policies of the time that stated “The national television
and radio channels were required to distribute one hour of free time daily to be spread among
the forty-three parties on the ballot in 1995,” studies have shown that Yeltsin received much
more on air time and drastically less critical analysis of his term than other candidates.19 This
was a godsend for Yeltsin because for the majority of his reelection campaign he was in such
dire health that he was unable to “get out of his sickbed to campaign” because he was on the
brink of a heart attack, the press though captured Yeltsin in drastic contrast to reality for the
18 Lilia Shevtsova. "The Two Sides of the New Russia." Journal of Democracy 6.3 (1995): 6-7. 19 Oates and Roselle, 33-34.
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sake of his campaign.20 In an odd twist of fate during the nation’s parliamentary election’s the
television channels, utilizing their freedom to report on issues they deemed necessary, spent a
majority of their time reporting on the atrocities in Chechnya and on the murder of Christian
Democratic Union leader and candidate, Vitaly Savitsky (something that was played up in the
media as “the first murder of the campaign” despite the lack of evidence of foul play).21 Left to
suffer was the serious coverage of the policies of the candidates and their representative
parties. What was covered on this subject was Yeltsin “promoting the election process rather
than any particular candidate or party.”22 Yeltsin utilized the very popular private television
network NTV to gain steam in his reelection campaign, adding the head of the station Igor
Malashenko, as the head of his campaign team. Yeltsin secured positive “favorable” treatment
during airtime on NTV, as well as governmentally controlled station ORT. He was played up as
being well liked by the people and having strong policies that will improve the country. NTV was
considered one of the most well respected independent media outlets in Russia at the time and
pulled in the top percentage of viewers boasting that it could reach “a potential audience of 70
million viewers, about half the Russian population.”23 So when Yeltsin was portrayed in such a
soft light by this respected independent channel, the views listened. Yeltsin had an amazing
comeback and defeated the “Communist contender who was openly hostile to a free press.”24
Even though NTV showed some bias in this election they did so with the best intentions, for “it
could be argued – and in fact it was contended by many in Russia – that the media needed to
20 Anne Nivat. "Russian Presidential Campaign Coverage." Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 92. See figure 2.21 Oates and Roselle, 39.22 Ibid., 39.23 Ibid., 32.24 Ibid., 47.
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support Yeltsin to protect their very right to survive,” had the communist candidate been
elected there would be no more freedoms in press.25 The press made Yeltsin out to be a
candidate worth electing in an effort of self preservation.
Once Yeltsin had enough of the political life, and survived another failed impeachment
attempt, he made some decisions that will affect Russia for a long time. On December 31, 1999
Boris Yeltsin suddenly announced his retirement and endorsed a successor “a former KGB man
from Leningrad,” Vladimir Putin. Put had recently been involved with cleaning up the media
mess left by Yeltsin in response to a comment made by President Clinton, "Yesterday, Clinton
permitted himself to put pressure on Russia. It seems he has for a minute, for a second, for half
a minute, forgotten that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons. He has forgotten about
that."26 Putin, then acting as Prime Minister was able to downplay Yeltsin’s comments and
smooth over the incident. According to some accounts Yeltsin made an agreement with Putin
that he would nominate him as his successor and “vanish from the political scene as long as
Putin didn’t pursue corruption cases against him.”27
Joseph Stalin reportedly made the comment, “It doesn’t matter how they vote, just how
we count.”28 That sentiment seems to shadow Putin’s unwritten policy of “it doesn’t matter
what you do, just what you let them see.” This can also be seen through the eyes of a young
Russian child when they were asked what they thought about learning history in school, “Why
25 Ibid., 47.26 Wikipedia contributors, "Boris Yeltsin" Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Boris_Yeltsin&oldid=175700050 (accessed December 1, 2007).27 Ignatious. “Boris Yeltsin”28 Joseph Stalin. As quoted in Anne Nivat. “Russian Presidential Campaign Coverage.” 92.
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do we need history? Tomorrow will be a different era and everything will change anyway.”29
With all the rapid changes in their country effecting how they remembered past events,
Russians were in a state of disbelief and rather than leaving themselves open to the shock of
political scandals they started to tune out reports of unpleasant issues. Boris Yeltsin’s abrupt
resignation six months before the next scheduled Presidential election and the fact that Putin
was appointed as the man to fill the duties of President until the next elections played a
significant role in the success of Putin’s campaign. Putin was able to have time to anticipate the
departure of Yeltsin and capitalize off of the momentum he had going for him now. The election
were moved up by three months and to the public Putin was the man to elect, after all he was
already successfully in office and administering policy without problem and that is what the
public was in need of – a smooth transition.
It was a matter of days after election to office that Putin started to unravel the delicate
balance of free press and nongovernmental controlled media. Putin was stung by the journalists
who were still reveling in the effects of the glasnost era. In what is considered “acts of
disloyalty” that proved the need for government control, Russian journalists’ reported on such
events as the submarine Kursk catastrophe and the 2002 Moscow theatre hostage crisis. In the
incident with the submarine the 118 sailors aboard drown. In the Moscow Theatre crisis 130 of
the hostages held by Chechen terrorists were left dead, not by the hands of the abductors but
due to the combination of the use of a potent knockout gas implemented by the state and the
failure to provide medical attention or information afterwards.30 Journalists exposed the lies
29 National Geographic Videos, "Russia's Last Tsar: Grandeur, Romance, Intrigue...Terror!" November 28, 2007 (originally aired 1994). 30 Lipman, 320.
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that government officials were giving in regards to both of these situations, their attempt to
conceal reality failed due to independent media outlets. Vladimir Putin lashed out at the
reporters blaming them for “subverting the Russian army and navy” and accusing them of
“cynical profit-seeking” by taking advantage of the tragedy to sell more papers and gain more
viewers.31 These incidents proved fatal to independent media in Russia, especially for NTV.
“Shortly afterward, the top manager…whose coverage especially enraged Putin was replaced by
a loyal director, to whom the Kremlin’s instructions were a much higher priority than the ethics
of the journalistic profession.”32
Masha Lipman, editor of Moscow-based Carnegie Center sponsored Pro et Contra
recalls that “In the spring of 2000, within days after President Vladimir Putin’s inauguration, the
government launched a campaign to take influential media under state control. The campaign
began with a raid by masked security men on the offices of Media-MOST, the largest privately
owned media group: three years later all national television networks were controlled by the
state.”33 In fact with the help of “media tycoon” Boris Berezovsky, a highly successful smear
campaign was undertaken to discredit all of Putin’s rivals even before he won the election.
Berezovsky was able to control the media to take down the rivals of his employer and Putin
obviously realized that the media is something he wants to have his thumb on as President. It
must have occurred to Putin that it would be too easy for businessmen and media moguls to
lose their feelings of loyalty to him and start leaking information that might demonize him.
Lipman’s article states that President Putin held only one press conference a year and that the
31 Ibid., 320.32 Ibid., 320.33 Ibid., 319.
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press stopped asking hard hitting questions at this event. Similarly, other high ranking officials
rarely make public appearances that air live and are never asked the sort of questions reports
from the west would ask.34 A great example of the failure for media to rise up against the strict
rule of Putin and his censorship is when the Federal Security Service (FSB is the successor of the
KGB) appeared on TV after the terrorist attacks in Beslan for the first time, they and Putin were
not asked even a single question about the incident.35 Even while the story was breaking the
now government controlled NTV initially showed live coverage but switched shortly after airing
it to be replaced with pre-recorded material and then only later on went back to edited
coverage of the incident. Putin has successfully created an environment where he would not be
put in danger of tarnishing his image; journalists have become weak and complacent with the
choke hold that the Kremlin has on the media. “Putin is a television president” who now
controls the content of the airwaves.36
“But this means that we also need to build our home and make it strong and well
protected. We see, after all, what is going on in the world."37 – Putin. You cannot say that Putin
is not a fiendishly clever man; he has managed his country exactly how he planned to. By the
time he took office there were three major television networks that provided news coverage
for Russia, the most opposition to government action was reported on by NTV which was still
privately owned. Putin changed this; NTV was turned into a government friendly network run
by newly rich media moguls who benefitted from Yeltsin late term sell out policies. Putin now
34 Ibid., 321.35 Telegraph.co.uk. “Putin’s Media Censorship.” Telegraph.co.uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2004/09/07/dl0702.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/07/ixportal.html (accessed November, 2, 2007). 36 Lupis, 32.37 Vladimir Putin. “Annual Address to Lawmakers”
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had all three networks in his pocket and coverage of any issue was to be filtered through his
people before airing.38 Putin and his cabinet are now shown on television often, never in
compromising situations, always hard at work.39 These sources of news never show the
government in a negative light, this policy was extended to both radio and online chat rooms in
April of 2007. “At least 50 percent of the reports about Russia must be ‘positive.’ And in
addition, opposition leaders could not be mentioned on the air and the United States was to be
portrayed as an enemy,” this comes from the heads of the Russian News Service.40 Reports to
back this up say that “the number of Russian radio stations carrying news programs from the
U.S.-funded Voice of America and Radio Liberty fell from 72 to nine since September.”41
Putin does not need to personally implement such radical measures into his propaganda
machine; his loyal associates do it willingly for him. This is the perfect situation for Putin to be
in, sitting back with positive news coverage by a media that is self censoring and pandering to
his preferences. The journalists themselves comment "You basically know what's prohibited it’s
clear to all of us which camp the owner [of the media outlet] belongs to, and what information
is allowed. I cannot write anything concerning Berezovsky himself, or his business partners or
ventures, and of course I cannot touch the Kremlin. With Luzhkov, I cannot write about
Moscow or the city authorities.”42
38 Telegraph.co.uk. “Putin’s Media Censorship.”39 Sebastian Smith. “Unreality Television: How Putin has remade the Media to Suite his Needs.” U. S. News & World Report. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060709/17russia.htm (accessed November 4, 2007).40 Andrew E.Kramer.”50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/world/europe/22russia.html?_r=1&ei=5065&en=d4929f91a6c5b2aa&ex=1177819200&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (accessed November 7, 2007).41 Jefferson Morley. “Putin’s Russia – Case Study in Media Control.” Washington Post. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/2006/07/putins_russia_case_study_in_me.html (accessed November 7, 2007).42 Emma Gray. “Putin’s Media War: Independent Journalism is under siege in Russia, where President-elect Vladimir Putin surfed to victory on a wave of docile press coverage.” The Committee to Protect Journalists.
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A recent incident in 2007 where in the streets of the capital city “54 people were beaten
badly enough by the police that they sought medical care” not a single news report reached the
airwaves of NTV. Instead they decided to “lead its newscast last Sunday with Mr. Putin
attending a martial arts competition, with the Belgian actor Jean-Claude Van Damme as his
guest.” This tactic of shielding the public from negative news coverage in favor of upbeat
reports that show off the President as a strong and popular leader is custom made for its
intended audience, the Russian people who are tired of seeing the ugly side of life. “The Russian
President does not regard the media as a self-sufficient public institution, but as a tool for
manipulation which must be used in the interests of what he sees as the greater public good,”
Putin’s government sees itself as both giving the people what they want and what they need in
the form of edited news coverage.43
According to U. S. based human rights group, Freedom House, “Russia [ranks] 158th out
of the 194 countries and territories for press freedom” since Putin has taken office. His policies
of having the Press Ministry (set up immediately after Putin’s election to control all forms of
media and their content and in early 2007 expanded to explicitly control all journalism
appearing on the internet in Russian44) be in charge of allotting subsidies to newspapers based
off of their compliance and “support of government policies” has helped Russia’s rank sink so
low.45 In 2005 it was found that in the annual report of Reporters Without Borders “Working
http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2000/Russia_analysis_March00/Russia_analysis_march00.html (accessed November 7, 2007). 43 Andrei Babitsky. “Putin regards media as a tool for manipulation.” Guardian Unlimited. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/freepress/story/0,,479997,00.html (accessed November 7, 2007).44 Reuters. “Putin Decrees Creation of a Media and Internet Regulator.” International Herald Tribune. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/15/business/russmedia.php (accessed November 6, 2007).45 Gray. “Putin’s Media War: Independent Journalism is under siege in Russia, where President-elect Vladimir Putin surfed to victory on a wave of docile press coverage.”
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conditions for journalists in Russia continued to worsen alarmingly in 2005, with violence the
most serious threat to press freedom. The independent press is shrinking because of crippling
fines and politically-inspired distribution of government advertising. The authorities’ refusal to
accredit foreign journalists showed the government’s intent to gain total control of news.”46
Another poll conducted in 2007 by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center brings to light
in certain terms some of the issues facing Russian people today in regards to the relationship
between the media and politics:
More than half of Russians – 60% - mention that they are not interested in politics (including 24% of those who are totally indifferent to this issue). 37% of respondents show interest in politics. The respondents of 45 years of age and older display more interest (43-45%), than respondents aged 35-44 years (34%) and, especially, than those aged 18-34 years (28-30%). 40% of respondents participate in discussions devoted to politics. Another 17% indicate that these topics are being discussed in the bosom of their family and friends, but they themselves do not take active part in them. Political discussions are least popular among young people of 18-24 years of age (28% among them participate in discussions like that); whereas they are most common among the respondents aged 45 years and older (46-47%).47
This poll shows that there is a wide spread disinterest in the discussions of politics in Russia.
The study goes on to present findings that indicate people have a very low regard for the media
presenting information on politics. In a list of six options ranging from the opinion of family
members, the President, other politicians, journalists, and heads of educational institutions the
media ranked fifth in “deserving respect.”48 The people of Russia no longer rely on their media
to give them information about their political officials to help them develop opinions about the
46 Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom. “Russia – 2006 Annual report.” Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17476&Valider=OK (accessed November 5, 2007). 47 All-Russian Public Opinion research Center. “How mass Media Influence Russians’ Political Views” Press-release No. 791 of VCIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center). http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archives/info-material/single/8971.html (accessed October 24, 2007). See figure 3. 48 Ibid.
19
issues. The people are barely exerting effort to develop opinions about their government,
period.
Another take on this poll could be that one the reaches back to the late 1800’s, a time
when peasant life was depressing and life expectancy short. In the first hand account, Village
Life in Late Tsarist Russia, the author documents her interactions with peasants in rural Russia.49
She lays out a picture that there is an inherent indifference in the people of Russia to look back
into history or to even look forward to the future because the conditions of the present are so
horrible. The youth especially are not willing to look at their past or plan for their future
because they are concerned with the here and now, how will I live, what will I eat, where will I
find it. These peasants did not even count on living past the next crop season much less dwell
on issues of policies and government. The peasants of late 19th century Russia refused to waste
time thinking of the future or dwell on the past due to the dismal realities of today. This pattern
of thinking may very well be repeating itself with the youth of modern Russia.
“History became front-page news” for the first time after the fall of the Soviet Union
and there was a revolution of information and an influx of documents shedding light on topics
long since buried by the government.50 Writer Catherine Merridale presents an apathetic
modern Russian culture in her article about “redesigning history in contemporary Russia.”
Russians were yearning for knowledge about their past, but it seems that after reading all these
documents and being reminded of all the horrible things that had occurred they were pushed
into a state of shock; they retreated from this information age and “preoccupied with mere
49 Olga Semyonova Tian-Shanskaia. Village Life in Late Tsarist Russia. Edited by David L. Ransel. Translated by David L. Ransel with Michael Levine. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, 1-172.50 Merridale, 16.
20
survival” became fixated on escapism via television programming like Santa Barbara.51 The
Russian people lost their will to seek out this history, they passed that blasé outlook onto the
youth of Russia, and evidenced by the VCIOM poll that showed merely 5-6% of 19-34 year olds
had a great interest in their history.52 Students in Russian Universities seem to be simply looking
for the right answer to be told to them and scoff at the idea that history is something that
needs to be investigated and looked at from all angles. “You seem to think that there can be
more than one right answer,” remarks a student in response to prodding by an adult
attempting a class discussion.53 The Russian people no longer have a need for uncovering their
history. They have no universal need for journalists to keep them informed on politics. They are
leading themselves to a very dark future. A society simply cannot ignore its past and be
unmoved by media censorship. The public’s level of disillusion with their journalists, who are
trying desperately to uncover stories of truth only to find government censorship or worse, is
disheartening.
In an article that dealt with international reason why Russian citizens are losing their
free press rights and are indifferent to this fact, Sarah Mendelson places a great deal of blame
on the shoulders of the rest of the Western world. Mendelson is the Director of International
Politics at the Fletch School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University as well as being Senior Fell
in the Russia/Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; she has a
strong history in foreign policy and human rights.54 Her studies have found that the “muted
51 Ibid., 17.52 All-Russian Public Opinion research Center. “No More Than 2% of Adult Russians Would be Able to get an A in the EGE History Test” Press-release No. 783 of VCIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion research Center). http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/8914.html (accessed October 31, 2007). 53 Merridale, 23.54 Mendelson, 39.
21
response of international organizations (IOs)…does further damage. In terms of foreign policy,
high-level Western government support that overlooks or minimizes noncompliance with
international norms and treaties helps to reinforce Soviet-era norms hostile to democracy.”55
It is argued that the actions of policy makers and countries eager to see Russia become a
strong democratic nation have actually helped to create a negative environment for the very
thing they want to cultivate. By ignoring Russia’s government when it violates human rights and
civil liberties laws, all the while praising it for its overall superficial show of democratization, we
have reinforced the idea that it is ok to not fully adhere to democracy. In a quote from the
director of the Moscow Helsinki office it is said that “there is not a single region in Russia where
the observance of human rights would meet international requirements” including such things
as “intimidation, forced disappearances, and torture.”56 Yet the world seems to coddle Russia,
not wanting to anger it and risk it regressing even more into a mixture of Soviet-democracy.
Some of the external barriers to the diffusion of social norms, the spread of true democracy and
freedom of speech can be summarized as follows: Russia makes a “show” to be a country that
cares about inalienable human rights and that pacifies the Western world into ignoring its
blatant civil liberty violations. Differing agendas from countries trying to bring democracy to
Russia undermine the treaties they are trying to instill by not creating a unified stance on issues.
The fact that Russia is still a power to be reckoned with militarily, along with their possession of
nuclear weapons, leaves policy makers believing “little can be done to curb its human rights
abuses ,” fear takes over and wins in this example.57
55 Ibid., 42.56 Ibid., 49.57 Ibid., 55-56.
22
Not to take the entire fault away from the Russians themselves, there were some
internal issues that were inhibiting a potential democratic state. Russian people’s views seem to
be that “state security [is] much more important than individual rights.”58 Polls are cited that
show that Russians are becoming more nostalgic for the strong leadership of the Soviet-era and
especially for Soviet era figures such as Stalin. The article concludes that even “a decade after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, gains in human rights and democracy have yet to be
consolidated in Russia. Instead there has been increasing regression.”59 Russia’s civil liberties
violations that have not been addressed by national agencies, reports of false attempts at
democratization, and the strengthening of a pseudo-Soviet government have ensured that
democratic ideals have not been able to blossom due to lingering Soviet-norms that are being
reinforced by the government.
In a way the effect of the Western world not following through on keeping Russian
democracy democratic is severe. Russian government is like a calculating spoiled child feigning
at an attempt to act mature but really manipulating those around it. Those in the position to
deal out reprimands do nothing to punish the child for fear of a massive tantrum; Russia has the
world right where its government officials want it, slowly realizing there are issues that need to
be dealt with but unable to address them for fear of what they once and could be capable of
again.
Even if he is now no longer a revered icon of the Russian people, Boris Yeltsin did once
have the right idea about freedom of press in his country. We can only hope, for the sake of the
58 Ibid., 59.59 Ibid., 39-69.
23
free and democratic future of Russian citizens, that one day information will flow freely from
the source to the people without the interruption of agenda pushing bureaucrats. "…Our
mindless unanimity will bring us to an even more hopeless state of stagnation. It is especially
important to encourage unorthodox thinking when the situation is critical: At such moments
every new word and fresh thought is more precious than gold. Indeed, people must not be
deprived of the right to think their own thoughts."60
60 Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990) 172.
24
History 477
Annotated Bibliography
Primary Sources
All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center. “How Mass Media Influence Russians’ Political Views” Press-release No. 791 of VCIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center). http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/8971.html (accessed October 24, 2007).
VCIOM uses government statistical information, archives of previous statistics, “face-to-face interviews, telephones interviews, focus groups, in-depth interviews, expert studies, product, packaging and advertising tests, diary studies, and retail trade audits” and other methods to take opinion surveys throughout all of Russia. This survey conducted in 2007 shows the opinion of the surveyed Russians on the subject of interest in politics, source of information about politics, and the biggest influence on individuals vote in elections.
All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center. “No More Than 2% of Adult Russians Would be Able to get an A in the EGE History Tests” Press-release No. 783 of VCIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center). http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/8914.html (accessed October 31, 2007).
VCIOM conducted a survey on general public interest in Russian history. Their study showed a general lack of great interest in the subject. Subjects over the age of 60 showed a more of an interest of the subject than the age groups 34 years of age and below.
Associated Press. “1991_coup_yeltsin.jpg” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:1991_coup_yeltsin.jpg (accessed October 30, 2007).This image has a copyright by the Associated Press; it is an image of Yeltsin on top of a
tank in front of the Russian White House giving an address to protestors and media crews.
Babitsky, Andrei. “Putin regards media as a tool for manipulation.” Guardian Unlimited. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/freepress/story/0,,479997,00.html (accessed November 7, 2007).
Andrei Babitsky is a journalist whose coverage of the conflict in Chechnya leads him to be arrested, detained, and considered a traitor of Russia.
BBC. “On This Day 19 August 1991” BBC News.
25
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/19/newsid_2499000/2499453.stm (accessed November 30).
The BBC is known worldwide as a reliable source of information. This page is dedicated to the events of August 1991 when a coup was staged against Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin made his famous speech from a tank.
Bush, George W. “Executive Order: Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq.” The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-3.html?1 (accessed December 1, 2007).
On July 17th, 2007 President Bush displays an executive order that effectively abolishes parts of the 5th Amendment. There is no way around the fact that the right a person has to not be deprived of property without due process, with his executive order Bush has taken away due process for any person who he or his government thinks may be promoting efforts in undermining the war in Iraq.
National Geographic Videos, "Russia's Last Tsar: Grandeur, Romance, Intrigue...Terror!" November 28, 2007 (originally aired 1994).
This video documents the fall of Nicholas II but also has quotes from Russians in the early 1990’s about their opinion of history. This quote is from a school aged child in 1991.
Pulitzer. ”Russian President Boris Yeltsin dancing at a rock concert during his campaign for re-election” http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1997/feature-photography/works/ (accessed November 2, 2007).
Russian photojournalist Alexander Zemlianichenko won his second Pulitzer Prize for Feature Photography with this submission of President Boris Yeltsin dancing at a concert. Yeltsin was actually in rapidly failing help at the time the picture was taken but was in the midst of a re-election campaign.
Putin, Vladimir. “Annual Address to Lawmakers” as quoted in Eckel, Mike. ”Putin Calls Soviet Collapse a ‘Geopolitical Catastrophe’.” San Diego Union-Tribune. April 26, 2005.
Vladimir Putin comments on the fall of the Soviet Union in a televised speech to the nation in 2005 were reported on by the San Diego Union-Tribune.
Reagan, Ronald. “Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate: West Berlin June 12, 1987” Ronald Reagan.com The Official Site. http://www.ronaldreagan.com/sp_11.html (accessed October 30, 2007).
President Reagan’s famous speech made in West Berlin on June 12, 1987.
26
Shevtsova, Lilia. "The Two Sides of the New Russia." Journal of Democracy 6.3 (1995): 56-71.
This article written by the director of the Center for Political Studies in Moscow deals with what Russia has become since the fall of the Soviet Union. That is, its evolution from a communist state to a complex hybrid democracy. The article also deals with contemporary myths of Russian, the power of those in charge, and the use of media (especially in Chechnya).
Thompson, Doug. “Bush on the Constitution: “It’s just a goddamned piece of paper.’ Capitol Hill Blue. http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/article_7779.shtml (accessed November 29, 2007).
Doug Thompson is a respected journalist and wrote about a meeting between President Bush and several Republican Congressional leaders. He has stood by his article and produced the names of cooperative witnesses to Bush’s statements mentioned in his article.
Tian-Shanskaia, Olga Semyonova. Village Life in Late Tsarist Russia. Edited by David L. Ransel. Translated by David L. Ransel with Michael Levine. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Firsthand accounts of village life at the end of the 19th century by a female Russian Ethnographer. Edited by author and Professor of History at Indiana University, David L. Ransel.
Wikipedia contributors, "Boris Yeltsin," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Boris_Yeltsin&oldid=175700050 (accessed December 1, 2007).
Used as a source for a quote made on public television, unable to find original source information.
Yeltsin, Boris. Against the Grain. Translated by Michael Glenny. New York: Summit Books, 1990.
Boris Yeltsin’s autobiography translated from Russian by Michael Glenny. Discussions of Yeltsin’s life, career, rise to power, and politics are the topics of his writing. Written, obviously, to cast a positive light on his life but also to shed light on the inside world of Soviet and Post Soviet Union politics.
Yeltsin, Boris. As quoted in Diller, Daniel C. ed. Russia and the Independent States. Congressional Quarterly: Washington, D.C., 1993.
A book revised from the previously published “The Soviet Union” (1990. 3d ed.) to reflect the development of the early nineties. Part one of the book covers Russian/Soviet history through the historic 1991 coup attempt. Part two discusses the “Commonwealth” of newly independent states, their economy, and defense capabilities. Part three shines a
27
spotlight on the independent republics on a case by case basis. Quotes from Boris Yeltsin are found within the book and are used as primary sources.
Secondary Sources
Gray, Emma. “Putin’s Media War: Independent Journalism is under siege in Russia, where President-elect Vladimir Putin surfed to victory on a wave of docile press coverage.” The Committee to Protect Journalists. http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2000/Russia_analysis_March00/Russia_analysis_ march00.html (accessed November 7, 2007).
This website collects articles and information about the violation of rights for journalists around the world. They collect information via firsthand account of reports stationed throughout the world and distribute their information with other organizations dealing with freedom of press by the International Freedom of Expression Exchange e-mail network. This article specifically deals with the issues facing journalists in modern Russia with Putin’s censoring of the media.
Ignatious, Adi. “Boris Yeltsin” Time in Partnership with CNN. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1615184,00.html (accessed November 25, 2007).
Time Magazine’s online version profiles Boris Yeltsin’s career and the incidents he had to face as a government official.
Kramer, Andrew E.”50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/world/europe/22russia.html?_r=1&ei=5065&en=d4929f91a6c5b2aa&ex=1177819200&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (accessed November 7, 2007).
The New York Times reported on the news that President Vladimir Putin has announced that “50% of the reports about Russia must be ‘positive’” as well as “opposition leaders [can not] be mentioned on the air and the United States was to be portrayed as an enemy.” The article follows with summaries of the state of censorship in Russian media and uses Russian journalists for quotations.
Lipman, Masha, "Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin's Russia." Current History 104, no. 684 (October 2005): 319-324.
An article written by a Moscow based journalists, this deals with mass media in the Putin regime, freedoms of media, and the use of television as a political tool.
Lupis, Alex, "Freedoms Found & Lost." Russian Life 50, no. 1(January/February2007): 28-39.
28
An article from Russian Life Magazine that deals with the loss of freedom of press that it gained in the early 1990's as well as the expanded state power that has occurred since Putin's took office.
Mendelson, Sarah. "Russians' Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?" International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 39-69.
Article that deals with the reasons why after the fall of the Soviet Union the process of democratization has not taken a firm hold in Russia as well as commenting on society and their views in modern day Russia.
Merridale, Catherine. “Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia.” Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 1 (2003): 13-28.
This article deals with the perception of Russian history in modern day Russia as well as the feelings of citizens, the apathy they have, and social procedures of modern day schooling in regards to Russian history.
Morley, Jefferson. “Putin’s Russia – Case Study in Media Control.” Washington Post. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/2006/07/putins_russia_case_study_in_me.html (accessed November 7, 2007).
The online edition of the Washington Post is no less respectable than its print version, one of the leading daily newspapers in America. This article cites specific reports that give information on the worsening conditions of journalists in Russia. It also mentioned the media tycoons who are in control of the vast majority of media outlets under Putin.
Nivat, Anne. "Russian Presidential Campaign Coverage." Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 92-97.
An article written by a correspondent based in Moscow, as the title suggests, deals primarily with the Russian presidential campaign coverage and gives short descriptions of people in power and their background.
Oates, Sarah and Roselle, Laura. "Russian Elections and TV News: Comparison of Campaign News on State-Controlled and Commercial Television Channels." Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 30-51.
This article deals with the use of media in modern Russia as a tool of politicians. This article deals with the use of television in elections, especially during that of President Putin's campaign.
Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom. “Russia – 2006 Annual report.” Reporters
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Without Borders for Press Freedom. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17476&Valider=OK (accessed November 5, 2007).
Reporters Without Borders presents information that has been thoroughly checked with multiple sources before giving reports about the state of media censorship in places around the world. The 2006 report for Russia cites multiple journalist murder/disappearance cases and their status, as well as the lack of broadcasting diversity with the government run news channels.
Reuters. “Putin Decrees Creation of a Media and Internet Regulator.” InternationalHerald Tribune. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/15/business/russmedia.php (accessed November 6, 2007).
The International Herald Tribune is described as the “international voice of the New York Times”. The article discusses the proposed creation of an agency that will regulate media as well as internet in Russia, potentially making it much easier for government to censor all forms of information exchange in Russia.
Smith, Sebastian. “Unreality Television: How Putin has remade the Media to Suite his Needs.” U. S. News & World Report. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060709/17russia.htm (accessed November 4, 2007).
The online version of the U. S. News & World Report contains all articles that also appear in print form. The article cited the strategies employed by President Putin to control the flow of media and the spin that is put on the information. It points out that after such propaganda has been unleashed on the people and the independent newsmakers have been silenced so efficiently it creates a need for less censorship amazingly, due to the people’s fears of being further punished for unapproved thoughts.
Telegraph.co.uk. “Putin’s Media Censorship.” Telegraph.co.uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2004/09/07/dl0702.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/07/ixportal.html (accessed November, 2, 2007).
This article from British based online newspaper, Telegraph, cites a specific situation where government controlled news stations chose not to inform its viewers of the Beslan incident. Other free media outlets such as independent foreign television stations were the only source of information on the event.
Tsygankov, Andrei. “Boris Yeltsin as a Tragic Figure.” Johnson’s Russia List. http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-98-15.cfm (accessed November 30, 2007).
Johnson’s Russia List is an online newsletter that deals with Russian issues on a daily basis. Funding and support for articles is provided by such organizations as the Center for
30
Defense Information and the nonprofit organization World Security Institute. This article deals with both the flaws and successes of Boris Yeltsin in the eyes of the West and in the eyes of native Russians.
Weir, Fred. “The excesses of Russia’s rapid privatization have come back to haunt the nation’s tycoons.” Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1128/p01s03-woeu.htm (accessed November 30, 2007).
The Christian Science Monitor is an international daily newspaper that has been in existence since 1908, based out of Boston, Massachusetts it is published by the First Church of Christ, Scientist. They have writers based in Russia who report directly without the aid of such organizations as AP or Reuters. This article talks about the sins of the past, the selling off of Russian assets during the privatization in the 1990s.
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Figure 1. Associated Press. “1991_coup_yeltsin.jpg” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:1991_coup_yeltsin.jpg (accessed October 30, 2007).
Figure 2. Pulitzer. ”Russian President Boris Yeltsin dancing at a rock concert during his campaign for re-election” http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1997/feature-photography/works/ (accessed November 2, 2007).
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Figure 3. All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center. “How Mass Media Influence Russians’ Political Views” Press-release No. 791 of VCIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center). http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/8971.html (accessed October 24, 2007).
Please, identify, if you are interested in politics.
Total respondents
Age, years
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and older
I am most definitely interested 7 4 6 7 8 11
I am to a certain degree interested 30 24 24 27 37 32
I am rather not interested 36 36 41 41 32 31
I am not interested at all 24 32 26 22 20 24
Hard to say 3 3 3 3 3 2
Are politics related questions being discussed in the bosom of your family, friends and colleagues, and if so, do you take part in these discussions?
Total respondents
Age, years
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and older
They are discussed and I take part in these discussions
40 28 35 39 47 46
They are discussed, but I do not take part in discussions like that
17 21 20 18 15 11
No, they are not being discussed here 39 46 43 39 33 40
Hard to say 4 5 2 4 5 3
Whose opinion on political issues do you consider most important and deserving respect? (Up to two responses)
Total respondents
Age, years
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and older
The opinion of my family members and relatives
28 33 26 24 29 26
The opinion of the President of Russia
23 17 23 19 25 31
The opinion of my close friends, co-workers, fellow-students, colleagues from the service
16 15 14 17 19 12
The opinion of well-known and respected politicians
11 8 10 13 10 11
The opinion of journalists, commentators, anchors
5 6 5 5 7 4
33
The opinion of head of my educational institution, enterprise, establishment
2 4 2 3 3 0
The opinion of head of the region, city, district
2 2 3 2 2 2
The opinion of loved and respected actors, sportsmen, scientists and workers of culture
2 3 2 2 2 3
The opinion of other people is of no importance to me
31 27 35 36 30 26
Hard to say 8 10 7 6 5 11
If we remember the latest elections to the State Duma, who (or what) influenced your choice decisively?
Total respondents
Political Party Supporters
„Unified Russia"
Communist Party, KPRF
LDPR „Fair Russia"
Family, relatives 13 16 10 11 14
Television, newspapers, radio 9 8 12 11 17
Friends or acquaintances 6 6 10 4 10
Recommendations of respected people
3 4 2 2 2
The candidates' public addresses 3 4 2 5 7
The candidates' onscreen debates 3 3 5 3 -
The candidates' pre-election propaganda
2 2 - 1 1
Publications of the candidates' ratings
1 1 - - 1
No propaganda influenced my decision, it was perfectly independent
33 33 30 28 35
I always vote for these candidates 5 6 13 14 1
Other 7 6 4 6 -
Hard to say 16 10 10 14 11
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