IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
TARGETSModule – I
CST CAMA & ALBLESS HOSPITAL OUTSIDE METRO CINEMA VILE PARLE GIRGAUM CHOUPATTY
Module-II
LEOPOLD CAFE THE TAJ MAHAL & PALACE HOTELS.
Module – III
NARIMAN HOUSE
Module-IV
TRIDENT - OBEROI HOTELS
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
THE TEN MENTeam I----- CST
Ismail Khan@ Abu Ismail (Dera Ismail khan) leader of all teams.Md.Azmal Ameer Iman@ Abu Muzahid (Okara )
Team II & III----- TajHfeez Arshad@ Bada Abdul Rahman (Multan)Javed @ Abu Ali (Okara)
Leopold hotel to TajShoeb@ Sahib (Sialkot) Nazeer @ Abu Umar ( Faislabad)
Team IV----- Nariman houseNasir @ Abu Umar (Faislabad)Babar Imaran @ Abu Aksha ( Multan)
Team V----- OberoiChota Abdul Rehman ( Multan)Fahadullah @ Abu Fahad (Okara)
Training Locations1). Muzaffarabad in POK2). Battal Hillocks in Manshera3). Karachi.
SIM cards were purchased in Kolkata
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
TERROR ATTACKS ON MUMBAION 26.11.2008 TO 28.11.2008
• Around 20 hrs- terrorists reached Budhwarpet jetty - clad inCargo pants and T-shirts - packed their AK-47 rifles -divided in 5 groups of two in each- took available Taxis -proceeded to their targets.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
THE WAY FROM CST TO CAMA HOSPITALTHE WAY FROM CST TO CAMA HOSPITAL
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
ATTACK ON CAMA HOSPITAL ON 26.11.2008
• CAMA Hospital is located near CST and Azad MaidanPolice Station
• The same team which attacked CST proceeded toCAMA Hospital. They killed people who came in the way
• They went to a road side hut at the compound of CAMAHospital, took some drinking water and killed theinmate.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
GIRGAUN CHOWPATTY ON 26.11.2008
• The terrorists tried to take a ‘U’ turn but the car was stuck on the road divider.
• The Police personnel rushed towards the car. One un-armed constable tried tosnatch the AK-47 from Ismail, but Ismail opened fired at the constable killing himon the spot.
• How ever other police personnel reacted swiftly and opened fire at Ismail.
• Injured Ajmal was apprehended immediately.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceSCODA CAR WHICH WAS USED BY ISMAIL AND AZMAL WHERE ISMAIL KILLED AND AZMAL APPREHENDED
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Steps of the Leopold Cafe: Broken cutlery and glass;and a few blood stains
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE
• Nariman House is a residential apartment 6 floor building - 1 Km from Colaba PS.
• Also called CHABAD House – Ultra Orthodox Jews residing in this building.
• The 1st floor -as Congregation Hall -2nd floor as library - remaining floors - asresidential apartments of Jews.
• It has only one stair case and one lift.
• Located in crowded residential locality.
• Two terrorists gained entry - killed all the inmates and took position on upper floors.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE
• The terrorists covered the stair case and lift making it difficult for the forces to enter into the building, thus necessitating air dropping.
• Two terrorists were killed in Nariman house.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceSmoke emanating from Nariman House
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Commandos Attempt Air Assault to Free Nariman House Jewish Hostages
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
EXPLOSION OF IED OF RDX IN TAXI
• The team of terrorists which attacked the CST boarded the taxi at Budhwarpet - left a bag containing an IED with RDX while getting down at CST.
• Later the driver of the taxi picked up three other passengers to go to Mahalaxmi
• The IED exploded at Vileparle near SantaCruz killing all the people in the vehicle.
MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Lessons to be learnt from Mumbai Terrorist Attack Incident
• The terrorists who perpetrated the Mumbai mayhem were foot
soldiers of ‘LeT.’
• Kasab’s interrogation reveals that 500 such trained terrorists
are ready for deployment.
• When news started pouring in from Trident, Oberoi, Taj, Ville
Parle, there was total confusion. There were no Crisis
Management Group or Command Centre to co-ordinate the
efforts, movements and deployment of resources.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Golden Hour
Close to 80% killings took place within the first hour of this
terrorists attack at various locations. During this hour the Police
response was brave but chaotic. The strategy of the terrorists
was to kill maximum number of people at selected locations in a
short time and then take hostages to a vantage point in highrise
buildings and thereafter prolong the situation as long as possible.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• In each police unit there are many internal security schemes,
but there is no scheme for such terrorist attacks. We need to
prepare the scheme urgently.
• In important cities we need to identify structures that are iconic
and which are frequented by the rich / powerful and people
from foreign countries.
• For each structure / building we need to make crisis response
plans, with details such as layout, locations of CCTV, stairs,
emergency exits etc.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• In hotel Taj the terrorists controlled the building so effectively
that the police did not know how many of them were there.
From 6th floor they had the entry point in their sight / control.
Hence they were able to keep security forces at bay.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• The weapons, equipments, ammunitions, teargas, bullet-proof
jackets, barricades should be distributed in such a way in the
city that they can be available without any loss of time.
• The QRT (Quick Relief Team) should also be stationed at
strategic locations and we must reduce the response time.
• The telephone and mobile numbers of key services like
Hospital, Fire brigade, Municipal Corporations, Army, Air Force,
CRPF, RAF and NSG so that atleast two key persons could be
contacted on mobile numbers and landline numbers.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• It is very important to keep the place of incident well cordoned
to avoid crowding and to keep the media away.
• The worst part of Mumbai operation was that media was
allowed to make it a spectacle, the terrorists inside always
knew what were security forces doing and how they were
being tackled because they were in live touch with their HQ
through mobile phones.
• However, a senior Police officer should hold periodical media
briefing so that media is provided necessary information and
the rumours do not spread.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• The SOP’s should be known to all concerned agencies and
individuals and must be rehearsed so that we move like a
machine.
• As a part of our exercise mock drill must be conducted to replicate
this scenario.
• When news started pouring in from one location after another
there was stunned silence in the Police Control Room and PHQ
and there was a palpable fear that the terrorists were going to
target the PHQ and CP’s office.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Time log of events
21:48 hrs Control Room is informed about firing at Leopold Café.
Within 2 minutes nakabandi instructions are issued.
21:53 hrs Message about firing at CST Rly. Stn.
22:03 hrs Message about firing at Taj hotel.
22:08 hrs Message about firing at Trident Oberoi.
22:30 hrs Message about firing at Nariman House.
22:47 hrs Blast in Ville Parle.
22:49 hrs Blast at Bandra.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Police Response
22:20 hrs JCP Crime and JCP L&:O reach Control Room.
22:26 hrs Nakabandi was ordered and officers were rushed to
different locations.
23:26 hrs JCP informs the DGP and Chief Secretary that this
situation cannot be handled by the Police and we
will need the Special Armed forces.
23:31 hrs Govt. of India was informed.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Police Response
23:40 hrs •The JCP Mumbai informed CRPF HQ in Mumbai to rush forces.
•150 RAF personnel were the first to reach and they were sent to
Oberoi and Taj hotels.
•They told they can cordon the locations and they can’t do any
other operations.
02:14 hrs •14 MARCOS marine commandos reached the Control Room and
sent to Taj and Oberoi hotels.
•They reached the CCTV control rooms of both the hotels and take
no other action.
03:30 hrs Army team reached to the spot but refuses to enter.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Police Response
04:50 hrs NSG lands at Mumbai Air Port.
06:30 hrs •The DCP traffic somehow arranges BEST buses to get themfrom Air Port to South Mumbai.•Brigadier Sisodiya of NSG reaches the Police Control Roomand asked for detailed briefing.•The JCP requests him to call his men also urgently to save timebut valuable time is lost in this whole process.
08:30 hrs NSG reaches Mantralaya and it is decided that they will coveronly two locations with 75 men each because of operational andtactical reasons. With 150 men they could not take up thirdlocation that is the Nariman House.
09:15 hrs NSG reaches Taj and Oberoi.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
The eye opening lessonSophisticated use of technology
• The terrorists just got creative. What they really did was to combine some simple tech, and use to deadly effect.
• Terrorists used four GPS-enabled handsets to enter India, nine mobile phones for communication and a satellite phone was used to guide terrorists through the attack.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Thuraya Dealer Network in PakistanThe satellite phone from Abu Dhabi-based Thuraya used by the terrorists was what came as a challenge to the authorities.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Fighting it
It’s safe to expect that the Google-Earth-nation-security issue will be dredged up again.
There might even be a similar outcry against GPS, but that won’t last long. The bottom line is that both these technologies have caused more good than harm, and it would be a crying shame to limit them in any manner.
GPS is an important tool on aircraft, ships, cars, and now even cell phones. And because a GPS device doesn’t send any personal information to the satellites, it’s impossible to tell who’s using which device.The smarter plan? Master both and use them to plan counter-terrorist activities.
THE TECH---GPS and Google EarthWhat they used it for:
Navigating their way to India, planning the attack, getting around Mumbai (likely).
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Fighting it
Thankfully, this isn’t hard – once the authorities know the offending number, they can shut it down, tap its calls, even track the phone’s position. They can also see which sites the phone’s user is visiting, and block them if necessary.As for the news, sites could stop reporting live news – especially if that news talks about the police’s plans. Then again, stopping live news means that nobody knows what’s going on, which means rumours, panic, and all the nastiness that comes with it.As for the e-mail issue, soon after the dispute arose, RIM allowed Indian security agencies to monitor the BlackBerry network, and in July 2008, the service was cleared by the telecom ministry.
THE TECH—BlackBerrysWhat they used it for:
Coordinating with each other, tracking news via
GPRS(GENERAL PACKET RADIO SERVICE)
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Fighting it
Remailers are actually being fought against even as you read this. Unless you have your own remailers server, you never know when one will be taken down.
However, sitting back and hoping for remailers to vanish is silly at best. Our forces need better experts, and more importantly, time, if they are to trace e-mails through remailers.
So even if the “Deccan Mujahideen” wasn’t really responsible for the attacks, tracing their e-mail can lead us to tomorrow’s attackers.
THE TECH—RemailersWhat they used it for:
Telling the media that they were responsible without being traceable.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Fighting it
While VoIP calls are difficult to trace and tap, they aren’t impossible.Unfortunately, these can be time-consuming processes, and in asituation like Mumbai, we can’t afford that time. To make its jobeasier, we need to push for a law that will require VoIP serviceproviders to build backdoors in their software, which lawenforcement agencies can use to tap calls when necessary.
The only good thing that emerged from the terrorists using VoIPphones was that the digital trail could potentially lead the authoritiesto their handlers. If the group was more reluctant to use phoneswhile they conducted the attacks, the trail would have ended at thelast terrorist alive.
The Tech :VoIP PhonesWhat they used it for :
“Phoning home” and getting orders from their handlers.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Lessons : NSG / Special Forces Briefing
• Whenever NSG is called their briefing should be held at the
Air Port only by a knowledgeable local officer who can tell –
(i) What is the situation?
(ii)Where is the location?
(iii)Topography of the surrounding area.
(iv)Layout plan of the building.
(v)How many policemen are available at the location?
(vi)What are the Policemen doing at the location?
(vii)Who is the Police Officer incharge at each location?
• In Mumbai incident Fire Brigade had all layouts of each
building.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Lesson: Preparing for the worst case scenario
• The Govt. response has to be effective at two levels (i) Therehas to be a Crisis Management Group with top Govt. officialssuch as the chief Secretary, the Home Secretary, the DGP, theSecretary Urban Development, CEO GSDMA, ReliefCommissioner.
• This crisis Management Group will meet at a Control Roomwhere sufficient number of landlines, mobile phones, wirelessand satellite phones are available.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• The local police should have a Command Centre with senior
officers like the CP or JCP incharge. This Command Centre
should also have the contact numbers of all important Govt.
functionaries such as the Municipal corporation, fire brigade,
hospitals and media.
• This command centre will issue instructions regarding
deployment of officers, men equipment and materials in the
fastest possible time.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• When a Mumbai like incident occurs the senior officers face a
dilemma whether to rush to the place of occurrence or to sit in a
office, hold meeting with other senior officers and take sound
decisions based on discussions.
• It is catch 22 situation if they rush to the spot and do the
running around, they are unable to get necessary details nor
they are able to communicate their decisions systematically and
without loss of time.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• The CP may ask the JCPs and the ACPs to take quick round andreach the nearest P.Stn. which is central / nearest to the place ofoccurrence.
• The CP may hold emergency meeting in the P.Stn. only and thisplace can become the command centre.
• The DCPs and ACPs should be asked to rush to the place ofoccurrence, take a measure of the situation and cordon the area bydeploying the police. They should quickly gather as muchinformation as possible about the place, hostages, number ofterrorists, fire power etc.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
• In the name of principle of need to know different agencies do
not share the intelligence available with them, this principles
has to give way to the right to know.
• A similar decision is badly required to be taken at the national
level also.
Dirty Bomb
• Not a weapon of mass destruction
• Certainly a weapon of mass disruption
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
Emergency Preparedness
• In response to terrorism - Example
– Chechen rebels threatened to use a bundle of radio
active material with explosives
– No explosion - A package of Cesium 137 recovered
the rebels had buried in a park in Moscow.
– AL Qaeda – Osama – “.. is my religious duty”. RDD
could result from a failed nuclear device
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
In 2004
• British Authorities arrested Salahuddin Amin attempting
to buy a ‘Radioisotope Bomb’ from Russian mafia in
Belgium.
• He was linked to Al-Qaeda
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
In 2004
• British Authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and several
associates on various charges including conspiring to
commit public nuisance by the use of radio active
material. Found guilty and sentenced to life.
• Conducted research on production of dirty bomb to
cause injury, fear, terror and chaos.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police
GUJARAT COASTAL: AT A GLANCE
COASTAL AREA – 1660 KM
CONTINENTAL SHELF – 1,64,00 SQ KM
CREEK AREAS – 440 SQ KM
NO. OF PORTS – 41
– 01 MAJOR PORT AT KANDLA– 11 INTERMEDIATE PORTS– 29 MINOR PORTS
CARGO HANDLING – 181.5 MILLION TONNES
– INCREASE TO 313 MILLION TONNES BY 2015.
COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS
• CROSS BORDER TERRORISM USING SHIPS/ DHOWS/
TRAWLERS
• INFILTRATION AND SMUGGLING OF DANGEROUS
GOODS THROUGH COAST AND CREEKS
• INFILTRATION DUE TO IMBL VIOLATION BY FISHERMEN
• 1660 KM LONGEST COASTLINE IN INDIA.
COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS
• PROXIMITY TO PAKISTAN- VULNERABLE TO
NEFARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF ISI
• HISTORY OF LANDING ARMS,AMMUNITION AND RDX IN
PAST.(E.G.1993 LANDING OF RDX USED IN BOMBAY
BLAST AND RECENT KUBER INCIDENT).
POINTS TO PONDER
• Special precautions for coastal areas.
• Closer supervision of fishing activities.
• Regular random checking of fishing boats.
– (who is going and who is coming back).
– (what is going and what material is coming).
• Prevent mixing of Indian boats with Pakistani boats. Strict
watch near IMBL.
• Verification process to be made full proof before issuing
fisherman cards.
• Intensive awareness campaign in coastal areas amongst
fishing community regarding possible threats and regarding
signs of anti-national / terror activities, e.g. how to identify
suspect activity, individuals & objects and what to do in
case of reasonable suspicion?
• Regular checking of security arrangements in the Vital
Installations along coastal areas.
POINTS TO PONDER
COASTAL VITAL INSTALLATIONS OF GUJARAT
Refinery &Vadinar Port
Kandla & Adani Port
Okha Port & Dwarka Temple
Porbandar Port
Cement, Rayon &Somnath
Bhavnagar Port
Hajira
Crick
Pipavav Port
IOC IBM
Cement &Power Project
Dholera Proposed Port
DAHEJ
VAPI
INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION
• Do we have better co-coordinating mechanism in place
today as compared to 2008?
• Are we conversant with the SOPs for emergent situation?
• Is this awareness widely prevalent at the cutting edge level
in our lower formations?
• Do we have Crisis Management Teams (well defined, with
proper control rooms and fully equipped?)
INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION
• How about training in effective usage of state-of-the-art
equipments purchased and hopefully deployed?
• The recent havoc emanating from social networking
caused serious problems (post Assam riots). The enemy
has successfully tested another potent weapon. How
seriously are we working out the counter measures?
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