LESSONS FROM Mumbai Terrorist Attack –26/11/2008 · IGP ATS, Gujarat Police GIRGAUN CHOWPATTY ON...

LESSONS FROM

Mumbai Terrorist Attack –26/11/2008

Ajay Kumar TomarJt. C.P., Ahmedabad

IGP ATS, Gujarat Police

MUMBAI 26/11


TARGETSModule – I

CST CAMA & ALBLESS HOSPITAL OUTSIDE METRO CINEMA VILE PARLE GIRGAUM CHOUPATTY

Module-II

LEOPOLD CAFE THE TAJ MAHAL & PALACE HOTELS.

Module – III

NARIMAN HOUSE

Module-IV

TRIDENT - OBEROI HOTELS

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THE TEN MENTeam I----- CST

Ismail Khan@ Abu Ismail (Dera Ismail khan) leader of all teams.Md.Azmal Ameer Iman@ Abu Muzahid (Okara )

Team II & III----- TajHfeez Arshad@ Bada Abdul Rahman (Multan)Javed @ Abu Ali (Okara)

Leopold hotel to TajShoeb@ Sahib (Sialkot) Nazeer @ Abu Umar ( Faislabad)

Team IV----- Nariman houseNasir @ Abu Umar (Faislabad)Babar Imaran @ Abu Aksha ( Multan)

Team V----- OberoiChota Abdul Rehman ( Multan)Fahadullah @ Abu Fahad (Okara)

Training Locations1). Muzaffarabad in POK2). Battal Hillocks in Manshera3). Karachi.

SIM cards were purchased in Kolkata

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Kuber – The Transit Boat of TerroristsMUMBAI 26/11


TERROR ATTACKS ON MUMBAION 26.11.2008 TO 28.11.2008

• Around 20 hrs- terrorists reached Budhwarpet jetty - clad inCargo pants and T-shirts - packed their AK-47 rifles -divided in 5 groups of two in each- took available Taxis -proceeded to their targets.

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THE PLACE WHERE THE TERRORISTS LANDED IN MUMBAI

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CHATRAPATI SHIVAJI TERMINUS(CST)

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Terrorists caught on CCTV camera at Mumbai CST

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Mumbai CST Train Station just after the attack

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THE WAY FROM CST TO CAMA HOSPITALTHE WAY FROM CST TO CAMA HOSPITAL

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CST TO CAMA HOSPITAL

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IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceTerrorist crossing Times of India Lane

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ATTACK ON CAMA HOSPITAL ON 26.11.2008

• CAMA Hospital is located near CST and Azad MaidanPolice Station

• The same team which attacked CST proceeded toCAMA Hospital. They killed people who came in the way

• They went to a road side hut at the compound of CAMAHospital, took some drinking water and killed theinmate.

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SRI KARKARE AND OTHERS TRAVELLED IN THIS VEHICLE

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IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceBULLET PENETRATION POINTS ON THE VEHICLE

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GIRGAUN CHOWPATTY ON 26.11.2008

• The terrorists tried to take a ‘U’ turn but the car was stuck on the road divider.

• The Police personnel rushed towards the car. One un-armed constable tried tosnatch the AK-47 from Ismail, but Ismail opened fired at the constable killing himon the spot.

• How ever other police personnel reacted swiftly and opened fire at Ismail.

• Injured Ajmal was apprehended immediately.

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IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceSCODA CAR WHICH WAS USED BY ISMAIL AND AZMAL WHERE ISMAIL KILLED AND AZMAL APPREHENDED

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AZMAL GETTING TREATMENT

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LEOPOLD CAFÉ - GOKUL RESTAURANT - TAJ MAHAL & PALACE HOTELS

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TERROR ATTACK AT TAJ(4 TERRORISTS)

IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceLeopold Cafe just after

the Attack

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Steps of the Leopold Cafe: Broken cutlery and glass;and a few blood stains

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TAJ IN FLAMES

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THE OBEROI TRIDENT

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The Nariman House

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nariman_House


ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE

• Nariman House is a residential apartment 6 floor building - 1 Km from Colaba PS.

• Also called CHABAD House – Ultra Orthodox Jews residing in this building.

• The 1st floor -as Congregation Hall -2nd floor as library - remaining floors - asresidential apartments of Jews.

• It has only one stair case and one lift.

• Located in crowded residential locality.

• Two terrorists gained entry - killed all the inmates and took position on upper floors.

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ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE

• The terrorists covered the stair case and lift making it difficult for the forces to enter into the building, thus necessitating air dropping.

• Two terrorists were killed in Nariman house.

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IGP ATS, Gujarat PoliceSmoke emanating from Nariman House

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http://www.flickr.com/photos/53911892@N00/3066566446/


Commandos Attempt Air Assault to Free Nariman House Jewish Hostages

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EXPLOSION OF IED OF RDX IN TAXI

• The team of terrorists which attacked the CST boarded the taxi at Budhwarpet - left a bag containing an IED with RDX while getting down at CST.

• Later the driver of the taxi picked up three other passengers to go to Mahalaxmi

• The IED exploded at Vileparle near SantaCruz killing all the people in the vehicle.

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VILLEPARLE CAR EXPLOSION

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Lessons to be learnt from Mumbai Terrorist Attack Incident

• The terrorists who perpetrated the Mumbai mayhem were foot

soldiers of ‘LeT.’

• Kasab’s interrogation reveals that 500 such trained terrorists

are ready for deployment.

• When news started pouring in from Trident, Oberoi, Taj, Ville

Parle, there was total confusion. There were no Crisis

Management Group or Command Centre to co-ordinate the

efforts, movements and deployment of resources.


Golden Hour

Close to 80% killings took place within the first hour of this

terrorists attack at various locations. During this hour the Police

response was brave but chaotic. The strategy of the terrorists

was to kill maximum number of people at selected locations in a

short time and then take hostages to a vantage point in highrise

buildings and thereafter prolong the situation as long as possible.


• In each police unit there are many internal security schemes,

but there is no scheme for such terrorist attacks. We need to

prepare the scheme urgently.

• In important cities we need to identify structures that are iconic

and which are frequented by the rich / powerful and people

from foreign countries.

• For each structure / building we need to make crisis response

plans, with details such as layout, locations of CCTV, stairs,

emergency exits etc.


• In hotel Taj the terrorists controlled the building so effectively

that the police did not know how many of them were there.

From 6th floor they had the entry point in their sight / control.

Hence they were able to keep security forces at bay.


• The weapons, equipments, ammunitions, teargas, bullet-proof

jackets, barricades should be distributed in such a way in the

city that they can be available without any loss of time.

• The QRT (Quick Relief Team) should also be stationed at

strategic locations and we must reduce the response time.

• The telephone and mobile numbers of key services like

Hospital, Fire brigade, Municipal Corporations, Army, Air Force,

CRPF, RAF and NSG so that atleast two key persons could be

contacted on mobile numbers and landline numbers.


• It is very important to keep the place of incident well cordoned

to avoid crowding and to keep the media away.

• The worst part of Mumbai operation was that media was

allowed to make it a spectacle, the terrorists inside always

knew what were security forces doing and how they were

being tackled because they were in live touch with their HQ

through mobile phones.

• However, a senior Police officer should hold periodical media

briefing so that media is provided necessary information and

the rumours do not spread.


• The SOP’s should be known to all concerned agencies and

individuals and must be rehearsed so that we move like a

machine.

• As a part of our exercise mock drill must be conducted to replicate

this scenario.

• When news started pouring in from one location after another

there was stunned silence in the Police Control Room and PHQ

and there was a palpable fear that the terrorists were going to

target the PHQ and CP’s office.


Time log of events

21:48 hrs Control Room is informed about firing at Leopold Café.

Within 2 minutes nakabandi instructions are issued.

21:53 hrs Message about firing at CST Rly. Stn.

22:03 hrs Message about firing at Taj hotel.

22:08 hrs Message about firing at Trident Oberoi.

22:30 hrs Message about firing at Nariman House.

22:47 hrs Blast in Ville Parle.

22:49 hrs Blast at Bandra.


Police Response

22:20 hrs JCP Crime and JCP L&:O reach Control Room.

22:26 hrs Nakabandi was ordered and officers were rushed to

different locations.

23:26 hrs JCP informs the DGP and Chief Secretary that this

situation cannot be handled by the Police and we

will need the Special Armed forces.

23:31 hrs Govt. of India was informed.


Police Response

23:40 hrs •The JCP Mumbai informed CRPF HQ in Mumbai to rush forces.

•150 RAF personnel were the first to reach and they were sent to

Oberoi and Taj hotels.

•They told they can cordon the locations and they can’t do any

other operations.

02:14 hrs •14 MARCOS marine commandos reached the Control Room and

sent to Taj and Oberoi hotels.

•They reached the CCTV control rooms of both the hotels and take

no other action.

03:30 hrs Army team reached to the spot but refuses to enter.


Police Response

04:50 hrs NSG lands at Mumbai Air Port.

06:30 hrs •The DCP traffic somehow arranges BEST buses to get themfrom Air Port to South Mumbai.•Brigadier Sisodiya of NSG reaches the Police Control Roomand asked for detailed briefing.•The JCP requests him to call his men also urgently to save timebut valuable time is lost in this whole process.

08:30 hrs NSG reaches Mantralaya and it is decided that they will coveronly two locations with 75 men each because of operational andtactical reasons. With 150 men they could not take up thirdlocation that is the Nariman House.

09:15 hrs NSG reaches Taj and Oberoi.


The eye opening lessonSophisticated use of technology

• The terrorists just got creative. What they really did was to combine some simple tech, and use to deadly effect.

• Terrorists used four GPS-enabled handsets to enter India, nine mobile phones for communication and a satellite phone was used to guide terrorists through the attack.


Thuraya Dealer Network in PakistanThe satellite phone from Abu Dhabi-based Thuraya used by the terrorists was what came as a challenge to the authorities.


Fighting it

It’s safe to expect that the Google-Earth-nation-security issue will be dredged up again.

There might even be a similar outcry against GPS, but that won’t last long. The bottom line is that both these technologies have caused more good than harm, and it would be a crying shame to limit them in any manner.

GPS is an important tool on aircraft, ships, cars, and now even cell phones. And because a GPS device doesn’t send any personal information to the satellites, it’s impossible to tell who’s using which device.The smarter plan? Master both and use them to plan counter-terrorist activities.

THE TECH---GPS and Google EarthWhat they used it for:

Navigating their way to India, planning the attack, getting around Mumbai (likely).


Fighting it

Thankfully, this isn’t hard – once the authorities know the offending number, they can shut it down, tap its calls, even track the phone’s position. They can also see which sites the phone’s user is visiting, and block them if necessary.As for the news, sites could stop reporting live news – especially if that news talks about the police’s plans. Then again, stopping live news means that nobody knows what’s going on, which means rumours, panic, and all the nastiness that comes with it.As for the e-mail issue, soon after the dispute arose, RIM allowed Indian security agencies to monitor the BlackBerry network, and in July 2008, the service was cleared by the telecom ministry.

THE TECH—BlackBerrysWhat they used it for:

Coordinating with each other, tracking news via

GPRS(GENERAL PACKET RADIO SERVICE)


Fighting it

Remailers are actually being fought against even as you read this. Unless you have your own remailers server, you never know when one will be taken down.

However, sitting back and hoping for remailers to vanish is silly at best. Our forces need better experts, and more importantly, time, if they are to trace e-mails through remailers.

So even if the “Deccan Mujahideen” wasn’t really responsible for the attacks, tracing their e-mail can lead us to tomorrow’s attackers.

THE TECH—RemailersWhat they used it for:

Telling the media that they were responsible without being traceable.


Fighting it

While VoIP calls are difficult to trace and tap, they aren’t impossible.Unfortunately, these can be time-consuming processes, and in asituation like Mumbai, we can’t afford that time. To make its jobeasier, we need to push for a law that will require VoIP serviceproviders to build backdoors in their software, which lawenforcement agencies can use to tap calls when necessary.

The only good thing that emerged from the terrorists using VoIPphones was that the digital trail could potentially lead the authoritiesto their handlers. If the group was more reluctant to use phoneswhile they conducted the attacks, the trail would have ended at thelast terrorist alive.

The Tech :VoIP PhonesWhat they used it for :

“Phoning home” and getting orders from their handlers.


Lessons : NSG / Special Forces Briefing

• Whenever NSG is called their briefing should be held at the

Air Port only by a knowledgeable local officer who can tell –

(i) What is the situation?

(ii)Where is the location?

(iii)Topography of the surrounding area.

(iv)Layout plan of the building.

(v)How many policemen are available at the location?

(vi)What are the Policemen doing at the location?

(vii)Who is the Police Officer incharge at each location?

• In Mumbai incident Fire Brigade had all layouts of each

building.


Lesson: Preparing for the worst case scenario

• The Govt. response has to be effective at two levels (i) Therehas to be a Crisis Management Group with top Govt. officialssuch as the chief Secretary, the Home Secretary, the DGP, theSecretary Urban Development, CEO GSDMA, ReliefCommissioner.

• This crisis Management Group will meet at a Control Roomwhere sufficient number of landlines, mobile phones, wirelessand satellite phones are available.


• The local police should have a Command Centre with senior

officers like the CP or JCP incharge. This Command Centre

should also have the contact numbers of all important Govt.

functionaries such as the Municipal corporation, fire brigade,

hospitals and media.

• This command centre will issue instructions regarding

deployment of officers, men equipment and materials in the

fastest possible time.


• When a Mumbai like incident occurs the senior officers face a

dilemma whether to rush to the place of occurrence or to sit in a

office, hold meeting with other senior officers and take sound

decisions based on discussions.

• It is catch 22 situation if they rush to the spot and do the

running around, they are unable to get necessary details nor

they are able to communicate their decisions systematically and

without loss of time.


• The CP may ask the JCPs and the ACPs to take quick round andreach the nearest P.Stn. which is central / nearest to the place ofoccurrence.

• The CP may hold emergency meeting in the P.Stn. only and thisplace can become the command centre.

• The DCPs and ACPs should be asked to rush to the place ofoccurrence, take a measure of the situation and cordon the area bydeploying the police. They should quickly gather as muchinformation as possible about the place, hostages, number ofterrorists, fire power etc.


• In the name of principle of need to know different agencies do

not share the intelligence available with them, this principles

has to give way to the right to know.

• A similar decision is badly required to be taken at the national

level also.


OTHER POSSIBILITIES

Cyber Terrorism

• Cyber Terrorism


Dirty Bomb

• Not a weapon of mass destruction

• Certainly a weapon of mass disruption


Emergency Preparedness

• In response to terrorism - Example

– Chechen rebels threatened to use a bundle of radio

active material with explosives

– No explosion - A package of Cesium 137 recovered

the rebels had buried in a park in Moscow.

– AL Qaeda – Osama – “.. is my religious duty”. RDD

could result from a failed nuclear device


In 2004

• British Authorities arrested Salahuddin Amin attempting

to buy a ‘Radioisotope Bomb’ from Russian mafia in

Belgium.

• He was linked to Al-Qaeda


In 2004

• British Authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and several

associates on various charges including conspiring to

commit public nuisance by the use of radio active

material. Found guilty and sentenced to life.

• Conducted research on production of dirty bomb to

cause injury, fear, terror and chaos.


GUJARAT COASTAL: AT A GLANCE

COASTAL AREA – 1660 KM

CONTINENTAL SHELF – 1,64,00 SQ KM

CREEK AREAS – 440 SQ KM

NO. OF PORTS – 41

– 01 MAJOR PORT AT KANDLA– 11 INTERMEDIATE PORTS– 29 MINOR PORTS

CARGO HANDLING – 181.5 MILLION TONNES

– INCREASE TO 313 MILLION TONNES BY 2015.

COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS

• CROSS BORDER TERRORISM USING SHIPS/ DHOWS/

TRAWLERS

• INFILTRATION AND SMUGGLING OF DANGEROUS

GOODS THROUGH COAST AND CREEKS

• INFILTRATION DUE TO IMBL VIOLATION BY FISHERMEN

• 1660 KM LONGEST COASTLINE IN INDIA.

COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS

• PROXIMITY TO PAKISTAN- VULNERABLE TO

NEFARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF ISI

• HISTORY OF LANDING ARMS,AMMUNITION AND RDX IN

PAST.(E.G.1993 LANDING OF RDX USED IN BOMBAY

BLAST AND RECENT KUBER INCIDENT).

POINTS TO PONDER

• Special precautions for coastal areas.

• Closer supervision of fishing activities.

• Regular random checking of fishing boats.

– (who is going and who is coming back).

– (what is going and what material is coming).

• Prevent mixing of Indian boats with Pakistani boats. Strict

watch near IMBL.

• Verification process to be made full proof before issuing

fisherman cards.

• Intensive awareness campaign in coastal areas amongst

fishing community regarding possible threats and regarding

signs of anti-national / terror activities, e.g. how to identify

suspect activity, individuals & objects and what to do in

case of reasonable suspicion?

• Regular checking of security arrangements in the Vital

Installations along coastal areas.

POINTS TO PONDER

COASTAL VITAL INSTALLATIONS OF GUJARAT

Refinery &Vadinar Port

Kandla & Adani Port

Okha Port & Dwarka Temple

Porbandar Port

Cement, Rayon &Somnath

Bhavnagar Port

Hajira

Crick

Pipavav Port

IOC IBM

Cement &Power Project

Dholera Proposed Port

DAHEJ

VAPI

INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION

• Do we have better co-coordinating mechanism in place

today as compared to 2008?

• Are we conversant with the SOPs for emergent situation?

• Is this awareness widely prevalent at the cutting edge level

in our lower formations?

• Do we have Crisis Management Teams (well defined, with

proper control rooms and fully equipped?)

INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION

• How about training in effective usage of state-of-the-art

equipments purchased and hopefully deployed?

• The recent havoc emanating from social networking

caused serious problems (post Assam riots). The enemy

has successfully tested another potent weapon. How

seriously are we working out the counter measures?

LESSONS FROM Mumbai Terrorist Attack –26/11/2008 · IGP ATS, Gujarat Police GIRGAUN CHOWPATTY ON...

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