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Royal nstitute of Philosophy
The Metaphysics of the StoicsAuthor(s): N. Lossky and Natalie DuddingtonSource: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Oct., 1929), pp. 481-489Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3745801 .
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8/9/2019 Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie Duddington -…
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THE
METAPHYSICS
OF
THE STOICS
Professor
N.
LOSSKY
The
metaphysical
doctrine of the Stoics
is a remarkable instance of
a
theory
that
appears
to be
materialism,
but
is
in truth a form
of
unconscious ideal-realism.
It
is
worth
while to
give
an
exposition
of
it in
order to show that this is
really
the
case,
and,
incidentally,
to
explain why a materialistic philosophy seems so attractive to many
minds.
I
will
refer
chiefly
to
the
teaching
of
the
ancient
Stoics,
i.e.
of
Zeno, Cleanthes,
and
Chrysippus,
and
also to
the
later
doctrine
of
Posidonius.
The
founder
of
Stoicism,
Zeno,
maintained that two
principles,
an
active
and
a
passive
one,
lie
at
the
root of
all
things.
The
passive
principle
is
the
unqualified
substance or
matter,
and the active
principle
in it is the
Logos
(Reason)
or God.
Being
eternal,
the
Logos
forms
all individual
things
out
of
matter
(I,
851). According
to
Zeno,
the Reason which
penetrates
all
things
is
ei/xap/xeV^
I, 87),
i.e. is
the
necessary
connection of
things,
the
law of nature.
This
can
be
gathered,
for
instance,
from the words of
Chrysippus,
who
says
that
elfiapixivrj
is
Reason,
in
accordance
with which the
existing
things
have come
into
being,
those
that
are
about
to
exist are
coming
into
being,
and those that are
going
to
exist
will
come into
being
(II, 913).
This Reason must
not
be
understood
as
merely
ideal and
spiritual,
as law and
Providence;
the Stoics
insist
through?
out that Cosmic Reason is
corporeal.
It is the Fire
(irvp)
that
pene?
trates
the
universe. To
distinguish
it
from
ordinary
earthly
fire
they
often
call
it
rrvp
reyw/coV,
i.e.
a
creative
fire,
or
ether,
or
irvevfia,
and
7Ti>evfjLa
vheppiov?the
breath
of
fire.
They definitely say
that
this
principle
is
a
body,
the
purest
and
finest conceivable. This
body
is God
(I, 153),
and all
other bodies
and the
world
as a whole
proceed
from it.
The
ancient
Stoics
definitely
affirmed
that all
being
is
corporeal.
According
to
Chrysippus,
that
only
exists
which
may
be
grasped
and touched (II, 359), the cause is something that exists, namely,
abody (11,336).
Allcauses, the
Stoics
said,
are
corporeal
because
they
are
pneumatic (II, 340).
With
regard
to the
soul,
Zeno
main?
tained that
it is
breath,
but breath is
a
body,
therefore the soulis
a
body (I, 137). Chrysippus proved
the
corporeal
nature
of
the
soul
1
The references
are to Stoicorum veterum
fragmenta,
Vols.
I
and
II;
the
Roman
figures
indicate
the volume
and the
Arabic the
number
of
the
frag?
ment.
481
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JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES
as
follows:
death is the
separation
of
the soul
from
the
body.
But
nothing incorporeal
can be
separated
from
the
body;
nor
can
any?
thing incorporeal be in contact with the body; the soul, however,
both
is in
contact
with
the
body
and
separates
itself
from
it,
hence
the soul
is a
body
(creola)
(II,
790;
see also
790-800).
Similarly
the ancient
Stoics
definitely
said
of God
that
He
is
purest body (I, 153).
Their
insistence on
the
corporeality
of
all that
exists was
often
carried
to
the
point
of
absurdity.
Thus,
for
instance,
they
maintained
that
the
qualities
of
things,
light,
whiteness,
warmth,
are
bodies
(II, 386).
Voice
is
a
body,
since
everything
capable
of
action
and
influence is
a
body
(II,
387).
Even virtues and
vices,
wisdom,
etc,
were
in
their
opinion
bodies.
Posidonius
taught
that
(1)
thought
existing merely
as
expressed
in
words,
(2)
emptiness,
(3)
space,
(4)
time,
were
incorporeal;
but
according
to
Basilides
these also
were
bodies.1
Such assertions
suggest
that the
metaphysical
teaching
of
the
Stoics was
the
crudest
form
of
materialism.
If
one
takes
them to
mean that
goodness,
wickedness,
wisdom,
etc,
are
substances,
the
implication is that, e.g., a fool can be made intelligent by introduc?
ing
into his
body
a
certain
quantity
of
the wisdom-substance
(some
product
of internal
secretion,
a
hormone
of
some
sort,
as
a modern
biologist
might
say).
It is
possible,
however,
to
put
a
more
reasonable
interpretation upon
their
teaching,
taking
it
to
mean
no more
than
the kind
of
thing
constantly
met with
in the
materialistic
literature
of
our
day, namely,
that
a
good-natured
man
has certain
bodily
characteristics,
a
bad-tempered
one has
definite
physical
peculiari-
ties,
a
genius
has
a
special
kind of
brain,
etc
It
will
be shown
later
what the Stoics really meant by the corporeality of qualities; at
present
sufficient has been said to show
why
they
are
generally
said
to
be
thoroughly
materialistic
in
their
metaphysics.
I
will now
pass
to
consider
another
aspect
of
their
doctrine,
namely,
its
pantheistic
character.
Zeno and
Chrysippus
maintained that
the earth
and
the
sky
were
the
substance
of
God
(II,
1022).
Just
as the
different
parts
of
the
body
unite to form
the
seed,
but when
a
new
body
grows
out
of
the
seed
they
divide once
more,
so
everything
arises out
of
the
One
and
is
reunited
with the
One,
says
Cleanthes.
All the
world
is
divine;
but
it
may
also
be
said that 'God
is the
soul of
the world'
(Cleanthes,
I,
532),
designating by
the word
God
the
rational
and
active
principle
in
the world.
As
already
said,
this
active and
rational
principle
is
a
fiery
pneuma
which
interpenetrates
and embraces
all
things
(II,
1051).
The
interpenetrating
action
of
the
pneuma
is
tovos,
i.e.
tension,
See
Stein,
Die
Psychologie
der
Stoa,
v.
I,
p.
18.
482
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THE
METAPHYSICS
OF
THE
STOICS
which
spreads
out from
within each
thing
and returns
into
it
again.
This
tension.
in
so
far as
it
is directed
outwards,
determines all
the
qualities of things, and in so far as it is directed inwards constitutes
the
unity
and
essence
of
things.1
It is
something
like
a
force of
repulsion
and
attraction.
Simplicius,
indeed,
expressly says
that
the
Stoics
recognize
force,
or
rather
a
rarefying
and
condensing
motion.2
The
qualities
of
things, arising
out of
this
tension,
are
said
by
Chry?
sippus
to
be
pneumatic
or
aerial
tensions
which
enter
particles
of
matter
and
give shape
to
them
(II, 445).
Elements
less
fine
than
fire?air,
water,
and earth?are
formed
out
of
the
divine
fire
through
a
slackening
of
its
tension;
but
an
increase of
tension
leads
up
once
more
from earth
through
water
and
air
back
to
fire. These two
opposed
directions of
the
process
of
tension
correspond
to what
Heraclitus
had
called the
downward
and
the
upward
path,
in
speaking
of the transformation
of
the Fire-
Logos
into
air,
water,
earth,
and then
back
again
into
fire.
Not
the whole
of
pneuma passes
into
the lower
elements;
a
part
of
it
remains
at the end
of
the
world
and rules the
world;
the
Stoics
called
it
rjyefjLovLKov
ov
Kovpiov
(the
ruling
principle
of
the
world).
Not all of them, however, agreed that it was situated at the end of
the world.
Posidonius
identified
this
principle
with the
sun,
the
heart
of
the world.
It
was
the source of
light
and
warmth,
of
the
earth's
vital breath.
But
wherever the
Stoics
might
locate
the
cosmic
Reason,
they
were
unanimous
in
asserting
that
it was the
source
of all
things
in
the world
conditioning
both
their
form
or structure
and
their
cor-
poreality.
All the
multiplicity
of
the
world
sprang
from
the
Cosmic
Reason,
because that
Reason contained
a
number
of
seed-logoi
(Xoyot
oTTtpixaTiKoL),out of which plants and animals and all other
things
developed
(Marcus
Aurelius, IV,
36).
Matter
devoid of
qualities
became
qualified
matter
through
the
action of
a
seed-logos
or
a
group
of
them.
L.
Stein
in
his
Die
Psychologie
der Stoa
explains
that
by
a
seed-
logos
the
Stoics
meant an
activity
of the
pure pneuma
which
by
means of
tension invited
and
encouraged
rational and
purposive
origination
and
development.3
As usual
with
the
Stoics,
we
have
here
a
case
of
an
indissoluble
unity
between the ideal
and
the
cor?
poreal
being;
the
seed-logos
is an
organic
bodily
whole,
a
pneuma
with such
a
tension
that
taking
possession
of
lifeless
matter
it
gives
it
shape
and
forms
an
individual
entity.
Such
an
individual
entity
may
perish,
but
its
seed-logos
is
indestructible:
it
goes
on
forming
1
See
Reinhardt, Posidonius,
p. 142.
2
See
L.
Stein,
Die
Psychologie
der
Stoa,
v.
I,
pp.
32,
90;
Simpl.
Sch.in
Arist.
Categ.,
ed.
Brandis,
p.
74.
3
L.
Stein,
Die
Psychologie
der
Stoa, I,
p. 49.
483
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JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES
new individuals of
the same
species,
being,
as
it
were,
the
spirit
of
the
genus.1
The
world,
united
and
interpenetrated
by
the
Divine
Logos, aspects of which?the seed-logoi?are to be found in each
individual
thing,
is one
living
whole.
If the
olive-tree,
says
Zeno,
produced
melodiously playing
flutes,
you
would
have
no
doubt that
it knew
something
about
flute-playing.
If
plane-trees
produced
rhythmically
sounding
lyres,
you
would also admit that
plane-trees
were musical.
Why
not
admit,
then,
that the
world
is a
living
and
rational
being,
since
it
produces
animate and rational entities?
(I,
112
and the whole of
110-114).
Chrysippus
and
Posidonius also
recognize
that
the
world
is a
rational,
animated,
and
thinking
entity
(II,
633-645).
All
parts
of the
world
are
therefore united
with
one another
through sympathy
and
correlation.
Plotinus,
whose
system
in
this
respect
is
similar
to that
of
the
Stoics,
says
about the
world:
This
One-all is
a
sympathetic
total
and stands
as one
living
being;
the
far
is
near;
it
happens
as
in
one
animal
with its
separate
parts:
talon,horn,
finger,
and
any
other member
are
not
continuous,
and
yet
are
effectively
near;
intermediate
parts
feel
nothing
but
at
a
distant
point
the
local
experience
is known
(Enneads,
IV,
4, ?
32,
translated by S. Mackenna).
The world
as
a
whole,
the
heavenly
bodies and the earth are
living beings.
Their
parts
are
subservient
to one
another,
and the
whole,
and,
vice
versa,
the
whole
is
subservient to the
parts.
Thus,
according
to
Posidonius,
the earth
feeds
the
plants:
in
the
coun?
tries where
there
is
no rain
she
secures for
them
the due amount
of
moisture
by
means of
floods,
such,
for
instance,
as we
find
in
the
case of
the
Nile,
the
Euphrates,
the
Ind;
in
flood-time the
Ind
not
merely
moistens
the
soil
but sows it with
seeds of
plants. 2
Causality
and teleology are not mutually exclusive; the Stoics conceive of the
divine cosmic
Reason on
the
one
hand
as
a
universal
law,
a
strictly
necessary
causal
bond,
and
on the
other as
purposive,
rational,
and
beneficial
Providence.
In the
words
of
Zeno,
necessity
is the
moving
power
of
matter;
it
always
remains
equal
to
itself,
and
may
also
be
called
Providence
or Nature
(I,
176).
The
universal
law
which
is
right
Reason
(6
6p6os
\6yos), penetrating
all
things,
is
identical
with
Zeus,
who
directs the
world-order
(I,
162).
Chrysippus
also identified
the law
of nature? the
eternal,
coherent,
and ordered motion
with cosmic
Reason or
Providence
(II,
913, 916).
And
so,
according
to the
Stoics,
the
necessary
is at the same
time
the
logical
and the
purposive;
the
causal
process
is
teleological
and
rational.
Consequently,
the
world
as
a
whole
is the
most
perfect
being
(I,
111),
it is
arranged
as
excellently
as
the
best-governed
1
Proclus,
Commentary
on Plato's
Parmenides,
v.
V,
p.
135,
3
Reinhardt,
Kosmos und
Sympathie,
pp.
110,
170,
176,
484
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THE
METAPHYSICS OF
THE
STOICS
State.
To
obey
the laws
and to
carry
out
the
purposes
of
this State
is man's
highest good
and
supreme
duty.
Lead
me,
Zeus and
Fate,
wherever it is destined by you that I should go, and I will follow
unfailingly;
but if I
tried
to
lag
behind
like a
coward,
I
should
be
compelled
to
go against
my
will,
says
Cleanthes
(I, 527).
fiDucunt
volentem
fata,
nolentem
trahunt,iy
writes Seneca
(Epistles
107,
10).
Having
considered the
main
conceptions
of
the Stoic
philosophy,
let
us ask whether the
usual
interpretation
of
it
as
materialism
is
correct. E. Zeller
asserts that their
doctrine is
materialism,
but,
in
contradistinction
to that
of
Democritus,
it
is
dynamic
materialism.
For
Democritus,
bodies consist of
impenetrably
hard
atoms
which
for ever remain what
they
are; the world
process
consists in the blind,
soulless movement of
these
atoms
in
space
and
of
their
accidental
and
purposeless impacts.
For the
Stoics,
on
the
contrary, corporeality
consists in
activity, space
is filled
through
tension,
i.e.
through
the
processes
of
attraction
and
repulsion.
These
processes
are
not soulless
or
irrational:
they
are
based
upon
the
sympathy
between
the
different
parts
of
the
world and
are
rational and
purposive.
We
find thus
an
indissoluble connection between
extended
corporeal
existence,
psychical
states
( sympathy ),
and
ideal or
spiritual
essence
expressed
by
the notion of
vovs
(Reason),
Logos,
and
\6yoi aTrtpiiariKoi.
In
order to
say
whether this
doctrine
is materialism
we must see
how it accounts for the
relation between
the
psycho-spiritual
and the
bodily reality.
It
must
be
observed
that
a
theory
should
be
only
called
materialistic
if
it
implies
that the
psychic
and the
spiritual
is
a
passive
derivative from the
physical.
But
for
the
Stoics
the
psychic
state
of
sympathy
is that which
directs
the
bodily
processes;
similarly,
the ideal
aspect
of the
Divine
pneuma designated
by
the word
Logos
conditions from the first the necessary and purposive order of physi?
cal
processes,
and is not
produced
by
the latter.
This
clearly
shows
that
Stoicism
is
not
materialism;
it is a
dynamic
view
according
to
which
everywhere
in
the
world there
is
activity,
tension,
striving
towards
a
definite
rational
purpose?namely,
towards the
realization
of
physical being
embodying
rational
principles.
The
doctrine of
the
Stoics
seems
materialistic
because
they
over-
emphasize
the
contention that
all
ideal
and
psychical
being
has
a
bodily
aspect.
But
this
assertion does
not,
as
such,
commit
us to
materialism: the fact that
spiritual
and
psychic
entities have a
physical
embodiment
actually
enhances their value
and
significance
for the
world,
and in no
way
affects their essential
nature.
Thus,
for
instance,
when
our
awareness of
a
humorous
situation
finds
expres?
sion
in a
smile,
it
acquires,
through
that
bodily
manifestation,
a
greater
fulness
of
reality,
while
preserving
its
psychic
and
spiritual
content.
The
fundamental
principle
of Stoic
metaphysic
is
not
substance
485
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JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES
but
force,
Svvafjus.
This
is
clearly
the case with
Posidonius,
as
Rein-
hardt has
shown.
He
discovers
special
forces
in
all
departments
of
the world; thus he speaks of the force of thought, the force of life,
etc.
Reinhardt shows that the
basis of
the
world for
Posidonius
is
a
living Primoforce,
the
manifestations
of
which
give
rise
to
physical
and
psychical
being.
In
the
terminology
of
W.
Stern,
author of
the
remarkable
book
Person
und
Sache,
force is for
Posidonius
a
meta-
psycho-physical
principle,
i.e.
it transcends the
distinction
between
the
psychical
and
the
physical.
The ancient
Stoics
emphasized
this
supremacy
of
the
active
prin?
ciple
over substance
or
corporeality.
It
has
already
been
said that
for Zeno the ultimate
reality
was
to
be found
not
in
elements but
in
principles (ap^cu)
which
were
in
no
sense
material.
Two
principles
lie
at
the
root
of all
things,
an
active and
a
passive
one. The
passive
isthe
unqualified
substance
or
matter
(vXrj),
and
the active
principle
in
it
is
Logos,
or
God.
Being
eternal,
the
Logos
forms
all
individual
things
out
of
matter
(I, 85).
Principles
(apxa0
are
to
be
distin?
guished
from
elements,
says
Chrysippus;
principles
do not
come
into
being
or
perish,
whereas
elements
perish
in a
cosmic
conflagra-
tion. Principles are incorporeal and have no shape, whereas elements
have
shape
(II,
299).
Substance,
then
(i.e.
the
elements?fire,
air,
water,
and
earth)
is,
for the
Stoics,
derivative;
as
to
firstmatter
(vXrj),
they
meant
by
it
neither
the atoms of
Democritus
nor
what
we
now
mean
by
matter;
it
was
not
the visible
and
tangible
matter
given
in
experience,
but an
indefinite
passive
principle,
the
subject
for the activities
of the
Logos.
This alone is
sufficient to show that
the
Stoic
metaphysic
is
not materialism.
They
insist
on
everything
being corporeal,
not
because
corporeality
is
for
them
an ultimate
principle, but because they interpret it as the actualization of the
spirit.
As
Aall
puts
it in
his
Geschichte
der
Logosidee
in der
griechischen
Philosophie,
the
active
principle,
the
living
force is for
them
the
Logos,
but it is
through
physical
activity
that
Logos acquires
onto?
logical
actuality.
The
metaphysic
of the
Stoics
may
then be
called
pansomatism,
not
in
the
sense
of
asserting
that
bodies
alone
exist,
but in
the sense
that
everything
actual
has a
bodily
as
well as a
psycho-spiritual
aspect,
and
these
two
aspects
are
inseparable
and cannot
exist
apart.
Such
a
view
may
appear
as
materialism to a
superficial
observer,
and
the
misapprehension
can
only
be
avoided
if
the ideal
(spiritual),
the
psychical,
and
the
bodily
aspects
of
a
real
entity
be
carefully
distinguished
from
one
another,
designated
by
exact
terms
and
shown to be
separable
in
thought,
though
not
in
reality.
The Stoics
failed to do
this,
or,
rather,
in
trying
to do it
they
perpetually
spoiled
the
results
by
committing
the
mistake
of
duplication
in
abstraction,
486
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THE
METAPHYSICS
OF THE STOICS
as
Luppe
has
well
called
it. The mistake
may
be
explained
as
follows:
Suppose
that
AB
is
an
actually
indivisible
whole;
the task of correct
abstraction is mentally to separate A from B; if AB is a concrete
whole of
perception,
the
abstracted elements
A
and
B
cannot be
imagined
pictorially,
but
may only
be
objects
of
conceptual thought.
Minds
that are
not
good
at
abstraction
will
find the
task
too
difficult,
and
in
trying
to
think
of
A
will still
picture
it
as
Ab,
and
instead
of
thinking
of
B,
will have
a
presentation
of
aB.
Thus abstraction
will
yield
not
the
elements of
AB,
but a
reduplication
of it.
Thus,
for
instance,
if
we
perceive
a
red cube and want
to
think
of its colour
and extendedness
in
abstraction
from
each
other,
we
generally
set
about it
incorrectly,
imagining
the colour as,
say,
a red
patch
and
the
extendedness
as a
cube or
some
other visual
shape
filled
with
colour
or
with some other sensible
quality.
A
correctly
performed
process
of
abstraction, however,
ought
to
yield
two elements
of
reality?colour
and
extension?that
cannot be
visualized
at
all,
but
can
only
be
thought
of
conceptually.
Distorting
A
by
the
addition
of
B,
and
B
by
the addition of
A,
we learn
nothing
about the
specific
nature
of
either.
It is
precisely
this mistake of
duplicating through
abstraction
that
the
Stoics
are
always
making.
Their intellectual
intuition
enables
them
to
differentiate
from the
world-whole
the rational
super-
temporal
and
superspatial
principle,
Logos,
but
they immediately
proceed
to sink
it
in
the
material element of
fire;
they
no sooner
think
of
the
ideal
aspect
of
force
than
they
convert
it
into
centrifugal
and
centripetal
currents,
and
so
on.
Let
us
consider,
for
instance,
in
greater
detail
their
doctrine of the
seed-logoi.
The
Stoics
certainly
conceived of
them as
supertemporal
and
superspatial
elements?
present in the extended material being, after the manner of Aris?
totle's
forms.
Thus,
in
the first
place,
the
seed-logoi
are indes-
tructible;
material
being,
on
the
other
hand,
is
destructible
because
it
is
infinitely
divisible,
and
can
always
be
destroyed through
division;
besides,
it
is
continually
undergoing
profound
qualitative
changes:
fire is
turning
into
air,
water,
earth,
and back
again.
In the
second
place,
definite
seed-logoi
condition
the
rational
purposive
structure
of
every
species
of
animals
and
plants,
and, indeed,
of
every
indi?
vidual
entity.
When
a
creature such
as,
e.g.,
an
eagle
dies,
the seed
logos corresponding
to it does not
die,
but conditions the birth of a
new
eagle
with the same
rational
and
purposive
structure of the
body.
This can
only
be
the
case
if
the
seed-logos
does
not
merely
fill
the
material
bulk
of the
eagle's
body,
but is
an
ideal
super?
spatial
unity
which
governs
a number
of material
particles
in
space dynamically,
i.e.
by manifesting
its
force
in
many
points
of
space.
According
to
a
dynamistic
theory
of
matter,
spatial
manifesta-
II 487
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JOURNAL
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STUDIES
tions
of
the
seed-logos
confer
upon
it
an
aspect
of
materiality,
but
it
is
not the fact
of the
seed-logos
being
extended
in
space
that enables
it to play the leading part in the process of building up and governing
the
body
of
an
eagle;
it can
only
do so
in
virtue of
its
superspatial
character,
which enables
it
to dominate
many
points
in
space.
The
Stoics were
apparently
aware
of
the ideal
character of
the seed-
logos's
wholeness,
but
they
identified
it with
its
corporeal
aspect
and
talked
of
the
seed-logos
penetrating
bodily
the
whole
bulk of
an
individual
thing
and
holding
it
together
as
a
unity.
Criticizing
this
view,
Proclus
pointedly
remarks that
if
seed-logoi
are
corporeal,
they
cannot combine
the
parts
of
a
thing,
for
in that
case
they
cannot
hold
even themselves
together.
Proclus,
afollower of
Plotinus,
and
a
man
highly
endowed
with
the
faculty
of intellectual
intuition,
clearly
perceived
that
spatial
unity
is
only
possible
if
it
springs
from
a
superspatial
source.
Both
the
seed-logoi
and
the
World
Logos
are
materialized
by
the
Stoics.
They
know
the
spiritual aspect
of
the
Logos,
but in
speaking
of
it
they
immediately
translate
it
into
terms
of
space
and
material
fire
which
bodily
interpenetrates
the world.
The
crudeness of
their
mistake consists not in their ascribing corporeality to a divine
principle,
but
in not
clearly
distinguishing
the
spiritual
and the
bodily aspects
of
it,
their
specific
qualities
and
significance.
They
reason
as
though
the actual
interpenetration
of the world
by
a
homogeneous pneuma
could
make
the world into
a
single
whole.
But
as
against
this
one
can
only repeat
once
more
the
argument
of
Proclus: such
a
pneuma,
occupying
a
number
of
points
in
space,
can
itself
be
a
single
whole
only
if
its wholeness
springs
from
an
ideal
supertemporal
and
superspatial
source which
combines
all its
tensions into an inseverable
unity.
The
ideal
source
of
the
wholeness
of an individual
thing
or
event
is
complex,
and two
kinds
of ideal
entities must be
distinguished
in
it:
the
concretely
ideal
element
or
the
substantival
agent,
and
the
abstract
ideas,
that
is,
the laws and forms of
that
agent's
manifesta?
tions.
The
consideration
of
any
concrete
fact
will
show
that
many
elements,
both
real and
ideal,
form
part
of
its
structure.
Suppose
a
singer
is
beautifully rendering
an
exquisite
musical
melody:
his
movements,
the
sounds
of
his
voice,
and his mental states constitute
the
real
aspects
of
this
process;
they
are
events
in
space
and
time.
But the
supertemporal
and
superspatial
reality
is
present
here
as
well, first,
as the
singer's
self
which
dominates
all
this
multitude of
events in
space
and
time;
secondly,
as the abstract form
of
the
events,
their
regular
structure,
and so
on;
finally,
the
melody
itself
exists
not
merely
as an event in
time,
but also
as an
ideal
super?
temporal
whole,
and
in order to
render
it
intelligently
the
singer
488
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8/9/2019 Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie Duddington -…
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THE
METAPHYSICS OF
THE
STOICS
must
have in
mind
the
pattern
of it as
a
unity
of elements
mutually
determining
one another.
The Stoics did not carefully distinguish these various aspects of
reality;
their
analysis
was not
sufficiently
thorough,
and
they
com?
mitted
endless
mistakes of
reduplication.
This lack of
subtlety?a
characteristic defect of
their
system?may
have
had some connection
with
the
fact that
many
of
the
leading
Stoics were
not
Greek
by
birth. The fundamental mistake of their
metaphysic may
be
expressed
as
follows:
in
preaching dynamic pansomatism
they
failed to
see
the
difference
between
asserting
that
every entity
is a
body
and
that
every entity
produces
physical
reactions,
though
it
transcends
them and is not exhaust ed
by
them.
I
have
dwelt
at such
length upon
these
peculiarities
of
Stoicism
because
they
are
highly
instructive. We
find that most materialists
are
guilty
of the
same
mistake.
They
unconsciously
ascribe ideal
characteristics to
matter, and,
unable
mentally
to
differentiate
them,
are
perfectly
content
with their inchoate or
at
any
rate
unanalysed
conception
of
matter,
finding
in it all
they
need
for
the
interpretation
of
the
world.
This,
for
instance,
is
the case with
Robinet,
a
French
thinker
of the
eighteenth century,
or
with
Priestley (1733-1804), and,
indeed,
with
all thinkers
who conceive of
the
world
as
a
mechanism
in
which
psychical
processes
are
subordinated
to the
physical,
and
yet
admit that the world has been
created
by
God.
The
elements
of
the
world
mechanism
are in their
view
so
wisely
co-ordinated that
natural
mechanical
processes
lead to
highly
purposive
and
rational
results. Such
thinkers
do
not
really deny
the
ideal
foundations of the
world
of
existence,
but
interpret
them
as
God's
ideas
in
accordance
with
which
the
world
has been created.
They
forget
that
every
ideal
principle exemplified in a real existent is indissolubly connected with
that
existent,
so
that
if
one
takes into account
all
the elements that
go
to the make
up
of
any
concrete
existing
entity,
such an
entity
will
always prove
to
be
both
real and ideal.
I
will
point
out
in conclusion
that the
overwhelming
majority
of
naturalists,
even when
they
do
not reduce
the world to mechanical
processes,
fall
into the same error
as
soon
as
they
come
to deal with
problems
of
philosophy.
In their own
sphere they
easily
differentiate
the
various
aspects
of
an
object
with
the
greatest
exactitude,
express?
ing
them in notions
admirably
fitted for the
purpose.
But as soon as
they go
beyond
their
own
special
field and turn
to
philosophical
problems
that
require
the
utmost
refinement of
analysis,
their
mental
subtlety
seems to
forsake
them;
the
ideal
and
the real
aspects
of existence blend
for
them into one
undifferentiated
mass,
and can
no
longer
be
distinguished.
(Translated
from
the
Russian
by
Natalie
Duddington.)
489
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