Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie...

8/9/2019 Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie Duddington -…

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Royal nstitute of Philosophy

The Metaphysics of the StoicsAuthor(s): N. Lossky and Natalie DuddingtonSource: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Oct., 1929), pp. 481-489Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3745801 .

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2/10

THE

METAPHYSICS

OF

THE STOICS

Professor

N.

LOSSKY

The

metaphysical

doctrine of the Stoics

is a remarkable instance of

a

theory

that

appears

to be

materialism,

but

is

in truth a form

of

unconscious ideal-realism.

It

is

worth

while to

give

an

exposition

of

it in

order to show that this is

really

the

case,

and,

incidentally,

to

explain why a materialistic philosophy seems so attractive to many

minds.

I

will

refer

chiefly

to

the

teaching

of

the

ancient

Stoics,

i.e.

of

Zeno, Cleanthes,

and

Chrysippus,

and

also to

the

later

doctrine

of

Posidonius.

The

founder

of

Stoicism,

Zeno,

maintained that two

principles,

an

active

and

a

passive

one,

lie

at

the

root of

all

things.

The

passive

principle

is

the

unqualified

substance or

matter,

and the active

principle

in it is the

Logos

(Reason)

or God.

Being

eternal,

the

Logos

forms

all individual

things

out

of

matter

(I,

851). According

to

Zeno,

the Reason which

penetrates

all

things

is

ei/xap/xeV^

I, 87),

i.e. is

the

necessary

connection of

things,

the

law of nature.

This

can

be

gathered,

for

instance,

from the words of

Chrysippus,

who

says

that

elfiapixivrj

is

Reason,

in

accordance

with which the

existing

things

have come

into

being,

those

that

are

about

to

exist are

coming

into

being,

and those that are

going

to

exist

will

come into

being

(II, 913).

This Reason must

not

be

understood

as

merely

ideal and

spiritual,

as law and

Providence;

the Stoics

insist

through?

out that Cosmic Reason is

corporeal.

It is the Fire

(irvp)

that

pene?

trates

the

universe. To

distinguish

it

from

ordinary

earthly

fire

they

often

call

it

rrvp

reyw/coV,

i.e.

a

creative

fire,

or

ether,

or

irvevfia,

and

7Ti>evfjLa

vheppiov?the

breath

of

fire.

They definitely say

that

this

principle

is

a

body,

the

purest

and

finest conceivable. This

body

is God

(I, 153),

and all

other bodies

and the

world

as a whole

proceed

from it.

The

ancient

Stoics

definitely

affirmed

that all

being

is

corporeal.

According

to

Chrysippus,

that

only

exists

which

may

be

grasped

and touched (II, 359), the cause is something that exists, namely,

abody (11,336).

Allcauses, the

Stoics

said,

are

corporeal

because

they

are

pneumatic (II, 340).

With

regard

to the

soul,

Zeno

main?

tained that

it is

breath,

but breath is

a

body,

therefore the soulis

a

body (I, 137). Chrysippus proved

the

corporeal

nature

of

the

soul

1

The references

are to Stoicorum veterum

fragmenta,

Vols.

I

and

II;

the

Roman

figures

indicate

the volume

and the

Arabic the

number

of

the

frag?

ment.

481


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JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

as

follows:

death is the

separation

of

the soul

from

the

body.

But

nothing incorporeal

can be

separated

from

the

body;

nor

can

any?

thing incorporeal be in contact with the body; the soul, however,

both

is in

contact

with

the

body

and

separates

itself

from

it,

hence

the soul

is a

body

(creola)

(II,

790;

see also

790-800).

Similarly

the ancient

Stoics

definitely

said

of God

that

He

is

purest body (I, 153).

Their

insistence on

the

corporeality

of

all that

exists was

often

carried

to

the

point

of

absurdity.

Thus,

for

instance,

they

maintained

that

the

qualities

of

things,

light,

whiteness,

warmth,

are

bodies

(II, 386).

Voice

is

a

body,

since

everything

capable

of

action

and

influence is

a

body

(II,

387).

Even virtues and

vices,

wisdom,

etc,

were

in

their

opinion

bodies.

Posidonius

taught

that

(1)

thought

existing merely

as

expressed

in

words,

(2)

emptiness,

(3)

space,

(4)

time,

were

incorporeal;

but

according

to

Basilides

these also

were

bodies.1

Such assertions

suggest

that the

metaphysical

teaching

of

the

Stoics was

the

crudest

form

of

materialism.

If

one

takes

them to

mean that

goodness,

wickedness,

wisdom,

etc,

are

substances,

the

implication is that, e.g., a fool can be made intelligent by introduc?

ing

into his

body

a

certain

quantity

of

the wisdom-substance

(some

product

of internal

secretion,

a

hormone

of

some

sort,

as

a modern

biologist

might

say).

It is

possible,

however,

to

put

a

more

reasonable

interpretation upon

their

teaching,

taking

it

to

mean

no more

than

the kind

of

thing

constantly

met with

in the

materialistic

literature

of

our

day, namely,

that

a

good-natured

man

has certain

bodily

characteristics,

a

bad-tempered

one has

definite

physical

peculiari-

ties,

a

genius

has

a

special

kind of

brain,

etc

It

will

be shown

later

what the Stoics really meant by the corporeality of qualities; at

present

sufficient has been said to show

why

they

are

generally

said

to

be

thoroughly

materialistic

in

their

metaphysics.

I

will now

pass

to

consider

another

aspect

of

their

doctrine,

namely,

its

pantheistic

character.

Zeno and

Chrysippus

maintained that

the earth

and

the

sky

were

the

substance

of

God

(II,

1022).

Just

as the

different

parts

of

the

body

unite to form

the

seed,

but when

a

new

body

grows

out

of

the

seed

they

divide once

more,

so

everything

arises out

of

the

One

and

is

reunited

with the

One,

says

Cleanthes.

All the

world

is

divine;

but

it

may

also

be

said that 'God

is the

soul of

the world'

(Cleanthes,

I,

532),

designating by

the word

God

the

rational

and

active

principle

in

the world.

As

already

said,

this

active and

rational

principle

is

a

fiery

pneuma

which

interpenetrates

and embraces

all

things

(II,

1051).

The

interpenetrating

action

of

the

pneuma

is

tovos,

i.e.

tension,

See

Stein,

Die

Psychologie

der

Stoa,

v.

I,

p.

18.

482




4/10

THE

METAPHYSICS

OF

THE

STOICS

which

spreads

out from

within each

thing

and returns

into

it

again.

This

tension.

in

so

far as

it

is directed

outwards,

determines all

the

qualities of things, and in so far as it is directed inwards constitutes

the

unity

and

essence

of

things.1

It is

something

like

a

force of

repulsion

and

attraction.

Simplicius,

indeed,

expressly says

that

the

Stoics

recognize

force,

or

rather

a

rarefying

and

condensing

motion.2

The

qualities

of

things, arising

out of

this

tension,

are

said

by

Chry?

sippus

to

be

pneumatic

or

aerial

tensions

which

enter

particles

of

matter

and

give shape

to

them

(II, 445).

Elements

less

fine

than

fire?air,

water,

and earth?are

formed

out

of

the

divine

fire

through

a

slackening

of

its

tension;

but

an

increase of

tension

leads

up

once

more

from earth

through

water

and

air

back

to

fire. These two

opposed

directions of

the

process

of

tension

correspond

to what

Heraclitus

had

called the

downward

and

the

upward

path,

in

speaking

of the transformation

of

the Fire-

Logos

into

air,

water,

earth,

and then

back

again

into

fire.

Not

the whole

of

pneuma passes

into

the lower

elements;

a

part

of

it

remains

at the end

of

the

world

and rules the

world;

the

Stoics

called

it

rjyefjLovLKov

ov

Kovpiov

(the

ruling

principle

of

the

world).

Not all of them, however, agreed that it was situated at the end of

the world.

Posidonius

identified

this

principle

with the

sun,

the

heart

of

the world.

It

was

the source of

light

and

warmth,

of

the

earth's

vital breath.

But

wherever the

Stoics

might

locate

the

cosmic

Reason,

they

were

unanimous

in

asserting

that

it was the

source

of all

things

in

the world

conditioning

both

their

form

or structure

and

their

cor-

poreality.

All the

multiplicity

of

the

world

sprang

from

the

Cosmic

Reason,

because that

Reason contained

a

number

of

seed-logoi

(Xoyot

oTTtpixaTiKoL),out of which plants and animals and all other

things

developed

(Marcus

Aurelius, IV,

36).

Matter

devoid of

qualities

became

qualified

matter

through

the

action of

a

seed-logos

or

a

group

of

them.

L.

Stein

in

his

Die

Psychologie

der Stoa

explains

that

by

a

seed-

logos

the

Stoics

meant an

activity

of the

pure pneuma

which

by

means of

tension invited

and

encouraged

rational and

purposive

origination

and

development.3

As usual

with

the

Stoics,

we

have

here

a

case

of

an

indissoluble

unity

between the ideal

and

the

cor?

poreal

being;

the

seed-logos

is an

organic

bodily

whole,

a

pneuma

with such

a

tension

that

taking

possession

of

lifeless

matter

it

gives

it

shape

and

forms

an

individual

entity.

Such

an

individual

entity

may

perish,

but

its

seed-logos

is

indestructible:

it

goes

on

forming

1

See

Reinhardt, Posidonius,

p. 142.

2

See

L.

Stein,

Die

Psychologie

der

Stoa,

v.

I,

pp.

32,

90;

Simpl.

Sch.in

Arist.

Categ.,

ed.

Brandis,

p.

74.

3

L.

Stein,

Die

Psychologie

der

Stoa, I,

p. 49.

483




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JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

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new individuals of

the same

species,

being,

as

it

were,

the

spirit

of

the

genus.1

The

world,

united

and

interpenetrated

by

the

Divine

Logos, aspects of which?the seed-logoi?are to be found in each

individual

thing,

is one

living

whole.

If the

olive-tree,

says

Zeno,

produced

melodiously playing

flutes,

you

would

have

no

doubt that

it knew

something

about

flute-playing.

If

plane-trees

produced

rhythmically

sounding

lyres,

you

would also admit that

plane-trees

were musical.

Why

not

admit,

then,

that the

world

is a

living

and

rational

being,

since

it

produces

animate and rational entities?

(I,

112

and the whole of

110-114).

Chrysippus

and

Posidonius also

recognize

that

the

world

is a

rational,

animated,

and

thinking

entity

(II,

633-645).

All

parts

of the

world

are

therefore united

with

one another

through sympathy

and

correlation.

Plotinus,

whose

system

in

this

respect

is

similar

to that

of

the

Stoics,

says

about the

world:

This

One-all is

a

sympathetic

total

and stands

as one

living

being;

the

far

is

near;

it

happens

as

in

one

animal

with its

separate

parts:

talon,horn,

finger,

and

any

other member

are

not

continuous,

and

yet

are

effectively

near;

intermediate

parts

feel

nothing

but

at

a

distant

point

the

local

experience

is known

(Enneads,

IV,

4, ?

32,

translated by S. Mackenna).

The world

as

a

whole,

the

heavenly

bodies and the earth are

living beings.

Their

parts

are

subservient

to one

another,

and the

whole,

and,

vice

versa,

the

whole

is

subservient to the

parts.

Thus,

according

to

Posidonius,

the earth

feeds

the

plants:

in

the

coun?

tries where

there

is

no rain

she

secures for

them

the due amount

of

moisture

by

means of

floods,

such,

for

instance,

as we

find

in

the

case of

the

Nile,

the

Euphrates,

the

Ind;

in

flood-time the

Ind

not

merely

moistens

the

soil

but sows it with

seeds of

plants. 2

Causality

and teleology are not mutually exclusive; the Stoics conceive of the

divine cosmic

Reason on

the

one

hand

as

a

universal

law,

a

strictly

necessary

causal

bond,

and

on the

other as

purposive,

rational,

and

beneficial

Providence.

In the

words

of

Zeno,

necessity

is the

moving

power

of

matter;

it

always

remains

equal

to

itself,

and

may

also

be

called

Providence

or Nature

(I,

176).

The

universal

law

which

is

right

Reason

(6

6p6os

\6yos), penetrating

all

things,

is

identical

with

Zeus,

who

directs the

world-order

(I,

162).

Chrysippus

also identified

the law

of nature? the

eternal,

coherent,

and ordered motion

with cosmic

Reason or

Providence

(II,

913, 916).

And

so,

according

to the

Stoics,

the

necessary

is at the same

time

the

logical

and the

purposive;

the

causal

process

is

teleological

and

rational.

Consequently,

the

world

as

a

whole

is the

most

perfect

being

(I,

111),

it is

arranged

as

excellently

as

the

best-governed

1

Proclus,

Commentary

on Plato's

Parmenides,

v.

V,

p.

135,

3

Reinhardt,

Kosmos und

Sympathie,

pp.

110,

170,

176,

484




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THE

METAPHYSICS OF

THE

STOICS

State.

To

obey

the laws

and to

carry

out

the

purposes

of

this State

is man's

highest good

and

supreme

duty.

Lead

me,

Zeus and

Fate,

wherever it is destined by you that I should go, and I will follow

unfailingly;

but if I

tried

to

lag

behind

like a

coward,

I

should

be

compelled

to

go against

my

will,

says

Cleanthes

(I, 527).

fiDucunt

volentem

fata,

nolentem

trahunt,iy

writes Seneca

(Epistles

107,

10).

Having

considered the

main

conceptions

of

the Stoic

philosophy,

let

us ask whether the

usual

interpretation

of

it

as

materialism

is

correct. E. Zeller

asserts that their

doctrine is

materialism,

but,

in

contradistinction

to that

of

Democritus,

it

is

dynamic

materialism.

For

Democritus,

bodies consist of

impenetrably

hard

atoms

which

for ever remain what

they

are; the world

process

consists in the blind,

soulless movement of

these

atoms

in

space

and

of

their

accidental

and

purposeless impacts.

For the

Stoics,

on

the

contrary, corporeality

consists in

activity, space

is filled

through

tension,

i.e.

through

the

processes

of

attraction

and

repulsion.

These

processes

are

not soulless

or

irrational:

they

are

based

upon

the

sympathy

between

the

different

parts

of

the

world and

are

rational and

purposive.

We

find thus

an

indissoluble connection between

extended

corporeal

existence,

psychical

states

( sympathy ),

and

ideal or

spiritual

essence

expressed

by

the notion of

vovs

(Reason),

Logos,

and

\6yoi aTrtpiiariKoi.

In

order to

say

whether this

doctrine

is materialism

we must see

how it accounts for the

relation between

the

psycho-spiritual

and the

bodily reality.

It

must

be

observed

that

a

theory

should

be

only

called

materialistic

if

it

implies

that the

psychic

and the

spiritual

is

a

passive

derivative from the

physical.

But

for

the

Stoics

the

psychic

state

of

sympathy

is that which

directs

the

bodily

processes;

similarly,

the ideal

aspect

of the

Divine

pneuma designated

by

the word

Logos

conditions from the first the necessary and purposive order of physi?

cal

processes,

and is not

produced

by

the latter.

This

clearly

shows

that

Stoicism

is

not

materialism;

it is a

dynamic

view

according

to

which

everywhere

in

the

world there

is

activity,

tension,

striving

towards

a

definite

rational

purpose?namely,

towards the

realization

of

physical being

embodying

rational

principles.

The

doctrine of

the

Stoics

seems

materialistic

because

they

over-

emphasize

the

contention that

all

ideal

and

psychical

being

has

a

bodily

aspect.

But

this

assertion does

not,

as

such,

commit

us to

materialism: the fact that

spiritual

and

psychic

entities have a

physical

embodiment

actually

enhances their value

and

significance

for the

world,

and in no

way

affects their essential

nature.

Thus,

for

instance,

when

our

awareness of

a

humorous

situation

finds

expres?

sion

in a

smile,

it

acquires,

through

that

bodily

manifestation,

a

greater

fulness

of

reality,

while

preserving

its

psychic

and

spiritual

content.

The

fundamental

principle

of Stoic

metaphysic

is

not

substance

485




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JOURNAL

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but

force,

Svvafjus.

This

is

clearly

the case with

Posidonius,

as

Rein-

hardt has

shown.

He

discovers

special

forces

in

all

departments

of

the world; thus he speaks of the force of thought, the force of life,

etc.

Reinhardt shows that the

basis of

the

world for

Posidonius

is

a

living Primoforce,

the

manifestations

of

which

give

rise

to

physical

and

psychical

being.

In

the

terminology

of

W.

Stern,

author of

the

remarkable

book

Person

und

Sache,

force is for

Posidonius

a

meta-

psycho-physical

principle,

i.e.

it transcends the

distinction

between

the

psychical

and

the

physical.

The ancient

Stoics

emphasized

this

supremacy

of

the

active

prin?

ciple

over substance

or

corporeality.

It

has

already

been

said that

for Zeno the ultimate

reality

was

to

be found

not

in

elements but

in

principles (ap^cu)

which

were

in

no

sense

material.

Two

principles

lie

at

the

root

of all

things,

an

active and

a

passive

one. The

passive

isthe

unqualified

substance

or

matter

(vXrj),

and

the active

principle

in

it

is

Logos,

or

God.

Being

eternal,

the

Logos

forms

all

individual

things

out

of

matter

(I, 85).

Principles

(apxa0

are

to

be

distin?

guished

from

elements,

says

Chrysippus;

principles

do not

come

into

being

or

perish,

whereas

elements

perish

in a

cosmic

conflagra-

tion. Principles are incorporeal and have no shape, whereas elements

have

shape

(II,

299).

Substance,

then

(i.e.

the

elements?fire,

air,

water,

and

earth)

is,

for the

Stoics,

derivative;

as

to

firstmatter

(vXrj),

they

meant

by

it

neither

the atoms of

Democritus

nor

what

we

now

mean

by

matter;

it

was

not

the visible

and

tangible

matter

given

in

experience,

but an

indefinite

passive

principle,

the

subject

for the activities

of the

Logos.

This alone is

sufficient to show that

the

Stoic

metaphysic

is

not materialism.

They

insist

on

everything

being corporeal,

not

because

corporeality

is

for

them

an ultimate

principle, but because they interpret it as the actualization of the

spirit.

As

Aall

puts

it in

his

Geschichte

der

Logosidee

in der

griechischen

Philosophie,

the

active

principle,

the

living

force is for

them

the

Logos,

but it is

through

physical

activity

that

Logos acquires

onto?

logical

actuality.

The

metaphysic

of the

Stoics

may

then be

called

pansomatism,

not

in

the

sense

of

asserting

that

bodies

alone

exist,

but in

the sense

that

everything

actual

has a

bodily

as

well as a

psycho-spiritual

aspect,

and

these

two

aspects

are

inseparable

and cannot

exist

apart.

Such

a

view

may

appear

as

materialism to a

superficial

observer,

and

the

misapprehension

can

only

be

avoided

if

the ideal

(spiritual),

the

psychical,

and

the

bodily

aspects

of

a

real

entity

be

carefully

distinguished

from

one

another,

designated

by

exact

terms

and

shown to be

separable

in

thought,

though

not

in

reality.

The Stoics

failed to do

this,

or,

rather,

in

trying

to do it

they

perpetually

spoiled

the

results

by

committing

the

mistake

of

duplication

in

abstraction,

486




8/10

THE

METAPHYSICS

OF THE STOICS

as

Luppe

has

well

called

it. The mistake

may

be

explained

as

follows:

Suppose

that

AB

is

an

actually

indivisible

whole;

the task of correct

abstraction is mentally to separate A from B; if AB is a concrete

whole of

perception,

the

abstracted elements

A

and

B

cannot be

imagined

pictorially,

but

may only

be

objects

of

conceptual thought.

Minds

that are

not

good

at

abstraction

will

find the

task

too

difficult,

and

in

trying

to

think

of

A

will still

picture

it

as

Ab,

and

instead

of

thinking

of

B,

will have

a

presentation

of

aB.

Thus abstraction

will

yield

not

the

elements of

AB,

but a

reduplication

of it.

Thus,

for

instance,

if

we

perceive

a

red cube and want

to

think

of its colour

and extendedness

in

abstraction

from

each

other,

we

generally

set

about it

incorrectly,

imagining

the colour as,

say,

a red

patch

and

the

extendedness

as a

cube or

some

other visual

shape

filled

with

colour

or

with some other sensible

quality.

A

correctly

performed

process

of

abstraction, however,

ought

to

yield

two elements

of

reality?colour

and

extension?that

cannot be

visualized

at

all,

but

can

only

be

thought

of

conceptually.

Distorting

A

by

the

addition

of

B,

and

B

by

the addition of

A,

we learn

nothing

about the

specific

nature

of

either.

It is

precisely

this mistake of

duplicating through

abstraction

that

the

Stoics

are

always

making.

Their intellectual

intuition

enables

them

to

differentiate

from the

world-whole

the rational

super-

temporal

and

superspatial

principle,

Logos,

but

they immediately

proceed

to sink

it

in

the

material element of

fire;

they

no sooner

think

of

the

ideal

aspect

of

force

than

they

convert

it

into

centrifugal

and

centripetal

currents,

and

so

on.

Let

us

consider,

for

instance,

in

greater

detail

their

doctrine of the

seed-logoi.

The

Stoics

certainly

conceived of

them as

supertemporal

and

superspatial

elements?

present in the extended material being, after the manner of Aris?

totle's

forms.

Thus,

in

the first

place,

the

seed-logoi

are indes-

tructible;

material

being,

on

the

other

hand,

is

destructible

because

it

is

infinitely

divisible,

and

can

always

be

destroyed through

division;

besides,

it

is

continually

undergoing

profound

qualitative

changes:

fire is

turning

into

air,

water,

earth,

and back

again.

In the

second

place,

definite

seed-logoi

condition

the

rational

purposive

structure

of

every

species

of

animals

and

plants,

and, indeed,

of

every

indi?

vidual

entity.

When

a

creature such

as,

e.g.,

an

eagle

dies,

the seed

logos corresponding

to it does not

die,

but conditions the birth of a

new

eagle

with the same

rational

and

purposive

structure of the

body.

This can

only

be

the

case

if

the

seed-logos

does

not

merely

fill

the

material

bulk

of the

eagle's

body,

but is

an

ideal

super?

spatial

unity

which

governs

a number

of material

particles

in

space dynamically,

i.e.

by manifesting

its

force

in

many

points

of

space.

According

to

a

dynamistic

theory

of

matter,

spatial

manifesta-

II 487




9/10

JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

tions

of

the

seed-logos

confer

upon

it

an

aspect

of

materiality,

but

it

is

not the fact

of the

seed-logos

being

extended

in

space

that enables

it to play the leading part in the process of building up and governing

the

body

of

an

eagle;

it can

only

do so

in

virtue of

its

superspatial

character,

which enables

it

to dominate

many

points

in

space.

The

Stoics were

apparently

aware

of

the ideal

character of

the seed-

logos's

wholeness,

but

they

identified

it with

its

corporeal

aspect

and

talked

of

the

seed-logos

penetrating

bodily

the

whole

bulk of

an

individual

thing

and

holding

it

together

as

a

unity.

Criticizing

this

view,

Proclus

pointedly

remarks that

if

seed-logoi

are

corporeal,

they

cannot combine

the

parts

of

a

thing,

for

in that

case

they

cannot

hold

even themselves

together.

Proclus,

afollower of

Plotinus,

and

a

man

highly

endowed

with

the

faculty

of intellectual

intuition,

clearly

perceived

that

spatial

unity

is

only

possible

if

it

springs

from

a

superspatial

source.

Both

the

seed-logoi

and

the

World

Logos

are

materialized

by

the

Stoics.

They

know

the

spiritual aspect

of

the

Logos,

but in

speaking

of

it

they

immediately

translate

it

into

terms

of

space

and

material

fire

which

bodily

interpenetrates

the world.

The

crudeness of

their

mistake consists not in their ascribing corporeality to a divine

principle,

but

in not

clearly

distinguishing

the

spiritual

and the

bodily aspects

of

it,

their

specific

qualities

and

significance.

They

reason

as

though

the actual

interpenetration

of the world

by

a

homogeneous pneuma

could

make

the world into

a

single

whole.

But

as

against

this

one

can

only repeat

once

more

the

argument

of

Proclus: such

a

pneuma,

occupying

a

number

of

points

in

space,

can

itself

be

a

single

whole

only

if

its wholeness

springs

from

an

ideal

supertemporal

and

superspatial

source which

combines

all its

tensions into an inseverable

unity.

The

ideal

source

of

the

wholeness

of an individual

thing

or

event

is

complex,

and two

kinds

of ideal

entities must be

distinguished

in

it:

the

concretely

ideal

element

or

the

substantival

agent,

and

the

abstract

ideas,

that

is,

the laws and forms of

that

agent's

manifesta?

tions.

The

consideration

of

any

concrete

fact

will

show

that

many

elements,

both

real and

ideal,

form

part

of

its

structure.

Suppose

a

singer

is

beautifully rendering

an

exquisite

musical

melody:

his

movements,

the

sounds

of

his

voice,

and his mental states constitute

the

real

aspects

of

this

process;

they

are

events

in

space

and

time.

But the

supertemporal

and

superspatial

reality

is

present

here

as

well, first,

as the

singer's

self

which

dominates

all

this

multitude of

events in

space

and

time;

secondly,

as the abstract form

of

the

events,

their

regular

structure,

and so

on;

finally,

the

melody

itself

exists

not

merely

as an event in

time,

but also

as an

ideal

super?

temporal

whole,

and

in order to

render

it

intelligently

the

singer

488




10/10

THE

METAPHYSICS OF

THE

STOICS

must

have in

mind

the

pattern

of it as

a

unity

of elements

mutually

determining

one another.

The Stoics did not carefully distinguish these various aspects of

reality;

their

analysis

was not

sufficiently

thorough,

and

they

com?

mitted

endless

mistakes of

reduplication.

This lack of

subtlety?a

characteristic defect of

their

system?may

have

had some connection

with

the

fact that

many

of

the

leading

Stoics were

not

Greek

by

birth. The fundamental mistake of their

metaphysic may

be

expressed

as

follows:

in

preaching dynamic pansomatism

they

failed to

see

the

difference

between

asserting

that

every entity

is a

body

and

that

every entity

produces

physical

reactions,

though

it

transcends

them and is not exhaust ed

by

them.

I

have

dwelt

at such

length upon

these

peculiarities

of

Stoicism

because

they

are

highly

instructive. We

find that most materialists

are

guilty

of the

same

mistake.

They

unconsciously

ascribe ideal

characteristics to

matter, and,

unable

mentally

to

differentiate

them,

are

perfectly

content

with their inchoate or

at

any

rate

unanalysed

conception

of

matter,

finding

in it all

they

need

for

the

interpretation

of

the

world.

This,

for

instance,

is

the case with

Robinet,

a

French

thinker

of the

eighteenth century,

or

with

Priestley (1733-1804), and,

indeed,

with

all thinkers

who conceive of

the

world

as

a

mechanism

in

which

psychical

processes

are

subordinated

to the

physical,

and

yet

admit that the world has been

created

by

God.

The

elements

of

the

world

mechanism

are in their

view

so

wisely

co-ordinated that

natural

mechanical

processes

lead to

highly

purposive

and

rational

results. Such

thinkers

do

not

really deny

the

ideal

foundations of the

world

of

existence,

but

interpret

them

as

God's

ideas

in

accordance

with

which

the

world

has been created.

They

forget

that

every

ideal

principle exemplified in a real existent is indissolubly connected with

that

existent,

so

that

if

one

takes into account

all

the elements that

go

to the make

up

of

any

concrete

existing

entity,

such an

entity

will

always prove

to

be

both

real and ideal.

I

will

point

out

in conclusion

that the

overwhelming

majority

of

naturalists,

even when

they

do

not reduce

the world to mechanical

processes,

fall

into the same error

as

soon

as

they

come

to deal with

problems

of

philosophy.

In their own

sphere they

easily

differentiate

the

various

aspects

of

an

object

with

the

greatest

exactitude,

express?

ing

them in notions

admirably

fitted for the

purpose.

But as soon as

they go

beyond

their

own

special

field and turn

to

philosophical

problems

that

require

the

utmost

refinement of

analysis,

their

mental

subtlety

seems to

forsake

them;

the

ideal

and

the real

aspects

of existence blend

for

them into one

undifferentiated

mass,

and can

no

longer

be

distinguished.

(Translated

from

the

Russian

by

Natalie

Duddington.)

489

Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie...

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Transcript of Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 4 Issue 16 1929 [Doi 10.2307_3745801] N. Lossky and Natalie...