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The
Promise
f
Ted opf
Constructivism
n
Internationalelations
Theory
A challenger
to the
continuing dominance
of neorealism and
neoliberal
institutionalism
n
the
study
of nternational elations
n
the United
States,
onstructivism
s
regarded
with
a
great
deal
of
skepticism y
mainstream
cholars.1
While the reasons
for
thisreception re many, hreecentralones are the mainstream'smiscasting f
constructivism
s
necessarilypostmodern
and antipositivist;
onstructivism's
own
ambivalence
about whether
t
can
buy
into
mainstream social science
methods
without
acrificing
ts theoretical istinctiveness; nd, related
to this
ambivalence, constructivism's
ailureto advance an alternative esearch
pro-
gram. In this article, clarify onstructivism's
laims, outline the differences
between conventional
and critical
constructivism,
nd
suggest
a
research
agenda
thatboth
provides alternative
nderstandings
f
mainstream
nterna-
TedHopf s Visiting rofessorfPeaceResearch, he MershonCenter, hio StateUniversity.e is the
author fPeripheralVisions: DeterrenceTheory and AmericanForeign Policy
in
the
Third
World,
1965-1990 Ann Arbor:UniversityfMichiganPress, 1994)
and is
at work
n
Constructing oreign
Policy
at Home: Moscow
1955-1999,
n
which
theoryf
dentitynd
international
elations
s
developed
and tested. e can
be
reached
y
e-mail t
<<[email protected]>>.
I
am most grateful o Matt Evangelista and Peter Katzenstein
who both read and commentedon
many ess-than-inspiringrafts
f
thiswork, nd,
more
mportant,upported my
overall
research
agenda.
I
am also thankful o Peter Kowert and Nicholas Onuf
for
nviting
me
to Miami in the
winter
of 1997 to
a conference
t
Florida InternationalUniversity
t
which
I
was
compelled
to
come
to
grips
with the difference etween critical and conventional constructivisms.
also
benefited
rom
specially
incisive and critical ommentsfromHenrikki
Heikka,
Badredine
Arfi,
RobertKeohane, JamesRichter,Maria Fanis,Ned Lebow,Pradeep Chhibber,Richard Herrmann,
David Dessler, and one anonymous reviewer.
would
also
like to
salute
the members of
my
graduate
seminar
n international
elations
heory
t
the University
f
Michigan,
n
particular,
rfan
Nooruddin,
Frank
Penirian,
Todd
Allee,
and
Jonathan
anedo
helped
me
figure
ut the relation-
ship
between the mainstream
nd its critics.
1. The canonicalneorealistwork
remainsKennethN. Waltz, Theory f
nternationalolitics Read-
ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
979).The debate between
neorealism nd neoliberal nstitutionalism
is presented and
summarized n David
A.
Baldwin, ed.,
Neorealism nd Neoliberalism
New York:
Columbia University ress, 1993).
Constructivist hallengescan be found
n
Nicholas
Greenwood
Onuf, World fOur Making:
Rules and Rule in Social Theory
nd International elations Columbia:
University
f South Carolina
Press,
1989); PeterJ.Katzenstein,
d., The Culture fNational ecurity:
Norms nd dentityn World olitics New York:Columbia University ress,1996); and Yosef Lapid
and Friedrich
V. Kratochwil, ds., The Return f Ctulture
nd Identityn IR Theory Boulder,
Colo.:
Lynne Rienner,
996).
Ihnternationalecurity, ol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200
?
1998 by the President nd Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts
nstitute
f
Technology.
171
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Internationalecurity 3:1 |
172
tional relationspuzzles and
offers few examples ofwhat constructivism
an
uniquely bring
to an understanding f world politics.
Constructivism ffers lternative nderstandings
f
a number
of
the central
themes n international
elations heory,ncluding: he
meaning of anarchy nd
balance of power, the
relationship between state identityand interest, n
elaboration
of
power,
and the prospects
for
hange
n
world
politics.
Construc-
tivism tself hould be understoodin its conventionalnd critical ariants, he
latterbeing more closely tied to critical ocial theory.
he conventional con-
structivist esire to present
n alternative o mainstreamnternational elations
theoryrequires a researchprogram. Such a program
ncludes constructivist
reconceptualizations f balance-of-threatheory, he
security ilemma, neolib-
eral
cooperation
theory,
nd the
democraticpeace.
The constructivistesearch
program has its own puzzles
that concentrate n issues of identity n world
politics and the
theorization
f domestic politics
and culture
n
international
relations heory.
Conventionalonstructivism
nd ssues
n
Mainstream
International
elations
heory
Since constructivism
s best
defined
in
relation to
the issues
it
claims to
apprehend, present
ts
position
on
several
of the most
significant
hemes
n
international
elations
heory oday.
ACTORS
AND STRUCTURES ARE MUTUALLY CONSTITUTED
How much do structures onstrain nd enable the actionsofactors, nd how
much
can actors
deviate
from he constraints f structure?
n
world
politics,
structure
s a
set
of
relativelyunchangeable
constraints
n
the
behavior
of
states.2
Although
these
constraints an take
the
form of
systems
of material
dis/incentives,
uch as a balance
of
power
or a
market,
s
important
rom
constructivist
erspective
s
how an
action
does or does not
reproduce
both
the actor
and
the
structure.3
or
example,
to the extent
hatU.S.
appeasement
in Vietnam was
unimaginable
because
of U.S.
identity
as a
great power,
2. Most important or his rticle,
his s the neorealist onceptualization f nternational tructure.
All references o neorealism, nless
otherwisenoted, are fromWaltz,Theoryf nternationalolitics.
3. FriedrichKratochwil uggests that
this difference
n
the understanding
f structure s because
structuralism
ntered international elations
theory
not
through
sociolinguistics,but through
microeconomics. riedrich
V.
Kratochwil,
Is the
Ship
of
Culture
at Sea or Returning? n Lapid
and Kratochwil,
The Return
f
Culture nd
Identity, .
211.
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ThePromisef
Constructivism173
military ntervention onstituted he United States as a greatpower. Appease-
ment
was an
unimaginable
act.
By
engaging
n
the enabled action of
inter-
vention, he United States reproduced tsown identity f great power, as well
as the structure hat gave meaning to
its action. So, U.S. intervention n
Vietnam perpetuated the international
ntersubjective nderstanding
f
great
powers as those states that use military
ower against others.
Meaningful behavior,or action,4 s possible onlywithin an intersubjective
social context. Actors
develop
their relations
with,
and
understandings of,
others throughthe media of norms and
practices.
n
the absence
of
norms,
exercises of
power,
or
actions,
would
be devoid
of
meaning.
Constitutive
norms
define
an
identity y specifying he actions that will cause Others
to
recognize that identity nd respond
to it
appropriately.5
ince structure
s
meaningless
without
ome intersubjectiveet
of norms and
practices, narchy,
mainstream nternational elations
heory's
most crucial structural
omponent,
is
meaningless.
Neither
narchy,
hat
s,
the absence
of
any authority
bove the
state,nor the distribution fcapabilities, an socialize statesto the desiderata
of the international
ystem's
structure
bsent
some
set
of
meaningful
norms
and
practices.6
A
storymany
use in
first-yearnternational elations ourses to demonstrate
the structural xtreme, hat is, a situation
where
no
agency
is
imaginable,
illustrates he point. The scenario is a fire
n
a theaterwhere all run for the
exits.7
But
absent
knowledge
of social
practices
or
constitutive
orms,
struc-
ture,
even
in
this
seemingly
overdetermined
ircumstance,
s still
ndetermi-
nate.Even
in
a theaterwith ustone
door,
while all run for hat
xit,
who
goes
first?Are they the strongest r the disabled, the women or the children, he
aged
or
the
infirm,
r is it
just
a
mad dash?
Determining
he outcome
will
require knowing more about the situation han about
the
distribution
f
ma-
terial
power
or the structure f
authority.
ne
will
need
to know about the
culture,norms, nstitutions, rocedures,
rules,
and social
practices
hatconsti-
tute the actors
and
the
structure
like.
4. The critical istinction etween action and behavior s made by Charles Taylor,
Interpretation
and the Sciences of Man, in Paul Rabinow and William
M.
Sullivan,eds., nterpretiveocial Science:
A SecondLook Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1987), pp. 33-81.
5. Ronald L. Jepperson, lexander Wendt, nd PeterJ.Katzenstein, Norms,
dentity,nd Culture
in National Security, n Katzenstein,The Culture fNational ecurity, . 54.
6. David Dessler, What's
At
Stake in the Agent-Structureebate? International
rganization,ol.
43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 459-460.
7. Arnold Wolfers,Discord and CollaborationBaltimore,Md.: Johns Hopkins
UniversityPress,
1962).
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 174
ANARCHY AS
AN
IMAGINED
COMMUNITY
Given that anarchy
s
structural,
t must
be mutually
constituted
by
actors
employing
constitutive ules
and social
practices, mplying
hat
anarchy
s as
indeterminate s Arnold
Wolfers'sfire.
Alexander
Wendt
has offered con-
structivistritiqueof
this
fundamental tructural
illar
of
mainstream
nterna-
tional relations
theory.8
ut
still more fundamentally,
his
move opens the
possibilityof thinking f anarchyas having multiple meanings fordifferent
actors based on
their wn communities f ntersubjective nderstandings nd
practices.And if
multipleunderstandings f anarchy re possible, thenone can
begin to theorize about different omains and issue areas of international
politics
that
are understoodby actors
as
more,or less, anarchic.
Self-help,
he neorealist nference hat all
states
should
prefer ecurity
nde-
pendence
whenever
possible,
s a
structurally
etermined ehavior of an actor
only
to
the extent hat
a
single particularunderstanding
f
anarchyprevails.9
If
the mplications
f
anarchy
re
not
constant cross
all
relationships
nd
issue
areas of nternational olitics, hen continuum fanarchies s possible. Where
there are catastrophic
onsequences
for not
being
able to
rely
on one's own
capacity
to
enforce
n
agreement,
uch as arms
control
n
a
world of
offensive
military dvantage,
neorealist
onceptualizations
f
anarchy
re
most
apt.
But
where actors do not
worry
much about
the
potential
costs of
ceding
control
over outcomes
to
other states
or
institutions,
uch as
in
the enforcement
f
trade
agreements,
his is a realm of world
politics
where neorealist
deas
of
anarchy
re
just
imaginary.
IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS IN WORLD POLITICS
Identities
re
necessary,
n international
olitics
and domestic
society like,
n
order
to
ensure
at
least some
minimal level
of
predictability
nd
order.'0
Durable
expectations
between states
require ntersubjective
dentities
hat
are
sufficiently
table
to
ensure
predictablepatterns
f
behavior.
A
world
without
8. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction f Power
Politics, nternational rganization, ol. 46, No.
2
(Spring 1992), 391-425.
9. Elizabeth Kier,
for
example, shows how the same objective external tructural rrangement
of power cannot account
for
Frenchmilitary trategy etween the two
world
wars. Elizabeth Kier,
Culture and FrenchMilitary octrinebeforeWorldWar I, inKatzenstein, heCulture fNational
Security,p. 186-215.
10. The focus on identity oes not reflect lack of appreciationfor ther lements n the construc-
tivist pproach, such as norms, ulture, nd institutions.nsofar s identities re themost proxi-
mate causes of choices,preferences,nd action, concentrate n them, ut withthe fullrecognition
that dentities annot be understood without simultaneous account of normative, ultural, nd
institutional ontext.
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ThePromise
fConstructivism
175
identities s a world of chaos, a world ofpervasive and
irremediable
uncer-
tainty,
world much more
dangerous
than
anarchy.
dentities
perform hree
necessaryfunctions n a society: hey ell you and otherswho you
are and they
tell youwho others re.11n
tellingyou who you are, dentities trongly mply
a
particular et
of
interests
r
preferences
with
respect
to choices of action
n
particulardomains,
and with
respect
to
particular
ctors.
The identity f a state implies its preferences nd consequent
actions.12
A
state
understands
others
ccording
to
the
identity
t
attributes
o
them,
while
simultaneously eproducing ts own identity hrough aily social
practice.The
crucial observationhere
s
that
theproducer
of
the dentitys
not in control f
what it ultimatelymeans to
others;
the
intersubjective tructure s the final
arbiter
f
meaning.
For
example, during the
Cold
War,Yugoslavia
and other
East
European
countries ftenunderstood the
Soviet
Union as
Russia, despite
the fact hatthe Soviet Union was trying ard not tohave that
dentity. oviet
control
over
its own
identity
was
structurally
onstrainednot
only by
East
European understanding, ut also by daily Soviet practice,which of course
included conversingwithEast
Europeans
in
Russian.
Whereas constructivism
reats dentity s an empirical question to
be theo-
rized within a historicalcontext,neorealism assumes that all
units in global
politics
have
only
one
meaningful dentity,
hat of
self-interested
tates.
Con-
structivism
tresses
that
thisproposition exempts
from
heorization
he very
11. Henri
Tajfel,Human Groups nd SocialCategories: tudies n Social Psychology
Cambridge,U.K.:
Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981), p. 255.
Although there are many
accounts of the origin of
identity,offer cognitive xplanationbecause ithas minimal priori xpectations, ssuming only
that dentities
re needed to reduce complexity o some manageable level.
12. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for
example, findthat, ontrolling orrational trategic eed,
domestic coalition politics, and superpower
manipulation, countries
n
the third world prefer
certain
weapons systems over others because of their
understanding of what it means to be
modern
in the
twentieth
entury.
ana
P.
Eyre
and Mark C.
Suchman, Status,Norms,
and the
Proliferation
f Conventional Weapons: An Institutional heory Approach, in
Katzenstein,The
Cultureof
National Security, p.
73-113.
Other examples of empirical research
that
have
linked
particular
dentities o
particular
ets of
preferences
re civilized identities
driving
attitudes
toward
weapons
of mass
destruction;
otions
of
what constitutes humanitarian
haping
deci-
sionsto intervene
n
other
tates;
he
dentity
f a normal
state mplying articular oviet
foreign
policies;
and
antimilitarist
dentities n
Japan
and German
shaping
their
post-World
War
II
foreign olicies.
These
arguments
an be found
n
Richard Price and
Nina
Tannenwald,
Norms
and Deterrence:The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos, pp. 114-152;MarthaFinnemore,
Constructing
Norms of Humanitarian
Intervention, p. 153-185;
Robert
Herman, Identity,
Norms,
nd National
Security:
he
Soviet
ForeignPolicy
Revolution nd the
End
of the
Cold
War,
pp. 271-316;
and Thomas U.
Berger, Norms,
Identity,
nd
National
Security
n
Germany and
Japan, pp.
317-356. All of the above are n
Katzenstein,
heCulture
f
National
ecurity.
n
identity
and
mutual
intelligibility,
ee
Roxanne LynnDoty,
The Bounds of
Race'
in
InternationalRela-
tions, Millennium: ournal f nternational
tudies,
Vol.
22,
No. 3
(Winter 993), p.
454.
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The Promise fConstructivism177
The consequences of this treatment f interests nd identitieswork in the
same direction s constructivism's ccount of structure, gency, nd anarchy:
states are expectedto have (1) a far wider arrayofpotentialchoices of action
beforethem than is assumed by neorealism, and (2) these choices will be
constrained
by social
structures hat are
mutuallycreated by
states and struc-
tures via social practices.
In
other words, states have more agency under
constructivism,ut that agency is not in any sense unconstrained.To the
contrary,
hoices are
rigorously
onstrained
by
the webs
of understanding
f
the practices, dentities, nd interests f otheractors that prevail
in
particular
historical ontexts.
THE POWER OF PRACTICE
Power is a central heoretical lement forboth mainstream nd constructivist
approaches to international elations theory,
ut
their conceptualizations of
power
are
vastly
different. eorealism and neoliberal nstitutionalismssume
that materialpower, whethermilitary r economicorboth, s the singlemost
important ource of nfluence nd authority
n
globalpolitics.16Constructivism
argues
that both material
and
discursive
power are necessary
for
any
under-
standing
of world affairs.
emphasize
both because oftenconstructivistsre
dismissed as unRealistic for
believing
in
the
power
of
knowledge, ideas,
culture, deology, nd language, that
s,
discourse.17 The
notion that
deas are
a formof
power,
that
power
is
more than brute
force,
nd
that
material and
discursive
power are related
s
not
new.
Michel Foucault's articulation f the
power/knowledge nexus,
Antonio Gramsci's
theory
f
deological hegemony,
and Max Weber'sdifferentiationfcoercion from uthority re all precursors
to constructivism's ositionon power
in
political ife.18Empiricalwork exists
16. A rare effortn the mainstream iterature o break away from his focus on materialpower is
JudithGoldstein and Robert
0.
Keohane, eds., Ideas and ForeignPolicy (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell
University ress, 1993).
17. As R.B.J.Walkerhas clarified, To suggest that ulture nd ideology are crucial for
he
analysis
of world politics
s not
necessarily
o take an
idealist position....
On the
contrary,
t s
important
to recognize hat deas, consciousness, ulture, nd ideology are bound up with more
mmediately
visible kinds of political,military,nd economic power. In R.B.J.Walker, East Wind, WestWind:
Civilizations,Hegemonies,
and World
Orders,
n
Walker, d., Culture, deology,
nd World
Order
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 3. See also Onuf, World f Our Making,p. 64. Joseph
Nye's conceptualization f soft power could be usefullyread through constructivist
nterpre-
tation. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ound to Lead: The ChangingNatureof American ower New
York:
Basic Books, 1991), esp. pp. 173-201.
18. ColinGordon,ed., Power/Knowledge:electednterviewsned therWritinigs,972-1997,
byMichel
Foucault Brighton, ussex, U.K.: HarvesterPress, 1980); AntonioGramsci, electionisrom
he rison
Notebooks,rans. and ed., Quinton Hoare and GeoffreyNowell Smith New York: nternational
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 178
in
both international elations theory
nd
security tudies
that
demonstrates
the
need
to appreciate
both
the material
nd the discursive
aspects ofpower.19
Given that the
operation
of the material
side
of
power
is
familiar
from
the
mainstream iterature, ere
I
concentrate n the discursiveside, the power of
practice
n
constructivism.
The power of social practices ies in their apacityto reproduce
the
ntersub-
jective meanings that constitute ocial structures nd actors alike. The U.S.
military nterventionn Vietnamwas consistentwith a number of U.S. identi-
ties: great power, imperialist, nemy, lly, and so on. Others observing the
United States not
only
inferredU.S.
identity
rom
ts
actions in
Vietnam,
but
also reproduced the intersubjective
web
of meaning about what
precisely
constituted hat dentity. o the extent, orexample, that a group of countries
attributed
n
imperialist dentity
o the
United
States,
he
meaning
of
being
an
imperialist tate was reproduced by the U.S. military
ntervention.
n
thisway,
social
practices
not
only reproduce
actors
through dentity,
ut
also reproduce
an intersubjectiveocial structure hrough ocial practice.A most important
power
of
practice
s its
capacity
to
produce predictability
nd
so, order.
Social
practicesgreatly educe uncertainty mong actors within socially structured
community, hereby ncreasing
onfidence hat
what actions
one
takes
will
be
followed
by
certain
onsequences
and
responses
from
thers.20
An actor s
not even able to act as its identity
ntil
the relevant
ommunity
of
meaning,
o
paraphrase
Karl
Deutsch,21acknowledges
he
egitimacy
f
that
Publishers,1992); and Max Weber,FromMax Weber, d., Hans Gerth and C. WrightMills (New
York: OxfordUniversity ress, 1946).
19. Price and Tannenwald show that even power as material as nuclear missiles and chemical
artillery ad to be understood and interpreted efore t had any meaning. n Price and Tannen-
wald,
Norms and Deterrence. RobertCox has
provided
an account
of the
rise,reproduction,
nd
demise
of
nineteenth-centuryritish upremacy,
nd the
rise and reproduction f U.S. dominance
in the twentieth entury hrough close reading of the nteraction etween material nd discursive
power.RobertW. Cox, Social Forces, States,and World Orders:Beyond International elations
Theory, Millennium: ournal fnternationaltudies,Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 126-155.
20. Onuf sees these reproduciblepatterns f action as the product of reflexive elf-regulation,
whereby gents refer o their wn and other'spast and anticipated ctions
n
deciding how to act.
Onuf,
World
f
Our
Making,
.
62.
21. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism nd Social Communication: n Inquiry nto the Foundations f
NationalityNew York:MIT Press, 1953), pp. 60-80.Deutsch was a constructivistongahead of his
time to the extent hat he argued that ndividuals could not engage in meaningful ctionabsent
some community-wide ntersubjectivity.notherwork constructivist
n
essence is RobertJervis's
The Logicof mages n International elations Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1970).
Applying Erving Goffmann's elf-presentationheory o international olitics,Jervis ointed out
that state actions, such as gunboat diplomacy,
were
meaningless unless situated
in a
larger
intersubjective ommunity f diplomatic practice.
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The
Promise f
Constructivism179
action,by thatactor,
n
that ocial context.The
power of practice
s
the power
to produce
intersubjectivemeaning
within
social structure.t is a
short tep
from hisauthorizingpower of practice to an
understanding f practice as a
way
of
bounding,
or
disciplining nterpretation,
aking
some
interpretations
of
reality ess likelyto occur or prevailwithina
particular ommunity.22he
meanings of actions of members of the
community, s
well
as the actions of
Others,become fixedthroughpractice;boundaries ofunderstandingbecome
well
known.
In
this
way,
the
ultimatepower
of
practice
s to
reproduce
and
police
an
intersubjectiveeality.23ocial
practices,
o the extent
hat hey utho-
rize, discipline, nd
police, have the power to
reproduce entire ommunities,
including the
international ommunity, s well
as the many communities f
identity ound therein.24
State actions
n
the
foreign olicy
realm
are constrained
nd
empowered by
prevailing social practicesat home and abroad.
Richard Ashley,for example,
writes of a
foreign
olicy
choice as
being
a kind of
social
practice
hat
at
once
constitutes nd empowersthestate,defines tssociallyrecognized competence,
and
secures the boundaries that
differentiate
he
domestic and international
economic
and
political
spheres
of
practice
and,
with
them,
the
appropriate
domains
in
which
specific ctors may securerecognition nd act competently.
Finally,Ashleyconcludes, foreign olicy practice
depends
on the existenceof
intersubjectiveprecedents
nd shared
symbolic
materials-in orderto
impose
interpretations pon events,
ilence alternative
nterpretations,
tructure
rac-
tices,
nd
orchestrate
he
collective
making
of
history. 25
Although
I
have
necessarily
concentratedon
articulating
how discursive
power works in this section, the power to control intersubjective nder-
standing
s not the
only
formof
power
relevantto a constructivist
pproach
to world
politics.Having resources
that
allow oneself to
deploy
discursive
power-the
economic and
military
wherewithal o sustain institutions eces-
22. See Doty, The Bounds of Race, p.
454; and Carol Cohn, Sex
and
Death
in the
Rational
World
of Defense
Intellectuals, igns:Journal
f
Women n Culture nd
Society,
ol.
12,
No. 32
(Summer
1987), pp. 687-718.
23. See Richard K. Ashley, Untyingthe Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique, Millennium: ournal
f nternationaltudies,Vol. 17, No.
2
(Summer1988), p. 243,
for discussion of thisprocess.
24. Richard K.
Ashley,
The
Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a CriticalSocial
Theory
of
International olitics, Alternatives,ol. 12, No. 4 (October-December1987), p. 409.
25.
Richard
K.
Ashley, Foreign Policyas PoliticalPerformance, nternationaltudiesNotes
1988),
p. 53.
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International
ecurity
3:1
|
180
saryfor
he
formalized
eproduction
f social
practices-is
almost
always part
of
the
story s
well.
CHANGE
IN
WORLD POLITICS
Constructivism s
agnostic
about
change
in
world
politics.26
t restoresmuch
variety nd difference o world affairs nd pointsout the
practicesby
which
intersubjective rder is maintained,but it does not offer ny more hope for
change
n
world politics
han neorealism.
Constructivism's
nsight
hat
narchy
is what statesmake of it,forexample, implies that
there are many different
understandings fanarchy
n
the world,and so
state actions should be more
varied thanonly
self-help.
ut
this s
an
observation f already-existing eality,
or,
more
precisely,
set of
hypotheses
bout the same. These different nder-
standingsof
anarchy
are still rooted
in
social
structures,
maintained
by
the
power
of
practice,
nd
quite impervious
to
change.
What
constructivism oes
offer s
an
account
of how
and
where
change may
occur.
One aspectof constructivistower is thepowertoreproduce,discipline, nd
police.
When such
power
is
realized, change
in
world
politics
is
very
hard
indeed. These
intersubjective tructures, owever,
although
difficult o chal-
lenge,
are not
mpregnable.
Alternative
ctorswith alternative
dentities, rac-
tices,
and
sufficientmaterial
resources are
theoretically apable
of
effecting
change. Robert
Cox's account
of British
nd
American
upremacy, or xample,
perhaps
best
illustrates he
extraordinary taying
power
of
a
well-articulated
ideological hegemony,
but
also
its
possible demise.
And
Walker
rightly b-
serves that
constructivism,
o the extentthat t surfaces
diversity, ifference,
and particularity,pens up at leastpotential lternatives o the current revail-
ing structures.27onstructivism onceives of the
politics
of
identity
s a con-
tinual
contestfor controlover thepower
necessary
to
produce meaning
in
a
social
group.
So
long
as there
s
difference,
here s a
potential
for
change.
Thus, contrary o
some
critics28 ho assert that constructivism
elieves
that
change
in
world
politics
s
easy,
that
bad neorealist tructures eed
only
be
thought way,
n
factconstructivism
ppreciates
the
power
of
structure,
f
for
no other reason thenit assumes that actors
reproduce daily their own con-
straints
hrough
ordinarypractice.
Constructivism's
onceptualization
of
the
26. Criticalconstructivism
enies thisvigorously.
27. R.B.J.
Walker, Realism,Change, and
International olitical
Theory,
nternational
tudiesQuar-
terly, ol. 31,
No.
1
(March1987), pp. 76-77.
28. See, for
example, John J.Mearsheimer,
The False Promise of International
nstitutions,
Internationalecurity, ol. 19,
No.
1
(Winter
994/1995),pp. 5-49, esp. 37-47.
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The Promise f
Constructivism
181
relationship etween agency and
structure rounds tsview
that
ocial change
is
bothpossible
and
difficult. eorealism's
position
that ll
states re meaning-
fully dentical denies a fair mount
of possible change to
its
theoretical truc-
ture.
In
sum, neorealism nd constructivismhare
fundamental oncernswith the
role of
structure
n
world
politics, he effects f anarchyon state behavior, he
definition fstate nterests,he natureofpower,and theprospectsfor hange.
They disagree fundamentally,
owever, on each concern.Contra neorealism,
constructivism
ssumes
that actors and
structures
mutually
constitute
ach
other; narchy
must be
interpreted
o have
meaning;
state nterests
re
part
of
the process of dentity
onstruction; ower
is both
material nd discursive; nd
change
in
world
politics
s both
possible
and
difficult.
Constructivisms:onventionalnd Critical
To thedegree that constructivismreates theoretical nd epistemologicaldis-
tance
between tself
nd
its origins
n
critical heory,t
becomes conventional
constructivism.
lthough
constructivism
hares
many
of the
foundational le-
ments of
critical heory,
t
also
resolves some
issues
by adopting defensible
rules ofthumb, r conventions, ather han
following ritical heory ll the way
up
the
postmodern
critical
path.29 situate
constructivism
n
this
way
to
highlight oth
ts
commonalities
with
traditional
nternational elations
heory
and its
differences
ith
the critical
heory
with which t s
sometimes
mislead-
inglyconflated.30 elow
I
sketch
out the relationshipbetween conventional
constructivismnd critical ocial theoryby identifying oth those aspects of
critical
theory
that
constructivism
as
retained
and
those
it
has chosen to
conventionalize. The
result,conventional
constructivism,
s a
collection
of
principles distilled from critical
social theory
but
without the latter's more
consistent
heoretical
r
epistemologicalfollow-through.
oth
critical nd
con-
ventional onstructivismre on the same side of the
barricades
n
Yosef
Lapid's
characterization
f the
battle zone: the
fixed, natural,
unitary, table,
and
29. Jepperson,Wendt, nd Katzensteindifferentiatehe kindof sociological analysis performed
in
their olume from he radical constructivist
osition of RichardAshley,David Campbell, R.B.J.
Walker,
nd
Cynthia
Weber.
See
Jepperson,Wendt,
nd
Katzenstein, Norms,
Identity,
nd Cul-
ture, p. 46,
notes
41
and 42.
30. As, forexample, in Mearsheimer, The
False Promise of Internationalnstitutions, wherein
constructivism, eflectivism, ostmodernism, nd poststructuralismre all reduced
to
critical
theory, . 37, note 128.
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International
ecurity
3:1 182
essence-like,
n the one
(mainstream
nternational elations
heory)hand,
and
the emergent, onstructed, ontested,
nteractive,
nd
process-like,
n
the other
(constructivist) ne.31
Conventional and
critical onstructivism
o
share theoretical undamentals.
Both aim to denaturalize the social
world,
that
s,
to
empirically
discover
and reveal how the institutions
nd
practices
and identities hat
people
take
as natural,given,ormatter ffact, re, in fact, heproductof human agency,
of social construction.32oth believe that
ntersubjective eality
nd
meanings
are criticaldata forunderstanding he social world.33
Both insist that all data
must be
contextualized,
hat
s, theymust be related
to,
and situated
within,
the social environment
n
which they
were gathered,
n
order to understand
their
meaning.34
Both
accept
the
nexus between
power
and
knowledge,
the
power
of
practice
n
its
disciplinary,meaning-producing,
mode.35 Both also
accept the restoration f agency to
human
individuals.
Finally,
oth
stress
he
reflexivity
f the
self and society, hat s, the
mutual
constitution f actor and
structure.36
Perhaps
where
constructivisms most conventional s in the area of meth-
odology
and
epistemology.
he authors of
the theoretical ntroduction o
The
Culture
f
National
Security,
or
example,
vigorously,
nd
perhaps defensively,
deny
that
their authors use
any special
interpretivist ethodology. 37 he
authors are careful o stressthat
they
do
not
depart
from normal science
in
this
volume,and none of the contributors
itherdeviates from hatground or
questions
whether it is
appropriate.38
his
position is anathema to critical
theorywhich,
as
part
of its constitutive
pistemology, as
a
lengthybill of
particulars gainst positivism.
31.
Yosef Lapid, Culture's
Ship: Returns nd Departuresin International
Relations Theory, n
Lapid and
Kratochwil,
The
Return f Culture
nd
Identity, p. 3-20.
32.
Mark Hoffman, CriticalTheory and the
nter-Paradigm ebate, Millennium: ournal f
nter-
national
tudies,Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp.
233-236.
33.
Ashley, The Geopoliticsof Geopolitical Space, p.
403.
34.
In this respect, oth critical nd conventional
onstructivism an be understood as sharing n
interpretivistpistemology,
more generally. ee Taylor, Interpretationnd the
Sciences of Man.
35. James Der
Derian,
On
Diplomacy.
A
Genealogy f Western
strangementOxford,U.K.: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), p. 4.
36. R.B.J.Walker, World Politics and WesternReason: Universalism,Pluralism,Hegemony, n
Walker,Culture, deology,
nd World
Order,p. 195; and
Ashley,
The
Geopolitics
of
Geopolitical
Space, pp.
409-410.
37.
Jepperson,Wendt,
nd
Katzenstein, Norms, dentity,
nd
Culture, p.
67.
38.
The
only,
even
partial,
exceptions
are Price
and
Tannenwald,
Norms and
Deterrence,
nd
Michael N. Barnett, Institutions,Roles, and Disorder:
The Case of the Arab States System,
International
tudiesQuarterly,ol. 37,No. 3 (September
1993), pp. 271-296.
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ThePromise
fConstructivism183
Conventional
constructivism,
hile expecting o uncover
differences,den-
tities, nd multiple
understandings, till assumes
that
t
can specify set of
conditionsunder which one can
expect to see one
identity r another.This is
what Mark
Hoffmanhas
called minimal
foundationalism, ccepting that a
contingent niversalism s
possible
and
may be
necessary.
n
contrast, ritical
theory ejects
ither he
possibility
r
the
desirability
f a
minimal or contin-
gentfoundationalism.39shley chidesall noncriticalpproachesfor anticipat-
ing analysis
coming
to
a close.
In
allowing for such
prematureclosure, the
analyst participates
n
the
normalization
or
naturalization of
what
is
being
observed, and risks
hiding thepatterns f domination that
mightbe revealed
if
closure could
only be deferred.40o reach an
intellectuallyatisfying oint
of
closure,
constructivism
dopts
positivist
onventions bout
sample charac-
teristics,
methods of
difference, rocess tracing, nd
spuriousness checks.
In
making
this
choice,
critical heorists
rgue,
constructivism
an offer n under-
standing
of
social
reality
ut
cannot
criticize he boundaries
of ts
own
under-
standing, nd this s preciselywhat critical heory s all about.41
So,
for
example,
Thomas
Bergermakes claims about
Japanese and German
national
dentities
hat
mply certain utcome for
n indefinite eriod oftime
to come.42
uch
a claim
requires
the
presumed nonexistence frelevantunob-
servables,
s well as the
assumption
that
he
practices, nstitutions,
orms,
nd
power
relations hat
underlay
the
production
of
those dentities
re
somehow
fixed
r
constant.
Critical heoristswould see this s an illusion of
control;
one
of
these
factors an
be
so
easily immobilized for
either nalysisor
prediction.
This
differencemanifests
tself as
well
in how
critical
and conventional
constructivismnderstand dentity. onventional constructivists ish to dis-
cover identities nd their
associated
reproductive
ocial
practices,
nd
then
offer
n
account of
how
those
identities
mply
certain actions.
But
critical
theoristshave a
different im.
They
also
wish
to
surface
identities,
not to
articulate heir
effects,
ut
to
elaborate
on how
people
come to believe
in
a
39.
Mark
Hoffman, Restructuring, econstruction, einscription, earticulation:
our
Voices
in
Critical nternational heory, Millennium: ournal f nternationaltudies,Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring
1991), p.
170. David
Campbell argues
that no
identity or any
other theoretical lement for
that
matter)may be allowed to be fixed rfinal. tmustbe critically econstructed s soon as it acquires
a meaning.David Campbell, ViolentPerformances:dentity,overeignty, esponsibility, nLapid
and
Kratochwil,
The Return
f
Culture nd
Identity, p.
164-166.
See also Stephen J.Rosow,
The
Forms
of Internationalization: epresentation f WesternCulture on a Global Scale, Alternatives,
Vol.
15,
No.
3
(July-September 990), p. 289, fordifferences n this ssue.
40.
Ashley,
The
Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space, p. 408.
41.
Hoffman, Restructuring, econstruction, einscription, earticulation, . 232.
42. Berger, Norms, dentity, nd National Security n Germany nd Japan.
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Internationalecurity
3:1 | 184
single version
of a naturalized
truth.
n other words, critical heory
ims
at
explodingthe
myths
ssociated
with dentity ormation,
hereasconventional
constructivists
ish to treat
hose dentities
s possiblecauses
of action.
Critical
theory
hus claims
an interest
n change,and a
capacity
to
foster
hange,
that
no
conventional
onstructivist
ould make.
In addition,
nd
in
a related
vein,
critical heorists elf-consciously
ecognize
theirown participation n the reproduction, onstitution,nd fixingof the
social
entities hey bserve.43
hey realize
that he
actor nd observer
an never
be separated.
Conventional
constructivists
gnore
this njunction,while
largely
adopting
interpretivist
nderstandings
of the connectivity
f subjects
with
other
ubjects n a web
of ntersubjective
meaning.
The observernever
becomes
a subject
of
the
same self-reflective
ritical nquiry.
Conventional
and
critical onstructivistslso split
over
the origins
of iden-
tity.44
hereas
conventional
constructivistsccommodate
a cognitive ccount
for
dentity,
r offer
o account at
all,
critical onstructivistsre
more
ikely
to
see some form f alienationdriving heneed for dentity. s remarked bove,
conventional
constructivism
ccepts
the
existence
of identities
nd wants
to
understand
theirreproduction
nd effects,
ut critical onstructivists
se criti-
cal social theory
to specifysome
understanding
of the origin
of
identity.
Tzvetan
Todorov and
Ashis
Nandy,
for
example,
assume thatEuropean
iden-
titieswere
incomplete indeed,
everyself s
incomplete
without n other)
until
they ncountered
peoples
in
the
Americasand
India, respectively.45
he neces-
sity
of difference
with an other
to produce one's
own identity
s
found
in
Hegel's
bondsman's tale, where
the more powerful
slaveowner
can
neither
knowhis own identity or exercisehis superiorpoweruntilhis slave,his other,
helps him construct
hat dentity
hrough
practice.Perhaps
conventional on-
structivism ould accept
this assumption: the
need
for
others
to construct
oneself,
but
critical
onstructivism
moves
beyond
this
position
with
the aid
of
Nietzsche,Freud,
and Lacan.46The former
llows
difference o
reign,
whereas
43.
Cynthia
Weber points
this out
as a
very mportant
istinction etween
her approach
to the
state and
more modernist
pproaches.Weber imilarly
eparatesconventional
onstructivists
rom
critical heorists.Max
Weber,Simulatingovereignty:
ntervention,
heState, nd Symbolic xchange
(Cambridge,
U.K.: CambridgeUniversity
ress,1995), p. 3.
44. Fora review of this ssue see FriedrichKratochwil,Is theShipof Culture t Sea orReturning?
pp. 206-210.
45. The discussion of
the
work
of Todorov and Nandy
is
in
Naeem Inayatullah
and David
L.
Blaney,
Knowing Encounters:
BeyondParochialism
n International elations
Theory,
n Lapid
and Kratochwil,
The Return f Culture
nd Identity,p. 65-84.
46. For an account of
identitybased on these
three theorists, ee
Anne
Norton,
Reflections
n
PoliticaldentityBaltimore,
Md.: Johns
Hopkins University ress,
1988).
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The Promise
fConstructivism185
the latter mplies eithertheassimilation of
the
other,
f
deemed equal, or his
oppression,
f
nferior.47
Critical
theory's pproach toward
identity
s
rooted
in
assumptionsabout
power.48 ritical
theorists ee power being exercised
n
every social exchange,
and there s
always
a
dominant ctor
n
that
xchange.
Unmasking
these
power
relations s a
large part
of
critical heory's
ubstantive genda; conventional
constructivism,n theotherhand,remains analyticallyneutral on the ssue
of
power
relations.
Although conventionalconstructivistshare
the idea
that
power is
everywhere,because they believe that social
practicesreproduce
underlying ower
relations, hey
re
not
necessarilynterested n
interrogating
those
relations. Critical
theory's
assumption
that all social
relations are
in-
stances
of
hierarchy,
ubordination,
r domination
ronically ppears similar
to the
expectations
of
realists and
neorealistsabout
world
politics.49 he dif-
ferent
conceptualizations
of
power imply different heoretical
agendas.
Whereas conventional
constructivism s
aimed at
the
production
of
new
knowledge and insightsbased on novel understandings, critical heory na-
lyzes
social
constraints nd cultural
understandings
from
supreme
human
interest
n
enlightenment
nd
emancipation. 50
Although
conventional nd critical onstructivism
hare a number of
posi-
tions-mutual
constitution f actors and
structures, narchy
as a social con-
struct, ower
as both
material
nd
discursive,
nd state
dentities
nd
interests
as
variables-conventional constructivism oes not
accept
critical
theory's
ideas about its own
role
in
producing change
and
maintains
fundamentally
different
nderstanding
f
power.51
47. Inayatullah and
Blaney, Knowing Encounters, p. 65-66. For a very useful analysis of how
differentccounts of
dentityhave made theirway through eminist heorizing, ee Allison Weir,
Sacrificialogics:
Feminist heory nd theCritique f dentityNew York:Routledge, 1996).
48. My views on the differences eparating critical nd
conventionalconstructivist ositions on
power were shaped
in
conversationwith JimRichter.
49.
See
Arturo
scobar,
Discourse and Power in
Development:
Michel Foucault and
theRelevance
of His Work to the Third
World, Alternatives,
ol.
10, No.
4
(October-December 1984), esp.
pp. 377-378.
50. This s takenfrom
Andrew Linklater, The Question
of the
NextStage
n
International elations
Theory:
A
Critical-Theoretical
oint of
View,
Millennium:
ournalf
nternational
tudies,
Vol.
21,
No. 1
(Spring 1992), p.
91,
and
is
based
on
his
interpretation
f
Jurgen
Habermas. For a view on
precisely he point ofthe emancipatory ower of critical heory,ee Chris Brown, 'TurtlesAll the
Way Down':
Anti-Foundationalism, riticalTheory, nd International elations, Millennium: our-
nal of nternational
tudies,
Vol.
23,
No. 2
(Summer 1994), p.
219.
51. For an alternative
ccount
of
international elations heory rom critical heoryperspective
in
which conventionalconstructivism's ositions can be found
as well, see Richard
K.
Ashley,
Three Modes of
Economism,
nternational tudies
Quarterly,
ol.
27,
No. 4
(December 1983),
pp. 477-491. On the construction f
anarchy,
n
particular,
ee
Ashley, Untying
the
Sovereign
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International
ecurity 3:1 |
186
A Constructivistesearch
genda
This sectionaims at moving constructivism rom
he margins52
y articulating
a
loosely
Lakatosian
research
program
for a constructivist
tudy
of interna-
tional relations.53present
his
research
genda
in
three ections.
The
first
tep
is
to show that constructivismffers
ompetingunderstandings
f
some key
puzzles frommainstream nternational elations heory. he secondmove is to
suggest what new and innovative
puzzles
constructivism
romises to raise.
The last step is forconstructivism
o point out its own weaknesses.
MAINSTREAM
PUZZLES,
CONSTRUCTIVIST SOLUTIONS
Constructivism an providealternative ccounts of the
balance
of
threat, ecu-
ritydilemmas, neoliberal
nstitutionalistccounts of cooperation under anar-
chy, nd theliberal theory fthe
democraticpeace.
BALANCE OF THREAT. Neorealism
tells
us
that states ally against power.
Steven Walt rightly bserved that this is empiricallywrong. He suggested,
instead,that
states ally against threats.The attempted
fix
was
to
claim that
states will balance, not against
power, but against particularkinds of power.
The latter
is the power possessed by a relatively
capable, geographically
proximatestate
with
offensive
military apabilities
and
perceived
hostile in-
tentions.54
hereas geographical
proximity
nd offensive
military apacitycan
be
established a priori,perceived intentions hreaten
autology.
everal
con-
structivistcholars have
pointed
to balance of threat s one of the
mainstream
State,
p.
253.
In
addition, conventional onstructivisms more
willing
to
accept the ontological
status of
the state when theorizing,
whereas critical heorydemands that the state remain a zone
of
contestation,
nd should be
understood as
such;
its autonomous existence should not
be
accepted. For the
former onventional
view,
see
Alexander
Wendt, Constructing
nternational
Politics,
nternationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 72.
For the criticalview of the
state,
ee
Ashley, Untying he SovereignState, pp. 248-251.
52. For
the challenge
to
constructivists
o
develop
a
research program
or
be marginalized, ee
Keohane, International nstitutions, . 392. For criticism n a
similar vein, see Thomas J. ier-
steker,
Critical Reflections n Post-Positivism n
InternationalRelations, nternational tudies
Quarterly,
ol. 33, No.
3
(September1989), p. 266.
53. It is a
loose adaptation because, while I
adopt
Lakatosian criteriafor what
constitutes
progressive nd degenerative hift
n
a research
program,
do not
adopt
his
standards of falsifica-
tionism rtheir ssociated protective elts ofauxiliaryhypotheses. ee Imre Lakatos, Falsifica-
tion and
the Methodology of ScientificResearch Programmes,
in Imre Lakatos and Alan
Musgrave,
eds.,
Criticism nd the
Growth
f Knowledge Cambridge,
U.K.:
Cambridge University
Press,
1970), pp. 91-196.
54.
Stephen
M.
Waltz,
The
Origins f
Alliances
Ithaca,
N.Y: Cornell
University ress, 1987,p.
5.
By
acknowledging that one cannot determine priori .
.
which
sources of threatwill be most
important
n any given case; one can say only that all of them are
likely to play a role, Waltz
does not offer
nontautologicalmeans
for
pecifying hreat.Quotation on p. 26.
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The Promise fConstructivism
187
accountsmostsusceptible o
a constructivistlternative.55
hat s missinghere
is a theory
of threatperception, nd this
is precisely what
a constructivist
account of identity ffers.
Distribution
f power cannotexplain the alliance
patterns hat
merged after
World War II; otherwise, he
United States
would have been balanced against,
not the Soviet
Union. Instead,the ssue
must be how France,Britain,Germany,
and the United States came to understand Soviet military apabilities and
geographicalproximity
s threatening.
he neorealist ccount
would
be
that
the Soviet
Union demonstrated y
its
behavior
that t was an objective threat
to
Western
urope.
A constructivistccount would be thatthe state dentities
of
Western
Europe,
the United States,and
the
Soviet
Union,
each rooted
in
domestic ociocultural
milieus,produced understandings
fone anotherbased
on differences
n
identity
nd
practice.
The potentialadvantage
of this
ap-
proach is that t
is
more likely
to surfacedifferences
n
how
the Soviet
threat
was constructed
n different ites than
is
the neorealistapproach,
which ac-
cordsobjectivemeaningto Soviet conduct.
Let
us
imagine,
for example, that the United States
balanced against the
Soviet Union because
of
the latter's
ommunist
dentity,
nd
what that meant
to
the United
States. ftrue,
t
means thatother
possible
Soviet identities, uch
as
an
Asian,
Stalinist,Russian,
or
authoritarian
hreat,
were not
operative.
So
what?
First,
ow the
United
States
understoodthe Sovietthreat,s communist,
notonly explainsthe anticommunist
irection f U.S. actions
n the Cold War,
but
t
also tells
us
that he
United Statesunderstood tself s
the anticommunist
protector f
a particular et of values both at
home and abroad. Second, how
the United Statesconstructed he Soviet communist hreatneeds to be under-
stood
in
relation to
how
Western
Europeans
understood
that
threat. f,
for
example,
France understood the Soviet
threat s a Russian
threat,
s an
in-
stance of superior
Russian
power
in
Europe,
then
France would not readily
join
in
U.S.
anticommunist entures
against
the
Soviet
Union. In
particular,
whereas
the United States saw the
thirdworld
during
the
Cold War as an arena
for
battling
ommunism,
s
in
Vietnam,Europeans very
rarely
understood
t
in
those terms,
nstead
regarding
hird
world states as economic actors
or as
former olonies.
55. See Thomas
Risse-Kappen,
Collective
Identity
n a Democratic Community:
The Case
of
NATO, in Katzenstein,
The Culture f NationalSecurity,p. 361-368; Barnett, Identity
nd
Alli-
ances,
pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein,
Introduction:Alternative
Perspectiveson
National
Security,
n Katzenstein, he Culture
fNational ecurity,p. 27-28;
Jepperson,
Wendt, nd Katzen-
stein, Norms,
dentity,
nd Culture,p. 63; and Wendt,
Constructing nternational
olitics, p.
78.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 188
SECURITY
DILEMMAS.
Security
dilemmas are the
products
of
presumed
un-
certainty.56hey are assumed
to be
commonplace
in
world
politics
because
states presumably
cannot
know,
with
sufficient
ertainty
r
confidence,
he
intentions f others.
But as
important
s the
security
dilemma
is
to
under-
standing
conflictual elations
among states,
we do
not
see
much
evidence
of
security ilemmas among many pairs
or
groups
of states:members f the same
alliance, members of the same economic institution, erhaps two peaceful
states
or
two neutralstates, nd so on.
In
the study
of world
politics,
uncer-
taintymightbe best treated
s a
variable,
not
a
constant.Constructivism an
provide
an
understanding
of
what happens
most of
the time in relations
between states, namely, nothing threatening t
all.
By providing meaning,
identities
educe uncertainty.57
States understand different tates differently.oviet and French nuclear
capabilities
had
differentmeanings
forBritish ecision makers. But of
course
certainty
s not
always
a source of
security. nowing
that another state
s an
aggressorresolves thesecurity ilemma,but only by replacing t withcertain
insecurity,n increased confidence hat the otherstate is
in
factthreatening.
As Richard
Ashley,bowing generously
to
Karl Deutsch, pointed out, politics
itself
s
impossible
n
the absence of a background
of
mutual understandings
and habitual
practices
that orients and limits
the mutual
comprehension
of
practices, he signification
f
social action. 58
onstructivism's
mpirical
mis-
sion
is to
surface the background
that
makes uncertainty variable to
understand,
ather han a constant o
assume.
NEOLIBERAL COOPERATION.
Neoliberalism offers compelling arguments
about how states can achieve cooperation among themselves. imple iterative
interaction
mong states,
ven when
they prefer
o
exploit
one
another,may
still ead to
cooperative
outcomes.
The
conditions
minimally ecessary
for uch
outcomes nclude
transparency
f
action, apacity
to
monitor
ny noncoopera-
tive behavior and punish the same
in
a predictablefashion, sufficiently
ow
discount
high appreciation)rate forfuture ains
from
herelationship,
nd an
expectation
hat the
relationship
will not end in the
foreseeablefuture.59
56. RobertJervis,
Cooperation
under the
SecurityDilemma,
World
olitics,
ol.
30,
No. 2
(March
1978), pp. 167-214.
57.
I
thankMaria Fanis forbringinghome tome the mportance f
thinking bout world politics
in this way.
58. Ashley, Three
Modes, p. 478;
see
also Ashley, The GeopoliticsofGeopoliticalSpace, p. 414.
59. Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy:
Hypotheses
and
Strategies,
n
Kenneth
A.
Oye, ed., Cooperation nderAnarchyPrinceton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversity ress, 1986),
pp. 1-24.
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The Promise f
Constructivism189
International
nstitutions, hether n the formof
regimes, aws, treaties,
r
organizations, help
provide these
necessary conditions for cooperation.
By
having rules about
what constitutes
violation of a relationship, nstitutions
help increase theconfidence feach
state that
t will
not be exploited and that
its
own cooperativemove will be
reciprocated.Byestablishing ormalmecha-
nisms
of
surveillance,
nstitutions nable states to see what
other states are
doing, again enhancing confidence hata defectionwill be seen and a coop-
erative action will
be followedby the same.
By creating ules and
procedures
for
surveillance and
sanction,
all
parties can
have greater confidence that
violations will be
punished. By formalizing hese
relationships, nstitutions
help reduce each
state's discount rate for futuregains
while increasingeach
state's expectation
hat
the relationshipwill
continue
nto
the future.60
Constructivism
haresneoliberalism's
onclusionthat ooperation s possible
under
anarchy,
but
offers very different ccount of how
that outcome
emerges.
Robert Keohane
presents
as the
heart
of
neoliberalismtwo funda-
mentalassumptions:there re potentially eneficial greements mong states
thathave not been
reached, and they
are
hard
to achieve.61
A
constructivist
approach
mightbegin by investigating ow
statesunderstand their nterests
within
particular
ssue
area. The distribution f dentities nd
interests f the
relevantstates would then
help
account for
whethercooperation s
possible.
The
assumption
of
exogenous interestss an
obstacle to developing a theory
of
cooperation.
Sitting
down to
negotiate tradeagreement
mong
friends
as opposed
to
adversaries or
unknowns)
affects
state's
willingness
to
lead
with
a
coopera-
tivemove. Perhaps twould no longerunderstand ts nterests s the unilateral
exploitation
f
the other
tate. nstead
it
might
ee
itself s
a
partner
n
pursuit
of some
value otherthan narrow
strategic
nterest.
n
Logicof
Collective
ction,
Mancur Olson bracketed host of situations
wherecooperationwas
relatively
easy,despite large
numbersof
players,
he
absence
of a
group large enough
to
provide
a
public good,
but
sufficiently
mall to avert coordination
problems
(a
k-group),
o
hegemonic eadership,
nd so on.
These were
situations
where
communities
f
identity
xisted such that
the
players
were
not in
a
noncoop-
erative
game
in
the
first
lace.
Too little
ttention
as
been
paid
to this
nsight.
60. The regimes literature s vast. For
an early foundational volume that includes
theoretical
specification,mpirical llustration,
nd
some self-critique,ee StephenD. Krasner, d., nternational
Regimes Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1983). Elaboration of the marketfailure ogic
is in
Robert
0.
Keohane, After egemonyPrinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1984).
61. Keohane, Internationalnstitutions,
. 386.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 190
A
constructivistccount of cooperationwould reconstruct
uch
intersubjective
communities
s a matter
f course.
When
a
neoliberal
writesof
difficulty
n
reaching
n
agreement,
he
usually
has one particular problem
in
mind:
uncertainty.Many
of the institutional
mechanismsdescribed
above are aimed at
reducinguncertainty mong
states:
provision of transparency; acilitation f iteration; nabling
of
decomposition;
and of course thedevelopmentofrules,monitoring apabilities, nd adjudica-
tion procedures.
A
constructivist ould agreethat hese are all very mportant,
but that a prior ssue must be raised: Is it not likelythat the level of certainty
is
a variable associated
with
dentity nd practice, nd that, eterisparibus,the
less certainty ne has, the more institutional evices are necessaryto produce
cooperation,
he
harderthat ooperation
will
be
to
achieve,and the more ikely
it will be to
break
down?
Neoliberalism
has concluded that n
important art
of
ensuring ompliance
with
agreements s thedevelopment
of
reputations
or
reliability.62ne of the
mostimportant omponentsofdiscursivepower is thecapacityto reproduce
order and predictability
n
understandings nd expectations.
n
thisrespect,
identities re a
congealed reputation,
hat
s,
the
closest
one can
get
in
social
life to being able
to
confidently xpect the same actionsfrom nother actor
time
after ime. Identities ubsume reputation;being a particular dentity s
sufficient o
provide necessary diagnostic
information bout a
state's
likely
actions
with
respect
to other states
n
particular
domains.63
On the other
side
of
the life
cycle,
neoliberals
argue
that institutions
ie
when membersno
longer
have incentives o maintain
hem. 64
ut
one of the
moreenduringpuzzles forneoliberals swhy these nstitutionsersistpast the
62.
On
the
critical mportance
f
a
theory
f
reputation
o
account for conomic transactions, uch
as
contracts,
ee David M.
Kreps, Corporate
Culture
and
Economic
Theory,
n
James
E. Alt
and
Kenneth A.
Shepsle, eds., Perspectives
n Positive olitical
Economy Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge
University ress, 1990), pp.
90-143. Formal
game-theoretic
ork on
reputation onsistently hows
that t should matter, nd it does, but
only when assumed to do so. Empiricalwork ninternational
relationshas shown thatreputations o
not work as hypothesizedby most nternationalelations
theory. ee JonathanMercer,Reputationnd
Internationalolitics Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Peripheral isions: eterrence heory nd American oreign olicy n the
Third
World,
965-1990
Ann
Arbor:
University
f
Michigan Press, 1994);
Richard Ned
Lebow,
Between
Peace and War: The Natureof
nternational risis Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins University ress,
1981); and Jervis, ogicof mages n International elations.
63.
For a
recognition
hat
shared focal
points, a
la Thomas
Schelling,
have much in common
with intersubjective eality nd its
capacity to promote cooperative solutions to iterative
games,
see Geoffrey arrett nd BarryR.
Weingast, Ideas, Interests, nd Institutions: onstructing he
European Community's nternalMarket, in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign
Policy,
pp. 173-206.
64.
Keohane, International nstitutions,
.
387.
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ThePromise
fConstructivism
I
191
point
that
great powers
have an
apparent
interest
n
sustaining them.
Their
answers
nclude
lags
caused
by domestic
political
resistance
o
adjustment, he
stickiness
f
institutional
rrangements,
nd
the transaction
osts entailed in
the
renegotiation f agreements
nd
the establishment f a
new order.65
n
alternative
onstructivistypothesiswould
be that
f
the identities
being re-
produced
by the social practices
onstituting
hat
nstitution ave gone
beyond
the strategicgame-playingself-regarding nits posited by neoliberals,and
have
developed an
understanding f each
other s partners n some
common
enterprise,
hen the nstitution
ill
persist, ven
if
apparentunderlying
ower
and
interestshave shifted.66 uncan
Snidal,
in
his
formalrepresentation f
what
is most
ikely ohappen as
a
hegemonfalters,ncludes as
an
untheorized
variable
interest
n
the regime, with the
obvious positive
relationshipbe-
tween interest
n
the
regime
and
willingness
to
expend
resourcesto maintain
it
afterhegemonic decline.67
Constructivist
esearch,through
exploring the
nature
of
the norms,practices,
nd
identities onstituting
membership
n
some
institution,an provide some measurablesubstantive ontent or hatvariable.
Although constructivists
nd
neoliberals agree
that
anarchy
does not
pre-
clude
cooperation among states,how
they
understand
the
emergence
and
reproduction f such cooperation
yields very differentccounts and
research
agendas.
THE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE. The
observation that
democratic states have not
fought
each other is an
empiricalregularity
n
search of
a
theory.
Neither
structural or normative
ccounts fare
very
well.68 he former
equires
ssum-
ing
a
consistently
ellicose executive
being
constrained
y
a
pacificpublic
and
itsduly-elected epresentativenstitutions-butonlywhen democratic dver-
65. On lags and stickiness, ee Stephen D. Krasner, tate Power and the Structure f nternational
Trade, World olitics, ol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-343. On transaction osts, see Keohane,
After egemony.
66.
Another onstructivist ypothesis ffers tselfhere: nstitutionalized ooperationwill be more
likely
to endure to the extent hatthe
dentities f
the
membersof
that
nstitution re understood
as common and they are reproduced by a thick array of social practices. This is meant as a
continuum,
with narrow self-interest
eing arrayed
t one end of the
spectrum,
eoliberal nstitu-
tionalization f self-interestedooperation n the middle, community f dentity oward the other
end, and harmony t the otherpole.
67. Duncan Snidal, The LimitsofHegemonic Stability heory, nternationalrganization,ol.39,
No. 4 (Autumn 1985), esp. pp. 610-611.
68.
For
a
comprehensivereview of the most recent iterature n the democraticpeace, and an
empirical
test that
shows
that
satisfaction
with
the status quo (a variable subject to constructivist
interpretation)s the single most important actor ffecting he use of force, y democracies and
authoritarian tates alike, see
David L.
Rousseau, ChristopherGelpi,
and
Dan Reiter, Assessing
the Dyadic Nature
of
the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988,
American
olitical cienceReview, ol. 90,
No. 3
(September1996), p.
527.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 192
saries
are about. The latterhas more
promise,
but
its
naturalization f certain
aspects
of
liberalism-the market,
nonviolent resolution of
differences,
he
franchise, he
First
Amendment-and
its crucial
assumption
that these norms
actually matter o decision makers
n
democratic tates
when
making choices
about
war and
peace
with
other
democracies,
are
untenable
and
untested,
respectively.
Constructivism s perfectlyuited to the task oftesting nd fundamentally
revisingthe democraticpeace.69 ts approach
aims at
apprehending how the
social
practices
nd norms of states construct he dentities nd
interests
f the
same.
Ergo,
f
democracies
do not
fight
ach
other,
hen t
must be
because
of
the way they understand
each
other,
heir
ntersubjective ccounts of each
other,
nd the socio-international
ractices
that
accompany
those accounts.70
But
constructivism ould offer more general account of zones of peace, one
not imited
o
democracies.Different eriods of the histories
f
both Africa
nd
Latin America have been marked by long stretches f little or no warfare
between states. These pacific periods are obviously not associated with any
objective indicators
of
democracy.By investigating
ow African nd Latin
American states constructed hemselves
and
others,
t
might
be
possible
to
understand these neglected zones of authoritarian eace.
Constructivistuzzles
Constructivism ffers
n
account of the
politics
of
dentity.71
t
proposes
a
way
of
understanding
how
nationalism, thnicity,ace, gender,religion,
nd
sexu-
ality, nd other ntersubjectivelynderstoodcommunties, re each involved n
an account of
global politics. Understanding
how identities re
constructed,
what
norms
and
practices ccompany
their
reproduction,
nd how
they
con-
struct ach other s a
major part
of
the constructivist esearch
program.
69. For a very well developed researchdesign to
test constructivist ersus mainstream ccounts
of the democratic eace, see Colin Kahl,
Constructing Separate Peace: Constructivism, ollective
Liberal Identity, nd the Democratic Peace, Security tudies forthcoming).
70. For accounts of the
democraticpeace
that
focus on its contextual ntersubjective haracters,
see Ido Oren, The Subjectivity f the Democratic' Peace: ChangingU.S. Perceptions f Imperial
Germany, nternationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 2
(Fall 1995), pp. 147-184; Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Cooperation mong Democracies, . 30; and Risse-Kappen, Collective Identity n a Democratic
Community, p.
366-367.
71.
I
do not try o compilea comprehensive et of
questions for onstructivists,ut nstead merely
elaborategeneralthemes
for
research, hemes that
do
not have a
prominent lace
in
mainstream
international elations heory.
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ThePromise f
Constructivism193
Althoughnationalism
and
ethnicity re receivingmore
attention
n main-
stream nternational
elations
heory,
ttention
o
gender, exuality,
ace,
and
religionhave
received much
less,
and
certainly one of
them s part of
either
neorealist or
neoliberal accounts of how the
world
works.72Constructivism
promises to deal
with these issues, not
merely because they are
topical or
heretofore
ndervalued,but because as
varietiesof dentity,hey re
central o
how constructivismeneratesunderstandings f social phenomena. Construc-
tivism
assumes,
a
priori,
hat
dentities re
potentially art
of
the
constitutive
practicesof the
state,
nd
so, productiveof
its actions at home and
abroad.73
One
of the most
mportant y-products f this
concernwith dentity
olitics
is the returnof
differencesmong states.The
same state is,
in
effect,many
different
ctors
n
worldpolitics, nd different
tatesbehave
differentlyoward
otherstates,based on the
identities
of each. If
true,
then we
should
expect
different
atterns
f
behavior across
groups
of
states
with
differentdentities
and
interests.74
lthough
t is
tempting
o
assert that
similarity
reeds
coop-
eration, t is impossibleto make such an a prioriclaim. Identitieshave much
more
meaning
for
each state than a mere label.
Identitiesoffer
ach state
an
understanding
f other
states, ts
nature,
motives, nterests, robable
actions,
attitudes,
nd
role
in
any given
political
context.
Understanding
nother tate as
one
identity,
ather han
another,
as conse-
quences
for the
possible
actions
of
both. For
example,
Michael Barnetthas
speculated
that the
failure of deterrence
gainst Iraq
in
Kuwait
in
1990 is
because Saudi Arabia
was seen as
an
Arab,
rather han a
sovereign,
tate.
Iraq's
understanding
of
Saudi Arabia as an Arab state
implied
that
Riyadh
would never allow U.S. forces o deploy on Arab territory.f, nstead, raq had
72. For a critical iew of neorealism'sbelated
efforts o capture nationalism, ee Yosef Lapid
and
Friedrich
Kratochwil, Revisitingthe
National': Toward an IdentityAgenda in Neorealism?, n
Lapid
and
Kratochwil,
The Return
f Culture nd
Identity, p. 105-126. For
a most imaginative
criticalconstructivist
reatment f nationalism, ee Daniel Deudney, Ground
Identity:Nature,
Place, and
Space
in
Nationalism,
n
ibid., pp.
129-145; see also Roxanne LynnDoty, Sovereignty
and the
Nation: Constructing he Boundaries of National Identity, n
Thomas J. Biersteker
nd
Cynthia
Weber, ds.,
State
Sovereignty
s Social Construct
Cambridge,
U.K.:
Cambridge University
Press, 1996) pp.
121-147.
73. For
example,J.Ann Tickner bserves that
ontemporary
masculinized
Western nderstandings
of
themselves ead to feminizedportrayals f the South as emotionaland
unpredictable. ickner,
Identityn International elations Theory:FeministPerspectives, n Lapid and Kratochwil,The
ReturnfCulturend dentity,p. 147-162.
74.
Forexample,Risse-Kappen, Collective
dentity
n
a
DemocraticCommunity, inds common
identity
within he NorthAtlanticTreaty
Organization; ee also Iver
B.
Neumann and Jennifer .
Welsh, The Other in
European
self-definition,
eview
of
nternational
tudies,
Vol.
17, No.
4
(October
1991), pp. 327-348, for an explorationof Christian and
European states versus
Islamic Asiatic
Turkey.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 194
understoodSaudi Arabia as
a
sovereign tate,
n a
realistworld, t would have
perhaps expected Saudi balancing against Iraqi actions
in
Kuwait, including
U.S. military ntervention,
nd
would have been deterred.75
n
other
words,
neorealistpredictions
f
balancing behavior, uch as
that
of
Saudi
Arabia, rely
on a single particular dentity eing
ascribed to that
countryby Iraq.
But
if
alternative dentities re possible, as constructivismuggests,the neorealist
world is smaller thanalleged.
Or another tatemaynot be seen as another state
at
all,
but instead as an
ally, friend, nemy, co-guarantor, hreat, democracy,
nd
so on.76 Finally,
constructivism's xpectationofmultiple dentities or actors
n
world politics
rests on
an
openness to local historical ontext.This receptivity o identities
being generatedand reproduced empirically, ather
han
resting n pregiven
assumptions, opens up
the
study
of world
politics
to
different
nits alto-
gether.77 ypothesizing
differences
mong
states
llows formovement
beyond
the typical binary characterizations
f
mainstream internationalrelations:
democratic-nondemocratic,reat power-non-greatpower, North-South, nd
so forth.While
these
common axes of
analysis
are
certainly elevant,
onstruc-
tivism promises to explain many other meaningful ommunities
of
identity
throughout
world
politics.
A
thirdconstructivist
romise
is to return ulture
and
domestic
politics
to
international
elations
heory.
o
the
extent
hat
constructivisms
ontologically
agnostic-that is,
it
does
not
include
or exclude
any particular
variables
as
meaningful-it
envisions no
disciplinary
divides
between international
ela-
tions
and
comparative
ubfields
or any
fields
for hat
matter).
Constructivism
has no inherent ocus on second image accounts of world politics. n fact,
an
appropriate
criticism
would
be
that it
has remained
far
too
long
at
the
systemic
evel
of
analysis.78 evertheless,
onstructivism
rovides
a
promising
75. Michael N. Barnett, Institutions, oles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab StatesSystem,
InternationaltudiesQuarterly, ol. 37, No. 3 (September1993), pp. 271-296.
76. See Risse-Kappen, Collective dentity
n
a DemocraticCommunity,
nd
Michael N. Barnett,
Sovereignty,Nationalism,
and
Regional Order
in
the
Arab
System,
nternational
rganization,
Vol.
49,
No.
3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479-510, forexamples.
77.
Yale Fergusonand Richard Mansbach, forexample,offer rich variety f polities, such as
city-states, ivilizations,polis, empires, kingdoms, caliphates, each
of which had
and,
in
some
cases, has and will have, meaningful dentities n world politics. Fergusonand Mansbach, Past
as
Prelude, pp. 22-28,
and
Sujata Chakrabarti asic, Culturing nternational elations Theory,
both in Lapid and Kratochwil,
The
Return f Culture nd Identity, p. 85-104.
78. Keohane, in International nstitutions, . 392, has made this observation bout reflectivist
scholarship.. or similar aments, ee Dessler, What's At Stake, p. 471;
and
Barnett, Institutions,
Roles, and Disorder, p. 276. Alexander Wendt acknowledges he has systematically racketed
domestic factors n Wendt, Anarchy s What States Make of It, p. 423.
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The Promise
f
Constructivism
195
approach for
uncoveringthose features fdomestic society, ulture, nd poli-
tics
that
hould matter
o
state
dentity
nd
state
action n
global politics.There
are many
different ays in which
a
constructivistccountcan operate at the
domestic evel.
I
mentiononly several here.
Any state identity n world politics is
partly the product of the social
practices
hat
constitute hat
dentity
t home.79
n
this way, dentity olitics
t
home constrain nd enable state dentity,nterests,nd actions abroad. Ashis
Nandy
has
written
bout
the close connectionbetween VictorianBritish
gen-
erational nd
gender
dentities t
home
and the colonization
of ndia. Victorian
Britain rew a
very trict ine between the sexes
and
also between generations,
differentiatinghe
latter nto young and old, productive and unproductive,
respectively. ritish olonial dominance was understood
as masculine
n
rela-
tionship
to Indian's feminine
ubmission,
nd Indian
culturewas understood
as infantile
nd
archaic.
n
these ways
Victorian
nderstandings f tselfmade
India comprehensible o Britain n a
particularway.80Whereas conventional
accounts of colonialismand imperialism elyon disparities nrelativematerial
power
to
explain
relations
of
domination
and
subordination, onstructivists
would
add that
no account of such hierarchical
utcomes
s
completewithout
exploring
how
imperial
identities are constructedboth at home and with
respect o the
subordinatedOther broad.81 ven ifmaterialpower is necessary
to produce
imperialism,
ts
reproduction
annot be
understood without nves-
tigatingthe social
practices
that
accompanied
it and
the discursive power,
especially
n
the form f
related
dentities, hey
wielded.
Within the
state
itself
might
exist areas
of cultural
practice, sufficiently
empoweredthroughnstitutionalizationnd authorization, o exert constitu-
tive or causative
influence on state policy.82 he state's assumed need to
construct
national
dentity
t
home to
legitimize
he
state'sextractive uthor-
ity
has effects n state
dentity
broad.
A
more critical onstructivistccount
79.
Two works
that
make the connection etween domestic dentity
onstruction
t
home
and
state
identity re Audie Klotz,
Norms n internationalelations: he
truggle gainst partheidIthaca,
N.Y.:
Cornell UniversityPress, 1995); and Peter
J.
Katzenstein,CulturalNorms
and
National
Security
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1996).
80.
Inayatullah
nd
Blaney, Knowing Encounters, p.
76-80.
81. Compare this,forexample,to RichardCottam'svery nterestingccount of imperialBritish
images of Egypt. The critical difference s that Cottam does not see
British constructions f
themselvesor their ociety'sparts as relevant o an understanding fBritish mages of Egyptians.
Richard Cottam,Foreign olicyMotivation: General heory nd Case Study
Pittsburgh: niversity
of
Pittsburgh ress, 1977).
82. One
might ay
this
about the Frenchmilitary etween World Wars and
II.
See Kier, Culture
and
FrenchMilitaryDoctrinebeforeWorld War II.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 |
196
mightbegin by positing
the state's
need
for
an Other
n
world
politics,
o as
to justifyts own
rule at home.83
A
last promise
of
constructivism
oncerns
not
so
much
research ssues
as
research strategy. onstructivism
ffers heterogamous
research
approach:
that s, t readilycombines
with differentields nd disciplines.Constructivism
itself s the product
of
structural
inguistics, ostmodernpoliticaltheory,
riti-
cal theory,ultural nd media studies, iterary riticism, nd no doubt others.
Far from laimingprimacy s a theory f nternational olitics,
onstructivism
lends itself ocollaborationwithother pproaches,
both within
political cience
and outside. Literatures
n
decision making,politicalculture,
ocialization,
nd
experimental ognitive
nd social
psychology
would seem to be
most
promis-
ing partners.
CONSTRUCTIVIST PROBLEMS
A
constructivistesearchprogram,
ike all others,has unexplainedanomalies,
but their xistenceneed notnecessitate he donningofprotective elts of any
sort.Conventional
constructivism as one
large problem
thathas several
parts.
FriedrichKratochwilhas observed
thatno
theory
f
culture
an substitute or
a
theory
of
politics.84
aul
Kowert and
Jeffreyegro
have
pointed
out
that
there s no causal theory f dentity
onstruction ffered y anyof the authors
in the
Katzensteinvolume.85
Both
criticisms
re as accurate as they re differ-
ent,
and
imply
different
emedies.
Kratochwil's statementreinforces he point
that
constructivism
s
an
ap-
proach, not a theory.
And if it is a theory, t is a theoryof process,
not
sub-
stantiveoutcome. In order to achieve the latter, onstructivismmust adopt
some
theory
f
politics
to
make it work. Critical
theory
s farmore advanced
in this
regard
than conventional
onstructivism,
ut it
comes
at a
price, price
that
one
may
or
may
not be willing
to
pay,depending
on
empirical, heoretical,
and/or aesthetic nterests.
have described how
differently
ritical nd
con-
ventional constructivism
reat he
origins
of
dentity
nd the nature
of
power.
83. This is done by
David
Campbell, Writing ecurity:
nited tates
Foreign olicy
nd the
Politics
ofdentityMinneapolis: University f Minnesota Press, 1992)
and JimGeorge,Discourses fGlobal
Politics:A Critical Re)Introductiono nternational elations Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 994).
84. Kratochwil, Is the Ship of Culture at
Sea or
Returning? .
206.
85. Paul Kowert and Jeffreyegro, Norms, dentity, nd TheirLimits:
A
TheoreticalReprise,
n
Katzenstein, he Culture fNational ecurity, . 469. For other ritical
eviews of constructivismnd
world politics, ee Jeffrey
.
Checkel,
The
Constructivist
urn n International elationsTheory,
World olitics, ol. 50, No. 2 (January 998), pp. 324-348, and Emanuel
Adler, Seizing the Middle
Ground: Constructivismn World Politics, European ournalfnternational elations, ol. 3, No. 3
(1997), pp. 319-363.
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The Promise fConstructivism197
It is here thatcritical heory
inds ts animating heory f politics.By
assuming
that the identitiesof the Self and Other are inextricably ound up in a rela-
tionship of power, and that the state is a dominating instrument, ritical
theorists an offer heoreticallynformed ccounts of the politicsof dentity: t
least along the dimensions specified, hatof hierarchy,ubordination, omina-
tion,emancipation, nd state-society truggle.
The price paid for such theories of politics,however, s an ironic one that
naturalizes certain realities, privileging ocial relations of dominance and
hierarchy. f course, critical heory sserts ts ultimateopenness to variation
and change,but the point here is that ts theoryof politics, priori, s more
closed than thatof ts conventional ersion,whichstands accused oftheoretical
underspecification. he problem of underspecification xists because conven-
tional constructivism,s a theory f process,does not specify he existence, et
alone the precise nature or value,
of
its main causal/constitutive lements:
identities, orms,practices, nd social structures.nstead, constructivismpe-
cifies how these elements are theoretically ituated vis-a-vis each other,pro-
viding an understanding of a process and an outcome, but no a priori
predictionper se. The advantages of such
an
approach are in the nonpareil
richness of its elaboration of causal/constitutivemechanisms in any given
social context nd its
openness (and
not
ust
in
the last
instance,
s
in critical
theory) o the discoveryof other ubstantive heoretical
lements t work. The
cost here, however, s the absence of
a
causal theory
f
identity.
The dilemma s thatthe more conventional onstructivismmoves
to furnish
such
a
causal
theory,
he more
it
loses the
possibility
of
maintaining
the
ontological openness that ts nterpretivist ethodsafford. utthe dilemma is
a
continuum,
ot a
binaryopposition.
Conventionalconstructivistsan
and do
specifytheir theoreticalelements
in advance in
practice. Just
to take
one
example,
not a
single
author n the Katzensteinvolume assessed
gender, lass,
or race
in
any
of their
nalyses.
This observation
not criticism)
s intended
to
underline how conventional onstructivists
lready
bound
their
priori
theo-
retical domains
according
to
empirical
nterest
nd theoretical
priors.
More-
over,
conventionalconstructivists
an make
predictions,
f
they
choose. Their
onlyconstraints just
how durable
they
believe
the
social
structures
o
be
that
theyhave demonstrated re constraining hereproduction f dentities,nter-
ests,
norms,
and
practices,
n
some social context.
For
example,
when Risse-
Kappen argues
that North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)
members
regard
each other s liberal
allies,
rather
han
as realist tates
balancing against
a
threat,
e is
making
a
prediction:
fNATO
members ee
each other s liberal
allies,
NATO will
persistbeyond the point
where the threat
disappears.
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Internationalecurity 3:1 | 198
One obstacle
to the
development
of
a
causal model
of
identity
s conven-
tional constructivism'silence on the issue of intentionality.ritical theorists
confidently eclare their ndifferenceo the issue: establishing ausality s
an
illusory goal. Kowert
and
Legro point out
the failure of
any
author
in
the
Katzensteinvolume to establishmore than
a
correlative elationship etween
an identity
nd an
outcome.
In
fact, he authors do
far
more
than
that:they
control for alternative xplanations and theyshow the connectionbetween
norms and interests nd outcomes. But what is missing s the decision based
on the dentity. ere again, constructivist eterogamy llows for n attempted
fix.
The answer may lie
in
trying
o
marry onstructivistrocess to psychologi-
cal process.Kowert and Legro discuss the possibility n termsofthe experi-
mental social
psychological
work
of
Marilyn
Brewer
nd
Jonathan
urner.86o
the extent
t
s possible to establisha causal link between a particular dentity,
such as
Japanese antimilitarism,
nd an
interest
n
opposing Japanesemilitary
expenditures or between belief
n a
norm, uch as
humanitarian
ntervention-
ism,and an actionto fulfill hatnorm), tmightbe attainable hrough ngoing
work
on the
connectionbetween identity
nd
behavior
n
social psychology.
The last problem
with
constructivisms really not so much a problem as
it
is an
advantage. Constructivism'sheory fprocessand commitment o inter-
pretivist
hick
descriptionplace extraordinary
emands
on the researcher
o
gather
mountains of elaborate
empirical
data.
To reconstruct he
operation
of
identitypolitics,
even
in a limited domain for a
short
period, requires
thou-
sands of
pages
of
reading,
monthsof interviews
nd archival
research,
nd a
host
of ess
conventional ctivities, uch as ridingpublic transportation,
tand-
ing in lines,and goingto bars and caf6s to participate n local practices. The
latterneed not be so
onerous.) The point here
is that
the evidence necessary
to develop
an
understanding f, ay, national dentity,ts relation
o
domestic
identities, he practices hat constitute oth, mplied
interests f
each,
and
the
overall social structure s
necessarily vast
and varied. Constructivism s no
shortcut.
The
Constructivistromise
The assumptions thatunderlay constructivismccount for ts different nder-
standing
of world
politics.
Since actors
and
structures
re
mutually
con-
structed,
tate behavior
in
the face of different
istributions
f
power
or
86.
Ibid.,
p. 479.
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ThePromise
fConstructivism
I
199
anarchy s unknowable absent
a reconstruction f the ntersubjectivemeaning
of these structures
nd actors.Since actors have multiple dentities, nd these
identities mply different
nterests, he a priori and exogenous attribution f
identical nterests o states
s invalid. Since power is both material nd discur-
sive, patterned ehaviorover
time hould be understood s a result f material
or economic power working
n
concert
with
deological
structures,ocial prac-
tices, nstitutionalized orms, nd intersubjective ebs of meaning. The great-
est
power
of all is thatwhich disciplinesactorstonaturally magine only those
actions
that
reproduce
the
underlying rrangements
f
power-material
and
discursive.Since constructivist
ocial structures re both
enduring and muta-
ble, change
in world
politics
s considered both
difficult nd
possible.
A
conventional onstructivist
ecasting f mainstream
nternational elations
puzzles is based on
the mplications f ts assumptions.Since what constitutes
a
threat
an never be stated as
an
a
priori,primordial
constant,
t should be
approached
as a
social construction f
an
Other,
nd theorized
at
that evel.
Since identities,norms,and social practices reduce uncertainty,he security
dilemma should not be
the starting oint for nalyzing
relations mong states.
Since states
are
already
situated
in
multiple
social contexts, ny
account of
(non)cooperation among them should begin by exploring
how their under-
standings
of
each
other
generate
heirrelevant nterests. ince communities
f
identity re expected to
exist,patternsof behaviorthat spur scholars to con-
sider a liberal
peace
should insteadprovokeus
to
consider
ones of
peace
more
generally.
A
conventional constructivist ccount
of
politics
operates
between main-
stream nternational elations nd critical heory. onventional constructivism
rejects he mainstream resumption
hat
world politics
s so homogenous
that
universally
valid
generalizations
an be expected
to
come
of
theorizing
bout
it. It
denies
the critical onstructivist
osition
that world politics s
so hetero-
geneous
thatwe should presume
to look for
onlythe unique
and
the differen-
tiating.Contrary
o
both
these
two
approaches,
conventional
constructivism
presumeswe should be looking
forcommunities fintersubjectivity
n
world
politics,domains
within
which
actors shareunderstandings
f themselves
nd
each
other,yielding predictable
and
replicable patterns
of action within
a
specific ontext.
Mainstream
nternational elations
theory
treats
world
politics
as an inte-
grated whole, undifferentiatedy either
time
or territory.
riticaltheoryre-
gards
world
politics
s an
array
of
fragments
hat an
never
add
up
to
a
whole,
and
regards
efforts
o
construct uch
a whole as
a
political
move
to
impose
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Internationalecurity3:1 | 200
some kind of
rationalistic,
aturalized order on
irrepressible
ifference. on-
ventional constructivism, n the other hand, regards the world as a compli-
cated and vast
array
of different
omains,
the
apprehension
of all of which
could never yield a fully oherentpictureof international olitics.The failure
to account for ny one of them,however,will guarantee a theoretically nsat-
isfying nderstanding f the world. In effect, he promise of constructivisms
to restorea kind of partial order and predictability o world politics that
derives not from
mposed homogeneity,
ut from n
appreciation f difference.
Corrections:
In Alexei G. Arbatov, MilitaryReform n Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and
Prospects, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998): p. 86 line 13 should read The quantity
of military ersonnel
..
must be sacrificed orhigher uality rms ; p. 90 line
17 should read Numerical Balance ; p. 92 line 3 should read reinforcement
advantages and interdictioncapabilities against Russian reinforcements ;
p. 106 line 10 should read has never been preprogrammed nto ; p. 109 line
11 should read to find ts force evels and structure n a priority asis ; p. 130
line 1 should read down to a level of 1.2 millionby 1999 ; and p. 130 line 25
should read are not carried out.
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