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Communication
Theory
Brant B. Bur l e son
Sally Planalp
Ten:
Two
Producing Emotion(a1) Messages Pages
221-250
Emotion is often a major part of the content of messages and is an important
influence on message production, but connections between emotion and mes-
sage-production processes have not received systematic attention until quite
recently. This article explores 3 ways in which emotion and message produc-
tion are connected: (a) Emotions and moods are important influences on cogni-
tive processes underlying message production; ( b ) emotion is expressed as the
content of messages; and ( c ) emotion knowledge is used t o manage the emo-
tional states of others.
Exploring how people communicate about emotion, under the influence
of emotion, and in efforts to manage emotion brings us face to face with
the mysteries and challenges of both communication and emotion re-
search. We must grapple with problems tha t long have plagued commu-
nication research: H o w can intentional and unintentional expressions
of emotion be reconciled? H o w d o emotional states influence communi-
cative behavior? H o w does communicative behavior influence emotional
states? We also have to wrestle with persistent problems in emotion re-
search: What constitutes a n emotion? What causes emotional reactions
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of certain types? H o w does emotion interact with cognition? It is inter-
esting terrain.
In this paper we address issues related to emotion and the production
of messages (for reviews of research examining emotion and message
reception, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
We will be concerned primarily with three major ways that emotion and
message-production processes are connected.' First, affective states (both
emotions and moods) influence how people produce messages (wha t we
might call emotional messages). Second, emotion can be expressed as
the content of message-production processes (wha t we might call mes-
sages of emotion. Third, one person's emotions are often the targets of
messages produced by others, such a s when people try to comfort, in-
spire, o r intimidate each other (wha t we might call emotion-focused
messages). Given the space available t o us, o u r survey of these issues
will necessarily produce more of a sketch than a comprehensive map.
Copyright 0 2000 International Communication Association
221 Communication
Theory
Our hope is that this initial guide will prompt much more detailed ex-
plorations in the future.
Emotion as an Influence on
Message-Production Processes
Our first question is this: How does affect influence message-production
processes? Tha t is, how d o affective states (e.g., anxiety, anger, happi-
ness) influence various cognitive operations that are commonly believed
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to figure in message production?
Models of Message Production and
Affective Experience
Affect and message production are complex, multifaceted phenomena.
Hence, exploring how affect influences message production requires
detailed models of both the nature of affect and the cognitive processes
underlying message production, as well a s an appreciation that different
aspects of affect may influence distinct elements of message production.
The Message-Production Process. Quite sophisticated cognitive
models of message production have been developed in recent years (see
Burleson, 1995; Greene, 1997b; Hewes, 1995; along with the articles in
this issue of Communication Theory). Although the models presented
by particular theorists differ in important ways, most of them propose
similar outlines of the processes assumed t o figure in message produc-
tion. Abstracting across these models, it appears that message produc-
tion involves the processes of ( a ) interpretation (e.g., defining the situa-
tion; making attributions about the causes of others actions; inferring
others internal states; noting relevant aspects of the setting; determin -
ing situationally relevant roles and rules), which gives rise t o ( b ) goal
generation (forming intentions pertaining to primary and secondary in-
strumental objectives; forming intentions pertaining to relational and
identity objectives), which serves as the impetus to (c) planning or ac-
tion assembly (building behavioral programs or cognitive representa -
tions of action lines), which eventuates in ( d ) enactment (executing be-
havioral plans or output representations), which is followed by (e) moni-
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toring (observing and evaluating the outcomes of ones behavior -a di-
rected form of interpretation), the results of which may lead to ( f )
reencoding (recycling processes b through e i n light of monitored
outcomes).
Emotion and Mood. Models of affect frequently begin by distin-
guishing between two primary forms of affective experience, mood and
emotion (see Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; Frijda, 1993). As forms of
affect, both emotion and mood are feelings that have some valence (typi-
cally on a good-bad or positive-negative continuum) and some level of
222 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
intensity (mild to strong). There are, however, important differences in
these two forms of affect. Emotions typically have some definite or spe-
cific object (they are provoked by some particular circumstance), ex-
hibit a relatively brief duration (in most cases lasting only a few mo-
ments), and are comparatively intense. Moods, in contrast, are more
global and diffuse in character, tend to be less intense states than emo-
tions, are comparatively enduring (often lasting for many minutes, even
hours), and usually are not tied to any particular provoking incident.
Thus, moods tend to be background states of which people may be
only vaguely aware. Moods generally have few direct motivational con-
sequences and typically influence behavior (when they do) through subtle
effects on perception, memory, information integration, and other forms
of information processing (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995a).
In contrast, a central element of an emotion is the arousal of distinct
motivational and behavioral orientations. These orientations are most
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widely referred to as action tendencies; the concept of action tendency
figures prominently in the analysis of emotions offered by a diverse ar-
ray of theorists (e.g., Averill, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;
Parkinson, 1995). Action tendencies are biologically based behavioral
responses that have the function of helping people cope adaptively with
emotion-arousing events. Associated with each action tendency is a dis-
tinctive set of cognitive appraisals or interpretations, a characteristic
subjective feeling state (affect), and a pattern of physiological arousal or
activity. For example, the action tendency for anger is to attack the of-
fending party; for fear, the action tendency is avoidance or escape (see
Lazarus, 1991; C. Smith & Pope, 1992). Action tendencies are not
hardwired reflexes or automatically executed programs; these tenden-
cies may be (and often are) suppressed, ignored, or transformed. But
regardless of whether they are exhibited or suppressed, action tenden-
cies provide a behavioral orientation toward the emotion-arousing event.
Emotion and Message Production
Effects of Emotion on Communicative Goals. One way in which
emotional experiences may influence message production is through the
goal generation process. Message-production researchers have given in-
creased attention to goal generation in recent years, but even sophisti-
cated models of this process have not explicated the potential influence
of emotions on interaction goals (see Wilson, 1997). We believe the con-
cept of action tendency provides a vehicle for linking emotion and the
generation of communicative goals.
The action tendencies associated with particular emotions provide
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only abstract behavioral orientations to emotion-arousing situations.
Thus, these emotion-based tendencies must exert behavioral consequences
through their influence on specific, contextually relevant goals. In gen-
2 2 3 Communication
Theory
eral, then, (a) interpretation or appraisal of a situation generates a certain
emotional state, along with, of course, a variety of cognitions, (b) the emo-
tional state carries with it an action tendency or abstract behavioral goal
that, in turn, (c) informs, in conjunction with other factors, the generation
of specific communicative goals relevant to that particular situation.
A general scheme like this has been developed by Weiner (1985,1995)
in his attribution-emotion-action model of behavior. Consistent with
appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), Weiner and his col-
leagues argue that ( a ) information in a situation leads a perceiver to
attribute a targets conduct (e.g., missing class) to certain causes (e.g.,
misfortune vs. laziness), ( b ) these attributions arouse complementary
emotional states (e.g., sympathy vs. irritation) that, in turn, ( c ) modu-
late the likelihood of specific behavioral reactions (e.g., loaning vs. with-
holding ones class notes). Weiner and his colleagues (see Weiner, 1 9 9 5 )
report considerable empirical support for this model in predicting gen-
eral behavioral orientations (e.g., the self-reported likelihood of helping
or not helping in certain situations). Bradbury and Fincham (1992) ap-
plied a similar model to the context of marital interaction. These re-
searchers found, consistent with Weiners framework, tha t distinct attri -
butions for the causes of a spouses behavior were associated with spe -
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cific emotional reactions, and these emotions, in turn, were associated
with particular behaviors toward the spouse. Although interesting, this
research did not examine just how attributions and emotions resulted in
characteristic forms of behavior and, in particular, did not examine the
connection between emotional states and interaction goals.
MacGe orge ( 1999b) recently elaborated and extended Weiners frame -
work to examine explicitly the likelihood of pursuing varied communi-
cative goals in situations where the provision of social support was con-
textually relevant. Specifically, MacGeorge found that when situational
information led participants to feel sympathetic rather than irritated to-
ward a target experiencing emotional distress (manipulated by making
the target appear more or less responsible for a problematic event), they
indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing communicative goals such as
making the target feel better, feel understood, and feel sympathized with.
When participants were led to feel more irritated toward the target, they
indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing critical and recriminative goals
such as getting the target t o recognize his or her responsibility for the
situation, getting the target to see tha t he or she needed t o behave more
responsibly in the future, and getting the target to realize that his or her
behavior had negative consequences. Importantly, MacGeorge was able
t o show (through path-analytic procedures) that perceiver attributions
affected communicative goals largely through the mediation of emo-
tional reactions.
224 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages
Although MacGeorges (1999b) results provide support for the no -
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tion tha t attributions influence interaction goals through emotions, they
leave unresolved many important questions about the precise ways in
which emotions combine with other elements of a communicative situa-
tion in the generation of interaction goals. As just one example, the inti-
macy level between interactants has been found to influence a wide range
of cognitions and behaviors. In particular, research suggests tha t infor-
mation indicating a target is responsible for his or her distressed state is
more likely to reduce help extended to low intimates (e.g., acquaintan-
ces) than high intimates (e.g., friends; see Weiner, 1995). Though not
terribly surprising, this finding raises several interesting questions about
how people generate interaction goals and the role of emotion in this
process. For example, does intimacy affect interaction goals in support
contexts by biasing attributions, and thereby influencing emotions (e.g.,
is the friend seen as less responsible than the acquaintance, with this
attribution generating more sympathy and less irritation)? Does inti-
macy affect interaction goals not so much through biasing attributions
but by influencing emotional reactions (e.g., does ones affection for in -
timates lead to more benign and sympathetic feelings for a friend than
for an acquaintance, regardless of the attributions made ) ? Does inti-
macy affect interaction goals primarily through relational rules that, for
example, dictate supportive behavior toward friends when they are in
need, n o matter what one may think or feel about the causes of this
n e e d ? The s e que s t ions , whi ch a r e cur r ent ly being addr e s s ed by
MacGeorge (1999a), illustrate some of the complex factors tha t may
both influence emotion and be influenced by emotion, in the process of
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generating interaction goals.
Although some research indicates that features of social situations
may arouse emotions tha t influence communicative goals, other research
suggests that personality traits may influence how situations are inter-
preted, the extent to which emotions are aroused by these interpreta-
tions, and the goals pursued in these situations. For example, people
differ in their empathic orientation, here viewed as the dispositional ten-
dency t o feel sympathetic concern on the part of distressed others. Re-
search has found what appear to be causal linkages between emotional
empathy ( t h e dispositional tendency to experience sympathetic con-
cern for distressed othe r s ) a n d generation of supportive communica-
tion goals in samples of both children (e.g., Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon,
Troyer, & Switzer, 1 9 9 4 ) a n d adul t s (e.g., Tamborini, Salomonson,
& Bahk, 1993; Trobst, Collins, & Embree, 1 9 9 4 ) . These findings
suggest t h a t othe r personality t r a i t s may be associated wi th distinct
emotional experiences (see Frijda, 1 9 9 3 ) tha t , in turn, generate char-
acteristic goals.
225 Communication
Theory
Viewing personality traits as influencing communicative goals through
the emotions these traits characteristically arouse addresses some of the
objections that have been raised to personality-based explanations of
message behavior (e.g., Hewes & Planalp, 1987). However, it remains
unclear whether personality traits affect interaction goals through their
influence on the interpretive process, the emotions aroused by particular
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interpretations, the goals activated by particular emotions, or some com-
bination of these. Moreover, it is quite possible that different traits af-
fect interaction goals through different mechanisms.
More broadly, there is much that we do not understand yet about
how emotions influence communicative goals; several specific issues merit
detailed investigation. First, just how does a global action tendency get
instantiated in context-specific communicative intentions? What are the
various processes through which the emotions manifest themselves in
communicative intentions? Do emotions make memories of particular
communicative goals especially salient, o r d o they exert their effects on
specific intentions through other mechanisms?
Second, to what extent are communicative goals determined by emo-
tions and their accompanying action tendencies? Many other features of
the person and situation also influence interaction goals (e.g., role con-
siderations, politeness norms, relational rules, other situational demands,
and priorities). H o w are all of these elements-in conjunction with
aroused emotional states-synthesized in the goal formation process?
Third, emotional states influence communicative goals in some situa-
tions more than others. People sometimes swallow their feelings, other
times give their feelings play, and still other times get carried away
by their feelings. How are these facts t o be explained? What are the
processes that inhibit, allow, and magnify the motivational potentials
associated with a n emotions action tendency in the process of forming
communicative goals? Concepts like display rule account for confor-
mity to social norms in the expression of emotion (see below), but d o
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not directly address the differential effect that emotions have on com-
municative goals in different situations. Clearly, additional research is
needed on a great many issues concerning the influence of emotions on
communicative goals.
Effects of Emotion on Message Planning and Enactment. The
goal generation process is certainly not the only component of message
production influenced by emotional experiences. There is considerable
evidence tha t both the planning (action assembly) process and enact-
ment (execution) process are influenced by emotions, sometimes strongly
so. Although there are suggestions tha t emotions may facilitate these
processes (perhaps through focusing attention and other cognitive re-
sources o n the task a t hand; see Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1991), the
226 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
overwhelming research focus has been o n how emotions-specially anxi-
e t y - c a n disrupt the planning and generation of messages.
Most of the research examining stage fright, social anxiety, communi-
cation apprehension, and related phenomena (see reviews by McCroskey
& Beatty, 1998; Patterson & Ritts, 1997) has focused on the causes of
social-communication anxiety, its personal and social consequences, and
its alleviation. Recently, however, increased attention has turned t o the
effects of anxiety o n the message-production process. People experience
anxiety in communication situations for several reasons, including un-
certainty about how to behave in a situation, the belief that they cannot
meet the demands of the situation, and anticipation of negative reac-
tions from others due t o their inadequate performances (see Greene &
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Sparks, 1983; Patterson & Ritts, 1997). Regardless of its source, once
aroused, anxiety tends t o have a variety of debilitating effects o n mes-
sage production, especially if the experience of anxiety in social situa-
tions is chronic. Anxious communicators are less fluent and less orga-
nized; they are more likely to stutter, exit interactions when given the
opportunity, exhibit a quivering voice, engage in less eye contact, repeat
themselves, pause more frequently, loose track of ideas and the topical
flow of interactions, speak more softly, and avoid many interactions
when given the choice (Beatty & McCroskey, 1998; Patterson & Ritts,
1997). We wish to propose several distinct mechanisms through which
anxiety may have these and related debilitating effects on message pro-
duction (for a somewhat different set of mechanisms, see Leary, 1983).
First, anxiety may distract the attentional capacities of the individual
from the communicative task a t hand. At its core, anxiety reflects a con-
cern with an uncertain threat (Lazarus, 1991). Given this core theme, it
has been suggested tha t the action tendency associated with anxiety in-
volves scanning for potential sources of danger (Leary, 1991; Mathews,
1990). Although such scanning (of both the perceptual field and memory)
may be functional when the potential of danger is real, most social situa-
tions are not very dangerous, so this scanning devotes important attentional
resources to little useful purpose. Hence, anxiety may distract attentional
focus and concentration from where it would be more usefully placed-n
relevant features of the ongoing communicative situation. Research needs
to examine the extent to which anxious communicators exhibit a dis-
rupted attentional focus during the message-planning process.
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Second, the onset of social anxiety, especially for chronic sufferers,
may generate a self-amplifying feedback loop wherein the anxious state
is maintained and intensified. Those experiencing social anxiety regu-
larly report having a host of negative, self-deprecatory thoughts, includ-
ing not knowing what to d o in the situation, feeling they are sure t o fail,
believing they will perform poorly in comparison t o others, expecting
227 Communication
Theory
they will look foolish o r incompetent in the eyes of others, anticipating
they will be rejected by others, and so forth (Sarason et al., 1991) . These
intrusive, self-preoccupied thoughts not only detract from attention to
the ongoing situation (see above), they tend t o be quite unmotivating
and are reported to be associated with reduced effort o n tasks (MacLeod,
1996) . Mor e serious, the prediction of failure and, especially, focus on
the unpleasant or harmful consequences of failure, tend t o maintain the
anxious state and may even intensify it over time. Two empirical impli-
cations of this account include that ( a ) the anxiety level of chronically
anxious communicators should increase over the course of a communi-
cative encounter while ( b ) the motivation to communicate should de-
crease. Future research should evaluate these predictions.
Third, the intrusive, self-deprecatory thoughts tha t accompany the
anxious state may interfere with the process of message planning or
assembly. Mos t current views of message production assume that hu-
man beings are limited capacity information processors who must de-
velop lines of behavior by retrieving relevant instructions from memory,
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integrating these modular instructions into a coherent behavioral repre-
sentation or program, and then physically executing the program.
These processes all make demands on cognitive resources, especially
working memory, where retrieved memories must be temporarily stored,
integrated, and held until executed (for detailed presentations of this
general scheme, see Berger, 1997, and Greene, 1995, 1997a ) . Anxiety
may interfere with these cognitive processes by filling valuable working
memory with task-irrelevant thoughts about the self. A recent study ex-
amining the message preparation process by low- and high-anxious in-
dividuals nicely illustrates the effects of such cognitive interference (Daly,
Vangelisti, & Weber, 1995) . This study utilized a talk aloud protocol
methodology to access the thoughts of participants during a 20-minute
period in which they prepared a speech. Compared to low-anxious par-
ticipants, those with high levels of communication anxiety reported more
thoughts expressing nervousness about speaking and doubt about their
personal capabilities; these subjects also reported fewer thoughts exhibiting
focus on audience concerns, constraints in the speaking situation, tools avail-
able for the speech, and ideas they intended to include in the speech.
The disruption in planning caused by irrelevant, intrusive thoughts
may increase the need for editing and revision, processes that consume
even more of scarce cognitive resources. Consistent with this, Daly et al.
(1995) found that highly anxious participants evaluated the complete-
ness of their thoughts more than less anxious participants; engaged in
more and longer searches for words, phrases, and concepts; and exhib-
ited more backtracking in the course of message preparation. Another
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recent study (Greene, Rucker, Zauss, & Harris, 1998) indicates that the
228 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
cognitive interference associated with anxiety not only disrupts message
planning, i t undermines the acquisition of message-production skills.
There are, then, several mechanisms through which anxiety may nega-
tively impact the message-production process. Future study should ex-
amine the extent to which these mechanisms jointly influence the mes-
sage-planning process; we suspect tha t they represent complementary
rather than competing accounts for the effects of anxiety on message
production.
For some, the anxiety associated with performance in social situa-
tions occasionally intensifies into fear- for example, stage fright in
the context of public presentations. A strong emotion like fear, with its
intense physiological accompaniments, not only may significantly dis-
turb message planning, but also thoroughly disrupt the execution of a
message plan. Powerful emotions like fear, with their high levels of physi-
ological arousal, have the potential t o hijack bodily and cognitive
systems in the service of their action tendencies (which, in the case of
fear, is escape; see Lazarus, 1991). The physical trembling, tightened
respiration, chattering teeth, and related physical manifestations of in-
tense fear may make i t virtually impossible for the frightened individual
to enact whatever message plan has been developed; indeed, these physi-
cal expressions of fear may only deepen if the desire t o escape the pro-
voking situation is resisted. Extreme embarrassment has also been ob-
served t o seriously disrupt communicative performances; the acutely flus-
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tered individual appears momentarily incapable of enacting any mes-
sage plan (e.g., Miller, 1996). Although the effects of intense fear and
embarrassment o n speech are well documented, we know little about
how intense emotional states disrupt communicative performances. For
example, how does emotional hijacking occur and what can be done
to combat i t ?
Anxiety, fear, and embarrassment are not the only emotional states
found t o have debilitating effects on communication behavior. There is
ample evidence tha t communicative performances can be degraded by
emotions such as anger (see the review by Canary, Spitzberg, & Semic,
1998) and depression (see the review by Segrin, 1998). Recent research
suggests tha t anger and depression may negatively influence informa -
tion processing through some of the same mechanisms as anxiety, nota-
bly cognitive interference (e.g., Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker,
1997; Zillman, 1993). Do emotions such as anger and depression de-
grade communicative performance by upsetting message-planning a n d
enactment processes? If so, are these degrading effects primarily due t o
cognitive interference o r t o some other mechanism? Do other emotions
(e.g., j o y ) have facilitative effects on communicative performance? If so,
by what mechanisms d o these emotions enhance message planning and
229 Communication
Theory
enactment? Clearly, there is a rich agenda for research on how emotions
influence message planning and related processes.
Moods and Message Production
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Compared to emotions, moods are milder states that typically last much
longer and have no particular object or focus; as Parkinson (1995, p. 9 )
puts it, moods are tonic rather than phasic, and generally d o not have
discernible causes to the individuals experiencing them. As mild, pro-
longed states, moods d o not manifest the action tendencies associated
with emotions. So, how d o these relatively mild, lingering affective states
influence the situationally bound, goal-focused activity of message pro-
duction? We examine here some well-documented mood effects on two
aspects of message production: planning and interpretation.
Moods and Message Planning. Most cognitive models of message
planning represent this process as occurring through two phases: an ac-
tivation process where relevant procedural memories (records about how
to d o things) are retrieved from long-term storage, and a n assembly pro-
cess where these memories are fit together into a coherent output repre-
sentation or plan for the current situation. Greenes (1995, 1997a) ac -
tion assembly theory provides a particularly detailed discussion of these
yoked processes, so we employ concepts from this theory in what fol-
lows. According t o Greene, in any communicative situation, relevant
elements of procedural memory ( w h a t Green e terms proc edur a l
records) are activated above some resting level by ( a ) the individuals
interaction goals and ( b ) relevant contextual factors. Procedural records
are conceptualized as nodes in an interlinked system; hence, when acti-
vated above threshold, a given procedural record may spread activation
to other procedural records with which it is associatively linked. Activated
procedural records are subsequently edited and assembled (integrated) into
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a coherent output representation (plan) that is then executed behaviorally.
Following Bower (1981) , Greene and other theorists (e.g., Forgas,
1995a; Motley & Camden, 1985) suggest that a n individuals prevailing
mood state may be one of the relevant contextual elements that spread
activation t o nodes with which it is associated. Tha t is, mood states may
themselves serve as aroused nodes in the procedural-memory network
tha t activate other nodes with which they are associatively and contex-
tually linked. Further, a given mood state may be associatively linked to
particular message forms or message elements. This suggests that, for
example, when pursuing the communicative goal of making a request,
persons in happy moods may use request forms characteristic of hap -
piness, whereas persons in sad or depressed moods may use re -
quest forms tha t reflect that state. Research (see the review by Forgas,
1995a) indicates tha t happy persons typically are more confident, ambi-
tious, and helpful; set themselves higher goals; overestimate the likeli-
230 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages
hood of success; and are more likely to take moderate risks. In contrast,
people in sad moods tend t o produce more negative assessments of the
self; show reduced self-confidence and self-efficacy; make more self-dep-
recating attributions; and display more cautious and risk-avoidant judg-
ments and behaviors. Based on these properties of happy and sad moods,
Forgas (1999a) suggested that:
People in a happy mood should form more positive and more confident inferences due
to the selective priming and greater accessibility of positive memories and experiences
about similar situations in the past and [thus should] use more confident, direct, and
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risky request forms. In contrast, sad people might selectively recall incidents when they
suffered a loss of face due to overly direct requests and [thus] should employ a more
cautious, indirect, and polite requesting strategy. (p. 852)
Similar predictions have been made with respect to the use of coopera-
tive, competitive, and avoidant negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998 b).
Moreover, Forgas (1995a) argues that the effects of mood states are
most likely to infuse operations, such as the assembly of request forms
and negotiation tactics, when messages are produced in response to rela-
tively demanding or challenging situations. Such situations require more
extensive and detailed processing (activation and assembly) than do com-
paratively simple, routine situations, and thus permit a greater infusion
of mood. An elegant set of experiments provides strong support for these
predictions, in particular, demonstrating that mood has its greatest ef-
fect in communicative situations calling for more elaborate and substan-
tive cognitive processing (Forgas, 199813, 1999a, 1999b); similar effects
were also found for responses to varied request forms (Forgas, 1998a).
Mood has also been shown to have several other effects on the mes-
sage-construction process. For example, several researchers have found
that induced mood states lead to the use of mood-congruent lexical items
when generating both oral and written messages (e.g., Lindsey, 1996;
Motley & Camden, 1985). Mood has also been found to influence the
amount and intimacy of communication in self-disclosure contexts (e.g.,
Cunningham, 1988), as well as the production of more persuasive argu-
ments when engaged in counterattitudinal advocacy (e.g., Bohner &
Schwarz, 1993). In all these instances, mood has been theorized t o influ-
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ence behavior through its impact on the message-planning process, and
specifically through priming (activating) procedural memories congru-
ent with the prevailing mood state.
Mood and Interpretation. Just as mood states have been found to
influence the operation of procedural memory through the activation of
mood-congruent records, so mood states have been found to influence
the operation of the declarative memory system (used in interpretive
processes) through the activation of mood-congruent interpretive
231 Communication
Theory
schemes. For example, mood states have been shown to influence the
character of the causal attributions people make about their own and
others behaviors (Forgas, l 9 9 4 , 1 9 9 8 c ) , judgments about the quality of
close personal relationships (e.g., Forgas, Levinger, & Moylan, 1994),
and evaluations made a bout both prototypical and atypical people and
relationships (Forgas, 1992, 1995b).
In addition, mood states have been found to influence the capacity to
organize and integrate information in the impression-formation process
(e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Rosenbach, Crockett, &
Wapner, 1973). These effects may be due more to attentional narrowing
than memory priming; however, more research is needed to determine
the exact mechanisms through which moods exert such effects on inter-
pretive processes. In any event, it is clear that mood states can have a
substantial effect on a variety of interpretive processes tha t underlie the
judgments people make about social situations, other persons, and in-
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terpersonal relationships. Definitions of situations, attributions about
the causes of others behaviors, and evaluations of personal relation -
ships obviously have relevance to communicative goals; hence, mood
effects o n these social judgments have important implications for mes-
sage production.
Mood and Message Production: Unanswered Questions. Al-
though the effects of mood have been documented on several facets of
message production, there is considerable room for additional specifica-
tion about the nature of mood states and how these states have their
observed effects. One issue concerns the effects of different mood states
on message-production processes. Most research has distinguished con-
ceptually between positive and negative moods, b u t has operationalized
this distinction in terms of the specific mood states of happiness and
sadness. Yet, it is clear tha t happiness does not exhaust the class of posi-
tive moods, just as sadness does not exhaust the class of negative moods
(e.g., negative moods can include irritation and anxiety as well as sad-
ness). Different mood states within the broad classes of positive and
negative should have distinct effects o n message production, given
that different moods should prime distinct sets of procedural memories.
Consistent with this, there is some evidence that different negative moods
have distinct effects on message reception (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard,
& Kramer, 1994) . Future research should explore how different moods
affect production processes and identify the ways in which specific moods
are likely to influence features of messages in different functional con-
texts (e.g., persuasion, support).
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Second, because moods dont prime all affectively congruent memo -
ries, but only those that are relevant to the current situation (see Forgas,
1995a, p. 45) , the question remains as to just how mood primes rel -
2 3 2 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
evant memories. What makes a mood -congruent memory relevant t o
the ongoing situation? There appear t o be many different ways in which
this question could be answered-features of the setting, the primary
communicative goal, the participant s, the speakers role, etc., could all
be viewed as relevant aspects of the situation. Are all mood -congru-
ent memories associated with diverse aspects of the communicative situ-
ation activated? If so, how does such a nebulous influence come t o af-
fect the content of messages produced?
Third, it is not clear when moods will affect message construction
and when they wont. Forgass (1 995a ) affect infusion model (AIM) sug -
gests that moods are most likely t o influence message production when
systematic, rather than heuristic, information processing is required.
Forgas further argues that mood effects are minimized when persons
approach tasks with either direct access or motivated processing strate-
gies (for a discussion of these information-processing modes, see Forgas,
1995a). Although Forgas has reported some support for these predic-
tions, the lines separating the circumstances provoking heuristic, sys-
tematic, and motivated processing remain fuzzy. To attain stronger pre-
dictive power, researchers will need to specify more clearly the particu-
lar features of situations tha t permit mood t o infuse message-produc-
tion operations.
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Fourth, accounts about how moods influence message construction
remain frustratingly underdeveloped. For example, Forgass impressive
research program clearly shows tha t moods can influence aspects of re-
quests and negotiation strategies, but doesnt show exactly how moods
exert their effects. In part, this is because Forgass work lacks an explicit
theory of message production, and the implicit model informing this
work closely resembles the outmoded strategy repertoire view of mes -
sage production-the notion that people store abstract representations
of message strategies in memory and then instantiate these abstract struc-
tures with contextually relevant content. This view of message produc-
tion suffers from numerous problems and has been abandoned by most
contemporary message- production theorists (see D. OKeefe, 1994; Wil -
son, 1997). Thus, one objective for future theorizing lies in integrating
detailed models of mood effects with more contemporary views of mes-
sage production.
In sum, affective states-both moods and emotions-have a variety
of effects on message production. Exploring these effects and detailing
them empirically depend critically on highly specific models of both af-
fect and message production. As more detailed models of these phenom-
ena are developed, we may look forward to more precise understand-
ings of how affect influences the cognitive processes implicated in the
production of messages.
233 Communication
Theory
Emotion as the Content of Messages
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O u r second question is this: How are emotional states communicated to
others? Tha t is, how are the emotional states that people experience
(love, shame, depression) communicated as the essential content of the
message, not just as a tone or relational message added onto other con-
tent? When someone puts his or her head down on the table, cries, and
says, I cant take i t anymore, sadness is the essence of the message.
Most of the early work on communicating emotion, such as Ekmans
work o n facial expressions, tells us about the nature of emotional ex-
pressions, but much less about the processes by which these expressions
are produced.
Emotion Is (Ex)Pressed Out
Darwin (1872/1965, pp. 28-65) posited three principles to explain how
expressions came to be associated with emotional states. First, the prin -
ciple of serviceable associated habits maintains tha t certain actions are
associated with certain states of mind because they once served some
function, but through habit come t o be associated with the feeling even
when the action itself becomes useless. For example, when preparing to
attack, our ancestors bared their canine teeth, but now we only curl up
the corner of the mouth in a sneer of derision (pp. 247-252). Second,
the principle of antithesis indicates that when one wants to suppress
certain actions, opposing muscle groups are used to inhibit the action,
and they become associated with opposing states of mind. For example,
whereas clenched fists and tense arm muscles indicate the tendency to
attack, shrugging the shoulders and showing the palms of the hands
indicates just the opposite (pp. 263-272). Finally, the third principle
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states that when nerve force is generated in excess, we recognize these
effects a s expressive. Hands trembling, hyperventilating, and sweating
with fear are examples. The three principles may explain how emotional
expressions came t o take the form that they did for humans and other
species, but they say little about the processes by which they are pro-
duced for individuals in specific situations. Presumably they are hardwired
programs tha t are accessed automatically when needed.
Nevertheless, Darwin was also quite aware that expressions are in-
hibited, exaggerated, changed, and even faked for strategic purposes.
H e observed, for example, that weeping is rare in men because of its
being thought weak and unmanly and cites reports that New Zealand
women were able t o shed tears at will while mourning for the dead
(pp. 153-155). Repeatedly, he notes that some muscular and other so-
matic changes are less easily controlled than others and so are more
likely to reveal genuine emotional state (for a n impressive review of the
huge range of cues t o emotion, see Bowers, Metts, & Duncanson, 1985).
T h u s began the scholarly distinction between spontaneous and strate-
234 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
gic-symbolic expression of emotion (Buck, 1984) . It is clear tha t they
are different. Posed facial expressions, for example, tend to be easier t o
recognize than spontaneous ones (Motley & Camden, 1988). O n the
other hand, it is equally clear tha t there is a gradient of controllability
tha t is partially innate and partially practiced, a s Darwin also noted. H e
even proposed a mechanism: Actions which were first voluntary, soon
became habitual, and a t last hereditary, and then came to be performed
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even in opposition to the will (Darwin 1872/1965, p. 356) . Yet it seems
tha t what can be done can be undone, a t least in part. Some inherited
emotional expressions (such as cries of distress) can be taken over by the
will and adjusted or even faked for effect. Babies learn t o do this in their
first year of life (Saarni, 1999, p. 18) , and they develop increasingly
sophisticated ways to manage emotion well into adulthood (Labouvie-
Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1990) .
The message-production processes by which expressions of emotion
are controlled are not well understood. One might speculate that the
ability t o modulate some expressions may be inherited because it ap-
pears so early in life, because it is so useful for survival, and because it is
found in other species (Marler & Evans, 1997) . Sometimes the squeaky
child gets the parent and sometimes the predator, so it pays t o be able to
cont rol t h e squeaks. People w h o s tudy the neurology of emot ion
(Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996) have found tha t sensory input is routed
first through the more primitive amygdala for a crude-but-quick screen-
ing for danger a split second before the neocortex gets the input to do a
more detailed analysis and to exert more intentional control over emo-
tional reactions. Goleman (1995, pp. 13-29) has popularized this se-
quence as a n emotional hijacking in which anger holds h ostage more
thoughtful emotional responses. In partial contrast, Zillman ( 1993) at-
tributes loss of control during anger t o overexcitation, which leads to
cognitive impairments that make it difficult to take a broader perspec-
tive and easy to fall back on well-practiced habits, such as violence. In
complete contrast to Goleman, Averill (1993) points o u t tha t anger may
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not be controlled because it serves as a convenient excuse for wrongdo-
ing-My anger made me d o it, or better yet, I was emotionally hi -
jacked! Frijda (1986, pp. 401 -450) argues tha t emotional regulation is
not something tha t comes after a n emotion has become fully manifested,
but rather is an integral part of the emotion process, so that one could
expect control or lack thereof to operate through any number of mecha-
nisms. The relative merits of these different accounts clearly deserve re-
search attention.
The most controllable emotional expression is, of course, verbal ex-
pression. Expressing feelings verbally with precision and accuracy, how-
ever, can be quite difficult, even setting aside the case of disingenuous
235 Communication
Theory
expressions. For example, the ability to label emotions with single words
starts early and usually increases in sophistication with age, though not
always. Some adults have such difficulty in verbalizing their own emo-
tional states that there is a special term for their impairment-alexithymia
( n o words for feelings; Sifneos, 1 9 9 6 ) . For example, Haviland and
Goldston (1992, pp. 220-221) cite a college sophomore who used the
term upset t o describe ( a ) how Hamlet felt over his fathers murder,
( b ) how his neighbors felt over their daughters school report, ( c ) how
the Pope felt over drugs tha t induce abortion, and ( d ) how he himself
felt over breakfast. Interestingly, these researchers also cite the example
of a precocious 26-month-old child who sai d, Im sad I popped it (a
balloon). There is some evidence that, in everyday interaction, people
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rarely label their feelings, although they d o speak of them indirectly
(Planalp et al., 1996; Shimanoff, 1985) . The process by which people
choose a n appropriate verbalization of their feelings, either using emo-
tion terms o r more complex descriptions, is an intriguing one tha t in-
vites more research.
One of the most intractable problems for scholars is t o understand
the coordination of emotional cues, especially verbal and nonverbal cue
combinations (Planalp & Knie, in press). Ordinary people, of course,
seem to have more trouble isolating cues than coordinating them, as is
apparent when watching the facial expressions and gestures of someone
on the phone or when trying t o read an emotionally charged e-mail with-
out imagining vocal inflections. Conversely, it may be much easier t o
fake a smile than it is to fake joy in the face, voice, body, and in elabo-
rate verbal messages all at the same time. Faking joy by smiling when
encountering a n acquaintance is childs play (literally); faking the emo -
tional devastation of being a holocaust victim takes a Meryl Streep (in
Sophies Choi c e ) . In fact, many actors find it easier and more convincing to
fake the emotion (Stanislavski acting) than to fake the expression. More-
over, the research tells us more about how t o manage feelings than it does
about how to leave the feelings alone and manage only the expressions.
Emotion Is Pulled Out
Expressions are pushed out by emotional states, t o be sure, but they are
also pulled out by social situations (Andersen & Guerrero, 1998, pp.
57-64; Scherer, 1994) . Plentiful evidence indicates tha t emotional ex-
pressions are adapted t o audiences, nearly always in the direction of
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making them more socially appropriate than spontaneous expressions
would be. For example, Bavelas and her colleagues (1988) found that
sympathetic winces in response to others pain were more likely when
the victim and observer had eye contact. Fernindez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda
(1995) found that Olympic gold medal winners who were extremely
happy tended not to smile when standing behind stage, did smile when
2 3 6 Producing Emotion( a l ) Messages
on stage receiving their medals, and then stopped again when the na-
tional anthem was played. Even imagined audiences have an impact.
Students who believed that a same-sex friend was in another room watch-
ing the same funny video that they were watching laughed more than
they did when watching the video alone and as much as when the friend
was watching in the same room (Fridlund, 1991).
Societies train their members in the proper expression of emotions,
and members internalize and use a variety of display rules that are ex-
quisitely sensitive to social situations. Children learn in their families
how frequently, intensely, and under what circumstances they should
express their feelings (Halberstadt, 1986). Well-socialized members of
U.S. culture learn that showing positive emotions is more acceptable
than showing negative ones (Scheff, 1984; Sommers, 1984) and that it is
more appropriate for women to express sadness by asking for support
than it is for men (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998), more appropriate to ex-
press feelings to a friend than to a stranger (M. Clark & Taraban, 1991),
and more appropriate to express sympathy to the deserving than to the
undeserving (C. Clark, 1997), and much more. Of course, these rules, as
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social conventions, vary across groups and cultures. African-Americans
tend to be more expressive than European Americans, Utku Eskimos
believe it is almost never appropriate for adults to express anger, and the
Balinese consider laughing on hearing of the death of a loved one to be
not only appropriate, but, in some cases, mandatory (see Planalp, 1999;
Porter & Samovar, 1998).
The processes by which emotional expressions are adapted to audi-
ences are intriguing because clearly they are learned, but equally clearly
audience adaptations become so automatic that they are largely uncon-
scious and effortless. The key to those processes is likely to be found by
studying childhood socialization of emotion (e.g., Saarni, 1999) or adults
making transitions to social situations tha t have different emotional
rules ( e . g . , in a different culture or a different workplace; see Conrad
& Witte, 1994).
Pressing and Pulling Emotion in aTug of War
Mostly, we assume that the experience of emotion is involuntary and
that the expression of emotion is tuned to social rules and norms. In
addition, people may engage in quite purposeful or planned expressions
of emotion for strategic or manipulative purposes. They take control
over the push of felt emotions and the pull of expected emotions to
shape emotional expressions for their own purposes. For example, they
use feigned emotional states as reasons, causes, and justifications for
action; they strategically manipulate others to respond as desired
through emotion display; and they deceive others by masking or ex-
pressing emotions.
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237 Communication
Theory
Deception is an interesting example. Liars must control the genuine
feelings t h a t may accompany lying-anxiety a b o u t getting caught,
arousal, even duping delight (Buller & Burgoon, 1 9 9 8 ) . At the same
time, the liar often must fake an emotion that is expected-surprise at
the missing records, anger toward the real murderer, righteous indig -
nation a t being falsely accused. Often managing all of the emotional
cues is too difficult and genuine emotion leaks out, especially through
the body and tone of voice, giving away the lie (Buller & Burgoon, p.
3 9 8 ) . In other circumstances, genuine emotions need only be exagger-
ated for effect, such as letting irritation build into rage in order t o get
your own way (Bailey, 1983), faking or exaggerating happiness to in-
gratiate yourself t o others, or milking sadness to elicit support (Clark,
Pataki, & Carver, 1 9 9 6 ) .
Children take a few years to learn emotional dissemblance. For ex-
ample, Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 , p. 1 8 9 ) found that when children were expected to
express positive feelings about a disappointing gift, the younger boys ( 6 -
year-olds) were unable t o d o it, the intermediate-aged children showed
what the researchers called transitional behaviors reflecting social
anxiety and tension about what t o do, and the 10- to 11-year-olds, espe-
cially girls, could show disingenuous joy. By the early teen years, girls
reported feeling a need t o balance expressions of their genuine feelings
with the requirements of the social situation (Saarni, 1999, pp. 289-
290). Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 ) provides a useful analysis of the complex knowl-
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edge, muscular control, and motivation needed t o dissemble emotion
successfully. Considerable work remains to be done in this area, how-
ever, especially on the integration of verbal and nonverbal production
systems during the course of dissembling.
Shaping Emotion in the Push and Pull
W h a t happens t o the emotional s t a t e a s i t is pressed a n d pulled o u t
into the open? Usually, we assume t h a t the experience of emotion
precedes its expression, but to some degree emotions a r e created a n d
shaped in expressing them. Various mechanisms have been posited,
ranging from microscopic physiological processes to macroscopic
social and cultural processes, t o explain how emotional expression
shapes emotional experience.
One of the most captivating and counterintuitive ideas is the facial
feedback hypothesis (FFH), which posits that feedback from facial ex-
pressions of emotion influences emotional experience, not just the other
way around, as is often presumed. The FFH has produced ingenious
experiments designed t o get around the problem of experimenter de-
mand by asking people t o hold a pen in their teeth (simulating a smile)
or in their lips (simulating a frown; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1 9 8 8 ) or
by giving them pronunciation tasks that d o the same ( e vs. ii; Zajonc,
2 3 8 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages
Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). In his extensive review, Cappella (1993, p.
27) finds tha t the FFH is a reliable effect tha t is small in magnitude, may
o r may not be emotion specific, and can initiate as well a s modify sub-
jective emotional states. At least three mechanisms have been posited to
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explain this effect, and all three remain controversial. The first is the
general cognitive-interpretive claim (Stepper & Strack, 1993) and its
more specific versions (e.g., Laird, 1974), which suggest that feedback
from a number of sources, including facial and other cues, along with
appraisals of the environment, are integrated into the subjective experi-
ence of emotion. A second physiologically grounded claim is tha t tem-
perature changes in blood flow t o the brain mediate subjective emo-
tional experience (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989). A third explanation links
facial feedback with conversational partners mutual imitation of each
others facial expressions (especially smiles) in generating a n account for
emotional contagion (Cappella, 1993).
Other mechanisms by which emotional expressions influence emo-
tional experience take a decidedly cognitive-interpretive and linguistic
turn. Talking through emotions with the goal of reframing and achiev-
ing insight is a staple of therapy (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 63-90;
Pennebaker, 1997). Conversely, expression t o vent feelings appears to
be useless, if not counterproductive (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 25-
62). Shared meanings for emotional experiences develop a s children get
help in labeling their feelings (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p. 181) and as
adults construct emotional experience interactively (Staske, 1994). Say-
ing Im not angry, just very disappointed helps to foreground, legiti -
mize, and perhaps shape the speakers feelings, and also works as a bid
to frame the listeners response as Im ashamed, not angry.
Flight attendants, bill collectors, medical students, and people in other
occupations use trained imagination and forms of talk to shape their
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emotions into what the job requires (Hochschild, 1983; Waldron, 1994).
To summon patience, flight attendants conjure up images of passengers
in distress and speak of uncontrolled passengers (Hochschild, 1983).
To call up anger, bill collectors imagine irresponsible credit card users
and talk about deadbeats (Sutton, 1991). To maintain emotional dis -
tance, medical students picture disempersoned bodies, a s opposed to
disembodied persons, and talk about the gall bladder in Room 27 (Smith
& Kleinman, 1989). Early work on emotional regulation a t work had a
critical tone, emphasizing its exploitive nature, but later commentators have
suggested that emotional labor may be helpful if it fosters positive feelings
or effective emotion regulation (Conrad & Witte, 1994; Mann, 1997).
Constructionist cultural models take the social shaping of emotion so
far as t o say tha t people live dramatically different emotional lives, de-
pending on the circumstances to which the culture has tuned its emo-
239 Communication
Theory
tions. If talk shapes, simplifies, selects and standardizes emotion and
lack of talk leaves emotions preconscious and inchoate, as Levy (1984,
p. 227) suggests, it is easy t o imagine why nearly all Chinese mothers
reported tha t their 3-year-olds understood the nearest Chinese equiva-
lent of ashamed, whereas only 10% of American mothers did (Shaver,
Wu, & Schwartz, 1992, p. 1 9 9 ) . The sea of messages tha t is cultural life
produces variations in emotional profiles through talk, and also through
nonverbal expressions. In Bali, smiling and showing positive feeling
nonverbally are highly valued, whereas expressing negative feelings, es-
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pecially in public, is nearly a cultural taboo. A Balinese woman away
from Bali reported that it is so much easier t o be happy in Bali, there
are so many smiles (Wikan, 1990, p. 111) .
Emotion as the Target of Messages: Emotion
Knowledge and the Production of Messages
Directed at Managing Others Emotions
Our third question is this: How does what people know ( o r believe)
about emotion influence their attempts to manage (create, increase, de-
crease, or otherwise modify) the emotional states of others? Others
emotions are a common target of communicative efforts; indeed, influ-
encing the feelings of others may be one of the most basic tasks in which
people engage, either as a means to some end (e.g., frightening someone
about risky conduct t o improve health behavior) or as an end in itself
(e.g., celebrating a friends accomplishment). When producing messages
in pursuit of such goals, people must dr aw on some store of knowledge
about the emotions and how they operate.
Emotion Knowledge Structures and
Message Production
People strive t o understand aspects of the world they encounter regu-
larly, and they build up stocks of knowledge about these features so they
can manage them effectively. An individuals stock of knowledge will, of
course, be directly influenced by his or her personal experiences. More-
over, cultures ( and other social collectives) develop shared stocks of
knowledge about facets of the world and then pass these stocks of knowl-
edge on t o new members through primary and secondary socialization
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processes. Thus, an individuals stock of knowledge reflects both per -
sonal and cultural influences (see Berger & Luckmann, 1967) .
Emotion, that is, human feeling, is certainly one aspect of the world
that all individuals and cultures experience and learn t o manage, both in
themselves and in others. Recent research documents that people have
quite elaborate stores of emotion knowledge, both about emotion in
general (e.g., Plutchik, 1984; Sh aver, Schwartz, Kirson, & OConnor,
240 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
1 9 8 7 ) and about many specific emotions (e.g., Fitness & Fletcher, 1 9 9 3 ) .
Theorists use a variety of terms in referring to these stocks of emotion
knowledge, including emotion concepts (e.g., Kovecses, 1 9 9 0 ) , emotion
protot ype s (e.g., Fehr, 1 9 9 4 ) , emotion scripts (e.g., Fehr & Baldwin,
1 9 9 6 ) , emotion knowledge structures (e.g., Fitness, 1 9 9 6 ) , and implicit
or lay theories of emotion (e.g., K . Smith, 1 9 9 5 ) . The varied terms re-
flect some important theoretical differences in assumptions regarding
the content and structure of peoples emotion knowledge. However, all
of these terms reflect a common concern with what people know about
emotions and how they use that knowledge.
What is in these stocks of knowledge? What is their content? H o w are
they organized? How d o people access and apply the knowledge resi-
dent in their stocks? In what ways d o these stocks of knowledge differ
across individuals within a culture? H o w d o these stocks of knowledge
typically differ for members of different cultures? Research has only re-
cently begun t o sketch answers t o these questions, and a great deal of
work must be completed t o answer them in meaningful detail. To date,
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most empirical work has focused on the knowledge of specific emotions
held by adult members of Western cultures, especially as tha t knowledge
is represented in emotion prototypes (e.g., Fehr, 1994; Fehr & Baldwin,
1 9 9 6 ) . This research has sought to describe the general features and
functions of emotion prototypes; thus far, little attention has been given
to individual differences in emotion knowledge structures. Moreover,
there is a paucity of research examining differences in emotion knowl-
edge structures associated with factors such as culture and gender (but
see Fischer, 1995; Paez & Vergara, 1 9 9 5 ) .
There is good reason for believing that emotion knowledge structures
influence message production. For example, these knowledge structures
have been found t o affect memory, judgment, and inference processes
about other persons and social situations (Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Fit-
ness, 1 9 9 6 ) , which suggests tha t they should also influence various mes-
sage-production processes. As yet, however, there appears to be n o re-
search directly examining how emotion knowledge influences messages
when people seek t o manage the emotions of others. Still, assessments of
individual variations in emotion knowledge structures would appear to
have the potential to illuminate why different people sometimes pro-
duce such diverse message forms when seeking t o manage the emotions
of others. Consider the following efforts to comfort someone w h o is
distressed about having been dropped by a dating partner:
1 . Im really sorry. Gee, I wish I knew what to say! I never know what to say in these
situations. Uh, youll feel better if you keep in mind theres nothing wrong with you; the
problem is with her.
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24 1 Communication
Theory
2. Go a h e a d a n d cry; I can tell you are upset. And its OK to scream o r yell, i f y o u want.
You need t o let your feelings o u t .
3 . Wow, this has to have turned your world upside d own . W h a t happened? And h ow
a r e you feeling a b o u t everything? Take your time a n d tell me a b o u t t h e whole thing.
Each of these messages reflects a distinct set of beliefs about the nature,
course, causes, and cures of emotional upset. The first appears t o be
informed by what might be called a magic bullet model of emotional
support (Burleson & Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) ; the idea underlying such mes-
sages appears t o be that others emotional states can be influenced quite
directly through the utterance of the right words. The second message
reflects what might be termed a catharsis model of emotional supp ort
(Planalp, 1999); here, the operative assumption is that people need t o
vent their emotions when upset. The third message exhibits what might
be called a sense -making model of support (Pennebaker, 1 9 9 7 ) ; the
assumption here is that distressing situations often undermine o u r rep-
resentations of the world, and people need t o make sense of these situa-
tions discursively if they are to heal. T h e point here is each message
reflects a different set of beliefs (or knowledge structures) about the course
and cure of emotional distress.
The differences manifest in these three approaches to comforting are
not merely stylistic, they are functional. Messages flowing from the sense-
making model of support are generally a more effective means of pro-
viding support (in the sense of helping people work through their dis-
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tressed emotions a n d eventually feel better) than are messages informed
by either the magic bullet o r catharsis models of support (see Burleson
& Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) . Given this functional difference, it is important t o
detail the differences in the emotional knowledge structures informing
distinct message forms. Mo r e generally, it can be hypothesized that some
implicit theories of emotion (of sadness, fear, anxiety, etc.) are better
than others-better in the sense of being more differentiated, abstract,
accurate, open t o modification, a n d correspondent with what profes-
sionals know about the nature and function of both emotion in general
and particular affective states. A corollary t o this hypothesis is that some
persons should generally be particularly good a t managing the emotional
states of others, or at least at managing particular emotional states, whereas
others will be less skillful. Obviously, these hypotheses should be tested.
Unfortunately, consistent with the paucity of research on individual
differences in emotion knowledge structures, there have been few theo-
retical efforts to delineate important dimensions of difference in emo-
tion knowledge structures, and still fewer efforts to develop methods
capable of capturing theoretically relevant differences. Without these
conceptual a n d methodological tools, it is difficult t o test hypotheses
242 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
regarding the effects of individual differences in emotion knowledge struc-
tures o n the production of effective, emotion-focused messages. Hence,
a n agenda for future research includes ( a ) identifying some of the di-
mensions along which different emotion knowledge structures can be
arrayed, (b) developing methods that will permit the assessment of indi-
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viduals knowledge stru ctures in terms of the specified dimensions of differ-
ence, ( c ) detailing ways in which different types of emotion knowledge should
influence message behavior, and (d) testing these predictions.
Individual Differences in the Capacity
to Acquire Emotion Knowledge and
Message Production
A rather different way of thinking about emotion knowledge is in terms
of the individuals capacity t o acquire information about the nature,
causes, and course of anothers emotions. Research o n this c apacity has
focused on abilities to recognize diverse emotional states (affect identifi-
cation), comprehend the causes for these states (affect understanding),
and correctly anticipate the course of these states (affect prediction).
Special attention has been given t o affective perspective taking (the abil-
i ty to make warranted inferences about others affective states), as well
as to the development of complex systems of interpersonal constructs,
which appear t o underlie the ability t o engage in affective perspective
taking (Burleson, 1982). Substantial developmental and individual dif-
ferences have been detected in all of these abilities (e.g., Burleson &
Caplan, 1998; Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shephard, 1997) .
Differences in the capacity t o infer, understand, and predict the course
of anothers emotional state have important implications for social ef -
fectiveness and communication, a notion developed in several theoreti-
cal analyses of social competence (e.g., Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984; Zahn-
Waxler & Radke- Yarrow, 1990) , and popularized in Golemans (1995)
treatment of emotional intelligence. Indeed, there is quite substantial
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research showing that, across the life span, the ability t o acquire emo-
tional knowledge about others is associated with the use of effective and
appropriate forms of social behavior, including more sophisticated mes-
sage structures. For example, Burleson and his colleagues (e.g., Burleson,
1984; see the review by Burleson & Caplan, 1998) have found that both
cognitive complexity and affective perspective-taking ability are associ-
ated with the use of comforting message forms that elaborate, legiti-
mize, and contextualize the feelings and perspectives of distressed oth-
ers-message forms tha t are widely regarded a s more sensitive and ef-
fective ways of providing comfort (e.g., Burleson & Samter, 1985) . Af-
fective perspective-taking skill has also been found t o be associated with
the use of sophisticated message forms when seeking to persuade and
inform (e.g., Applegate, Burleson, & Delia, 1992) , as well a s when man-
243 Communi c a t ion
Theory
aging conflicts (e.g., Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998). Thus, skill
in the capacity to acquire knowledge about the emotional states of oth-
ers is reliably associated with the production of more effective message
forms. Exactly how knowledge about others emotional states is used in
message construction remains unclear and is a matter needing further
research. There is some suggestion, however, tha t knowledge of others
emotions acquired through social perception skills influences the gen-
eration of interaction goals (for a discussion of this account and alterna-
tives, see Burleson & Caplan, 1998) .
It seems likely that individual differences in the capacity t o acquire
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information about others emotional states are connected in important
ways to how people structure their emotional knowledge. Thus, other
objectives for future research include exploring interrelations between
emotion knowledge structures and skill a t acquiring emotion informa-
tion about others, as well as determining how people integrate informa-
tion retrieved from their knowledge structures with that supplied by o n -
line processes in the course of generating messages.
Conclusion
We have addressed three questions concerning the connection between
emotion and message production. First, we showed that emotion (or,
more broadly, affect) has numerous effects o n several of the cognitive
processes associated with message production. Through their influence
on these processes, moods and emotions can have quite substantial ef-
fects o n the content of the messages people generate in varied circum-
stances. Second, we detailed some of the many ways in which emotion
serves as the content of the messages tha t people produce. People ex-
press feelings through their communicative conduct in incredibly rich
and diverse ways; understanding the processes through which they d o
so requires a n appreciation of the biology, psychology, and sociology of
emotion. Third, we explored how what people know about emotion
might influence properties of the messages they produce when seeking
to manage the emotions of others. Little research has directly examined
this topic, but i t represents an exciting area for future work.
Author Brant R. Burleson (PhD, University of Illinois, Ur b a n a - C h amp a i g n , 1 9 8 2 ) is aprofessor in t h e
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De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , Purdue University. Sally Pl ana lp ( P hD, University of Wisconsin,
Madi son, 1 9 8 3 ) is a prof e s sor in t h e De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , University of M o n t a n a ,
Mi s soul a , a n d a n a d j u n c t prof e s sor a t t h e University of Wa ika to, Hami l t o n , N e w Ze a l a n d . An
out l ine of thi s p a p e r wa s presented a t t h e pr e conf e r enc e o n message produc t ion, Inte rna t iona l
Communi c a t ion Association convent ion, San Francisco, CA, M a y 1 9 9 9 . Cor r e spondenc e c on -
cerning thi s p a p e r may be directed to Br ant Burleson a t br antb@purdue . edu or to Sally Pl ana lpa t
2 4 4 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages
Other scholars have developed t ypologies of emotional communication that overlap partially
with the one used here. Scherer (1992) writes of vocal expressions of emotion as symptoms, sym-
bols, and appeals, thus focusing on controllability and goal orientation. Gallois (1993) refers to
three traditions of communication research that focus on ( a ) experience and expression, ( b ) encod-
ing skills, decoding skills, and accuracy, and (c) rules, codes, and styles. Planalp and Knie (in press)
borrow B. OKeefes (1988) messag e design logics: expressive, conventional, and rhetorical. Al-
though their first type corresponds well to ours, their second and third types combine into o u r
second, and none of these address messages directed a t influencing anothe r persons emotional
state as a separate type of emotional expression-communication.
Perhaps closest to o u r typology is the set of distinctions proposed by Dillard (1993). Dillards
emotion -motivated communication is quite similar to our emotional messages, but considers
only the effects of emotion o n message goals, whereas our treatment includes the effects of both
emotion and mood on a broad array of message- production processes. Dillards emotion -mani-
festing communication appears quite similar to our messages of emotion, though o u r category
8/2/2019 emotivity
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may be somewhat less inclusive than his. Finally, Dillards emotion -inducing communication is
rather narrower than o u r emotion -focused messages in that Dillards cate gory focuses on mes-
sages that elicit affective responses in others, and o u r category encompasses messages that are
directed a t managing the emotional states of others, which may include reducing or moderating
affective responses, as well a s eliciting them.
In the course of reviewing this article, John Greene suggested yet a fourth focus for research on
emotion and message production: the impact of an individuals message behavior on his or her own
emotional states (as when the inability to say everything one might want leads t o frustration-
something we certainly felt as we wrote this article!). Although this phenomenon is touched on
briefly in o u r discussion of messages of emotion, we acknowledge the need for the independent
development of this concern. Bowing to the limits of time and space, we defer such development t o
later efforts.
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