emotivity

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Communication

Theory

Brant B. Bur l e son

Sally Planalp

Ten:

Two

Producing Emotion(a1) Messages Pages

221-250

Emotion is often a major part of the content of messages and is an important

influence on message production, but connections between emotion and mes-

sage-production processes have not received systematic attention until quite

recently. This article explores 3 ways in which emotion and message produc-

tion are connected: (a) Emotions and moods are important influences on cogni-

tive processes underlying message production; ( b ) emotion is expressed as the

content of messages; and ( c ) emotion knowledge is used t o manage the emo-

tional states of others.

Exploring how people communicate about emotion, under the influence

of emotion, and in efforts to manage emotion brings us face to face with

the mysteries and challenges of both communication and emotion re-

search. We must grapple with problems tha t long have plagued commu-

nication research: H o w can intentional and unintentional expressions

of emotion be reconciled? H o w d o emotional states influence communi-

cative behavior? H o w does communicative behavior influence emotional

states? We also have to wrestle with persistent problems in emotion re-

search: What constitutes a n emotion? What causes emotional reactions

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of certain types? H o w does emotion interact with cognition? It is inter-

esting terrain.

In this paper we address issues related to emotion and the production

of messages (for reviews of research examining emotion and message

reception, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).

We will be concerned primarily with three major ways that emotion and

message-production processes are connected.' First, affective states (both

emotions and moods) influence how people produce messages (wha t we

might call emotional messages). Second, emotion can be expressed as

the content of message-production processes (wha t we might call mes-

sages of emotion. Third, one person's emotions are often the targets of

messages produced by others, such a s when people try to comfort, in-

spire, o r intimidate each other (wha t we might call emotion-focused

messages). Given the space available t o us, o u r survey of these issues

will necessarily produce more of a sketch than a comprehensive map.

Copyright 0 2000 International Communication Association

221 Communication

Theory

Our hope is that this initial guide will prompt much more detailed ex-

plorations in the future.

Emotion as an Influence on

Message-Production Processes

Our first question is this: How does affect influence message-production

processes? Tha t is, how d o affective states (e.g., anxiety, anger, happi-

ness) influence various cognitive operations that are commonly believed

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to figure in message production?

Models of Message Production and

Affective Experience

Affect and message production are complex, multifaceted phenomena.

Hence, exploring how affect influences message production requires

detailed models of both the nature of affect and the cognitive processes

underlying message production, as well a s an appreciation that different

aspects of affect may influence distinct elements of message production.

The Message-Production Process. Quite sophisticated cognitive

models of message production have been developed in recent years (see

Burleson, 1995; Greene, 1997b; Hewes, 1995; along with the articles in

this issue of Communication Theory). Although the models presented

by particular theorists differ in important ways, most of them propose

similar outlines of the processes assumed t o figure in message produc-

tion. Abstracting across these models, it appears that message produc-

tion involves the processes of ( a ) interpretation (e.g., defining the situa-

tion; making attributions about the causes of others actions; inferring

others internal states; noting relevant aspects of the setting; determin -

ing situationally relevant roles and rules), which gives rise t o ( b ) goal

generation (forming intentions pertaining to primary and secondary in-

strumental objectives; forming intentions pertaining to relational and

identity objectives), which serves as the impetus to (c) planning or ac-

tion assembly (building behavioral programs or cognitive representa -

tions of action lines), which eventuates in ( d ) enactment (executing be-

havioral plans or output representations), which is followed by (e) moni-

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toring (observing and evaluating the outcomes of ones behavior -a di-

rected form of interpretation), the results of which may lead to ( f )

reencoding (recycling processes b through e i n light of monitored

outcomes).

Emotion and Mood. Models of affect frequently begin by distin-

guishing between two primary forms of affective experience, mood and

emotion (see Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; Frijda, 1993). As forms of

affect, both emotion and mood are feelings that have some valence (typi-

cally on a good-bad or positive-negative continuum) and some level of

222 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages

intensity (mild to strong). There are, however, important differences in

these two forms of affect. Emotions typically have some definite or spe-

cific object (they are provoked by some particular circumstance), ex-

hibit a relatively brief duration (in most cases lasting only a few mo-

ments), and are comparatively intense. Moods, in contrast, are more

global and diffuse in character, tend to be less intense states than emo-

tions, are comparatively enduring (often lasting for many minutes, even

hours), and usually are not tied to any particular provoking incident.

Thus, moods tend to be background states of which people may be

only vaguely aware. Moods generally have few direct motivational con-

sequences and typically influence behavior (when they do) through subtle

effects on perception, memory, information integration, and other forms

of information processing (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995a).

In contrast, a central element of an emotion is the arousal of distinct

motivational and behavioral orientations. These orientations are most

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widely referred to as action tendencies; the concept of action tendency

figures prominently in the analysis of emotions offered by a diverse ar-

ray of theorists (e.g., Averill, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;

Parkinson, 1995). Action tendencies are biologically based behavioral

responses that have the function of helping people cope adaptively with

emotion-arousing events. Associated with each action tendency is a dis-

tinctive set of cognitive appraisals or interpretations, a characteristic

subjective feeling state (affect), and a pattern of physiological arousal or

activity. For example, the action tendency for anger is to attack the of-

fending party; for fear, the action tendency is avoidance or escape (see

Lazarus, 1991; C. Smith & Pope, 1992). Action tendencies are not

hardwired reflexes or automatically executed programs; these tenden-

cies may be (and often are) suppressed, ignored, or transformed. But

regardless of whether they are exhibited or suppressed, action tenden-

cies provide a behavioral orientation toward the emotion-arousing event.

Emotion and Message Production

Effects of Emotion on Communicative Goals. One way in which

emotional experiences may influence message production is through the

goal generation process. Message-production researchers have given in-

creased attention to goal generation in recent years, but even sophisti-

cated models of this process have not explicated the potential influence

of emotions on interaction goals (see Wilson, 1997). We believe the con-

cept of action tendency provides a vehicle for linking emotion and the

generation of communicative goals.

The action tendencies associated with particular emotions provide

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only abstract behavioral orientations to emotion-arousing situations.

Thus, these emotion-based tendencies must exert behavioral consequences

through their influence on specific, contextually relevant goals. In gen-

2 2 3 Communication

Theory

eral, then, (a) interpretation or appraisal of a situation generates a certain

emotional state, along with, of course, a variety of cognitions, (b) the emo-

tional state carries with it an action tendency or abstract behavioral goal

that, in turn, (c) informs, in conjunction with other factors, the generation

of specific communicative goals relevant to that particular situation.

A general scheme like this has been developed by Weiner (1985,1995)

in his attribution-emotion-action model of behavior. Consistent with

appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), Weiner and his col-

leagues argue that ( a ) information in a situation leads a perceiver to

attribute a targets conduct (e.g., missing class) to certain causes (e.g.,

misfortune vs. laziness), ( b ) these attributions arouse complementary

emotional states (e.g., sympathy vs. irritation) that, in turn, ( c ) modu-

late the likelihood of specific behavioral reactions (e.g., loaning vs. with-

holding ones class notes). Weiner and his colleagues (see Weiner, 1 9 9 5 )

report considerable empirical support for this model in predicting gen-

eral behavioral orientations (e.g., the self-reported likelihood of helping

or not helping in certain situations). Bradbury and Fincham (1992) ap-

plied a similar model to the context of marital interaction. These re-

searchers found, consistent with Weiners framework, tha t distinct attri -

butions for the causes of a spouses behavior were associated with spe -

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cific emotional reactions, and these emotions, in turn, were associated

with particular behaviors toward the spouse. Although interesting, this

research did not examine just how attributions and emotions resulted in

characteristic forms of behavior and, in particular, did not examine the

connection between emotional states and interaction goals.

MacGe orge ( 1999b) recently elaborated and extended Weiners frame -

work to examine explicitly the likelihood of pursuing varied communi-

cative goals in situations where the provision of social support was con-

textually relevant. Specifically, MacGeorge found that when situational

information led participants to feel sympathetic rather than irritated to-

ward a target experiencing emotional distress (manipulated by making

the target appear more or less responsible for a problematic event), they

indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing communicative goals such as

making the target feel better, feel understood, and feel sympathized with.

When participants were led to feel more irritated toward the target, they

indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing critical and recriminative goals

such as getting the target t o recognize his or her responsibility for the

situation, getting the target to see tha t he or she needed t o behave more

responsibly in the future, and getting the target to realize that his or her

behavior had negative consequences. Importantly, MacGeorge was able

t o show (through path-analytic procedures) that perceiver attributions

affected communicative goals largely through the mediation of emo-

tional reactions.

224 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages

Although MacGeorges (1999b) results provide support for the no -

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tion tha t attributions influence interaction goals through emotions, they

leave unresolved many important questions about the precise ways in

which emotions combine with other elements of a communicative situa-

tion in the generation of interaction goals. As just one example, the inti-

macy level between interactants has been found to influence a wide range

of cognitions and behaviors. In particular, research suggests tha t infor-

mation indicating a target is responsible for his or her distressed state is

more likely to reduce help extended to low intimates (e.g., acquaintan-

ces) than high intimates (e.g., friends; see Weiner, 1995). Though not

terribly surprising, this finding raises several interesting questions about

how people generate interaction goals and the role of emotion in this

process. For example, does intimacy affect interaction goals in support

contexts by biasing attributions, and thereby influencing emotions (e.g.,

is the friend seen as less responsible than the acquaintance, with this

attribution generating more sympathy and less irritation)? Does inti-

macy affect interaction goals not so much through biasing attributions

but by influencing emotional reactions (e.g., does ones affection for in -

timates lead to more benign and sympathetic feelings for a friend than

for an acquaintance, regardless of the attributions made ) ? Does inti-

macy affect interaction goals primarily through relational rules that, for

example, dictate supportive behavior toward friends when they are in

need, n o matter what one may think or feel about the causes of this

n e e d ? The s e que s t ions , whi ch a r e cur r ent ly being addr e s s ed by

MacGeorge (1999a), illustrate some of the complex factors tha t may

both influence emotion and be influenced by emotion, in the process of

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generating interaction goals.

Although some research indicates that features of social situations

may arouse emotions tha t influence communicative goals, other research

suggests that personality traits may influence how situations are inter-

preted, the extent to which emotions are aroused by these interpreta-

tions, and the goals pursued in these situations. For example, people

differ in their empathic orientation, here viewed as the dispositional ten-

dency t o feel sympathetic concern on the part of distressed others. Re-

search has found what appear to be causal linkages between emotional

empathy ( t h e dispositional tendency to experience sympathetic con-

cern for distressed othe r s ) a n d generation of supportive communica-

tion goals in samples of both children (e.g., Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon,

Troyer, & Switzer, 1 9 9 4 ) a n d adul t s (e.g., Tamborini, Salomonson,

& Bahk, 1993; Trobst, Collins, & Embree, 1 9 9 4 ) . These findings

suggest t h a t othe r personality t r a i t s may be associated wi th distinct

emotional experiences (see Frijda, 1 9 9 3 ) tha t , in turn, generate char-

acteristic goals.

225 Communication

Theory

Viewing personality traits as influencing communicative goals through

the emotions these traits characteristically arouse addresses some of the

objections that have been raised to personality-based explanations of

message behavior (e.g., Hewes & Planalp, 1987). However, it remains

unclear whether personality traits affect interaction goals through their

influence on the interpretive process, the emotions aroused by particular

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interpretations, the goals activated by particular emotions, or some com-

bination of these. Moreover, it is quite possible that different traits af-

fect interaction goals through different mechanisms.

More broadly, there is much that we do not understand yet about

how emotions influence communicative goals; several specific issues merit

detailed investigation. First, just how does a global action tendency get

instantiated in context-specific communicative intentions? What are the

various processes through which the emotions manifest themselves in

communicative intentions? Do emotions make memories of particular

communicative goals especially salient, o r d o they exert their effects on

specific intentions through other mechanisms?

Second, to what extent are communicative goals determined by emo-

tions and their accompanying action tendencies? Many other features of

the person and situation also influence interaction goals (e.g., role con-

siderations, politeness norms, relational rules, other situational demands,

and priorities). H o w are all of these elements-in conjunction with

aroused emotional states-synthesized in the goal formation process?

Third, emotional states influence communicative goals in some situa-

tions more than others. People sometimes swallow their feelings, other

times give their feelings play, and still other times get carried away

by their feelings. How are these facts t o be explained? What are the

processes that inhibit, allow, and magnify the motivational potentials

associated with a n emotions action tendency in the process of forming

communicative goals? Concepts like display rule account for confor-

mity to social norms in the expression of emotion (see below), but d o

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not directly address the differential effect that emotions have on com-

municative goals in different situations. Clearly, additional research is

needed on a great many issues concerning the influence of emotions on

communicative goals.

Effects of Emotion on Message Planning and Enactment. The

goal generation process is certainly not the only component of message

production influenced by emotional experiences. There is considerable

evidence tha t both the planning (action assembly) process and enact-

ment (execution) process are influenced by emotions, sometimes strongly

so. Although there are suggestions tha t emotions may facilitate these

processes (perhaps through focusing attention and other cognitive re-

sources o n the task a t hand; see Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1991), the


overwhelming research focus has been o n how emotions-specially anxi-

e t y - c a n disrupt the planning and generation of messages.

Most of the research examining stage fright, social anxiety, communi-

cation apprehension, and related phenomena (see reviews by McCroskey

& Beatty, 1998; Patterson & Ritts, 1997) has focused on the causes of

social-communication anxiety, its personal and social consequences, and

its alleviation. Recently, however, increased attention has turned t o the

effects of anxiety o n the message-production process. People experience

anxiety in communication situations for several reasons, including un-

certainty about how to behave in a situation, the belief that they cannot

meet the demands of the situation, and anticipation of negative reac-

tions from others due t o their inadequate performances (see Greene &

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Sparks, 1983; Patterson & Ritts, 1997). Regardless of its source, once

aroused, anxiety tends t o have a variety of debilitating effects o n mes-

sage production, especially if the experience of anxiety in social situa-

tions is chronic. Anxious communicators are less fluent and less orga-

nized; they are more likely to stutter, exit interactions when given the

opportunity, exhibit a quivering voice, engage in less eye contact, repeat

themselves, pause more frequently, loose track of ideas and the topical

flow of interactions, speak more softly, and avoid many interactions

when given the choice (Beatty & McCroskey, 1998; Patterson & Ritts,

1997). We wish to propose several distinct mechanisms through which

anxiety may have these and related debilitating effects on message pro-

duction (for a somewhat different set of mechanisms, see Leary, 1983).

First, anxiety may distract the attentional capacities of the individual

from the communicative task a t hand. At its core, anxiety reflects a con-

cern with an uncertain threat (Lazarus, 1991). Given this core theme, it

has been suggested tha t the action tendency associated with anxiety in-

volves scanning for potential sources of danger (Leary, 1991; Mathews,

1990). Although such scanning (of both the perceptual field and memory)

may be functional when the potential of danger is real, most social situa-

tions are not very dangerous, so this scanning devotes important attentional

resources to little useful purpose. Hence, anxiety may distract attentional

focus and concentration from where it would be more usefully placed-n

relevant features of the ongoing communicative situation. Research needs

to examine the extent to which anxious communicators exhibit a dis-

rupted attentional focus during the message-planning process.

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Second, the onset of social anxiety, especially for chronic sufferers,

may generate a self-amplifying feedback loop wherein the anxious state

is maintained and intensified. Those experiencing social anxiety regu-

larly report having a host of negative, self-deprecatory thoughts, includ-

ing not knowing what to d o in the situation, feeling they are sure t o fail,

believing they will perform poorly in comparison t o others, expecting

227 Communication

Theory

they will look foolish o r incompetent in the eyes of others, anticipating

they will be rejected by others, and so forth (Sarason et al., 1991) . These

intrusive, self-preoccupied thoughts not only detract from attention to

the ongoing situation (see above), they tend t o be quite unmotivating

and are reported to be associated with reduced effort o n tasks (MacLeod,

1996) . Mor e serious, the prediction of failure and, especially, focus on

the unpleasant or harmful consequences of failure, tend t o maintain the

anxious state and may even intensify it over time. Two empirical impli-

cations of this account include that ( a ) the anxiety level of chronically

anxious communicators should increase over the course of a communi-

cative encounter while ( b ) the motivation to communicate should de-

crease. Future research should evaluate these predictions.

Third, the intrusive, self-deprecatory thoughts tha t accompany the

anxious state may interfere with the process of message planning or

assembly. Mos t current views of message production assume that hu-

man beings are limited capacity information processors who must de-

velop lines of behavior by retrieving relevant instructions from memory,

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integrating these modular instructions into a coherent behavioral repre-

sentation or program, and then physically executing the program.

These processes all make demands on cognitive resources, especially

working memory, where retrieved memories must be temporarily stored,

integrated, and held until executed (for detailed presentations of this

general scheme, see Berger, 1997, and Greene, 1995, 1997a ) . Anxiety

may interfere with these cognitive processes by filling valuable working

memory with task-irrelevant thoughts about the self. A recent study ex-

amining the message preparation process by low- and high-anxious in-

dividuals nicely illustrates the effects of such cognitive interference (Daly,

Vangelisti, & Weber, 1995) . This study utilized a talk aloud protocol

methodology to access the thoughts of participants during a 20-minute

period in which they prepared a speech. Compared to low-anxious par-

ticipants, those with high levels of communication anxiety reported more

thoughts expressing nervousness about speaking and doubt about their

personal capabilities; these subjects also reported fewer thoughts exhibiting

focus on audience concerns, constraints in the speaking situation, tools avail-

able for the speech, and ideas they intended to include in the speech.

The disruption in planning caused by irrelevant, intrusive thoughts

may increase the need for editing and revision, processes that consume

even more of scarce cognitive resources. Consistent with this, Daly et al.

(1995) found that highly anxious participants evaluated the complete-

ness of their thoughts more than less anxious participants; engaged in

more and longer searches for words, phrases, and concepts; and exhib-

ited more backtracking in the course of message preparation. Another

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recent study (Greene, Rucker, Zauss, & Harris, 1998) indicates that the


cognitive interference associated with anxiety not only disrupts message

planning, i t undermines the acquisition of message-production skills.

There are, then, several mechanisms through which anxiety may nega-

tively impact the message-production process. Future study should ex-

amine the extent to which these mechanisms jointly influence the mes-

sage-planning process; we suspect tha t they represent complementary

rather than competing accounts for the effects of anxiety on message

production.

For some, the anxiety associated with performance in social situa-

tions occasionally intensifies into fear- for example, stage fright in

the context of public presentations. A strong emotion like fear, with its

intense physiological accompaniments, not only may significantly dis-

turb message planning, but also thoroughly disrupt the execution of a

message plan. Powerful emotions like fear, with their high levels of physi-

ological arousal, have the potential t o hijack bodily and cognitive

systems in the service of their action tendencies (which, in the case of

fear, is escape; see Lazarus, 1991). The physical trembling, tightened

respiration, chattering teeth, and related physical manifestations of in-

tense fear may make i t virtually impossible for the frightened individual

to enact whatever message plan has been developed; indeed, these physi-

cal expressions of fear may only deepen if the desire t o escape the pro-

voking situation is resisted. Extreme embarrassment has also been ob-

served t o seriously disrupt communicative performances; the acutely flus-

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tered individual appears momentarily incapable of enacting any mes-

sage plan (e.g., Miller, 1996). Although the effects of intense fear and

embarrassment o n speech are well documented, we know little about

how intense emotional states disrupt communicative performances. For

example, how does emotional hijacking occur and what can be done

to combat i t ?

Anxiety, fear, and embarrassment are not the only emotional states

found t o have debilitating effects on communication behavior. There is

ample evidence tha t communicative performances can be degraded by

emotions such as anger (see the review by Canary, Spitzberg, & Semic,

1998) and depression (see the review by Segrin, 1998). Recent research

suggests tha t anger and depression may negatively influence informa -

tion processing through some of the same mechanisms as anxiety, nota-

bly cognitive interference (e.g., Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker,

1997; Zillman, 1993). Do emotions such as anger and depression de-

grade communicative performance by upsetting message-planning a n d

enactment processes? If so, are these degrading effects primarily due t o

cognitive interference o r t o some other mechanism? Do other emotions

(e.g., j o y ) have facilitative effects on communicative performance? If so,

by what mechanisms d o these emotions enhance message planning and

229 Communication

Theory

enactment? Clearly, there is a rich agenda for research on how emotions

influence message planning and related processes.

Moods and Message Production

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Compared to emotions, moods are milder states that typically last much

longer and have no particular object or focus; as Parkinson (1995, p. 9 )

puts it, moods are tonic rather than phasic, and generally d o not have

discernible causes to the individuals experiencing them. As mild, pro-

longed states, moods d o not manifest the action tendencies associated

with emotions. So, how d o these relatively mild, lingering affective states

influence the situationally bound, goal-focused activity of message pro-

duction? We examine here some well-documented mood effects on two

aspects of message production: planning and interpretation.

Moods and Message Planning. Most cognitive models of message

planning represent this process as occurring through two phases: an ac-

tivation process where relevant procedural memories (records about how

to d o things) are retrieved from long-term storage, and a n assembly pro-

cess where these memories are fit together into a coherent output repre-

sentation or plan for the current situation. Greenes (1995, 1997a) ac -

tion assembly theory provides a particularly detailed discussion of these

yoked processes, so we employ concepts from this theory in what fol-

lows. According t o Greene, in any communicative situation, relevant

elements of procedural memory ( w h a t Green e terms proc edur a l

records) are activated above some resting level by ( a ) the individuals

interaction goals and ( b ) relevant contextual factors. Procedural records

are conceptualized as nodes in an interlinked system; hence, when acti-

vated above threshold, a given procedural record may spread activation

to other procedural records with which it is associatively linked. Activated

procedural records are subsequently edited and assembled (integrated) into

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a coherent output representation (plan) that is then executed behaviorally.

Following Bower (1981) , Greene and other theorists (e.g., Forgas,

1995a; Motley & Camden, 1985) suggest that a n individuals prevailing

mood state may be one of the relevant contextual elements that spread

activation t o nodes with which it is associated. Tha t is, mood states may

themselves serve as aroused nodes in the procedural-memory network

tha t activate other nodes with which they are associatively and contex-

tually linked. Further, a given mood state may be associatively linked to

particular message forms or message elements. This suggests that, for

example, when pursuing the communicative goal of making a request,

persons in happy moods may use request forms characteristic of hap -

piness, whereas persons in sad or depressed moods may use re -

quest forms tha t reflect that state. Research (see the review by Forgas,

1995a) indicates tha t happy persons typically are more confident, ambi-

tious, and helpful; set themselves higher goals; overestimate the likeli-

230 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages

hood of success; and are more likely to take moderate risks. In contrast,

people in sad moods tend t o produce more negative assessments of the

self; show reduced self-confidence and self-efficacy; make more self-dep-

recating attributions; and display more cautious and risk-avoidant judg-

ments and behaviors. Based on these properties of happy and sad moods,

Forgas (1999a) suggested that:

People in a happy mood should form more positive and more confident inferences due

to the selective priming and greater accessibility of positive memories and experiences

about similar situations in the past and [thus should] use more confident, direct, and

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risky request forms. In contrast, sad people might selectively recall incidents when they

suffered a loss of face due to overly direct requests and [thus] should employ a more

cautious, indirect, and polite requesting strategy. (p. 852)

Similar predictions have been made with respect to the use of coopera-

tive, competitive, and avoidant negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998 b).

Moreover, Forgas (1995a) argues that the effects of mood states are

most likely to infuse operations, such as the assembly of request forms

and negotiation tactics, when messages are produced in response to rela-

tively demanding or challenging situations. Such situations require more

extensive and detailed processing (activation and assembly) than do com-

paratively simple, routine situations, and thus permit a greater infusion

of mood. An elegant set of experiments provides strong support for these

predictions, in particular, demonstrating that mood has its greatest ef-

fect in communicative situations calling for more elaborate and substan-

tive cognitive processing (Forgas, 199813, 1999a, 1999b); similar effects

were also found for responses to varied request forms (Forgas, 1998a).

Mood has also been shown to have several other effects on the mes-

sage-construction process. For example, several researchers have found

that induced mood states lead to the use of mood-congruent lexical items

when generating both oral and written messages (e.g., Lindsey, 1996;

Motley & Camden, 1985). Mood has also been found to influence the

amount and intimacy of communication in self-disclosure contexts (e.g.,

Cunningham, 1988), as well as the production of more persuasive argu-

ments when engaged in counterattitudinal advocacy (e.g., Bohner &

Schwarz, 1993). In all these instances, mood has been theorized t o influ-

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ence behavior through its impact on the message-planning process, and

specifically through priming (activating) procedural memories congru-

ent with the prevailing mood state.

Mood and Interpretation. Just as mood states have been found to

influence the operation of procedural memory through the activation of

mood-congruent records, so mood states have been found to influence

the operation of the declarative memory system (used in interpretive

processes) through the activation of mood-congruent interpretive

231 Communication

Theory

schemes. For example, mood states have been shown to influence the

character of the causal attributions people make about their own and

others behaviors (Forgas, l 9 9 4 , 1 9 9 8 c ) , judgments about the quality of

close personal relationships (e.g., Forgas, Levinger, & Moylan, 1994),

and evaluations made a bout both prototypical and atypical people and

relationships (Forgas, 1992, 1995b).

In addition, mood states have been found to influence the capacity to

organize and integrate information in the impression-formation process

(e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Rosenbach, Crockett, &

Wapner, 1973). These effects may be due more to attentional narrowing

than memory priming; however, more research is needed to determine

the exact mechanisms through which moods exert such effects on inter-

pretive processes. In any event, it is clear that mood states can have a

substantial effect on a variety of interpretive processes tha t underlie the

judgments people make about social situations, other persons, and in-

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terpersonal relationships. Definitions of situations, attributions about

the causes of others behaviors, and evaluations of personal relation -

ships obviously have relevance to communicative goals; hence, mood

effects o n these social judgments have important implications for mes-

sage production.

Mood and Message Production: Unanswered Questions. Al-

though the effects of mood have been documented on several facets of

message production, there is considerable room for additional specifica-

tion about the nature of mood states and how these states have their

observed effects. One issue concerns the effects of different mood states

on message-production processes. Most research has distinguished con-

ceptually between positive and negative moods, b u t has operationalized

this distinction in terms of the specific mood states of happiness and

sadness. Yet, it is clear tha t happiness does not exhaust the class of posi-

tive moods, just as sadness does not exhaust the class of negative moods

(e.g., negative moods can include irritation and anxiety as well as sad-

ness). Different mood states within the broad classes of positive and

negative should have distinct effects o n message production, given

that different moods should prime distinct sets of procedural memories.

Consistent with this, there is some evidence that different negative moods

have distinct effects on message reception (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard,

& Kramer, 1994) . Future research should explore how different moods

affect production processes and identify the ways in which specific moods

are likely to influence features of messages in different functional con-

texts (e.g., persuasion, support).

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Second, because moods dont prime all affectively congruent memo -

ries, but only those that are relevant to the current situation (see Forgas,

1995a, p. 45) , the question remains as to just how mood primes rel -

2 3 2 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages

evant memories. What makes a mood -congruent memory relevant t o

the ongoing situation? There appear t o be many different ways in which

this question could be answered-features of the setting, the primary

communicative goal, the participant s, the speakers role, etc., could all

be viewed as relevant aspects of the situation. Are all mood -congru-

ent memories associated with diverse aspects of the communicative situ-

ation activated? If so, how does such a nebulous influence come t o af-

fect the content of messages produced?

Third, it is not clear when moods will affect message construction

and when they wont. Forgass (1 995a ) affect infusion model (AIM) sug -

gests that moods are most likely t o influence message production when

systematic, rather than heuristic, information processing is required.

Forgas further argues that mood effects are minimized when persons

approach tasks with either direct access or motivated processing strate-

gies (for a discussion of these information-processing modes, see Forgas,

1995a). Although Forgas has reported some support for these predic-

tions, the lines separating the circumstances provoking heuristic, sys-

tematic, and motivated processing remain fuzzy. To attain stronger pre-

dictive power, researchers will need to specify more clearly the particu-

lar features of situations tha t permit mood t o infuse message-produc-

tion operations.

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Fourth, accounts about how moods influence message construction

remain frustratingly underdeveloped. For example, Forgass impressive

research program clearly shows tha t moods can influence aspects of re-

quests and negotiation strategies, but doesnt show exactly how moods

exert their effects. In part, this is because Forgass work lacks an explicit

theory of message production, and the implicit model informing this

work closely resembles the outmoded strategy repertoire view of mes -

sage production-the notion that people store abstract representations

of message strategies in memory and then instantiate these abstract struc-

tures with contextually relevant content. This view of message produc-

tion suffers from numerous problems and has been abandoned by most

contemporary message- production theorists (see D. OKeefe, 1994; Wil -

son, 1997). Thus, one objective for future theorizing lies in integrating

detailed models of mood effects with more contemporary views of mes-

sage production.

In sum, affective states-both moods and emotions-have a variety

of effects on message production. Exploring these effects and detailing

them empirically depend critically on highly specific models of both af-

fect and message production. As more detailed models of these phenom-

ena are developed, we may look forward to more precise understand-

ings of how affect influences the cognitive processes implicated in the

production of messages.

233 Communication

Theory

Emotion as the Content of Messages

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O u r second question is this: How are emotional states communicated to

others? Tha t is, how are the emotional states that people experience

(love, shame, depression) communicated as the essential content of the

message, not just as a tone or relational message added onto other con-

tent? When someone puts his or her head down on the table, cries, and

says, I cant take i t anymore, sadness is the essence of the message.

Most of the early work on communicating emotion, such as Ekmans

work o n facial expressions, tells us about the nature of emotional ex-

pressions, but much less about the processes by which these expressions

are produced.

Emotion Is (Ex)Pressed Out

Darwin (1872/1965, pp. 28-65) posited three principles to explain how

expressions came to be associated with emotional states. First, the prin -

ciple of serviceable associated habits maintains tha t certain actions are

associated with certain states of mind because they once served some

function, but through habit come t o be associated with the feeling even

when the action itself becomes useless. For example, when preparing to

attack, our ancestors bared their canine teeth, but now we only curl up

the corner of the mouth in a sneer of derision (pp. 247-252). Second,

the principle of antithesis indicates that when one wants to suppress

certain actions, opposing muscle groups are used to inhibit the action,

and they become associated with opposing states of mind. For example,

whereas clenched fists and tense arm muscles indicate the tendency to

attack, shrugging the shoulders and showing the palms of the hands

indicates just the opposite (pp. 263-272). Finally, the third principle

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states that when nerve force is generated in excess, we recognize these

effects a s expressive. Hands trembling, hyperventilating, and sweating

with fear are examples. The three principles may explain how emotional

expressions came t o take the form that they did for humans and other

species, but they say little about the processes by which they are pro-

duced for individuals in specific situations. Presumably they are hardwired

programs tha t are accessed automatically when needed.

Nevertheless, Darwin was also quite aware that expressions are in-

hibited, exaggerated, changed, and even faked for strategic purposes.

H e observed, for example, that weeping is rare in men because of its

being thought weak and unmanly and cites reports that New Zealand

women were able t o shed tears at will while mourning for the dead

(pp. 153-155). Repeatedly, he notes that some muscular and other so-

matic changes are less easily controlled than others and so are more

likely to reveal genuine emotional state (for a n impressive review of the

huge range of cues t o emotion, see Bowers, Metts, & Duncanson, 1985).

T h u s began the scholarly distinction between spontaneous and strate-


gic-symbolic expression of emotion (Buck, 1984) . It is clear tha t they

are different. Posed facial expressions, for example, tend to be easier t o

recognize than spontaneous ones (Motley & Camden, 1988). O n the

other hand, it is equally clear tha t there is a gradient of controllability

tha t is partially innate and partially practiced, a s Darwin also noted. H e

even proposed a mechanism: Actions which were first voluntary, soon

became habitual, and a t last hereditary, and then came to be performed

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even in opposition to the will (Darwin 1872/1965, p. 356) . Yet it seems

tha t what can be done can be undone, a t least in part. Some inherited

emotional expressions (such as cries of distress) can be taken over by the

will and adjusted or even faked for effect. Babies learn t o do this in their

first year of life (Saarni, 1999, p. 18) , and they develop increasingly

sophisticated ways to manage emotion well into adulthood (Labouvie-

Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1990) .

The message-production processes by which expressions of emotion

are controlled are not well understood. One might speculate that the

ability t o modulate some expressions may be inherited because it ap-

pears so early in life, because it is so useful for survival, and because it is

found in other species (Marler & Evans, 1997) . Sometimes the squeaky

child gets the parent and sometimes the predator, so it pays t o be able to

cont rol t h e squeaks. People w h o s tudy the neurology of emot ion

(Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996) have found tha t sensory input is routed

first through the more primitive amygdala for a crude-but-quick screen-

ing for danger a split second before the neocortex gets the input to do a

more detailed analysis and to exert more intentional control over emo-

tional reactions. Goleman (1995, pp. 13-29) has popularized this se-

quence as a n emotional hijacking in which anger holds h ostage more

thoughtful emotional responses. In partial contrast, Zillman ( 1993) at-

tributes loss of control during anger t o overexcitation, which leads to

cognitive impairments that make it difficult to take a broader perspec-

tive and easy to fall back on well-practiced habits, such as violence. In

complete contrast to Goleman, Averill (1993) points o u t tha t anger may

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not be controlled because it serves as a convenient excuse for wrongdo-

ing-My anger made me d o it, or better yet, I was emotionally hi -

jacked! Frijda (1986, pp. 401 -450) argues tha t emotional regulation is

not something tha t comes after a n emotion has become fully manifested,

but rather is an integral part of the emotion process, so that one could

expect control or lack thereof to operate through any number of mecha-

nisms. The relative merits of these different accounts clearly deserve re-

search attention.

The most controllable emotional expression is, of course, verbal ex-

pression. Expressing feelings verbally with precision and accuracy, how-

ever, can be quite difficult, even setting aside the case of disingenuous

235 Communication

Theory

expressions. For example, the ability to label emotions with single words

starts early and usually increases in sophistication with age, though not

always. Some adults have such difficulty in verbalizing their own emo-

tional states that there is a special term for their impairment-alexithymia

( n o words for feelings; Sifneos, 1 9 9 6 ) . For example, Haviland and

Goldston (1992, pp. 220-221) cite a college sophomore who used the

term upset t o describe ( a ) how Hamlet felt over his fathers murder,

( b ) how his neighbors felt over their daughters school report, ( c ) how

the Pope felt over drugs tha t induce abortion, and ( d ) how he himself

felt over breakfast. Interestingly, these researchers also cite the example

of a precocious 26-month-old child who sai d, Im sad I popped it (a

balloon). There is some evidence that, in everyday interaction, people

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rarely label their feelings, although they d o speak of them indirectly

(Planalp et al., 1996; Shimanoff, 1985) . The process by which people

choose a n appropriate verbalization of their feelings, either using emo-

tion terms o r more complex descriptions, is an intriguing one tha t in-

vites more research.

One of the most intractable problems for scholars is t o understand

the coordination of emotional cues, especially verbal and nonverbal cue

combinations (Planalp & Knie, in press). Ordinary people, of course,

seem to have more trouble isolating cues than coordinating them, as is

apparent when watching the facial expressions and gestures of someone

on the phone or when trying t o read an emotionally charged e-mail with-

out imagining vocal inflections. Conversely, it may be much easier t o

fake a smile than it is to fake joy in the face, voice, body, and in elabo-

rate verbal messages all at the same time. Faking joy by smiling when

encountering a n acquaintance is childs play (literally); faking the emo -

tional devastation of being a holocaust victim takes a Meryl Streep (in

Sophies Choi c e ) . In fact, many actors find it easier and more convincing to

fake the emotion (Stanislavski acting) than to fake the expression. More-

over, the research tells us more about how t o manage feelings than it does

about how to leave the feelings alone and manage only the expressions.

Emotion Is Pulled Out

Expressions are pushed out by emotional states, t o be sure, but they are

also pulled out by social situations (Andersen & Guerrero, 1998, pp.

57-64; Scherer, 1994) . Plentiful evidence indicates tha t emotional ex-

pressions are adapted t o audiences, nearly always in the direction of

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making them more socially appropriate than spontaneous expressions

would be. For example, Bavelas and her colleagues (1988) found that

sympathetic winces in response to others pain were more likely when

the victim and observer had eye contact. Fernindez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda

(1995) found that Olympic gold medal winners who were extremely

happy tended not to smile when standing behind stage, did smile when

2 3 6 Producing Emotion( a l ) Messages

on stage receiving their medals, and then stopped again when the na-

tional anthem was played. Even imagined audiences have an impact.

Students who believed that a same-sex friend was in another room watch-

ing the same funny video that they were watching laughed more than

they did when watching the video alone and as much as when the friend

was watching in the same room (Fridlund, 1991).

Societies train their members in the proper expression of emotions,

and members internalize and use a variety of display rules that are ex-

quisitely sensitive to social situations. Children learn in their families

how frequently, intensely, and under what circumstances they should

express their feelings (Halberstadt, 1986). Well-socialized members of

U.S. culture learn that showing positive emotions is more acceptable

than showing negative ones (Scheff, 1984; Sommers, 1984) and that it is

more appropriate for women to express sadness by asking for support

than it is for men (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998), more appropriate to ex-

press feelings to a friend than to a stranger (M. Clark & Taraban, 1991),

and more appropriate to express sympathy to the deserving than to the

undeserving (C. Clark, 1997), and much more. Of course, these rules, as

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social conventions, vary across groups and cultures. African-Americans

tend to be more expressive than European Americans, Utku Eskimos

believe it is almost never appropriate for adults to express anger, and the

Balinese consider laughing on hearing of the death of a loved one to be

not only appropriate, but, in some cases, mandatory (see Planalp, 1999;

Porter & Samovar, 1998).

The processes by which emotional expressions are adapted to audi-

ences are intriguing because clearly they are learned, but equally clearly

audience adaptations become so automatic that they are largely uncon-

scious and effortless. The key to those processes is likely to be found by

studying childhood socialization of emotion (e.g., Saarni, 1999) or adults

making transitions to social situations tha t have different emotional

rules ( e . g . , in a different culture or a different workplace; see Conrad

& Witte, 1994).

Pressing and Pulling Emotion in aTug of War

Mostly, we assume that the experience of emotion is involuntary and

that the expression of emotion is tuned to social rules and norms. In

addition, people may engage in quite purposeful or planned expressions

of emotion for strategic or manipulative purposes. They take control

over the push of felt emotions and the pull of expected emotions to

shape emotional expressions for their own purposes. For example, they

use feigned emotional states as reasons, causes, and justifications for

action; they strategically manipulate others to respond as desired

through emotion display; and they deceive others by masking or ex-

pressing emotions.

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237 Communication

Theory

Deception is an interesting example. Liars must control the genuine

feelings t h a t may accompany lying-anxiety a b o u t getting caught,

arousal, even duping delight (Buller & Burgoon, 1 9 9 8 ) . At the same

time, the liar often must fake an emotion that is expected-surprise at

the missing records, anger toward the real murderer, righteous indig -

nation a t being falsely accused. Often managing all of the emotional

cues is too difficult and genuine emotion leaks out, especially through

the body and tone of voice, giving away the lie (Buller & Burgoon, p.

3 9 8 ) . In other circumstances, genuine emotions need only be exagger-

ated for effect, such as letting irritation build into rage in order t o get

your own way (Bailey, 1983), faking or exaggerating happiness to in-

gratiate yourself t o others, or milking sadness to elicit support (Clark,

Pataki, & Carver, 1 9 9 6 ) .

Children take a few years to learn emotional dissemblance. For ex-

ample, Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 , p. 1 8 9 ) found that when children were expected to

express positive feelings about a disappointing gift, the younger boys ( 6 -

year-olds) were unable t o d o it, the intermediate-aged children showed

what the researchers called transitional behaviors reflecting social

anxiety and tension about what t o do, and the 10- to 11-year-olds, espe-

cially girls, could show disingenuous joy. By the early teen years, girls

reported feeling a need t o balance expressions of their genuine feelings

with the requirements of the social situation (Saarni, 1999, pp. 289-

290). Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 ) provides a useful analysis of the complex knowl-

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edge, muscular control, and motivation needed t o dissemble emotion

successfully. Considerable work remains to be done in this area, how-

ever, especially on the integration of verbal and nonverbal production

systems during the course of dissembling.

Shaping Emotion in the Push and Pull

W h a t happens t o the emotional s t a t e a s i t is pressed a n d pulled o u t

into the open? Usually, we assume t h a t the experience of emotion

precedes its expression, but to some degree emotions a r e created a n d

shaped in expressing them. Various mechanisms have been posited,

ranging from microscopic physiological processes to macroscopic

social and cultural processes, t o explain how emotional expression

shapes emotional experience.

One of the most captivating and counterintuitive ideas is the facial

feedback hypothesis (FFH), which posits that feedback from facial ex-

pressions of emotion influences emotional experience, not just the other

way around, as is often presumed. The FFH has produced ingenious

experiments designed t o get around the problem of experimenter de-

mand by asking people t o hold a pen in their teeth (simulating a smile)

or in their lips (simulating a frown; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1 9 8 8 ) or

by giving them pronunciation tasks that d o the same ( e vs. ii; Zajonc,

2 3 8 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages

Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). In his extensive review, Cappella (1993, p.

27) finds tha t the FFH is a reliable effect tha t is small in magnitude, may

o r may not be emotion specific, and can initiate as well a s modify sub-

jective emotional states. At least three mechanisms have been posited to

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explain this effect, and all three remain controversial. The first is the

general cognitive-interpretive claim (Stepper & Strack, 1993) and its

more specific versions (e.g., Laird, 1974), which suggest that feedback

from a number of sources, including facial and other cues, along with

appraisals of the environment, are integrated into the subjective experi-

ence of emotion. A second physiologically grounded claim is tha t tem-

perature changes in blood flow t o the brain mediate subjective emo-

tional experience (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989). A third explanation links

facial feedback with conversational partners mutual imitation of each

others facial expressions (especially smiles) in generating a n account for

emotional contagion (Cappella, 1993).

Other mechanisms by which emotional expressions influence emo-

tional experience take a decidedly cognitive-interpretive and linguistic

turn. Talking through emotions with the goal of reframing and achiev-

ing insight is a staple of therapy (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 63-90;

Pennebaker, 1997). Conversely, expression t o vent feelings appears to

be useless, if not counterproductive (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 25-

62). Shared meanings for emotional experiences develop a s children get

help in labeling their feelings (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p. 181) and as

adults construct emotional experience interactively (Staske, 1994). Say-

ing Im not angry, just very disappointed helps to foreground, legiti -

mize, and perhaps shape the speakers feelings, and also works as a bid

to frame the listeners response as Im ashamed, not angry.

Flight attendants, bill collectors, medical students, and people in other

occupations use trained imagination and forms of talk to shape their

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emotions into what the job requires (Hochschild, 1983; Waldron, 1994).

To summon patience, flight attendants conjure up images of passengers

in distress and speak of uncontrolled passengers (Hochschild, 1983).

To call up anger, bill collectors imagine irresponsible credit card users

and talk about deadbeats (Sutton, 1991). To maintain emotional dis -

tance, medical students picture disempersoned bodies, a s opposed to

disembodied persons, and talk about the gall bladder in Room 27 (Smith

& Kleinman, 1989). Early work on emotional regulation a t work had a

critical tone, emphasizing its exploitive nature, but later commentators have

suggested that emotional labor may be helpful if it fosters positive feelings

or effective emotion regulation (Conrad & Witte, 1994; Mann, 1997).

Constructionist cultural models take the social shaping of emotion so

far as t o say tha t people live dramatically different emotional lives, de-

pending on the circumstances to which the culture has tuned its emo-

239 Communication

Theory

tions. If talk shapes, simplifies, selects and standardizes emotion and

lack of talk leaves emotions preconscious and inchoate, as Levy (1984,

p. 227) suggests, it is easy t o imagine why nearly all Chinese mothers

reported tha t their 3-year-olds understood the nearest Chinese equiva-

lent of ashamed, whereas only 10% of American mothers did (Shaver,

Wu, & Schwartz, 1992, p. 1 9 9 ) . The sea of messages tha t is cultural life

produces variations in emotional profiles through talk, and also through

nonverbal expressions. In Bali, smiling and showing positive feeling

nonverbally are highly valued, whereas expressing negative feelings, es-

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pecially in public, is nearly a cultural taboo. A Balinese woman away

from Bali reported that it is so much easier t o be happy in Bali, there

are so many smiles (Wikan, 1990, p. 111) .

Emotion as the Target of Messages: Emotion

Knowledge and the Production of Messages

Directed at Managing Others Emotions

Our third question is this: How does what people know ( o r believe)

about emotion influence their attempts to manage (create, increase, de-

crease, or otherwise modify) the emotional states of others? Others

emotions are a common target of communicative efforts; indeed, influ-

encing the feelings of others may be one of the most basic tasks in which

people engage, either as a means to some end (e.g., frightening someone

about risky conduct t o improve health behavior) or as an end in itself

(e.g., celebrating a friends accomplishment). When producing messages

in pursuit of such goals, people must dr aw on some store of knowledge

about the emotions and how they operate.

Emotion Knowledge Structures and

Message Production

People strive t o understand aspects of the world they encounter regu-

larly, and they build up stocks of knowledge about these features so they

can manage them effectively. An individuals stock of knowledge will, of

course, be directly influenced by his or her personal experiences. More-

over, cultures ( and other social collectives) develop shared stocks of

knowledge about facets of the world and then pass these stocks of knowl-

edge on t o new members through primary and secondary socialization

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processes. Thus, an individuals stock of knowledge reflects both per -

sonal and cultural influences (see Berger & Luckmann, 1967) .

Emotion, that is, human feeling, is certainly one aspect of the world

that all individuals and cultures experience and learn t o manage, both in

themselves and in others. Recent research documents that people have

quite elaborate stores of emotion knowledge, both about emotion in

general (e.g., Plutchik, 1984; Sh aver, Schwartz, Kirson, & OConnor,


1 9 8 7 ) and about many specific emotions (e.g., Fitness & Fletcher, 1 9 9 3 ) .

Theorists use a variety of terms in referring to these stocks of emotion

knowledge, including emotion concepts (e.g., Kovecses, 1 9 9 0 ) , emotion

protot ype s (e.g., Fehr, 1 9 9 4 ) , emotion scripts (e.g., Fehr & Baldwin,

1 9 9 6 ) , emotion knowledge structures (e.g., Fitness, 1 9 9 6 ) , and implicit

or lay theories of emotion (e.g., K . Smith, 1 9 9 5 ) . The varied terms re-

flect some important theoretical differences in assumptions regarding

the content and structure of peoples emotion knowledge. However, all

of these terms reflect a common concern with what people know about

emotions and how they use that knowledge.

What is in these stocks of knowledge? What is their content? H o w are

they organized? How d o people access and apply the knowledge resi-

dent in their stocks? In what ways d o these stocks of knowledge differ

across individuals within a culture? H o w d o these stocks of knowledge

typically differ for members of different cultures? Research has only re-

cently begun t o sketch answers t o these questions, and a great deal of

work must be completed t o answer them in meaningful detail. To date,

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most empirical work has focused on the knowledge of specific emotions

held by adult members of Western cultures, especially as tha t knowledge

is represented in emotion prototypes (e.g., Fehr, 1994; Fehr & Baldwin,

1 9 9 6 ) . This research has sought to describe the general features and

functions of emotion prototypes; thus far, little attention has been given

to individual differences in emotion knowledge structures. Moreover,

there is a paucity of research examining differences in emotion knowl-

edge structures associated with factors such as culture and gender (but

see Fischer, 1995; Paez & Vergara, 1 9 9 5 ) .

There is good reason for believing that emotion knowledge structures

influence message production. For example, these knowledge structures

have been found t o affect memory, judgment, and inference processes

about other persons and social situations (Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Fit-

ness, 1 9 9 6 ) , which suggests tha t they should also influence various mes-

sage-production processes. As yet, however, there appears to be n o re-

search directly examining how emotion knowledge influences messages

when people seek t o manage the emotions of others. Still, assessments of

individual variations in emotion knowledge structures would appear to

have the potential to illuminate why different people sometimes pro-

duce such diverse message forms when seeking t o manage the emotions

of others. Consider the following efforts to comfort someone w h o is

distressed about having been dropped by a dating partner:

1 . Im really sorry. Gee, I wish I knew what to say! I never know what to say in these

situations. Uh, youll feel better if you keep in mind theres nothing wrong with you; the

problem is with her.

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24 1 Communication

Theory

2. Go a h e a d a n d cry; I can tell you are upset. And its OK to scream o r yell, i f y o u want.

You need t o let your feelings o u t .

3 . Wow, this has to have turned your world upside d own . W h a t happened? And h ow

a r e you feeling a b o u t everything? Take your time a n d tell me a b o u t t h e whole thing.

Each of these messages reflects a distinct set of beliefs about the nature,

course, causes, and cures of emotional upset. The first appears t o be

informed by what might be called a magic bullet model of emotional

support (Burleson & Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) ; the idea underlying such mes-

sages appears t o be that others emotional states can be influenced quite

directly through the utterance of the right words. The second message

reflects what might be termed a catharsis model of emotional supp ort

(Planalp, 1999); here, the operative assumption is that people need t o

vent their emotions when upset. The third message exhibits what might

be called a sense -making model of support (Pennebaker, 1 9 9 7 ) ; the

assumption here is that distressing situations often undermine o u r rep-

resentations of the world, and people need t o make sense of these situa-

tions discursively if they are to heal. T h e point here is each message

reflects a different set of beliefs (or knowledge structures) about the course

and cure of emotional distress.

The differences manifest in these three approaches to comforting are

not merely stylistic, they are functional. Messages flowing from the sense-

making model of support are generally a more effective means of pro-

viding support (in the sense of helping people work through their dis-

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tressed emotions a n d eventually feel better) than are messages informed

by either the magic bullet o r catharsis models of support (see Burleson

& Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) . Given this functional difference, it is important t o

detail the differences in the emotional knowledge structures informing

distinct message forms. Mo r e generally, it can be hypothesized that some

implicit theories of emotion (of sadness, fear, anxiety, etc.) are better

than others-better in the sense of being more differentiated, abstract,

accurate, open t o modification, a n d correspondent with what profes-

sionals know about the nature and function of both emotion in general

and particular affective states. A corollary t o this hypothesis is that some

persons should generally be particularly good a t managing the emotional

states of others, or at least at managing particular emotional states, whereas

others will be less skillful. Obviously, these hypotheses should be tested.

Unfortunately, consistent with the paucity of research on individual

differences in emotion knowledge structures, there have been few theo-

retical efforts to delineate important dimensions of difference in emo-

tion knowledge structures, and still fewer efforts to develop methods

capable of capturing theoretically relevant differences. Without these

conceptual a n d methodological tools, it is difficult t o test hypotheses


regarding the effects of individual differences in emotion knowledge struc-

tures o n the production of effective, emotion-focused messages. Hence,

a n agenda for future research includes ( a ) identifying some of the di-

mensions along which different emotion knowledge structures can be

arrayed, (b) developing methods that will permit the assessment of indi-

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viduals knowledge stru ctures in terms of the specified dimensions of differ-

ence, ( c ) detailing ways in which different types of emotion knowledge should

influence message behavior, and (d) testing these predictions.

Individual Differences in the Capacity

to Acquire Emotion Knowledge and

Message Production

A rather different way of thinking about emotion knowledge is in terms

of the individuals capacity t o acquire information about the nature,

causes, and course of anothers emotions. Research o n this c apacity has

focused on abilities to recognize diverse emotional states (affect identifi-

cation), comprehend the causes for these states (affect understanding),

and correctly anticipate the course of these states (affect prediction).

Special attention has been given t o affective perspective taking (the abil-

i ty to make warranted inferences about others affective states), as well

as to the development of complex systems of interpersonal constructs,

which appear t o underlie the ability t o engage in affective perspective

taking (Burleson, 1982). Substantial developmental and individual dif-

ferences have been detected in all of these abilities (e.g., Burleson &

Caplan, 1998; Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shephard, 1997) .

Differences in the capacity t o infer, understand, and predict the course

of anothers emotional state have important implications for social ef -

fectiveness and communication, a notion developed in several theoreti-

cal analyses of social competence (e.g., Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984; Zahn-

Waxler & Radke- Yarrow, 1990) , and popularized in Golemans (1995)

treatment of emotional intelligence. Indeed, there is quite substantial

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research showing that, across the life span, the ability t o acquire emo-

tional knowledge about others is associated with the use of effective and

appropriate forms of social behavior, including more sophisticated mes-

sage structures. For example, Burleson and his colleagues (e.g., Burleson,

1984; see the review by Burleson & Caplan, 1998) have found that both

cognitive complexity and affective perspective-taking ability are associ-

ated with the use of comforting message forms that elaborate, legiti-

mize, and contextualize the feelings and perspectives of distressed oth-

ers-message forms tha t are widely regarded a s more sensitive and ef-

fective ways of providing comfort (e.g., Burleson & Samter, 1985) . Af-

fective perspective-taking skill has also been found t o be associated with

the use of sophisticated message forms when seeking to persuade and

inform (e.g., Applegate, Burleson, & Delia, 1992) , as well a s when man-

243 Communi c a t ion

Theory

aging conflicts (e.g., Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998). Thus, skill

in the capacity to acquire knowledge about the emotional states of oth-

ers is reliably associated with the production of more effective message

forms. Exactly how knowledge about others emotional states is used in

message construction remains unclear and is a matter needing further

research. There is some suggestion, however, tha t knowledge of others

emotions acquired through social perception skills influences the gen-

eration of interaction goals (for a discussion of this account and alterna-

tives, see Burleson & Caplan, 1998) .

It seems likely that individual differences in the capacity t o acquire

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information about others emotional states are connected in important

ways to how people structure their emotional knowledge. Thus, other

objectives for future research include exploring interrelations between

emotion knowledge structures and skill a t acquiring emotion informa-

tion about others, as well as determining how people integrate informa-

tion retrieved from their knowledge structures with that supplied by o n -

line processes in the course of generating messages.

Conclusion

We have addressed three questions concerning the connection between

emotion and message production. First, we showed that emotion (or,

more broadly, affect) has numerous effects o n several of the cognitive

processes associated with message production. Through their influence

on these processes, moods and emotions can have quite substantial ef-

fects o n the content of the messages people generate in varied circum-

stances. Second, we detailed some of the many ways in which emotion

serves as the content of the messages tha t people produce. People ex-

press feelings through their communicative conduct in incredibly rich

and diverse ways; understanding the processes through which they d o

so requires a n appreciation of the biology, psychology, and sociology of

emotion. Third, we explored how what people know about emotion

might influence properties of the messages they produce when seeking

to manage the emotions of others. Little research has directly examined

this topic, but i t represents an exciting area for future work.

Author Brant R. Burleson (PhD, University of Illinois, Ur b a n a - C h amp a i g n , 1 9 8 2 ) is aprofessor in t h e

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De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , Purdue University. Sally Pl ana lp ( P hD, University of Wisconsin,

Madi son, 1 9 8 3 ) is a prof e s sor in t h e De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , University of M o n t a n a ,

Mi s soul a , a n d a n a d j u n c t prof e s sor a t t h e University of Wa ika to, Hami l t o n , N e w Ze a l a n d . An

out l ine of thi s p a p e r wa s presented a t t h e pr e conf e r enc e o n message produc t ion, Inte rna t iona l

Communi c a t ion Association convent ion, San Francisco, CA, M a y 1 9 9 9 . Cor r e spondenc e c on -

cerning thi s p a p e r may be directed to Br ant Burleson a t br antb@purdue . edu or to Sally Pl ana lpa t

[email protected].

2 4 4 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages

Other scholars have developed t ypologies of emotional communication that overlap partially

with the one used here. Scherer (1992) writes of vocal expressions of emotion as symptoms, sym-

bols, and appeals, thus focusing on controllability and goal orientation. Gallois (1993) refers to

three traditions of communication research that focus on ( a ) experience and expression, ( b ) encod-

ing skills, decoding skills, and accuracy, and (c) rules, codes, and styles. Planalp and Knie (in press)

borrow B. OKeefes (1988) messag e design logics: expressive, conventional, and rhetorical. Al-

though their first type corresponds well to ours, their second and third types combine into o u r

second, and none of these address messages directed a t influencing anothe r persons emotional

state as a separate type of emotional expression-communication.

Perhaps closest to o u r typology is the set of distinctions proposed by Dillard (1993). Dillards

emotion -motivated communication is quite similar to our emotional messages, but considers

only the effects of emotion o n message goals, whereas our treatment includes the effects of both

emotion and mood on a broad array of message- production processes. Dillards emotion -mani-

festing communication appears quite similar to our messages of emotion, though o u r category

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may be somewhat less inclusive than his. Finally, Dillards emotion -inducing communication is

rather narrower than o u r emotion -focused messages in that Dillards cate gory focuses on mes-

sages that elicit affective responses in others, and o u r category encompasses messages that are

directed a t managing the emotional states of others, which may include reducing or moderating

affective responses, as well a s eliciting them.

In the course of reviewing this article, John Greene suggested yet a fourth focus for research on

emotion and message production: the impact of an individuals message behavior on his or her own

emotional states (as when the inability to say everything one might want leads t o frustration-

something we certainly felt as we wrote this article!). Although this phenomenon is touched on

briefly in o u r discussion of messages of emotion, we acknowledge the need for the independent

development of this concern. Bowing to the limits of time and space, we defer such development t o

later efforts.

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