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V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
**No Marino vs Gamilla
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers from National
Labor Union due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang
Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations, represented by the Sol-
Gen forwarded a motion for recon with the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the National Labor Union prays for the
vacation of the judgment of the trial court and have a new
trial in CIR on the grounds of:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. the supposed lack of leather materials claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the
National Labor Union, Inc., from work.
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one (
National Workers Brotherhood)
5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been
(the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where
industrial peace has always been the rule
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his
union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue
for the trial?
Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR.There was no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. The function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers
and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration,
decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords andtenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to
the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for
the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall,
before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and
induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the
industry concerned or to the industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of
laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to
be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation andcompulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation
of governmental powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not
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bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also
include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of
judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from
technical rules
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented
at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to
other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching acontroversy. It mustnt merely accept the views of a
subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale
for the decision.
The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis
as to predicate a conclusion of law. Evidence was still
inaccessible. The motion for a new trial should be
granted and sent to the CIR.
Suntay vs People
Facts:
the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in
the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition to
enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the
petitioners passport without previous hearing
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a
minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio
Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia
Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compoundin Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia
being a minor of 16 years old
(so go rape diay ni si Alicia nubla)
On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty
recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant
addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City
wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the
Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a
complaint for seduction be filed against the herein
petitioner.On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and
was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs
On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines
for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at
present enrolled in school.
On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore
to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after
preliminary investigation had been conducted
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion
praying the Court to issue an order "directing such
government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law."
On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the
Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the
Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued
to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the
Philippines to answer the criminal charges against
him.However, this order was not implemented or carried
out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved
Petitioners Claim:
while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in
the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be
exercised until after hearing,"because the right to travel
or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning
and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot
be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.
Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior
hearing
Held:
Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in
our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise
of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot
be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
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withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon are
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal
charge against the passport holder hearing may be
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not
violate the due process law clause of the Constitution; and
the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of
such hearing.
Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have
been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent
Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport
issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and
necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of
the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the
holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be
held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal
charge against the passport holder, hearing may be
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not
violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;
and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of
such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order tocomply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex
parte would be violative of the said clause.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L.
GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Immigration, respondent-appellant.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American
citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three
years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee
of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and
general manager. He applied for extension of stay with
the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959.
In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports
(Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration Office, Benjamin de
Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more
of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of
local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de
Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his
income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a
communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that
his application for extension of stay as a prearranged
employee has been denied by the Board of
Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5
days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a
copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal
officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11
September 1959, in this tenor:
"In reply to yours of even date requesting that you be
furnished copy of the decision, order or resolution of the
Board of Commissioners denying the application for
extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be
advised that, pursuant to immigration practice and
procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is avote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency,
no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by
the Board
In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that
Mr. Bisschop is hereby required to depart within five (5)
days of this notice."
No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of
Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of
the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop
filed the present case on 18 September 1959.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the
Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to
conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of
stay of aliens;
b) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that said
Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written
decisions in such cases.
Ruling of the Court:
We fully agree with appellant's contention on several
grounds.
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and
exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the
government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of immigration authorities.
Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the
procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to
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uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to
review the purely administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This would not violate the
due process clause if we take into account that, in this
particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner
advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality,
a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as
alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the
complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that
unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to
take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in
this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in
administrative proceedings.
With respect to the contention that the decision of the
Board of Commissioners on matters of petition for
extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing,
appellee relies on Section 8 of the Immigration Act, whichprovides that in "any case coming before the Board of
Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall
prevail". However, we agree with the Solicitor General that
the word "decision", as employed in this section,
obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to
constitute the decision of the said Board. The
Sampaguita Shoe case (102 Phil., 850), which was taken into
account by the lower court, is not applicable to the case at
bar; it applies to judicial decision, as provided in Section 1,
Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed
out in appellant's brief, where the intention of the lawmaker
is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate
when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be
in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or
exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the
Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of
Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37,
paragraph (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the
immigration law which provides that the Board of
Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions
for extension of stay.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, , vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION,
Facts: 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex
parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into
a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
According to the Board, Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing
Corporationis involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles with wastewater of about 30 gallons per minute and
80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by
means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channeled
into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant
(WTP).
Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the
presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was
permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing
Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26
September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board
was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Acting on the motion for recon filed by Solar, the Board
issued an Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to
enable the Board to conduct another inspection andevaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities.
Solar, however, went to the RTC on petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC
dismissed.
CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA
declared the Writ of Execution null and void.
Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the
Board.
Ruling: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders. It may be
issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by
an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b)
whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]."
On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that
an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte ceaseand desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board
finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of
wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and
desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards.
Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet
been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the
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Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater
or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life."
Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible
or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the
general standard of an "immediate threat to life public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life"
remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant
allowable standards have been set by the Commission or
Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or
to animal or plant life."
From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at
least prima facie evidence before the Board that the
effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the
maximum allowable levels of physical and chemicalsubstances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was
adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist
order issued by the Board.
Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13
October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test
conducted by the NPCC.
Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease
and desist order until after the November 1986 and
September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the
violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other
words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably
forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards
vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual
about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably
loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was
issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether
the effluents of a particular industrial establishment complywith or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters
of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
which of course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as
the police power. It is a constitutional common place that
the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like
those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of
course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant
operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have
avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of
putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial
establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce
their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase
their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks
to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by
disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes andtheir implementing regulations.
Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and
desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie
findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing
where such establishment would have an opportunity to
controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an
opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is
required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like that we have here. The Board's decision
rendered after the public hearing may then be tested
judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public
hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead
of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order
and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court
of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave
Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still
another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities
and then another analysis of effluent samples could be
taken and evaluated.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in
A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of
petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of
Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21
July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to
the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of
the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing
before the Board.
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Montemayor vs Bundalian
FACTS:
Montemayor was the OIC-Regional Director, Region III of
DPWH. He was removed from office due to a letter-
complaint submitted by respondent Bundalian to the
Philippine Consulate where the petitioner was accused of
accumulating unexplained wealth which he allegedly
amassed through lahar funds. With the letter were attached
documents such as the Grant Deed for a big-ass house in
California and an SPA for petitioners sister-in-law
authorizing her to purchase the property. The Consulate
forwarded the complaint to the Philippine Commission
Against Graft and Corruption for investigation. The
petitioner then submitted his counter-affidavit but refused
to submit his SALN. He also defended that similar charges
against him were discharged due to insufficiency of
evidence. PCAGC then submitted its report to the Office of
the Pressident which concurred with the PCAGC that his
property was unlawfully acquired. His appeal to the CA was
likewise dismissed. On appeal to the SC, he contended that
the decisions of the Office of the President and the PCGAC in
establishing his guilt were not supported by evidence.
ISSUES: 1. WON he was denied due process 2. WON the
charges against him were not backed by substantial
evidence WON the dismissals by the Ombudsman of similar
complaints were binding on the current case (res
adjudicata).
HELD:
1. He was afforded due process because he was giventhe opportunity to be heard, he was represented
by counsel and he was allowed to present his
counter-affidavit. He also was able to attend the
hearings and filed motions in his favor before the
PCAGC.
2. On the third issue, we cannot sustain petitionersstance that the dismissal of similar charges against
him before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case against him before the PCAGC
moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the
Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case subject of this review. The
doctrine ofres judicata applies only to judicial orquasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.[15]Petitioner was
investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible
criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank
property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the
same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a
presidential appointee, was investigated by the
PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and
control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs
investigation of petitioner was administrative in
nature, the doctrine ofres judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
3. LASTLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, on the secondissue, there is a need to lay down the basic
principles in administrative investigations. First,
the burden is on the complainant to prove by
substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint.[10]Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.[11]Second, in reviewing
administrative decisions of the executive
branch of the government, the findings of facts
made therein are to be respected so long as
they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewingcourt to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency with respect to the
sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative
decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of
law. These principles negate the power of the
reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency
of the evidence in an administrative case as if
originally instituted therein, and do not
authorize the court to receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned.
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the
subject property was in his name. However, he
insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo
who paid for the property in installments. He
submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by
Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the
property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to
convince us.
With these admissions, the burden of proof wasshifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of
the property. He cannot now ask this Court to
remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of
additional evidence as, in the absence of any
errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to
do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his
evidence before the PCAGC.
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****NO OCAMPO vs OMBUDSMAN
JUDGMENT
****NO SERRANO vs PSC
IN RE MATTER OFTHEPETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEASCORPUS( PIO NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION)
FACTS:
Pio Neria(Petitioner) seeks to inquire into the legality of his
arrest by agents of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, and his subsequent detention at the Bureau of
Immigration's detention station.
Petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport from
Hongkong. The immigration inspector at the airport, not
satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents, referred
the matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry
for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a
Filipino citizen". The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
conducted a hearing. The said board on August 2, 1961
deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for
petitioner's admission. into the Philippines. This written
decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the
Board of Immigration Commissioners, who attest that he
"was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines".
The Secretary of Justice then issued a Memorandum Order
directing that all decisions purporting to have beenrendered by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or
on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is
directed to review, all decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country.
In compliance with the directive, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the
entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 relative to the petitioner's case. On September 4, 1962
the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that
the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for
admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and
ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the
Philippines as an alien not properly documented for
admission and be returned to the port from where he came.
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed by
petitioner claiming that he "has been unlawfully and
illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in
the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station by
Respondents agents. The lower court granted the writ
ofhabeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the
petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered
by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible
because the question involved in this case is purely a legal
question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies has no application in this case."
ISSUE:
WON the decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioner valid so as to justify petitioners detention.
HELD:
The legality or illegality of the petitioner's detention or
confinement3 depends upon resolution of the issue of
whether the decision of the new Board of Immigration
Commissioner is null and void for having been rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuseof discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613,
as amended, which provides in part that
[t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of
Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final
unless reversed on appeal by the Board of
Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the
absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the
Board of Commissioners after a review by
it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within
one year from the promulgation of said
decision....
August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case. That
date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of
promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall
be final... unless reversedby the Board of
Commissioners aftera reviewby it, motu proprio of the
entire proceedings within one yearfrom the promulgation
of said decision."
HOWEVER, the minutes of the meeting of the new Board of
Commissioners show that as late on August 8, 1962, the
new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the
case of the petitioner. The alteration of the date of the
decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8,
1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. On August 2, 1962,
it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the
case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have
on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry.
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As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of
Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on
and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was
effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by
section 27 (b). The said decision of the Board of
Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of
exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are
therefore, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that
time had already become "final."
The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition
for habeas corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not
first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is
vested with power of control and supervision over the said
Board.11 We have already held that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable
"where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one",12 or where the controverted act is "patentlyillegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done" thereon. 13 The case at bar
falls under this exceptions.
****NO MANILA ELECTRIC vs PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS
****NO NASIPIT vs NLRC
Clavanovs HLURB
Facts:
Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who
paid 50% of the purchase price. Alleging the spouses
default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent
payments and instead sued them for rescission of the
contract and forfeiture of all prior payments made. This was
however dismissed.
The spouses filed a specific performance
complaint with the HLURB Cebu Regional Office againstClavano to compel it to honor the contract. They asked for
judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and
to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, plus
damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of the
spouses, and this was upheld by the HLURB in its Decision,
and the Office of the President. The petitions of Clavano in
the CA and the SC were not given merit due to its failure to
comply with rules on civil procedure.
When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the
HLURB Regional Office issued a Writ of Execution.
Eventually, the spouses complained via a motion to the
HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit,
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was unnotarized, and that the
TCT was still in Clavanos name. They also asked Clavano to
pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and
taxes, among others. HLURB granted this motion via an
Order.
Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB
Order amended the final HLURB Decision which, according
to Clavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed
out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses
will be the ones to answer for the expenses involved in the
transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order, denied Clavanos
motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB
Orders, and so the Sheriff demanded from Clavano the
reimbursements sought by the spouses.
Held:
Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is
left with no other authority but to enforce the decisions
dispositive portion, which it can no longer amend,
modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the
judgment. Clavano is correct in availing of the remedy offiling a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Execution must conform to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision;
consequently, where the order of execution is not in
harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it
life, the order has pro-tanto no validity. Subsequent
HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses
incurred do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision.
The Orders cannot be considered part of the decision which
must be executed against Clavano. The obligation to pay for
such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the
obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale
and the certificate of title.
The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this
late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative to the
transfer of title when the spouses did not allege this
obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to
prove this cause of action. Sps. Tenaza only sought the
enforcement of the mutually binding contract to sell so that
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they could finally own the house and lot but did not ask for
the transfer of the title at Clavanos expense.
Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve
supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to
admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and
thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant
relief as may be warranted which may or may not result in
its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for
registering and titling the subject house and lot - a matter
pre-dating the filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and
in fact, written in the contract to sell - does not qualify as a
supervening event.
The foregoing matters, in addition to alleging
them in the complaint, should have also been heard
during the trial on the merits before the HLURB where
the parties could have proved their respective claims.
However, believing that the assailed rulings were merely
part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB
instead precipitately resolved the issue in favor of the
spouses without notice and hearing.
Since the Orders are a wide departure from
and a material amplification of the final and at least
executory HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and
absolutely unenforceable for any purpose.After the
decision has become final and executory, it can no
longer be amended or corrected except for clerical
errors or mistakes.
Under the circumstances, SC has no authority to
unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executed
HLURB Decision. The general power of courts to amendtheir judgments or orders to make them conformable to
justice cannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error as
a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity,
curable without a proper proceeding filed before the
judgment had become final.
The spouses are barred from raising the issue
either in the instant case or in another action. Under Sec.
47, Rule 39, a final and executory judgment is conclusive
upon any matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto.
Petition for certiorari GRANTED.
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, petitioners, vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ,
TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D.
BUENALUZ, respondents.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the
"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said
office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise
provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the
case shall be personally and directly prepared by theDirector and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the
hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade
name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of
determining the question of priority of adoption and use of
a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation
of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the
Patent Office.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the
Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the
above-mentioned cases.
Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the
aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:.
"168. Original jurisdictional interpartes proceedings. The
Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings. [In the event that the Patent Office is
provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner
shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases,
instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of
Interferences taxes over the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to
appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed
by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are
applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be
P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine
Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the
Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking
official of the office designated by the Director but all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed
by him. (Emphasis supplied.).
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of
Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to
hearing officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the Director of Patents has authority to
delegate the hearing of petitioners cases to hearing officers.
Ruling of the Court:
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of
the Director of Patents under the general lawand Republic
Acts Nos. 165 and 166 to sustain the contention of
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petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of
Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical,
scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations
owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when
deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter
submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the
provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also
empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the
Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory
authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration
and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.
166).
It has been held that power conferred upon an
administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as
may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its
purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of
authority to delegate a particular function, unless by
express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been
withheld. 4There is no provision either in Republic Act
No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such
authority, so far as the designation of hearing
examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such
authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and
consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the
Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws
(Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165)
should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the
administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of
said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to
determine the question of priority in patent interference
proceedings,decide applications for reinstatement of a
lapsed patent,cancellations of patents under Republic Act
No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions,
claims of interference,cancellation cases under the Trade-
mark Law and other matters in connection with the
enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be
expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to
require him to hear personally each and every case pendingin his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his
other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend
personally to the discharge of every other duty or
responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not
further the development of orderly and responsible
administration. The reduction of existing delays in
regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless
work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details
often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the
heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious
consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a
far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This
subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound
principles of organization" which demand that "those at
the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the
larger and more important questions of policy and
practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible,
from the consideration of the smaller and far less
important matters of detail."
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide
resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law,
this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold
a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise
his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report
to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his
decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretionfinally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law.As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and
the decision is supported by the evidence in the record,
there is no question that the requirements of due process
and fair trial are fully met.
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make
preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the
hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the
merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to
the Director of Patents.
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR
MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, vs. LUCINA S.
SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila
Facts: Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with
Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square
meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paraaque
for P307,800.00
On July 18, 1989, Sendinopaid REVI P16,600.00 as full
downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was
advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed,
asking for an extension of one month to do so.
For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of
submission of the appropriate documents under the terms
of the original agreement, REVI informed Sendinoof the
cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989.
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April 20, 1990, Sendinofiled a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. This
petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading
petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which
appeared to be the to be the registered owner of the subject
lot as per TCT No. 76023.
April 3, 1991 the HLURBrendered its judgment in favor
ofSendinoand ordered petitioners to continue with the sale
of the house and lot and to paySendino moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit.
An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB
OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The
decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of
the President (OP)
January 7, 1993. OP rendered its decision dismissing the
petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied.
Issues: 1) Whether OP erred in declaring that the HLURB
has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of
express grant by Executive Order No. 90 which created it.
2) And even if the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions,
whether OP likewise seriously erred in declaring that the
Board of Commissioners is allowed to sit in a decision to
render judgment and to delegate its quasi-judicial authority
to a subordinate office.
Ruling: 1) The President issued EO 90 S. 1986, recognizing
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed
the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the
government.Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981
transferred all the functions of the National Housing
Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216
and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions
relating to land use and housing development in a single
entity.
Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development, the renamed body, the HLURB,would havebeen reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the
petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its
predecessor which included the power to settle disputes
concerning land use and housing development and
acquisition.
United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit: There is no
question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain
disputes and controversies falling within the agency's
special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the NHA (now HLURB) over cases
involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was
upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. NHA and again sustained in
a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA
where We restated that the National Housing Authority
(now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial
or quasi-judicial powers of said agency."
Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its
jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its
adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to
comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation
Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-
judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of
the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation
vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the
successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, ittherefore follows that the transfer of such functions from
the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series
of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of
adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear
and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . .
. and cases of specific performance." 14 Obviously, in the
exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the
parties under these contracts, and award damages
whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC
which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific
performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lots against developers had
suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a
change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the
determination of private rights under these agreements is
no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of
any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing
those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the
National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against
petitioners' position on the question.
2) Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of theOAALA should have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample authority
both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the
Board's act of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under
section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of
the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to
"(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business"
and perform such functions necessary for the effective
accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Since
nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies
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or withholds the power or authority to delegate
adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the
Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its
administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as
a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter
of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its
adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the
power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue
rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions
has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provision
of the Act or by implication it has been withheld." The
practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby
cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore
assumes greater significance when one notes that the
HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time
commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal
with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or
otherwise, entrusted to it.
In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its
authority in ordering petitioners to comply and continue
with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract
between the original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the
quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary
incidents to the proper exercise of its powers and functions
under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of
authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body
those functions so necessary in carrying out its power to
regulate housing and land use results in its effective
emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area
vital to the national economy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SEARCH AND ARREST
REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN
DISCLAIMER: The case was very long so there was some
difficulty in consolidating it into a coherent piece. Try
focusing your reading more on the last two paragraphs of
the ruling portion.
FACTS:
The PCGG issued an order for the sequestration of the
respondents Sipalay and Allied Bank for ill-gotten wealth of
Lucio Tan and others. Sipalay and Allied opposed the orders
in the Supreme Court buy the SC remanded the resolution to
Sandiganbayan. PCGG also issued search and seizure orders
against the bank documents of Sipalay and Allied Bank
which are necessary for the investigation. However, despite
Sipalays motions opposing the sequestration orders, the
PCGG did not act on its motions and proceeded to start
sequestration. In the Sandiganbayan, the validity of the
search and seizure order was under question for lack of
prima facie foundations. PCGG presented witnesses, all of
whom testified for the validity of the search order by
pointing out documents which would justify the issuance of
the search order. The PCGG, however, never tendered any of
the evidence pointed out by the witnesses. Instead, it filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. PCGG likewise contends that its
filing of a motion to dismiss should halt the period within
which to present their evidence.
The Sandiganbayan ruled against PCGG and considered only
the testimonies of the witnesses without documentary
evidence to support its claims. Sandiganbayan invalidated
PCGGs orders.
ISSUES: WON there was exhaustion of administrative
remedies is necessary before assailing the sequestration
orders.
WON the motion to dismiss halted the time within which to
present evidence to the court.
WON the search and seizure orders were backed bysufficient prima facie foundations.
HELD:
1. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature,
warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this
case preclude the rightful application of the principle
aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to
dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in
between that so much has already transpired in the
proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismisscame only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its
written formal offer of evidence as required by
the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144
SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: "Failure to
observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We
have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The
only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
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ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take
cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel
by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to
presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned
or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of
action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such
perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction
an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency
extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be
invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches or
the failure to do something which should be done or to
claim or enforce a right at a proper time.
2. The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating
in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss,
arguing that said motion should have been resolved first
and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the
light of the "peculiarities" of this case where there was
nothing left for the parties to do but to await the
forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for thesubmission of the PCGG's written formal offer of
documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within
the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to
dismiss instead. That the 20-day period was not suspended
upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The Court agrees
with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the
only period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period
to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the
filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for
such suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without
seeking leave of court to stay the running of the period for
filing its written formal offer of evidence as agreed upon
and ordered in open court could not have the effect of
suspending the period. Without express leave of court,
PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to
suspend the running of the period agreed upon. PCGG is
deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence
and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence
on record.
3. The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in
SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII.
The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued
against SIPALAY "for lack of sufficient prima facie factual
foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account
the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and
Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised
insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN'S exclusive reliance on the
testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned.
The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these
testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the
PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might
have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by
the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence
decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the
testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as
evidence meriting due appreciation by
the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the
Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence "must
be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With
respect to documents, however, the same Section 35
(second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer.
Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack on its
admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN.
With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony,
the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding
the PCGG does not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista's
supervening death in the course of her cross-examination,
the controlling case is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the
Court allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before
his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If testimony
is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-
examination, with more reason should testimony partially
cross-examined at the time of the witness' death (as in
Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Dr. Doromalwas basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to
documents purportedly coming from Malacaang, the US
State Department and other sources. What his testimony
essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s
supporting the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY
is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to
repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there
was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized
at this point that mere identification of documents and the
marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents not formally offered. Verily then,
without the PCGG documents having been formally offered,
however decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it
is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all.
That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself
worthless. The same can be said of deceased Commissioner
Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the
mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony
and the documents she referred to were totally unrelated to
the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they
chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against
ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up
a prima facie case against SIPALAY.
The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a
search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH
AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the
branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all
bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is
unauthorized because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1
(particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the
search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly
empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its
mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained
wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the
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PCGG; and the Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v.PCGG" simplified
these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that
its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing
the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from
subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from
No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case,
by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the
essential nature of the provisional measures of
sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that
the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and
receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in
character, not involving an active and drastic intrusion into
and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or
search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes
that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for
which it was created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly
in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" and
being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acid test for
validity as provided by the prevailing constitution underwhich it was issued the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which
adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution.
Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following
requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of
even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just
discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so
constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner
Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish
probable cause. This is so because, as what her testimony
irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and
circumstances supporting the order are exclusively
traceable from documents she identified but which were
never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN.
She never testified to any fact of her own personal
knowledge to bolster the PCGG'S claim that ALLIED was in
possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio
Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving,or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search
warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of
fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has
no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a
"judge" and "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly,
the order does not provide a specification of the documents
sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY
REFERS TO "all bank documents" which is too all embracing,
the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records
pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of
whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of
seizure warrant is not a particular description, thus
contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that
there be a particular description of things to be seized.
Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
is constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise,
void for lack of particularity.
****NO In RE: Harvey
****NO Guevara vs COMELEC
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES
PAAT vs. CA
FACTS:
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was
seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration of the order of Executive
Director Baggayan, which was, however,
denied. Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents' statement that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should beconsidered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was
filed by the private respondents Regional Trial Court issued
a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
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Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was
under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
ISSUE:
Instances where Exhaustion of Remedies may be
disregarded.
HELD:
The plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. A party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court; it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. 11Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause
of action. 12This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due
process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, 16(5) when there is irreparable
injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bearsthe implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, 19(8) when it would amount to a nullification
of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy
was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of
the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. In
their letter of reconsideration, private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which
they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their
case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does
not merit your favorable action, then this
letter should be considered as an appeal
to the
Secretary. 24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still availableand open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus,
they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of
their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
Moreover, the assumption by the trial courtof the replevin
suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.
****NO LOPEZ vs MANILA
****NO Uy vs PALOMAR
LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINECOCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING
BOARD, and JOSEFEL P.
GRAJEDA, respondents.
Facts: On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the
"Board" for brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating
an "Investigation Committee" which would look into the
complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner,
Leandro garcia, then administrator of the Philippine
Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed
by him. The Investigation Committee, after conducting
formal hearings on the charges against petitioner by
complainant Antonio Pua found prima facie evidence that
petitioner indeed committed a crime. The PCA, through its
then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an
administrative complaint, gainst herein petitioner Leandro
P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents,
grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in
connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young
coconuts" or "buko." The Board, placed petitioner under
preventive suspension.
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The petitioner through his lawyer employ tactics
that delayed the proceeding prompting the Board to issue
Resolution No. 046-89 stating that the period of delay in the
disposition of the case caused by petitioner shall not be
counted in the computation of preventive suspension and
petitioner's re-assumption of office shall require prior
notice of reinstatement by the Board.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction which was
granted by the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion, dated 04 July
1989, praying for the creation of a new investigating
committee and that, pending resolution thereof, the
Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting
further proceedings. The RTC did not grant the petition, but
ordered that evidence of petitioner will be received on
whether a temporary restraining order shall be issued.
Later, the Board issued Resolution No. 070-89
finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge and
imposing upon him the penalty of forced resignation.
However, the RTC issue a TRO stopping the respondent
Board from implementing its resolution. Respondent
appealed to CA which granted the lifting of TRO.
Issue: 1. WON CA erred in granting the motion of lifting the
TRO. (answer is in relation to exhaustion of administrative
remedies)
2. WON the Philippine Coconut Authority violate
administrative due process
Held: No on both issue.
The records would show that petitioner filed the
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the
trial court even while the administrative investigation was
yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial
court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of
the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy
ofappeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be
available to him.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, recourse through court action, cannot
prosper until after all such administrative remedies
would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like
the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special
competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of
action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid
by the courts.
Petitioner would insist that the Grageda Investigation
Committee defied the restraining order ("TRO") issued by
the trial court when it submitted to the Board on 21 August
1989 its resolution finding petitioner guilty of theadministrative charges and recommending the penalty of
forced resignation, later adopted and approved by the
Board in its Resolution No. 070-89 on 25 August 1989.
There was no such defiance. The trial court issued the TRO
on 26 July 1989, and it became functus oficio after 15 August
1989. Thus, when the Grageda Investigation Committee
submitted its recommendation to the Board on 21 August
1989, which the latter adopted and approved on 25 August
1989 in its Resolution No. 070-89, respondents were no
longer under any legal restraint.
The second issue of alleged violation by the PCA of
administrative due process must also be
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