Compiled Admin Quasi-judicial Review (Incomplete)

7/28/2019 Compiled Admin Quasi-judicial Review (Incomplete)

1/32

V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

**No Marino vs Gamilla

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO

TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS'

BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL

LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Facts:

Toribio claimed to have laid off workers from National

Labor Union due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang

Tibay factory.

The Court of industrial relations, represented by the Sol-

Gen forwarded a motion for recon with the Supreme Court.

On the other hand, the National Labor Union prays for the

vacation of the judgment of the trial court and have a new

trial in CIR on the grounds of:

1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis

2. the supposed lack of leather materials claimed

by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to

systematically discharge all the members of the

National Labor Union, Inc., from work.

3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme

4. The company union was an employer dominated one (

National Workers Brotherhood)

5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.

6. the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been

(the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil

war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in

interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a

modern labor legislation of American origin where

industrial peace has always been the rule

7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his

union.

8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.

9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue

for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR.There was no substantial evidence that the

exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union

affiliation or activity.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special

court whose functions are specifically stated in the law

of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more

an administrative board than a part of the

integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not

intended to be a mere receptive organ of the

Government. The function of the Court of Industrial

Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic

law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only

exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the

determination of disputes between employers and

employees but its functions are far more

comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction

over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,

decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or

dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers

and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants

or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between

them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions

of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take

cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration,

decision and settlement, of any industrial or

agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike

or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage

shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of

tenancy or employment, between employers and

employees or laborers and between landlords andtenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of

employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers

involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or

agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the

Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to

the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor

as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for

the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall,

before hearing the dispute and in the course of

such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and

induce them to settle the dispute by amicable

agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When

directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall

investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the

industry concerned or to the industries established in a

designated locality, with a view to determining the

necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such

industry or locality a minimum wage or share of

laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to

be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to

landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to

voluntary arbitration in the settlement of

industrial disputes; may employ mediation or

conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more

effective system of official investigation andcompulsory arbitration in order to determine

specific controversies between labor and capital in

industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a

mingling of executive and judicial functions, which

is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation

of governmental powers.

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly

constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not


2/32

bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also

include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations

may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain

procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in

justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the

fundamental and essential requirements of due process in

trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Some examples that it must follow are:

1. right to a hearing

2. consideration of evidence by the court

3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be

disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it

is a nullity, a place when directly attached

4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of

judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from

technical rules

5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented

at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to

other judicial bodies.

6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching acontroversy. It mustnt merely accept the views of a

subordinate.

7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale

for the decision.

The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis

as to predicate a conclusion of law. Evidence was still

inaccessible. The motion for a new trial should be

granted and sent to the CIR.

Suntay vs People

Facts:

the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in

the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be

dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition to

enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the

petitioners passport without previous hearing

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a

minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio

Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,

alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia

Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compoundin Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia

being a minor of 16 years old

(so go rape diay ni si Alicia nubla)

On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty

recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the

complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant

addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City

wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the

Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a

complaint for seduction be filed against the herein

petitioner.On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and

was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs

On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines

for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at

present enrolled in school.

On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore

to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which

was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after

preliminary investigation had been conducted

On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion

praying the Court to issue an order "directing such

government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the

National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of

Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused

brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt

with in accordance with law."

On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the

Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the

Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued

to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the

Philippines to answer the criminal charges against

him.However, this order was not implemented or carried

out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in

order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved

Petitioners Claim:

while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in

the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be

exercised until after hearing,"because the right to travel

or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning

and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot

be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior

hearing

Held:

Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in

our courts and left the country to evade criminal

prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise

of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot

be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in


3/32

withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process

does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When

discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon are

undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal

charge against the passport holder hearing may be

dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the

cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not

violate the due process law clause of the Constitution; and

the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be

deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of

such hearing.

Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have

been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent

Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport

issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and

necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of

the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the

holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts

and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his

discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be

held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in

withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process

does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When

discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an

undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal

charge against the passport holder, hearing may be

dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the

cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not

violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;

and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be

deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of

such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order tocomply with the due process of law clause of the

Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex

parte would be violative of the said clause.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L.

GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of

Immigration, respondent-appellant.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American

citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three

years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee

of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and

general manager. He applied for extension of stay with

the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959.

In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports

(Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration Office, Benjamin de

Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more

of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of

local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de

Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his

income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a

communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that

his application for extension of stay as a prearranged

employee has been denied by the Board of

Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5

days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a

copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal

officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11

September 1959, in this tenor:

"In reply to yours of even date requesting that you be

furnished copy of the decision, order or resolution of the

Board of Commissioners denying the application for

extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be

advised that, pursuant to immigration practice and

procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is avote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency,

no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by

the Board

In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that

Mr. Bisschop is hereby required to depart within five (5)

days of this notice."

No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of

Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of

the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop

filed the present case on 18 September 1959.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the

Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to

conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of

stay of aliens;

b) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that said

Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written

decisions in such cases.

Ruling of the Court:

We fully agree with appellant's contention on several

grounds.

The administration of immigration laws is the primary and

exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the

government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely

discretionary on the part of immigration authorities.

Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the

Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the

procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to


4/32

uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to

review the purely administrative practice of immigration

authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases

as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of

practicability and expediency. This would not violate the

due process clause if we take into account that, in this

particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner

advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality,

a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as

alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the

complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the

deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that

unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to

take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in

this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in

administrative proceedings.

With respect to the contention that the decision of the

Board of Commissioners on matters of petition for

extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing,

appellee relies on Section 8 of the Immigration Act, whichprovides that in "any case coming before the Board of

Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall

prevail". However, we agree with the Solicitor General that

the word "decision", as employed in this section,

obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to

constitute the decision of the said Board. The

Sampaguita Shoe case (102 Phil., 850), which was taken into

account by the lower court, is not applicable to the case at

bar; it applies to judicial decision, as provided in Section 1,

Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed

out in appellant's brief, where the intention of the lawmaker

is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate

when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be

in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of

the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or

exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the

Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of

Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37,

paragraph (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the

immigration law which provides that the Board of

Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions

for extension of stay.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, , vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION,

Facts: 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex

parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist

from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations

which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into

a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.

According to the Board, Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing

Corporationis involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing

textiles with wastewater of about 30 gallons per minute and

80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a

drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by

means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channeled

into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant

(WTP).

Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the

presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was

permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing

Regulations.

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26

September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board

was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.

Acting on the motion for recon filed by Solar, the Board

issued an Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to

enable the Board to conduct another inspection andevaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities.

Solar, however, went to the RTC on petition for certiorari

with preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC

dismissed.

CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and

remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA

declared the Writ of Execution null and void.

Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC on the

ground that Solar had been denied due process by the

Board.

Ruling: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner

Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders. It may be

issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by

an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public

health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b)

whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable

standards set by the [NPCC]."

On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that

an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,

or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte ceaseand desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board

finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable

standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of

wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by

the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and

desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an

establishment exceeding such allowable standards.

Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet

been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the


5/32

Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis

when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater

or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,

public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life."

Since the applicable standards set by the Commission

existing at any given time may well not cover every possible

or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the

general standard of an "immediate threat to life public

health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life"

remains necessary.

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant

allowable standards have been set by the Commission or

Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an

"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or

to animal or plant life."

From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at

least prima facie evidence before the Board that the

effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the

maximum allowable levels of physical and chemicalsubstances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was

adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist

order issued by the Board.

Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13

October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test

conducted by the NPCC.

Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease

and desist order until after the November 1986 and

September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the

violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other

words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably

forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards

vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual

about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive

effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably

loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater

Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.

In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was

issued not by a local government official but by the

Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the

Government charged with the task of determining whether

the effluents of a particular industrial establishment complywith or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and

regulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and

regulations in situations like that here presented precisely

because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and

untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters

of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted

litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such

orders has run its full course, including multiple and

sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,

which of course may take several years. The relevant

pollution control statute and implementing regulations

were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that

persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,

and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the

protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as

the police power. It is a constitutional common place that

the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield

to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like

those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of

course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant

operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have

avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of

putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial

establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce

their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase

their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks

to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by

disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes andtheir implementing regulations.

Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and

desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie

findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing

where such establishment would have an opportunity to

controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an

opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is

required by the due process clause of the Constitution in

situations like that we have here. The Board's decision

rendered after the public hearing may then be tested

judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance

with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public

hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead

of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order

and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court

of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave

Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still

another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities

and then another analysis of effluent samples could be

taken and evaluated.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE

COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in

A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of

petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of

Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21

July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to

the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of

the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing

before the Board.


6/32

Montemayor vs Bundalian

FACTS:

Montemayor was the OIC-Regional Director, Region III of

DPWH. He was removed from office due to a letter-

complaint submitted by respondent Bundalian to the

Philippine Consulate where the petitioner was accused of

accumulating unexplained wealth which he allegedly

amassed through lahar funds. With the letter were attached

documents such as the Grant Deed for a big-ass house in

California and an SPA for petitioners sister-in-law

authorizing her to purchase the property. The Consulate

forwarded the complaint to the Philippine Commission

Against Graft and Corruption for investigation. The

petitioner then submitted his counter-affidavit but refused

to submit his SALN. He also defended that similar charges

against him were discharged due to insufficiency of

evidence. PCAGC then submitted its report to the Office of

the Pressident which concurred with the PCAGC that his

property was unlawfully acquired. His appeal to the CA was

likewise dismissed. On appeal to the SC, he contended that

the decisions of the Office of the President and the PCGAC in

establishing his guilt were not supported by evidence.

ISSUES: 1. WON he was denied due process 2. WON the

charges against him were not backed by substantial

evidence WON the dismissals by the Ombudsman of similar

complaints were binding on the current case (res

adjudicata).

HELD:

1. He was afforded due process because he was giventhe opportunity to be heard, he was represented

by counsel and he was allowed to present his

counter-affidavit. He also was able to attend the

hearings and filed motions in his favor before the

PCAGC.

2. On the third issue, we cannot sustain petitionersstance that the dismissal of similar charges against

him before the Ombudsman rendered the

administrative case against him before the PCAGC

moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the

Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in

the PCAGC case subject of this review. The

doctrine ofres judicata applies only to judicial orquasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of

administrative powers.[15]Petitioner was

investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible

criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank

property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the

same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a

presidential appointee, was investigated by the

PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and

control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs

investigation of petitioner was administrative in

nature, the doctrine ofres judicata finds no

application in the case at bar.

3. LASTLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, on the secondissue, there is a need to lay down the basic

principles in administrative investigations. First,

the burden is on the complainant to prove by

substantial evidence the allegations in his

complaint.[10]Substantial evidence is more than a

mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion, even if other

minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine

otherwise.[11]Second, in reviewing

administrative decisions of the executive

branch of the government, the findings of facts

made therein are to be respected so long as

they are supported by substantial

evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewingcourt to weigh the conflicting evidence,

determine the credibility of witnesses, or

otherwise substitute its judgment for that of

the administrative agency with respect to the

sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative

decisions in matters within the executive

jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of

gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of

law. These principles negate the power of the

reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency

of the evidence in an administrative case as if

originally instituted therein, and do not

authorize the court to receive additional

evidence that was not submitted to the

administrative agency concerned.

In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the

subject property was in his name. However, he

insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo

who paid for the property in installments. He

submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by

Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the

property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to

convince us.

With these admissions, the burden of proof wasshifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of

the property. He cannot now ask this Court to

remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of

additional evidence as, in the absence of any

errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to

do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his

evidence before the PCAGC.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/149335.htm#_ftn15


7/32

****NO OCAMPO vs OMBUDSMAN

JUDGMENT

****NO SERRANO vs PSC

IN RE MATTER OFTHEPETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEASCORPUS( PIO NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION)

FACTS:

Pio Neria(Petitioner) seeks to inquire into the legality of his

arrest by agents of the respondent Commissioner of

Immigration, and his subsequent detention at the Bureau of

Immigration's detention station.

Petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport from

Hongkong. The immigration inspector at the airport, not

satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents, referred

the matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry

for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a

Filipino citizen". The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1

conducted a hearing. The said board on August 2, 1961

deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for

petitioner's admission. into the Philippines. This written

decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the

Board of Immigration Commissioners, who attest that he

"was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines".

The Secretary of Justice then issued a Memorandum Order

directing that all decisions purporting to have beenrendered by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or

on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special

Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is

directed to review, all decisions of the Board of Special

Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country.

In compliance with the directive, the Board of Immigration

Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the

entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry

No. 1 relative to the petitioner's case. On September 4, 1962

the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that

the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for

admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed

the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and

ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the

Philippines as an alien not properly documented for

admission and be returned to the port from where he came.

The present petition for habeas corpus was filed by

petitioner claiming that he "has been unlawfully and

illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in

the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station by

Respondents agents. The lower court granted the writ

ofhabeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the

petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered

by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack

of jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible

because the question involved in this case is purely a legal

question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies has no application in this case."

ISSUE:

WON the decision of the Board of Immigration

Commissioner valid so as to justify petitioners detention.

HELD:

The legality or illegality of the petitioner's detention or

confinement3 depends upon resolution of the issue of

whether the decision of the new Board of Immigration

Commissioner is null and void for having been rendered

without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuseof discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613,

as amended, which provides in part that

[t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of

Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final

unless reversed on appeal by the Board of

Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the

absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the

Board of Commissioners after a review by

it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within

one year from the promulgation of said

decision....

August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special

Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case. That

date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of

promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry

No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall

be final... unless reversedby the Board of

Commissioners aftera reviewby it, motu proprio of the

entire proceedings within one yearfrom the promulgation

of said decision."

HOWEVER, the minutes of the meeting of the new Board of

Commissioners show that as late on August 8, 1962, the

new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the

case of the petitioner. The alteration of the date of the

decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8,

1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. On August 2, 1962,

it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special

Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the

case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have

on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of

Special Inquiry.


8/32

As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of

Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on

and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board

of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was

effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by

section 27 (b). The said decision of the Board of

Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of

exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are

therefore, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since

the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that

time had already become "final."

The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition

for habeas corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not

first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration

Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is

vested with power of control and supervision over the said

Board.11 We have already held that the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable

"where the question in dispute is purely a legal

one",12 or where the controverted act is "patentlyillegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in

excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative

nature is to be or can be done" thereon. 13 The case at bar

falls under this exceptions.

****NO MANILA ELECTRIC vs PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS

****NO NASIPIT vs NLRC

Clavanovs HLURB

Facts:

Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who

paid 50% of the purchase price. Alleging the spouses

default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent

payments and instead sued them for rescission of the

contract and forfeiture of all prior payments made. This was

however dismissed.

The spouses filed a specific performance

complaint with the HLURB Cebu Regional Office againstClavano to compel it to honor the contract. They asked for

judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and

to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, plus

damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of the

spouses, and this was upheld by the HLURB in its Decision,

and the Office of the President. The petitions of Clavano in

the CA and the SC were not given merit due to its failure to

comply with rules on civil procedure.

When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the

HLURB Regional Office issued a Writ of Execution.

Eventually, the spouses complained via a motion to the

HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit,

that the Deed of Absolute Sale was unnotarized, and that the

TCT was still in Clavanos name. They also asked Clavano to

pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and

taxes, among others. HLURB granted this motion via an

Order.

Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB

Order amended the final HLURB Decision which, according

to Clavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed

out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses

will be the ones to answer for the expenses involved in the

transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order, denied Clavanos

motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB

Orders, and so the Sheriff demanded from Clavano the

reimbursements sought by the spouses.

Held:

Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is

left with no other authority but to enforce the decisions

dispositive portion, which it can no longer amend,

modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the

judgment. Clavano is correct in availing of the remedy offiling a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Execution must conform to that ordained or

decreed in the dispositive part of the decision;

consequently, where the order of execution is not in

harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it

life, the order has pro-tanto no validity. Subsequent

HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses

incurred do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision.

The Orders cannot be considered part of the decision which

must be executed against Clavano. The obligation to pay for

such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the

obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale

and the certificate of title.

The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this

late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative to the

transfer of title when the spouses did not allege this

obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to

prove this cause of action. Sps. Tenaza only sought the

enforcement of the mutually binding contract to sell so that


9/32

they could finally own the house and lot but did not ask for

the transfer of the title at Clavanos expense.

Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve

supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to

admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and

thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant

relief as may be warranted which may or may not result in

its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for

registering and titling the subject house and lot - a matter

pre-dating the filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and

in fact, written in the contract to sell - does not qualify as a

supervening event.

The foregoing matters, in addition to alleging

them in the complaint, should have also been heard

during the trial on the merits before the HLURB where

the parties could have proved their respective claims.

However, believing that the assailed rulings were merely

part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB

instead precipitately resolved the issue in favor of the

spouses without notice and hearing.

Since the Orders are a wide departure from

and a material amplification of the final and at least

executory HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and

absolutely unenforceable for any purpose.After the

decision has become final and executory, it can no

longer be amended or corrected except for clerical

errors or mistakes.

Under the circumstances, SC has no authority to

unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executed

HLURB Decision. The general power of courts to amendtheir judgments or orders to make them conformable to

justice cannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error as

a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity,

curable without a proper proceeding filed before the

judgment had become final.

The spouses are barred from raising the issue

either in the instant case or in another action. Under Sec.

47, Rule 39, a final and executory judgment is conclusive

upon any matter that could have been raised in relation

thereto.

Petition for certiorari GRANTED.

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, petitioners, vs. THE

DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ,

TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D.

BUENALUZ, respondents.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the

"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent

Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the

Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said

office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise

provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the

case shall be personally and directly prepared by theDirector and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the

hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade

name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of

determining the question of priority of adoption and use of

a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation

of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the

Patent Office.

Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the

Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the

above-mentioned cases.

Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of

the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the

aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:.

"168. Original jurisdictional interpartes proceedings. The

Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter

partes proceedings. [In the event that the Patent Office is

provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner

shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases,

instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of

Interferences taxes over the original jurisdiction over inter

partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to

appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the

receipt of notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed

by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are

applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be

P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine

Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the

Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking

official of the office designated by the Director but all

judgments determining the merits of the case shall be

personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed

by him. (Emphasis supplied.).

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of

Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to

hearing officers.

Issue:

Whether or not the Director of Patents has authority to

delegate the hearing of petitioners cases to hearing officers.

Ruling of the Court:

It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of

the Director of Patents under the general lawand Republic

Acts Nos. 165 and 166 to sustain the contention of


10/32

petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of

Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical,

scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other

departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and

instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations

owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when

deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter

submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the

provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also

empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the

Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and

regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all

business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory

authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration

and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.

166).

It has been held that power conferred upon an

administrative agency to which the administration of a

statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as

may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its

purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of

authority to delegate a particular function, unless by

express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been

withheld. 4There is no provision either in Republic Act

No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such

authority, so far as the designation of hearing

examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such

authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and

consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the

Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws

(Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165)

should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the

administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and

expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of

said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to

determine the question of priority in patent interference

proceedings,decide applications for reinstatement of a

lapsed patent,cancellations of patents under Republic Act

No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions,

claims of interference,cancellation cases under the Trade-

mark Law and other matters in connection with the

enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be

expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to

require him to hear personally each and every case pendingin his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his

other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend

personally to the discharge of every other duty or

responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not

further the development of orderly and responsible

administration. The reduction of existing delays in

regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless

work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details

often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the

heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious

consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a

far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This

subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound

principles of organization" which demand that "those at

the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the

larger and more important questions of policy and

practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible,

from the consideration of the smaller and far less

important matters of detail."

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide

resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law,

this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold

a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the

administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise

his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him

from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative

procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report

to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his

decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretionfinally exercised are those of the officer authorized by

law.As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present

his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and

the decision is supported by the evidence in the record,

there is no question that the requirements of due process

and fair trial are fully met.

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make

preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the

hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the

merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to

the Director of Patents.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR

MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, vs. LUCINA S.

SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila

Facts: Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with

Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square

meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paraaque

for P307,800.00

On July 18, 1989, Sendinopaid REVI P16,600.00 as full

downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was

advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed,

asking for an extension of one month to do so.

For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of

submission of the appropriate documents under the terms

of the original agreement, REVI informed Sendinoof the

cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989.


11/32

April 20, 1990, Sendinofiled a complaint for Specific

Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals,

Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. This

petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading

petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which

appeared to be the to be the registered owner of the subject

lot as per TCT No. 76023.

April 3, 1991 the HLURBrendered its judgment in favor

ofSendinoand ordered petitioners to continue with the sale

of the house and lot and to paySendino moral damages,

exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit.

An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB

OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The

decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of

the President (OP)

January 7, 1993. OP rendered its decision dismissing the

petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the

decision was denied.

Issues: 1) Whether OP erred in declaring that the HLURB

has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of

express grant by Executive Order No. 90 which created it.

2) And even if the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions,

whether OP likewise seriously erred in declaring that the

Board of Commissioners is allowed to sit in a decision to

render judgment and to delegate its quasi-judicial authority

to a subordinate office.

Ruling: 1) The President issued EO 90 S. 1986, recognizing

the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed

the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the

government.Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981

transferred all the functions of the National Housing

Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216

and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory

Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions

relating to land use and housing development in a single

entity.

Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land

development, the renamed body, the HLURB,would havebeen reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the

petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its

predecessor which included the power to settle disputes

concerning land use and housing development and

acquisition.

United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit: There is no

question that a statute may vest exclusive original

jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain

disputes and controversies falling within the agency's

special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of

exclusive jurisdiction to the NHA (now HLURB) over cases

involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was

upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. NHA and again sustained in

a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA

where We restated that the National Housing Authority

(now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate

the real estate trade and business in accordance with the

terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial

or quasi-judicial powers of said agency."

Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its

jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its

adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to

comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation

Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-

judicial powers which an administrative agency may

exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of

the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation

vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the

successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, ittherefore follows that the transfer of such functions from

the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series

of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of

adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear

and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . .

. and cases of specific performance." 14 Obviously, in the

exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must

interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the

parties under these contracts, and award damages

whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC

which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific

performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed

by buyers of subdivision lots against developers had

suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a

change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the

multiplication of administrative agencies is that the

interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the

determination of private rights under these agreements is

no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of

any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing

those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the

National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against

petitioners' position on the question.

2) Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of theOAALA should have been rendered by the Board of

Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample authority

both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the

Board's act of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under

section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of

the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to

"(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business"

and perform such functions necessary for the effective

accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Since

nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies


12/32

or withholds the power or authority to delegate

adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the

Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its

administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as

a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter

of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its

adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the

power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue

rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions

has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to

delegate a particular function, unless by express provision

of the Act or by implication it has been withheld." The

practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby

cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore

assumes greater significance when one notes that the

HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time

commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal

with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or

otherwise, entrusted to it.

In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its

authority in ordering petitioners to comply and continue

with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract

between the original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the

quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary

incidents to the proper exercise of its powers and functions

under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of

authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body

those functions so necessary in carrying out its power to

regulate housing and land use results in its effective

emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area

vital to the national economy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SEARCH AND ARREST

REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN

DISCLAIMER: The case was very long so there was some

difficulty in consolidating it into a coherent piece. Try

focusing your reading more on the last two paragraphs of

the ruling portion.

FACTS:

The PCGG issued an order for the sequestration of the

respondents Sipalay and Allied Bank for ill-gotten wealth of

Lucio Tan and others. Sipalay and Allied opposed the orders

in the Supreme Court buy the SC remanded the resolution to

Sandiganbayan. PCGG also issued search and seizure orders

against the bank documents of Sipalay and Allied Bank

which are necessary for the investigation. However, despite

Sipalays motions opposing the sequestration orders, the

PCGG did not act on its motions and proceeded to start

sequestration. In the Sandiganbayan, the validity of the

search and seizure order was under question for lack of

prima facie foundations. PCGG presented witnesses, all of

whom testified for the validity of the search order by

pointing out documents which would justify the issuance of

the search order. The PCGG, however, never tendered any of

the evidence pointed out by the witnesses. Instead, it filed a

motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies. PCGG likewise contends that its

filing of a motion to dismiss should halt the period within

which to present their evidence.

The Sandiganbayan ruled against PCGG and considered only

the testimonies of the witnesses without documentary

evidence to support its claims. Sandiganbayan invalidated

PCGGs orders.

ISSUES: WON there was exhaustion of administrative

remedies is necessary before assailing the sequestration

orders.

WON the motion to dismiss halted the time within which to

present evidence to the court.

WON the search and seizure orders were backed bysufficient prima facie foundations.

HELD:

1. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of

administrative remedies, when required, is premature,

warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded

on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this

case preclude the rightful application of the principle

aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to

dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in

between that so much has already transpired in the

proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismisscame only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings

where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its

written formal offer of evidence as required by

the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144

SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: "Failure to

observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We

have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The

only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will

deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a


13/32

ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper

time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take

cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel

by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to

presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned

or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of

action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such

perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction

an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency

extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be

invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches or

the failure to do something which should be done or to

claim or enforce a right at a proper time.

2. The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating

in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss,

arguing that said motion should have been resolved first

and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the

light of the "peculiarities" of this case where there was

nothing left for the parties to do but to await the

forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for thesubmission of the PCGG's written formal offer of

documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within

the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to

dismiss instead. That the 20-day period was not suspended

upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The Court agrees

with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the

only period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period

to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the

filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for

such suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without

seeking leave of court to stay the running of the period for

filing its written formal offer of evidence as agreed upon

and ordered in open court could not have the effect of

suspending the period. Without express leave of court,

PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to

suspend the running of the period agreed upon. PCGG is

deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence

and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence

on record.

3. The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in

SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII.

The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued

against SIPALAY "for lack of sufficient prima facie factual

foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account

the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and

Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised

insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN'S exclusive reliance on the

testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned.

The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these

testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the

PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might

have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by

the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence

decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has

not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the

testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as

evidence meriting due appreciation by

the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the

Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence "must

be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With

respect to documents, however, the same Section 35

(second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer.

Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack on its

admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN.

With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony,

the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding

the PCGG does not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista's

supervening death in the course of her cross-examination,

the controlling case is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the

Court allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before

his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If testimony

is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-

examination, with more reason should testimony partially

cross-examined at the time of the witness' death (as in

Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Dr. Doromalwas basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to

documents purportedly coming from Malacaang, the US

State Department and other sources. What his testimony

essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s

supporting the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY

is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to

repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there

was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized

at this point that mere identification of documents and the

marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary

weight on documents not formally offered. Verily then,

without the PCGG documents having been formally offered,

however decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it

is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all.

That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself

worthless. The same can be said of deceased Commissioner

Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the

mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony

and the documents she referred to were totally unrelated to

the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they

chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against

ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up

a prima facie case against SIPALAY.

The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a

search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH

AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the

branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all

bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is

unauthorized because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1

(particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the

search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly

empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its

mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained

wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the


14/32

PCGG; and the Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v.PCGG" simplified

these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that

its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing

the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from

subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from

No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case,

by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the

essential nature of the provisional measures of

sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that

the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and

receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in

character, not involving an active and drastic intrusion into

and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or

search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes

that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for

which it was created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly

in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine

Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" and

being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE

ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acid test for

validity as provided by the prevailing constitution underwhich it was issued the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which

adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution.

Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following

requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of

even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must

be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must

be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant

or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable

cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,

the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may

produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly

describe the place to be searched and persons or things to

be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just

discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so

constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner

Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish

probable cause. This is so because, as what her testimony

irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and

circumstances supporting the order are exclusively

traceable from documents she identified but which were

never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN.

She never testified to any fact of her own personal

knowledge to bolster the PCGG'S claim that ALLIED was in

possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio

Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving,or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search

warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of

fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has

no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a

"judge" and "such other responsible officer as may be

authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM

CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly,

the order does not provide a specification of the documents

sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY

REFERS TO "all bank documents" which is too all embracing,

the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records

pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of

whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of

seizure warrant is not a particular description, thus

contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that

there be a particular description of things to be seized.

Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

is constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise,

void for lack of particularity.

****NO In RE: Harvey

****NO Guevara vs COMELEC

VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

A. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES

PAAT vs. CA

FACTS:

The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was

seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the

required documents for the forest products found

concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the

Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer

(CENRO) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and

gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to

submit an explanation why the truck should not be

forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the

required explanation. Regional Executive Director Rogelio

Baggayan of DENR ordered the forfeiture of the truck

invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as

amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents

filed a letter of reconsideration of the order of Executive

Director Baggayan, which was, however,

denied. Subsequently, the case was brought by the

petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private

respondents' statement that in case their letter for

reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should beconsidered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending

resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was

filed by the private respondents Regional Trial Court issued

a writ ordering the return of the truck to private

respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director

Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court

contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no

cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative

remedies.


15/32

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not

legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was

under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

ISSUE:

Instances where Exhaustion of Remedies may be

disregarded.

HELD:

The plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. A party is

allowed to seek the intervention of the court; it is a pre-

condition that he should have availed of all the means of

administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy

within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to

by giving the administrative officer concerned every

opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his

jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first

before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature

invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of

action. 11Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or

estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause

of action. 12This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due

process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal

question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently

illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4)

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative

agency concerned, 16(5) when there is irreparable

injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department

secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bearsthe implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when

to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be

unreasonable, 19(8) when it would amount to a nullification

of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in

land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not

provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)

when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of

judicial intervention. 22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy

was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was

forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of

the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. In

their letter of reconsideration, private respondents clearly

recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which

they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their

case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does

not merit your favorable action, then this

letter should be considered as an appeal

to the

Secretary. 24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents

looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of

their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the

existence of an adequate and plain remedy still availableand open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus,

they cannot now, without violating the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's

intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of

their relief during the pendency of an administrative

proceedings.

Moreover, the assumption by the trial courtof the replevin

suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified

encroachment into the domain of the administrative

agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the

authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over

which is initially lodged with an administrative body of

special competence.

****NO LOPEZ vs MANILA

****NO Uy vs PALOMAR

LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINECOCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING

BOARD, and JOSEFEL P.

GRAJEDA, respondents.

Facts: On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the

"Board" for brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating

an "Investigation Committee" which would look into the

complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner,

Leandro garcia, then administrator of the Philippine

Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed

by him. The Investigation Committee, after conducting

formal hearings on the charges against petitioner by

complainant Antonio Pua found prima facie evidence that

petitioner indeed committed a crime. The PCA, through its

then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an

administrative complaint, gainst herein petitioner Leandro

P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents,

grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in

connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young

coconuts" or "buko." The Board, placed petitioner under

preventive suspension.


16/32

The petitioner through his lawyer employ tactics

that delayed the proceeding prompting the Board to issue

Resolution No. 046-89 stating that the period of delay in the

disposition of the case caused by petitioner shall not be

counted in the computation of preventive suspension and

petitioner's re-assumption of office shall require prior

notice of reinstatement by the Board.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction which was

granted by the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion, dated 04 July

1989, praying for the creation of a new investigating

committee and that, pending resolution thereof, the

Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting

further proceedings. The RTC did not grant the petition, but

ordered that evidence of petitioner will be received on

whether a temporary restraining order shall be issued.

Later, the Board issued Resolution No. 070-89

finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge and

imposing upon him the penalty of forced resignation.

However, the RTC issue a TRO stopping the respondent

Board from implementing its resolution. Respondent

appealed to CA which granted the lifting of TRO.

Issue: 1. WON CA erred in granting the motion of lifting the

TRO. (answer is in relation to exhaustion of administrative

remedies)

2. WON the Philippine Coconut Authority violate

administrative due process

Held: No on both issue.

The records would show that petitioner filed the

petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the

trial court even while the administrative investigation was

yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial

court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of

the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy

ofappeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be

available to him.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, recourse through court action, cannot

prosper until after all such administrative remedies

would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not

warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to

resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over

which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like

the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special

competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of

action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid

by the courts.

Petitioner would insist that the Grageda Investigation

Committee defied the restraining order ("TRO") issued by

the trial court when it submitted to the Board on 21 August

1989 its resolution finding petitioner guilty of theadministrative charges and recommending the penalty of

forced resignation, later adopted and approved by the

Board in its Resolution No. 070-89 on 25 August 1989.

There was no such defiance. The trial court issued the TRO

on 26 July 1989, and it became functus oficio after 15 August

1989. Thus, when the Grageda Investigation Committee

submitted its recommendation to the Board on 21 August

1989, which the latter adopted and approved on 25 August

1989 in its Resolution No. 070-89, respondents were no

longer under any legal restraint.

The second issue of alleged violation by the PCA of

administrative due process must also be

Compiled Admin Quasi-judicial Review (Incomplete)

Documents

Transcript of Compiled Admin Quasi-judicial Review (Incomplete)