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A002-R01-2014
Project Polemos
K-BOMB: Analysis of G/LEO Kinetic Bombardment
and Application to National Security
Strategies for Full-Spectrum Military
Interoperability
Rammah M. Elbasheer
May 2014
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Abstract
The objective of this study centralized on the analysis of a
kinetic bombardment long-rod penetrator system and its evident
processes, ramifications, and applications. Applications spanned
three broad operational intentions; deep bunker breach,intercontinental strike capability, and preeminence over
terrestrial forces without matched investment. The ambition of a
viable Kinetic Bombardment Orbital Mechanism (KBOM), is for the
cost in its entirety from being put into orbit, to maintenance,
and ejecting payloads, to be less than or equal to the same amount
of marginal effort required to build, maintain, and launch the
required number of ICBMs to complete a given set of tactical
objectives.
Eleven potential Kinetic Bombardment Rod (KBR) configurations were
initially developed varying between two forms; standard tungstencarbide rods and tungsten carbide rods equipped with thermobaric
warheads. Through an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) down select
process, a final standard tungsten carbide rod composition was
selected for use as a case example for further investigation.
It is concluded that as policies are shaped to allow less
restricted military activity in space, kinetic bombardment systems
will be acquired in response to distinct international events or
threats. Peer nations seeking to match U.S. general terrestrial
forces without matching U.S. investment may also look to acquire
orbital defense satellites. In regards to nations such as the
United States that already own weapons effective against all
classes of targets, kinetic bombardment systems will only become
viable prospects once launch costs decline with the development of
reusable launch vehicles. This study makes the beginning but surely
not the whole case, for the long pursued concept of orbital defense
satellites as the obstacles that once stood in the way recede.
While it does not however suggest or constitute the immediate
development of such a project, it perhaps constitutes its future
consideration.
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Table of ContentsAbstract
List of Tables
List of Figures
Nomenclature and Acronyms
1.0 Introduction
2.0 History of Kinetic Bombardment
3.0 Kinetic Bombardment
3.1 Parameters
3.2 Process
3.3 Penetration
4.0 Vulnerability and Revision
4.1 Vulnerability
5.0 Payload Transportation
5.1 ELVs and RLVs
6.0 Nuclear Weapons and the KBOM
5.1 Efficacy and ICBM Contrast
7.0 Anti-Bombardment
8.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
References
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List of Tables
Table 1: Parameters of a Case Tungsten Rod
Table 2: Space Transportation RLV and ELV Cost Comparison
Table 3: Average ELV Price Per Pound - Futron
Table 4: Tungsten Rod Transportation Comparison
List of Figures
Figure 1: Space Transportation Cost History to Low Earth Orbit
Figure 2: Prospective Method of Calculated Deorbit (Pulsed Laser)
Figure 3: Conventional Trident II Breakdown
Figure 4: X-51 WaveRider
Figure 5: Inertial Reference Platform
Figure B: Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot
Figure 6a: Mapped Mesh for Generic Re-Entry Body
Figure 6b: Mapped Mesh for Generic Spiked Re-Entry Body
Figure 7: Diagram of Aerospike Induced Flowfield
Figure 8: ELV Space Transportation CostsFigure 9: RLVs to ELVs Comparison
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Nomenclature and Acronyms
ODS Orbital Defense Satellite
KBR Kinetic Bombardment Rods
KBOM Kinetic Bombardment Orbital Mechanism
KB Kinetic Bombardment
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OST Outer Space Treaty
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain
USA United States of America
FAA Federal Aviation Agency
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle
LEO Low Earth Orbit
GPS Global Positioning System
SSO Semi-Synchronous Orbit
GEO Geosynchronous
GSO Geostationary
PGS Prompt Global Strike
ODM Orbital Defense Mechanism
MEO Medium Earth Orbit
AOA Analysis of Alternatives
APFSDS Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot
IRP Inertial Reference Platform
CEP Circular Error of Probability
OCST Office of Commercial Space Transportation
NGSO Non-Geosynchronous Orbit
ABMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
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1.0 Introduction
In August of 2006, the Bush administration revised the National
Space Policy to reject arms-control agreements that hinder freedom
of action in space. The direction and planning of space policy is
defined by such events and others like it, such as therecommendation of the implementation of orbital kinetic energy
weapons by the Defense Science Board to the Department of Defense
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2010. Or again, in the
long-range plan of the United States Space Command (USSC), calling
for policy makers to “shape [the] international community to accept
space-based weapons to defend against threats in accordance with
national policy.” USSC currently projects that there will be
weapons in space within the first two or three decades of the 21st
century driven by the need for alternatives to terrestrial
capabilities. 2003 brought the most recent and cited explicit
Government mention of a kinetic energy weapon, the hypervelocity
rod bundle, by the U.S. Air Force Transformative Flight Plan.
Actions such as the aforementioned have set the political
groundwork for the introduction of KBOMs, yet the 64-year old
dilemma continues to be the launch cost. Thus far, the argument
has been terrestrial ICBMs can complete the same objectives as
KBOMs for a more reasonable amount. However, Reusable Launch
Vehicles (RLV) are beginning to solve that dilemma, as can be seen
in Figure 1, and bringing ICBMs and KBOMs to a tactical crossroad.
One will not replace the other but rather they will each becomeappropriate in differentiating sets of circumstances.
Figure 1: Space Transportation Cost History to Low Earth Orbit
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2.0 History of Kinetic Bombardment
Framework of Orbital Defense Mechanisms (ODM), such as bombardment
satellites, were designed in the Cold War era to become prospective
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower
administration sponsored satellite research development programsfor bombardment, electronic countermeasures, and military
communications along with novel concepts such as manned lunar
stations — all summarized by a then classified 1958 National
Security Council Space Policy Subcommittee report. Kinetic
bombardment was given further credence by the military in the 1950s
when it was proposed by RAND to equip ICBMs with tungsten rod
bundles in the effort to reinforce their capability. On the
opposing side of the Cold War and in the pursuit of the application
of space weapons, the Soviet Union ICBM program later tested a
Fractional Orbital Bombardment system in the 1960s, orbiting mock
nuclear warheads in LEO and setting them to an objective by
calculated deorbit.
Figure 2: Prospective Method of Calculated Deorbit (Pulsed Laser)
However, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the subsequent SALT IITreaty of 1979 put an end to the research and development of
orbital WMDs. Be that as it may, modern day military research on
kinetic bombardment, progressions in space transportation, and
recent changes in global space policy have once again shed the
light of possibility on kinetic bombardment and by extension KBOMs,
with programs emerging as recently as the past decade from groups
such as Boeing, DARPA, NASA, and Pratt & Whitney.
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Kinetic bombardment became reborn in 1990 with the introduction of
the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program, the objective of which
according to deputy commander Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler (U.S.
Strategic Command), is “to strike virtually anywhere on the face
of the Earth within 60 minutes.” PGS aims to retrofit Trident II
65-ton ballistic missiles with multiple warheads filled withtungsten rods. Upon leaving the atmosphere and reaching its apogee,
the warheads of the $60 million modified Trident II missile would
separate, beginning its descent using flaps to steer to a target.
Moments before impact the warheads would detonate, sending a hail
of tungsten rods. PGS was reinvigorated in 2001 as Defense
Department planners sought for the development of conventional
weapons with accelerated strike capability.
Figure 3: Conventional Trident II Breakdown
The shift in military focus from using kinetic bombardment to
augment conventional weapons to establishing weapons capable of
destroying targets with their own kinetic energy however, came
only recently with the Boeing X-51 WaveRider in May 2010. The X-
51 consists of a single module and at Mach 5 speeds, eliminates
targets by its own hypersonic impact. Harnessing the series ofhypersonic waves caused by its own flight by breaking them at a
precise angle, the X-51 directs pressure into its internal inlet
to add lift. Nonetheless, the X-51 is limited to a range of 740km
along with constraints such as requiring to be lifted into the air
by plane and accelerated via rocket-fueled booster before being
able to activate its hypersonic engine.
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Figure 4: X-51 WaveRider
3.0 Kinetic Bombardment
This section addresses the process, implications, and results of
kinetic bombardment and its application to orbital mechanisms.
Section 3.1 defines the parameters of the KBR to be used for
investigation, Section 3.2 presents the case in practice of the
orbital discharge of a KBR with following general analysis of drag
reduction measures, and Section 3.3 discusses final descent putting
under consideration the various processes and variables.
3.1 Parameters
In order to provide a case in practice of a KBOM the parameters of
a tungsten rod must be set. For our purposes the following
parameters will be used for analysis;
Parameters Value
Nose 0.3048m (1ft)Nose Cone Von Kármán 30° - 50° Cone
Body Height 6.096m (20ft)Body Width 0.3048m (1ft)Tail 0.6096m (2ft)Base 0.3048m (1ft)Weight 33,000kgCost $1.44 million
Table 1: Parameters of a Case Tungsten Rod
3.2 Process
The case begins in LEO with the tungsten rod attached to a satellite
bus. Upon launch, the projectile is ejected by a high-acceleration
linear motor (mass driver) supported by solar or electric power,
much like the one demonstrated at the May 1977 Princeton/AIAA/NASA
University Space Manufacturing Facilities Conference. Force of
ejection on the satellite can be negated via ion drive, likely not
all the force would be negated causing a necessary recovery time
to correct the orbit of the satellite.
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Once the rod has left the bus, the matter of steering must be
addressed without a handwaving reference to GPS. Ejection will
provide an initial trajectory, but from there forth steering can
be accomplished by an Inertial Reference Platform (IRP). An IRP
provides the benefit of an onboard solution with no requirement of
radio communication, thus remaining unaffected by ionizationblackout. However, the projectile could indeed benefit from a GPS
to provide early guidance during descent while upon reentry, update
coordinates through momentary windows in the ionized air envelope.
Figure 5: Inertial Reference Platform
During descent the bulk of drag would occur at the tail, whosefins are similar to that of a compact kinetic energy missile such
as the Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS),
assisting in keeping the rod in an optimal point-first orientation.
In this regard, the use of a structural aerodynamic spike should
be considered. The basic logic of kinetic bombardment is
eliminating targets by the concentrated kinetic energy stemming
from the velocity of a given projectile, thus drag and ablation
reduction are a main priority.
Figure B: Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot
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In conventional missiles such as the Trident D-5 the application
of an aerodisk aerospike increased flight distance by 550km. In
the pursuit of drag reducing nose configurations, solutions such
as the application of two aerospikes in series with a 3:2 ratio
which among the cases investigated with a blunt body resulted in
a 38 percent reduction in peak reattachment heat flux and a 25percent reduction in drag, may be analyzed. Alternatively, concepts
such as the airspike, a pulsed laser projecting forward from the
body, may be further studied for application to kinetic bombardment
projectiles. An airspike produces low-density hot air ahead of the
body providing a lower air density behind the detached shock wave
resulting in increased drag reduction.
Figure 6a: Mapped Mesh for Generic Re-Entry Body
Figure 6b: Mapped Mesh for Generic Spiked Re-Entry Body
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Figure 7: Diagram of Aerospike Induced Flowfield
3.3 Penetration
KBOMs are postulated to be capable of ejecting payloads that
produce the approximate concentrated force of a nuclear weapon
without producing the threat of nuclear fallout, contamination,
and major political fallout. They of course require further
examination in this regard, though we now continue on to analyze
final descent and hypothetical impact putting under consideration
the processes and variables concerning them such as penetration
depth, before providing further insight on these measures and
investigating their consequences.Inducing a vertical descent is the intent of the APFSDS-like design
of the tungsten rod. To realize the full capability of the KBOM,
vertical descent must be coupled with a suitable velocity, yet
fortunately what a suitable velocity is, isn’t what most evidently
interpret as orbital velocity. Orbital velocity is simply
unnecessary, a dense thin projectile such as the tungsten rod in
case can transfer sufficient energy at a hypersonic speed of 3
kilometers per second to achieve the desired effect. It should
also be noted that the energy of a high explosive corresponds to
a material speed of 3 kilometers per second and is matched pergram by a projectile dropped from an altitude of 460 kilometers,
whereas LEO hangs at 2000 kilometers.
To resume, most space-born objects entering our atmosphere rather
than plummet into earth, disperse into a cloud of debris or shatter
in the stratosphere altogether. Yet, the concern of a tungsten
projectile isn’t melting, for tungsten holds a melting point of
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3400 degrees Celsius, but instead, a projectile is vexed by its
own necessary design. To offset loss of velocity, aerodynamic
controls and surfaces are adopted to correct drift and speed and
despite surviving re-entry, substantial ablation of aerodynamic
control surfaces will possibly alter course, disrupt flight path,
or cause non-vertical descent. Nonetheless, this is a possibilityas is with all re-entry impactors such as the ICBM, which survives
re-entry by descending at considerably less than orbital velocity
with a blunt nose. Likewise, the rod in case as aforementioned
will also travel considerably less than orbital velocity, for only
a speed of 3 kilometers per second is required for an effective
kinetic strike. If necessary an ablative heat jacket or carbon cap
can be applied to a rod.
In regards to penetration depth, the dynamics of long-rod
penetrators were deftly explained by Richard L. Garwin when he
presented the case of a copper-jacketed lead bullet impacting steelat approximately 1 kilometer per second. Adamantine projectiles
impacting rock at a similar speed can penetrate several times their
own length. Although, the bullet was shown to fragment against the
hardened steel, it produced sufficient pressure to leave a crater.
Such is the way with long-rod penetrators, as shown by Sandia
Laboratory which during a series of tests confirmed that no matter
the strength of the rod material, penetration depth reaches a peak
at a speed of 1 kilometer per second. As it is described, above
that speed the rod tip liquefies and penetration depth falls off,
becoming effectively independent of impact speed. Yet, it shouldbe noted that in his report, Richard L. Garwin investigated
independent long-rod penetrators that are orbited and de-orbited
by canceling their orbital velocity, as opposed to the currently
investigated case of long-rod penetrators mounted on a satellite
bus and ejected from LEO, MEO (Medium Earth Orbit), NGSO (Non-
Geosynchronous Orbit), or GEO by the means of defense satellite.
4.0 Vulnerability and Revision
We now further explore the discussed modules and launch process of
the projectile in case while analyzing modifications andalternatives to them.
In regards to the aforementioned ejection by high-acceleration
linear motor, there are a few concerns. Primarily in terms of the
impact time and the resulting vulnerability. From LEO a launched
projectile would have a minimum time to target of approximately 10
– 45 minutes coupled with a distinctive flight path. If the launch
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platform is put into a higher orbit such as GEO, than time to
target increases to approximately 45 - 60 minutes of predictable
flight, this all of course depending on the ejection method. This
is time enough for surface elements such as ships and convoys to
escape an area along with any targeted individuals. Although,
divisions caught by geography or active warzones, would not havesuch an opportunity. One of the few possible ways to hit a moving
target with KBOMs is to predict their route and intercept on a
confined path so only speed rather than direction, must be
estimated.
Nonetheless, ODS systems are devised to eliminate stationary
targets such as bunkers, the business of targeting ships and
individuals is one properly left to standard and less severe
military assets. Yet, there are modifications that can be made to
a projectile to handle other general surface elements. One such
modification is controlled fragmentation. Controlled fragmentationof the rod could augment the result of impact at the cost of
penetration depth. Such a system would split the rod into scores
of ‘needles’ to shower an area by timing the window of
fragmentation to impact. Thus, a later fragmentation would result
in a compact shower with a lesser margin of error as opposed to an
earlier fragmentation which would cause a larger shower with an
increased margin of error. Such modifications also bring in the
concern of a problematic Circular Error of Probability (CEP), where
the possible drift of the needles could eliminate unintended
elements. Controlled fragmentation admittedly is a pooralternative to a surface-launched ICBM which could mount rod-
bundles as proposed by RAND to achieve a similar or even greater
effect against surface targets.
To vie with the ICBM a KBOM would need to decrease time to target
while preventing vulnerability of the system from reaching a
problematic standing. This could come in the form of lowering the
orbit of the KBOM and negating vulnerability with onboard
countermeasures against anti-satellite weapons. Conversely, a more
forceful ejection method in preference to introducing propellants
to projectiles could be used to hasten descent, albeit at greatercost. The addition of propellants to projectiles would require a
larger and more complicated launch assembly. The resulting large
quantity of propellants would have to be carried into orbit and
cause a needless complication to an already complex weapon.
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4.1 Vulnerability
As we progress, vulnerability consistently becomes a recurring
topic as ODMs suffer the same problems as all manmade objects in
space. Satellites fly predictable closed paths and have low
maneuverability, most satellites limit their maneuvers to evadingspace debris and station-keeping. Using basic flight maps and dead
reckoning techniques, anyone could anticipate where and when a KB
platform is overhead. Furthermore, due to this limited
maneuverability an ODM may be forced to ride a higher orbit to
avoid orbital denial conditions such as debris in lower orbits or
concerns such as standard trackers and casual observation. Yet,
this comes at the benefit of increasing the volume of space that
must be watched by adversaries and augmenting the global strike
capability of the ODM. Satellites can’t hide, ejection of
projectiles can be tracked and any payload of sufficient size can
be followed. Hull ionization for one, will generate an IR streak
in space, and a liberal ejection of rods will likely appear on
magnetic anomaly detectors. This is not to mention any ionization
blooms which are just as susceptible to radar. If propellants are
mounted on the rods, visible infrared signatures will be produced
as well. Yet, detection of the rods themselves is no true ordeal,
the dilemma in truth is the detection of the satellite itself which
cannot be truly helped either.
5.0 Payload Transportation
Transportation to and fro even the closest orbits are truly the
bane of all space endeavors, for the cost of putting equipment and
vehicles into space has long been a disabling anchor in budgets of
all prestige and size. This dilemma led to research into various
launch/propulsion technologies and methods, cultivating modernized
system architectures. The forefront of this research yielded a
fruitful solution, reusable launch vehicles.
Standard payload transportation is unduly costly per kilogram but
the emergence of well-funded private ventures such as SpaceX in
unity with the accelerated development of reusable launch vehiclesopened possibilities that had never been available to us. We are
becoming capable to deploy a complex and heavy payload without
facing inordinate amounts of expenditure, effectively bringing
light once more to the long darkened corner of orbital defense
weapons and its ilk. Table 2 exemplifies the magnitude of
difference between ELVs and RLVs, the RLVs in this case being the
Falcon 9 Heavy and the smaller Falcon 9, both by SpaceX.
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Model Launch LEO Payload GEO PayloadELV: Space Shuttle $300m 63,443kg 13,010kgFalcon 9 Heavy $77.1m 53,000kg 21,200kg
Falcon 9 $56.5m 13,150kg 4,850kg
Table 2: Space Transportation RLV and ELV Cost Comparison
The Space Shuttle is not available for commercial use and as of
now is in fact retired from service thus it does not have a defined
public launch cost. But, it was one of the heaviest launch vehicles
to date and boasted the highest capacity to LEO in its class so it
serves as a proper subject for comparison to standard RLVs, for if
it can be shown that a standard RLV can outperform the most capable
ELV, the point is made. As can be observed, the Falcon 9 Heavy can
deliver a payload on par with the Space Shuttle for 25.7 percent
of the cost. In the NASA Space Transportation Architecture studyof the late 1990s, launch cost of the Space Shuttle was put at
$300 million against an annual budget of $2.4 billion and eight
flights a year. Comparatively, SpaceX holds a $1.6 billion contract
with NASA to carry out cargo resupply missions to the ISS for a
total of at least 12 missions. SpaceX holds 50+ launches to its
name and a total of $5 billion in contracts with a forefront foot
in RLVs that will be the main construct to heavy defense payload
delivery. A possible inaccuracy should be noted, there are varying
methods to compute the cost of the shuttle; one divides the Space
Shuttle budget by flights per year, yielding the given $300million, the second estimating the marginal cost of additional
flights, possibly yielding actual costs of less than $100 million.
5.1 ELVs and RLVs
Figure 8 represents the decreasing cost of expendable launch
vehicles over the years in all four classes defined by the FAA
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) while Figure 9
exemplifies the starker dip in cost of reusable launch vehicles in
relation. Differences in vehicle size hides price discrepancies
caused by nation of manufacture, design, and such. Thus, Table 3has been included courtesy of the Futron Corporation as a
supplementary guide to average ELV launch prices by means of the
standard price per pound metric. Some measures such as that used
in Figures 8 and 9 may not be wholly accurate due to terms of many
launch contracts being sealed. In such cases the available generic
launch prices were put into use.
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Figure 8: ELV Space Transportation Costs
Table 3: Average ELV Price Per Pound - Futron
As somewhat aforementioned, a kinetic bombardment system would
require to be dominantly designed upon the singular cost of putting
it into orbit. If propellants are introduced to the projectiles of
a KB system, the continuing transportation cost of replenishing
the satellite at current rates would cripple the reasoning of both
its use and existence. However, it is to be kept in mind that some
level of resupply is necessary. A satellite bus must be stocked
with an appropriate amount of tungsten rods and depending on the
size and capacity of a satellite bus you will find yourself with
varying resupply cycles. This of course can be offset by the rate
of use of a KBOM.
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Figure 9: RLVs to ELVs Comparison
To resume, we again reference Table 2. The weight of a tungsten
rod for our hypothetical KBOM to be delivered to LEO was set at
33,000kg by Table 1. We now devise Table 4 to compare the
approximate resupply costs of a KBOM system representing theconsequent rates produced by ELVs and RLVs respectively.
Unfortunately, we must ignore the actual launch cost of putting a
KBOM into orbit in its entirety for the complexities, amount of
required presumption, and broad margin of error would nullify any
produced figure.
Model Launch LEO GEO # of Rods/$ Per
ELV: Space Shuttle $300m 63,443kg 13,010kg 1.92/$156.25mRLV: Falcon 9 Heavy $77.1m 53,000kg 21,200kg 1.60/$48.18mELV: Proton (Heavy) $85m 43,524kg 10,209kg 1.31/$64.88m
ELV: Delta 2 $55m 11,330kg 3,969kg 0.34/$161.76mRLV: Falcon 9 $56.5m 13,150kg 4,850kg 0.39/$144.87m
Table 4: Tungsten Rod Transportation Comparison
Table 4 offers us a small but informative sample of information.
From determining the number of rods possible per launch for each
vehicle and pairing the result with the calculated cost per whole
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rod we can observe the sheer difference in expenditure caused by
the application of an expendable launch vehicle or a reusable
launch vehicle. This makes the beginning but surely not the whole
case, for the nearing possibility of orbital defense satellites as
the decade long obstacle that stood in the way is waning. It does
not constitute the immediate development of such a project, butperhaps it constitutes its future consideration.
6.0 Nuclear Weapons and the KBOM
Nuclear arms have become tainted by bureaucracy, although military
actions have always had a political underlining, the launch of a
nuclear missile in particular has become a political action in
physical manifestation rather than only in part. The use of a
nuclear weapon threatens a cascade effect and a range of
retaliatory strikes justified by its initial use, thus nuclear
arms today are built only to induce peaceful diplomacy by means ofmutually assured destruction. Furthermore, building and
maintaining ICBMs or nuclear arsenals in general requires employing
cleared individuals year round to preserve, protect, and repair
arms. In addition, the various treaties in regards to nuclear arms
must be upheld, international discussions must be had to expand an
arsenal, and nuclear inspectors must be facilitated. Development
of a KBOM would be a means to add a specialized tactical weapon to
a military arsenal or rival the terrestrial military forces of a
peer nation. Considering nuclear arms its entirety, the notion of
the less obdurate and potentially equally potent results of a KBOMbecomes enticing.
Kinetic bombardment is anomalous in nature for it, as can be told
by its name, is the process of using the hypervelocity speed of an
object to eliminate a target with unadulterated kinetic energy. It
was mentioned that a configuration of tungsten carbide rods
equipped with thermobaric warheads was formulated to potentially
augment the capability of a KBR, but due to the political
complexities of the various treaties held by the global arena,
complications of re-entry, and consequent added costs to the
system, it was abandoned during analysis. However, it is knownthat tungsten vapor, liquid droplets, and small solid particles
are combustible. It was investigated that while the front-end of
a tungsten rod at hypervelocity will not melt, it will produce
sufficient amounts of said vapors, droplets, or particles and in
descent to cause a result similar to an explosive charge upon
impact in addition to evident penetration.
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6.1 Efficacy and ICBM Contrast
To continue, we now turn to investigate the military capabilities
and advantages of a KBOM. It was aforementioned that a KBR would
likely not only be used for deep bunker breach, the targeting of
hardened nuclear missile silos, or other such elements found in arogue state, but also against surface targets. Prime targets would
include elements vulnerable to penetration of a few meters, this
could mean munition storages, buildings, large vessels, fuel tanks,
and hardened aircraft shelters. This expands to the capability to
eliminate enemy launch and control facilities, logistic stores,
communication nodes, surface navy fleets in port, and shore
infrastructure.
This range of capabilities would allow a nation to for example,
clear a coast for troop landings or damage enemy response
capabilities ahead of an incursion. If an ICBM equipped with anuclear warhead was targeted to such a location the risk of
contaminating the water, the landing site for troops, and
surrounding elements would be waged. Of course, an ICBM could be
launched with a conventional warhead but you are faced with the
waste of a complex and valuable missile that would only achieve a
modest detonation, meaning several costly missiles would need to
be launched. In addition, at our time of technological advancement,
ballistic missiles can readily be defended against by first world
countries with programs such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
System (ABMDS) belonging to the United States. This was proven asrecently as September 3, 2013 when Russia brought down two United
States ballistic missiles heading toward the Syrian coast.
Immediately, this resulted in Russia going into war alert and
notifying United States intelligence. The incident threatened
bilateral relations and could have caused unduly escalation, as
Russia was in support of Syria at the time and could have viewed
the event as a confrontation by proxy.
Kinetic bombardment has the advantage in such circumstances, a KBR
is economical and less austere than an ICBM, they are expendable,
and can be launched in force in manners aforementioned such ascontrolled fragmentation, to provide a variety of tactical uses.
7.0 Anti-Bombardment
Implementation of a KBOM by any nation would inevitably lead to
acquisition of parallel systems by others. This does not
necessarily mean sudden widespread development of similar orbital
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mechanisms, but instead likely the accelerated development of anti-
satellite arms, monitoring infrastructures, or general denial and
deception mechanisms. Various prominent research reports observe
the threats of micro-satellites, terrestrial assaults on ground
stations, and means of electronic incapacitation, thus we move on
to centralize on immediate sources of anti-satellite arms.
One such possible source are modified high-capability ballistic
missile interceptors as was proven by the intentional test
destruction of the USA-193 spy satellite by what was only a
modified RIM-161 Standard Missile 3, originally built to intercept
short to intermediate range ballistic missiles as part of the
ABMDS. The RIM-161 successfully reached the beginnings of LEO and
shattered USA-193 at a total mission cost of $100 million, bearing
all to witness the economic anti-satellite capabilities of even
the most standard of anti-ballistic arms.
In the wake of the destruction of USA-193, the capabilities of
sophisticated anti-ballistic arms such as the Arrow 3, an Israeli
anti-ballistic missile, albeit one built in cooperation with
Boeing, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and funded by upwards of
$74 million by the United States, is put under consideration.
Adapted to provides exo-atmospheric interception of ballistic
missiles, the Arrow 3 has been deemed a prime anti-ballistic arm
that could serve in an anti-satellite capacity by such authorities
as retired Major General Yitzhik Ben-Israel, chairman of the Israel
Space Agency and former director of Israeli military research and
development as it is capable of operating at exceptionally high-altitudes.
Of course, this is in regards to the targeting and theoretical
elimination of a KB platform in LEO. If such a platform was hung
in GEO than even the most sophisticated anti-ballistic missiles of
today would find interception highly difficult. Yet, in March,
Brian Weeden, a technical advisor for the Secure World Foundation,
wrote in regards to a May 2013 Chinese test launch, “While there
is no conclusive proof, the available evidence strongly suggests
that the launch was the test of the rocket component of a new
direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons system derived from a
road-mobile ballistic missile.” And that, “The system appears to
be designed to place a kinetic kill vehicle on a trajectory to
deep space that could reach medium earth orbit (MEO), highly
elliptical orbit (HEO), and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).” If
true, this would represent a significant development in ASAT
capabilities.
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Then continues the issue of the rods themselves, standard anti-
ballistic missiles have limited capability against even ICBMs and
interception of a hypervelocity rod is questionable. If it is found
there is a high-risk of a KBR being intercepted, evasive
countermeasures as seen in sophisticated ICBMs such as the Russian
RT-2UTTKh Topol-M could be applied to a limited quantity ofspecialized rods. It is claimed by Russian officials the Topol-M
is immune to any current or planned missile defense system,
achieved by carrying targeting countermeasures, several decoys,
along with shields against EMPs, laser technology, and nuclear
explosions at distances of over 500 meters. Although, this would
add to the complication of a rod and thus add to the cost, it may
become a necessary addition as countermeasures are eventually
readied against the KBOM and its rods. It would be preferable to
instead simply stock the satellite bus with modified rods than
face incapability.
8.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
The 1997 U.S. Air Force Global Engagement vision, recognizes that
U.S. military use of space beyond supporting terrestrial forces
will be “driven by national policy, international events, and
threats” but anticipates that “the nation will expect the Air
Force to be prepared to defend U.S. interests in space when
necessary.” The U.S. government in particular relies on
satellites for a number of defense-critical services from
strategic and tactical reconnaissance and intelligence gathering,to communications, weather monitoring, and early warning of
missile launches.
Officials look for open and transparent access to space, but in
times of modern crisis a key element becomes controlling and
denying access to space. As infrastructure is built to protect
and control interests in space, a theatre is set to arm space.
The notion of space weapons as a central element of future U.S.
national security, in advance of a specific compelling threat has
long appeared in scientific advice to the Defense Department. In
1999, the Defense Science Board explicitly recommended that theDepartment of Defense acquire space-based weapons as essential
capabilities for implementing the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint
Vision 2010. Most official mentions and research have a tone of
eventual inevitability without providing a clear picture of a
proximate cause for a unilateral decision to acquire.
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Nations looking to gain independence from U.S. capabilities or
balance the military strengths of peer nations are slowly shaping
their policies to increase activity in space in various non-
military and military capacities. Japan in particular, revised a
law regarding its non-military activities in space in 2008 in
response to the testing of satellite destruction capabilities byChina, allowing the creation of a "space force" and planning to
add the new division to its military in 2019 to protect equipment
in orbit from space debris as well as other attacks. Though,
Japan looks to assist the U.S. military with the information it
obtains through the program to strengthen bilateral cooperation
in space.
Of course, a central theme to this study has been as activities
in space are planned, a decrease in the cost to space access is
one of the only triggers to significantly stimulate national
defense programs in space. Far deeper cuts in the price per poundto orbit, such as the $1,000/pound goal of the NASA Space Launch
Initiative, is necessary. Until RLVs and launch technologies
further develop, a KBOM remains an asset only to be acquired in
response to definitive international events such as the
development by a peer nation. Yet, even so there are alternative,
less austere courses of action available in such cases. Kinetic
bombardment as an independent application on the other hand, can
continue to be economically applied to surface missiles as an
augmentation such as described in the aforementioned PGS program.
Nonetheless, it is to be noted development of the Atomic andHydrogen bomb in the 1930s and 1950s respectively by the United
States was not primarily to gain dominance in the global arena
and doubtlessly not intended as a standard mass-produced military
asset, but instead as a display of power and resolve. KBOMs aka
the “K-BOMB” would be a continuation of that legacy and as such
is why the ambitious prospect of an orbital defense weapon is
investigated here and in numerous papers and reports, by all
manners of researchers and authorities.
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