Analysis of G LEO Kinetic Bombardment An

8/16/2019 Analysis of G LEO Kinetic Bombardment An

1/28

© 2014 Rammah M. Elbasheer

A002-R01-2014

Project Polemos

K-BOMB: Analysis of G/LEO Kinetic Bombardment

and Application to National Security

Strategies for Full-Spectrum Military

Interoperability

Rammah M. Elbasheer

May 2014


2/28


Abstract

The objective of this study centralized on the analysis of a

kinetic bombardment long-rod penetrator system and its evident

processes, ramifications, and applications. Applications spanned

three broad operational intentions; deep bunker breach,intercontinental strike capability, and preeminence over

terrestrial forces without matched investment. The ambition of a

viable Kinetic Bombardment Orbital Mechanism (KBOM), is for the

cost in its entirety from being put into orbit, to maintenance,

and ejecting payloads, to be less than or equal to the same amount

of marginal effort required to build, maintain, and launch the

required number of ICBMs to complete a given set of tactical

objectives.

Eleven potential Kinetic Bombardment Rod (KBR) configurations were

initially developed varying between two forms; standard tungstencarbide rods and tungsten carbide rods equipped with thermobaric

warheads. Through an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) down select

process, a final standard tungsten carbide rod composition was

selected for use as a case example for further investigation.

It is concluded that as policies are shaped to allow less

restricted military activity in space, kinetic bombardment systems

will be acquired in response to distinct international events or

threats. Peer nations seeking to match U.S. general terrestrial

forces without matching U.S. investment may also look to acquire

orbital defense satellites. In regards to nations such as the

United States that already own weapons effective against all

classes of targets, kinetic bombardment systems will only become

viable prospects once launch costs decline with the development of

reusable launch vehicles. This study makes the beginning but surely

not the whole case, for the long pursued concept of orbital defense

satellites as the obstacles that once stood in the way recede.

While it does not however suggest or constitute the immediate

development of such a project, it perhaps constitutes its future

consideration.


3/28


Table of ContentsAbstract

List of Tables

List of Figures

Nomenclature and Acronyms

1.0 Introduction

2.0 History of Kinetic Bombardment

3.0 Kinetic Bombardment

3.1 Parameters

3.2 Process

3.3 Penetration

4.0 Vulnerability and Revision

4.1 Vulnerability

5.0 Payload Transportation

5.1 ELVs and RLVs

6.0 Nuclear Weapons and the KBOM

5.1 Efficacy and ICBM Contrast

7.0 Anti-Bombardment

8.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

References


4/28


List of Tables

Table 1: Parameters of a Case Tungsten Rod

Table 2: Space Transportation RLV and ELV Cost Comparison

Table 3: Average ELV Price Per Pound - Futron

Table 4: Tungsten Rod Transportation Comparison

List of Figures

Figure 1: Space Transportation Cost History to Low Earth Orbit

Figure 2: Prospective Method of Calculated Deorbit (Pulsed Laser)

Figure 3: Conventional Trident II Breakdown

Figure 4: X-51 WaveRider

Figure 5: Inertial Reference Platform

Figure B: Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot

Figure 6a: Mapped Mesh for Generic Re-Entry Body

Figure 6b: Mapped Mesh for Generic Spiked Re-Entry Body

Figure 7: Diagram of Aerospike Induced Flowfield

Figure 8: ELV Space Transportation CostsFigure 9: RLVs to ELVs Comparison


5/28


Nomenclature and Acronyms

ODS Orbital Defense Satellite

KBR Kinetic Bombardment Rods

KBOM Kinetic Bombardment Orbital Mechanism

KB Kinetic Bombardment

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OST Outer Space Treaty

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

UK United Kingdom of Great Britain

USA United States of America

FAA Federal Aviation Agency

RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle

ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle

LEO Low Earth Orbit

GPS Global Positioning System

SSO Semi-Synchronous Orbit

GEO Geosynchronous

GSO Geostationary

PGS Prompt Global Strike

ODM Orbital Defense Mechanism

MEO Medium Earth Orbit

AOA Analysis of Alternatives

APFSDS Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot

IRP Inertial Reference Platform

CEP Circular Error of Probability

OCST Office of Commercial Space Transportation

NGSO Non-Geosynchronous Orbit

ABMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System


6/28


1.0 Introduction

In August of 2006, the Bush administration revised the National

Space Policy to reject arms-control agreements that hinder freedom

of action in space. The direction and planning of space policy is

defined by such events and others like it, such as therecommendation of the implementation of orbital kinetic energy

weapons by the Defense Science Board to the Department of Defense

for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2010. Or again, in the

long-range plan of the United States Space Command (USSC), calling

for policy makers to “shape [the] international community to accept

space-based weapons to defend against threats in accordance with

national policy.” USSC currently projects that there will be

weapons in space within the first two or three decades of the 21st

century driven by the need for alternatives to terrestrial

capabilities. 2003 brought the most recent and cited explicit

Government mention of a kinetic energy weapon, the hypervelocity

rod bundle, by the U.S. Air Force Transformative Flight Plan.

Actions such as the aforementioned have set the political

groundwork for the introduction of KBOMs, yet the 64-year old

dilemma continues to be the launch cost. Thus far, the argument

has been terrestrial ICBMs can complete the same objectives as

KBOMs for a more reasonable amount. However, Reusable Launch

Vehicles (RLV) are beginning to solve that dilemma, as can be seen

in Figure 1, and bringing ICBMs and KBOMs to a tactical crossroad.

One will not replace the other but rather they will each becomeappropriate in differentiating sets of circumstances.

Figure 1: Space Transportation Cost History to Low Earth Orbit


7/28


2.0 History of Kinetic Bombardment

Framework of Orbital Defense Mechanisms (ODM), such as bombardment

satellites, were designed in the Cold War era to become prospective

delivery platforms for nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower

administration sponsored satellite research development programsfor bombardment, electronic countermeasures, and military

communications along with novel concepts such as manned lunar

stations — all summarized by a then classified 1958 National

Security Council Space Policy Subcommittee report. Kinetic

bombardment was given further credence by the military in the 1950s

when it was proposed by RAND to equip ICBMs with tungsten rod

bundles in the effort to reinforce their capability. On the

opposing side of the Cold War and in the pursuit of the application

of space weapons, the Soviet Union ICBM program later tested a

Fractional Orbital Bombardment system in the 1960s, orbiting mock

nuclear warheads in LEO and setting them to an objective by

calculated deorbit.

Figure 2: Prospective Method of Calculated Deorbit (Pulsed Laser)

However, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the subsequent SALT IITreaty of 1979 put an end to the research and development of

orbital WMDs. Be that as it may, modern day military research on

kinetic bombardment, progressions in space transportation, and

recent changes in global space policy have once again shed the

light of possibility on kinetic bombardment and by extension KBOMs,

with programs emerging as recently as the past decade from groups

such as Boeing, DARPA, NASA, and Pratt & Whitney.


8/28


Kinetic bombardment became reborn in 1990 with the introduction of

the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program, the objective of which

according to deputy commander Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler (U.S.

Strategic Command), is “to strike virtually anywhere on the face

of the Earth within 60 minutes.” PGS aims to retrofit Trident II

65-ton ballistic missiles with multiple warheads filled withtungsten rods. Upon leaving the atmosphere and reaching its apogee,

the warheads of the $60 million modified Trident II missile would

separate, beginning its descent using flaps to steer to a target.

Moments before impact the warheads would detonate, sending a hail

of tungsten rods. PGS was reinvigorated in 2001 as Defense

Department planners sought for the development of conventional

weapons with accelerated strike capability.

Figure 3: Conventional Trident II Breakdown

The shift in military focus from using kinetic bombardment to

augment conventional weapons to establishing weapons capable of

destroying targets with their own kinetic energy however, came

only recently with the Boeing X-51 WaveRider in May 2010. The X-

51 consists of a single module and at Mach 5 speeds, eliminates

targets by its own hypersonic impact. Harnessing the series ofhypersonic waves caused by its own flight by breaking them at a

precise angle, the X-51 directs pressure into its internal inlet

to add lift. Nonetheless, the X-51 is limited to a range of 740km

along with constraints such as requiring to be lifted into the air

by plane and accelerated via rocket-fueled booster before being

able to activate its hypersonic engine.


9/28


Figure 4: X-51 WaveRider

3.0 Kinetic Bombardment

This section addresses the process, implications, and results of

kinetic bombardment and its application to orbital mechanisms.

Section 3.1 defines the parameters of the KBR to be used for

investigation, Section 3.2 presents the case in practice of the

orbital discharge of a KBR with following general analysis of drag

reduction measures, and Section 3.3 discusses final descent putting

under consideration the various processes and variables.

3.1 Parameters

In order to provide a case in practice of a KBOM the parameters of

a tungsten rod must be set. For our purposes the following

parameters will be used for analysis;

Parameters Value

Nose 0.3048m (1ft)Nose Cone Von Kármán 30° - 50° Cone

Body Height 6.096m (20ft)Body Width 0.3048m (1ft)Tail 0.6096m (2ft)Base 0.3048m (1ft)Weight 33,000kgCost $1.44 million

Table 1: Parameters of a Case Tungsten Rod

3.2 Process

The case begins in LEO with the tungsten rod attached to a satellite

bus. Upon launch, the projectile is ejected by a high-acceleration

linear motor (mass driver) supported by solar or electric power,

much like the one demonstrated at the May 1977 Princeton/AIAA/NASA

University Space Manufacturing Facilities Conference. Force of

ejection on the satellite can be negated via ion drive, likely not

all the force would be negated causing a necessary recovery time

to correct the orbit of the satellite.


10/28


Once the rod has left the bus, the matter of steering must be

addressed without a handwaving reference to GPS. Ejection will

provide an initial trajectory, but from there forth steering can

be accomplished by an Inertial Reference Platform (IRP). An IRP

provides the benefit of an onboard solution with no requirement of

radio communication, thus remaining unaffected by ionizationblackout. However, the projectile could indeed benefit from a GPS

to provide early guidance during descent while upon reentry, update

coordinates through momentary windows in the ionized air envelope.

Figure 5: Inertial Reference Platform

During descent the bulk of drag would occur at the tail, whosefins are similar to that of a compact kinetic energy missile such

as the Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS),

assisting in keeping the rod in an optimal point-first orientation.

In this regard, the use of a structural aerodynamic spike should

be considered. The basic logic of kinetic bombardment is

eliminating targets by the concentrated kinetic energy stemming

from the velocity of a given projectile, thus drag and ablation

reduction are a main priority.

Figure B: Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot


11/28


In conventional missiles such as the Trident D-5 the application

of an aerodisk aerospike increased flight distance by 550km. In

the pursuit of drag reducing nose configurations, solutions such

as the application of two aerospikes in series with a 3:2 ratio

which among the cases investigated with a blunt body resulted in

a 38 percent reduction in peak reattachment heat flux and a 25percent reduction in drag, may be analyzed. Alternatively, concepts

such as the airspike, a pulsed laser projecting forward from the

body, may be further studied for application to kinetic bombardment

projectiles. An airspike produces low-density hot air ahead of the

body providing a lower air density behind the detached shock wave

resulting in increased drag reduction.

Figure 6a: Mapped Mesh for Generic Re-Entry Body

Figure 6b: Mapped Mesh for Generic Spiked Re-Entry Body


12/28


Figure 7: Diagram of Aerospike Induced Flowfield

3.3 Penetration

KBOMs are postulated to be capable of ejecting payloads that

produce the approximate concentrated force of a nuclear weapon

without producing the threat of nuclear fallout, contamination,

and major political fallout. They of course require further

examination in this regard, though we now continue on to analyze

final descent and hypothetical impact putting under consideration

the processes and variables concerning them such as penetration

depth, before providing further insight on these measures and

investigating their consequences.Inducing a vertical descent is the intent of the APFSDS-like design

of the tungsten rod. To realize the full capability of the KBOM,

vertical descent must be coupled with a suitable velocity, yet

fortunately what a suitable velocity is, isn’t what most evidently

interpret as orbital velocity. Orbital velocity is simply

unnecessary, a dense thin projectile such as the tungsten rod in

case can transfer sufficient energy at a hypersonic speed of 3

kilometers per second to achieve the desired effect. It should

also be noted that the energy of a high explosive corresponds to

a material speed of 3 kilometers per second and is matched pergram by a projectile dropped from an altitude of 460 kilometers,

whereas LEO hangs at 2000 kilometers.

To resume, most space-born objects entering our atmosphere rather

than plummet into earth, disperse into a cloud of debris or shatter

in the stratosphere altogether. Yet, the concern of a tungsten

projectile isn’t melting, for tungsten holds a melting point of


13/28


3400 degrees Celsius, but instead, a projectile is vexed by its

own necessary design. To offset loss of velocity, aerodynamic

controls and surfaces are adopted to correct drift and speed and

despite surviving re-entry, substantial ablation of aerodynamic

control surfaces will possibly alter course, disrupt flight path,

or cause non-vertical descent. Nonetheless, this is a possibilityas is with all re-entry impactors such as the ICBM, which survives

re-entry by descending at considerably less than orbital velocity

with a blunt nose. Likewise, the rod in case as aforementioned

will also travel considerably less than orbital velocity, for only

a speed of 3 kilometers per second is required for an effective

kinetic strike. If necessary an ablative heat jacket or carbon cap

can be applied to a rod.

In regards to penetration depth, the dynamics of long-rod

penetrators were deftly explained by Richard L. Garwin when he

presented the case of a copper-jacketed lead bullet impacting steelat approximately 1 kilometer per second. Adamantine projectiles

impacting rock at a similar speed can penetrate several times their

own length. Although, the bullet was shown to fragment against the

hardened steel, it produced sufficient pressure to leave a crater.

Such is the way with long-rod penetrators, as shown by Sandia

Laboratory which during a series of tests confirmed that no matter

the strength of the rod material, penetration depth reaches a peak

at a speed of 1 kilometer per second. As it is described, above

that speed the rod tip liquefies and penetration depth falls off,

becoming effectively independent of impact speed. Yet, it shouldbe noted that in his report, Richard L. Garwin investigated

independent long-rod penetrators that are orbited and de-orbited

by canceling their orbital velocity, as opposed to the currently

investigated case of long-rod penetrators mounted on a satellite

bus and ejected from LEO, MEO (Medium Earth Orbit), NGSO (Non-

Geosynchronous Orbit), or GEO by the means of defense satellite.

4.0 Vulnerability and Revision

We now further explore the discussed modules and launch process of

the projectile in case while analyzing modifications andalternatives to them.

In regards to the aforementioned ejection by high-acceleration

linear motor, there are a few concerns. Primarily in terms of the

impact time and the resulting vulnerability. From LEO a launched

projectile would have a minimum time to target of approximately 10

– 45 minutes coupled with a distinctive flight path. If the launch


14/28


platform is put into a higher orbit such as GEO, than time to

target increases to approximately 45 - 60 minutes of predictable

flight, this all of course depending on the ejection method. This

is time enough for surface elements such as ships and convoys to

escape an area along with any targeted individuals. Although,

divisions caught by geography or active warzones, would not havesuch an opportunity. One of the few possible ways to hit a moving

target with KBOMs is to predict their route and intercept on a

confined path so only speed rather than direction, must be

estimated.

Nonetheless, ODS systems are devised to eliminate stationary

targets such as bunkers, the business of targeting ships and

individuals is one properly left to standard and less severe

military assets. Yet, there are modifications that can be made to

a projectile to handle other general surface elements. One such

modification is controlled fragmentation. Controlled fragmentationof the rod could augment the result of impact at the cost of

penetration depth. Such a system would split the rod into scores

of ‘needles’ to shower an area by timing the window of

fragmentation to impact. Thus, a later fragmentation would result

in a compact shower with a lesser margin of error as opposed to an

earlier fragmentation which would cause a larger shower with an

increased margin of error. Such modifications also bring in the

concern of a problematic Circular Error of Probability (CEP), where

the possible drift of the needles could eliminate unintended

elements. Controlled fragmentation admittedly is a pooralternative to a surface-launched ICBM which could mount rod-

bundles as proposed by RAND to achieve a similar or even greater

effect against surface targets.

To vie with the ICBM a KBOM would need to decrease time to target

while preventing vulnerability of the system from reaching a

problematic standing. This could come in the form of lowering the

orbit of the KBOM and negating vulnerability with onboard

countermeasures against anti-satellite weapons. Conversely, a more

forceful ejection method in preference to introducing propellants

to projectiles could be used to hasten descent, albeit at greatercost. The addition of propellants to projectiles would require a

larger and more complicated launch assembly. The resulting large

quantity of propellants would have to be carried into orbit and

cause a needless complication to an already complex weapon.


15/28


4.1 Vulnerability

As we progress, vulnerability consistently becomes a recurring

topic as ODMs suffer the same problems as all manmade objects in

space. Satellites fly predictable closed paths and have low

maneuverability, most satellites limit their maneuvers to evadingspace debris and station-keeping. Using basic flight maps and dead

reckoning techniques, anyone could anticipate where and when a KB

platform is overhead. Furthermore, due to this limited

maneuverability an ODM may be forced to ride a higher orbit to

avoid orbital denial conditions such as debris in lower orbits or

concerns such as standard trackers and casual observation. Yet,

this comes at the benefit of increasing the volume of space that

must be watched by adversaries and augmenting the global strike

capability of the ODM. Satellites can’t hide, ejection of

projectiles can be tracked and any payload of sufficient size can

be followed. Hull ionization for one, will generate an IR streak

in space, and a liberal ejection of rods will likely appear on

magnetic anomaly detectors. This is not to mention any ionization

blooms which are just as susceptible to radar. If propellants are

mounted on the rods, visible infrared signatures will be produced

as well. Yet, detection of the rods themselves is no true ordeal,

the dilemma in truth is the detection of the satellite itself which

cannot be truly helped either.

5.0 Payload Transportation

Transportation to and fro even the closest orbits are truly the

bane of all space endeavors, for the cost of putting equipment and

vehicles into space has long been a disabling anchor in budgets of

all prestige and size. This dilemma led to research into various

launch/propulsion technologies and methods, cultivating modernized

system architectures. The forefront of this research yielded a

fruitful solution, reusable launch vehicles.

Standard payload transportation is unduly costly per kilogram but

the emergence of well-funded private ventures such as SpaceX in

unity with the accelerated development of reusable launch vehiclesopened possibilities that had never been available to us. We are

becoming capable to deploy a complex and heavy payload without

facing inordinate amounts of expenditure, effectively bringing

light once more to the long darkened corner of orbital defense

weapons and its ilk. Table 2 exemplifies the magnitude of

difference between ELVs and RLVs, the RLVs in this case being the

Falcon 9 Heavy and the smaller Falcon 9, both by SpaceX.


16/28


Model Launch LEO Payload GEO PayloadELV: Space Shuttle $300m 63,443kg 13,010kgFalcon 9 Heavy $77.1m 53,000kg 21,200kg

Falcon 9 $56.5m 13,150kg 4,850kg

Table 2: Space Transportation RLV and ELV Cost Comparison

The Space Shuttle is not available for commercial use and as of

now is in fact retired from service thus it does not have a defined

public launch cost. But, it was one of the heaviest launch vehicles

to date and boasted the highest capacity to LEO in its class so it

serves as a proper subject for comparison to standard RLVs, for if

it can be shown that a standard RLV can outperform the most capable

ELV, the point is made. As can be observed, the Falcon 9 Heavy can

deliver a payload on par with the Space Shuttle for 25.7 percent

of the cost. In the NASA Space Transportation Architecture studyof the late 1990s, launch cost of the Space Shuttle was put at

$300 million against an annual budget of $2.4 billion and eight

flights a year. Comparatively, SpaceX holds a $1.6 billion contract

with NASA to carry out cargo resupply missions to the ISS for a

total of at least 12 missions. SpaceX holds 50+ launches to its

name and a total of $5 billion in contracts with a forefront foot

in RLVs that will be the main construct to heavy defense payload

delivery. A possible inaccuracy should be noted, there are varying

methods to compute the cost of the shuttle; one divides the Space

Shuttle budget by flights per year, yielding the given $300million, the second estimating the marginal cost of additional

flights, possibly yielding actual costs of less than $100 million.

5.1 ELVs and RLVs

Figure 8 represents the decreasing cost of expendable launch

vehicles over the years in all four classes defined by the FAA

Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) while Figure 9

exemplifies the starker dip in cost of reusable launch vehicles in

relation. Differences in vehicle size hides price discrepancies

caused by nation of manufacture, design, and such. Thus, Table 3has been included courtesy of the Futron Corporation as a

supplementary guide to average ELV launch prices by means of the

standard price per pound metric. Some measures such as that used

in Figures 8 and 9 may not be wholly accurate due to terms of many

launch contracts being sealed. In such cases the available generic

launch prices were put into use.


17/28


Figure 8: ELV Space Transportation Costs

Table 3: Average ELV Price Per Pound - Futron

As somewhat aforementioned, a kinetic bombardment system would

require to be dominantly designed upon the singular cost of putting

it into orbit. If propellants are introduced to the projectiles of

a KB system, the continuing transportation cost of replenishing

the satellite at current rates would cripple the reasoning of both

its use and existence. However, it is to be kept in mind that some

level of resupply is necessary. A satellite bus must be stocked

with an appropriate amount of tungsten rods and depending on the

size and capacity of a satellite bus you will find yourself with

varying resupply cycles. This of course can be offset by the rate

of use of a KBOM.


18/28


Figure 9: RLVs to ELVs Comparison

To resume, we again reference Table 2. The weight of a tungsten

rod for our hypothetical KBOM to be delivered to LEO was set at

33,000kg by Table 1. We now devise Table 4 to compare the

approximate resupply costs of a KBOM system representing theconsequent rates produced by ELVs and RLVs respectively.

Unfortunately, we must ignore the actual launch cost of putting a

KBOM into orbit in its entirety for the complexities, amount of

required presumption, and broad margin of error would nullify any

produced figure.

Model Launch LEO GEO # of Rods/$ Per

ELV: Space Shuttle $300m 63,443kg 13,010kg 1.92/$156.25mRLV: Falcon 9 Heavy $77.1m 53,000kg 21,200kg 1.60/$48.18mELV: Proton (Heavy) $85m 43,524kg 10,209kg 1.31/$64.88m

ELV: Delta 2 $55m 11,330kg 3,969kg 0.34/$161.76mRLV: Falcon 9 $56.5m 13,150kg 4,850kg 0.39/$144.87m

Table 4: Tungsten Rod Transportation Comparison

Table 4 offers us a small but informative sample of information.

From determining the number of rods possible per launch for each

vehicle and pairing the result with the calculated cost per whole


19/28


rod we can observe the sheer difference in expenditure caused by

the application of an expendable launch vehicle or a reusable

launch vehicle. This makes the beginning but surely not the whole

case, for the nearing possibility of orbital defense satellites as

the decade long obstacle that stood in the way is waning. It does

not constitute the immediate development of such a project, butperhaps it constitutes its future consideration.

6.0 Nuclear Weapons and the KBOM

Nuclear arms have become tainted by bureaucracy, although military

actions have always had a political underlining, the launch of a

nuclear missile in particular has become a political action in

physical manifestation rather than only in part. The use of a

nuclear weapon threatens a cascade effect and a range of

retaliatory strikes justified by its initial use, thus nuclear

arms today are built only to induce peaceful diplomacy by means ofmutually assured destruction. Furthermore, building and

maintaining ICBMs or nuclear arsenals in general requires employing

cleared individuals year round to preserve, protect, and repair

arms. In addition, the various treaties in regards to nuclear arms

must be upheld, international discussions must be had to expand an

arsenal, and nuclear inspectors must be facilitated. Development

of a KBOM would be a means to add a specialized tactical weapon to

a military arsenal or rival the terrestrial military forces of a

peer nation. Considering nuclear arms its entirety, the notion of

the less obdurate and potentially equally potent results of a KBOMbecomes enticing.

Kinetic bombardment is anomalous in nature for it, as can be told

by its name, is the process of using the hypervelocity speed of an

object to eliminate a target with unadulterated kinetic energy. It

was mentioned that a configuration of tungsten carbide rods

equipped with thermobaric warheads was formulated to potentially

augment the capability of a KBR, but due to the political

complexities of the various treaties held by the global arena,

complications of re-entry, and consequent added costs to the

system, it was abandoned during analysis. However, it is knownthat tungsten vapor, liquid droplets, and small solid particles

are combustible. It was investigated that while the front-end of

a tungsten rod at hypervelocity will not melt, it will produce

sufficient amounts of said vapors, droplets, or particles and in

descent to cause a result similar to an explosive charge upon

impact in addition to evident penetration.


20/28


6.1 Efficacy and ICBM Contrast

To continue, we now turn to investigate the military capabilities

and advantages of a KBOM. It was aforementioned that a KBR would

likely not only be used for deep bunker breach, the targeting of

hardened nuclear missile silos, or other such elements found in arogue state, but also against surface targets. Prime targets would

include elements vulnerable to penetration of a few meters, this

could mean munition storages, buildings, large vessels, fuel tanks,

and hardened aircraft shelters. This expands to the capability to

eliminate enemy launch and control facilities, logistic stores,

communication nodes, surface navy fleets in port, and shore

infrastructure.

This range of capabilities would allow a nation to for example,

clear a coast for troop landings or damage enemy response

capabilities ahead of an incursion. If an ICBM equipped with anuclear warhead was targeted to such a location the risk of

contaminating the water, the landing site for troops, and

surrounding elements would be waged. Of course, an ICBM could be

launched with a conventional warhead but you are faced with the

waste of a complex and valuable missile that would only achieve a

modest detonation, meaning several costly missiles would need to

be launched. In addition, at our time of technological advancement,

ballistic missiles can readily be defended against by first world

countries with programs such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

System (ABMDS) belonging to the United States. This was proven asrecently as September 3, 2013 when Russia brought down two United

States ballistic missiles heading toward the Syrian coast.

Immediately, this resulted in Russia going into war alert and

notifying United States intelligence. The incident threatened

bilateral relations and could have caused unduly escalation, as

Russia was in support of Syria at the time and could have viewed

the event as a confrontation by proxy.

Kinetic bombardment has the advantage in such circumstances, a KBR

is economical and less austere than an ICBM, they are expendable,

and can be launched in force in manners aforementioned such ascontrolled fragmentation, to provide a variety of tactical uses.

7.0 Anti-Bombardment

Implementation of a KBOM by any nation would inevitably lead to

acquisition of parallel systems by others. This does not

necessarily mean sudden widespread development of similar orbital


21/28


mechanisms, but instead likely the accelerated development of anti-

satellite arms, monitoring infrastructures, or general denial and

deception mechanisms. Various prominent research reports observe

the threats of micro-satellites, terrestrial assaults on ground

stations, and means of electronic incapacitation, thus we move on

to centralize on immediate sources of anti-satellite arms.

One such possible source are modified high-capability ballistic

missile interceptors as was proven by the intentional test

destruction of the USA-193 spy satellite by what was only a

modified RIM-161 Standard Missile 3, originally built to intercept

short to intermediate range ballistic missiles as part of the

ABMDS. The RIM-161 successfully reached the beginnings of LEO and

shattered USA-193 at a total mission cost of $100 million, bearing

all to witness the economic anti-satellite capabilities of even

the most standard of anti-ballistic arms.

In the wake of the destruction of USA-193, the capabilities of

sophisticated anti-ballistic arms such as the Arrow 3, an Israeli

anti-ballistic missile, albeit one built in cooperation with

Boeing, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and funded by upwards of

$74 million by the United States, is put under consideration.

Adapted to provides exo-atmospheric interception of ballistic

missiles, the Arrow 3 has been deemed a prime anti-ballistic arm

that could serve in an anti-satellite capacity by such authorities

as retired Major General Yitzhik Ben-Israel, chairman of the Israel

Space Agency and former director of Israeli military research and

development as it is capable of operating at exceptionally high-altitudes.

Of course, this is in regards to the targeting and theoretical

elimination of a KB platform in LEO. If such a platform was hung

in GEO than even the most sophisticated anti-ballistic missiles of

today would find interception highly difficult. Yet, in March,

Brian Weeden, a technical advisor for the Secure World Foundation,

wrote in regards to a May 2013 Chinese test launch, “While there

is no conclusive proof, the available evidence strongly suggests

that the launch was the test of the rocket component of a new

direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons system derived from a

road-mobile ballistic missile.” And that, “The system appears to

be designed to place a kinetic kill vehicle on a trajectory to

deep space that could reach medium earth orbit (MEO), highly

elliptical orbit (HEO), and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).” If

true, this would represent a significant development in ASAT

capabilities.


22/28


Then continues the issue of the rods themselves, standard anti-

ballistic missiles have limited capability against even ICBMs and

interception of a hypervelocity rod is questionable. If it is found

there is a high-risk of a KBR being intercepted, evasive

countermeasures as seen in sophisticated ICBMs such as the Russian

RT-2UTTKh Topol-M could be applied to a limited quantity ofspecialized rods. It is claimed by Russian officials the Topol-M

is immune to any current or planned missile defense system,

achieved by carrying targeting countermeasures, several decoys,

along with shields against EMPs, laser technology, and nuclear

explosions at distances of over 500 meters. Although, this would

add to the complication of a rod and thus add to the cost, it may

become a necessary addition as countermeasures are eventually

readied against the KBOM and its rods. It would be preferable to

instead simply stock the satellite bus with modified rods than

face incapability.

8.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The 1997 U.S. Air Force Global Engagement vision, recognizes that

U.S. military use of space beyond supporting terrestrial forces

will be “driven by national policy, international events, and

threats” but anticipates that “the nation will expect the Air

Force to be prepared to defend U.S. interests in space when

necessary.” The U.S. government in particular relies on

satellites for a number of defense-critical services from

strategic and tactical reconnaissance and intelligence gathering,to communications, weather monitoring, and early warning of

missile launches.

Officials look for open and transparent access to space, but in

times of modern crisis a key element becomes controlling and

denying access to space. As infrastructure is built to protect

and control interests in space, a theatre is set to arm space.

The notion of space weapons as a central element of future U.S.

national security, in advance of a specific compelling threat has

long appeared in scientific advice to the Defense Department. In

1999, the Defense Science Board explicitly recommended that theDepartment of Defense acquire space-based weapons as essential

capabilities for implementing the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint

Vision 2010. Most official mentions and research have a tone of

eventual inevitability without providing a clear picture of a

proximate cause for a unilateral decision to acquire.


23/28


Nations looking to gain independence from U.S. capabilities or

balance the military strengths of peer nations are slowly shaping

their policies to increase activity in space in various non-

military and military capacities. Japan in particular, revised a

law regarding its non-military activities in space in 2008 in

response to the testing of satellite destruction capabilities byChina, allowing the creation of a "space force" and planning to

add the new division to its military in 2019 to protect equipment

in orbit from space debris as well as other attacks. Though,

Japan looks to assist the U.S. military with the information it

obtains through the program to strengthen bilateral cooperation

in space.

Of course, a central theme to this study has been as activities

in space are planned, a decrease in the cost to space access is

one of the only triggers to significantly stimulate national

defense programs in space. Far deeper cuts in the price per poundto orbit, such as the $1,000/pound goal of the NASA Space Launch

Initiative, is necessary. Until RLVs and launch technologies

further develop, a KBOM remains an asset only to be acquired in

response to definitive international events such as the

development by a peer nation. Yet, even so there are alternative,

less austere courses of action available in such cases. Kinetic

bombardment as an independent application on the other hand, can

continue to be economically applied to surface missiles as an

augmentation such as described in the aforementioned PGS program.

Nonetheless, it is to be noted development of the Atomic andHydrogen bomb in the 1930s and 1950s respectively by the United

States was not primarily to gain dominance in the global arena

and doubtlessly not intended as a standard mass-produced military

asset, but instead as a display of power and resolve. KBOMs aka

the “K-BOMB” would be a continuation of that legacy and as such

is why the ambitious prospect of an orbital defense weapon is

investigated here and in numerous papers and reports, by all

manners of researchers and authorities.


24/28


References

2013 Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts. N.P.: FAA Office

of Commercial Space Transportation, May 2013.

Bender, Bryan, “U.S. Blueprint for Future Weapons Systems Is

Outlined ,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 26, 1999.

Capabilities & Services. Capabilities & Services | SpaceX.

SpaceX. Web. May 2014.

.

Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, 1996.

Cohen, William, Space Policy, Washington, D.C.: Department of

Defense, Directive 3100.10, July 1999.

Committee on Space Debris, Orbital Debris: A Technical

Assessment: Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995.

Dawn Mission. Ion Propulsion. NASA, n.d. Web. May 2014.

.

Durch, William J., National Interests and the Military Use of

Space, Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government,

Center for Science and International Affairs, Ballinger Pub. Co.,

1984.

Estes, Howell M., USSPACECOM Long Range Plan, Colorado Springs,

Colo.: Headquarters, U.S. Command, 1998.

Garwin, Richard L. Space Weapons: Not Yet. N.P.: N.P., May 2003.


25/28


Golovitchev, Valeri I. Drag Reduction of Blunt Bodies at

Supersonic Speeds by Counterflow Combustion - Application of the

"Flame Spike". Goteborg: N.P., 1 July 2000.

Gray, Colin S., American Military Space Policy: InformationSystems, Weapon Systems, and Arms Control, Cambridge, Mass.: Abt

Books, 1982.

Huebner, Lawrence D. Experimental Results on the Feasibility of

an Aerospike for Hypersonic Missiles. N.P.: American Institute of

Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1995.

Johnson, Dana J., “The Impact of International Law and TreatyObligations on United States Military Activities in Space,” High

Technology Law Journal, 1987.

Killian, James Rhyne, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A

Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for

Science and Technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977.

Koelle, D. E., and R. Janovsky.Development and Transportation

Costs of Space Launch Systems. N.P.: DGLR/CEAS European Air and

Space Conference, 2007.

Kramer, Miriam. "SpaceX Reusable Rocket Test an 'Evolutionary'

Breakthrough, Elon Musk Says." Space.com. 25 Apr. 2014. Web. May

2014. .

Long, Franklin A., Donald Hafner, and Jeffrey Boutwell, Weaponsin Space, 1st ed., New York: Norton, 1986.

National Security Council, Space Policy Subcommittee, U.S. Policy

on Outer Space, Washington, D.C., NSC 5814, 1958.


26/28


O’Neill, Ian. "U.S. Air Force Increases Investment in Satellite

Protection Technology." Universe Today, 25 Oct. 2008. Web.

Opall-Rome, Barbara (2009-11-09). Israeli Experts: Arrow-3 Could

Be Adapted for Anti-Satellite role. Imaginova SpaceNews.com.

p. 16.

Outer Space Treaty — See United Nations (1967).

Phipps, Claude R., and Kevin L. Baker. Removing Orbital Debris

with Lasers. Sante Fe: Sandia National Laboratories, n.d.

Preston, Bob, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J.A. Edwards, Michael Miller,and Calvin Shipbaugh. Space Weapons Earth Wars. N.P.: RAND

Project Air Force, n.d.

Princeton/AIAA/NASA Conference on Space Manufacturing Facilities

(Space Colonies) (1975 Princeton University), Grey, Jerry and

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space

Manufacturing Facilities (space colonies): Proceedings of thePrinceton/AIAA/NASA Conference, May 7-9, 1975 (including the

proceedings of the May, 1974 Princeton Conference on Space

Colonization). American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics, New York, 1977.

Roy, Kenneth, “Ship Killers from Low Earth Orbit,” Naval

Institute Proceedings, October 1997, pp. 1–43.

SALT II TREATY. SALT II Treaty. U.S. Department of State, 20 Jan.

2001. Web. May 2014.

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html.


27/28


Schelling, Thomas C., “The Military Use of Outer Space:

Bombardment Satellites,” in Joseph M. Goldsen, ed., Outer Space

in World Politics, New York: Praeger, 1963, pp. 97–113.

Shachtman, Noah. "Hypersonic Cruise Missile: America's New GlobalStrike Weapon." Popular Mechanics. Popular Mechanics, 4 Dec.

2006. Web. May 2014.

.

Shainin, Jonathan. "THE 6th ANNUAL YEAR IN IDEAS; Rods From God .

“ The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Dec. 2006. Web. May

2014. .

Shneider, M.N. Energy Addition in a Hypersonic Flow: Analysis of

the Interaction Region. San Antonio: American Institute of

Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 2009.

Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit.

Bethesda: Futron Corporation, 6 Sept. 2002.

Stares, Paul B. Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy: Origins and

Development. London: Croom Helm, 1985.

The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan. N.P.: HQ

USAF/XPXC, Nov. 2003.

Trident II Fleet Ballistic Missile. FBM / SLBM. Federation of

American Scientists. Web. May 2014.

.

United Nations, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967.


28/28

Yadav, Rajesh. Aerothermodynamics of Generic Reentry Vehicle with

a Series of Aerospikes at Nose. Naples: International

Astronautical Federation, 2012.

Analysis of G LEO Kinetic Bombardment An

Documents

Transcript of Analysis of G LEO Kinetic Bombardment An