Beyond Cold-War Thinking:

Young Perspectives on U.S.-Russia Relations

Alec Albright, Korneliya Bachiyska, Leslie Martin and Yelena Osipova

October 2015

October 2015

Beyond Cold-War Thinking:

Young Perspectives on U.S.-Russia Relations

Alec Albright, Korneliya Bachiyska, Leslie Martin and Yelena Osipova

About CGI

The Center on Global Interests (CGI) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research institution based in Washington, D.C. Established in 2012, the Center promotes the rigorous study of modern-day Russia and Eurasia through objective analysis, panel discus-sions and academic publications geared towards audiences on both sides of the Atlan-tic. As part of its mission to maintain scholarly independence, CGI does not accept funding from the United States or foreign governments.

The Center on Global Interests does not take an institutional position on policy issues. The views represented here are the authors’ own.

© 2015 Center on Global Interests All rights reserved.

1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036Phone: +1-202-973-2832www.globalinterests.org

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Table of Contents

IntroductIon

Forward thInkIng: hurdles and opportunItIes to russIa’s ModernIzatIon agenda

Alec Albright

obstacles and opportunItIes In preventIng and ManagIng cIvIl wars

KorneliyA bAchiysKA

Is FrIendshIp possIble? an outlook For the Future oF sIno-russIan relatIons

leslie MArtin

u.s.-russIa relatIons In the context oF cold war 2.0: attItudes, approaches, and the potentIal oF publIc dIploMacy

yelenA osipovA

about the authors

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ver the past year, CGI’s inaugural Rising Experts Program focused on the theme “Beyond Cold War Thinking: New Approaches to U.S.-Russia Relations in a Global Context.”

This program brought together advanced students and young practitioners in the Washington area to identify ways in which U.S.-Russian engagement can be directed toward addressing emerging global challenges. The program featured guest speakers with participants meeting once a month to discuss a wide range of issues related to the theme and to share their own research on the topic.

CGI is pleased to present a selection of capstone essays by graduates of the 2014-2015 Rising Experts Program. The young authors featured in this publication maintain a necessarily critical approach to the topic, but provide some light in an otherwise dim time in U.S.-Russian relations. While many pressing issues compete for the attention of our most talented young professionals, understanding Russia and its actions continues to be a persistent and essential task for Washington’s foreign-policy community. We are grateful to all our participants, who have invested significant energy into this endeavor, and wish them the best in using the insights gained from this program as they move forward with their careers and advance the discussion on this critical world region.

Nikolai ZlobinFounder and President, Center on Global Interests

I. Introduction

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II. Forward Thinking: Hurdles and Opportunities to Russia’s Modernization Agenda

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n September 2009, Dmitri M. Medvedev, then-President of the Russian Federation, penned “Go Russia!,” a 4,000-word treatise1 on how Russia must seize on the opportunity

provided by the 2008 global financial crisis to modernize its economy. The essay argued that the time had come for the country to move beyond centuries of economic backwardness and resource dependence, utilizing its historic technological prowess to embrace a 21st century growth model driven by innovation and entrepreneurship, rather than oil and other commodity exports.

For many, Medvedev’s words represented the larger dream of a new Russian socioeconomic reality, a meaningful leap from the difficult years of post-socialist transition and toward the fulfillment of a higher standard of living. These modernization aspirations would not prove to be unique to the Medvedev administration. Current President Vladimir V. Putin has also continually voiced his vision for a more advanced Russian technology sector, specifically outlining the required steps needed to propel his country forward.

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Alec M. AlbrightM.A. candidate in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies and candidate in the Landegger Honors Program for International Busi-ness Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

In an op-ed published in Vedomosti in 2012, Putin stressed the need for Russia to follow through on its innovative potential, writing that “what is important is to get the market leaders in global technology to move from the initial stage where Russia is perceived as a promising market, to the second stage where they start investing in local production facilities, and to the third stage where new processes and products would be designed in Russia.”2 More recently, Putin has stressed that Russia must not “cut itself from the kind of foreign investment and technology that can drive economic growth,” despite the country’s increasing alienation from capital markets.3

At the surface, Russia has begun to address the challenges outlined by Medvedev by establishing technology enclaves across Russia, passing legislation to facilitate the development of innovation, and providing substantial grants to launch entrepreneurial universities and regional innovation clusters. Most importantly, these activities have demonstrated that Russian policymakers are aware of the country’s long-term economic challenges and recognize the latent potential of the population to excel in innovative sectors. While Russia’s emerging market competitors, such as India and China, have found ways to increase the share of exports accounted for by information and technology sectors, less than a quarter of Russia’s existing export structure is related to innovation.4 At the structural level, it is clear that simply throwing state resources at the problem will not provide a durable way forward for Russia’s modernization vision, as systemic barriers, such as corruption and regional integration, will remain as embedded obstacles to advancing growth.

Key Takeaways

• Russian policymakers have been keen in identifying the primary challenges facing economic modernization and diversification moving forward. However, policy approaches have been narrowly focused, favoring a “beacon model” of innovation development. This approach has limited the urgency to complete structural reforms, while diminishing the network effects of modernization investment.

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• The greatest challenges to innovation implementation are related to Russia’s inhospitable small business environment. While the ease of starting a new business is slowly improving, Russian entrepreneurs still face a number of start-up costs that render transferring innovative ideas to the marketplace prohibitively expensive. Beyond these barriers, new firms are not allowed to compete on the same playing field as large, often state-owned, firms. This condition has led to an artificial growth ceiling for the expansionary efforts of Russian companies.

• While operation risks remain key to understanding Russia’s innovative shortcomings, politics are playing an increasingly antagonistic role in the country’s modernization efforts. At the domestic level, restrictive legislation and a predatory regulatory environment have handicapped entrepreneurs, while pushing many of Russia’s brightest minds abroad. Internationally, Russia has ostracized itself from international capital markets, and foreign investors remain weary of non-commercial risks, resulting in the non-fulfillment of previously made cooperation arrangements.

Small Business as Usual

The most immediate challenge to innovation in Russia is the small business environment. Though small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) are increasing both in terms of number and contribution to GDP, Russia still lags behind its Western and emerging market competitors. In 2014, the EU exhibited roughly twice the number of small businesses per unit of population than Russia.5 From the GDP perspective, Russian SMEs will comprise around a quarter of Russia’s domestic output in 2015.6 In comparison, SME activity accounts for nearly half of U.S. and 60 percent of Chinese GDP, respectfully.7

While innovation, research and development (R&D) activity, and growth can be driven by large, mature companies, the present composition of Russia’s economic activity is lopsided. State-owned giants, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, have followed the forces of inertia, opting to protect their entrenched interests at the opportunity cost of competition. Under these artificial rules, good ideas are crowded out by scale, while

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inefficiency is permitted to linger. As described by a manager at St. Petersburg-based software firm, “the real startup in Russia can never receive a contract with a big private or state-owned company. Those contracts belong to large integrators or resellers, who sell brands and won’t allow anybody to intervene.” Thus, accessibility to the market, and subsequently the availability of expansion-producing opportunities, remain sorely lacking.

Prior to market participation, Russian SMEs face a more fundamental barrier in the form of extra start-up costs. The added burden of navigating complex tax structures and dealing with rent-seeking officials is prohibitively costly for many start-up firms, which cannot afford to divert their energies from the basic tasks associated with establishing a new business or to hire lawyers to deal specifically with regulatory issues. Again, Russian policymakers have identified the regulatory challenges posed by the country’s business environment as critical to the modernization agenda, choosing the World Bank’s annual Doing Business index as an official indicator of SME and innovation progress.

Russia has achieved success in legislating its way up the ranks, implementing measures in 2012-2013 that allowed it to realize a 20-position rise within the year.8 Example results of reforms pursued in 2014-2015 to increase the ease of starting a business include:9

• Eliminating the requirement to deposit the charter capital before company registration as well as the requirement to notify tax authorities of the opening of a bank account. This reform applies to both Moscow and St. Petersburg.

• Abolishing the requirement to have the bank signature card notarized before opening a company bank account.

• Easing the process of acquiring a construction permit by eliminating several requirements for project approvals from government agencies and reducing the time required to register a new building.

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Doing Business is a broad framework that is not without its faults. However, it offers a departure point for understanding the context in which Russian firms operate. In the broader picture, it is evident that Russia’s business environment has a long road of reform ahead. As Figure 1 below illustrates, Russia’s scores on trade, dealing with construction permits, and obtaining electricity are still among the world’s worst. These issues will continue to impede the creation of new business and innovation unless policymakers get serious about tackling difficult issues involving infrastructure development, bureaucratic delays, and regulatory corruption.

Figure 1: Rankings on Doing Business topics - Russian Federation 2015 (Scale: Rank 189, center; Rank 1, outer edge) [Source: World Bank]

Though the government has established initiatives to facilitate SME growth in high-tech sectors, such as RusNano in 2011, it is too early to effectively judge the utility of such bodies. It is clear, however, that Russia lacks private sources of funding for innovation-related activities. Without an established pool of domestic, privately sourced capital investment, the ills that have systematically plagued state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in other sectors are likely to befall government investment structures like RusNano.

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Regional Asymmetries

GDP per capita grew an astounding 83 percent during Russia’s decade of growth, between 1999 and 2009. However, these high rates were not uniformly realized, with only 13 of Russia’s 80 regions displaying GDP per capita at twice its previous level.10 This regional disparity extends across a variety of indicators for competitiveness, productivity, investment, and demographics.11

These broad trends have impacts throughout the innovation life cycle. In practice, Moscow and St. Petersburg remain the only viable environments for start-up activity to occur. Beyond these centers, firms are hard-pressed to find reliable and consistent access to business incubators, peer communities, foreign corporations, and sources of investment. Over-centralization creates obvious challenges at the start-up stage, including access to capital and infrastructure. As firms expand, the absence of homogeneous regional development creates an abrupt growth ceiling for firms not based in one of Russia’s major cities. In addition, Moscow and St. Petersburg-based companies are not able to horizontally integrate operations throughout the rest of the country, furthering the cycle of technological balkanization.

To date, policymakers have tried to address regional disparities by funding physical infrastructure development through technological and industrial parks. The story of Akademgorodok provides a telling case study.12 Born during Khrushchev’s push for industrialization in the late 1950s, this “science city” outside of Novosibirsk became home to over 65,000 of the Soviet Union’s brightest scientists and researchers. After the collapse of communism, Akademgorodok fell into dilapidation, suffering from brain drain and lack of purpose. In the summer of 2013, the Kremlin assumed control of the city as part of the Russian Academy of Sciences.13 Today, Russia’s “Silicon Forest” boasts a 13-story start-up incubator and has received funding from prominent Western companies such as IBM.

Thus, rebranding the Soviet industrial legacy has exhibited some success. At the very least, a new generation of young scientists, researchers, and entrepreneurs has been able to utilize space that would have likely been left to ruin. That being said, Russia’s current approach to regional innovation development through this “beacon model” reduces the potential network effects of each ruble invested. In other words, targeted funding for incubator environments such as Skolkovo or Akademgorodok is unlikely to translate to the wider Russian economy. While this directed approach can serve in identifying and capitalizing on regional competitive advantages, as well as shining a focused light to attract FDI, it is clear that the Kremlin must begin to address the larger issues posed throughout this paper if it intends to diminish regional disparities in innovation.

A Bear to Innovation

A final challenge worthy of discussion exists at the intersection of business and politics. Non-commercial factors, both at the domestic, and increasingly at the international levels pose serious risks to the future of Russia’s modernization agenda. State-backed initiatives have succumbed to the endemic corruption that plagues so much of the Russian market. Most notably, the technology enclave Skolkovo, intended to be a Russian version of Silicon Valley, has been mired in scandal, including an anti-corruption raid in 2013.14 In recent events, opposition politician and tech entrepreneur Ilya V. Ponomarev, the only member of Russia’s lower house of parliament to vote against the annexation of Crimea, has been accused of siphoning $750,000 allocated for Skolkovo.15 These examples of predatory activity are emblematic of the larger power plays between various interest groups, including those associated with Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin, as they jockey to secure rights to the pool of state funds targeted at economic development.

Strong international partnership from elite names like MIT, Microsoft, and Siemens drove much of the early optimism surrounding Skolkovo and the larger push for Russia’s tech revolution. However, as scandals

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continue to develop around the initiative and as geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West intensify, Western investors have shown less willingness to follow through on their original collaboration agreements. New York-based Bessemer Venture Partners allocated $20 million to Skolkovo projects in early 2012 to spend over the following two years, but has so far refrained from allocating any funds in practice.16 Recent legislative acts on Internet regulation and the status of foreign non-governmental organizations have only increased Western hesitance to enter the Russian market for fear of arbitrary treatment.17 18

For many, this adverse involvement on the part of the government fits with Russia’s historical trajectory. Loren Graham argues that throughout Russia’s modern existence, innovation has been stifled by the state, typically leading to ideas failing to move beyond the product development stages.19 This trend, due in part to the factors discussed above, has continued into the Putin era. Likewise, Harley Balzer has pointed to Russia’s demonstrated inability to learn from its economic missteps and take advantage of its resource endowment to diversify and grow its economy following crises, including in the current recessionary environment.20 Instead, the government has more often opted for measures that restrict innovative business activities.

Ultimately, Russia’s modernization agenda must be pursued from the ground up, with commercial factors, such as the ease of starting business and regional market integration, comprising the key drivers of success. That being said, politics remain central to the defining characteristics of Russia’s present growth ceiling. In the long run, the Kremlin’s internally focused vector is unsustainable. Though Russia will not fall off the cliff into economic despair, continued political interference will result in habitual economic underperformance, which the regime will eventually have to reconcile with the population’s hopes for a better future.

Scenarios Moving Forward

• Innovative Status QuoRussia’s baseline scenario entails a continuation of state-supported

modernization efforts based on the “beacon model.” Under these conditions, existing initiatives will continue to receive funding and marginally expand. Mr. Putin will package future efforts with the Kremlin’s recent policy of import substitution and industrialization, focusing on developing Russian products that can replace Western models, for example favoring the YotaPhone over Apple’s iPhone. While some concepts may achieve success at the international level, most Russian firms will not be able to compete with Western and Asian rivals. In this case, private investment, both domestic and foreign, will remain flat, due to the factors described above.

• Modernization in RetreatA more negative outlook witnesses a retreat in the relative progress Russia has achieved during the previous decade. Under this scenario, an increasingly hostile regulatory environment will push Russia’s existing SME sector towards extinction while prohibiting the entry of new firms. Current innovation initiatives will be plagued by corruption, and growing start-ups will leave the country. Increased political risk will drive any vestigial foreign investment from the country, including headline partners in existing “beacon projects.”

• Forward ThinkingThe most optimistic forecast for Russia’s modernization agenda envisions an increase in private investment in innovation, as well as significant expansion of international collaboration through private-private, and public-private partnerships. To achieve this end, Russian policymakers will begin to address the structural issues—including the regulatory environment, basic infrastructure, and credit availability—that currently hinder the success of SME activity. Political risks will diminish as part of a slow, but substantive détente with the West. Finally, Russia will utilize its uniquely advantageous geographic location to catalyze regional innovation through engagement with both the West and Asia.

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Notes

1 “Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!” Website of the President of Russia, Sept. 10, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413. 2 “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Contributes an Article to the Vedomosti Newspaper,” Website of the Government of the Russian Federation, Jan. 30, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17888/. 3 “Putin: Russia Should Not Cut Itself Off from Foreign Investment,” Voice of America/Reuters, May 26, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/putin-says-russia-should-not-cut-itself-off-from-foreign-investment/2790786.html. 4 See Ch. 7 of “Diversifying Russia,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/special-reports/diversifying-russia.html. 5 Sergey Safonov, “Roundtable Discussion: Small and Medium Entrepreneurship in Russia,” European Investment Bank, March 12, 2014, http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/events/2014_03_12_luxembourg_sme_financing_enca_safonov_en.pdf. 6 Ibid. 7 Kathryn Kobe, “Small Business GDP: Update 2002-2010,” U.S. Small Business Administration, Jan. 2012, https://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-gdp-update-2002-2010. 8 “Ease of Doing Business in the Russian Federation,” World Bank Group: Doing Business 2015, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia. 9 “Business Reforms in the Russian Federation,” World Bank Group, http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Economy/russia. 10 Mark Adomanis, “Russian Regional Economic Inequality: Tyumen is Like the United States, Stavropol is Like Sri Lanka,” Forbes, Jan. 11, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/01/11/russian-regional-economic-inequality-tyumen-is-like-the-united-states-stavropol-is-like-sri-lanka/. 11 Fadi Farra, Nadia Klos, Uwe Schober, Olga Sigalova and Alexander Zhukov, “Improving Regional Performance in Russia: A Capability-Based Approach,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 155, January 2013, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0155.pdf. 12 Eleonore Dermy, “Siberian ‘Academic City’ Eyes Return to Soviet Glory,” Phys.org, July 6, 2012, http://phys.org/news/2012-07-siberian-academic-city-eyes-soviet.html. 13 Pete Brook, “A Peek into Life in ‘Silicon Forest,’ Russia’s Hot New Startup Scene,” Wired, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/grant-slater-silicon-forest/. 14 James Appel, “The Short Life and Speedy Death of Russia’s Silicon Valley,” Foreign Policy, May 6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/06/the-short-life-and-speedy-death-of-russias-silicon-valley-medvedev-go-russia-skolkovo/. 15 David M. Herszenhorn, “Lawmakers Take Step to Remove Putin Critic,” The New York Times¸ Apr. 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/world/europe/russian-lawmakers-take-step-to-remove-putin-critic.html.

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16 Yuliya Chernova, “Russia’s Tech Startup Scene Retreats Amid Ukraine Conflict,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-tech-startup-scene-retreats-amid-ukraine-conflict-1410213746. 17 Olga Razumovskaya, “Russian Parliament Approves New Law Restricting the Internet,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579531460215555456. 18 “Foreign Agents Law May Sound Death Knell for Famed Science Foundation,” The Moscow Times, May 25, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/foreign-agents-law-may-sound-death-knell-for-famed-science-foundation/522314.html. 19 Loren Graham, “Russia’s Great at Invention, but Stinks at Innovation,” International Policy Digest, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/01/19/russia-s-great-at-invention-but-stinks-at-innovation/. 20 See Harley Balzer, “Will Russia Waste another Crisis?” in “Putin’s Third Term: Assessments Amid Crisis,” The Center on Global Interests, March 2015, http://www.globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Putins-Third-Term_CGI.pdf.

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III. Obstacles and Opportunities in Preventing and Managing Civil Wars

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n 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali delivered the “Agenda for Peace,” a re-conceptualization of conflict management strategies with a specific focus on intrastate crises. The then-

UN Secretary General prioritized conflict prevention by expanding both the number of external actors meant to be involved—including regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions of the willing, and a more assertive role for the United Nations—and by expanding the desired scope of these actors to add preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping to the international community’s conflict-resolution toolbox.

In practice, however, single states remained the primary third-party actors in internal conflicts, with the P5 (permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) members actively taking positions in other countries’ internal crises. With the end of the Cold War and the end of the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence, increased cooperation between the two countries was seen as a natural approach to navigating the threats and opportunities of this new world order. Unfortunately, the last 25 years have yielded only inconsistent cooperation between the United States and Russia, and the relationship has become increasingly adversarial since 2008.

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KorneliyA bAchiysKAPh.D., Comparative Politics, American University

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Following the initial surge of civil wars that coincided with the end of the Cold War, there has been a gradual decline in conflict in general (See Graph 1).1 Between 1990 and 2013, there have been 124 internal conflicts recorded worldwide. Internal conflict is defined as the contested incompatibility between the state and an organized opposition over control of the central government or a certain territory, where the use of armed force between the two parties has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths over the course of one year. Thus, internal conflict captures both manifested low-level conflict (any violence that results in at least 25 deaths) and civil war (which is defined as reaching 1,000 deaths per year).2

Since 1990, fewer than 1/3 of all internal conflicts have escalated into full-blown civil wars. The majority of conflict is marked by low-level, but continual, violence. In other words, there are fewer new crises every year, while the majority of current conflict is the result of pervasive, older conflicts. This statistic alone posits that the international community is much more effective at managing civil war than actually resolving it.

Third-Party Conflict Prevention and Management

Depending on the visibility of the conflict, external actors have intervened in various ways in an attempt to manage the spread and escalation of violence. For example, the most consistently visible conflict over the last two decades—that between Israel and Palestine—has received extensive political and military support from a diverse set of external actors.3 This is less the case in less visible conflicts (i.e. those in Algeria, Eritrea, and Niger); conflicts where the central government’s authority is unquestioned (i.e. in Mexico); or conflicts where the state is a major power internationally (i.e. in the United Kingdom and Russia). In these cases, the international community has made only rhetorical commitments to peace by appealing to the two sides to resolve the conflict themselves, while avoiding direct engagement with either side.

Management and resolution of internal conflicts has proven especially difficult. This is primarily so because there are numerous causes of internal conflict (including breakdown of government authority or loss of legitimacy, security dilemma issues, demographic and environmental changes, regional instability, lack of political representation, weak and ineffective institutions, underdevelopment and the “resource curse,” ethnic and/or religious domination of one group over another).4 Resolution efforts are also hampered by the speed at which civil wars tend to spread and escalate.

To address these challenges, new efforts to prevent civil wars before they escalate and contribute to regional instability have proliferated over the years. Such methods include direct mediation, shuttle diplomacy, facilitation, provision of “good offices,” permanent observer missions, fact-finding missions, arbitration, imposition of sanctions, and peace operations.5 Soft measures, broadly defined as political and diplomatic efforts, have been used much more frequently than hard measures, which include some level of coercion (like sanctions,) arms embargoes, or peacekeeping. The use of soft measures appears to have been effective more often at resolving conflict, or at least deescalating the violence, than hard measures.6 One reason for this is the frequency of soft measures

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employed as well as their timing: soft measures are more often used at the beginning of conflict. In contrast, hard measures, which require more political will and ability than diplomacy, are deployed almost exclusively as a last resort, or when violence is visibly escalating.

Russia and the United States in Civil War Management

Since 1993, there have been 29 conflicts in which Russia and the United States have undertaken civil war management efforts together or individually.7 Civil war management efforts here are defined as the provision of “good offices,” direct and indirect talks between the third-party and one or both of the warring sides, fact-finding missions, the establishment of permanent observer missions, the imposition of sanctions, arbitration, and the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Of the 29 conflicts mentioned above, the United States has been involved in 25 while Russia has engaged in 12. Most of the latter conflicts have been located in Russia’s “sphere of influence,” which is generally encompassed within the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Civil war management by both actors has overlapped in 10 conflicts (Table 1).8 These are conflicts where both countries appeared to have an important national interest. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, both the United States and Russia view their involvement as indispensable to the conflict’s successful resolution. It is important to note, however, that this cooperation is not bilateral but within the multilateral framework of the Quartet on the Middle East (consisting of the United States, Russia, the United Nations, and the European Union).

Table 1: Conflict Management Efforts by Country

Conflict United States Conflict RussiaAfghanistan 5 - -Algeria 4 Algeria 1BiH 18 BiH 8Burundi 15 - -

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Conflict United States Conflict Russia- - Colombia 1Cambodia 1 - -

Croatia 46 Croatia 16

DRC 3 - -Ethiopia 2 - -- - Georgia

(Abkhazia)20

Georgia (South Ossetia)

16 Georgia (South Ossetia)

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Guatemala 6 - -Haiti 3 - -Indonesia 8 - -Iran 2 - -Israel-Palestine 504 Israel-Palestine 102Ivory Coast 6 - -Liberia 9 - -Macedonia 10 Macedonia 1Myanmar 3 - -Nigeria 1 - -Philippines 19 - -Sri Lanka 4 - -- - Tajikistan 1Thailand 2 - -Uganda 1 - -Uzbekistan 2 Uzbekistan 2- - Yemen 1Yugoslavia-Kosovo 30 Yugoslavia-Kosovo 7Total Conflict Management Efforts

732 Total Conflict Management Efforts

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Other conflicts where both countries have been heavily involved include the wars in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In that instance,

Table 1: Conflict Management Efforts by Country (continued)

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the inability of the European Union to effectively deal with its own “backyard” prompted the involvement of the United States. This, in turn, prompted greater engagement by Russia, after Moscow grew concerned with the level of U.S. activity in an area of historical Russian influence.

Overall, however, the broad picture of cooperation between the United States and Russia on preventing and managing civil wars is grim. There are very few cases in which Washington and Moscow were simultaneously involved in and played a constructive role in the resolution of conflict in a cooperative way. One rare example was in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),

where Russia supported a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force in March 1993 to enforce UN-mandated safe zones. After the Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995, Russia sent troops to support the

NATO-led Stabilization Force, and has since served on the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which acts as the executive body for coordinating the international community’s policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the current conflict over Ukraine, cooperation between the United States and Russia on Bosnia and Herzegovina has not decreased.

In contrast, no cooperation took place in the Yugoslavia-Kosovo conflict in 1998-9, where Moscow and Washington separately backed the warring sides. Fearing a veto from Russia, the United States did not put the issue of military intervention to a vote at the United Nations, but rather opted for a multi-lateral NATO intervention that most of the international community accepted as a humanitarian one. Following Serbia’s refusal to sign a peace deal brokered by the Western powers and Russia in March 1999, NATO launched a military air campaign intended to stop an intensified Serb offensive against the Kosovars and force Slobodan Miloševic, the president of the rump Yugoslav state,

Aside from Bosnia, the United States and Russia have rarely cooperated on

civil-war management.

to accept the deal.9 Russia repeatedly condemned the attack and tried unsuccessfully to pass a formal resolution at the UN Security Council. At the G-8 meetings, however, Russia and the United States continued discussions over the Kosovo conflict and ultimately reached a deal to stop the NATO offensive through a UN resolution supporting a peace agreement.10 This case shows that despite the original disagreement on how to deal with the conflict, constant communication and discussion between the United States and Russia at the highest levels contributed to the resolution of the conflict in the end.11 The case of Israel-Palestine, albeit intractable for many decades now, likewise demonstrates cooperation between Washington and Moscow within the multilateral framework of the Quartet. Even though the conflict is nowhere near resolution, it provides an example of lasting U.S.-Russia cooperation when both sides have a common interest in the outcome.

Emergent Trends in U.S.-Russian Conflict Management

Despite whatever little cooperation took place in the 1990s, cooperative U.S.-Russia relations in civil war management has disappeared in the last few years. Adversarial relations in the Syrian conflict and outright confrontation in the Ukrainian crisis have overshadowed cooperation in BiH and Israel. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify several general trends that have emerged in the two countries’ conflict-management relationship during the past 25 years.

Trend 1: Increasingly Assertive Russian Intervention

For much of the last two decades, the United States has been much more interventionist in outside conflicts, even without the presence of a direct strategic interest, than has Russia. After “winning” the Cold War and emerging as the world’s sole superpower, the United States has increasingly acted in the role of the “world’s police officer”—the only country capable and willing to solve internal conflicts in other states. As a result, the United States has attempted to manage various conflicts in which it claimed it was defending human rights and democratic freedoms rather than pursuing any clear strategic interests (i.e. BiH, Algeria, Indonesia).

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Russia, by contrast, remained domestically focused for the first half of the 1990s following its own internal struggle resulting from the breakup of the Soviet system. Only towards the end of the wars in the former Yugoslavia did Russia take a more assertive role in that region. Yet this effort only came after these conflicts had escalated to civil wars, and in response to Serbia’s insistence that the entire “Slavic brotherhood” was under attack from the West.

Russia’s prioritized strategic interest has consistently been to restore its former great power status and corresponding standing in the international system. This goal led to an initially pragmatic foreign policy aimed at elevating Russia’s status in the international system to an increasingly assertive foreign policy culminating, most recently, with the Ukrainian crisis.12

In the early 1990s, Russia appeared focused on establishing itself as a “normal” country, a democratic and civil power. From the mid-1990s to 2000, Russia expanded its influence as a Eurasian power while striving for international standing and equitable partnerships with the West. More strategic foreign policy followed in the early 2000s. Strong opposition to NATO enlargement was coupled with equally strong support for the “war on terror”. Such policies, sometimes contradictory on the surface, were actually indicators of a pragmatic geo-economic foreign policy.13 Focusing on the CIS sphere is both an attempt to ensure Russian dominance in its near abroad and to counterbalance U.S. geopolitical prominence. The most direct example of this is Russian involvement in the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The precedent of these “frozen conflicts” may presage a similar situation in eastern Ukraine.

The conflict over the status of South Ossetia has been going on since 1992. It has been active three times during this period – in 1992 when it first manifested, during a resurgence in violence in 2004, and during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. The last, a five-day conflict, saw the heaviest fighting and direct military intervention by the Russians not as a third-party mediator, but as an outright party to the conflict. Despite the outcry of the international community, Russia presented its military

offensive as a peacekeeping enforcement, precipitated by the Georgian attack on South Ossetia.14 This unequivocal support for South Ossetia obliterated any legitimacy that Russia might have previously retained in its ability or willingness to mediate effectively between the two sides. The recent treaty Russia signed with the break-away province on integration and committing to protecting its borders, similar to the one signed with Abkhazia last year, effectively guarantees Russia’s dominance in the region for the foreseeable future.15

Thus, the role of Russia as a third-party mediator has significantly lessened over the last two decades while the country has undertaken a more and more assertive foreign policy when dealing with challenges in its neighborhood, in most cases essentially becoming a party to the conflict itself.

Trend 2: Stability Over Democracy

Despite differing rhetoric on why the United States and Russia intervene in civil wars, with one side claiming support for human rights and the other side claiming protection for its people, both countries have largely followed a policy of stability over democracy. The two countries are much closer in the frames they use to view the world than they acknowledge: both the United States and Russia deem intervention as an appropriate foreign policy tool when a conflict necessitates it, with relatively little regard for local actors.16 This is evidenced by the tendency to side with existing governments over the opposition in the majority of internal conflicts over the last two decades.

While research shows that direct mediation—defined as a third-party actor directly mediating between the two sides—highly increases the

23

The 2008 war with Georgia marked Russia’s transition from being a mediator to increasingly being a party in neighboring conflicts.

likelihood that the conflict will deescalate, the data show that both Moscow and Washington have generally supported only one side, and it has usually been that of the government.17 Over the last two decades, the United States has supported the government in 54% of cases, and in only 17% of conflicts it has mediated directly between the two parties. In Russia’s case, 51% of interventions have been on the government side, and only 15% included both parties. With the exception of the Israeli-Palestinian case, where Russia sees its rightful role as that of a great power helping to solve the world’s longest internal conflict, all other cases of intervention and conflict management have been driven by direct strategic interests. For example, in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia unambiguously defended the interests of the breakaway regions and, by extension, its own strategic interests by solidifying its sphere of influence.

Most recently, this preference for stability was exemplified by Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict in managing to secure a deal for the removal of Syrian chemical weapons.18 Russia has been a staunch supporter of the Assad regime, seeing Assad as its only ally in the region and being suspicious about American motives in a Middle East constantly shaped by what Putin sees as efforts aimed at “regime change” orchestrated by the United States.19 Fears of instability that might spread to the North Caucasus are also a factor in Russian calculations.20 Putin’s ability to secure the deal both served his interests in the conflict and at least temporarily elevated Russia to the position of a great-power mediator on par with the United States.21

Trend 3: More Management, Less Resolution

Despite similar strategies in conflict war management, overall both Russia and the United States have been ineffective in resolving civil conflict, and have focused instead on managing it.

It is interesting to note that from the countries in which there is an overlapping involvement by Russia and the United States, half have escalated to civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Yemen, and

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Yugoslavia-Kosovo), two have signed a peace agreement that effectively ended the violence (Macedonia and Croatia), and in two (Israel-Palestine and Algeria) low-level violence has become the norm.

Of the countries in which the United States has been involved in since 1993 without Russian management/mediation, five conflicts have escalated to civil war (Afghanistan, the DRC, Liberia, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone). Only three countries have signed a peace agreement (Guatemala, Indonesia, Ivory Coast), while the majority (eight) continue to experience some level of violence. Of the conflicts that Russia has been involved in without American management/mediation, one has gone through a civil war (Abkhazia), and none have signed a peace agreement or continue to experience low-level violence.

Policy Recommendations

Despite the fact that multilateral cooperation on civil wars is much more effective than unilateral interventions, unilateral third-party management remains the norm. If the trends over the last two decades show limited cooperation between the United States and Russia on preventing and managing civil wars, given the current outright hostility over the Crimean annexation and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, we should expect very little (if any) cooperation in other conflicts. Two policy recommendations are made here to advance towards the goal of cooperation.

1. Link cooperation on conflict resolution and management through other common interests, i.e. war on terror, non-proliferation, etc.

Following 9/11, Russia was one of the first countries to offer the United States almost unconditional support in the war on terror. This collaboration should be used to further expand cooperation on other issues that are of strategic interest to both countries. Considering that the latest eruption of internal conflicts has been largely driven by terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, ISIS in Iraq, and Al-Shabaab

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in Somalia, there is ample room to cooperate in trying to resolve these conflicts. A precedent is to be found in Afghanistan, where cooperation increased significantly during the first Obama administration; Russia allowed NATO to send personnel and equipment through its territory and contributed arms to the Afghan National Security Forces. Despite differing rhetoric, both countries developed a way to cooperate through their shared strategic interest of containing the terrorist threat.22

Non-proliferation has been another long-standing issue of mutual interest for the United States and Russia. The two countries continue to maintain a relationship based on 40 years of experience in negotiations and agreements on arms limitations and reductions.23 Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to implement the New START reductions, even as contentious issues such as restraints on U.S. missile defenses and reductions in Russian tactical stockpiles remain.24 With regards to Iran, the P5+1 negotiations have brought Washington and Moscow into closer contact over the issue of nuclear development in other countries. In short, cooperation in already-established areas of mutual interest could lead to further combined efforts on conflict resolution and management.

2. Seek out multilateral interventions which increase third-party legitimacy and limit the possibility of escalation

Given the current fallout over Ukraine, bilateral cooperation in a third country seems impossible. Working together under a multilateral framework—under the auspices of the United Nations; as a part of a regional effort that has a broader goal, such as fighting ISIS; or in an ad-hoc multilateral effort like the PIC in BiH—offer an alternative to the unilateral and confrontational policies that Russia and the United States have used in the recent past.

Finally, it is unlikely that the United States and Russia will cooperate in preventing and managing civil wars until they see each other as equal partners. This is the case for two reasons. First, the United States sees

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Russia as a regional power but not a global one. Second, Russia will do almost anything to acquire the position of a global power, thus creating a cycle of aggression and mistrust. Competition for achieving one’s strategic interests, often at the expense of the other, is still the predominant modus operandi for both countries. Since equalizing their relative positions does not seem likely in the near future, working under a broader framework for the time being offers the only alternative.

Notes

1 Data on conflict type and frequency available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ 2 Definitions of civil war and low-level violence are consistent with the COW Project and all major research on civil war violence. 3 This does not mean that external actors have been effective in resolving the conflict, but simply that they are consistently engaged in managing its spread ad intensity. 4 For a discussion of causes and consequences of conflict see, for example: Bercovitch et al., The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Los Angeles, SAGE, 2009; Michael E. Brown and Rachel Bronson, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996; David Carment and Patrick James, Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts, University of South Carolina Press, 19985 Korneliya Bachiyska, “The More We Sweat in Peace , the Less We Bleed in War: Regional Organizations and the Prevention of Violent Conflict,” May 2014, Dissertation Manuscript available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org//handle/1961/167996 Ibid. 7 Open-source data collected by the author for the years 1993-2010 using Factiva Search Engine; details on collection methodology available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org//handle/1961/167998 Ibid. 9 See, for example, Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, Yale University Press, 2002;Rebecca J. Johnson, “Russian Responses to Crisis Management in the Balkans: How NATO Past Actions May Shape Russia’s Future Involvement,” Democratizatziya, available at https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/09-2_Johnson.PDF10 See, for example, Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, Yale University Press, 200211 With the 2008 declaration of independence of Kosovo, however, the precedent was set for the subsequent Russian intervention in Georgia on the side of South Ossetia by claiming right to self-determination, and has contributed to further deterioration of relations between the two countries. 12 Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign

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Policy, Routledge New York, 200913 Thorun14 For a detailed analysis of the conflict see, Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, Oxford University Press, 2013, 150-16915 RT News, “Russia signs major alliance treaty with South Ossetia, pledges military protection,” March 18, 2015; The Telegraph, “Russia signs integration deal with South Ossetia,” March 19, 2015; Financial Times, “Vladimir Putin signs treaty with Abkhazia and puts Tbilisi on edge,” November 2, 2014; RFEL, “Putin Signs Law Ratifying Russia-Abkhazia Strategic Partnership Treaty, February 4, 201516 Conversation with Fiona Hill, May 20, 201517 Michael Lund, Preventing violent conflicts: a strategy for preventive diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace, 1996; Korneliya Bachiyska, “The More We Sweat in Peace , the Less We Bleed in War: Regional Organizations and the Prevention of Violent Conflict,” May 2014, Dissertation Manuscript available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org//handle/1961/16799 18 The Washington Times, “Putin offers Obama face-saving lifeline in push for Syria to surrender chemical weapons,” September 9, 2013; CNN, “U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical weapons, September 15, 201319 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Line in the Sand: Why Moscow Wants to Halt the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, February 201220 Fiona Hill, “The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad: Mistaking Syria for Chechnya,” Foreign Affairs, March 201321 Dmitri Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry,” Carnegie Moscow Center, July 201422 Richard J. Krickus, Russia After Putin, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014; Discussion with John Wallace, CGI, October 8, 2014; Richard Weitz, “U.S.-Russian Beyond Ukraine: Realities and Recommendations moving Forward,” CGI, May 201523 Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Great Strategic Triangle”,: Carnegie Moscow Center, April 201324 Richard Weitz, “U.S.-Russian Beyond Ukraine: Realities and Recommendations moving Forward,” CGI, May 2015

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IV. Is Friendship Possible? An Outlook for the Future of Sino-Russian Relations

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ver the past years, scholars and pundits alike have gone to great lengths attempting to deconstruct the nature of the China-Russia tandem. Between the two countries there is

extensive cooperation in the field of security, especially through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Likewise, historic economic deals and a multitude of announcements for infrastructure projects have been reached. Presidents Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China appear to be closer than ever with numerous state visits and the signing of almost 60 accords in the past year alone.

Without a doubt, Russia and China continue to support each other in their central foreign policy and economic goals. In May 2014, Russia and China signed a landmark $400 billion gas deal.1 In February 2015, Russia joined China to oppose the development of a U.S. missile shield in South Korea. Negotiations are well underway for the sale of Russia’ Su-35 multi-role combat aircraft to Beijing. And at the end of March 2015, Russia announced its application to the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).2 Currently, Russia is one of the bank’s 57 “prospective founding members”—a group that includes China, India, and Great Britain, and excludes the United States.

O

leslie MArtinM.A. candidate in Eurasian, Russian, and Eastern European Studies,

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University’

Of course, a major boon to the relationship has been China’s response to the situation in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. China abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine held on March 27, 2014. Since then, China has appeared at least acquiescent to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In an interview with China Daily, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thanked Beijing for its “measured and impartial stance on the Ukrainian crisis.”3 A recent statement made by Wang Min, China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, called for the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement, stressing that “a political solution is the only way out of the question of Ukraine.” Wang added that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries has been China’s consistent position, and underlined that the use of unilateral sanctions is often unproductive in resolving geopolitical conflicts.

While President Putin initiated Russia’s pivot to China well before the Maidan revolution of 2013-2014, the policy has been pursued even more aggressively since the seizure of Crimea and the resulting first wave of Western sanctions against Russia. Increasingly, Putin looks to China for economic and political support for his regime. Western opposition to Russia’s actions in Ukraine has left the Russian leadership with little choice but to look to China for investment in Russian businesses, infrastructure projects and, perhaps one day, a bailout for its struggling state enterprises and financial institutions.4 With Russia facing economic crisis, China has financed the majority of joint ventures, including the $242 billion high-speed rail project between Beijing and Moscow. At a meeting with Putin at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing in November 2014, Xi praised the increased activity in the Sino-Russian relationship: “Together we have carefully taken care of the tree of Russian-Chinese relations.”5

At this moment, the relationship appears to be mutually beneficial. However, many questions remain regarding the roots of the relationship and its long-term prospects for growth. To what extent is this relationship more than an opportunity for Putin and Xi to “stick it” to

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the West? Is there more that drives the two countries together than sanctions against Russia and China’s need for Russian energy? Are there indicators of a substantial partnership that can go beyond a relationship of mutual convenience?

It is certainly true that recent circumstances have pushed Russia closer to China. The timing of this heightened level of cooperation may suggest to some that Russia is running to China because it has left itself no other choice. However, there is evidence that the China-Russia tandem has the basis for substantive partnership that goes beyond the personalized relationship between the two leaders and opportunistic economic deals.

The theory of social liberalism suggests that cooperation and mutual understanding amongst governments improves when there are increased positive personal and business relations between peoples across borders. Stable relations typically develop through greater interpersonal relations, open trade, student exchanges, and emphasis on cross-cultural studies.

Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly how the citizens of China and Russia relate to one another. At the same time, there are several signs indicating improvements in interpersonal relations: public polling, spikes in tourism and student exchanges between the two countries, all in addition to the increased bilateral economic contact and trade exchange since the 1990s.

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The China-Russia tandem might have the basis for a substantive partnership that goes beyond the Putin-Xi relationship and opportunistic economic deals.

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Public Polling

From the Russian perspective, polling data presents a shift in Russian public opinion in attitudes towards China. The most recent Levada Center public opinion poll clearly demonstrates a positive shift in Russian public opinion towards China. In their description of current relations between Russia and China, 19% of respondents characterized the relationship as “friendly,” 25% as “good neighborly,” 35% as “normal and peaceful,” and only 1% said as “hostile.” When asked to “name five countries that you consider to be the closest allies of Russia,” the percentage of respondents that named China in Russia’s top-five friends doubled from 20% in 2013 to 40% in 2014.6 In comparison, only 1% of respondents named China as one of Russia’s top-five enemies. Since 2005, no more than 5% of respondents have named China as one of Russia’s enemies. Questions dealing with Russian fears over Chinese encroachment into Russia are also sure indicators of a positive shift in the relationship. When asked whether Russia should “restrict the residence of certain nationalities in Russia,” “Chinese” received its lowest percentage in the past decade: only 13% of respondents said that the residency of Chinese citizens in Russia should be restricted, compared to 46% in 2005. When asked to name the main internal threat to Russia, only 4% of respondents said the “loss of control over the adjacent Russian territory to China in the Far East.”

Additional survey data from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) shows a similar trend in Russian attitudes towards China. In October 2014, WCIOM conducted a survey on Russians’ characterization of Sino-Russian relations.7 Forty-nine percent of respondents said that China is, above all, a strategic and economic partner for Russia, while 36% of respondents said that China is a friendly ally of Russia—roughly double the percentage of those who thought so in 2009. Eight percent of respondents characterized China as an economic rival and a political opponent, compared to 24% in 2009. Only 1% of respondents saw Sino-Russian relations as hostile. In the economic sphere, 74% of respondents said that an economic partnership with China would allow Russia to offset the effects of the severed economic ties with the West.8 When asked for

which country is the economic cooperation between Russia and China most beneficial, 60% of respondents said it is mutually beneficial for both Russia and China, compared to only 37% in 2009. Finally, those polled predicted a positive outlook for the future of Russo-Chinese relations: 43% of respondents said that China will remain friendly towards Russia (up from 20% in 2009) and 36% said it would remain a close partner (also up from 27% in 2009). A negative outlook for the future of the partnership was suggested by only 10% of respondents (compared to 29% in 2009): 9% of respondents said that China may become a rival of Russia (down from 24% in 2009), and only 1% of respondents said that China will become Russia’s enemy (compared to 5% in 2009).

Increased Tourism and Migration

An additional positive trend can be seen in the rise of tourism between Russia and China. Increasing tourist activity between the two countries appears to be of great importance for both governments. For the past three years, the two governments have hosted a Russian-Chinese Tourism Forum, underlining the importance of this initiative for both sides. 2012 was declared the year of Russian tourism in China and of Chinese tourism in Russia.9 Both countries lure tourists with events, forums and propaganda campaigns, all of which highlight the beautiful geography and rich culture each country has to offer. The visa-free exchange regime (for groups up to 50 and for stays up to 15 days) also contributed to the rise in tourism between the two countries.

Despite the weak Russian ruble and hard economic times, Russian tourism to China has remained significant. China was in the top five countries visited by Russians in the past two years. However, the exact number of Russian tourists traveling to China is unclear. Tour operators claim the figure is about 1 million visitors, whereas Russia’s state statistical agency Rosstat indicates approximately 400,000 tourists. The year 2014 set a record for the number of Chinese citizens visiting Russia, with more than 1.1 million tourists. This rise in Chinese tourism to Russia could provide an important economic boost to Russia, especially if tourists travel to regions besides the typical St. Petersburg and Moscow.

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Oleg Safonov, head of Russia’s Federal Agency for Tourism, saw “huge potential” in the development of tourism from China and stated that Russia wanted to increase the number of Chinese tourists to 5 million.

In terms of drawing Russians away from their homeland, China cannot currently compete with the West. While exact numbers are hard to verify, there are about 20-30 million ethnic Russians living outside of the Russian Federation, The largest Russian diaspora community is found in the United States, estimated at 3.1 million people. Germany (1.3 million) and Israel (340,000) also host sizeable populations of Russian speakers. In comparison, roughly 15,600 ethnic Russians

reside in China, mostly in the northern Xinjiang region. However, there are at least 70,000 Russians residing in China who retain their Russian citizenship.

Expanding Educational and Cultural Ties

In the realm of education, both governments are making efforts to encourage student exchange programs as part of the 2014-15 Russia-China Youth Friendly Exchange program. After Russia canceled FLEX, an exchange program with the United States, in 2014, Russia and China announced a plan to increase the number of students studying under mutual exchange programs to 100,000 by 2020. Currently, about 25,000 Chinese students are attending Russian colleges and universities, while 15,000 Russian students are studying in China.

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The rise in Chinese tourism to Russia could

provide an important economic boost to

Russia, especially if tourists travel to regions

besides the typical St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Lastly, Russian media outlets increasingly cover events and daily life in China, signifying that at least the Russian media’s interest is making a pivot to China. The numerous state visits between Putin and Xi, including the famous shawl incident at the 2014 APEC summit, have been highly publicized in Russian media and propagandized in social media.10 Events in China and stories involving Chinese public figures typically receive a high billing on Russia’s top television stations. Independent and liberal outlets have also featured news stories and reports on China frequently in the last two years. For example, the liberal daily Novaya Gazeta regularly publishes stories related to China, ranging on topics from youth suicide rates in major Chinese cities to riots in China’s Xinjiang region. When the Russian reporter Zahar Prilepin recounted his trip to Shanghai in detail in a piece for Novaya Gazeta, he described Shanghai as an ideal city and a symbol of China’s new power status in the world.11 The enticing lifestyle of Shanghai presents an obviously positive image. Chinese fashion, economic prosperity and efficiency in expanding Chinese cities all combine to present China in an attractive manner.

Still No Replacement For The West

With regard to personal interest in China, however, results from surveys from Levada and WCIOM indicate that China is not at the top of most Russians’ minds. When asked which events from the past year respondents consider the most important, Putin’s visit to China and the signing of a $400 billion gas contract with China for the next 30 years came in the bottom third of answers, with only 15% of respondents naming it the most important. Given that the annexation of Crimea occurred in the same timeframe, it is understandable that a majority of respondents did not list events related to China as a top concern.

Last year, WCIOM published data from a poll on the study of foreign languages in Russia. The vast majority of Russians (92%) consider the study of foreign languages in schools to be necessary. In ranking foreign language in order of their usefulness, 92% of respondents listed English first, 17% German, 15% Chinese and 10% French. This data is reflective of the fact that when given the option, the Russian elite

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overwhelmingly chose to send their children to study at universities in Europe and the United States. In the UK last year, 3,685 Russians enrolled in British higher education programs.12 China is no different in this respect, with 274, 439 Chinese students studying at American colleges and universities last year, and 87,895 in 2013-2014.13 Despite evidence of improved Russian attitudes and a growing interest towards China, there are indicators that the Russia-China tandem, for

the short term at least, will not be the end-all relationship for either country. Not all Russians consider the recent developments in Sino-Russian relations as the best path for Russia. Some members of the Russian elite have adopted a more nationalist perspective, believing that Beijing views Moscow as a junior partner or a resource appendage. Conversely, the recent uncertainty in the Chinese economy has only fueled Russian policy makers’ concerns over China’s ability to

assist Russia during its economic crisis. Rumors of a complete collapse of the Chinese market have made their way into Russian news outlets.14 Chinese funds are not as unlimited as previously believed. At the moment, and for the foreseeable future, neither country represents for the other a real replacement for the West in terms of drawing families, students or tourists.

Interview Data: Russian and Chinese Students on China-Russia Relations

My research included a discussion on geopolitics with ten graduate students from Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Despite evidence of improved Russian

attitudes and a growing interest towards China,

the Russia-China tandem will not be the

end-all relationship for either country.

(MGIMO). During our conversation, I gained some insight into their perception of the state of Sino-Russian relations. The question “do you consider China Russia’s friend and/or ally” elicited a general consensus from the students that China does not have allies, only interests. In the political sphere, the students stated that they valued China’s respect for Russia and its “spheres of influence,” but added that they did not expect more than silent support from China on Russia’s important geopolitical issues. They characterized China’s political decisions as carefully calculated. One student went as far as to say, “I don’t think China wants to be friends with anyone.” First and foremost, the students characterized the relationship as simply economic, because, from their perspective, that is the only type of partnership that China desires with other nations. The students foresaw Russia becoming more dependent on China due to the size and strength of the Chinese economy. In their opinion, the $400 billion gas deal with China was to China’s advantage —not Russia’s. Clearly, the group saw China as a strategic, economic partner for Russia but questioned the limits of China’s loyalty to Russia.

For a different perspective, I conducted interviews with three young Chinese nationals, who are studying Russian at American universities, regarding their motivations to study Russian, and their overall views and perceptions of Russia and Russian culture. Their reasons for studying Russian were often personal in nature, ranging from a desire to conduct business in Russia, to a love of Soviet film and linguistic curiosity. All three individuals found their studies of Russian challenging, but very satisfying and rewarding overall.

The question regarding Russian language elicited a variety of responses. One student stated that she strongly opposes Russia’s patriarchal system and saw it reflected in Russian language. Another student said that she was “fascinated by Russia because of its history throughout the 20th century,” and went on to say that, “I think Russian society is going through a very similar identity crisis as China did.” The student of Soviet film saw a connection between the urban landscape of China and Russia, due to the Soviet Union’s architectural influence on communist China. When ask if they had any desire to travel to Russia or live in

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Russia, all three participants said they wished to travel to different areas in Russia but did not want to live there for an extended period. The three students unanimously expressed a cultural connection between Russia and China due to their shared communist history, but were certain that a political or economic relationship with Russia would not replace China’s strong ties to the West, specifically the United States.

Conclusion

In summary, there are clear indicators that the Russia-China tandem is not, in the short term, capable of supplanting the importance of relationships with the West. In many circles in Russia, there is skepticism and cynicism about the seriousness of the relationship and concerns regarding China’s intentions towards Russia’s Far East. China’s recent market crisis casts additional doubts on the Russia-China tandem. Moreover, when given the opportunity, Russians and Chinese alike are voting with their feet and still choosing the West over each other. Nonetheless, the polling data shows that Russian attitudes towards China are much more positive than previously existed. There appears to be a growing Russian interest towards China that is, perhaps, more genuine than opportunistic.

Russia has much to gain from the further development of its partnership with China. China’s self-proclaimed “great renaissance” could serve as a model (or even act as a catalyst) for Russia’s own renaissance by encouraging economic diversification, investment in public infrastructure and fighting corruption.15 Moscow has an opportunity to connect the Eurasian Economic Union to China’s Silk Road economic belt by supporting an increase of freight traffic between China and Europe. Russian industry, if it were to receive substantial Chinese investment, could finally reform and modernize its infrastructure, its system of distribution, and technology that has largely remained unchanged since the end of the Soviet Union. China is presenting Russia with an opportunity to be a key player in the formation of their shared neighborhood, to modernize its economy and, perhaps, to influence the geopolitical balance of the world more broadly.

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However, none of this can take shape through a top-down approach alone. State propaganda, bully tactics and repetitive rhetoric about the “friendship of the century” between Putin and Xi are simply not enough. If this strategic partnership desires to become more—if the leaders are serious about reaching the full potential of their 60 plus accords—then further development of interpersonal relations between the two countries is needed. If this relationship is for the long haul, then spontaneous, bottom-up, interpersonal contact, unimpeded by Russian bureaucracy and propaganda, must take place.

Notes

1 William Wan and Abigail Hauslohner, “China, Russia sign $400 billion gas deal,” Washington Post, May 21, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/china-russia-sign-400-billion-gas-deal/2014/05/21/364e9e74-e0de-11e3-8dcc-d6b7fede081a_story.html.2 “Russia Joins Rush to Enroll in China-Led AIIB Investment Bank,” Reuters, March 30, 2015 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-joins-rush-to-enroll-in-china-led-aiib-investment-bank/518239.html.3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation, “Interview of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to China Daily,” April 15, 2014, http://archive.mid.ru//BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/44375F6EEE6A82C944257CBB002097B6?OpenDocument.4 Andrew Collier, Arthur Peng and Abigail Collier, “Will China Bail Out Putin?” The Diplomat, March 14, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-china-bail-out-putin/5 “Russia, China Add to $400 Billion Gas Deal With Accord,” Bloomberg, November 10, 2014 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/russia-china-add-to-400-billion-gas-deal-with-accord.6 Belarus was the only country that surpassed China in 2014 with 51% of respondents listing Belarus in top five friends of Russia.7 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), “Россия-Китай: от вражды и конкуренции – к дружбе и сотрудничеству (Russia-China: from animosity and competition to friendship and cooperation),” Nov. 6, 2014, http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115042. 8 From that 74%, 24% said that China will completely replace the West as an economic partner, and 50% said only partially replace. 9 Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, “Year of Russian Tourism in China,” http://www.russiatourism.ru/en/contents/deyatelnost/international-activities/.interregional-and-bilateral-cooperation/year-of-russian-tourism-in-china.10 Associated Press, “Vladimir Putin’s shawl gesture to leader’s wife covered up by Chinese,” November 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/11/

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putin-gallant-gesture-chinese-leader-wife-censored.11 Zahar Prilepin, “Боги меняются местами (The gods trading places), Novaya Gazeta, April 19, 2013, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/arts/57782.html.12 GoStudyUk,“Students from CIS member states in the UK,” accessed September 22, 2015, http://www.gostudyuk.com/life.jsp?id=LIFE_cis_general.13 Institute of International Education, “International Students in the United States,” accessed September 22, 2015, http://www.iie.org/EN/Services/Project-Atlas/United-States/International-Students-In-US.14 Novaya Gazeta, Власти Китая наказали граждан за слухи об обвале рынка (The Chinese government has punished citizens for inciting rumors about the collapse of the market), August 31, 2015, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/1696238.html.15 Malcolm Moore,”Xi Jinping calls for a ‘Chinese Dream,” The Telegraph, March 17, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9935609/Xi-Jinping-calls-for-a-Chinese-Dream.html.

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V. U.S.-Russia Relations in the Context of Cold War 2.0: Attitudes, Approaches, and the Potential of Public Diplomacy

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s the Kremlin becomes more assertive in its foreign policy, the relationship with the United States is at a new all-time low since the end of the Cold War. In fact, looking at the

current rhetoric coming from both sides, it might seem that the Cold War never really ended, but was merely put on hold.1 Cold War frames still dominate the public discourse in both the United States and Russia, providing reference points, shaping attitudes, and consequently affecting policy-making and outcomes in the present day.2

Despite the changing global context, overcoming these deeply-ingrained attitudes remains one of the major challenges for the U.S.-Russian relationship in the 21st century. The United States is struggling to hold on to the position of sole superpower, and is hesitant to accept a rapidly rising multipolar world order. Russia, on the other hand, is still reeling from the abrupt demise of the Soviet Union, seeking restoration of its regional power and demanding recognition as an actor of global significance with legitimate interests that others should respect. While there are concrete economic and security interests at stake, perceptions play an equally important part in shaping the distrust and tensions

A

yelenA osipovAPh.D. candidate at the School of International Service, American University

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plaguing the relationship between the two former superpowers. Therefore, along with the focus on resolving the “hard” problems in the relationship, there should also be emphasis on true dialogue and mutual understanding, which can help both nations overcome stereotypes and find common ground. Only then will these two countries be able to address the rapidly growing number of challenges posed to them by a globalized, interdependent, and increasingly unstable world.

At a time when security concerns have contributed to the deterioration of the political and economic relationship between the United States and Russia, the existing social, cultural and educational ties have also suffered. This project explores the effect of these events on the socio-cultural relationship between the two countries and argues that strengthening cooperation in this area can ultimately lead to improvements in the political and security spheres. This paper makes specific policy suggestions, particularly regarding professional and educational exchange initiatives, that can help mitigate, if not resolve the crisis fully.

The Problem

Throughout history, the relationship between the United States and Russia has often faced challenges and difficulties, particularly regarding issues that can be characterized as of key strategic and national interest to both countries. Yet, even at the height of political tensions, both sides found alternative avenues – such as educational or cultural exchanges – where they could come together and work to achieve some common ground. These exchanges not only helped mutual understanding, but also cultivated a relationship of trust between certain groups, which later served as a foundation for the discussion and resolution of other seemingly intractable issues and, in the longer-term, created the openness required for a gradual improvement of the bilateral relationship itself. Perhaps the best example of such cooperation is the “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields”, or the “Lacy-Zarubin Agreement,” signed between the United States and

the Soviet Union in 1958. Its scope included exchanges for students and scholars, artists and athletes, scientists, public administrators, and journalists, among others, and the exchanges themselves provided both sides with invaluable insights into each other’s world at a time when other channels of communication were virtually non-existent.3

After the end of the Cold War, the number of similar programs and cooperation mechanisms vastly increased and ranged from the educational sphere to bilateral presidential commissions and joint innovation investment projects.4 Both countries, but particularly the United States, actively supported and funded a vast array of educational and professional exchange programs, including those for high-school and university students, young professionals, and legislators. Since the Perestroika years of the mid-1980s, when the relationship became more open and the interest and funding increased on both sides, the total number of participants in those programs – both American and Russian – is estimated to be in the tens of thousands.5

However, the deteriorating political relationship between the United States and Russia since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency, and particularly after the Ukraine crisis, has negatively affected relations, including bilateral relations in the educational and cultural spheres. For example, the Russian “Foreign Agents Law” passed in 2012, which mandated that all organizations and programs that receive any funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents,”6 made it difficult for organizations such as the American Councils for International Education to operate freely or recruit Russian participants. In April 2014, the organization was ordered to shut down indefinitely because of purported failure to properly re-register with the authorities.7

Another major blow came in October 2014, when Moscow decided to shut down the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program for high school students from Russia and the former Soviet Union, citing a violation in the terms of agreement. Since 1993, more than 8,000 Russian students participated in the FLEX Program, through which they spent the requisite academic year with an American host family and

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attended an American high school. The reason for shutting down the program – a homosexual teen participant’s refusal to return to Russia – was largely seen as a mere excuse for a political decision that was a long time coming.8

The United States, too, has created hurdles in this process. Due to various domestic and international issues, funding for foreign language and area studies – among them Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European studies – provided by Title VI of the Higher Education Act has come under increasing pressure to be cut or eliminated altogether.9 Similarly, in 2014, some members of Congress called for cuts in funding for the Open World Leadership Program, which brings mid-career professionals and potential future leaders from Russia and Eurasia for short-term visits to the United States, citing the mounting tensions with Russia over Ukraine.10

Perhaps the biggest setback was the decision in 2013 to completely eliminate the Title VIII Research and Training for Eastern Europe and Eurasia Grant Program, which, within the auspices of the State Department, provided research money to American students, scholars, and researchers interested in studying the region. Title VIII was responsible for the education of most prominent Russia scholars and experts in the United States – many currently serving in the Obama Administration (or having served in past administrations) – and was seen as an essential program for maintaining and further developing the knowledge base in the field. Its elimination, therefore, caused a major uproar in academic and policy circles, especially after the tensions between the two countries reached new highs over Ukraine.11 In April 2015 it was announced that Title VIII was reinstituted; however, in contrast to 2012 and 2013, when the funding amount was at $5 million and $3 million, respectively, the 2015 amount was only $1.5 million.12

Both sides now seem to be prioritizing other regions in terms of their public diplomacy and educational expenditure. The Russian government has increased the budget for providing scholarships and funding to foreign students wishing to study in Russia’s institutions of higher education,

increasing the number of full scholarships from 3,000 in 1993 to 15,000 in 2013.13 The actual number of foreign students studying in Russia is much higher.14 Yet, due to government distribution quotas, language requirements, and defined foreign policy objectives, the vast majority of these students come from the immediate region – the Former Soviet Union – leaving fewer opportunities for interaction and exchange with students from the United States and Western Europe.15

Likewise, the regional priorities in U.S. foreign policy did not assign significant importance to Russia and Eurasia, particularly after 9/11, when the establishment became primarily concerned with issues in and perceived threats emanating from the Greater Middle East. By the early 2010s the Obama Administration’s increasing emphasis on the relationship with East Asia and Africa meant that many resources were also redirected away from Russia and Eurasia programs towards programs that work with the newly prioritized regions.16 It was only after Putin’s third administration adopted increasingly repressive domestic and assertive foreign policies and the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, that both academic and policy worlds started paying more attention to the region again.17

The funding for academic and educational visits and cultural exchanges, however, has not followed suit. If anything, it has been cut and redirected, as discussed above, not only restricting the opportunities for dialogue and mutual understanding, but also potentially creating a significant knowledge and expertise gap in the future, which will be further exacerbated by dominant stereotypes and the hostility in official discourse coming from both sides.

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While political interest in the region has grown since the Ukrainian crisis, funding for educational and cultural exchanges has been cut or redirected.

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For experts as well as practitioners in the field, misunderstandings and misconceptions about the other side are prominent reasons for the present deterioration of relations.18 Alexander Gabuev, Chair of the “Russia in Asia-Pacific” Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and former deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant-Vlast, says that education and better knowledge about each other is crucial because the lack thereof brings about many mistaken interpretations, insecurities, and a lack of cooperation. “The common task is to become as transparent and clear for each other as possible – not in terms of where our nuclear warheads are positioned, but about how decisions are made, who makes them, what are the motivations, etc.,” he says.19 Similarly, David Patton, Executive Vice President of the American Councils for International Education, suggests that knowledge and understanding of each other is very important for both countries. “This is in the self-interest of the U.S. We need people who speak Russian, we need people who know Russia. Russia is just too important […] to be a black hole and for it not to be known.” For Russians too it is important to know and be able to communicate properly with the United States, Patton says. “It’s hard to hate someone you know – it’s easier to hate someone you don’t know, [who] is faceless.”

Marina Lebedeva of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations says that educational and cultural contacts should be maintained at any cost, because they can eventually lead to other forms of cooperation. “Cutting off these relations will only lead to further deterioration of formal relations,” Lebedeva says.20 Anna Velikaya of the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy is more optimistic, stating that the United States and Russia can improve their bilateral relations through cultural and personal contacts. She places a lot of faith in the exchanges between experts and scientists of the two countries. According to Velikaya, “no one is interested in confrontation” and the relations can be much more constructive at the individual level – people simply should be given a chance to come together, voice their concerns, and spread the goodwill further.21

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A similar sentiment is expressed by Maura Shelden of the Open World Program, who emphasizes the importance of people getting together and sharing ideas, expertise and friendship. “They go home and they multiply that by telling people about their experience, [by] writing articles, social media posts, and television appearances, etc.” These people, she says, gain an interest in their overseas counterparts and an invaluable understanding of how they work and what perceptions they hold of each other. According to Shelden, on this basis, they can then start working on changing these perceptions and stereotypes, thus bringing the two countries together at the grassroots level.

A Money Issue?

In light of the budget cuts in the United States and the economic crisis in Russia, arguing for reinstating or increasing funding for projects that are not construed as strategic or military priorities might not be expedient. Nevertheless, in other aspects of what is considered a part of public diplomacy – international broadcasting – budget increases are being called for and implemented in both Russia and the United States. For example, the Russian government budget for 2015 initially planned for major increases in the funding of its media targeting foreign audiences: by 30% for the RT Television network that increased the budget to about $235 million, and by 142% for its newly restructured Sputnik Information Agency (new budget of about $100 million).22 It was later reported that these figures had to be cut by some 10% due to the economic crisis,23 which still amounted to about $220 million and $93 million for RT and Sputnik, respectively.24 On the other hand, the American expenditures on similar initiatives – examples of which include Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), make up about $742 in 2015.25

In light of the Ukraine crisis and the perceived ratcheting up of the information war by the Russian side, prominent policy-makers in the field have been calling for a further $10 million increase of the BBG budget ($751 requested for FY 2016), in order to “confront Russian propaganda.”26

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This focus on the informational aspects of public diplomacy demonstrates more faith in programs that promote propaganda and emphasize informational warfare over other approaches to cross-national dialogue and understanding. The debate on the subject is equally prominent on both sides: the Russians claim that the United States controls most of the international media, ensuring hegemony over global information flows; while the Americans are increasingly concerned about “losing” the “information war,”which they see Russia as carrying out successfully.27

The logical consequence of such thinking includes increases in one-way information broadcasting, attempts to outdo and “outcommunicate” the other, and the creation of new media outlets that can somehow do the job better than the existing ones. This approach, however, does not address

key issues such as legitimacy, credibility, persuasiveness, and actual effectiveness of these media tools in terms of changing public attitudes on either side. If anything, this approach contributes to an increase in hostile rhetoric against the other side, makes biased or incomplete reporting more justifiable, and only further expands an already large bureaucratic machine.

It is also necessary to consider the media environment within which these programs operate. Unlike the Cold War era, there is a multitude of various outlets, media and technologies consumed by publics around the world. The issue is not the dearth of information, but rather the cacophony of voices that any international broadcaster has to compete with. According to former Foreign Service Officer and Georgetown Professor John Brown, “You can no longer be the Voice of America; you can only be a voice of America [sic.]. […] And how much we can ‘get our message through’ with these many other voices is a real challenge.”28

Our current public-diplomacy policy emphasizes

informational warfare over other approaches to cross-national dialogue.

He thus questions the purpose of present attempts to respond to political and information challenges by simply increasing the volume of information broadcast by one government to the opposite public.

Furthermore, cognitive biases and information processing effects can also limit the success of media and other information-based attempts to reach out to foreign publics. Unwillingness to be exposed to or even consider information from the “Other” is one such hindrance and it results in outright ignorance of media and/or arguments presented by the other side. Yet, selective perception is arguably a more prominent issue, since it occurs when, even if exposed to alternative information, only certain parts of the message are accepted, while others are filtered out based on the audience’s value schema and pre-existing biases. Where the message is perceived to be inconsistent with one’s worldview and prior experience, the information presented is used to counter-argue with the message, thus further reinforcing one’s biases and worldview. This is done in order to avoid cognitive dissonance.29 For instance, if the American public believes that Russia is following an expansionist foreign policy, messages on RT about Russia’s international development aid or support to ethnic Russians living abroad might be perceived as yet another proof of Russia’s attempts to extend its hegemony or even territory. Similarly, if Russians view American foreign assistance as meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states, RFE/RL reports on Russian human rights abuses or curtailing of foreign NGO activity can be interpreted as justified actions to prevent illegal foreign intervention in domestic affairs.

Therefore, efforts that focus on simply broadcasting a certain message or positive images will most likely fail in overcoming these cognitive biases or changing existing attitudes and perceptions. On the contrary, they might reinforce them further. To better understand the gravity of the situation, one just has to look at the opinion poll data on the attitudes that Russians and Americans hold towards each other.

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Favorable Opinions of the US in Russia and of Russia in the US (2004-2014)

Unfavorable Opinions of the US in Russia and of Russia in the US (2004-2014)

* Source: Global Indicators Database, Pew Research Center.† Favorable combines “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” responses. Unfavorable combines “very unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable.”30

As the data indicates, the attitudes have begun to change as early as 2012 and 2013; yet it is in 2014 that we see a dramatic increase in unfavorable views of each other (and correspondingly, a decrease in favorable views),

suggesting that the Ukrainian crisis did indeed have a very significant effect on mutual perceptions. It is important to emphasize that no direct causation can be drawn between the decreasing rate of educational and cultural exchanges and deteriorating perceptions. In fact, it is more likely that the actual policies and their coverage in the media affect the public attitudes more directly. Nevertheless, engaging members of the public more directly and at a people-to-people level creates opportunities for overcoming preexisting attitudes and negative stereotypes by better contextualizing and rationalizing the problematic policies and their often distorted coverage by the media.

Given this background, it is therefore important to recast the issue in a different light and to redirect debates and funding into programs and projects that can contribute to mutual understanding and lay the foundations for building trust, as opposed to furthering distrust and hostility. After all, the very point of creating track-two diplomacy initiatives and platforms for educational and cultural exchanges is to ensure communication and contacts during times when the political relationship might be problematic. They can promote mutual understanding and, through the multiplier effect, help overcome negative attitudes towards each other among the greater public, thus laying the foundations for a less confrontational relationship at the highest levels.

Policy Suggestions

In order to mitigate the most recent crisis in the relations between the United States and Russia, perhaps the best policy recommendation is for both sides to change the actual policies and approaches to certain foreign policy issues. However, recognizing that this might be an unrealistic goal under current circumstances, the effort should instead focus on alternative measures, which might eventually bring about a more sensitive and constructive approach towards each other.

1. Emphasize public diplomacy and people-to-people contacts To emphasize the importance of the exchange programs, John Brown quotes the late Senator William Fulbright: “the purpose of

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these programs is ‘the acquisition of empathy,’ in other words, to put oneself in somebody else’s head, […] [to] understand how he or she feels [and] thinks. […] [These programs] mustn’t be extravagant, but certainly it’s in our national interest for our citizens and especially our young people to know something about the outside world.”31 Foreign policy tends to be an elite-driven process and one where the discourse and policy are often initiated and directed from above. However, as discussed throughout the paper, the public can and does play a significant role facilitating or opposing these initiatives; attitudes, perceptions, and experiences can have a multiplier effect and serve to pressure policy and decision makers. Yet, perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to consider the influence of scientists, cultural figures, reporters and academics who often shape – directly and indirectly – the perceptions and opinions of decision makers about countries and cultures of which they have limited understanding or personal experience. Targeting them for educational, cultural, and professional exchange can cultivate a high level of expertise among these groups and thus ensure that foreign policy decisions are based on better-informed, contextual and factual understanding of the issues. Furthermore, it is important to target rising and potential leaders and decision-makers for such exchanges, because first-hand experience and knowledge of other countries – in this case, of Russia and the region or, respectively, of the United States – can prove invaluable for bilateral as well as broader international relationships. Such programs can be organized and financed directly by government-affiliated organizations, or by third parties – non-profits, educational institutions and even corporations – that might receive some starting capital from the government, yet mostly rely on private sources of funding.

2. Invest in a collaborative model for exchanges In 2008 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault suggested a “collaborative model” of public diplomacy, involving “initiatives and outreach campaigns that feature an effort by citizens of different countries to complete a common project or achieve a common goal.”32 This approach is based on the premise that working together

on projects – not necessarily political or related to current issues – brings about trust and understanding, and thus helps bridge social and political divides. It clarifies the image of “The Other” and helps both sides empathize with and relate to each other, thus building trust and goodwill, and potentially serving as a starting point for broader dialogue on political and more sensitive issues. It is, therefore, important to invest in such projects across various spheres and disciplines, including scientific and cultural projects which can lay the foundations for further broader cooperation and dialogue between Russia and the United States.

3. Increase funding and support for bilateral exchangesAs described above, funding for of educational, professional and cultural exchanges between the Americans and Russians has been significantly declining in both countries throughout the past several years, and particularly after the events of early 2014. Yet, the need for them has never been greater since the end of the Cold War. While recognizing problems in the bilateral relationship, policy-makers seem to prefer focusing on strictly informational and one-way public diplomacy approaches, calling for bigger budgets and more attention for international broadcasting projects, expecting that those will have more definitive and immediate results. As John Brown characterized it: “The temptation is to look for a quick fix, and broadcasting is the perfect quick fix from the point of view of the planners [or the] Congress. It’s got an immediate result: you have a program, information, ‘the American way,’ ‘the American perspective.’”33 However, such measures not only may be ineffective, but also counter-productive. Instead, emphasis should be placed on prioritizing alternative approaches to communication between the two publics. People-to-people interactions and personal experiences facilitate openness and create potential willingness to recognize one’s mistaken prejudices and misunderstandings.34 They also create opportunities for understanding issues from the other’s perspective, thus reducing the hostility in the language and creating the foundation for a more constructive dialogue. Such contacts between decision-makers might have the most immediate and direct results; however,

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promoting those among the broader public and expert community is also important, since they can then advocate for more collaborative approaches and push for changes further up the policy chain.

4. Harness the promise of new media as an alternative method of exchange As discussed above, one of the major concerns about international exchanges is the cost. Difficulties and complications with travel arrangements can also present hindrances to the process. That is why utilizing new information and communication technologies can provide an alternative, though not perfect, option for exchange opportunities, as people from different countries and cities can come together in virtual spaces to share thoughts, ideas, knowledge and experiences with one another. These exchanges can be particularly helpful in certain educational contexts, such as language, culture, history or current-affairs classrooms, yet they do not have to be limited to that. Participants with diverse interests and from all walks of life can be introduced to each other in formal settings – for instance, at special events put together by specialized organizations or programs – but can then continue their conversations informally over social networking platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter. Furthermore, these online exchanges can also involve virtual collaboration on joint projects and potentially lead to further “in-person” opportunities. Thus, it is possible to enhance such exchange and learning opportunities with minimal coordination and at no additional cost – whether to organizations initiating the process or the participants – by utilizing freely available and easily accessible technologies and tools. This is not to suggest that they can effectively replace actual, in-person conversations and opportunities; but they can provide a viable alternative in situations where no such programs exist at all.

Notes

1 Simon Tisdall, “The New Cold War: Are We Going Back to the Bad Old Days?,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine. 2 For examples, see the following discussions: Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from the Last One,” Foreign Affairs 2014; Anne Applebaum, “The New Cold War,” Slate, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/02/saving_ukraine_and_stopping_vladimir_putin_the_west_needs_a_long_term_strategy.html; Interfax, “Горбачев Предсказал Перерастание Начавшейся “Холодной Войны” В “Горячую” [Gorbachev Predicts Escalation of the New “Cold War” to a “Hot” One],” Interfax, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/420811; Vzglyad, “Эксперт: В Отношениях Между Россией И Западом Возможна Новая Холодная Война [Expert: New Cold War Possible in the Relationship between Russia and the West],” Vzglyad, http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/9/23/707019.html. 3 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 4 For examples, see: DOS, “2009 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission,” US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/usrussiabilat/c38418.htm; AC, “Russia Abroad,” American Councils for International Education, http://www.americancouncils.org/programs/us-russia-innovation-corridor; “Us-Russia Innovation Corridor,” American Councils for International Education, http://www.americancouncils.org/programs/us-russia-innovation-corridor.5 Yelena Osipova, “Author’s Interview with Maura Shelden, Public Affairs Officer, Open World Program, April 8,”(Washington, DC2015); “Author’s Interview with Dr. David Patton, Executive Vice President, American Councils for International Education, April 14,”(Washington, DC2015).6 HRW, “Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency,” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/24/laws-attrition-0. 7 Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “U.S. Education Ngo American Councils Ordered to Cease Operations,” The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-education-ngo-american-councils-ordered-to-cease-operations/497910.html. 8 Pavel Koshkin, “The Uncertain Future of Us-Russia Educational Exchanges,” Russia Direct, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/uncertain-future-us-russia-educational-exchanges; Neil MacFarquhar and Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Cancels Exchange Program after a Student Seeks U.S. Asylum,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/europe/russia-cancels-exchange-program-after-a-student-seeks-us-asylum.html. 9 DOE, “Title Vi Programs: Building a U.S. International Education Infrastructure,” US Department of Education, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/title-six.html; Nathan J. Brown, “In Defense of U.S. Funding for Area Studies,”

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The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/30/in-defense-of-u-s-funding-for-area-studies/. 10 Hannah Hess, “Citing Ukraine Crisis, Gop Looks to Cut Open World Leadership Center,” Roll Call, http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/citing-ukraine-crisis-gop-looks-to-cut-exchange-program/?dcz=. 11 IHE, “Federal Cuts for Eurasian and Eastern European Studies,” Inside Higher Ed, https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2013/10/23/federal-cuts-eurasian-and-eastern-european-studies; Laura Adams, “Why America Needs to Fund the Next Generation of Russia Scholars,” Russia Direct, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/why-america-needs-fund-next-generation-russia-scholars; Matthew Rojansky and Kenneth Yalowitz, “The Slow Death of Russian and Eurasian Studies,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-slow-death-russian-eurasian-studies-10516. 12 Grants.Gov, “Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title Viii) Fy 14 Department of State,” US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, http://www.grants.gov/view-opportunity.html?oppId=275794; Osipova, “Author’s Interview with David Patton.”13 RussianGovernment, “Постановление Правительства Рф От 28 Октября 1995 Г. N 1039 “О Развитии Сотрудничества С Зарубежными Странами В Области Образования” [Resolution of the Government of Russian Federation “on the Development of Cooperation with Foreign Countries in the Area of Education”, October 28, 1995],” Russian Educational Portal, http://www.school.edu.ru/laws.asp?cat_ob_no=5954&ob_no=5821&oll.ob_no_to=; “Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации От От 8 Октября 2013 Г. № 891 “Об Установлении Квоты На Образование ИностранныхГраждан И Лиц Без Гражданства В Российской Федерации” [Resolution of the Government of Russian Federation “on the Establishment of Quotas for the Education of Individuals without Citizenship of Russian Federation”, October 8, 2013],” Government of Russian Federation, http://government.ru/media/files/41d49508643d1f64e871.pdf. 14 MoS, “Обучение Иностранных Граждан В Высших Учебных Заведениях Российской Федерации: Статистический Сборник [Education of Foreign Citizens in the Higher Educational Institutions of the Russian Federation: Statistical Collection],”(Moscow: Center of Sociological Research, Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, 2014).15 Alexey Fominykh, “Российские Университеты На Образовательных Рынках Центральной Азии: Публичная Дипломатия, Сотрудничество И Конкуренция [Russian Universities in the Educational Markets of Central Asia: Public Diplomacy, Cooperation, and Competition],” Вестник Томского университета. История. [Tomsk State University Journal of History] 32, no. 6 (2014).16 Osipova, “Author’s Interview with David Patton.”17 Koshkin, “The Uncertain Future of Us-Russia Educational Exchanges”.

18 Alexander Gabuyev, “Kommersant Vlast: Fervent Advisors: Who in Washington ‘Gets’ Russia,” Russia in Global Affairs, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Kommersant-Vlast-Fervent-Advisors-Who-in-Washington-Gets-Russia-16733. 19 Yelena Osipova, “Author’s Interview with Alexander Gabuyev, Chair of “Russia in Asia-Pacific” Program, Carnegie Moscow Center, November 12,”(Moscow, Russia2014).20 “Author’s Interview with Marina Lebedeva, Head of the Department of World Politics, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Mgimo-University), October 9,”(Moscow, Russia2014).21 “Author’s Interview with Anna Velikaya, Project Coordinator, Alexander Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy, November 11,”(Moscow, Russia2014)..22 RBC, “Ошибка Рбк: Минсвязи Распределило Средства «Информационного Сообщества» [Correction: Ministry of Communication Allocates Funds for “Information Society”],” Russian Business Consulting, http://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/16/01/2015/54b8356d9a79471b609fad23. Dollar amounts based on the January 2015 exchange rate.23 Robert Orttung and Elizabeth Nelson, “Russia’s Foreign Propaganda Curbed by Recession,” The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-foreign-propaganda-curbed-by-recession/515438.html. 24 RT, “More Money, More Problems?,” RT, http://rt.com/op-edge/233147-media-rt-financing-myths-facts/.25 BBGWatch, “Administration Fy 2016 Budget Request for Broadcasting Board of Governors,” BBG Watch, http://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/administration-fy-2016-budget-request-broadcasting-board-governors/.26 “Kerry Tells Royce He’s 100 Percent with Him on Bbg Reform, Asks for More Money,” BBG Watch, http://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/kerrry-tells-royce-hes-100-percent-bbg-reform-asks-money/. See also: Warren Strobel, “U.S. Losing ‘Information War’ to Russia, Other Rivals: Study,” REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-usa-broadcasting-idUSKBN0ML1MN20150325; BBGWatch, “Administration Fy 2016 Budget Request for Broadcasting Board of Governors”. 27 For examples, see: Valentin Katasonov, “Информационная Война Против России: Откуда Исходят Удары [Information War against Russia: Where the Strikes Are Coming from],” Strategic Culture Foundation, http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2015/01/29/informacionnaja-vojna-protiv-rossii-otkuda-ishodjat-udary-31527.html; Dmitry Belyaev, Разруха В Головах. Информационная Война Против России. [Devastation in Heads. Information War against Russia](St. Petersburg: PITER, 2014); Strobel, “U.S. Losing ‘Information War’ to Russia, Other Rivals: Study”; BBGWatch, “Former Bbg Governor, Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Agree: U.S. Losing Information War,” BBG Watch, http://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/former-bbg-governor-former-u-s-ambassador-to-russia-agree-u-s-losing-information-war/. 28 Yelena Osipova, “Author’s Interview with Dr. John Brown, Fomer Public Affairs Officer and Lecturer at Georgetown University, April 15,” (Washington, DC2015).29 Farhad Manjoo, True Enough: Learning to Live in a Post-Fact Society (Hoboken,

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NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008); Richard E. Petty, Joseph R. Priester, and Pablo Brinol, “Mass Media Attitude Change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” in Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research, ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann, Routledge Communication Series (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002).30 PEW, “Russia: Opinion of the United States,” Pew Research Center, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/181/; “United States: Opinion of Russia,” Pew Research Center, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/27/country/233/.31 Osipova, “Author’s Interview with John Brown.”32 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008).33 Osipova, “Author’s Interview with John Brown.”34 “Author’s Interview with Maura Shelden.”

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Alec Albright is a M.A. candidate in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, as well as a candidate in the Landegger Honors Program in International Business Diplomacy where he is a Wallenberg Fellow. His research focuses on political economy, innovation policy, and foreign direct investment. Alec’s Rising Expert paper, “Forward Thinking” explores Russia’s start-up environment and opportunities for US-Russia business exchanges in high-technology sectors.

Korneliya Bachiyska has a Ph.D. in political science from American University, where she teaches courses on comparative politics and national security. Her dissertation “The More We Sweat in Peace, the Less We Bleed in War: Regional Organizations and the Prevention of Violent Conflict” explored the role of regional actors in preventing civil wars. More broadly, her research focuses on conflict prevention and resolution with emphases on the European Union and the Balkans—where she has conducted extensive field research. As part of the Rising Experts program, she is examining the ways in which the United States and Russia could—but often don’t—collaborate to prevent and manage civil wars.

Leslie Martin is a M.A. candidate in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service where she is a Russian Teaching Fellow for 2015-2016. In 2014, Leslie graduated from Kenyon College, where she double majored in

VI. About the Authors

Political Science and Russian Area Studies. Leslie researched the Sino-Russian partnership from the perspective of interpersonal relations between citizens of both countries, focusing on effectiveness of Chinese soft power in Russia. Leslie’s additional research interests include Civil-Military relations in the post-Soviet space, the role of propaganda and the media in Russia and Ukraine, and celebrity culture in the Putin era.

Yelena Osipova originally from Yerevan, Armenia, is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Service, American University. Her research interests primarily focus on international and cross-cultural communication and Eurasian affairs. In her dissertation, Yelena analyzes Russian soft power and public diplomacy discourse, as well as identity transformation. She received a double B.A. in Communication and International Relations from the American University in Bulgaria, and a M.A. in International Communication from SIS, American University.

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