Yilmaz, I & B. Burak - TJP 2011 - Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist...

8/3/2019 Yilmaz, I & B. Burak - TJP 2011 - Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview

1/18

Turkish Journal of Politics

Volume 2 Number 1 Summer 2011

154

Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic

Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period

Ihsan Yilmaz1

and Begum Burak2

Abstract

This paper analyses hegemonic use of the press in the process of top-down Kemalist

modernization in the early periods of the Turkish Republic that is characterized by one

party rule between early 1920s and 1950. In addition to helping Westernization attempts

of the Kemalists, the press in this period also was hegemonically engaged in vilification

of the past. Moreover, intolerant attitude towards pluralism and plurality of views was thediscursive norm of the Turkish press at that time. The journalism and the press in the

early years of the Republic had consistently supported the new regime which was

committed to social engineering. This issue could unfortunately find little space in

political science literature on Turkey. First of all, a theoretical framework concerning

Gramscian theory of hegemony vis--vis media will be presented in this paper. Then,Turkish modernization history will be covered shortly, and lastly, in a more detailed way,

the role of journalism and the press as an instrument in hegemonic modernization

process in the early Republican period will be quested.

Keywords: Gramsci, Hegemony, Turkey, Media, Press, Journalism, Islam,

Modernization

Introduction: The Medias Role in Maintaining Hegemony

The biggest strength of hegemony theory is its sensitivity to how history, culture

and ideology can give rise to forces that stabilize and legitimize authoritarian regimes

(Sim 2004, 19). Gramsci (1971) recognized that the stability and cohesion of Western

societies could not depend on only fear (Femia 1983, 347). The basic premise of the

theory of hegemony is that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas (Bates 1975,

351). Physical domination is not enough; there is a need for spiritual supremacy as well

(Femia 1983, 346). The concept of hegemony means political leadership based on the

consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the

world view of the ruling class (Bates 1975, 352).

1Fatih University, [email protected]

2Fatih University, [email protected]


2/18



155

Hegemony refers to the consensual basis of any given political regime within civil

society, i.e., roughly what Weber meant by legitimation, though with a greater sensitivity

to the interweaving of consent and culture (Adamson 1980, 627). Those who obey must,

to some degree, share the values and standards of their 'superiors', and consent to their

own subordination. Hegemony therefore signifies the control of social life (by a group or

a class) through cultural, as opposed to physical, means (Femia 1983, 346). Elites attempt

to secure consensus so that their rule would appear just and natural. The hegemonic group

represents a theoretical self- perception, a philosophy (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano

2009, 441). The state is no longer simple coercion, no longer the organized force of the

ruling class used to maintain its supremacy over subordinate groups (Fontana 2002, 168).

In media studies, hegemony refers to the ways in which the media influences

individuals minds to consent to status quo power structures. Gramsci believed the media

had a vital role in inculcating individuals to do things in their everyday lives that would

support the establishment. Even though there are some disagreements over the precise

nature of hegemony, it is widely perceived that emphasis is on the cultural and

ideological modes produced by the institutions dominated by ruling elites (Altheide

1984, 477). Media helps perpetuating an economically, culturally and ideologically

biased consciousness and all of society is thus effectively dominated by the false logic

and consciousness through the instrumentalist use of media (Altheide 1984, 477).

The Gramscian sense of hegemony refers to moral and intellectualdirection alone,

and hegemonic rule should not be confused with rule by coercion (Femia 1979, 482).

Hegemony is related to the mechanisms and processes by which knowledge and beliefs

are first, produced, and second, disseminated in order to maintain the rule of the elite by

gaining the consent of the masses (Fontana 2005, 98).

Hegemony is a permanent practice that concentrates on ideological struggles for

recognition, through which moral, political, and intellectual leadership is established

(Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2009, 442). The ruling elite is able to clutter the minds of

the masses with mystifications and distortions (i.e., establish its hegemony) because it

controls this apparatus of transmission (Femia 1983, 348). From the hegemony theorys

perspective, culture is a site of continuous struggles that result in no final, once-and-for-

all victories and that cannot be reduced to economic determinations (Cupples et al 2007,

787).


3/18



156

The processes of discursive contestation whereby particular ideological

formations dominate the public sphere that allows no room for alternative and competing

discourses and visions for society (Cupples et al 2007, 787). This domination is secured

by the ideological apparatuses of the state like schools, churches, or media that make

hegemony more acceptable (Mattei 2003, 5). The media also plays crucial roles in

bringing the overwhelming majority of citizenry into line and to marginalize the

dissenters through a campaign of vilification (Buttigieg 2005, 46)

Media has an important role in justifying the establishment rule by supporting its

claims to superiority, and in persuading the ruled to consent to the status quo. People who

formulate and disseminate ideas (such as journalists, priests, public relations companies,

politicians, advisers, and academics) are constantly engaged in interpreting current

events and debates so as to fit dominant conceptions and categories (not always

conspiratorially) (Harris 2007, 2101). Journalists can also unwittingly promote

hegemony by using hegemonys cultural categories and symbols as they do their work,

even though in most cases as part of the ruling elite, journalists employ these codes

consciously and strategically to promote dominant ideological interests (Chaney,

1981,117, cited in Altheide 1984, 478).

Turkish Modernization

The Ottoman Empire was a bureaucratic empire. The ruling class was strictly

controlled by the center. In parallel to that, while the empire was dissolving, the elites

who started to build a nation-state and modernize it were not of the bourgeoisie but of the

bureaucrats (Keyder 1993, 3). The modernization of the Ottoman Empire emerged with

the Westernization of the bureaucrats (Mardin 1973, 179). Thus, in Turkish political

culture an elitist aspect has always existed (Frey 1965, 43). As a natural result of this,

Turkish modernization has been mentioned together with Turkish intellectuals or elites.

After Tanzimat, with the replacement of the Ulema by the modernizing elites, the

reforms changed in form and quality, and a series of changes in a top -down process

affected the whole society. The Wests political, military and economic successes were

not recognized until the Ottoman Empire started to decline. Along with the military

defeats, the idea of implementing some reforms in the context of technology came into


4/18



157

being. While discussing over the issue of Can the technology be imported without

importing the culture of the Western world?

The reforms carried out also revealed Ottoman Empires envy for the West in its

attempts to get modernized. The point that must be emphasized here is that,

modernization was carried out in a top-down fashion in Kautskys (1972) words by a

group of modernizers. The intellectuals and artists who in fact must have been analysts

owned a collective identity with a view to transform the society and they became

ideologues (Gle 2000). The Western powers could indirectly and to some extent

directly affect the Ottoman modernization through these people. Also, the debts of the

Empire were used as a tool in manipulating modernization movements.

The Noble Edict of the Rose Garden (Glhane Hatt- Hmayunu) in 1839 can be

seen as one of the most radical aspects of the modernization movements. Despite the fact

that its rhetoric is totally Islamic, the text has a completely secular character announced

by Mustafa Reit Pasha. Moreover, some Ottoman intellectuals in their novels at that

time, conserved the Islamic epistemology while also putting a passive role on modernity.

Another edict (Islahat Ferman) declared in 1859 brought the idea of nation -state into

the Empire despite the risk of Empires collapse.

Meanwhile, the new Ottomans with their publications released from Europe,

eclectically defended the ideas of democracy, parliamentarism, constitutionalism,

secularism and liberalism. New Ottomans who used Islam as a source of legitimacy

struggled to bring new themes and concepts to the Empire. For instance, Namk Kemal

tried to reach a consensus between Islam and parliamentarism by showing that

consultation (Meveret) in Islam is harmonious with parliamentarism. The Islamism

which was adopted by the new Ottomans had emerged in an ideological form as a resultof the interaction between the ideological thinking of the West and traditional values

(Trkne 1994, 25). Briefly, the new Ottomans aimed to reach a more modern, secular

and Western type of political system (Kara 1994, 62). In this context, it can be asserted

that even positivism had been introduced with the new Ottomans (Kker 1994, 222).

What the new Ottomans desired, happened in 1876 and a constitution (Kanun-i

Esasi) entered into force. However, this step was not seen sufficient and the elites in the

Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) got the control of political power through a

military coup in 1908. Thus, the political power of the bureaucracy and the elites had


5/18



158

been established. The Young Turks and the CUP evidently declared that they had been

the inheritors of the new Ottomans in terms of modernization (Haniolu, 1985, 36).

The nationalist discourse as one of the effects of modernization was firstly

pronounced by the elites, Turkish nationalism was used against the nationalist attitudes of

minorities. The publications such as Turkish Association (Trk Dernei), Young Pens

(Gen Kalemler), Turkish Homeland (Trk Yurdu), Islam Magazine (slam Mecmuas)

tried to prove that nationalism had been the most rational one in Three Types of Policy

( Tarz- Siyaset) (Mardin 1992a, 275). Besides, the language was simplified, through

these simplification attempts with the help of social communication channels, the masses

were tried to make mobilized for modernization (Mardin 1992b, 143).

Consequently, the elites had strengthened their hands while drifting apart from

the society. For example, The Young Turks started to have feelings of hatred towards

the idea of populism and got engaged in elitist attitudes(Haniolu 1985, 613). It is

possible to assert that, most of the revolutions carried out in the early years of the

Republic including that of adopting the Latin alphabet and abolishing the Caliphate were

planned in this era. From this perspective, it can be understood that most of the

revolutions seen with the introduction of the Republican Regime do not constitute a

radical change. These reforms differ from the previous ones in the context of their ability

to exercise sanctions. Unlike the previous decades, in the Republican era the revolutions

were imposed to the masses in a top-down fashion. In Webers words the

bureaucratization of the political authority had started in as early as in 1908. From then

on, the impact of Islam on state was minimized and even folk Islam was controlled. The

Kemalist Republican elites passion for modernization, seen as an escape from

backwardness, translated itself into a total dislike and distrust of all things associated with

the ancient regime and the old way of life. Topping the long list of suspect establishments

were religion and religious institutions (Yilmaz 2005, 387).

The reform movements concerning the language were radicalized in the early

years of the new regime and with the introduction of the Latin alphabet, a total break

from the past was witnessed. In addition, with a new conception of history, a new secular

Turkish history was rewritten.

After the War of Independence, Westernization was seen as the second goal. The

positivist understanding inherited from the Young Turks was kept alive through the


6/18



159

revolutions carried out by Kemalist elites. Apart from that solidarism paved the way for

the legitimization of the single-party rule (Kker 1994, 234, 235). Also, the people

appointed for the bureaucratic cadres were chosen from the enthusiastic people towards

modernity, because bureaucracy was seen as an important agent for change (Heper 1977,

70).

Kemalists did not want to rule Turkish society by means of traditions, and social

convictions and symbols and they preferred to create a new ideology and symbols which

would permit Turkey to progress rapidly into the twentieth century (Ahmad 1993, 56).

They were very clear in their minds about the pace of modernization: to reach the level

of contemporary European civilization, the Western way of life had to be espoused and

imported with all kind of its institutions including laws (Yilmaz 2002, 114). In parallel

with this, it was also obvious that the opposing elements for the new regime were treated

very harshly. The nationalist discourse which Kemalism has tried to establish opposed

liberalism and pluralism as well as neglecting the idea of civil society (Gle 1994, 130).

Even today, as Yilmaz (2009, 109) puts is succinctly,

There are both de jure and de facto constraints in the name of Kemalism

limiting a fully functioning democracy in Turkey. The 1982 constitution,

which was prepared after the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup, severely limits the

democratic power of parliament and elected government compared to

Western democracies. Until very recently, through the National Security

Council the military had direct influence on the government. A parallel

military court structure with even a Supreme Court of Appeals which has no

equivalent in the West makes even a black-letter civilian control of themilitary impossible It is also a fact that there have always been civilian

supporters of such a Kemalist autocracy among elite circles such as the

media, politics, business and even judiciary.

The institutions which produced this socio-political climate tried to transmit the messages

of the new regime to the public via education. To serve this aim, the press was used in an

effective way.


7/18



160

Journalism in Imposing the Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses

The mass communication as well as press and publishing have a firm relationship

with modernization and Westernization project in Turkey. Publishing, above all, is one of

the reform movements following the West; it is known that, publishing has been

employed in order to motivate other reforms. However, what is more important is that,

while the Republican elites were trying to carry out the social-engineering projects

through revolutions in the early years of modernization, they did not just enact laws, but

also used mass communication instruments as an efficient tool to make the modernization

project get a wide support among the masses.

In another sense, the Republican regime like any other regimes, from the verybeginning, got engaged in the legitimization of itself and adopting itself to the public.

Like any other regimes, it used the press as a tool to serve this aim (Kabacal 1987, 78).

The supreme interests of the State pulled the journalists to getting engaged in shortcuts,

and because of the notion of interest, the journalists turned into an identity of a civil

servant (Kongar 1986, 46). Besides, modernity had been defended, and a consensus had

been made about reaching the level of modern civilizations. Under the name of

Ottoman, the traditional had been discredited, and the Western culture had been put in

the foreground. The revolutions had been defended and the cultural metamorphosis of the

masses had been tried to be effectuated via the press. On the other hand, the antagonists

had been accused of being ignoble (Kabacal 1994, 151). Moreover, the antagonists

rights to have a voice in politics were quite limited until 1946.

The journalist-deputies had tried to legitimate the new regime and the political

power with their publications, while seeing the demand for a second political party as a

divisive behavior. (Gvenir 1991, 70, 74). In addition to that, it was evidently declaredthat a second political party would pave the way for reactionary trends. The period of

the Republican era until 1946 witnessed the steering of the press including that of

magazines too within the boundaries of the new regime. The starting point of this steering

came into being with the trials of the journalist referring to the Caliphate. With the

introduction of the Law of Maintenance ofOrder in 1925, the press in Istanbul was put

under strict control; the newspapers representing the Islamic stand or extreme left were

closed down. Some journalists were sent to exile, and all newspapers adopting liberal or

socialist positions were closed down.


8/18



161

The magazines published between the years of 1923 and 1950 had the following sub-

titles:

- Praise to the regime and political authority

-Passion for modernity and technology

-Empowerment of women

-Popularization of upper culture (Oktay 1995, 58-62).

Those magazines tried to loosen the ties with the past by emphasizing the

superiority of the Western technology and by pushing the masses towards a radical

modernization. The issues such as the mandatory Greek classes, skating, employment lifeand factories, urbanism, nationalist ideology, gymnastics and television were all

undertaken by the members of the press (Topuz 1973, 137).

During the time of War of Independence, the press had played a major role too.

For example, Mustafa Kemal paved the way for the publication of National Will

(rade-i Milliye). This journal published in 1919 was used to make the decisions taken in

Sivas Congress gain a widespread audience. Moreover, the journal called New Day

(Yeni Gn) which was published by Yunus Nadi was one of the most important

publications that supported the War of Independence.

Besides, in most of the Anatolian provinces, national struggle was supported by

the press. In 1920, in order to inform the Turkish public and foreign public about the

process of national struggle, a news agency called Anatolian Agency was founded.

Even though Ankara became the capital city after 1923, Istanbul remained as the center

of the press. Mustafa Kemal in order to underline the key role of the press in the

modernization and Westernization process gave a speech to the journalists in 1924:

Turkish press should build an iron wall around the Turkish Republic as a

reflection of the nations real voice and will. A wall of ideas, a wall of mind

Our nation has a right to demand this from the members of the press. It is a

must for the whole nation to be in a sincere union and solidarism (Topuz

1973, 142).


9/18



162

It was obvious that the modernization project was not welcomed by a majority of

the masses. Hence, one of the influential journalists of the time-beingHseyin Cahit

Yaln who was judged in the Independence Tribunals (stiklal Mahkemeleri), while

defending himself said that Am I not republican? Am I not secular? Am I not

progressive? Do I not favor democracy? How can you complain about me? (Kktener

2004, 68).

The new regime had wanted all the new publications to work with the aim to help

the modernization project. Also the opposing publications were repressed. After the

Sheikh Said Rebellion with the enactment of the law of Maintenance of Order, all theopposing press was hushed. A newspaper called Tomorrow which was favoring the

Free Republican Party was closed down.

The experience of the opposing press lasted as long as the life of the opposing

political parties at that time. With the press out of the way, on the advice of the

Independence Tribunal the government closed down the Progressive Republican Party on

3 June. According to the tribunal, members of the party had supported the rebellion and

tried to exploit religion for political purposes (Zurcher 2004, 172). All newspapers andperiodicals leaning towards the liberal or socialist opposition had been closed down in

1925 and from then on only the government-controlled newspapers appeared since the

adoption of a new press law that gave the government to close down any paper that

published anything contradicting the general policies of the country (Zurcher

2004,180).

Even though the press had acted in a monolithic way in supporting the

modernization project, some journalists revealed a heavier effort compared to others. For

instance, despite the existence of almost the whole press support for Mustafa Kemal, the

role of the newspaper called Republic (Cumhuriyet) had been a distinguished one.

(Kktener 2004, 70). That newspaper tried to support each single new law and social

change ((Kktener 2004, 69). For instance, when the reform of the alphabet was

experienced, the newspaper published an article called The New Writing on the very

first page and it was emphasized that the adoption of the Latin Alphabet had been the

main step towards Westernization ((Kktener 2004, 70). It must be known that with thisreform Turkey will completely resemble to Europe holding the key of civilization.


10/18



163

(Kavakl 2005, 65)Another newspaper called The Evening which was first published

in 1918, in its first volume with the new alphabet declared that with this the reform of the

alphabet; the country would get rid of ignorance (Kavakl 2005, 51).

It was easily seen that the newspaper called The Evening played a key role in

making the masees adopt the revolutions and Kemalist principles (Kavakl 2005, 51). The

publishing policy of the newspaper was to educate the masses in the light of Western

values and to help the new regime transform the masses in line with Kemalist principles.

The radical reform movements carried out in the fields of art, education and economics

were placed in the first pages of the newspaper (Kavakl 2005, 51). As noted, this

newspaper had adopted a publishing policy that served the interests of modernization

project enthusiastically (Kavakl 2005, 68). The newspaper that supported the social

change had revealed progressive attitudes by gently focusing on cultural and artistic

issues(avdar 1995, 302).

In the 1930s, radio broadcasting started as a state-run enterprise and was

mandated to define and promote a common and collective agenda for modernization

(Oncu 1995, 55). The radio was used as an instrument of indoctrination (Alanku-Kural

1995, 105-106). It acted to reinforce unified understandings and experiences across the

nation that could easily be formed and manipulated by those transmitting the messages

(Wuthrich 2010, 221).

In 1931, the journal called The Cadre was published to legitimize the new

regime. The Cadre explained the purpose of itself in the following words: In this

mysterious process that the world is going through, to keep the revolutions alive and

strong is our first duty. The Cadre is alive for this reason (Er 2003, 91).

The first press law enacted in 1931 put a heavy pressure on the press. The legal

amendments made in 1938, besides censorship brought limitations for the people working

in the press. According to the press law, the publications could be abolished any time the

council of ministers wanted (Topuz 1973, 152). In this new environment, the state

declared what it wanted the press to do in many times: It wanted the press to serve the

modernization project (Er 2003, 75). (See also Topuz 2003, 113). With a circular sent to

all of the members of the press, the press was declared as the vehicle of the social

engineering process:


11/18



164

The press constitutes the main pillar of the cultural revolutions. The president

called the whole Turkish people for a cultural campaign. He declared that

they could make the national culture stand in the same level with Western

civilizations. The press of Turkey would play a major role in this process

(skit 1939, 224).

When the Turkish Press Congress was held in 1935, 116 newspapers and 127

magazines were being published. However, all of these publications were to defend the

discourse of the top-down modernization process. The opposing elements in the press

were not given any right to survive despite being modern and Western oriented.

According to the press congress, the newspapers were defined as follows:

a. The most powerful tool of propaganda in making the revolutions to gain a widespreadsupport among the public.

b. A tool of defense against reactionary attitudes.c. A servant for the incumbent governments.d. The most effective school in the political, economic and cultural education of the

masses (nuur 1992, 108).

During the Second World War, some kind of front line similar to that seen in the

national struggle was witnessed. Some newspapers were defending democracy whereas

some others were on the side of Germany. In 1945, some newspapers that had a leftist

tendency were abolished. Contemporary scholars argue that this had been an operation of

the deep state.

Conclusion

The question of hegemony is also a question of new cultural order (Hall 1988,

145). It also focuses on the question ofwhoseversion of reality is being universalized

and which alternatives are rendered unthinkable (Sim 2004, 7). In this sense, in the

Kemalist westernization project, which is a top-down hegemonic socio-cultural

transformation process, the Kemalist bureaucratic elite that gained the upper hand after


12/18



165

1923 espoused the view that modernization and progress consisted mainly of the

cultural transformation of society. They firmly believed that European-style civilization

was the pinnacle of progress, and they hurried to adopt the symbols of the European

civilization (Karpat 2004, 228).

Kemalists, as the main successors of Jacobinist and positivist Young Turks, firmly

believed that socio-cultural change must be imposed from the top and should be directed

towards altering the traditional institutions, organizations, and, especially, culture, as

these were regarded as the chief hindrance to progress (Karpat 2004, 217). Kemalists

aimed at creating a nationalist Turkish culture to replace the Islamic culture which the

reformers sought to sweep away (Karpat 2004, 219).

The Kemalists viewed themselves as the educator of the masses and established a

political tutelage regime designated to educate the masses in the rudiments of modern

politics (Karpat 2004, 227). This was some kind of a vulgar process of intellectual

civilizing (Landy 2008, 129). The realization of this social engineering process was

considered possible only through intellectual conversion (Karpat 2004, 229). Kemalists

wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks had come to realize, through

Kemalist leadership and education, their true role as patriotic citizens (Dodd 1992: 18).

Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to implement this project

(Zurcher 2004, 181).

The press in the early Republican period was used as a socio-political

manipulation tool of mass communication. The press had consistently supported the new

regime and Western-oriented policies. The journalists reflected the Jacobin and elitist

spirit of modernization in their articles and columns. They acted in a monolithic way and

gave no permission and column to the opposition. Plurality and freedom of press werethe two missing links that characterize this era.

Another dimension of the media hegemony is that the media frames a negative

image of other countries, civilizations, cultures, traditions and religions (cf. Schlesinger,

1978; Beharrell et al., 1976, Gitlin, 1980; Dahlgren, 1982). In the early Republican

Turkish case, this was done with regard to the Middle Eastern societies, Muslim cultures,

practicing Muslims, Muslim religious functionaries, Sufi brotherhoods, and several

public manifestations of Islam which were considered anathema to the Kemalist

modernization project. Put it differently, they were made the constitutive other of the


13/18



166

Kemalist modernization project. In most cases, rather than challenging these directly, the

Kemalists made use of an empty signifier: the notion of reactionarism (irtica). Kemalist

discourse takes the meaning of reactionism as opposition to the existing secular system,

but it refers to a social order built on Islamic values, norms and principles (Dursun 2006,

174). What is more, it has become a signifier for the irrational dimensions of Islam

(Dursun 2006, 174).

On the other hand, with the victory of United States after the Second World War,

the wave of democratization came to Turkey and made it adopt a multi-party system.

With the introduction of the democratic political life, the Turkish press and press elites

had to transform themselves (for this pseudo-transformation see now Ozden and Yilmaz

2010). Yet, it is hard to say that this transformation process has ended and the Kemalist

hegemony as far as the Turkish media is concerned evaporated.

References

Adamson, Walter L. 1980. Gramsci's Interpretation of Fascism,Journal of the History

of Ideas, Vol. 41(4), pp. 615-633.

Ahmad, Feroz .1993. The Making of Modern Turkey, London and New York: Routledge.

Alanku-Kural, Sevda. 1995. Trkiyede Medya, Hegemonya ve tekinin

Temsili[Media, Hegemony and the Representation of the Other in Turkey],

Toplum ve Bilim, stanbul, Gz 1995, Say: 67, pp. 76-110.

Altheide, David L. 1984. Media Hegemony: A Failure of Perspective, The Public

Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 48(2), pp. 476-490.

Bates, Thomas R. 1975. Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,Journal of the History

of Ideas, Vol. 36(2), pp. 351-366.

Beharrell, Peter, et al. 1976.Bad News. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Buckel, Sonja and Andreas Fischer-Lescano. 2009. Gramsci Reconsidered: Hegemony

in Global Law,Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, pp. 437454.

Buttigieg, Joseph. 2005. The Contemporary Discourse on Civil Society: A Gramscian

Critique, boundary, 2(12), pp. 33-53.


14/18



167

avdar, Tevfik. 1995. Trkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi (1839-1950) [The History of

Turkish Democracy], Ankara: mge.

Chaney, David. 1981. "Public Opinion and Social Change: The Social Rhetoric of

Documentary and The Concept of News", in Elihu Katz and Tamas Szecsko

(eds.),Mass Media and Social Change. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 115-36

Cupples, Julie, Kevin Glynn, and Irving Larios. 2007. Hybrid Cultures of

Postdevelopment: The Struggle for Popular Hegemony in Rural Nicaragua,

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 97(4), pp. 786801.

Dahlgren, Peter. 1982. "The Third World on TV News: Western Ways of Seeing the

Other." in William C. Adams (ed.), Television Coverage of International Affairs.

Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, pp. 45-66.

Dodd, Clement H. 1992. Ataturks Idea of Democracy, British Journal of Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 16-30.

Dursun, iler. 2006. The Struggle Goes On: The Discursive Strategies of the Islamist

Press in Turkey, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14(2), pp.

161-182.

Eldridge, John. 1993. News, Truth and Power, in: J. Eldridge (Ed.) Getting the Message:

News, Truth and Power, pp. 333 London: Routledge.

Eldridge, John. 1995. That was the World That was, in: J. Eldridge (Ed.) News,

Content, Language and Visuals: Glasgow Media Group Reader, vol. 1, pp. 126

London: Routledge.

Er, Turgut. 2003. Trkiyede Basn, Yayn ve Tantma (The Press, Publishing and

Advertising in Turkey], Ankara: Basn Yayn ve Enformasyon Genel Mdrl.

Femia, Joseph V. 1979. The Gramsci Phenomenon: Some Reflections, Political Studies

, Vol. 27, pp. 472483.

Femia, Joseph V. 1983. Gramsci's Patrimony,British Journal of Political Science, Vol.

13(3), pp. 327-364.

Fiske, John. 1989.News, History and Undisciplined Events. London: Routledge.


15/18



168

Fontana, Benedetto. 2002. Gramsci on Politics and State, Journal of Classical

Sociology, Vol 2(2), pp. 157178.

Fontana, Benedetto. 2005. The Democratic Philosopher: Rhetoric as Hegemony in

Gramsci,Italian Culture , Vol. 23, pp. 97-124.

Frey, Fredrick. 1965. The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gitlin, Todd. 1980. The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and the

Unmaking of the Left. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gle, Nilufer. 1994.Modern Mahrem,[ The Forbidden Modern] stanbul: Metis.

Gle, Nilufer. 2000. Modernlik: Zaman, Bilin ve Desen [Modernity: Time, Consciousand Design], in Nilfer Gle (ed)Melez Desenler. Istanbul: Metis, pp. 7-18.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.

Gvenir, Murat. 1991. 2. Dnya avanda Turk Basn: Siyasal ktidarn Basn

Denetlemesi ve Ynlendirmesi [Turkish Press in the Second World War: The

control and Manipulation of the Press by the Political Authority], stanbul:

Simurg.

Hall, Stuart. 1977. The Media and Ideological Effect in J. Curran et. al. (eds) Mass

Communication and Society, London: Arnold, pp. 315-348.

Hall, Stuart. 1978. Policing the Crises. London: Macmillan

Haniolu, kr. 1985. Osmanl ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jn Trklk [ Ottoman

Union and Progress Committee and Jeunne Turcs] stanbul: letiim.

Harris, Dave. 2007. Hegemony and the Media, Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology.

Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 2101-2104.

Heper, Metin. 1977. Trk Kamu Brokrasisinde Gelenekilik ve Modernleme: Siyaset

Sosyolojiis Asndan Bir nceleme [Traditionalism and Modernization in Turkish

Public Bureaucracy: A Study From the Perspective of Political Sociology].

Ankara: Simurg.

nuur, Nuri. 1992.Trk Basn Tarihi [Turkish Press History], stanbul: Gazeteciler

Cemiyeti.


16/18



169

skit, Server. 1939. Trkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri [The Press Regimes in Turkey],

Ankara: Matbuat Umum Mdrl Neriyat,

Kabacal, Alpay. 1987. Trk Yayn Tarihi[The History of Turkish Publication ], stanbul:

Gazeteciler Cemiyeti.

Kabacal, Alpay. 1994. Trk Basnnda Demokrasi [Democracy in the Turkish

Democracy], Ankara: Kltr Bakanl.

Kara, smail. 1994. slamclarn Siyasi Grleri [The Political Views of the Islamists].

Istanbul: z Yaynclk.

Karpat, Kemal H. 2004. Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and

Essays. Leiden: Brill.

Kautsky, John H. 1972. The Political Consequences of Modernization, New York: John

Wiley and Sons.

Kavakl, Nurhan. 2005. Bir Gazetenin Tarihi:Akam [The History of a Newpaper: The

Evening], stanbul: Yap Kredi.

Keyder, alar. 1993.Trkiye'de Devlet ve Snflar,[State and Class in Turkey] stanbul:

letiim.

Kker, Levent. 1994. Modernleme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi [Modernization, Kemalism

and Democracy], letiim, stanbul: letiim.

Kktener, Aysun. 2004. Bir Gazetenin Tarihi: Cumhuriyet[The History of a Newpaper:

Republic], stanbul.

Kongar, Emre. 1986. Kltr ve letiim [Culture and Communication] stanbul: Say

Yaynevi.

Landy, Marcia. 2008. Gramsci, Passive Revolution, and Media, boundary 2 35(3), pp.

99-131.

Mardin erif. 1992. Trkiyede Din ve Siyaset,[ Religion and Politics in Turkey] stanbul:

letiim.

Mardin, erif. 1973. Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?Daedalus,

Winter, pp. 169-190.


17/18



170

Mardin, erif. 1992. Trkiyede letiim Modernlemesinin Erken Bir Safhas zerine

Notlar [Notes on Early Stage of the Modernization of Communication in Turkey]

in Trk Modernlemesi(. Mardin), stanbul: letiim.

Mardin, erif. 1992. Jn Trklerin Siyasi Fikirleri [ The Political Views of the Jeunne

Turcs], stanbul: letiim.

Mattei, Ugo. 2003. A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the

Latin Resistance, Global Jurist Frontiers, Vol. 3(2), pp. 1-61.

Oktay, Ahmet. 1995. Trkiyede Popler Kltr [Popular Culture in Turkey], stanbul:

Everest Yaynlar.

nc, Aye. 1995. Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish

Commercial Television, Public Culture, 8(1), pp. 51-71.

Ozden, Kemal and Ihsan Yilmaz. 2010. An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical

Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inns Decision to Transition to a

Multi-Party Political System, European Journal of Economic and Political

Studies, Vol 3(2), pp. 189-205.

Schlesinger, Philip. 1978. Putting "Reality" Together. London: Constable.

Sim, Soek-Fang. 2004. Dewesternising Theories of Authoritarianism: Economics,

Ideology and the Asian Economic Crisis in Singapore. Working Paper No. 103.

Perth, AU: Murdoch University.

Topuz, Hfz. 1973. Yz Soruda Trk Basn Tarihi [Turkish Press History in 100

Questions], stanbul: Gerek Yaynevi.

Topuz, Hfz. 2003.II. Mahmuttan Holdinglere Trk Basn Tarihi, 2nd edition. stanbul:Remzi Kitabevi.

Torfing, Jacob. 1999. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek, London:

Blackwell.

Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. London,

UK: Free Press.

Trkne, Mmtazer. 1994. Siyasi deoloji Olarak slamcln Douu [The Birth ofIslamism as a Political Ideology], stanbul: letiim.


18/18



171

Wuthrich, F. Michael. 2010. Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey

during Failed and Successful Interventions, Turkish Studies, Vol. 11(2), pp. 217-

234.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2002. Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic

Law,Middle East Journal, Vol. 56(1), pp. 113-131.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2005. State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey, The

Muslim World, Vol. 95, pp. 385-411.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2009. Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a

Catalyst,Insight Turkey, Vol. 11(2), pp. 93-112.

Zurcher, Eric J. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd edition. London: I.B. Tauris.

Yilmaz, I & B. Burak - TJP 2011 - Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist...

Documents

Transcript of Yilmaz, I & B. Burak - TJP 2011 - Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist...