WP 1 - STATE OF THE ART REPORT: SPAIN by MARÍA ROS · PDF fileOrientations of Young Men...

Orientations of Young Men and Women to Citizenship and European Identity Workpackage No.1

Spain November 2001 – January 2002

WP 1 - STATE OF THE ART REPORT: SPAIN

by

MARÍA ROS (U. Complutense de Madrid)

& HÉCTOR GRAD (U. Autónoma de Madrid)

with the collaboration of

MIRYAM RODRÍGUEZ & GEMA GARCÍA



INDEX

1. Political Context 3 1.1. Political Structure of the State 3 1.2. Political Parties: the nationality question, European construction 6 1.3. Analyses of Content of the Political Programs 7

1.3.1. Orientation in social & national policy 7 1.3.2 The nationality question & model of State 8 1.3.3 European construction 13 1.3.4 Attention to youth & youth movements 13 1.3.5 Citizens socialization & gender 14

1.4. Electoral Results 14 1.10. General elections 14 1.11. Regional elections 15 2. Political Participation 17 2.1. Electoral participation in Spain 17 2.1.1.Participation and abstention among young people 18 2.2. Reported vote to political parties 19 3. The Multiplicity of Social Identities 20 3.1. Personal Identities 21 3.2. Social Identities 22 3.2.1. Localism/cosmopolitanism 22 3.2.2. Autonomous community identity & national identity 23 3.2.3. National & European identity 26 4. Citizenship and Associationism 28 4.1. Foundations of Citizenship 28 4.2. European Citizenship 4.3. Attitudes to European Construction

3233

5. Immigration, Xenophobia and Racism 34 5.1. Legislation 34 5.2. Immigration in Spain 36 5.3. Attitudes of young people towards immigration 38 6. Education 40 6.1. Normative Context 40 6.2. Curricular Content 41 6.3. Conclusion 44 References 45 Tables Figures

4950



1. Political Context.

1.1. Political structure of the state.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 adopted a political régime of parliamentary

monarchy and a quasi-federal structure based on regional autonomy. This state

organization reflects both the historical inheritance of organization in provinces of the

nineteenth-century centralist state1 and the recognition of the historic rights of nations,

in the form of autonomous regions, confirmed by the Republican Constitution of 1931.

The resulting ambiguity is reflected in various articles of the constitution’s text:

• Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution declares that “The Constitution is founded on the

indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all

Spaniards,...”, though it also “...recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the

nationalities and regions of which it is made up...” and finally, “...solidarity between all

of them”.2

• Furthermore, while Article 143 establishes, on the one hand, that “In the exercise of

the right to autonomy recognized in Article 2 of the Constitution, adjacent provinces

with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, island territories and

provinces with a historic regional character may accede to self-government and

constitute themselves in Autonomous Communities in accordance with the

provisions of this Document and the respective Statutes”.

1 The creation in 1833 of the provincial administrative system in substitution of the historic regions is characteristic of the centralizing tendency introduced with the Constitution of 1812. 2 This principle is developed in Article 138, which sets down that "The State guarantees the effective achievement of the principle of solidarity enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution, ensuring the establishment of sufficient and fair economic equilibrium between the different parts of the Spanish territory..." and that "The differences between the Statutes of the different Autonomous Communities may in no case involve economic or social privileges"; in Article 139.1, "All Spaniards have the same rights and obligations in any part of the territory of the State"; and in Article 149.1, which stipulates that "The State has exclusive power" over "The regulation of the basic conditions that guarantee the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of constitutional rights and the fulfillment of constitutional duties".



• On the other hand, this right to autonomy is restricted by Article 145, which

establishes that “In no case will the federation of Autonomous Communities be

admitted”.3

Article 148 offers the Autonomous Communities the possibility of self-

government, and of assuming exclusive responsibility for language, education, culture,

social services, public works, economic development, justice and independent police in

the region.4 In a complementary way, on the one hand, Article 149 reserves for the State

exclusive responsibility on all common and supraregional issues5, and on all matters not

covered by the regions Statute of Autonomy. However, on the one hand, Article 150.2

allows the state, through a constitutional law, to transfer or delegate its responsibilities

to the Autonomous Communities.

Specifically, the Constitution recognizes the existence of historic nationalities6 in

Catalonia, the Basque Country7 and Galicia. These nationalities acceded directly to

autonomy, by virtue of the Second Transitory Order, as the corresponding statutes had

3 Moreover, Article 145 subsequently establishes that "The Statutes can make provision for the cases, requirements and terms in which the Autonomous Communities may make agreements among one another for the management and provision of their own services, as well as the nature and terms of the corresponding communication to the General Assembly", and adds the limitation that "In other cases, cooperation agreements between the Autonomous Communities shall require the authorization of the General Assembly". 4 Specifically, Article 148 recognizes the possibility that the autonomous government assumes powers in territorial organization and economic development, in education, research, culture and, where applicable, teaching of the regional language, in social services and health, in public works, in transport and communications, in environmental and water management, in agriculture, cattle and inland fishing, in the promotion of tourism and sport, and in public security and policing in the region.

5 Article 149.1 cites specifically the areas of nationality and immigration, international relations, defense and armed forces, administration of justice and legislation of all types, public security, customs and excise régime, monetary system, general planning of economic activity, general taxation and State debt, state statistics, merchant marine and fishing, public works, transport and communications, energy, hydraulic resources, Spanish cultural, artistic and historical heritage, regulation of academic and professional titles, pharmaceutical products, authorization for the calling of referendums, and the general bases for health, social security, judicial system and public administration, environmental protection, and the social communication media.

6 The 1978 Constitution avoids using the term “nation” due to its political and juridical connotations of recognition of the right to independent state organization following the principle of self-determination. The term “nationality” is intended to be restricted to the cultural aspect, without implying the transcendence of independent political organization (cf. Blas Guerrero, 1984). 7 The Constitution expressly restored the Basque charter of rights (abolished in 1839 and 1876), including fiscal autonomy, so that The Basque Country lies outside the general fiscal régime and contributes to the State an annual quota agreed between the administrations.



been approved during the Second Republic.8 Subsequently, Andalusia and Navarre

acceded to autonomy via referendum (in accordance with Article 151); and

responsibilities were transferred to Valencia and the Canary Islands by constitutional

law (applying Article 150.2). While these seven Autonomous Communities acceded to

the maximum level of powers progressively and all at once, the remaining ten

Autonomous Communities acceded to various degrees of autonomy on the initiative of

the respective provinces or the majority of their municipal districts (a slow track

provided for in Article 143.2).

As Clark (1989) and Fusi (2000) note, this generalization of the autonomy process

attempts to dilute the effect of the rights granted to the historic nationalities, equating,

especially after the Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico (1982)

[Constitutional Law for the Harmonization of the Devolution Process], the level of

responsibilities of the historic nationalities with that of regions that did not have the

desire, the need, the disposition or the capacity to assume such responsibilities. A first

paradoxical effect of this statutory development was a dynamic of reinforcement of the

ethno-territorial identity of other regions. In this context, Andalusia also put forward its

claim as a national entity in its autonomic statute, and the regionalist identity was

strengthened in Aragón, Asturias, Canaries, Cantabria and Valencia (Hernández and

Mercadé, 1986, present monographs relating social, demographic, economic and

political structures to national-regional identities in “the Spain of the Autonomous

Communities”9).

8 The constitutional order lends itself to contradictory interpretations as regards the primordial source of legitimacy for the nationalities. On the one hand, the First Additional Order (which, in its first paragraph, "...protects and respects the historic rights of the fueros [privileged territories]") and the Second Transitory Order of the 1978 Constitution (referring to the historic nationalities as those "territories that in the past would have approved by plebiscite projects for autonomy Statutes..."), and the Additional Order of the Basque Autonomy Statute (on the continuity of the historic rights), appear to recognize that the rights derive from the historic status and precede the constitutional text. On the other hand, Article 2 of the Constitution appears to give priority to the unity of the Spanish nation (the second paragraph of the First Additional Order even restricts the first, on establishing that the restoration of the charter of rights"...shall be carried out, where applicable, within the framework of the Constitution..."), and a traditional juridical interpretation argues that the constitutional order is the origin of the rights of all citizens and supersedes the previous order, and that the fact that the historic rights are granted within the framework of the Constitution itself reflects its supremacy (see discussion in Clark, 1989). 9 In this work can be found chapters on identity and nationalism such as that of Mollà on Valencia, that of Sevilla Guzmán on Andalusia, that of Hernández Bravo on the Canaries, and even arguments in relation to the nationality question in Castilla and León, such as that made by Carretero.



The provision for the different regions to assume different responsibilities and at

different paces, and the ambiguity of the constitutional text with respect to the limits of

autonomy has meant that the quantity of responsibilities transferred (that is, the degree

of political and organizational autonomy, as well as the financing of the services

transferred) has been the object of a continuing process of re-negotiation, with all the

concomitant tensions, between the central state and the autonomous regions. As a result

of this process, the State has transferred practically all educational and health

responsibilities to the autonomous communities, while Catalonia and the Basque

Country demand further powers (see, e.g., Fusi & Palafox, 1997).

1.2. Political parties: the nationality question, European construction, youth and

gender.

One of the principal characteristics of the Spanish party system is the permanent

competition of nationwide parties and regional parties, both in general and regional

elections. The programs of all parties include direct or indirect references to the

definition of the national group (its historical justification, the people that has the right

to self-determination, the criteria of belonging to the national group, etc.), and the

centralism-regionalism dilemma in the organization of the state. Below, we shall

analyze the proposals of the political parties’ programs with respect to these issues and

to the construction of Europe. Subsequently, we shall analyze the policies of the parties

with respect to issues of gender and youth – specifically to the attention paid by these

organizations to this sector.

Given their contribution to the political culture and socialization of young people,

our analysis will focus on the parties with con parliamentary representation. The parties

that have obtained parliamentary representation are: Partido Popular [Popular Party]

(PP, in alliance with the Partido Aragonés, Unión Valenciana and Unión del Pueblo

Navarro), Partido Socialista Obrero Español [Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party]

(PSOE, including the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya and the Partido Socialista de



Euskadi-Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Socialist Party]), Izquierda Unida [United Left]

(IU, including the representation of Iniciativa per Catalunya–Els Verds in Catalonia and

of Ezker Batua in the Basque Country), Convergencia i Unió (CiU), Eusko Alderdi

Jetzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ–PNV), Bloque Nacionalista Galego

[Galician Nationalist Bloc] (BNG), Coalición Canaria [Canaries Coalition] (CC),

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [Catalan Republican Left] (ERC), Euskal

Herritarrok (EH, formerly Herri Batasuna - HB), and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA).

Given that our study will compare the configuration of social identities in Madrid, the

state capital, and in the Basque Country, this analysis will focus on the programs for the

last general elections (12-3-2000) and Basque elections (13-5-2001) of the nationwide

and Basque parties.

1.3. Analysis of content of the political programs.

1.3.1. Orientation in social and national policy.

Since the French Revolution, political discourse, cognitive schemas and actions

have been organized around attitudes to conflicting goals of social change (for the

distribution of social resources) and goals of conservation of the status quo. This

dimension has mainly reflected different concerns with economic egalitarianism and

political liberalism (valuing individual rights and freedoms, which suggests a liberal-

authoritarian dichotomy). These orientations in social policy are reflected in the

corresponding of “left” and “right” orientation in social policy, (Lipset, 1960).

The political options in the construction of nation and state suggest a second

dimension of orientation in national policy. This dimension distinguishes between

political positions supporting established nationalist movements and central state

building, on the one hand, and positions supporting rising ethno-regional national

movements, self-determination and the development of different degrees of self-

government on the other.

A content analysis of the political parties’ programs in Spanish and Basque

constituencies represented in parliament allowed us to classify reported vote according



to its Social (left vs. right) and National (central vs. regional) orientation. This party

categorization10 is presented in Table 1.1.

-------------------

Insert Table 1.1 -------------------

1.3.2. The nationality question and model of state.

The principal content on this issue in political agendas at the last general elections

was:

• Partido Popular (PP): The PP considers it a priority to preserve the subordination of

the autonomous communities to the central state as reflected in the 1978

Constitution. In its program, it makes a commitment to achieving “equivalence of

basic powers and institutions among all the autonomous communities”. This

implies, on the one hand, continuing the transfer of responsibilities in education

(including universities), health and social security, with the corresponding financing,

to the autonomous governments. This, in turn, would result in making the powers of

all regions equivalent to those of the historic regions. This development of the

autonomous regions requires “the strengthening of the organs of co-operation

between the State and the autonomous communities, with the aim of increasing their

participation and ensuring the necessary coordination between the different political

centers of decision”. However, it is proposed to respect unique aspects “that

constitute elements of identity of the nationalities and regions”. The final result is

the subordination of these identities to the Spanish national identity.

In the last Basque elections, the PP competed in conjunction with the Unión

Alavesa party. The principles of their program are reflected in the following proposals:

10 This categorization of political orientation of the parties emerges both from the analysis of their manifesto proposals and the grouping of different opinions and perceptions (such as the assessment of personal proximity to the different parties) registered in Catalonia and the Basque Country by means of a recent opinion poll by the CIS (Moral, 1998).



• Solution to the current situation of conflict: Achievement of peace in the Basque

Country in accordance with the Statute of Autonomy and within the framework of the

present Spanish Constitution, maintaining the current balance between centralism and

regional autonomy. Strictly police-orientated approach to political violence.

• Institutional development: Reform of the Parliamentary Regulations and review of

the Basque Electoral Law in order to return to the 5% threshold of votes to obtain a seat.

Map of powers to avoid duplication of functions of the four Basque administrations.

Transfer of more responsibilities of the state and the Autonomous Community to the

provincial and local councils.

• Education: Teaching of Euskera [the Basque language] through a public network of

centers with personal freedom in the learning and use of the languages of the

Community. In the current context, this proposal implies a criticism of the network of

subsidized private centers (that the PP alleges to be linked to the nationalist movement)

that play a central role in the teaching and diffusion of Euskera, and the suspension of

institutional support for the learning and use of the language. Likewise, the PP proposes

a reinforcement of the content shared with the rest of the state in the educational

curriculum (to the detriment of the Basque-oriented content in the social and human

sciences).

• Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE): The PSOE considers it a priority to

promote “from consensus, and with a federal perspective, the development of the

statutes of autonomy and the conclusion of the process of transfer”. In this context,

it proposes “the reform of the Constitution in order to make the Senate a true House

of regional representation, modifying its electoral basis and ensuring the presence in

it of the regional Governments. The new Senate would have specific functions for

promoting the real participation of the Communities and for reducing the differences

in income between them”.

The PSOE has a specific organization in the Basque Country, the Partido

Socialista de Euskadi (recently unified with Euskadiko Eskerra – EE). In the last

Basque elections, its program included the following proposals:



• Solution to the current situation of conflict: The Constitution and the Statute of the

Autonomous Communities should form the basis for any solution. Their modification

(for example, towards greater federalization of the state) can be the object of

negotiation. Policy of unity and dialogue to eliminate ETA. Firmer policing with a more

professional Basque police force (there is criticism of the supposed subordination to the

police authorities of the autonomous government and the approach of the PNV).

• Institutional development: To create an administrative structure, ascribed to the

Presidency of the Basque Government, of struggle against fascism and for the defense

of liberties. To create a Basque Democratic Institute and a Human Rights Directorate in

the Department of Education, Universities and Research. Finally, to establish a policy of

development of the Statute and its institutions.

• Education: Educational policy to stop terrorism. Establishment of a day for freedom

throughout the educational system, and all schools to ratify the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. Support measures for families in which there are detected violent

attitudes and behaviors.

• United Left (IU): Proposes a reinforcement of the federal organization that reflects

the multinational, democratic and supportive character of the state. The regional

parliaments should play a central role in this process. The federal model advocated

would oblige “profound reform of the Spanish Constitution” through an institutional

pact. The new Constitution should recognize “the multinational, multi-regional,

multi-cultural and multi-lingual culture of the State”. The federal State would make

necessary a transformation of the Senate into “a true House of regional

representation that reflected the multinational and multi-regional character of the

peoples making up the Spanish State”. The program distinguishes between powers

exclusive to the federal State, exclusive to the federated regions, and shared. IU also

defends the recognition of the right to self-determination “both to respect those that

do not wish to become involved in the federation project and to channel the will for

federalization in the peoples of the Spanish State”.



In the last Basque elections, Ezker Batua (the IU organization in the Basque

Country) reflected this content in the following proposals:

• Solution to the current situation of conflict: Right to self-determination for the

Basque Country and a federal organization of the state that promotes inter-regional

solidarity.

• Institutional development: Transfer of all powers to the Basque Administration,

modification or derogation of State laws that conflict with the regional ones, reform of

the Senate both in its system of election and in its functions, and a reduction of the

Administration of the State in the Basque Country.

• Education: Recognition of the multi-lingual nature of the federal state,

strengthening of the public communications media, development of programs in

regional languages in each Community on the private channels and the possibility of all

regional TV channels being accessible in all Communities of the State.

• Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV): The program reflects the agreements reached in

1998 between the principal nationalist political organizations with regional bases

(Convergencia i Unió de Cataluña, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, and the Partido

Nacionalista Vasco). The PNV proposes converting these accords into

parliamentary initiatives, whose objective is the development of “a model of a

multinational, multicultural and multi-lingual State”. This model would be

developed “ based on the projects of emancipation formulated in Galicia, the Basque

Country and Catalonia, conceiving the self-determination process of the Galician,

Catalan and Basque peoples as a pacific and democratic process”. For the PNV, “the

Parliaments of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia are the Houses in which

the popular sovereignty of the Galicians, Basques and Catalans resides”.

The model of self-government proposed is different from the current one in the

Spain of the Autonomous Communities, “... in that it should be constructed on a

bilateral basis that guarantees two basic principles: the effective participation of the

Basque public powers in the decisions adopted by the State that affect the Basque

Country and the guarantee of non-interference in the Basque Country by organs of the



State in which the Basque public powers have not participated”. The program defends

the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Basque Country within the framework of the

Constitution and by virtue of the current financing agreement with the State, and

proposes the direct presence of the Basque Government in the EU organs that affect the

region.

In the last Basque elections, this content was reflected in the following proposals:

• Solution to the current situation of conflict: Unequivocal and firm rejection of

political violence. Demand to ETA to definitively renounce the use of arms.

• Institutional development: Right of the Basque Country to have its own powers in

socioeconomic and work areas, in fiscal matters and in education and culture, and a

presence and voice in international issues; promotion of the necessary changes in the

framework of self-government, bearing in mind the changing circumstances of the

process of European construction.

• Education: Educational projects that transmit, set down and generate universal

democratic values. Cultural policy with a plural and cohesive orientation. Drawing up

of a Basque Culture Project, a Basque National Library and a Basque National History

Archive.

• Eusko Alkartasuna (EA): This is a nationalist party with social-democratic

principles that emerged from a split in the PNV in 1986. EA supports the right to

sovereign self-determination and the independence of the reunified Basque Country

(including Navarre and the historic territories in France in a federal or confederal

state) by pacific and democratic means. It proposes a civic and integrating

nationalism that combines nationalist values with the construction of a plural society

incorporated in Europe.

• Solution to the current situation of conflict: It proposes the adoption of political

initiatives for pacification, demanding ETA to call a truce in favor of dialogue and

negotiation.

• Institutional development: Reinforcement of the Basque institutions (parliament and

government) over and above the provincial bodies.



• Education: Promotion of a language policy for the normalization of Euskera as the

national language. Humanization of the conflict, developing a culture of peace.

• Euskal Herritarrok (EH): This is a political front that links the self-determination of

the Basque people to the revolutionary construction of a socialist society throughout

the Basque Country (including the historic territories in Spain and France). On the

one hand, the influence of this conception reflects the beliefs of, and is amplified by,

a wide variety of radical groups and social movements in the Basque Country. On

the other hand, it supports armed struggle as a means of political action, justifying

the violent actions of ETA. EH substituted, widening the political base, the Herri

Batasuna (now Batasuna) party after the detention of the executive committee of this

organization on charges of collaboration with ETA.

• Solution to the current situation of conflict: It proposes a National Agreement for

Sovereignty that deals with the organization of Basque society as its sole political

subject, with all the rights admitted by international legislation.

• Institutional development: It rejects the current Autonomous Parliament in Vitoria

and proposes the creation of an Assembly of the Basque People (Udalbiltza), a Cámara

de Herrialdes (an assembly of representatives from the historic provinces in Spain and

France) and a Constituent National Assembly.

• Education: Promotion of teaching in Euskera and the creation of a Basque National

University. Reinforcement of the national identity through the creation of institutions

such as the National Library, the Academia de la Historia de Euskal Herria [Academy

of the History of the Basque Country], and prioritization of support for projects

developed in the Basque language.

1.3.3. European construction.

There is no explicit reference to the construction of a European identity in any of

the political programs analyzed.

Gema

No tenemos información



1.3.4. Attention to youth and youth movements.

The programs analyzed generally include a section proposing action to improve

the cultural, social and employment situation of young people. In general, there is no

explicit inclusion of specific content related to associationism and the political

participation of young people or their integration in the national movement.

Nevertheless, while the state-orientated parties tend to have only a political-

organizational structure (secretariat) for youth, there are youth movements of significant

size linked to regional nationalism (Eusko Gaztedi-EGI to the PNV, Gazte Abertzaleak

to EA, and Jarrai to EH). These movements carry out socio-cultural and educational

activities, paying special attention to the development of the Basque national identity

and, in the case of Jarrai, participating actively and notoriously in confrontations and

actions of political violence in the Basque Country.

1.3.5. Citizens’ socialization and gender.

All of the programs analyzed include proposals for improving the status of women

in society within the framework of policies for gender equality. The only differential

references in the area of political socialization are the quotas (40%) for women in the

electoral lists of the PSOE and IU, and the proposal by IU to include the subject

“education for equality” in the educational curriculum for pupils aged 7 to 16 (minimum

school-leaving age).

1.4. Electoral results.

1.4.1 General Elections.

Table 1.1 summarizes the results of the parties that obtained representation at the

last general elections (3-3-1996 and 12-3-2000) for the State parliament. Results are

shown for the state as a whole and the regions of Madrid and the Basque Country.

Gema

Falta información Informe Juventud 2001 INJUVE y 2000 País Vasco



------------------ Insert Table 1.2 -------------------

The table shows, firstly, that in Madrid only state-oriented parties obtain

representation, and that the distribution of votes in this region is close to that for the

state as a whole (with a higher proportion of votes for the PP and IU). The distribution

of the vote in the Basque Country is clearly different: three regional parties obtain

representation and are “relevant” in the state political arena. The distribution of the vote

differs from that seen in the general results, since the most voted option is the Partido

Nacionalista Vasco, followed quite closely by a state-oriented party (PP or PSOE,

depending on the election), and the difference in vote between the parties coming first

and second is much smaller. The increase in the PP vote from the general election of

1996 to that of 2000 is greater in this region than in the state as a whole, and is

accompanied by the reinforcement of the PNV, resulting in a substantial increase in the

center-right vote.

1.4.2 Regional Elections.

Madrid. The vote in the Autonomous Community of Madrid is concentrated in the

state-orientated parties, as there are no relevant regionalist parties. Thus, the parties

differ only in their social policy orientation: PSOE and IU representing the left and PP

representing the center-right.

The regional election vote in Madrid, see Table 1.3, is similar to the vote in the

general elections, both in terms of distribution of votes and in general tendencies.

------------------ Insert Table 1.3 ------------------



Basque Country. The distribution of the vote in the Autonomous Community of

the Basque Country, together with that of Navarre, is notable , in comparison with Spain

as a whole, for the large number of political parties that compete with relative success

and electoral continuity (seven parties obtain representation in the regional parliament).

This political pluralism is articulated in the two independent dimensions of orientation

in social policy (left vs. right) and in national policy (state/regionalist vs.

regionalist/nationalist), defining a considerable variety of political spaces (Llera Ramo,

2000): PNV, EA, PP and UA with center-right orientation; PSE, EE, IU/EB and HB

with left orientation; PNV, EA, HB and EE with regional-national orientation; and PSE,

PP, UA, and IU/EB with state-regional orientation.

In Table 1.4 there can be seen a decreasing tendency in the regional-nationalist

vote and an increasing tendency in the center-right vote in the last three elections.

Likewise, we can observe that the vote for regional-nationalist parties is greater in the

regional elections than in the general elections. This “dual vote” reflects the existence of

a voting population that chooses a regional-nationalist option in the regional elections

and a State option in the general elections. --------------------- Insert Table 1.4 ---------------------

Finally, Table 1.5 shows that the state vote is greater in the province of Álava,

while the regional-nationalist vote is greater in Vizcaya and, especially, in Guipúzcoa

(in the latter, with substantial support for EH).

--------------------- Insert Table 1.5 ------------------



2. Political Participation

Political participation by young people takes place both in institutional and non-

institutional, formal and informal frameworks. In a previous chapter we have analyzed

the participation of youth in social and political associations and movements. The aim

of this chapter is to analize the participation in electoral processes.

2.1. Electoral participation in Spain

For any international comparison of participation and abstention in electoral

processes, it should be borne in mind that Spain has a long tradition of electoral

abstention (Justel, 1990; Montero 1984). Thus, high levels of electoral abstention could

be interpreted both as a questioning of the democratic system and as the expression of

this historical pattern.

Surveys that aim to explain electoral participation and abstention tend to focus on

identifying the profile of those who abstain. These surveys show that abstention is

associated with sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, marital status,

educational level, occupational status or income level (Justel, 1990). Ros, Grad, Alvaro

and Garrido (1993) concluded that the trend for abstention decreased with age; was

higher among single people than married, separated and divorced people; was higher

level among manual workers and employees than among managers; decreased at high

income levels and of religiosity. Finally, they point out that abstention behaviour is

associated with a configuration of post-materialist personal values (giving priority,

specifically, to Openness To Change and Hedonism values), insofar as the value

configuration of voters is characterized by conservative and materialist orientations,

which support social system (giving priority to Security and Achievement values).



Ros, Grad, Alvaro and Garrido (1993) also asked about reasons for not voting.

The most frequently reported reason for abstention was indifference or apathy (25%),

followed by the absence of the electoral district or illness (16%), lack of identification

with existing political options (14%) and disappointment or disenchantment (13%).

These authors stressed the need to distinguish between attitudes of apathy or lack of

interest and particular forms of active abstention (more and more frequent among some

sectors of the population, such as young people), which imply a critical position with

respect to the political system - so that they can be considered as a special form of

political participation, even though they result in lack of electoral participation.

2.1.1. Participation and abstention among young people

In order to study political participation in Spanish youth, we analyzed the post-

electoral surveys carried out by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de

Investigaciones Sociologicas, CIS) at the last general elections (199611 and 200012).

CIS (2000b) shows that young people present the stronger trend for abstention

among those interviewed. Sixty-nine percent of interviewees in the age range 18-25

reported having participated in the elections, as against a mean participation of 83% for

all age groups (actual participation at these elections was 69%). No significant

differences were found according to gender.

Also, those who reported abstention were asked when and why they decided not to

vote. We shall draw attention to the fact that among the 22% of interviewees reporting

abstention, 28% of men and 33% of women stated that they “never voted” - when asked

about when they made the decision. As regards the reasons for abstention, those most

frequently reported were: “there is no alternative that satisfies me”, “neither parties nor

11 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,210: Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andalucia, 1996. Representative sample of Spain (N= 5,350, including N=635 at Madrid region and N=280 at the Basque Country). 12Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,.384: Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andaluicia,, 2000. Representative sample of Spain (N= 5,600, including N=694 at Madrid Region and N=270 at the Basque Country).



politicians inspire confidence in me” (this reason is less frequently reported by women),

and “it doesn’t matter whether you vote or you don’t, it is worthless”. An additional

reason, “to show my displeasure” was frequently reported among the total population

but not among the young people.

-------------------------

Insert Tables 2.1 & 2.2

-------------------------

It should be stressed that the rate of electoral participation among young people

(aged 18 to 25) according to the survey of 2000 (69%), is significantly lower than that

reported by the post-electoral study of 1996 (79%) – see Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

Analyzing by region the post-electoral survey of 2000, in the Madrid Region, 90%

of young men interviewed reported having voted, as against 69% of young women. The

reported participation rates were much lower in the Basque Country, 28% among young

men and 41% among young women. Moreover, whilst these participation rates were

similar to those of the post-electoral survey of 1996 in the Madrid Region, the rates in

the Basque Country were much lower than in 1996 (55% for men and 67% for women).

-------------------------

Insert Table 2.3

-------------------------

2.2. Reported vote to political parties

Continuing with the post-electoral survey by CIS (2000b), the figures of vote for

Spain were: 42.7% of young people between 18 and 24 (42.0% among men and 43.5%

among women) reported having voted for the Popular Party (Partido Popular - PP),

28.4% (23.2% and 33.6%, respectively) for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party

(Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE), and 9.2% (13.4% and 4.9%) for the



United Left (Izquierda Unida - IU). These vote figures were very similar to those of

total sample (all age groups), with the exception of a slightly higher percentage of

reported vote for IU. It is noteworthy that young women reported a vote closer to the

political centre (reported vote to IU was higher among young men while the reported

vote for PSOE was higher among young women).

The sample size of these CIS studies does not allow us to carry out an analysis by

region of the reported vote for the different political parties in the age range 18-25. For

all age groups, the distribution of reported vote in Madrid was: 50.2% for PP, 31.7% for

PSOE, and 12.3% for IU. In the Basque Country, it is worthwhile to note that a high

percentage of interviewees were reluctant to report their vote (40%), which may reflect

a certain political climate of fear and/or polarization in the region. Furthermore, 37.9%

of interviewees reported having voted for the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido

Nacionalista Vasco - PNV), 19.0% for PP, 12.7% for PSOE, 9.8% for Basque Alliance

(Eusko Alkartasuna - EA) and 9.0% for IU. The gap between reported vote and actual

electoral results was significantly larger in the Basque Country. There, the reported was

greater than actual participation; furthermore, the reported was smaller than the actual

electoral results for PP and PSOE, and was greater for IU and PNV (see Table 2.3). This

gap may also be attributed to the political tension between regional nationalists and

supporters of a centralized Spain in the Basque Country. This feature of the local

political culture should be taken into account in the design of any study in the region.

3. The Multiplicity of Social Identities.

Identities can be considered to be articulated at various levels. Tajfel (1978)

distinguishes between personal identity and social identity. While personal identity is

the result of our personal and idiosyncratic experiences in particular contexts, such as

having a type of personality, supporting a sports team or being single or married, social

identity is that which allows us to identify ourselves with wider social categories, such



as man or woman, Spaniard or Scotsman, European or citizen of the planet earth. While

personal identity tends to be the result of our frequent, intense and face-to-face

interactions with people from the most immediate contexts, such as those of the family

or friends, social identities tend to be the result of our identification with wider, abstract

entities that revolve around a consensus or social norm, and for which face-to-face

interaction with all its members is not necessary in order to identify with the social

category in question; in this category we would include the social identities of gender

and local, regional, national and European identities. But people have multiple personal

and social identities, and consequently the activation of each of one of these personal

and social identities, according to Turner’s (1985) theory of social categorization, would

depend on one’s fit with the environment. This fit means, according to the theory, that

those identities most important for defining the situation are activated. Therefore, the

multiplicity of our identities is a form of psychological adjustment to more interpersonal

or more social situations.

We shall continue by reviewing the studies carried out in Spain on the importance

given by youth to groups that contribute to the development of their personal identity,

and of the studies that analyze the relative importance of their psychological

relationship to more political social identities, such as region, nation or Europe.

3.1. Personal Identities.

According to theories of human development, the family and friends are the

groups that in all societies have the earliest and most persistent socializing impact in the

shaping of the person. In Spain, Elzo and Orizo (1999) 13carried out a representative

study of young Spaniards aged 15 to 24. They asked these young people about the

degree of importance they gave to the family, friends, work, wining money, leisure and

free time. They rated the family in first place, followed by friends. They were also asked

about the proximity or distance they perceived between their family and themselves in

attitudes towards work, the family, money, leisure, sex, politics, relationships and the

role of women. The intergenerational distance between parents and children measured

13 Study carried out with a sample of 3, 855 young Spaniards by means of personal interviews.



as differences in attitudes or ways of thinking is greater among 15 to 17-year-olds than

among those aged 21 to 24.

Moreover, when young people are faced with problems and difficulties, the

majority, especially women, tend to turn to others for help. In the study by Cruz and

Santiago (1998)14, a sample of young people representative on a nationwide scale

indicated that men are more likely to try and solve problems alone. When they need

help, men tend to ask for it first from their friends and then from their parents; women,

on the other hand, choose first their mother, followed by their partner and their friends.

Friends are the most important support group for young people aged 15 to 24, after this

period friends are substituted in priority by one’s partner. None of the studies reviewed

made a comparison between identification with the family and friends and identification

with other social identities of a national and European scope.

3.2. Social identities.

We reviewed the studies that compare local identities with more cosmopolitan

ones. Local identities, refer to identification with village, town/city, province or region,

whilst more cosmopolitan identities tend to include State-national identity and European

identity. As we shall see, in the majority of cases, the dynamic of these identities is dealt

with in a dual or exclusive way, and there are few studies that deal with the dynamic of

these identities independently.

Indeed, we found only one study that makes a comparison of identification with

one’s Autonomous Community, with Spain and with Europe.

3.2.1. Localism/Cosmopolitanism.

Moral (1998), in a representative study on a national scale and in eight

Autonomous Communities15, found two factors of ethnoterritorial identification:

14 Study with national scope carried out with 2,474 young people aged 15 to 29. 15 Study carried out in 1996 with a sample of 2,500 interviews, distributed proportionally throughout the seventeen ACs (excluding Ceuta and Melilla), and which was extended in the eight ACs with their own



localism is a factor that reflects identification with the closest and most specific ambits,

such as village, town/city, province or Autonomous Community (from now on AC),

while cosmopolitanism implies identification with more abstract and distant ambits,

such as Spain or the European Union (EU)16. Responses from the AC of Madrid place

in first position the Spanish identity and in last position the European one. In the Basque

Country, however, local identity is placed first, and European identity again comes last.

Those aged 15 to 29, as is the case for the population as a whole, identify more with

closer and more specific ambits (village, town/city, province and AC) than with the

more cosmopolitan ones such as the EU. Level of cosmopolitanism is somewhat higher

among young people with a university education (Moral and Mateos, 1999)17.

In order to define ethnoterritorial belonging, young people refer above all to

subjective elements (feeling like a member of that group) and awareness elements

(living in that territory and feeling like a member of that group). This combination of

subjective and pragmatic elements is more accentuated among those that attribute a

national identity to the group to which they belong, and among those with higher

educational levels, younger subjects (15-19-year-olds) and those with a left political

orientation. Those with lower educational level, and with an extreme right political

ideology, prefer an ethnic membership that implies having been born in the territory and

being the child of citizens of that territory.

Moreover, little internal mobility is observed. Though 80% of young people were

born in the AC in which they currently live, in the Basque Country the figure is 72%,

while in Madrid it is only 58%. Young immigrants identify more with their community

of residence than with that of their birth (Moral and Mateos, 1999).

3.2.2. Autonomous Community Identity and National Identity.

language (Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencia Community, Galicia, Navarre and the Basque Country) or a significant presence of nationalist representation (Andalusia and Canaries). The sample is representative both at a national level and for these eight Communities, in which a minimum of 300 interviews was set. 16 Anderson (1991) discusses the imagined character of the representation of the national communities. 17 The study by Moral and Mateos 1999 was carried out in 1997. Study representative on a national scale of the Spanish population of both sexes aged 15 to 19. 2,437 interviews throughout the 270 municipal districts and 48 provinces. The sampling was multi-staged and stratified by clusters, first municipal districts, then sections and finally individuals by random routes and with sex and age quotas.



In general, the measurement of AC and national identification is carried out by

means of three measurement procedures that reflect different theoretical conceptions of

the dynamic of these identities.

One of the ways of approaching identification with one’s AC and with Spain is

through the procedure used by Moreno (1988). This procedure implies that young

people can identify either exclusively with each of the national or AC identities or in a

combined way with both of them, but in no case does it register the intensity of the

identifications. In the study by Moral and Mateos (1999), young people have a dual

identification (with Spain and with their AC to a greater extent than the general

population (55% as against 50%), and this tendency is even more marked among

women. Educational level and political ideology affect these results in the sense that the

higher the educational level and the more leftward the political orientation, the greater

the national – AC orientation, while the lower the educational level and the more

rightward the political orientation, the greater the national – Spanish orientation.

The Basque Country differs from Madrid in that there is more identification with

one’s province and Autonomous Community. On the one hand, three out of four voters

of Basque nationalist parties identify first with their village or town/city and none

claims to identify first with Spain. On the other hand, although localism also

predominates, among the voters of State-scope parties, identification with Spain

displaces to third position the identification with Autonomous Community (Smolzka,

1999)18.

A second way of measuring these two identities is through independent

identification scales that indicate the direction and intensity of the two types of

identification and allow their subsequent intertwined combination. Their relational

combination is referred to as comparative identity. This can be high when AC

identification predominates, null when the two identities have the same intensity and

low when state identity predominates over AC identity. The Basque Country is

characterized by high comparative identity, that is, identification with AC is greater than

18 Study representative of the Spanish population of both sexes and of age 18 or over. 2,500 interviews were distributed proportionally throughout 168 municipal districts of 46 provinces corresponding to 17 Autonomous Communities.



identification with Spain. One of the consequences of this high comparative identity is

the tendency to positive ingroup differentiation and the adoption of acultural separation

strategies (Ros, Huici and Gómez 2000)

A third form of measuring Spanish national identification considers its emotional

component. In the study by Moral and Mateos (1999), this component is measured as

the degree of pride one feels to be Spanish. While in the Autonomous Community of

Madrid more than 80% feel proud to be Spanish, in the Basque Country the figure

reaches only 33%. On comparing the level of pride felt for Spain and for one’s AC, the

results are clear. In the Basque Country people feel prouder of being Basque than

Spanish, while in Madrid the opposite is found. Moreover, while only one in four young

Basques interviewed consider that Spain is their country or nation, this idea is supported

by the majority of young people from Madrid.

Some studies analyze the relative importance of the determinant factors of the

national character of an AC. Moral (1998) reports that for the Basque Country the

language factor, the ethnic factor and the historical factor are, in that order, the most

important determining factors of the national character of an AC. Other studies focus on

the importance of the vitality of the language for the social identity of these

communities (Ros, Bourhis and Azurmendi 1999, Sigúan 1999). In our country the

1978 Constitution recognized, together with Spanish or Castilian, as the national

language of the State, the co-officiality of Catalan, Basque and Galician in their

respective Autonomous Communities. The adoption of policies of revitalization of the

use of regional languages in education, work, the mass media and public institutions has

increased the importance of these languages in the definition of the AC national

identity. Ros, Cano and Huici (1987) show that Catalan and Basque constitute

differentiating elements of the social identity of Catalans and Basques. Moreover,

young people with high comparative identity explain the use of these regional

languages, as against the use of Spanish, from the point of view of ingroup

identification (Ros, Huici and Cano, 1994).



Grad (2001a) considers that the implications of these identities are different in

political cultures that stress civic or ethnic elements in the social representation of the

national group. While identification with a civic identity (such as that of Catalonia) is

accompanied by the attribution of greater relative importance to prosocial universalist

values (equality, social justice, world peace) versus the importance of values of

benevolence (prosocial values that are applied in a particularist way, favoring the

endonational group, such as helping, honesty, or the ability to forgive), identification

with an ethnic identity (such as the Basque one) correlates with the relative importance

of particularist prosocial values versus universalist ones. Likewise, Grad and Ros (1998)

show that ethnic (Basque) national identity is incompatible with the Spanish identity,

while civic identity (Catalan) is compatible with it. In a similar line, ethnic identity is

associated with a higher intensity of comparative identity (in the Basque Country) than

civic identity (in Catalonia). Moreover, immigrants into nationalist cultures with an

ethnic basis appear to need identification with the dominant identity for their social

integration (Grad, 2001b).

3.2.3. National and European Identity.

Studies that compare national identity with European identity usually employ a

procedure similar to that of Moreno (1988). This procedure consists in differentiating

exclusively national or supranational identities from combined identities. Interviewees

had to choose one of these four possibilities: “just national”, “your own nationality and

European”, “European and national” or “just European”. The predominant form of

identity in the European population is one’s own nationality or a combination of one’s

own nationality and European. Spaniards are above the European mean in feeling only

European (Eurobarometer n.47 and 47.2, 1997).

In the study by Smolzka (1999), subjects were asked whether they felt: “above all

a European citizen”, “above all a Spanish citizen”, “A European citizen and Spanish at

the same time” or “none of the above answers”. The Spanish population interviewed

opted mainly for Spanish citizenship (67.8%), followed by dual Spanish and European



citizenship (19.2%), none of these (6.7%), and above all a European citizen (5.8%)

Those interviewed in the Autonomous Community of Madrid differed from the national

mean in that a lower percentage chose Spanish citizenship (66%), more chose dual

Spanish-European citizenship (28%) and fewer chose European only (3.8%), while in

the Basque Country the “only European” figure was higher (15.7%), Spanish citizenship

(34%) and dual citizenship (17.6%) were lower, and the lack of identification with

these social categories was significantly higher (34%).

Young Spaniards (aged 18 to 24), like the other age groups, mainly choose

Spanish citizenship (61.4%); however, they differ from the other age groups in that

more of them choose dual Spanish and European citizenship (25.7%) and more (8.5%)

choose “none of the above answers”. European citizenship alone, though the option

least chosen, is the most popular among those aged 35 to 44 (8.5%). As age increases

(from 45 years on), Spanish identification increases and dual identification decreases

(Smolzka, 1999).

Comparative identity has also been applied to the comparative analysis of national

regional identity and European identity. Huici et al (1997) analyzed the European

identity of young people as a function of comparative identity (national/regional

community). In a study comparing young university students in Scotland (GB) and

Andalusia (Spain), these researchers found that in Scotland, where regional identity is

more salient, European identification is associated with beliefs in changes in the

political relations of the region with the nation. On the other hand, in Andalusia, where

regional identity is less important, European identification is not associated with this

type of belief. Thus, beliefs associated with the European identity appear to be related to

the dynamic of the relations between national and autonomous region identity.

The content of the European identity has been studied through the meaning

Europe has, by means of questions with closed answers. For young people the meaning

of Europe is related, first, to the ability to go wherever one wants within Europe (35%);

second, to a way of creating a better future for young people (34%); and third, as a form

of improving the economic situation in the EU (34%). Spain differs in that it scores



below the mean in seeing Europe as helping freedom of movement, creating jobs and

guaranteeing peace (Eurobarometer 47, 1997).

4. Civic Citizenship and Associationism.

4.1. Foundations of Citizenship.

Marshall (1997) defines three aspects of citizenship: civil, political and social.

Civil citizenship is composed of rights necessary for individual liberty, and the courts of

justice are the institutions that best represent it. Political citizenship consists

fundamentally in the right to participate in the exercise of political power as a voter, and

also as a member of bodies of political authority. It is linked in a direct way with the

appearance of parliamentary institutions, and is associated with democratization

processes. Lastly, social citizenship implies the right to participate in the standard of

living that prevails in each particular society, which covers a range of aspects from the

right to a minimum economic well being to one’s security. These rights are guaranteed

mainly through the social services and the educational system, and historically have

given rise to the Welfare State.

Youth is the stage of life at which individuals begin to acquire the rights

associated with membership of a community. Civil and political rights are attributed

largely with one’s coming of age, though social rights are not necessarily linked to a

legal adulthood threshold. In Spain, young people from the age of 16 have the right to

work, to administer their income and to get married, and are considered penally

responsible. At age 18 their legal capacity is extended, as they receive the right to vote,

to sign contracts, to sell property, etc., while in the area of social rights the pace is

slower, since they must reach 25 before being able to accede to the system of minimum

wages.

More recently, Turner (1993) defined citizenship as a set of practices that define a

person as a competent member of a society. The learning of citizenship consists in the



learning of the norms, values, abilities and skills that permit one to behave as a

responsible citizen. The good citizen is one who feels part of the community, respects

and tolerates the diversity of its members and is committed in a responsible way to its

functioning. Moran and Benedicto (2000)19 analyze three aspects of citizenship among

young people: the values of interpersonal trust and tolerance, civic morals, and the

degree of social justice in the sociopolitical system. Two out of three young Spaniards

between 15 and 29 are of the opinion that “one can never be too careful where others

are concerned”. Such mistrust decreases as the educational level of young people rises.

Thus, the civic links established by young people lack the cohesive strength that

provides social trust. Nevertheless, tolerance towards others has become one of the

trademarks of their civic orientations. Secondly, the moral reprobation of young people

is quite strict with aspects that affect negatively and directly the members of the

community, while moral permissiveness increases in response to negative behaviors in

citizen-State relationships, such as tax evasion or failing to pay traffic fines.

Finally, sociopolitical criticism is highly intense. Three out of four young people

consider Spanish society to be unjust. Between 60% and 70% of young people consider

labor conflict and inequality in the distribution of social welfare as serious or very

serious conflicts. According to these authors, these factors hinder the active

participation of young people in the public sphere. Moreover, in the last two decades

there has been increased interest among young people in the conditions in which their

individual biography develops, rather than in political participation (Alvarez, Azofra

and Cuesta, 1999).

In this context, it is not surprising that the Spanish population manifests a very

low tendency for associative behavior. To the question of whether the respondent is a

member of different associations, from 1995 to 2001 the data show constantly low

levels of association (CIS, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001)20. The highest level tends

to be around 10% for citizens’ associations, sports groups and local and regional

19 Data from the survey carried out by Orizo (1995), who used a sample of 2,530 young people, representative in the national ambit of young people aged 15 to 24. 20 Representative studies at national level and also by gender. The CIS study of 1995 is study # 2154, with an N of 3976. The 1996 CIS study is # 2.206, carried out with 2486 subjects. The 1997 CIS study is # 2240, carried out with 2,490 subjects. The 1998 CIS study is # 2286, carried out with an N of 9,988 subjects . Finally, the 2001 CIS study is # 2419, carried out with an N of 2,493 interviewees.



societies, and the lowest is around 1.5 % for ecologists’, pacifists’ or women’s

movements21.

-------------------- Insert Table 3.1 --------------------

Young people aged 18 to 24 differ from the older groups in that they are more

likely to be affiliated to sports and cultural groups, local and regional societies, and

educational and youth groups, and in that they are the least likely to be affiliated to

political parties and trade unions. Moreover, since 1998 their association with political

parties and trade unions has decreased significantly in relation to other age groups22.

-------------------------------- Insert Table 3.2 & Figure I --------------------------------

The data for the Basque Country on registers of associations shows a similar

tendency of predominance of sports and cultural associations (54.8%) versus political

associations (10.4%); nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the relative level of

political associationism in the Basque Country is much higher than the Spanish mean

for the same year (Eustat, 2001)23. González (2000) also provides evidence of a low

level of associationism in young people aged 15 to 25, on analyzing data from the

survey by Elzo and Orizo (1999). However, there is a notable and highly favorable

attitude in these same young people to movements for: human rights, aids victims,

ecology, pacifism and women’s support; however, the antecedents of this discrepancy

between attitude and conduct are not studied. In line with the results of the CIS surveys

mentioned above, the studio by Elzo and Orizo (1999) also finds that young men aged

18 to 24 show a tendency to participate more than women in political parties, trades

unions and sports associations.

21 See Table 3.1 22 See Table 3.2 23 The register of Associations of the Basque Country for the year 2000 included 25,832 associations. 54.8% were devoted to Cultural and Sports activities, 14.4% to Political and Socioeconomic activities, 10.9% to activities related to Education, 5.6% to Neighborhood activities, 5.4% to Charitable activities, 5% to Consumer activities and 3.7% to Leisure and Free Time.



The Report on Spanish Youth (2000)24 also reflects, first, the low level of

participation of young people in political associations and social movements in Spain. A

breakdown of this data by region, see Table 3.3, shows that membership of political

parties and trades unions in the Basque Country, 3.7% and 3.1% respectively, is greater

than in Madrid, where membership is 1.2% for parties and 1.9% for trades unions. The

same is not true for social movements (Human Rights, Pacifists, Feminists and

Ecologists), for which Madrid shows a membership index higher than that of the

Basque Country, with the exception of feminist associations. With respect to

interviewees claiming to participate in sociocultural associations, the Basque and

Madrid means are similar, except that more of those interviewed in the Basque Country

participate in youth clubs.

--------------------- Insert Table 3.3 ---------------------- While participation in political movements tends to increase with age,

participation in social associations begins to decrease in the age range 21-24.

Participation in sociocultural associations, on the other hand, shows no relationship. In

the regional ambit, it is important to point out the higher percentage of membership of

political parties in those aged 15 to 17 in the Basque Country. In Madrid, on the other

hand, no participation in these associations is appreciated until age 18. The greater

participation found in the sample of young Basques might be attributable to a higher

level of politicization and everyday mobilization, as well as the existence of politically

active and committed youth organizations.

Analysis by gender shows that the participation of young women in political

organizations is much lower than that of men. Women appear more likely to opt for

associations with social content or aimed at helping others.

With regard to the relationship between type of association and young people’s

perception of their position on the ideological spectrum, it is noteworthy that those

positioning themselves on the left show a greater tendency for participation both in

24 See Table 3.3.



political and social associations. In contrast, those young people that place themselves

on the right belong mainly to associations of a sociocultural nature.

In this context, we can observe a greater identification of young Basques with

the left of the scale (40.9%) as compared to young people in Madrid (31.7%). In Madrid

no relevant differences are observed with regard to perception of ideological position by

gender or age. However, in the Basque Country there would exist, on the one hand, a

higher proportion of men on the left as against a more central ideological self-

perception among women and, on the other, an increase in the age of men placing

themselves on the left25.

----------------------- Insert Table 3.4 ------------------------

4.2. European Citizenship.

The Treaty of Maastricht saw a broadening of European citizenship to the

adoption of political rights and rights of freedom of movement and residence. Thus, the

concept of civic belonging by right was extended to belonging by participation in a

transnational identity. Nevertheless, post-Amsterdam European citizenship has not

replaced national citizenship; State institutions have not been created, nor State action

policies. And in consequence the practice of citizenship related to this union has

generated a fragmented kind of citizenship (Wienar, 1997).

Eight out of ten Europeans knew in 1997 of their right to study and or work in any

other European country, while only four out of ten Europeans knew of their right to

travel without customs formalities and to vote in local elections in their country of

residence, their non-obligation to declare articles bought in another European country

and their right to work in any part of the EU without a work permit. People would like

to know more about some other aspects. For example, about the purchase of articles in

other European countries; about the procedures for starting a business in another

country; about the rules on the right to vote; about how to become a candidate both for

25 See Table 3.4.



local and for European elections; and about reimbursement of emergency medical costs

incurred in another member state (Eurobarometer, n. 47, 1997).

Citizenship as an active learning process extends throughout life, and this process

can be defined through the acquisition of the knowledge and practices for becoming

socially committed, responsible and effective individuals (Holford, 2001). We know of

no other studies that analyze in the form of a comparison the educational content that is

transmitted in order to reinforce European citizenship in the EU member states.

4.3 Attitudes to European Construction.

Spaniards’ attitude to the EU is positive. The majority of Spaniards (64%) are in

favor of European construction. Only 12.5% claim that they are opposed to it, while

18.5% are indifferent. A comparison of this attitude with that expressed in 1994 shows a

clear increase in the favorability towards the EU and a stabilizing of opposition. The

Basque Country has a somewhat more favorable attitude than Madrid towards European

integration. Men are also more favorable than women. Young people aged 18 to 34 are

much more favorable than those of 55 and over. Finally, the higher the educational level

the more favorable the attitude towards the EU. This favorable attitude towards the EU

is explained, in 60% of cases, by a set of factors, the most important of which include

feeling upset at the idea of the dissolution of the EU and the belief that if Spain were

not part of the EU things would be worse for it (Smolzka, 1999).

Being able to work, live and study in any of the 15 member states is the principal

advantage young people see in their European citizenship. This is followed by access to

health and social services and the right to vote in local and national elections in any

member country (Eurobarometer 55, 2001).

According to the Eurobarometer (47.2, 1997), the higher the educational level,

more likely young people are to see these positive effects. The most negative effects are

the difficulties for making decisions due to the increase in the number of countries that

have joined the EU, and the increase in social problems and unemployment. Young



Spaniards differ from young people in the rest of Europe in that they believe they have

less mobility than those from other countries and that the EU has increased

unemployment. They also differ in that fewer of them believe it more difficult for the

EU to make decisions with the increased membership and that more of them believe the

EU has contributed to better quality of life for most people and the achievement of

greater equality between men and women.

Employment, the environment and investment in research and development are

the three priorities that young people see for Europe. Young Spaniards, however, in line

with their perception of their less freedom of movement for studying, living and

working in other European member states, place this aspect second in their list of

priorities (Eurobarometer, 47.2, 1997).

Szmolka’s (1999) study reports that Spaniards trust the Spanish government more

than the EU to solve the unemployment problem. While Madrid follows the national

profile, the Basque Country is less confident than the rest in the Spanish government,

more confident than the rest in the EU, and also less confident than the rest in both

institutions. Young people aged 18-24 are less confident than the other age groups in the

Spanish government and more in the EU, but it also has the highest proportion of people

who expresses least confidence in both social identities. Men and those with the highest

educational levels are those that show most confidence in the EU.

5. Immigration, Xenophobia and Racism

5.1. Legislation.

The Immigration Law of 1999, modified in 2000, represented an advance against

discrimination, as compared to the previous law passed in 1985. This first law for

foreigners in Spain had been drawn up on the basis of the legal axis migration-

employment: it focused on the administrative processes in the initial phases of

immigration (crossing of borders, entry, requirements for residence and work, etc). In

contrast, the Ley Organica 4/2000 sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en

España y su integracion social (Law of rights and freedoms of foreigners and their



integration in Spain) of 1999 focused on the social-civil rights to be enjoyed by

immigrants living in Spain. Among the changes this law represents, the following are

noteworthy:

• Basic rights, acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(health, education, housing and social security benefits) are ensured.

• Immigrants are allowed to regularize their situation, after a period of two years.

• The administration must give reasons for the rejection of visas, while restriction

and control of entrance persist.

During the final phase of development of this law, some critical voices were

raised within the government, raising an alarmist discourse with regard the potential

undesirable effects of the law (which it was argued would promote the flow of illegal

immigration). Finally, the criticisms led to its amendment, through Law 8/2000, which

came into force on 23rd January, 2001. The new law does not acknowledge the rights of

association, assembly, trade union membership and strike to irregular (“illegal”)

immigrants. Given these restrictions, some critics questioned whether the new law was

compatible with the Spanish Constitution.

The legislation was completed with two Decrees: On the one hand, the Royal

Decree (Real Decreto) 142/2001, of 16th February, which established the requirements

for the regularization of immigrants without a residence permit, which had been

established in the Law 8/2000. This decree regulated the review procedure for refused

applications, and defined the requirements for those interested in the regularization of

their status in Spanish territory. On the other hand, the Royal Decree 864/2001, of 20th

July, regulated the application of the Law 8/2000.

The regional governments of Madrid and the Basque Country introduced the

following noteworthy regulations on immigration:

• Madrid:

Regional Plan for Immigration 2001-2003, establishing social welfare

measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants in Madrid.



Education Orders introducing the issues of cultural diversity and inter-

cultural relations, and defining the integration of pupils in socially and

culturally disadvantaged situations as the main aim of the educational

system: Madrid Council Order, 15th October 1999 (BOCM, 25th

October, 1999) and Resolution, 4th September 2000 (BOCM, 12th

September, 2000).

Regional Plan for Educational Compensation, 2000 (as a result of the

legislation above).

• The Basque Country:

Basque Parliament Law, 1998: measures against social exclusion (Law

12/1998, 22nd May).

5.2. Immigration in Spain

According to figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior (2000a), the

number of foreign residents in Spain increased from 198,042 in 1981 to 938,783 in

2000. The most substantial increases were registered in the late 1990s. The number of

foreign residents per 1000 census-registered inhabitants in Spain at the end of the year

2000 was 22.28 - that meant an increment of 2.17 in relation to the 20.11 foreign

residents per 1000 inhabitants at the end of 1999. Table 4.1 shows the change in the

number of foreign residents by continent of origin from 1999 to 2000. For either year,

the largest numbers of foreign residents came from Europe, followed by Africa, the

Americas, Asia and, finally, Oceania. Residents from Africa were those that showed the

greatest rise in 2000 figures, with an increase of 48,373 (22.71%) in comparison to the

previous year; the Americas came behind, with an increase of 19.95%. The numbers of

residents from other continents rose by between 7% and 2,2%, with the exception of

small decrease in the number of residents from Oceania26.

------------------------------

Insert Table 4.1 & Table 4.2

------------------------------

26 See table 4.1



The number of foreign residents at the end of year 2000 was 162,985 in Madrid

Region and 18,822 in the Basque Country27. These figures represented a much higher

proportion of foreign residents in Madrid (31.68 per 1000 inhabitants for year 2000) and

much lower in the Basque Country (8.96 per 1000 inhabitants for year 2000) than the

global figure for Spain. In regions, the proportional increment in the number of foreign

residents between the end of year 1999 and the end of year 2000 (2.58 for Madrid and

1.07 for the Basque Country) was smaller than for Spain, because the biggest increment

in immigration figures was in Andalucia. There are also regional differences in the

immigration composition according to continent of origin: In comparison to the Spanish

total, there was a higher proportion of immigrants from America in Madrid (where they

represent the biggest group of immigrants) and the Basque Country, while African

origin was underrepresented among the immigrants in both regions.

With regard to the number of immigrants in Spain by nationality of origin, the

Interior Ministry data for 2000 showed that 80% of the foreign population is

concentrated in some 21 countries of origin, the first being Morocco (22.3% of foreign

residents), followed by Great Britain (8.3%), Germany (6.8%), France (4.7%) and

Portugal (4.7%).

Another numerous group, though not recorded in the official statistics, are the

immigrants without residence permit. According to estimates by the Ministry of the

Interior itself (2000a), this population would be made up principally of immigrants of

North African (38% of the total) and Latin American origin (25%).

As regards the occupations of the immigrant population, the four main areas of

activity are, in order of importance, agriculture (33%), construction (15%), bars, hotels

and restaurants (11%), and domestic service (15%). The labor market for immigrants

with no legal residence has a different distribution (Ministry of the Interior, 2000a):

street-selling (27%), domestic service (23%), bars, hotels and restaurants (16%), and

construction (15%).

27 See table 4.2



5.3. Attitudes of young people towards immigration

Mateos & Moral (2000) carried out a study on youth opinions and attitudes

toward foreign immigration. The study was based on a survey carried out by the CIS in

199728. In the survey, interviewees were required to rate the relative size of the

immigrant population. For 55% of the young people interviewed, the number of

immigrants living in Spain was high, but not excessive (literally “a lot, but not too

many”). On comparing young people with the total population, Mateos & Moral (2000)

found that young people were more balanced in their judgement of the number of

immigrants, that is, the proportion of young people considering that the number of

immigrants in Spain is not excessive was higher than this proportion for the total

population.

Within the youth group, main differences were due to educational level. On the

one hand, 56%, of young people with university studies considered that, although the

numbers of immigrants resident in Spain is high, it is not excessive; on the other hand,

37% of those with only primary education believed that there are too many immigrants

in Spain. The only significant difference in these beliefs according to political

orientation was found among those self-defined at extreme right positions: almost half

(49%) of this group perceived that the number of immigrants is “too high”.

In the same study, participants were also asked for their perceptions about the

number of immigrants in other European countries (in comparison to Spain). The

majority perception is that in France and Germany there are relatively more immigrants

than in Spain. The situation in Italy is perceived as similar to that of Spain (28%

consider that the number of immigrants is similar, whilst 25% consider there are fewer

immigrants in Italy). Paradoxically, participants also report less knowledge of the

situation in that country (28%).

With regard to the opinions in relation to the legal regulation of immigration,

70% of interviewees believed that the prerequisite of an employment contract for

28 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,257. Representative sample of Spain (N= 2,499), age 15 to 29.



authorization of entry into Spain is the most appropriate measure for controlling

immigration. Six percent considered that immigration should be prohibited, and only

16% believed it should be made as easy as possible for immigrants to enter the country.

As regards the legislation, 26% of the young interviewees considered the immigration

laws appropriate, as against 21% with the same opinion among the total population. A

similar proportion of young people considered the legislation is tough (in comparison to

16% of the total population). Worthy of note is the high percentage of interviewees,

both among young people and in the total population, that reported ignorance of the

legislation regulating the entry of immigrants (20% and 32%, respectively).

With regard to interviewees’ assessment of immigration, Mateos & Moral

(2000) found that young people had a clearly negative judgement of the potential

consequences of immigration. For 41% of interviewees, immigration had more negative

consequences than positive ones; for 18% it has “neither positive nor negative effects”;

28% believed it to have positive effects; and 13% had no opinion on the matter.

Differences about the potential impact of immigration were found related to

sociodemographic: A higher percentage of young men (45%) than of young women

(37%) considered that immigration has negative effects. As regards age, the younger

interviewees (aged 15 to 19) perceived negative impact far more frequently (43%), than

the older ones. Whilst 50% of the young interviewees with only primary education

perceived more overall negative than positive effects, 41% of those with university

studies perceived more overall positive effects.

In a more specific study, Martin & Velarde (1996) found that, according to the

perceptions of young people aged 15 to 29, immigration would not adversely affect

morals and social customs in Spain (50% were of this opinion, while 12% expected

beneficial effects and another 14% prejudicial effects). On the other hand, 55% of the

interviewees expected some impact on the racial characteristics of the Spanish people

(especially, prejudicial effects for 26% as against 10% who expected beneficial effects).

Finally, 62% expected some impact on country’s economy (prejudicial for 34% and

beneficial for 12%). Gender differences are small in this study.



When asked about feelings toward immigrants according to their nationality, the

young people interviewed expressed more liking, proximity and trust with respect to

Argentinean, Italians, Germans and Portuguese immigrants; at the other extreme, less

liking, proximity and trust with respect to the French and the Moroccans immigrants.

Martin & Velarde also asked for an assessment of xenophobic political

programmes (Le Pen and Harder programs were cited as examples in the question).

Xenophobic political programs were clearly rejected by 84% of young aged 18-19 years

(against 5% of clear support), and by 82% of interviewees aged 20-24 years (against 4%

of support). The rejection was slightly weaker in the group older than 30 years (75% of

clear rejection against 3% of clear support).

In sum, the studies on the opinions of youth about immigration in Spain reflect a

complex and paradoxical situation, characterized by: a) a strong majority rejection of

xenophobic political programmes; b) relative ambiguity with regard to whether the

current legal regulation of immigration is appropriate or too tough; and c) mainly

unfavourable expectations with respect to the potential impact of immigration

(especially in terms of the economy, and among young people with lower levels of

education).

6. Education.

6.1. Normative context.

The ratification of the Constitutional Law 1/1990, of October 3rd, on the General

Regulation of the Educational System (LOGSE) resulted in the reform of the

timetabling and curricular content of non-university education in Spain. This law

guarantees a common formative period of ten years, which covers both primary and

secondary mandatory education, so that the minimum school-leaving age is 16.

The law attempts to reconcile the equality of all Spaniards as regards the

constitutional right to education with the decentralization of the powers of the “Spain of



the Autonomous Communities”. The government is responsible for fixing the minimum

content of the curricula and the school timetabling, leaving 45% of the school timetable

to be defined by the Autonomous Community in the case of those with an official

language other than Castilian (Spanish), or 35% in the case of the rest. Respecting these

minimum requirements, the Autonomous Communities and schools can organize the

curriculum of the different levels, stages, programs, grades and modes of the

educational system.

6.2. Curricular content.

Within the basic curriculum fixed by the government can be found content related

to European, Spanish or regional identities, and in general to civic education in the areas

of: a) Social Sciences, Geography and History, b) Language and c) Cross-disciplinary

Topics.

a) Social Sciences, Geography and History. Within the general objectives the area of Social Sciences proposes to:

- Identify and appreciate the plurality of the social communities to

which pupils belong, participating critically in their projects, values

and problems in full awareness of their rights and duties, and

rejecting discrimination for reasons of birth, race, sex, religion,

opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.

- Value linguistic and cultural diversity as a right of peoples and

individuals to their identity, showing attitudes of tolerance and

respect for other cultures and for opinions that do not coincide with

one’s own, without in the process renouncing critical judgment of

them.

Within the minimum content of the curriculum, reference is made to the political

and social organization of the territory in three ambits: European, Spanish and Regional

(AC). This includes the basic principles and institutions of democratic régimes and their

presence in the Spanish Constitution, political participation and social movements.



Within this area, the curricular development in the Basque Country (Decree

213/1994, of June 21) contains certain differentiating elements with respect to the state

curriculum. Specifically, references are introduced to the history, geography, culture

and political organization of the Basque Country.

Among the attitudes it is aimed to foment, some of the most important are:

- Interest in participation and collective expression in relation to

projects of territorial organization of one’s own community.

- Interest in learning about the roots, consequences and current

implications of industrialization, bourgeois revolution and the

emergence of socialism and nationalism in the Basque Country.

- Recognition of the right of peoples, nations and states to exercise

their sovereignty and develop their culture.

- Attitude of involvement in the problems existing in one’s own area or

within the community, with the aim of trying to understand their

historical roots and the various proposals and alternatives.

Finally, the curriculum of the Basque Country includes a block devoted to Conflict

and Citizens’ Participation, in which special emphasis is placed on social violence as a

problem, and on social groups and movements as forms of citizens’ participation.

b) Castilian Language, Official Language of the corresponding Autonomous

Community and Literature.

Both the LOGSE and Decree 213/1994 that establishes the curricular content for

the Basque Country stipulate that the development of this second area shall be

influenced by the linguistic model chosen by each school.

The Basque government, by means of Decree 138/83 of July 11th, regulated the use of

the official languages at non-university educational levels, distinguishing three official

teaching models:

• Model A: teaching in Castilian, with Euskera as a subject.

• Model B: approximately 50% of teaching is imparted in each language (Castilian

and Euskera).



• Model D: teaching is imparted in Euskera.

• Model X: initially, it was agreed to use the name Model X to refer to teaching in

which there was no presence whatsoever of Euskera. Currently, the model

denotes those schools that impart their teaching exclusively in foreign languages.

They are generally private schools without official approval.

From the implementation of this Decree to date, there has been a decrease in

demand for Model A, a sustained increase in demand for Model D and a an initial

growth followed by stagnation in demand for Model B. The behavior of demand in

relation to the language models presents differences between areas, with the pace of the

promotion of Euskera being far superior in Guipúzcoa, where Model D is in a majority,

while Model A is in a majority in Álava and Vizcaya (Gurrutxaga & Unceta, 2000).

c) Cross-disciplinary subjects.

The LOGSE provides for cross-disciplinary subjects with the object of reaching

all corners of the curriculum. The subjects are: moral and civic education, education for

peace, education for health, education for equality of opportunities between the sexes,

environmental education, sex education, consumer education and road safety education.

These subjects allow for the participation of the corresponding social movements

(feminists, ecologists, non-profit-making organizations, etc.) in the definition of

curricular content and the specification of the content.

Although the subjects of civic education and education for peace may include

content relevant to the development of European, national and regional identities and

citizenship, the curriculum of cross-disciplinary subjects does not prescribe obligatory

content, its specific make-up depending on the educational project and teaching staff of

the school. Both factors make it difficult to judge the true impact of such content on

pupils’ civic socialization.

6.3. Conclusion.



The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the educational

curriculum manifests clearly the intention to propose pluralism and compatibility

between regional, state and European identities, generating “dual” identities. The key

words of the curriculum do not permit us, however, to assess the ethnic or civic

orientation of curricular content related to identities and to social representations of the

nation and Europe. Such assessment will require detailed analysis of the discourse in

educational texts and practices.



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48



TABLES

TABLE 1.1: Categorization of parties’ platforms by Social and National orientation

TABLE 1.2: General Elections´ Results – Spain, Madrid and Basque Country. % of vote by party.

TABLE 1.3: Results of the Elections to the Madrid AC Parliament - 1995 y 1999. % of votes.

TABLE 1.4: Results in the 1994, 1998 & 2000 elections for the Basque Parliament. % of party votes.

TABLE 1.5:Results of the 2001 elections for the Basque Parliament by Provinces. % of parties votes.

TABLE 2.1.: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996. Spain Total

TABLE 2.2: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 2000 Spain Total

TABLE 2.3: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996 & 2000. Madrid Region & Basque Country

TABLE 3.1: Trends in the Percentage of Associationism between 1995-2001.

TABLE 3.2: Temporal Series of Percentage of Affiliation to Associations by Age Groups.

TABLE 3.3. Membership in social, cultural and political associations - 1999. Reported % of membership in each type of association by gender and age. Basque Country & Madrid.

TABLE 3.4. Ideological position - 1999. Reported % in left-right scale by gender and age. Basque Country & Madrid.

TABLE 4.1. Number of Foreing Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000 Spain Total.

TABLE 4.2. Number of Foreing Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000 Madrid Region & Basque Country.

49



FIGURES

FIGURE 1. Temporal Series (1995-2001) of Participation in Civic, Political, Sportive and Local-Regional Associations.

50



Table 1.1: Categorization of parties’ platforms by Social and National orientation

Social policy National policy Right Left

Central state PP: Popular Party (CD) PSOE-PSC: Labor Party

IU-IC: Left front Green Party

Regional

CiU:Catalonian CD, PNV, EA: Basque CD

CC: Canarias’ regionalist (centre-right)

EE: Basque SD EH/HB: Basque radical

BNG: Galicia nationalist front

ERC: Catalonian nationalist Notes:

CD: Christian Democratic current. SD: Social Democratic / Labor current.

51



Table 1.2: General Elections´ Results – Spain, Madrid and Basque Country.

% of vote by party.

% of vote 1996 General Elections 2000 General Elections

Parties Total Spain Madrid Basque Country Total Spain Madrid Basque

Country PP/PAR/UPN 39 49 18 45 53 28

PSOE-PSC 38 31 24 35 33 23 IU-IC-EB 11 16 9 6 9 5

CiU 5 4 EAJ-PNV 1 25 2 30

EA 0,5 8 0,4 8

CC 0,9 1

BNG 0,9 1 ERC 0,7 0,9 HB/EH 0,7 12 Others 2 4 4 4 5 6

Total Region 10 0 46 10 0 40

Total State 90 100 53 90 100 60

Total Left 52 49 47 45 44 30

Total Center- Right 47 51 53 55 56 70

Participation 77 72 64 69 78 72

Source: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central). Table produced by authors.

Key:

PP: Partido Popular (in alliance with Partido Aragonés, Unión Valenciana & Unión del Pueblo Navarro). PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español, including Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya and Partido Socialista de Euskadi (united with Euskadiko Eskerra). IU: Izquierda Unida, including the representation of Iniciativa per Catalunya–Els Verds & de Ezker Batua in the Basque Country. CiU: Convergencia i Unió. EAJ-PNV: Eusko Alderdi Jetzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco. EA: Eusko Alkartasuna. CC: Coalición Canaria. BNG: Bloque Nacionalista Galego. ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. HB/EH: Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok.

52



Table 1.3: Results of the Elections to the Madrid AC Parliament - 1995 y 1999.

% of votes.

% of votes Elections Parties 1995 1999

PP 52 52 PSOE 30 37

IU 16 8 Rest 2 3

Total Left 48 48 Total Right 52 52

Participation 70 61

Source: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central). Table produced by authors.

Key:

PP: Partido Popular. PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español. IU: Izquierda Unida.

53



Table 1.4: Results in the 1994, 1998 & 2000 elections for the Basque Parliament.

% of party votes.

% of votes Elections

Party 1994 1998 2000 EAJ-PNV 29 28

EA 10 8.8 42

HB/EH 19 18 10 PP 14 20 UA 2.7 1.2 23

PSE/EE 17 17 18 IU-EB 8.9 5.6 5.5 Others 0.1 0.7 1.4

Total Regional 58 55 52 Total State 42 44 47 Total Left 44 41 34

Total Center-Right 56 58 65 Participation 60 70 79

Source: EUSTAT-Instituto Vasco de Estadística (Ed.)(2000). Panorama social de la Comunidad Autónoma de

Euskadi [Social scene of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi]. Vitoria: Universidad del País Vasco, Universidad de Deusto, EUSTAT y Gobierno Vasco (table produced by authors).

Key: EAJ-PNV: Eusko Alderdi Jetzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco. EA: Eusko Alkartasuna. HB/EH: Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok. PP: Partido Popular, in alliance with regional party Unión Alavesa (UA). PSE-EE: Partido Socialista de Euskadi (including Euskadiko Eskerra - EE). IU-EB: Izquierda Unida/Ezker Batua.

54



Table 1.5:Results of the 2001 elections for the Basque Parliament by Provinces.

% of parties votes.

% of votes Provinces

Parties Araba /Álava Bizkaia/ Vizcaya Guipúzcoa

EAJ/PNV-EA 33 43 44 EH 6 8 15 PP 32 23 18

PSE-EE 20 18 16 IU/EB 5,9 5,6 5,1 Others 3 2 2

Total Regional 40 52 60 Total State 60 48 40

Total Left 33 33 37 Total Center -Right 67 67 63

Source: EUSTAT-Instituto Vasco de Estadística (Ed.)(2000). Panorama social de la Comunidad Autónoma de

Euskadi [Social scene of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi]. Vitoria: Universidad del País Vasco, Universidad de Deusto, EUSTAT y Gobierno Vasco (table produced by authors).

Key: EAJ-PNV: Eusko Alderdi Jetzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco. EA: Eusko Alkartasuna. HB/EH: Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok. PP: Partido Popular, in alliance with regional party Unión Alavesa (UA). PSE-EE: Partido Socialista de Euskadi (including Euskadiko Eskerra - EE). IU-EB: Izquierda Unida/Ezker Batua.

55



Table 2.1: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996

Spain Total

Post-elections poll 19962

Youth (18-24 years) Vote behavior

Actual Elections’ Results1 1996

Total Population N=4,959 Total

N=774 Male

N=394 Female N=380

Voting 77% 87.9% 79.7% 77.8% 81.7%

Abstention 23% 12.1% 20.3% 22.2% 18.3%

PP 39% 35.7% 34.1% 32.5% 35.7%

PSOE 38% 38.5% 30.3% 29.2% 31.4%

IU 11% 11.9% 17.5% 19.2% 15.7%

PNV 1% 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 1.4%

Others 11% 12.5% 16.9% 18.2% 15.7% Sources:

1 Ministerio del Interior (1996): Resultados de las Elecciones Generales de 1996. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central) - [Results of General Elections 1996, Ministery of Interior (Central Electoral Board)] -Table produced by authors-.

2 CIS (1996, March). Estudio nº 2,210: Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía [Survey nº 2,210: Post-elections, General and Andalucia Autonomic Elections]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas -Table produced by authors-.

Table 2.2: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 2000

Spain Total

Post-elections poll 20002

Youth (18-24 years) Vote behavior

Actual Elections’ Results1 2000

Total Population N=4,391 Total

N=500 Male

N=255 Female N=245

Voting 69% 83.2% 69.0% 69.1% 68.9%

Abstention 31% 16.8% 31.0% 30.9% 31.1%

PP 45% 49.2% 42.7% 42.0% 43.5%

PSOE 35% 29.2% 28.4% 23.2% 33.6%

IU 6% 6.2% 9.2% 13.4% 4.9%

PNV 2% 1.2% 1.2% 0.5% 0.9%

Others 12% 14.1% 18.9% 20.8% 17% Sources:

1 Ministerio del Interior (2000b): Resultados de las Elecciones Generales de 2000. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central) - [Results of General Elections 2000, Ministery of Interior (Central Electoral Board)] -Table produced by authors-.

2 CIS (2000, March-April). Estudio nº 2.384: Postelectoral - Elecciones generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía [Survey nº 2.384: Post-elections, General and Andalucia Autonomic Elections]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas -Table produced by authors-.



Table 2.3: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996 & 2000 Madrid Region & Basque Country

General Elections 1996 – Total population General Elections 2000 - Total population Madrid Region Basque Country Madrid Region Basque Cuntry

Vote behavior Elections’ results 19961

Post-elections poll2 N=553

Elections’ results 19961






Voting 79.6% 87.8% 71.5% 79.5% 73.3% 83.7% 64.5% 68.5%

Abstention 20.4% 12.2% 28.5% 20.5% 26.7% 16.3% 35.5% 31.5%

PP 49.3% 44.6% 18.3% 11.5% 52.5% 50.2% 28.2% 19.0%

PSOE 31.4% 32% 23.7% 27.9% 32.9% 31.7% 23.3% 12.7%

IU 16.4% 19.3% 9.2% 12.1% 9.1% 12.3% 5.5% 9.0%

PNV - - 25% 30.7% - - 30.4% 37.9%

EH - - 12.3% 10.1% - - - -

EA - - 8.2% 2.8% - - 7.6% 9.8%

Others 2.9% 4% 3.3% 8% 5.5% 5.8% 5% 11.7%Sources:

1 Ministerio del Interior (1996): Resultados de las Elecciones Generales de 1996. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central) - [Results of General Elections 1996, Ministery of Interior (Central Electoral Board)] -Table produced by authors-.

2 CIS (1996, March). Estudio nº 2,210: Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía [Survey nº 2,210: Post-elections, General and Andalucia Autonomic Elections]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas -Table produced by authors-.

3 Ministerio del Interior (2000b): Resultados de las Elecciones Generales de 2000. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior (Junta Electoral Central) - [Results of General Elections 2000, Ministery of Interior (Central Electoral Board)] -Table produced by authors-.

4 CIS (2000, March-April). Estudio nº 2,384: Postelectoral - Elecciones generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía [Survey nº 2,384: Post-elections, General and Andalucia Autonomic Elections]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas -Table produced by authors-.



Table 3.1: Trends in the Percentage of Associationism between 1995-2001.

AFILIATED TO 1995 1996 1997 1998 2001TOTAL

CIVIC ASSOCIATION 9.5 7.5 10.8

POLTICAL PARTY 3.1 3.1 3.2 2.4 2.2

TRADE UNION 7.3 6.2 6.1 4.7 6.7

RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION 3.9 5.0

SPORTIVE GROUPS 10.4 9.4

LOCAL & REGIONAL SOCIETIES 9.6 11.2

CULTURAL & EDUCATIONAL 8.2 9.1

YOUTH (SCOUTS,CLUBS) 2.4 1.6

CHARITY ASSOCIATIONS 6.2 9.0

ECOLOGICAL GROUPS 1.6 1.5

HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENTS 2.8 3.1

WOMEN MOVEMENTS 1.1 1.2

TOTAL (N) (3976) (2482) (2490) (9989) (2493)

Source: Table produced by authors after data from CIS, surveys # 2514, # 2206, # 2240, # 2286, # 2419,

(1995-2001). Note: Blanks on table mean that these categories have not been asked in the different surveys.



Table 3.2: Temporal Series of Percentage of Affiliation to Associations by Age Groups.

% of Affiliation

ASSOCIATIONS 1995 1996 1997 1998 2001

18/24 25/3435 & above 18/24 25/34 35& above 18/24 25/34

35 & above 18/24 25/34

35& above 18/24 25/34

35& above

CIVIC 6.4 10.1 9.9 7.0 6.4 8.1 9.6 11.0 12.2

POLÍTICAL PARTIES 2.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 4.1 2.7 3.5 3.1 3.2 1.4 2.8 2.5 0.9 3.1 2.3TRADE UNION 2.5 9.0 7.9 2.8 9.3 6.1 2.3 6.3 7.3 1.6 5.8 5.1 1.8 10.5 6.8RELIGIOUS 4.3 3.7 3.7 4.5 4.7 5.2SPORTIVE 22.6 13.5 6.6 16.6 12.6 7.0LOCAL & REGIONAL SOCIETIES 13.2 12.4 8.0 14.5 13.0 10.1EDUCATIONAL & CULTURAL GROUPS 10.5 9.8 6.9 10.2 9.3 8.9YOUTH GROUPS (SCOUTS,CLUBS) 6.6 3.4 1.0 4.9 3.1 0.4CHARITY ASSOCIATIONS 6.9 6.8 6.2 6.8 8.9 4.0ECOLOGICAL GROUPS 2.3 2.6 1.1 1.5 2.3 1.1HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENTS 2.7 3.3 2.7 3.4 3.7 2.8WOMEN MOVEMENTS 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.6 1.7 1.2

TOTAL (N) (642) (780) (2554) (389) (515) (1578) (395) (511) (1584) (1493) (2038) (6457) (325) (516) (1652) Source: Table produced by authors after data from CIS, surveys # 2514, # 2206, # 2240, # 2286, # 2419, (1995-2001). Note: Blacks on table mean that these categories have not been asked in the different surveys.



Figure 1. Temporal Series (1995-2001) of Participation in Civic, Political, Sportive and Local- Regional Associations.

0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

18/24 25/34 35 y más 18/24 25/34 35 y más 18/24 25/34 35 y más 18/24 25/34 35 y más 18/24 25/34 35 y más

1995 1996 1997 1998 2001

CIVIC ASSOCIATION POLITICAL PARTY TRADE UNION SPORTIVE GROUPS LOCAL & REGIONAL SOCIETIES

Source: Table produced by authors after data from CIS, surveys # 2514, # 2206, # 2240, # 2286, # 2419, (1995-2001).



Table 3.3. Membership in social, cultural and political associations - 1999. Reported % of membership in each type of association by gender and age. Basque Country & Madrid.

Madrid Basque Country

Men Women Men Women

Age Age Age Age

Total Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Total Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Trade unions 1.9 2.8 0 1 4 4.7 1.3 0 0 1.9 1.6 3.1 3.6 0 0 2.3 8.8 2.5 0 2.2 2.9 3.7Political parties 1.2 1.0 0 1.0 1.0 1.6 1 0 0 2.9 1.6 3.7 4.2 3.6 2.7 4.5 5.3 3.2 0 2.2 2.9 5.6Human rights 2.6 1.8 0 2 2 2.3 3.4 0 2.7 5.8 3.9 1.5 0.6 0 2.7 0 0 2.5 4.3 2.2 2.9 1.9Peace movement 1.7 1.3 0 1 2 1.6 2.1 4.9 1.4 1 1.6 1.2 1.8 0 2.7 2.3 1.8 0.6 0 0 0 1.9Environmentalism 2.6 2.3 0 1 2 4.7 2.8 1.2 4.1 3.9 2.3 0.9 1.2 0 0 0 3.5 0.6 0 2.2 0 0Feminism 0.6 0.3 0 0 0 0.8 1 1.2 0 1 1.6 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 1.9 0 2.2 2.9 1.9Sport 17.3 27.5 38.8 26.3 32.7 18.6 6.7 11.1 10.8 5.8 2.3 19.8 31.3 67.9 32.4 25 17.5 7.6 17.4 8.9 2.9 5.6Regional culture and traditions 12.3 13.1 17.9 14.1 9.9 12.4 11.4 18.5 12.2 10.7 7.0 11.8 15.7 3.6 24.3 15.9 15.8 7.6 0 8.9 5.7 11.1Religious 5.1 4 7.5 4 4 2.3 6.2 12.3 9.5 4.9 1.6 3.4 1.2 3.6 0 0 1.8 5.7 4.3 13.3 2.9 1.9Culture and education 9.7 9.8 7.5 11.1 10.9 9.3 9.6 9.9 9.5 10.7 8.6 8 9.6 7.1 16.2 9.1 7 6.4 8.7 11.1 0 5.6Youth movements 4.2 3.8 6 5.1 4 1.6 4.7 9.9 6.8 4.9 0 7.4 7.8 10.7 5.4 6.8 8.8 7.0 8.7 13.3 5.7 1.9Social welfare 4.7 3.8 4.5 3 3 4.7 5.7 3.7 5.4 7.8 5.5 2.5 2.4 0 0 2.3 5.3 2.5 4.3 2.2 2.9 1.9Total (N) (782) (396) (67) (99) (101) (129) (386) (81) (74) (103) (128) (323) (166) (28) (37) (44) (57) (157) (23) (45) (35) (54)

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Survey nº 2.370: Informe sobre la juventud española [Report on Spanish Youth], 200029.

29 Study carried out in 1998 with a sample of 6.492 interviews; the sample was distributed in a non proportional style among the sixteen AC´s; the sample is representative both at national level and for the Basque Country and Madrid.



Table 3.4. Ideological position - 1999. Reported % in left-right scale by gender and age.

Basque Country & Madrid.

Madrid Basque Country

Men Women Men Women

Age Age Age Age

Total

Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Total

Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Total

15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29

Left

(1-2)

11.5 10.6 3.0 10.1 9.9 15.5 12.4 9.9 13.5 14.6 11.7 18.6 23.5 14.3 24.3 22.7 28.1 13.4 8.7 15.6 5.7 18.5

(3-4) 20.2 21.5 13.4 22.2 21.8 24.8 18.9 3.7 23 17.5 27.3 22.3 24.7 14.3 18.9 27.3 31.6 19.7 8.7 20 25.7 20.4

(5-6) 26.3 29 25.4 28.3 30.7 30.2 23.6 22.2 18.9 26.2 25 23.5 21.7 10.7 29.7 22.7 21.1 25.5 17.4 22 34.3 25.9

(7-8) 10.6 10.1 7.5 8.1 14.9 9.3 11.1 9.9 10.8 9.7 13.3 1.5 1.8 0 0 6.8 0 1.3 0 2.2 2.9 0

(9-10)

Rigth

2.3 2.3 3.0 4.0 2.0 0.8 2.3 1.2 0 3.9 3.1 0.9 0.6 0 2.7 0 0 1.3 0 2.2 2.9 0

N.S. 14.7 11.4 23.9 15.2 5.0 7 18.1 37 20.3 14.6 7.8 19.8 18.1 57.1 16.2 6.8 8.8 21.7 47.8 22.2 5.7 20.4

N.C. 14.3 15.2 23.9 12.1 15.8 12.4 13.5 16 13.5 13.6 11.7 13.3 9.6 3.6 8.1 13.6 10.5 17.2 17.4 15.6 22.9 14.8

Total

(N)

(782) (396) (67) (99) (101) (129) (386) (81) (74) (103) (128) (323) (166) (28) (37) (44) (57) (157) (23) (45) (35) (54)

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Survey nº 2.370: Informe sobre la juventud española [Report on Spanish Youth].



Table 4.1: Number of Foreign Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000 Spain Total

Continents 1999 2000 Absolute change 1999/2000

% change 1999/2000

Europe 353,556 361,437 7,881 2.23 % America 166,709 199,964 33,255 19.95 % Africa 213,012 261,385 48.373 22.71 % Asia 66,340 71,015 4,675 7.05 % Oceania 902 -111 -10.96 % No data 699 1,017 318 45.49 % Total 801,329 895,720 94,391 11.78 % By 1,000 of population 20.11 22.28 2.17 10.79 %

1,013

Source: Ministerio del Interior (2000a). Anuario Estadistico de Extranjeria, 2000 [Foreigners’ Statistical Annual, 2000]. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjeria y la Inmigración.



Table 4.2: Number of Foreign Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000

Madrid Region & Basque Country

Region Madrid Basque Country

Continents 19991 20002 Absolute change 1999/2000

% change 1999/2000 19991 20002

Absolute change 1999/2000

% change 1999/2000

Europe 48,765 49,366 601 1.23 % 9,056 8,620 - 436 - 4.81 % America 58,459 63,056 4,597 7.86 % 5,016 5,381 365 7.28 % Africa 33,530 33,183 - 347 - 1.03 % 3,230 3,493 263 8.14 % Asia 17,701 16,817 - 884 -4.99 % 1,244 1,253 9 0.72 % Oceania 212 192 - 20 - 9.43 % 68 60 -8 -11.76 % No data 218 371 153 70.18 % 8 15 7 87.50 % Total 158,885 162,985 4.100 2.58 % 18,622 18,822 200 1.07 % by 1,000 of population

31.21 31.68 0.47 1.51 % 8.87 8.96 0.09 1.01 %

Source: Our elaboration based on:

1 Ministerio del Interior (1999). Anuario Estadistico de Extranjeria, 1999 [Foreigners’ Statistical Annual, 1999]. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjeria y la Inmigración.

2 Ministerio del Interior (2000a). Anuario Estadistico de Extranjeria, 2000 [Foreigners’ Statistical Annual, 2000]. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjeria y la Inmigración.

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