Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

Rqewt No. 5122

PROJECT CONPLErION REPORT

SENEGAL SECOND SEDHIOU PROJET(CREDIT 647-SE)

June 11, 1984

Western Africa Regional Office

This dwome ts re_ i by ry pewfonme odrffnd d We& If ekofma qa Dot dws be dadsdw Ww B sfwa-

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Wame of Currency CPA FrancYearsAppraisal US$1 = CFAF 225Interven-ng US$t = CFAF 222Completion USS1 = CFAF 275

WEIGHTS AND KESURES(Ketric System)

1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres (ac)I acre = 0.405 ha1 kilogram (kg) = 2.205 pounds (lb)1 ton (tt) = 2,205 pounds

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP Agent Comptable Particulier (Chief Accountant)BNDS Banque Nationale de Dve'Loppement du Senegal

(Agricultural Bauk)CCCE Caisse Centrale de Coop5ration Economique (France)IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(World Bank)ICB International Competitive BiddingIDA International Development Association (World Bank)ISRA Institut S5negalais de Recherches AgricolesLCB Local Competitive BiddingONCAD Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le

DeveloppementPMU Project Management UnitPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportPRS Projet Rural de SedhiouR?4WA Regional Mission in Western Africa (World Bank)SAED Socit-e d'Amenagement et d'Exploitations des terres du

Delta du fleuve Senegal et des vallees du fleuve Sn-egal etde la Falsme

SODAGRI Societe de Developpement Agricole et IndustrielSODEFITEX Soci&t5 pour le D5veloppement des Fibres TextilesSOMIVAC Soci;t6 de Mise en Valeur Agricole de la CasamanceWARDA West Africa Rice Development Association

Fiscal Year July 1 - June 30

FOR OMFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGALSECOND SEDEIWU PROJECTS

(CREDIT 647-SE)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Table of Contents

* ........ Page No.

Preface ........ ... iBasic Data Sheet ii.. .......Highlights-- ---.....------------------------------- ii-

I. INTRODUCTION . ... ... .. ...........

II. PROJECT FORMULATION.A. Identification, Preparation, Appraisal and Negotiations 1B. Objectives and Brief Description ..................... 2

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATIONA. Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-u p 3B. Project Revisions 4.......... .4C. Credit Cancellation . . 4D. Physical Progress.... 4E. Studies ........ 6P. Staffing ...................................... ........ 7G. Procurement .. 7H. Project Costs ........... . 7I. Financing and Disbursenbertsn... 8J. Covenants.... 9

IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACTA. - Technological changes . .. 9B. Incremental output t.......

V. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RETURNSA. Economic Re-Evaluation... . 12B. Farmers Incomes..... 13

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCEA. Executing Agency: SOMIVAC/PRS . .13B. Input Supply, Credit Management and Subsidy Policy 14C. Cooperative Insstitutios . ............... 16D. Accounting and Auditing .. .... 16E. Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluationl....... 17F. Consultants' Performnee .. 17G Government and Bank's Performance 17

This document has a restrced ditbuon and may be used by recipiens only im the performance ofthi oficd dues Its contents may not otherwe be discosed wdihout Wodd Bank authoriaun

VII. SPECIAL ISSUESA. Weather: Persistence of drought since 1970 ........... 18B. Special role and problems of women ................... 19

VIII. LESSONS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS IN THE AREAA. Technical Aspects ...... ........... *........... *......... 20B. Institutional Aspects ................................ 21

TABIES

Table 1: Project Cost and Financing ....................... 23Table 2: Schedule of Disbursement ......................... 24Table 3: Key Indicators .. o ......... .... .... 25Table 4: Project Incremental Production................... 26Table 5: Economic Rate of Return ..........................0 27Table 6: Project Area Farmers" indebtedness on Dec. 31, 1980 28Table 7: Statistics of Fertilizers Use in 1980/81 ......... 29Table 8: 'Rainall data 1928-1983 .......................... 30

ATTACHENTBorrower comments

HAP: IBRD 11923 (PCR) Project Area

SEGAL

SECOND SEDHIOU PROJECT(CREDIT 647-SB)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

PREFACE

This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Second SedhiouProject, for vhich a Credit 647-SE for US$6.3 million was approved on June 22,1976. The Credit was closed on March 30, 1982 after an extension of ninemonths. The undisbursed balance of USS1.5 million was cancelled.

This PCR was prepared cy the Vest Africa Regional Office following acountry visit in larch-April 1982 and based on a review of the AppraisalReport (No. 1094-SE) dated June 4, 1976, the President's Report No. P-1821a-SE) dated June 10, 1976, the Credit Agreement dated June 25, 1976, thesupervision reports, project management's semi-annual progress reports, anddiscussions with Bank-staff previously associated with the project and theproject completion report, dated August 9, 1982, prepared by the executingagency. The PCR was submitted to OED on February 8, 1984.

The assistance provided by the Government of Senegal and staff ofproject executing agencies is gratefully acknowledged.

The project was not selected for audit by OED and the PCR was sent to-the Borrower for comment on March 30, 1984. Comments received have beenattached to the PCR.

{X.- IL -

n ~ i 12 /m ir.7n PM2T

bSIC DArA YIt * 3K0 es DamK

2T PlOJEC! ATTA .0 IC US C11S

Ap"Minal Acealb wr octtl as Z Mf

7t'isl. Mai.ot. - lioatiom rs Ia.; Itolnaotijm Etiontia, act-II. 1-. W ;E.io I

rojmang. CMSS Ullis) 13.91 9.O 73 b e _t fruit 13/ - 1112.COdiAt As (i'llC .131W) .3 5.5.. 73 utmaei. Coic iCss oUtIS.C*SIS..C1. (C.i.. ce.srahd. campfracia., btiaince.n c :Catou Crwtd. dec..praci..

_etoOI. CU MLIUO11di 3.2 2.8 55 C.aw3 (MS wtali.)2:. Satd _eouml *73 Dam Apptbc.lon CritDa,t caos_ -A Saw SimstworDec ZtfIi_,- 09/73 11.73 b.c. la" -a eip.. Creditamt. fle.ical Comunt C_lftfd Sot. 0A3&e..e.t r _W-- P3diq.

Pr.opctlas eb. ctpled C) 100 20 20 Dpasmo. .oie_ Mcbru tICIrde6 Datu O3/51 03152 Dam. a. CISCurn, d. ctkii_i.a.aesic. of 3x.1 C:) 23 3 23 5. vs-abilLtt f &dm.... CZ)Imtitoi. . m dt I d3 tl__ £_th.ci 1I. V

_r.ic Prjoraac. a I 3 P..rb. _ rPis

11m at D£r ct Smticiari.n nh. d- blelCiar- (-&tif$) dirart.bis.t.,,O.)- C. _IOiO SI X 53 _..1& ; .6,_

J 77 Jos_ 7e a 79 n , _ 0 L, of Josr *2

AWp-1 gaItann CUSS sillian) 0.3 2.0 33 3-3 3.3. 3.u 1 ; w_i. .SI .illauseAtt-o ICUS illi_. a 0.3 1.7 2.9 -. 2 Z.& SAli tii CL .ilslionAtoaX ma Z ot lEtinst- 0 IS 47 55 67 73 l.ii.rai tir _ . I-.. prwtLmMer. df ti.I d i 01152 . d. d.r.i.r Afb.-e

1 DATA. DOOM3S C1 3 US !ll:113SIsSmaizuatio. hft at-

Onabo of 304. dYS In Si.,,todl Rot..cP,earnnuffh- F1oIdJeo3 Specinsinarislc Tr_nd a/ 1 oS Pc!bl_ b'

I nficci, Dt. jj* ~ *rru__ -r S.rrai. !SffAts4 _ _ur tr. Tm. a. ue-l.a_bl_

3drmiclatioe, D2176 2 20 S.k Idetiflcti.rti_on I * 11i t J

r£31.5 I 3 Df.175 I 9a- 2lui [ _ e ns C t

3.t.s 5 U/nS I IL .- IApprail tn75 100 b. . d E.aw.ti_mS:_-Tl 15: _. . sd. - So- tocal

Einsis 1 11/n3 1 la Z 1.7 MS.=im IriIi.. 2 0es77 t 10 * S : r..1.i 2I.ai..3 *2177 1 11 a - 7.7 - 3

Ptivelem, L03179 2 la. 2 2 T7T11I flia.iS ~~~02/19 3 27 a.2 2 F."1-

NiadB 09179 2 12 2 3 0." -s

Hlaai- 7 03e 2 14 c C 3 2 0.n.r - 7111-as 0 310 1 7 a 3 1 6.11 _ SNigoi..9 11/90 3 27 C., d 3 2 G."1 9flied.. 10 0 l31 2 l a. C 3 2 ." - 10Ca.aIotin 05/53 1 £a Acblemest

3-t_ao eC. d S..-,c._M-I

TOa 30* ba. C. T.

PFALH=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AlC DIMC

Swam. 0.oe~~~~catrust at Semia) C.o..tin.3t d. SiodgulbeKtL 5 ARM-CY f,,, Rural a. Sedh. OWIS1 S-SI.&L p.. 1. 5_- .1- A/ C__t d2. C. ISHIAC) A,1 7 ftr I

Pnmeis hoject _/ Prt Aetr.r__

_... Cae. Sic. r.Ioct I Fruit sk. 33mb. beboils 1_t 252-St want a. dr clilo_rc. 0313. .111*0 bet do Ed1tboils art dit. A J- 38. 1971 1t, a. Aiwot.r. a.

IPAC,,r a. Cr3isf

9b.l1.-p mJMe. Susixiat Projet lt& wr

-7 se-iog s%h. coot oS Lar. Inputs m o .- _ _, ka. 1- alft _ rid. menoIo d.i iLwa&il_ ,.proc.c.d by -ah. C-a.n. Aw.oy- At AppL-tas - - panioio..at -_ta coot I1 i _ r. "Mm do _ _.erins

ctss 3. Mil. .££ lolsaiMc rodospoti.) vaseatad gmr A I _fM.atioO _ Attac_t d. M5 3.1 Lllioo Cy7 wr 13 i£Prie153.. Ite., at55 atlmS, I ca, 053.5..

b k . roil. £a c..p.e.d .Ik fkr tal ot c oci_atud ort o-pral' 3) L. r a LIt t.1-sL - dr.. la coi tota ntE i r;I'd_1PMO.caCIsdi., CM. cos Of No. I.PoA And .qolpWMMt- Si.Wi do co& di. isESeatoe do snarSl" ogtico@.

PA Ac o t IS.I Million_we -o Imaled tfa CS .1ii_t credit C/ 0s _toMC d. VW 1.I I .S ati *d _a crfidit Isic'il. -Cs Hmk.19a2 2A b 3 11d2.

d/ 1: r mlleet 2: Fair 3: la-dew"" dl 1: 1Ic e 2: ot _ : 3: im et.**: Agrtclturit: b: _IM-t: c: t i 4S: d: ihi_ *1 a _ ;;: c ;t; C; y t ciar d: iasim,

r.: u .ack .g.ier. d d.risa*tian. .: _at-tkicio.LI 1: plr .- rm. ort 'iow pS1aw: 2:1 bdera: prokl2ow: 3:-Jor I: 3.- problimem,ow. p_blims mime... 2: ablim- smdr%

William. 3: prek1r-. -.J-sIs5 .p.ros7 2: S_CL.-q. 3. UomdororCft 1. Is .. csroio: 2: tt3clowmaim.: 3: _ dftIiorstlem.r. fi: c'; rs k i: P: FolLce r tir : T- k. ical0: aF 1 r: ce.. It *e F: piti S: teis s _te

IIete t 1113 2es Itart 03. 2055 (03/aN107 'J ' _t d &_l_tIa .dtr.esc. 3o. 2tl 1 do 10 T i 191. 1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~= 631n)2&A a, 98

- iii -

SENEGALSECOND SEDHIOU PROJECT

(CRETIT 647-SE)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HIGHLIGHTS

The project, which was the tenth Bank operation in the agriculturalsector in Senegal and the second in the Casamance area, aimed, over a four-year period, at increasing yields and farmers' productivity by promotingintensive production techniques and animal traction. At full development itwas expected to benefit 7,400 farm families or 40% of the rural population inthe project area. The project was built on the results of a successful firstBank-assisted project (Casamance Rice Project -Credit 252-SE). Yet itsresults fell short of expectations, mainly because the conditions whichpermitted the success of the first project could not be replicated.

Project activities started actua2ly even before credit effectivenessdue to the momentum of the first project. However, soon institutionalshortcomings accumulated: lack of administrative and financial autonomy,inadequacy of transportation means for extension staff, lax credit eligibilityand repayment policy, unmotivating farmer organization and a generous inputsubsidy policy entailing too heavy a burden on the already constrained publicfinances. The persistence of these difficulties led to the decision, in July1981, to cancel the credit with undisbursed funds of about USS1.5 million or24% of the initial credit amount.

Despite a one-year extension of the initial completion date, physicalcomponents were only about 20% completed. Throughout project implementationonly about half of the quantities of draft animals and related equipmentanticipated at appraisal were actually made available to farmers.

At full development, the average participant farmer's revenues wereexpected to increase by 33% compared with that of a non-participant farmer.However even during the best year, this increase was less than 10%. Theproject' s re-estimated economic rate of return is 6% compared with theappraisal forecast of 23%.

The following points are of particular interest:

(a) The Public Agency regulations, requiring prior control ofexpenses proved to be unsuitable to agricultural projectmanagement (para. 6.01);

(b) the arrangement whereby extension staff must own a car, use itto discharge their duties and receive an allowance incompensation, proved unworkable and led to low morale and poorsupervision (para. 6.02); In similar situations, the projectshould buy cars, operate them and monitor their use and gasconsumption (para. 8.07);

- iv -

Cc) despite women's overwhelming role in rice cultivation, theycould not have access to input supply because they could not becooperative members and their husbands refused to take creditfor them (para. 7.06); special arrangements are required toovercome this discrimination (para. 8.08);

(d) monitoring and evaluation were successfully established andpermitted to assess the project's impact and identifyconstraints (para. 6.11);

(e) comparison of cotton yields achieved under SOMIVAC/PES andSODEFITEX managements points to the inefficiencies ofSOMIVAC/PRS extension services (para. 6.03). It also shows thatwith effective extension services such as those of SODEFITBX,cotton results in the project area compare favorably with thoseof the best cotton producing areas in the country. For thisreason, the most important and immediate prospect lies incotton-related development within the framework of the recentlyapproved Eastern Senegal Rural Development Project, (Credit1406-SE) (para. 8.09);

Cf) since 1970, a persistent drought has hit the project area. Itseffect on paddies' salinisation requires that priority be givento anti-saline dike construction for land development (para.8.03).

SENEGALSECOND SEDHIOU PROJECT

(CREDIT 647-SE)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Introduction

1.01 The Second Sedhiou Project, designed to be implemented over fouryears, was financed by a US$6.3 million IDA Credit (Credit 647-SE) which wassigned on June 25, 1976, and became effective on November 23, 1976. Itcovered the Sedhiou District in the Middle Casamance which has one of thehighest potential, for rainfed agriculture. The Project was the tenth Bankoperation in the agricultural sector in Senegal and the second in theCasamance area.

1.02 The Second Sedhiou Project was built on the results of the CasamanceRice Project (Cr. 252-SE), executed from 1972 through 1976. The first projectaimed at developing upland rice production in association with millet andgroundnuts, through the strengthening of extension and credit services. Itdeviated in several respects from the appraisal design because recommendedtechnical improvements proved to be inadequate and climatic conditionsrequired changes in cropping patterns. However it was rated, on the whole, assuccessful (PPAR 2056, dated Nay 10, 1978). This success was attributed to:(i) a drought situation which drove farmers from upland soils to grey soils,which proved to be much more suitable for modern high-yielding rice varieties,(ii) a competent local project manager who succeeded in correcting projectpreparation flaws and alertly perceived the high potential of grey soils, and(Uii) an effective use of competent foreign technical assistance.

1.03 This report is based on the findings of Bank supervision missions,Project semi-annual progress reports, Project Management's completion reportof August 1982 and a completion mission in March-April 1983.

II. Project Formulation

A. Identification, Preparation, Appraisal and Negotiations

2.01 The Second Sedhiou Project was identified in December 1974 by a Banksupervision mission of the first project. It was prepared by the managementstaff of the first project with the assistance of Bank staff from Abidjan(RIWA). It was appraised jointly by the Bank and CCCE in September-October1975.

2.02 No important point of disagreement with Government arose duringappraisal. However, in the course of project processing within the Bank,several issues were raised which are worth recalling.

-2-

2.03 Concerning the financing plan, it was first proposed that the Bank 'scontribution be an IBRD loan and that Government counterpart financing cover alarge part of total project cost. However, in view of the deteriorating trendof world market prices for groundauts and rock phosphate --the two majorexport commodities of Senegal-- the Bank conceded to make its contributionwith an IDA credit and contented itself with Government's commitment toparticipate more actively in the long run in the financing of agriculturalprojects.

2.04 It was questioned why all personnel and operating costs were treatedas incremental. This was justified by the 'plateau theory" which argued thatthe level of technology reached by farmers under the first project did notrequire, in order to be maintained, further extension services. Therefore,extension services under the second project were intended to bring farmers toa higher level of technology which they would otherwise not reach. Consistentwith this argument, it was assumed that after project completion no personnelor operating costs would be required to maintain the new performance whichwould be reached. In view of th6 precedent created with the Sine SaloumAgricultural Development Project (Cr. 549-SE/Ln-1113-SE) 1/ , the aboveassumptions were readily accepted.

2.05 Concerning project organization, at the time of appraisal andnegotiations, Government intended to set up a Regional AgriculturalDevelopment Agency which would absorb the project management unit set up toimplement the first project. The Bank feared that this might hampersatisfactory project execution. It was agreed with Government that theresponsibility of carrying out the second project would be transferred to thenew Regional Agency only on condition that this agency had been adequatelyfunded and was provided with adequate financial and adminnistrative autonomy.Experience proved that more precise and watertight conditions should have beendesigned to get through Senegalese intricate administrative procedures.

2.06 Concerning cooperatives, in view of ONCAD's poor performance underprevious Bank-assisted projects, it was agreed with Government that, withinone year after the date of the Credit Agreement, the project management unitwould be entrusted with the responsibility of supervising cooperatives in theproject area. However, at the Board discussions, doubts were expressed thatthe proposed project would lead to a strengthening of the cooperativeinstitutions. In retrospect it appears that the political dimensions of thecooperative organization were underestimated by the Bank.

B. Objectives and Brief Description

2.07 The Project aimed, over a four-year period, at increasing farmers'standard of living in the project area by encouraging them to adopt improvedcrops and livestock production techniques. It was anticipated to benefitabout 7,400 farm families (80,000 peo;le), representing about 40% of the ruralpopulation of the district. At full development, annual incremental

1/ OED is preparing an audit on this project experience.

production was estimated at about: 10,000 tons of paddy, 8,000 tons of milletand maize, 8,000 tons of groundnuts, 700 tons of seed-cotton, 1,100,000 litersof milk and 78,000 kg of beef.

2.08 The above objectives were expected to be achieved through thefollowing project components:

(i) Strengthening of the project managi *ment unit by trainingextension agents and providing vehicles and equipment.

(ii) A program for demonstrating and promoting improred mariAl, semi-intensified and intensified farming methods.

(iii) A program for demonstrating and promoting animal husbandry; andthe construction, equipment and operation of a feed mixingplant.

(iv) The construction of water control systems to cover a total areaof 1,650 ha of rice fields.

(v) The settlement of about 400 farmers' families, including theconstruction of wells.

(vi) Organizing annual training sessions for farmers and agriculturalextension workers and organizing an adult literacy program

(vii) The organization and distribution of agricultural inputs tofarmers and the supply of farm implements to farmers andblacksmiths.

(viii) The construction, equipment of 35 rice mills and supervision oftheir operation.

(ix) The training of agricultural cooperatives' staff in creditmanagement, procurement, accounting and marketing; and theconstruction and equipment of facilities for agriculturalcooperatives.

Cx) Monitoring and evaluation of the project's activities.

(xi) The establishment of a regional planning unit to be responsiblefor the preparation of a master plan for agriculturaldevelopment of Casamance and for the preparation of projectswhich would be included in said plan.

III. Implementation

A. Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-Up

3.01 The credit was approved on June 22, 1976. The Development CreditAgreement was signed on June 25, 1976. The credit became effective onNovember 23, 1976, two months later than the date scheduled in the DevelopmentCredit Agreement. The only condition of effectiveness in addition to the

- 4-

General Conditions was that the co-financier CCCE had notified the Bank inwriting that all conditions precedent to initial disbursement, if any, underits Loan Agreement had been fulfilled, save only for the effectiveness of theDevelopment Credit Agreement.

3.02 Project activities actually started before credit effectiveness sincethe project management unit was already in place and Government was able toprefinance the minimal expenses required for project operation. Therefore thedelay in credit effectiveness had no adverse effect on project implementation.

B. Project Revisions

3-03 There were no formal revisions of the project. However in 1979i80important changes were made in the design and scope of some components. Theland development objectives were drastically scaled down and emphasis was puton protecting paddies against salt incursion (para. 3.06). In view of thedeficiencies of the credit delivery and recovery systems and the inefficiencyof the extension services, it became obvious that the implementation of theintensification packages recommended at appraisal could not be achieved on alarge scale. Therefore the objectives became to build viable institutions:namely village farmers groups (sections villageoises) and a nucleus ofefficient extension services which would serve for future development. Thesedecisions were in line with those made at the reappraisal of the Sine SaloumAgricultural Project (Cr. 549-SE/Ln 1113-SE), which was experiencing similarproblems.

C. Credit Cancellation

3.04 Project Management was reluctant to curtail extension staffing asrequested by the Bank. Moreover, in April 19B1, Government decided to cancellall farmers' debts and to replace credit repayment for seeds and fertilizersby mandatory retention on groundnuts price. These measures took away anychance for village groups to succeed and prevented selective access to inputsupply by progressive farmers. For these reasons, together with CCCE, theBank decided in July 1981 not to exterd the original closing date of June 30:1981, except to honour commitments Government had made prior to that date. OnMarch 30, 1982 the undisbursed balance of approximately US$1.5 million (orabout 24% of the initial credit amount) was cancelled.

D. Physical Progress

Land Development

3.05 The project provided financing for land development of 1650 ha.Works started two years behind schedule due to the delay in recruiting theexpatriate rural engineer and long procedures for bid evaluation and award.Due to the remoteness and the dispersion of work sites, the project was ableto attract only one small local contractor with limited experience.

-5-

3-06 Soc after works had started, the Project Nanagement realized that:

(a) studies had relied on unverified da a which proved to be wrong;

(b) many swamps were planned to be d-ai_ed but this appeared to beunnecessarY with the lowerxng of the water table as a result ofthe low rainfalls recorded since '969;

(c) the most urgent need was protecting paddies from saltl.ncursXon.

. _Therefore, the program was scaled down and priority was given toprotection against salt. 'he drains which were already constructed wereobstructed with earth or gravel. The contractor was unable to implement eventhis reduced program. The contract was terminated in December 1980, with only301 ha completed, out of the 915 ha of the original contract. The Projec'Nanagement Unit developed another 75 ha by force account with farmers'participation for land leveling and other on-farm land development works.Hence the total area developed was 376 ha or about 23% of the programanticipated at appraisal.

3-07 In contrast to the low performance for works implemented under thecontrol of the Project Nanagement, farmers realized important collectiveinvestments on their own, with only 4 qchnLcal advice from the project staff.This consisted mainly in building aacl-saline dikes to salvage large areas ofabandoned paddies. This suggests that much more could have been achieved hadthe project been able to identify farmers' priorities and to get theircooperation in the process of project design, planning and implementation.

Crops and Animal Feed Processing Equipment

3.08 It was anticipated that 35 rice huskers would be installed at thecooperative level. However Governzent's priority was to satisfy the capacityof an existing commercial mill. Therefore it took two years for the ProjectNanagement to get the authorization to acquire rice huskers. In order tominimi e risks, the Bank proposed, and Government agreed, to limit the firstorder to four units. Specifications were provided by a consultant from theWest Africa Rice Development Association (iARDA). Although the equipmentdellvered had a higher capacity than the one recommended, the approach provedto be quite satisfactory. It could be extended to projects with ricecomponents in West Africa in order to increase the value added at the producerlevel and free women from the daily chore of hand pounding.

3.09 The project also provided financing for a feed mixing plant. Theequipment was installed in 1980 but was still idle in April 1983 because of amissing transformer.

Farm Investments

3-10 The promotion of animal traction was considered as an importantfactor for achieving the project's objectives. However, because of thedeficiencies of the credit system, only about one half of the equipmentanticipated was actually procured. Harrows, which are important for rice land

-6-

preparation, were not available at all. The detail for draft animals and mostimportbant implements Is provided below.

Actua}/Actual Forecast Forecast (%)

Plows 2090 2900 72Seeders *898 3150 60Harrows 0 3150 0Carts 1761 3150 56

Total Bquipment 5749 12350 47PaLrs of oxen 2193 4020 55

Other Investments

3.11 The project was to build 112 warehouses for cooperatives; however,it was impossible to attract a contractor for this program, which had to beundertaken by force account. Yorks started two years behind schedule and wereoften disrupted by shortages of cement and roof sheets resulting fromGovernaent administrative procedures. In total only 44 warehouses were built.

3.12 For the same reasons, the five wells anticipated at appraisal wereeonstructed by force account and completed three years behind schedule. Theproject was unable to dig the additional wells which were approved by -the Bankand CCCE in response to cattle owners' needs.

3.13 It was also anticipated to equip 47 blacksmiths as part of the animaltrascton development program. However in order to ensure that equipment wouldbe used at full capacity, only ten sets of equirnent were ordered. Recipientsmade a down-payment equivalent to 10% of the equipment cost and have beenpaying their credit installment regularly. The only problem has been that theProject Management has been unable to supply blacksmiths with steel of therequired quality because of adimnistrative and financial procedures.

B. Studies

3.14 The projec,t provided financing for the preparation of a masteragricultural development plan covering the whole Casamance Region in order toavoid the piecemeal development lCh;ich prevailed. The study mobilizedconsiderable resources in expatriate and local staff. It brought a valuablecontribution in gathering a comprehensive inventory of existing data and acritical review of past and on-going agricultural development projects.However the part consisting of a definition of a strategy and proposals forfuture actions was somewhat lacking. It received little attention fromrelevant Government departments and despite the recommendations to thecontrary, actions such as -the development of mangrove soils and the SODAGRIProject were undertaken. In retrospect the master plan did not warrant theefforts which were devoted to it.

-7-

F. Staffing

3.15 In July 1976 the Regional Development Agency (SODIWAC) was set up andthe former Sedhiou Project Manager was appointed SOMIVAC General Nanager. Theformer head of Sedhiou. Project's extension services was then appointed projectmanager. A recently graduated Senegalese agronomist was appointed to fill theposition of head of extenslon services but did not perform satisfactorily andwas removed after a year In office. For more than another fuill year, theproject was unable to find a suitable Senegalese for this vacancy- Althoughit was not anticipated to fill this position with aa expatriate, the Bank andCCCE agreed to do so on Government's request. All other upper level positionswere filled on time with civil servants on secondment.

3.,6 Concerning staff other than civil servants, PHU took advantage of theswitch to Sedhiou II to terminate their contracts and to rehire only thosethat had performed well. Thus, seventeen positions of village extensionworkers were discontinued, and twenty-three other extension workers wereremoved and replaced by new recruits, most of whom were agricultural schoolleavers. During -the whole period of project implementation, ProjectManagement succeeded in keeping the staffing within the limits forecast atappraisal.

3.17 Three expatriates were expected to fill the positions of (i) head ofthe monitoring and evaluation unit, (Li) head of the civil works division and(iii) head of the finance and administrative division, by end of 1976.However due to administrative procedures, these experts took up their assign-ments six to nine months behind schedule.

G. Procurement

3.18 it was anticipated that contracts for buildings, water-control works,equipment and vehicles, totalling about US$3.4 million would be awarded on thebasis of international competitive bidding (ICB) procedures. However onlywater-control works were so procured. There was only one tender from a localcontractor. Even though the program was scaled down (see para. 3.06) he wasunable to complete it. Eventually only US$160,000 was disbursed under thiscontract. Vehicles, paddy huskers and blacksmith equipment, which were tohave been procured through ICB procedures, were actually procured throughlocal competitive bidding (LCB). Cooperative warehouses and wells wereconstructed by force account because they could not attract contractors. Farminputs and implements, which were entirely financed by Government, wereprocured under government's agreements with local industries. Consultantservices were procured according to IDA's guidelines.

H. Project Costs

3.19 Total project costs were estimated at US$14.9 million (CFAP 3,355million), including taxes and duties (estimated at US$2.0 million) andphysical and price contingencies. Actual costs cannot be accurately assessed,because farm inputs and implements were procured nationwide by ONCAD and theircost were not available. Excluding these items, actual costs and appraisalestimates compare as follows:

-8-

Actual Forecast Actual/Forecast-- USS '0o -

Capital ExpendituresCivil works 3B3 2,146 18Equipment 402 1,711 23Vehicles 208 267 78

Total capital expenditures 993 4,124 24

Recurrent CostsExpatriate staff and consultants 2,322 1,333 174Local staff 4,611 5,333 86Operating costs 1,098 1,115 98

Total recurrent costs 8,031 7,781 103

Total Project costs 9.024 11,905 76

In spite of the extension of the project completion date by one year,actual costs were below appraisal estimates for a11 items except expatriatestaff, mainly because of: (i) additional staff not anticipated at appraisal(head of extension services), and (ii) higher unit costs. While the projectspent all the operating budget anticipated at appraisal, it was able to absorbonly about 25% of Its capital expenditures allocation.

I. Financing and Disbursement

3.20 IDA with a credit of US$6.3 million was expected to finance 42% oftotal project costs. A CCCE loan of FF 14.2 million (US$3.2 million) wasexpected to cover 21% of total project costs estimated at appraisal at US$14.9million. Government's contribution estimated at US$3.4 million or 23% oftotal project costs had to finance 100% of taxes and civil servants's salariesand part of investments and operating costs. BNDS was expected to financefarm inputs and implements, estimated at US$1.9 million or 13% of totalproject costs. Beneficiaries were expected to finance a downpayment of 10% ofthe cost of rice huskers and blacksmith equipment for a total of US$0.1million, or about 1% of total project costs.

3.21 Actual total project financing amounted to about US$9.0 million. IDAand CCCE financings were respectively about US$4.8 and 2.8 million or 53% and31% of total project financing. Their shares were higher than anticipated dueto cost overrun on expatriate staff and consul+tants' costs, which theyfinanced at 100%. Government's actual contribution was about US$1.5 millionor 17% of total project costs. Government was unable to raise itscontribution from its own resources and resorted to borrowing from the euro-dollar market on commercial terms. For reasons given above, BIDS' actualfinancing could not be accurately assessed but was certainly much lower thananticipated, in view of the low quantities of farm inputs and implements madeavailable to farmers. Beneficiaries financial participation was negligiblebecause only a small fraction of the equipment intended for cooperatives was

-9-

procured and also because cooperatives' funds deposited at BUDS were not madeavailable for the down payment for the purebase of rice huskers, as agreed inthe Credit Agreement.

3.22 Credit disbursement started only in October 1977, eleven months aftercredit effectiveness, due to the delay in recruiting the expatriate financialanalyst. The proceeds of the first withdrawal were kept by the Treasury, inviolation of the Credit Agreement. The Bank threatened to cancel the creditif its funds did not reach the Project Account. For this reason Governmentrefrained from presenting withdrawal applications until this situation wasresolved in August 1978. Even after that the pace of disbursement remainedsluggish, with six to nine-month lags between the time the Project incurredexpenses and related funds were withdrawn. Appralsal estimate and actualschedule of disbursements are in the Table 2.

J. Covenants

3-23 The Credit Agreement required that PMU (PRS) would be transferred tothe Regional Development Agency (SONIVAC) only after: (i) this agency had beenestablished with adequate financial and administrative autonomy, and (ii) ithad been adequately funded. In fact this integration took place even beforecredit effectiveness and SOWIVAC was bound by Public Agency regulations,implying among other obligations the prior authorization of the CentralFinancial Controller for most expenses. The credit agreement provided alsothat the Caisse d'Avance of CFAF 50 million created during the first projectwould be maintained. However this amount was assigned to SOMIVAC as a wholeand only 40% of this amount was reserved for the project. Noreover the use ofthis Caisse d'Avance was very restricted and therefore it could not providethe flexibility needed for the operation of such project.

3.24 The credit agreement provided also that the assistance to andsupervision of cooperatives in the project area would be transferred fromONCAD to the Project Management Unit within one year after signing. However,this transfer took place more than two years benind schedule. Other covenantspertaining to nationwiLde policies proved to be difficult to tackle at thelevel of a particular project and were generally not complied with. They are:(i) availability of cooperatives' funds deposited in BNDS, (ii) agriculturalcredit terms and conditions, (iii) interest on agricultural credit, and (iv)deposit by Government in the Project Account of funds covering the project'sestimate of expenditures for the following three months, and (v), timelyauditing of the project's accounts.

IV. Agricultural Impact

A. Technological changes

4.01 The project aimed at increasing agricultural production by: (i)increasing the area cropped compared to the situation without project, mainlythrough the promotion of animal traction, and (il) increasing yields throughthe use of inputs and better crop husbandry practices. As indicated in para.3.10, only about half of the draft animnls and related implements anticipatedat appraisal were actually made available to farmers. The shortfall was even

- 10 -

worse for inputs. Throughout project implementation, input supply was lowerthan the pre-project situation. Pre-project, forecast and actual suppliescompare as follows:

Actual Forecast Actual/Forecast-- tons---- _______

Compound fertilizersPlO 2,569PY1 939 3,000 31PY2 787 3,148 25PI3 1,192 4,250 28P14 73 4,180 2

Total PY1-4 2,991 14,578 21Urea

P1O 723PA1 603 828 73PY2 501 1,025 49P13 623 1,167 53P14 56 1,547 4

Total P1l-4 1,783 4,567 39

4.02 Despite these shortcomings, surveys have shown that the project hashad some positive impact. Participant farmers were better equipped than thenon-participant farmers and obtained higher yields as a result of timely landpreparation and sowing. However survey data did not support the appraisalassumption whereby promotion of animal traction would increase the areacropped. The reason is that area expansion was limited by the unavailabilityof adequate equipment for weeding.

4.03 Surveys have also shown that participant farmers used more inputsthan non participant farmers. Moreover, faced with input shortages, theytended to apply the right dosages on a reduced area simultaneously withrecommended crop husbandry practices in order to get higher returns: seeTable 7.

4.04 Another technological change expected from the project was increaseduse of improved seeds. Very little was achieved in this field. Groundnut andrice seeds distributed by ONCAD were very often of poorer quality than thosekept by farmers themselves. The project was unable to organize a successfulmaize seed multiplication scheme. Upon the recommendation of a Bank mission,the project started in 1979 to extend the "mini-kit" technique to assistfarmers in producing and storing good quality rice seeds, taking advantage ofthe auto-gamous character of the species and its high multiplicationcoefficient from seed to harvest (about 100 in good conditions).

4.05 Concerning the development of livestock, performance was generallylow. Use of mineral supplements and feeding of lactating cows weresuccessfully tested but could not be extended in view of sociologicalconstraints: conflicts of interest between cow-owners and herders. The Cattlefattening program came to a deadlock, because farmers were unable to find anoutlet for their fattened cattle. With regard to smallstock, the crossbreeding of local sheep with the northern "Djallonke" breed was not warranted,

- 11 -

as these rams and their offspring were unable to endure the high humidityprevailing in the project area. Introduction of an improved breed of youngroosters for crossbreeding with local poultry was successful but the projectcould not meet the demand. In retrospect, it appears that the highestpriorities for livestock development were water and drug supply, but theproject was not equipped to satisfy these needs.

B. Incremental output

4.06 Due to shortcomings in input supply and to unfavorable rainfall,throughout project implementation, production for both with" and "withoutproject" (respectively measured from the results of participant and non-participant farmers) fell much below appraisal forecasts (see Key Indicators:Table 3). Surveys conducted for the last three project years suggest that:

(i) <the project did not lead to area expansion, thus its impact wasfelt only on yield increase;

(ii) Only new participants who joined the project during the secondphase contributed to incremental production;

(ili) Incremental maize production was insignificant as a combinedeffect of unfavorable rainfall, and short supply of Inputs andseeds;

(iv) incremental production for other crops was erratic, depending onthe rainfall and input supply. For PY4 and 5, incrementalproduction of groundouts and millet were insignificant;

(v) incremental livestock production was insignificant throughoutthe project implementation.

4.07 The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit collected data for participant andnon-participant farmers which permitted to estimate productions "with' and'without" project (see table 4). Cumulative actual and forecast incremental

productions, for the five-year implementation period compare as follows:

Actual Forecast Actual/Forecast----- tons---- _____--

Paddy 9,105 31,113 29Millet 1,505 10,385 14maize 0 18,809 0Groundauts 3,638 24,391 15Cotton 332 1,870 18

4.08 The evolution of imported rice in the project area provides anotherindication that incremental production fell short of expectations. During thefirst project (1972-76), rice importations decreased sharply. It was expectedthat the second project would achieve rice self-sufficiency in the projectarea and would even allow a transfer of about 8,000 tons of milled rice toother regions. However this result was far from being achieved. Instead of a

_ 12 -

rice surplus, the district experienced an increasing deficit as shown by thefollowing stastics.

Importations of rice in the Sedhiou District

1973 15981974 11721975 5751976 (last year of 1st Project) 2651977 6961978 24931979 1785

V. Economic and Financial Returns

A. Economic Re-Evaluation

5.01 At appraisal, the project's economic rate of return over 15 years wasestimated at 23%. The calculation included project expenditures andincremental on-farm costs. Regional Planning Unit costs were excluded becauseit was assumed that they would have no direct relation with the project'sbenefits. Consistent with the "plateau theory" (see para 2.04), noincremental extension costs were included after the project developmentperiod, as it was contended that there was no need for extension efforts tosustain the productivity level to be achieved at project completion. Thisassumption can be disputed on two grounds: (i) it is doubtful that the highintensity level targeted at appraisal could be sustained after only a fewyears of extension advice, and (ii) the feasibility of an abrupt withdrawal ofextension staff would be slim for political and social reasons. Nevertheless,because the project is a repeater one, and there was no build-up in staffingcompared to the first project, it can be assumed that staff requirement afterthe project development period would be the same 'with" and "without" thesecond project. For this reason, we kept the above assumptions in re-evaluating the project economic return.

5.02 Because evaluation surveys suggest that only participants who joinedduring the second phase contributed to project incremental production, onlyon-farm costs and benefits pertaining to those farmers have been taken intoconideration in re-evaluating the project's economic return. Actual costs andproduction have been used up to 1981. After this date, in view of thecollapse of the agricultural credit and input supply systems and the long timewhich would be required to redress this situation, it is assumed that onlyvery limited quantities of fertilizers would be made available to farmers.Incremental production after project completion is estimated at 100 kg/ha forpaddy, and 50 kg/ha for millet and groundnuts. Because cotton requires denseand permanent extension staffing, it is assumed that after project completionthis crop would be no longer under the PRS's control. The Bank's priceforecasts of July 1982 were used for the computation of farm-gate economicprices. All costs and benefits are in 1981 terms. On this basis the economicrate of return was estimated at 6% (see table 5), compared to 23% atappraisal. The re-estimated rate of return is even lower than the one

- 13 -

obtained with the most pessimistic assumption made in the sensitivity analysisat appraisal.

B. Farmers Incomes

5.03 At appraisal average partlcipant income was expected to increase by33% in 1976 terms over a five-year period, while non-participants' incomewould remain constant. This improvement did not materialize; actual incomesevolved according to input availability and climate vagaries. Even for1978/79 when the best results were recorded, the avarage participant's netrevenue was not more than 10% higher than the average non-participant'srevenue, as follows:

Participant Non-Participant

Production (kg)Paddy 1-98 166Millet and Maize 244 186Groundnuts 610 636Seed-cotton 32 0

Gross Value (CFAF'o0O) 43.2 39.7On-farm Costs 2.8 2.5Net Revenue 40.4 37.2

VI. Institutional Performance

A. Executing Agency: SOMIVAC/PRS

6.01 At appraisal it was assumed that the project management organizationestablished under the first project, which had proved satisfactory, wouldremain essentially the same. It was also expected that PhU would get greaterfinancial and administrative autonomy. However because SOMIVAC was put underPublic Agency regulations requiring prior control on most expenses, theproject was faced with complicated and inefficient procedures. Concerningstaffing, the critical post of head of the extension services was vacant orinadequately filled for most of the project implementation period.

6.02 Another problem wnich hampered SOMIVAC/PRS' performance was theinadequacy of transportation means for extension staff. The extension staffat sub-district and district levels were supposed to buy cars on their own,use them in discharging their duties and receive an allowance incompensation. However from the time the project was put under Public Agencyregulations no credit was made available to them for buying cars. Moreover,despite Bank and CCCE requests, Government refused to adjust the car allowancerates for more than 10 years. Only in 1980 were rates increased by 20%, butthis was far from adequate to cover actual costs. For this reason, in 1980,out of the 30 extension workers who needed cars to perform their duties only5 had a car in good condition. To alleviate this problem the Bank and CCCEagreed in July 1980 to finance the purchase of 15 cars to be used underproject's control. However, due to Government's lengthy procedures, these

- 14 -

cars were not delivered until August 1981. Hence, the mobility of high levelextension workers and the supervision of village extension workers, which wereperequisites for the project's success, were impaired throughout the projectexecution period, and this led to low morale and poor supervision.

6.03 The evolution of cotton yields gives an indication of theinefficiency of SOMIVAC/PRS extension services. During the first project,SODEFITEX, -- a commercially oriented mixed entreprise, enjoying a great dealof autonomy-- was responsible for cotton extension in the project area. Forthe second project, it was decided to transfer this activity to SOMIVAC/PRS,with the agreement that SODEFITEX would continue to supply all inputs requiredfor intensive cotton cultivation. To ensure a smooth transfer, SODEFITEX andPRS extension staff worked together in 1978/79. From then, PBS was solelyresponsible for cotton extension activities, and SODEPITEX complied with itsobligation to provide cotton inputs. In 1982, when external financing ended,SOMIVAC/PRS withdrew its extension staff from cotton and requested SODEFITEXto take over. Therefore in 1982/83, cotton growers were assisted again bySODEFITEX. The table below gives the evolution of cotton cultivation from1977 to 1983, in the project area and compares the yields obtained there withthose of the neighboring district of Kolda, which presents similar climaticconditions and has always been covered by SODEFITEX.

77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83

Sedhiou

Extension Agency SODEFITEX SODEFITEX/SOMIVAC SONIVAC SOMIVAC SONIVAC SODEPITEK

Area (ha) 505 653 214 226 262 355Production (t) 530 640 121 83 128 451Yield (kg/ha):A 1050 980 565 367 489 1270

KoldaYield (kg/ha):B 1153 711 943 663 1319 1143Ratio A/B .91 1.38 .60 .55 .37 111 -

From these figures, one cannot help but conclude that withSOMIVAC/PRS management, cotton yields in the project area deteriorateddramatically and that this can be attributed, partly at least, to extensioninefficiency.

B. Input Supply, Credit Management and Subsidy Policy

6.04 Adequate and timely input supply was a prerequisite to the success ofthe project. However high delinquency resulting from lax credit managementand the burden entailed by high subsidy rates led to large shortfalls in inputsupply throughout the project implementation period and eventually to thecollapse of the entire system of input supply and credit delivery and thedissolution of ONCAD in 1980. The following sequence of decisions illustrates

- 15 -

the increasing deterioration in credit management. In December 1977,Governuent decided to: (i) cancel 30% of all outstanding debts, (ii) grant aone-year moratorium, and (iii) re-schedule the repayment of the remainingdebts over three years. In 1978, Government decided not to provide credit tocooperatives which had repaid less than 65% of their mature debts. At thebeginning of the 1979/80 marketing campaign, Goversment required repayment ofall mature debts before any purchase of groundnuts for cash could be made.After one month, Government, under pressure, lowered its requirement of debtrepayment to 70%. Finally the decision was that 30% of the value of thequantity of groundnuts delivered by farmers should serve for debt repayment.However, with the connivance of cooperative presidents and ONCAD weighers,farmers cashed the value of most of the groundnuts they delivered. At the endof the marketing campaign, Government decided for the next campaign, to liftall conditionalities for access to credit and to retain 3 CFAF/kg ofgroundnuts or 6% for debt repayment. This represented only a small fractionof mature debts. Besides this mandatory retention, debt repayment was left tothe farmers' good will. In 1980, following a poor groundnut harvest and inview of farmers' high indebtedness--nationwide, total debts amounted to almostthe equivalent of an entire average annual groundaut production- Governmentdecided to re-schedule the repayment of arrears over five years. It alsodecided to call off credit for draft animals and farm-equipment. In April1981, Government decided to cancel the bulk of all farmers' debts. It alsodecided to replace credit repayment for seeds and fertilizers by mandatoryretention on groundnuts price.

6.05 Besides the lack of stringent rules for credit repayment, high debtdelinquency resulted from Government policy inducing farmers to takeunnecessary credits. Each year Government distributed on credit the entireneeds of groundnuts seeds. There was no technical justification for such alarge distribution since farmers could easily produce and store their ownseeds. Although many farmers did so, they still took advantage of thedistribution of Government' s groundnuts seeds but used them for otherpurposes. Because of this generous policy, on December 31, 1980, groundnutsseeds accounted for more than 50% of total mature debts (see Table 6).Another case was for draft animals, for which farmers could easily receivecredit even if they actually drew animals from their own herds.

6.06 Another factor which contributed to the co"lapse of the agriculturalcredit and input supply systems was the high subsidy rate on fertilizers andseeds, entailing financing beyond Government's capability. Although from 1976to s980, the producer price of groundnuts increased from CEAF 41.50 to 50/kgGovernment kept the fertilizer price constant at CFAF 25/kg. . In 1979, thesubsidy on fertilizers represented 60% of the input cost. Meanwhile, with thecrisis of public finances, total appropriations for agricultural subsidieswere shrinking. Under the re-negotiated Sine-Saloum Agricultural DevelopmentProject (Cr. 549-SE/Ln. 113-SE) and the Structural Adjustment Loan (Cr. 1084-SE/Ln 1931-SE) Government agreed to progressively phase out subsidies onfertilizers and to reduce the quantities of groundnuts seeds to be distributedto farmers; however, this did not materialize. It is worth recalling thatsince 1976, opposition political parties were authorized in Senegal.Willingly or not, Government has been compelled to match generous electoralpromises made by those parties. The political pressure was particularly

- 16 -

intense in the months preceding general eleotions (early 1978 and 1983). The1977 and 1981 debt cancellation and re-scheduling should also be seen againstthis background.

C. Cooperative Institutions

6.07 Transfer of cooperative supervision from ONCAD to PMU and re-structuring of cooperatives by splitting them into village farmers groups(sections villageoises) were major institutional goals of the project.However, as reported in para. 3.23, the transfer took place two years behindschedule. Immediately, PMU initiated a test on two sub-districts. It wasfound that almost all membership fees were paid but about 25% of the proceedswere mis-appropriated by some eooperative presidents and ONCAD's ex-officers. Farmers requested appropriate actions for the repayment of thesemisSing funds, but there has been no follow-up. Cooperative accounts wereaudited by reconciling figures recorded by ONCAD with what was aknowledged bycooperatives members in general assemblies. During this exercise, farmerswere very cooperative and honest in reporting equipment received by them andmisrecorded by ONCAD. They were also able to accurately assess individualdebts. Overall, for the two sub-districts, the total debts aknowledged byfarmers differed from ONCAD's records by only 3%.

6.08 The second step consisted in the setting-up of sections villageoises,simultaneously with the test undertaken by the Sine Saloum AgriculturalDevelopment Project. For both projects the test was undermined by Governmentdecisions, in April 1981, to cancel farmers' outstanding debts and to make amandatory retention for the repayment of seeds and fertilizers. Thispenalized farmers and prospective sections villageoises that had alreadyrepaid their debts and prevented selective access to inputs by progressivefarmers. No role was left to sections villageoises. Thus the test ofcooperative re-structuring aborted.

D. Accounting and Auditing

6.09 The Project's accounting was the responsibility of the Special ChiefAccountant (ACP) who was not under the hierarchical authority of SONIVACGeneral Manager. Instead he was accountable to the Central Accounting Officeand to the Financial Controller, both in Dakar. This administrativearrangement satisfied Government's control requireexents but failed to providea management tool.

6.10 Under the Para Public Enterprise Technical Assistance Project, theBank financed the audit of SOMIVAC by an internationally recruited auditingfirm. Because financial statements were not produced on time it was neverpossible to have the audit reports within four months after the end of eachfiscal year as required under the Credit Agreement. In addition to auditing,the firm prepared a manual of procedures. It recommended the appointment ofan internationally recruited accountant to train SOXIVAC staff in the use ofthe manual and fill the position of an internal auditor. However this couldnot be implemented due to administrative procedures and SONIVAC GeneralManager's resistance. In 1980, no more funds were available in the TechnicalAssistance Project for the auditing of SOMIVAC's accounts. Bank and CCCE

- 17 -

agreed to finance these fees under the Consultant Category, but SOMIVAC tookno action on this issue until credit cancellation. Therefore only the firstthree project years accounts were audited according to the standards set inthe Credit Agreement.

E. Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation

6.11 Semi-annual reports were generally submitted on schedule to theBank. The main shortcoming of these reports was that they were often toodescriptive and not enough critical and problem-solving oriented. On theBank's request Project Management also submitted a completion report whichmade commendable efforts to learn from the project's low performance and drawlessons for the future. The first Bank supervision mission assisted projectauthorities in establishing the format of a "tableau de bord", designed tocompare actual achievements with appraisal forecasts. This document wasregularly updated throughout the project implementation period. It proved tobe a very useful tool. It should be extended to similar projects.

6.12 Due to the delay in recruiting the expatriate head of the Monitoringand Evaluation Unit, project evaluation started only with the third projectyear. It generally succeeded in disentangling project's impact, providingguidance for extension works, identifying costraints and makingrecommendations to overcome them. Foreign technical assistance helped tobuild up a local capability for continuing of monitoring and evaluationactivities.

F. Consultants' Performance

6.13 Because of the lack of trained local staff, the project financed thecosts of four expatriates. They all were in executive positions. They wererecruited from two consulting firms. Their performance was hampered byadministrative procedures, input unavailability and a high rate of turnover:only one position was filled by the same expatriate throughout the projectimplementation.

G. Government and Bank's Performance

6.14 The former Sedhiou Project Manager and the then Minister of RuralDevelopment, who were instrumental in the setting-up of SOMIVAC apparentlycould not get the type of flexible administrative arrangements which hadpermitted the success of the first project. When the adverse effect of theprior financial and administrative control was felt, Government made noserious attempt to devise any departure from these stringent rules in order tohave the project successfully implemented. In its laudable quest to minimizepublic spending and prevent embezzlement, Government fell into the pitfall ofimposing unduly controls leading to inefficiencies. A case in point isGovernment's resistance to adjust car allowances for extension staff.

6.15 During the preparation phase, Bank staff anticipated the mostimportant problems which hampered successful project implementation. However,the conditionality set for overcoming some of these problems was not efficient

- 18 -

For instance, in view of the critical importance of the cooperative re-structuring and the administrative and financial autonomy for projectmanagement, the Bank should have required that these conditions be satisfiedbefore credit effectivenese.

6.16 Bank supervision miesions took place about twice a year asenvisaged. There was a great continuity of staff assigned to the project: insix years there were only two supervision mission leaders, one of whomparticipated in the appraisal mission. CCCE joined all Bank missions. Duringthese missions, staff went beyond routine supervision and devoted a great dealof their efforts in a technical assistance capacity. Such inputs were muchappreciated by the project management. However the efforts to solve technicaland managerial problems at the project level were frustrated by inadequatenational policies. In realizing that, the Bank tried to complement its actionat the project level by addressing sectoral issues at the Government level:annual consultations on fertilizer policy, monitoring of obligations derivingfrom the Structural Adjustment Loan, e.g. phasing out of fertilizer aubsidy,reduction of groundnuts seed stocks, and implementation of section villaeoisetest. However the dialogue at the national level was not successful either,because of the dilution of responsibilty, the difficulty of identifying theright interlocutors, and the political implications of the issues.

6.17 In retrospect it appears that the Bank underestimated the politicalproblems and made a taatical error in requesting the implementation of sectionvillageoise and seed stock reduction tests simultaneously in Sine Saloum andSedhiou. Instead it should have restricted these tests to the Sedhioudistrict, where the reforms would have met with less resistance because of thedistrict's isolation from the Groundnut Basin and the habits that most farmersalready have to store their own seeds.

VII. Special Issues

A. Weather: Persistence of drought since 1970

7.01 Despite the difficulties related above resulting from institutionalshortcomings and short supply of inputs, rainfall was the single mostimportant factor which affected project performance. At appraisal, theanalysis of data showed that average rainfall fo7 Sedhiou was 1400 mm with aprobability of at least 1200 mm in four years out of five. However during thefive-year project implementation period, average rainfall was only 955 mm,with a maximum of only 1150 mm and a minimum of 745 mm, which was also theabsolute minimum since 1928 that rainfall has been recorded. Low rainfall wasoften compounded with poor distribution. In looking back at rainfall dataavailable (see Table 8) it appears that sincea 1970, the project area has beenhit by a persistent drought. Average rainfall decreased by about 30% from1375 mm for the 42-year period of 1928-69 to 965 mm for the last fourteen

-19-

years (1970/83). It is worth noting that since the early 1970's a similartrend bas been observed in the wrhole country 1/ and even in the Sudano-Sahelian Zone as a whole 2/.

7.02 This lingering drought has bad far-reaching consequences. mostvarieties used in the project area are long duration types which were suited'to the high rainfalls which prevailed until recently but paid a heavy toll todrought in recent years. The effect of drought was also felt throughgroundwater and water salinity in paddies, because of the environmentalcharacteristics of the project area. Grey soil rice was the most successfulcrop which permitted the suceess of the first project. With this type of ricecultivation., water is supplied both by rains and shallow groundwater, whichnormally comes to the reach of rice roots only a few weeks after the start ofthe rainy season. This two-fold source of water supply makes for appreciablesecurity because the groundwater tapped by- the plant roots can offset rainfallvagaries. However with the cumulative rainfall deficit of about 6,000 mm overthe last fourteen years, groundwater was depleted and fenl out of the reach ofrice roots, *nakdig grey soil rice cultivation as drought prone as uplandfarming.

7.03 The consequences of the drought were also felt on water salinity inpaddies. In the project area, most lowland rice is grown along the Casamanceriver and the SoungrougroU, its tributary. During the dry season, water inthese rivers is always salty, but during the rainy season, high flows normallydisplace salty water with fresh water, irhich makes rice cultivationpossible. However with the prolonged droughts, flow decreased in the rivers,and most paddies were invaded by salty water all year round. This led to theloss of hundreds of hectares of paddies. The only way to salvage -thesepaddies would be to protect them against salt incursion by constructing a dikeand leaching the salt with rains before rice could be grown again.

B. Special role and problems of women

7.04 Rice growers are mostly women. Among the reasons for the firstproject's high performace was that the management succeeded in making inputsava-lable to all participants, including women. However during the secondproject, with the merging of ONCA]) and PNU's credits through the exclusivebcannel of cooperatives, women lost access to credit because: (i) only heads

of family compounds, hence men, could be cooperative -members, and (ii)husbands often refused to take inputs on credit for their wives, althoughexperience has shown that women's records in credit repayment are better than,men's. This situation was not only detrimental to women but also entailedless efficiency in the overall use of the mnall quantities of fertilizerswhich were made available to the project. In fact, women would have madebetter use of fertilizers because they grew mostly swamp rice, w)tceh was lessdrought prone than the other types of rice cultivation, and also because it-iswell known that weeding -which is a prerequisite to the efficiency of

1 / CILSS/Cub ddu Sahel, Developpemet des cultures pluviales, 1983.

2/ Iamb, P.J., Nature, Vol. 299, pp 46-47, 1982.

- 20 -

fertilizer use- is better performed in women's paddies than in men's uplandfields.

7.05 To solve this problem, PHW envisaged to assist in setting up women'scommittees within the sections villageoises in order to channel creditsespecially intended for women. This could not be implemented because thewhole re-structuring of farmers' organizations aborted for the reasons givenabove.

VIII. Lessons for future projects in the area.

8.01 In spite of the dismal performance of the Second Sedkiou Project, thefact remains that -the area is endowed with great natural resources, -akimg itone of the most favorable regions for rainfed farming in Senegal. Howeverthis potential could materialize only if the shortcomings which preventedsuccessful implementation of the Second Sedbiou Project are overcome. In thisregard, the following recommendations could be drawn from the experience ofthe First and Second Sedhiou Projects.

A. Technical Aspects.

8.02 Unless there are technological breakthroughs, no further exteMsionefforts are warranted on groundnuts, millet and rice, for which the technicalpackages feasible under the present constraints of seed and input distributionpolicies have already been mastered by farmers. In contrast, the resultsobtained with SODEFITEX extension on cotton in one sub-district of the projectarea (para. 6.05) suggest that there is a great po:tential- for cottondevelopment. There are good indications that the success of cotton-baseddevelopment which has been experienced in Upper Casamance could be replicatedin the project area. The institutional arrangements for such an option willbe discussed later.

8.03 Concerning land development,, in view of the increasing salinisationof paddies due to the drought which has been observed since 1970, top priorityshould be given to dike construction to protect swamps against saltincursion. There is a great demand for such works, the bulk of which consistsof earth moving which can be done by farmers with only topographic studies andlight civil works requiring the project's intervention. CCCE is alreadyconsidering pilot project along these lines.

8.04 Concerning livestock development, priority should be given in thefuture to drug and water supplies which lend themseves to a large physicaland financial participation from beneficiaries as experienced in EasternSenegal.

8.05 Institutional arrangements permitting, the extension of the mini-kittechnique would allow farmers to produce good quality seeds of paddy with onlya small flov of foundation seeds, the production of which could be contractedto ISRE.

- 2t -

B. Institutional Aspects

8.06 The experience of the Second Sedhiou Project and that of SAED beforeits reorganization in 1981, show that the existing statutes of "EtablissementsPublics" as they stand are an unsuitable framevork for executing anagricultural project. This was acknowledged by Government when it re-structured SAED into a "Societe Nationale' in 1981. Similar arrangementsshould be made for SOMIVAC before the Bank envisages a project to be executedby it.

8.07 In view of the high cost of car purchase and operation in comparisonwith extension workers' salaries, it is no longer warranted to request them toown a mar, and use it to discharge their duties against an allowance. Insteadcars should be bought and operated by project authorities. As for SODEFITEX,stringent rules should be set and enforced to monitor the use of the cars andthe consumption of gas.

8.08 In view of the important role played by women in rice cultivation,special care should be taken in the future to ensure their access to inputsupply and credit delivery in determining new credit eligibility criteria andreorganizing cooperative institutions. This could be reached by authorizingspecial "sections villageoises" for women as independent borrowers.

8.09 The most Important and immediate prospect lies in cotton-relatedd-evelopment. This is enhanced by the net price system, whereby all inputs(seeds, fertilizers and insecticides) are apparently free of charge tofarmers, their cost being included in SODEFITEX cotton operating margin.Under the recently (August 10, 1983) approved Eastern Senegal RuralDevelopment Project (Cr. 1406-SE), SODEFITEX has already authority to expandcotton cultivation in the same sub-district of Bounkiling where it has beenoperating. Government and donors should be prepared for an expansion ofcotton-based development from this sub-district to the entire district ofSedhiou. This could be achieved through a revision of the existingcreditf/loan agreements if the additional expenses required could beacconmodated within financing already secured or through a supplementarycredit which could be easily prepared and appraised.

lll-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

l k

w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

iaole jyableeu L

SESECAL

52d2 SEDIOO inECr / DEIITElE YUCJEI BE SEDHROC

(Cr. S47-5E)

Project Completion Report ! Rapport d'Achiveuent

Project Cost and Financing

(cm5 Mfillion)

Apraisal Eatiaste 21 Actual 31 Actual Total an

c.ponars 2 of AppraisalLocal Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Estimate Total

Civil worcks 1_201 0.945 2.146 0.214 0.169 0.3B3 18 Treaas de gEniecivil

Crop processing 0.463 0.537 1.ODO 0.011 0.012 0.023 2 Traitement des ricoltes

Vehicles i.119 l 0.48 0.267 0.093 0.115 0.208 78 V&icules

Equipment (excluding Equipament (Dno-cDris

fer equipment) 0.340 0.371 0.711 0.181 0.19B 0.379 53 macerieL arricole)

Expatriate Staff and Pere,_1l sqatrie et

Coultata O_67 1.066 1.333 0.464 I.8B8 2322 174 coneltamDC

Local Staff 4.703 0.630 5.333 4.066 0.545 4.611 86 Pereonnel local

Operating cost 0.930 0.185 1.115 0.915 0.133 1.098 98 Frais de foectionnemc

Total 3.023 3_82 11.905 5.944 3.080 9.024 76 Total

Financing:

IDA 6.300 4.768 76 AID

CCCE 3.1S5 2.757 87 CCCl

Gover ment 2.350 1.497 4 Couvezeent

Benef ciaries 0.100 0.002 Z Beneficiaires

t1/ Excluding fam inputs and equipment which have been procured II Son cmris le materiel et incrant agricsles qui mC Ste

? anote; Govemrent amecy and for which actual costs fournia par ue autre agece d gouverne_ent et pour lequelsare not sailable. le corat neat pas isole

Z/ Exchange race: ;SI - CFAF 225 2/ Tm de change: 0551 - CFAF 225

3t Average exchange rate: US$ I - CFAF 222 3/ TaD de change yen 55 - CFAF 222

- 24 - Table/Tableau 2

SENEGAL

SECOND SEDHIOU PROJECT / DEUXIEME PROJET DE SEDHIOU(Cr. 647-SE)

Project Completion Report / Rapport d'Achevement

Schedule of Disbursement / Calendrier des dgboursements

IDA Fiscal Year and Accumulated Disbursements (US$ million)/ Actual as Z of Forecast/semester/ Annie et Deboursements Cumulls (USS million) Realisation en Z de lasemestre Fiscaux AID Actual/RUalisation Forecast/ Prvis ion prfvision

19771 0 0.33 02 0 0.65 0

19781 0.26 1.35 192 0.26 2.05 13

19791 1.09 2.85 382 1.74 3.65 48

19801 2.47 4.50 552 2.99 5.35 56

19811 3.20 5.83 552 4.22 6.30 67

19821 4.77 1/ 6.30 76

Closing Date 6/30/81 3/30/82

1/ The remaining balance of US$1.53 million was cancelled on March 30, 1982.

an. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 71n> 1-

Annie-e

um~ ~ ~ a_ 0 p r j_ Ar 11 A IF

-_ /a mit *' m

be tee utilP1 sM

_ e Fm y'f £ yi * F * £ r yz * r * p -

*r (or hrtlt 23.5 34.9 33.8 103 4SJ 30 1SI 700 45.0 154 77.3 50 155 83.7 50.0 167 _ belte s pertlipsa (-C00)

Ilnber otf lean ( ) Z 0 8.A 4.9 tn 7.5 5 S. 133 9.9 65 152 11.3 7.2 15 12.1 7.2 170 eSb. 4"no plt1alle. (low)

ares _er re'jet eeet.. CUD ta) et.. necelf" CR0 baUtL. 6. 5.6 7.2 77 7.2 OA 8 a a.5 10.1 64 .4 11.8 so 6.0 21.8 Gs UsfiZX.t 4.4 2.3 54 42 4. 6.2 78 6.9 7.2 96 10.2 6.2 124 1225 8.2 152 811Phl 1.0 07 .7 41 * 4 2* 1 67 2.5 2.5 go 3.4 3.1 III 4.7 3.. 152 1IeOntIsh 9.0 S9. 20.3 93 25.7 12.0 *23 22.2 1 253 27.5 1.0 262 24.6 17.0 145 kre-Wles 0.3 0D 0. 0 0 0.5 0 0.7 S0.6113 2.2 0.7 30 0.20.7 t31 tte

WTere. 21.2 16.2 25.0 73 29. 29.3 99 404 3S4 116 50.7 40.9 e t@.t 409 96 -I?bl _qrbL

mactern C 4) inducll t.CS ti12.5 26S 14.2 117 22.3 17.4 72 21.0 21.0 200 17.8 25.7 49 7?. 25.7 29 Tl rm00o t)

ulot *4.7 1.2 6.8 S7 .2 7.9 n3 86 9.7 89 12.7 22.1 205 12.7 1t.1 log nUbel 24 1.2 .0 I1 2.0 4*.9 3 3.7 6.2 S0 4.* 7.5 2 6.0 7.5 02 Ide

I. S 0a 22.2 *2.9 240I 121 '90 16.7 ¶14 34.6 S.7 2*O M5.5 25.1 122 84 25.1 34 Pelcom e 0.3 0 04 0 0 0.5 0 0.6 0.7 94 0.2 0.9 23 0.1 O.9 a tIes

rFed( 2.0 3.0 2.0 145 1.7 2.0 85 2.5 2.1 119 2.9 2.1 g0 0.9 2.1 43 luCy111.4 t.: 0.6 1.3 42 0.9 1.3 69 12 1.3 92 1.2 2.4 62 0.8 1.4 6t

time T.7 1.7 2.3 74 1.4 Z. 58 *.5 2463 14. 2.5 56 1.3 2.5 52 tleOrtmeemti 1.3 2.0 1.4 141 1.2 2.4 66 1.6 U.5 104 1.2 2.5 74 0.3 1.5 2! ArdLhI6s

aIles T.0 AL 1.0 A 8 2.1 3A 1.0 1.2 62 0.6 1.2 46 0.4 1.2 30 e.2

humls a lets mte4eet S3uir th:-s mlesslo. a

'uier- tertlnsla Ct) z569 939 m 31 'MT l 1s1 25 215z 420 28 75 £teD 2 26 A1l0 7 lesel. cweds (41e mC) 723 405 I lan 73 501 1a0 49 62 1147 5 56 1547 4 391 1547 25 US.Ct)

0_ (c ) 5o 57 s0 os 385 83 710 452 w0 35 580 2550 39 0 0 _ besf d- belt (ps.eLOs0can. (set.) 189 328 655 4 35 725 43 100 M0 22 320 SW 36 0 0 Certta A see_ C_ tt.e)Plan_ s c ) P51 402 625 96 5w 67S as 42 M SS a am 61 0 0 flerrese (emtS)

serm (twitJ) IDt6 GSeM as ito 415 25 S7 5U at 62 279 8go 31 0 0 _In Cdttle)

fee hssl.-t (be) 0 6 40 15 86 560 15 256 1130 22 301 1650 32 2650 20 Aeueeeete _drear1z1s (h.)Ce-aminu) CnedUIs

tidy here Ct_te) 0 0 6 0 0 1S 0 0 25 0 0 35 0 4 35 *i _cerliqee. pidy (Cattle)

bApc) m-1e_tes) b) in.)- a ri s*,1n 4 * ma emmut saneRc hf~ - atSfld eeial

a)

Tabl/tabt"u 4

-26-

Jman s0ms FROsa / amas PROI iD S31D

Congletion Import / Rapert 4Chacwaant

Proje. Ilnrmntal Productlos / Produeton Additionnlla du Proset

Unit: tone. unle otbarime Indicated / aIt. ton., m?f Indtoition contare

PlO MI Pr2 P73 PYU P5 P16 Py7 P76IS

1. without Project - r 1. Sam Prajet -Ppadwy 1240 13t10 13760 34510 19240 19260 15240 15260 tS260 PaddyRiftlt 466 5543 423 7423 8423 6423 6m2 a423 8423 wtiRaie 1800 15 z210 2275 2650 2650 2650 260 2650 PASSCroundauts 1257 13302 1t 15669 16972 16072 16972 16972 16972 reidCotta. 5O 0 30 300 100 MZ 300 '0 I500 cato.

2. Without Prject - A 2 Sam Projet - 2Peddy 18100 15e 1065 17126 16480 6772 5072 5072 15072 Paddymillet 1276 I11 386 7690 11699 11323 12960 12*60 12560 XlIMaIe 752 1219 3969 3661 4656 50 0 FeeaCrOnd sa 687 16500 1737 31665 30532 6666m 3520 3520 3520 AnebideCotton a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cuot.

3. Witl Project -F 3. Avea Project - PPaddJ 12460 1431 17367 21016 25221 25221 25221 25221 25221 Paddy

ilnet 46A3 681J5 7895 9664 11122 11122 11122 1t122 11122 nuase 8oW MO9 4926 6115 7512 7512 7512 7512 7512 Nas

Crsdnata 11445 14039 1672; 20702 25122 25112 25112 25112 25112 aSiclCotton 30 36 505 683 6 99 89 9 899 699 Ceton

4. Win project - A 4. Awe Project -1ad 1200 1656 12272 21042 17778 7350 1600 16800 16800 PaddMillet 1876 1247 4170 8601 11699 t1t74 3 135W 500 13500 ELIKane 752 1219 3965 366 4656 5964 0 0 0 KalGrosudnt 6897 16932 19003 34579 30532 8668 36400 '6400 340 AreSdeCotton 0 0 0 640 121 83 0 0 0 Coton

5. Inera_vtal Priduction P 5. Prodution Additinlle-PPaddy 1078 3607 6506 9961 561 9961 t 9961 961 PaddyHulet 1270 1476 2241 26°9 2699 2655 2659 2699 ELIRaise 2019 26226 3D6 5062 s0 56 506 56 MaeGroUodSuts 757 2321 5013 8150 8150 6150 6150 8150 AreSideCotton 82 205 383 599 599 595 9 559 Coton

6. Increa.tal Prodnctinc-A 6. Prodution Additlosoalle4Guantite Ct) Wantitla

Paddy 1(94 1819 3916 1256 578 1726 1728 1726 PAddSue2st 160 4a i1s 0 425 54O 540 540 mlMaI14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 KauOCrsuodnuts £y32 166 2040 0 0 Ow 1t00 1O60 ArAddiCot-on a 0 640 121 63 0 0 0 C:lon

UItt Iconae Vlen. tC?POlOOIt) Ta2aura toon1oiqe UnItainapadd 60 67 57 66 75 51 51 55 radMllet 47 43 45 48 £9 44 49 49 muMaine £5 42 t2 42 4S A1 45 47 YAeGr_oo.dnt t1o IttO 75 6s 86 43 5 73 ArabhdaCotton 133 99 51 108 10 0 86 f5 Congo

ta st Talme (CeA alnon) - Valaura tofaain (CPA? tillsi)paddy 50 122 223 86 £3 a 95 PaddyM11ilet. 6 21 41 0 21 24 26 26 MIRai" 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 MauOruodnute 47 12 153 0 0 46 49 79 AnSideCotton a 0 58 13 8 0 0 0 Cots

tota 145 27 475 99 72 156 163 200 o

1 - Appralal Drna t P * PiieLosa a L alnatlonA - Actual or otleated Actual , I ISsileattoms on btemstlona de rlaiasenti

-2F 97-qr .bl-Jbl. c

Co11.*S 8.o.r t r ' n -

turemetal~1 : ~ea w se tbeX- ^PY P: : 5 P~ W PTOo PS'. P710 P11 PeSI m7 PSI. P

.ddo u1 t1n19 'ml; 1258 %-- 1728 1726 3726 1728 *7 1 1726 1724 1726 1728 8.dY1ttt-t 160 am all 0 a 425 540 540 540 540 s40 o 4s 54 ND o 40 Nil1^r n3 .t 432 1I6" 20o e 0 lo08 low0 lo0 o0 18 1080 l0o0 00 10 80 10 0 low Armbid.c.tt. 0 0 640 321 83 0 0 0 0 § a 0 0 a 0 1.10

F-r-t. Pt.. (craA,t) Pri. Ico..66qs.. mt productsur rrA^,)

60 67 s7 66 7 5 St 51 5S T5 57 w8 62 5 66 4 P.d4,ll1.:t 47 43 4% 48 49 44 3a 40 61 51 '2 16 64 6f ." 511

4- t. :01 1l10 78 I" t6 43 44 73 '6 77 "W 76 7 74 7T £mid.c.t1A. 333 09 91 10C 300 79 St 102 1t 1t12 la I liP 1320 12n :Wtm,

nrrrftw %.ft (crxr trilton 56n&e* .411t-lnel rCl'l tl:.tor'lqt w1n) (Pr'. .. t..t. 1381)

P-dd4 9C 122 2 ,l6 43 PA n as aff 8 102 17 112 fie 1A4 Pa1dIII. t 21 at a 0 18 26 26 33 33 3s 3 35 Nil

7r5Atzm 27 129 15Q n 0 45 49 19 P4 - 42 me ort s0 1n1 Ar6s4.2:.ton 0 0 58 15 e a a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 cOt.O

7.1.1 345 271 461 80 9I 153 193 200 12 234 n7 222 228 2m otal

Project T,1.: copt. ECFAP millIto) 360 40 547 39 30 4T 47 47 47 *7 *7 A7 47 *7 47 r-at tt.1l do. Pa..t (VIA tilimn)IlqAl t.g38 (Film comut.t Ig81)

csnnmn- (t nr liini) (23] (135) (66) .2t31 (29) 106 1I" 1 13 5 165 W. t70 17r le 166 1*6 Co.6.11j (VVA 411216n)!tast :.rmin) (Piti. c..it.ri. ?81)

Encmte 8ant. .. of 7.5 de ren lblUt4 ic..lq.. (6%)

~ 2t YaVb1.-tab1 6

361020 1332w01 130J611/ Dl_SUIIIZ 134067 02 33

eaooiolUo t, . rt/otort d1.eb.om a t

PW"2r_ fa a_re. t.orladbtadoae lmeaber 31. 1e1o0/ Toatt_t rega t 31 dileb.. 11U1a teo-D~_ taV eat £OWC ee va. n Bi 0E0

Imbriteon 3t/t/SO 31/12/81 31,12/a 31/12/S3 31/12/St Tota

1. 197/7d freterim t talt - UN arditt S2 - - - - 52 1. moitas irstoire 197778- Creditsa M2 ' ' - oe. _er o lt 10 - - - - 110 2. ' ' ' - Cre4tt _,

3. - ' -_130 aredite 51 - - - St4 3. - - ' - fU orolta*. 1979/80 rIoratorl.m t Maffts IM orodta 669 669 6S9 669 669 3.3 . . teair. 1979o - Cdta W10D

- * - _Cooer. I ase4lto 1.621 1,621 1.621 1,621 1.621 6.10 Credita *o_e.*

. - ' ' -2 tIfnd. aOja aroiLta 276 274 274 ZTt 274 1.370 6. - crn' t taIndGivml

7. N M - NW aredlt 60 Go 603 60S 603 3.015 7. * * - CrdIt ProJ.t

6. RbIa Noretoa ta1t_ol_ s 34 -16T l.t67 3167 31 167 9or trori_ _NM

9. 197 310 bodlmtar Crediti oatalb_a S6T S6 _ _ - s.L5 :: t9T ~ I10. IT7" 67 57 1,154 to. I 197 - -

I1. 1978 - o60 60 650 - _ 1 950 II. 'M 19J 12. *979 , 0 32 325 32 3S2 - 100 12. 197913. 1976 HUe - 2 _ _ _ _ 20 13. 114. *STT 3*20 320 - _ _ 640 14. t19771 9. 1978 296 296 296 - _ Itt t5 :976 -

16. 232 IIod±a.trau cre6±? tamtala.ta - 101 101 101 Is03 1. 13

17. Total w m-ten Credit Istiots t 2.G2 12. 1._72 6 .e169 M7. Total _taitid crd_t tre

18. t980 NM OS art-tare Croats (rarttnier1 657 - - - - 657 l. 198 cr4t1 O t.torO NIM es)19. 19f PC art-tam orodito teala son") 48 so 15. 150 * - P3e8t 1ooOOOO pe6y)

20. Sootal a*rt tar erm dlto n5Z 25 20. Totl CrSlto oert tra.

21. Total -" inoabtedowt 7 .MI 526 %W s.s 3.167 2.ST 21. bd.tt_nat otal

9

-_,-

24AM.PM...7

-0iu r wll - - igm m3matq A.inuind'zo

ow - W aammw ~lSm w9Ube. inbLrn# Di.9. - bWAu En UiNe. inlmL- U- E

34m.. U.w~n h.- Sipe Uuf En lm ON06 ~ Sb~ mecc. b swa -ON-& 90(l as a1(4 (5) Ca) M7 M6 Cs) Ca ii

lom i gm lie es VA15 ND . 1 81 m,mGM.d a rm 133 SW in 479 M D 15 . -33 A. an.8l.gn rm 3JA am3 122 339 7 am VW . .l1.6 .57 aUQnUa .. 116 21 630 1 .16 a. .5 .. hud.

_ <_r _ _ ___ _ __ _

mWI 5 12 a s Il W _I _ 1 . idme .i q iVb _E * I- 1 n V m Jmm V .19 2 h - _

D . 1. r.6 0 lCO :111 mD.1 .rinUS mi i e

_c -pd@/UlmUm V. B XI& ww ° °w r ° 6m Jft

lSflmmo M gm co . - 5* m m lea P. iUf . mm Gomm 15 *mm

o(am~ t U6 2Md nr to S.b aC a- 0.4 Gd3 1.0-0 P- lUOa-ra-

m En h m aW Uo a. . .6 .R rA

~~_8lB1* D 2 X 1Y:1JYb

30 -TablutTabl.au B

SEUKOAL

SgIcm SbDRI0 P UOJT / DEUIXUIE PROT x SED8IO

(Cr. 67-SE)

Project C.e:tion imonrt I 3apport d'achivemt

RainfaLl 1 Pluvlaitrie

YearJAmnnSa M-

i92s 1 5201929 1 3381930 1 124

1931 90f p

1932 1 e6o1933 1 469193L 1 3001935 1 531

1936 1 6121937 1 152193B 1 5691939 1 1141940 1 2291941 9561942 1 3161943 1 330194 1 1891945 1 1941946 1 5581947 1 4311948 9871949 1 6031950 1 3981951 1 6631952 1 1521953 1 5181954 1 501955 1 B121956 1 4781957 1 I1C1956 1 6441959 1 2021960 1 7611961 1 4941962 1 2721963 1 6271964 1 1411965 1 042

1966 1 3201967 1 4541968 W071969 1 960

Aorage / toyesA 192B-69 1 3751970 1 0581971 1 0321972 U61973 9931974 1 0711975 1 0D11976 1 0711977 U71978 1 151

1979 92t1960 7451981 1 0621982 882198_ 718

Arna. I Hym 1969-83 965Overall Avenr I YAyma g ;n:rale 192843 1 272

- 31 - AITACUMEIT

INFORNAL TRANSLATIONRvdL /GA/I 05/29/84)

Borrower Comments

Republic of SenegalSupreme CourtCommission for the Auditingand Control of State Agencies Dakar, May 8, 1984

The Advisor of the Supreme Courtand President of the Commission

to:

Mr. KapurDirector Operations EvaluationDepartment of the World Bankthrough the World BankResident Representative in Dakar

Dear Sirs:

With reference to your letter dated March 30, 1984, I would liketo inform you that I have no specific comments to make on the PCR on theSecond Sedhiou Project which you sent to me.

Indeed, since the commission for the Auditing and Control ofState Agencies did not participate in the monitoring of this project, we arenot in a position to pass judgement on the quality of the project management.

Nevertheless, I would like to inform you that the comm'issionwill undertake an-audit of SONIVAC 1/ beginning in July and that this willgive the commission a better opportunity to review project implementation. Wewill submil to you the commissions' observations and comments in due course.

Sincerely yoursI

Signed:George Vandercbmitt

1/ note: the project executing agency

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --o

G A M B I A

TDJINANI

It

0 ' 5~~~EFA

'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9

W\f~~~~~~~~- - o: 9'1 -- ' -

tP . . P ~~~BONKLIG U I N-

B I SS A

IBMD 1 1923P3C

SENEGALSECOND SEDHIOU PROJECT

DEUXIEME PROJET DE SEDHIOUPROJECT AREA/ REGION DU PROJET

RUOWAS DE LA RNDIIt4 Dt/ Eg = SFA AREA

FEEDER FlC TO 8E WROVED tDFR THE FEEDER ROADS PRONCr (FiBE YEAR)ROUES DE DEM1 ETE A,4MEWR DYRAIIT LA PREMIERE "AVEEDU .ARQEFEEDER ROADS 10 BE IIRWDW UNDFR THE FEEDER ROADS PROJECT ISEWiD YEARSO ROOM OSD DESSERTE A AAFEIJORER DURANT LA SECD*DE A*VEE DU, PBWOT

FOREST RESERE_ _ _RE64AESP CRW)ERES

FEEDER ROADS IWROVED UNDER SEONOU IROUTmES OE DESEERTE .dUEWREES OURAiVr LE PROAET DE SElHIOU

0 /|3 SEDOiOU I ZME CENTEIS

-1|E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CE -SI5f

st. ) =a_ ~~~~~~~AlVED ROD IVRSS

R_UTES W7LNIEESGRAVEL RCOaDS

, ROUTES ACV EITIAEES

FA RECAG ESRNERS AND mftzERvTr SREAMCORE DEAU PEIAfAA. ;T I*MT0E5 ef

DEPARThENT.AL SO(NEDARFESUNiTFES DEPARTBENESALES;TER?4ATIONAL \U OI RIESFRDEr1ERES WTFERNATM)NALEY

0 20

- ---.- ------ ~~~KILONMETES

' o s o ~ s's/ ; Oi

MILES

V

~~- t r-/_

Th. PER -w.. d IBRD w U 12 -3.

s. 1 476. 0 h b6 -e

h.T TV2. NWB i. wa.U 2 &

|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~T. Pt ,o. .8 - RD193

.f ,,, Fleuwe ~, MAURITANIA

R -or- Re g io nf

G U I N E A -p6hQ5 E N 0,G A L OAKAR J -- 52.?2TJ_---- t? MALI

B I S S A U - Eastern ":; -; '' . J Re n Senegal ,

UINEA U .

,.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~BSA JGUIN