World Bank Document · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 20, 2015) Currency Unit...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003475

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H4640)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.5 MILLION (US$ 8.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FOR A SUPPORT TO VULNERABLE GROUPS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT

November 30, 2015

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 20, 2015)

Currency Unit = C.F.A Francs BEAC, XAF US$ 1.00 = 587 C.F.A Francs

FISCAL YEAR 2016

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACTED Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (Technical Cooperation and Development Agency)

AfDB African Development Bank

AGETIP Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public (Public Works Agency)

CAR Central African Republic

CDC Commune Development Committee

CDD Community Driven Development

CNP Comité National de Pilotage (Inter-ministerial Steering Committee)

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

CRP Comité Regional de Pilotage (Regional Steering Committee)

CRN Country Re-Engagement Note

DA Designated Account

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

FAP Fonds d’Actions Prioritaires (Priority Response Fund)

FDL Fonds de Développement Local (Local Development Fund)

FM Financial Management

FURCA Forces pour l’Unification de la République Centrafricaine (Forces for the Unification of CAR)

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

IDA International Development Association

1

ICASEES Institut Centrafricain des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques et Sociales (National Institute of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies)

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

IPP Indigenous Peoples Plan

ISN Interim Strategy Note

JIS Joint WB/AfDB Interim Strategy Note

MAS Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Solidarité Nationale et de la Promotion du Genre (Ministry for Social Affairs, National Solidarity and Gender Promotion)

MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

MDOD Maître d’Ouvrage Délégué (Contracting Authority Delegat)

MTR Mid Term Review

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedure

PDCAGV Projet de Développement Communautaire et d’Appui aux Groupes Vulnérables (Support to Vulnerable Groups Community Development Project)

PIM Project Implementation Manual

PCT Project Coordination Team

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

RPF Resettlement Policy Framework

TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program

TTL Task Team Leader

UFDR Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity)

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

VDC Village Development Council

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Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Jan Weetjens Task Team Leader: Paul Bance ICR Team Leader: Peter Lafere

3

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUPPORT TO VULNERABLE GROUPS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Contents

I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................ 17 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................. 1

1.1 Context at Appraisal .......................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators ............................... 1

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ................................................................................................................ 2

1.4 Main Beneficiaries, ........................................................................................................... 2

1.5 Original Components (as approved) .................................................................................. 3

1.6 Revised Components ......................................................................................................... 4

1.7 Other significant changes .................................................................................................. 4

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................. 4 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ............................................................. 4

2.2 Implementation ................................................................................................................. 6

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .................... 8

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ................................................................................ 9

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase ......................................................................... 10

3. Assessment of Outcomes ......................................................................................... 10 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation .................................................... 10

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives .......................................................... 11

3.3 Efficiency.......................................................................................................................... 12

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating .......................................................................... 14

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...................................................... 14

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ................. 15

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ........................................................ 15 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................... 16

5.1 Bank Performance .......................................................................................................... 16

5.2 Borrower Performance .................................................................................................... 17

4

6. Lessons Learned ...................................................................................................... 18 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ......... 19 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 20

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) ................................................. 20

(b) Financing ......................................................................................................................... 20

Annex 2: Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 21 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 25 Annex 4 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 28

(a) Task Team members ........................................................................................................ 28

(b) Staff Time and Cost .......................................................................................................... 29

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 29 Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................. 30 Annex 7: Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR .................... 30 Annex 8: Comments of Co-Financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ..................... 43 Annex 9: List of People Interviewed ............................................................................ 44 Annex 10: List of Background Documents .................................................................. 46 Annex 11: Map ............................................................................................................. 48 Annex 11: Map ............................................................................................................. 48

A. Basic Information

Country: Central African Republic Project Name:

CF-Support to Vulnerable Groups Community Development Project

Project ID: P111679 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H4640

ICR Date: 11/08/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Original Total Commitment: XDR 5.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 5.44M

Revised Amount: XDR 5.50M

5

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Social Affairs

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/22/2008 Effectiveness: 08/03/2009 08/03/2009

Appraisal: 11/10/2008 Restructuring(s): 06/30/2013 07/31/2014

Approval: 03/31/2009 Mid-term Review: 06/20/2012 07/05/2012

Closing: 07/31/2013 05/31/2015

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: High

Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately

Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision:

Moderately Satisfactory

Implementing Agency/Agencies:


6

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance:


C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:


D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 15 15

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 20 20

Other social services 20 20

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 15 15

Sub-national government administration 30 30

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Other social protection and risk management 37 37

Participation and civic engagement 21 21

Rural services and infrastructure 37 37

Social Protection and Labor Policy & Systems 5 5

7

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Gregor Binkert Mary A. Barton-Dock

Practice Manager/Manager: Jan Weetjens Ian Bannon

Project Team Leader: Paul G. A. Bance Bernard Harborne

ICR Team Leader: Peter F. B. A. Lafere

ICR Primary Author: Peter F. B. A. Lafere

Felipe Jacome

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The PDO of the Community Development Project is to rehabilitate social infrastructure and improve the capacity of local stakeholders to plan and manage local recovery in targeted areas of CAR.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value Original Target

Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Direct Project Beneficiaries

8

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 1,005,314 1,005,314

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 05/31/2015

Comments (incl. % achievement)

The Results Framework was revised when the project was restructured. All indicators and targets changed and new PDO indicators were introduced. (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013). 100% of target beneficiaries reached.

Indicator 2 : Female Beneficiaries


0 0 301,594 301,594

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


The Results Framework was revised when the project was restructured. All indicators and targets changed and new PDO indicators were introduced. (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013). 100% of target female beneficiaries reached.

Indicator 3 : Investments maintained in a satisfactory way 24 months after implementation


0 40% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


This indicator was dropped at Restructuring (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013).

Indicator 4 : Sub-projects in which results/outcomes in terms of increased access/use of infrastructure were satisfactorily achieved.


0 50% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 5 : Targeted Communities that organize quarterly public meetings to report on development activities and budgets.

9


0 40% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 05/31/2015 05/31/2015



Indicator 6 : Targeted Communities with Local Development Plans developed through a participatory process.


0 60% 36 communes 34 communes

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


This PDO indicator was retained at Restructuring, but its target was revised down from 60% (i.e. 61 out of 102 targeted communes) to 36 communes. 94.4% of the revised target was achieved. The last plan was approved in March 2015.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value Original Target

Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Members of municipal councils and village councils trained in local development

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 No target 1800 1737

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


This is a new IO indicator introduced at restructuring (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013). 96.5% of targeted members of municipal and village council members were trained.

Indicator 2 : Members of municipal councils and village councils trained in local development - female participants

10


0 No target 30% 22.71%

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


This is a new IO indicator introduced at restructuring (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013). 22.71 % of trained members of municipal and village council members were female.

Indicator 3 : Training days on community recovery for local stakeholders in ten targeted communes


0 No target 220 198

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


This is a new IO indicator introduced at restructuring (See Restructuring Paper dated June 30, 2013). 90% achieved.

Indicator 4 : Number of additional primary classroom built or rehabilitated under the project


0 no original target 111 120

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


A formal target value was introduced in the Restructuring Paper of June 30, 2013. 108% achieved.

Indicator 5 : Improved community waterpoints constructed or rehabilitated under the project


0 no original target 76 78

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


A formal target value was introduced in the Restructuring Paper of June 30, 2013. 103% achieved.

Indicator 6 : Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped under the project

11


0 No original target 21 20

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


A formal target value was introduced in the Restructuring Paper of June 30, 2013. 18 health posts and 2 community pharmacies - 95% achieved.

Indicator 7 : Improved latrines constructed under the project


0 No original target 58 46

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


A formal target value was introduced in the Restructuring Paper of June 30, 2013. 18 health posts and 2 community pharmacies - 79% achieved.

Indicator 8 : Other social public infrastructures constructed or rehabilitated under the project


0 No target 18 16

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015


A formal target value was introduced in the Restructuring Paper of June 30, 2013. 9 manioc drying areas, 4 warehouses, 2 playgrounds and 1 bridge. The 2 community pharmacies are included under the health facilities indicator - 89% achieved.

Indicator 9 : Targeted villages which have received capacity building support


0 50% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 10 : Targeted villages have representative and participatory bodies (VCDs) assuming their roles in local development (planning and management of local sub-projects)

12


0 50% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 11 : Communes in target area with functioning and representative coordination bodies with regular meetings


0 50% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 12 : Targeted communes with non-CDP funding coordinated by the local authority (commune, sub-prefect or prefect) (number)


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 13 : Roads Constructed, rural (km) - PRF


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 14 : Roads Constructed, rural (km) LDF

13


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 15 : Bridges Constructed (number) - RPF


0 No target 0 1

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 16 : Bridges Constructed (number) - LDF


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 17 : Markets Constructed (number)


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 18 : Sub-projects signed by both CDC/VCD, the service provider and implementing agency (number)

14


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 19 : Local Development Plans publicized and regularly updated


0 50 % (i.e. 30 communities) 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 20 : Activities implemented are part of a Local Development Plan


0 50% 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



Indicator 21 : People trained in Ministries and PCT involved in project implementation (number)


0 No target 0 n/a

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



15

Indicator 22 : Comprehensive annual M&E reports produced on time capturing all relevant information including that generated by the communities being used to inform project management (number)


0 No target 0 5

Date achieved 08/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 05/31/2015



G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.58

2 05/28/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.77

3 03/23/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.31

4 10/10/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.06

5 06/03/2012 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.38

6 12/26/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.55





H. Restructuring (if any)

16

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at Restructurin

g in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

06/30/2013 MS S 4.74

(i) Update of the results framework; (ii) a reallocation of costs among components and of proceeds among categories; and (iii) a 12-month extension.

07/31/2014 MS MS 6.62 10 month extension to the project to complete activities that were delayed by the crisis in CAR.

I. Disbursement Profile

17

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Successive outbreaks of violence followed by unsuccessful attempts to re-establish stability had created a climate of mistrust and had exacerbated both generic poverty and an ongoing humanitarian crisis across the Central African Republic. Due to the relative weakness of both Government and rebel forces, CAR has been more affected by ongoing political instability than the kinds of large-scale organized violence witnessed in neighboring countries such as DRC or Sudan. Nevertheless, such instability, and in particular the inability of the state to effectively project law and order beyond the remits of the capital, continued to have dire humanitarian consequences. 2. In June 2007 the Government launched a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with four strategic pillars: (i) Restore security, consolidate peace and prevent conflict; (ii) promote good governance and the rule of law; (iii) rebuild and diversify the economy; and (iv) develop human capital. At that juncture, the Bank sought to support the CAR with an emergency project that focused on improving social infrastructure in marginalized rural areas to contribute to the stabilization of the fragile transition. 3. At project design, a new Joint Country Partnership Strategy was being developed in conjunction with the African Development Bank (AfDB) that sought to support an inclusive political dialogue with inclusive development. The challenge for the Government and for its development partners was to demonstrate a peace dividend for vulnerable marginalized populations. Recognizing the risks involved, the Bank approach was to engage prudently, tackling key economic reforms as well as providing demonstrative benefits to the population. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 4. The development objective of the Support to Vulnerable Groups Community Development Project is to rehabilitate social infrastructure and improve the capacity of local stakeholders to plan and manage community1 recovery in targeted areas of CAR. 5. The original Project Outcome Indicators (KPIs) as outlined in the approved project appraisal document (PAD) were:

1. Investments maintained in a satisfactory way 24 months after implementation (40%). 2. Sub-projects in which results/outcomes in terms of increased access/use of infrastructure

were satisfactorily achieved (50%). 3. Targeted communes with Local Development Plans developed through a participatory

process (60%). 4. Targeted communes that organize quarterly public meetings to report on development

activities and budgets (40%).

1 There are three different definitions of the PDO. The PAD’s PDO in the main text is to “… and manage local recovery in targeted areas of CAR, while the PDO in the PAD’s Results Framework is to “… and manage community recovery in targeted areas of CAR”. The Financing Agreement’s PDO is to “… and manage community recovery in targeted areas of the Recipient’s Territory”. Outcomes will be assessed against community recovery as per the formulation in the Financing Agreement and Results Framework, and we will use CAR throughout the text for the Recipient’s Territory.

1

The targeted areas are the 102 communes that make up the four Southern regions of CAR. Of these, 54 communes were further identified in 2010 for infrastructure investments through the Baseline Study for the Impact Evaluation. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 6. The project was formally restructured on June 30, 2013 following a fast-tracking of the implementation of the project after the MTR in July 2012, but also to adapt the project to the new operational circumstances of the political and security crisis in CAR that led to the triggering of OP 7.30 on May 31, 2013 and the temporary suspension of construction works. Although the original PDO, the components and the activities were not formally revised, there were key changes on the implementation arrangements and on the local community’s role that were not included in the Restructuring Paper. The four original Project Outcome Indicators were revised into two new PDO level Results Level Indicators:

1. Direct project beneficiaries (# inhabitants, # communes) 2. Female beneficiaries (30% of direct project beneficiaries)

7. The revisions to the PDO level results indicators and the revisions to intermediate level results indicators in the results framework were justified with the following reasons: (a) Propose set of indicators that better illustrate progress in project´s implementation; (b) take into account technical constraints in data collection and synchronize it with the Client´s M&E system; and (c) include relevant Core Sector Indicators. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries, 8. The project focused on beneficiaries in marginalized rural areas with weak local governments and poor social infrastructure, and particularly on the four southern regions (Region 1, 2, 4, and 6), which at project design stage were relatively more stable than the low intensity conflict zones in the three Northern regions. These four regions are divided into the nine prefectures of Nana Mambere, Mambere Kadei, Shangha Mbaere, Ombella-Mpoko, Lobaye, Kemo, Ouaka, Basse Kotto, and Mbomou which are further divided administratively into 102 communes. In these prefectures, (i) about 50 communes would benefit from capacity strengthening for local development; (ii) about 75 villages would be targeted for priority investments; and (iii) about 40 communes and 80 villages having elaborated local development plans would have access to social infrastructure investment.2 Additionally the project would build capacity at project level and of Ministry structures at central, regional, prefectural and sub-prefectural levels.

9. By the end of the project: (i) Forty-five communes benefitted from capacity strengthening for local development, 34 of which developed local development plans through a participatory approach; (ii) 1,737 members of municipal councils and village councils trained in local development, 3 (iii) 23 communes received social infrastructure investments, 10 of which in accordance with their local development plans.4

2 PAD, Annex 1: Detailed description of project components, p. 26-29. 3 ISR 10. 4 SEE ANNEX 1 for the full list of communes that benefitted from the various components.

2

1.5 Original Components (as approved) 10. The project had the following four components that focused on the improvement of social infrastructure and strengthening of local stakeholders:

- Component A: Capacity Strengthening for Local Development (US$1.5 million) which sought to empower rural communes and villages to prepare and implement development plans in an inclusive manner, with adequate support from Government staff. The Field Guide also incorporated innovative tools and approaches for human security reporting and conflict prevention at the local level. The methodology employed permitted targeted communes and villages to establish, or where already in place, strengthen Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Communal Development Committees (CDCs), reinforce the capacities of de-concentrated line ministry staff and local administrations to support the planning and implementation of these activities; foster trust and mitigate conflicts between communities and Government; and stimulate the effective communication between diverse stakeholders involved in local development.

- Component B: Priority Response Fund (US$1.86 million): The priority response fund’s

(PRF) objective was two-fold: (i) offer a window of opportunity to expedite the delivery of most-needed resources; and (ii) encourage participation and buy- in of the project by demonstrating a rapid tangible dividend to collaboration. This component disbursed funds in small increments to finance sub-projects that are ready for implementation.

3

- Component C: Local Development Fund (US$2.79 million): The objective of the LDF was for rural communes and villages to identify public socio-economic investments through a local development planning process. Service providers were contracted by the CDP to undertake these investments during the course of the project. The focus of the fund was on community public goods and complemented the AfDB community fund, which focused on individual benefits and income generation activities.

- Component D: Project Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation (US$l.85 million): This

component supported a Project Coordination Team (PCT) responsible for technical and fiduciary oversight of the project. Monitoring and Evaluation focused on results-oriented data collection to inform decision-making and impact evaluation.

1.6 Revised Components 11. The components remained the same throughout project implementation. 1.7 Other significant changes 12. Extensions. The Country Director (CD) approved two no-cost extensions—from July 2013 to July 2014 (12 months) and from July 2014 to May 2015 (10 months). Both extensions were needed to make up for delays resulting from the deteriorating security situation in the country since December 2012 and the triggering of OP 7.30 from March to November 2013. According to the Restructuring Paper of 2013, notwithstanding the crisis, the project could have been successfully completed on time. 13. Reallocations. The CD approved the reallocation of funds as a part of the July 2013 restructuring to match the project’s contractual commitments and implementation strategy, and fund an additional year of project management. The project costs were reallocated among components to reflect the dynamics of implementation, in particular (i) the completion of the Capacity Strengthening component; (ii) the improved procurement and disbursement of the PRF; (iii) the revised implementation strategy for the LDF that would focus on only 10 communes; and (iv) an additional year of project management. The Table below reflects the reallocations in project funding.

Project costs (US$, million)

Component Initial Revised Final

Capacity strengthening for Local Development 1.5 0.8 0.78

Priority Response Fund 1.86 3.4 3.10

Local Development Fund 2.79 1.7 1.53

Project Management, monitoring and Evaluation 1.85 2.1 1.99

Total 8.0 8.0 7.40

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

4

14. Adequacy of government commitment. The commitment of the government was assured early on in the preparation phases. The project was designed in consultation with an Inter-Ministerial working group that included representatives of the Ministries of Social Affairs, Rural Development, Communication, Planning, Education, Health, Environment, Water and the High Commission for Decentralization. This high level of dialogue was set up to continue through a standing Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee. As the implementing ministry, the Ministry of Social Affairs created a lightly-staffed Project Coordination Team (PCT) to manage the project and four regional offices to oversee the operations from the provincial hubs. Given the modest capacity of the CAR, it took approximately 12 months to set up the PCT, but once in place was fully effective. 15. Soundness of background analysis. The project was prepared under OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies by a team of CDD experts with in-depth experience of designing and managing operations in fragile and post-conflict situations. The project design incorporated lessons learned from prior LICUS funded CDD activities and from the multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS project, both in CAR. It also drew on a June 2006 Bank review of CDD operations in the context of conflict-affected countries. In addition, the team conducted a round-table review with stakeholders and NGOs in Bangui. The design, however, was based on the mistaken assumption that there were pre-existing regional development plans and/or community needs assessments available from which social infrastructure needs could be rapidly identified for priority rehabilitation under the PRF in the first 12-18 months. 16. Assessment of project design. First, the project’s choice to focus on beneficiaries in vulnerable and marginalized rural areas was based fully appropriate for the country context and based on the following key learnings (i) ensure to contribute to quick stabilization of the country by demonstrating a peace divided for vulnerable populations; (ii) involve communities in the recovery phase; (iii) focus on vulnerable and marginalized regions; (iv) build capacity at central and decentralized levels; ensure qualified financial and procurement staff for agile implementation. However, second, the design was overly ambitious in scope and intended impact: the geographical coverage, 615 communes spread over 4 regions, was not aligned with the available financing of USD 8 million, and the intended impact on trust and peacebuilding with the communities were not the proposed small scale rehabilitation activities. Third, the design of the implementation arrangements with the selection of AGETIP-CAF as the first year project implementing entity based on their prior experience with World Bank fiduciary procedures and with the specific objective of building capacity did not take into account the key objective of the PRF in “expediting the delivery of most-needed resources” 6. The selection of one or more INGOs for the rapid identification and construction of social infrastructure under the PRF would have been more appropriate based on the LICUS project in CAR and other post conflict experience. Fourth, the initial results framework’s indicators did not align with the project development objectives. Neither project nor intermediate outcome indicators were well defined and failed to set targets, hindering effective monitoring and decision-making. OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies was meant to allow for faster project preparation, based on partial information, but given that shortcomings in design and background analysis became apparent within the first year of implementation, an early restructuring to address these issues would have been appropriate.

5 One PDO Indicator aimed to achieve that 60% of the 102 communes would have local development plans developed through a participatory process. 6 PAD. p. 8, par 3.8

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17. Risk assessment. The overall risk of the project was rated as Substantial at entry. It was accurately highlighted that despite the high risks regarding the uncertain and volatile security and political situation, the greater risk would have been to fail to support post-conflict recovery. Furthermore, the operation directly sought to mitigate some of the causal factors of the unstable political situation by working to restore trust between citizens and government. Other operation-specific risks adequately assessed and addressed at the project level were: (i) Corruption and weak implementation capacity at central and decentralized levels, for which the project put in place an experienced Project Coordination Team, provided capacity building to national and regional authorities, and used AGETIP-CAF, a public implementing entity with World Bank experience, for fiduciary management; and (ii) Elite capture of sub-project activities in the communes and villages for which transparency mechanisms were put in place in the training and constitution of VDCs and CDCs. The risk of unsustainable social infrastructure investments as a result of lack in local development planning was identified, but not effectively mitigated. The capacity building component focused on the transfer of knowledge and expertise to communities and villages to identify local development needs and develop local development plans, but did not include arrangements for transfer of the constructed infrastructure to relevant authorizes, nor for sustainable management and maintenance. 18. AfDB funding. This project was prepared in parallel to an African Development Bank project that shared the same name, implementation structures, geographic coverage and modus operandi. This arrangement was conceived in the context of the joint 2007-2008 AfDB/World Bank Interim Strategy for the CAR, and sought to deepen the impact of the project in beneficiary areas. The key difference between the designs of the two projects was that the AfDB funding would cover income-generation and micro-credit activities in the same communities. 2.2 Implementation 19. Mid-Term Review and Restructuring. The decisions taken in the MTR and formalized in the first restructuring took 4 measures to address the flaws in project design, simplify the project and increase disbursement of the project. These measures consisted of:

1. A dedicated project implementation unit was set up within AGETIP-CAF that streamlined the procurement process and allowed for faster procurement authorizations. This unit would focus on the construction activities that had already been identified under the PRF component.

2. Two international NGOs, ACTED and COOPI, were contracted to implement the LDF component. Both NGOs had a strong network and experience with community development in the country, and they were allowed to sub-contract construction works directly themselves. They were also contracted to provide capacity building and training to local development committees in the development and implementation of local development plans7.

3. The number of beneficiary communities that would receive LDF funds under the project was reduced from 36 to 10. The 36 had been randomly selected after the base-line study; the 10 were those communities that had completed their Local Development Plans at the time of the MTR.

4. The Results Framework’s PDO Level and Intermediate Indicators were updated to better be able to track progress in the project’s implementation. The new indicators set clear targets for all project components.

7 COOPI halted operations during and after the crisis in the country. ACTED assured the completion of the affected activities.

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20. While project design changed significantly at the MTR/Restructuring, the PDO did not. There was a clear shift away from the originally intended CDD approach, because of the need to speed up project implementation, the deteriorating country context, and the actual rehabilitation/reconstruction needs as assessed in the baseline study. The late stage in project implementation of the restructuring and the decision not to formally change the PDO contributed greatly to the moderately unsatisfactory rating of the outcomes (see 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Outcomes). 21. Beneficiary selection. The selection of beneficiary communes and villages changed significantly after Board approval of the project. The project paper describes targeting based on existing local and communal development plans and other needs assessments, on consultation with the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee, and on a rapid assessment for the priority activities. It describes that targeting for the community development activities would be done in consultation with the Regional PRSP Monitoring Committee and regional prefects based on availability of local development plans, community contributions, inter-village collaboration villages, and needs based criteria. While the project paper’s activities includes an impact assessment, it was not clear to the borrower that this signified a targeting of beneficiary communities through random selection of eligible communities. 45 out of 102 communes in the intervention area were randomly selected initially. Ultimately, only 10 of these received financing for the reconstruction of social infrastructure in their local development plan. 22. Handover to the government and sustainability of works. While fortunate to have had a good continuity of staff within the PCT and at lower Ministerial levels, handover of infrastructure to line Ministries suffered due to a large turnover of Ministers and to a large number of people required to be present at Steering Committee meetings. As of this evaluation, handover of infrastructure to line Ministries has not taken place. At a local level, handover has also been hindered by the unabated displacement and disarticulation of local authority structures. Moreover, the sustainability of project infrastructure is also threatened as not all health centers and schools built by the PRF were equipped within the project.8 23. Delays in AfDB financed project preparation and implementation, and absence of coordination. The World Bank and the AfDB financed projects were conceived as complementary, parallel projects coordinated by a joint PCT and using the same structures at national, regional and local level. AfDB financing was approved with a delay of one year (date) after the World Bank and the two Banks only conducted two joint supervision missions (December 2011 and the MTR in July 2012). Reflecting the delays in implementation, at the MTR the target areas were divided up between the two projects contributing to a further diverging approach and reducing the demonstration effect of the project´s social infrastructure works. In response to the crisis, AfDB suspended disbursement for (x) months longer than the World Bank until (month) 2015 which affected the WB financed project in two ways: (i) Key PCT staff who had been funded under the AfDB project could not resume work when WB financed operations started again; and (ii) AfDB financed activities were further delayed and the project was extended. Factors outside of the control of the Government/Implementing Partners

8 Schools built by ACTED for the LDF were equipped. Those managed by AGETIP-CAF for the PRF have not. The PCT hopes to furnish and equip these schools with AfDB’s financing of the project.

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24. Volatile security situation. The security situation started to deteriorate in November 2012 when the new Séléka rebel coalition rapidly overran the north and center of the country. In March 2013, Séléka rebels took over the capital and seized power. President Bozizé fled and rebel leader Michel Djotodia suspended the Constitution and dissolved parliament in a coup d´état. The escalating conflict fueled widespread displacement across the country. As of May 2015, over 400,000 people are still displaced. Owing to uncertainty and the safety risks of Bank staff in CAR, the World Bank Group, in consultation with UN security authorized the evacuation of its staff to Yaoundé, Cameroon. 25. Triggering of Operational Policy 7.30 and project resiliency. Following the coup d´état on March 24, 2013 the World Bank triggered Operational Policy 7.30, which led to the temporary suspension of disbursements until September 2013. In spite of the difficult environment in country and the triggering of OP 7.30 the project remained active. At the height of the crisis the project implemented a Mitigation Plan (June 2013) and a Recovery Plan (January 2014) that consisted mainly in (a) securing the project’s sites where construction had started prior to the crisis and (b) mitigate losses incurred on the project, and (c) complete remaining civil works. These proactive measures were complemented by a high degree of luck that project infrastructure was not widely looted during the conflict. 26. Nonetheless, the project did suffer significant setbacks during the crisis. Obstacles in the implementation of activities included: the high levels of insecurity restricted access of contractors, project staff and World Bank missions to communities, local authorities and project stakeholders were displaced or left (and in many cases had not returned by the end of the project), prices for construction materials increased, regional offices and vehicles of the PCT were looted resulting in a loss of assets and data. The insecurity also directly impacted contracting companies and their personnel: one employee of company was killed and two were severely injured in an incident at a checkpoint on the way to the construction site. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 27. M&E design. The project’s M&E was designed to be supported by a simple Management Information System that relied on AGETIP-CAF and their regional offices to supervise the works, and monitor and evaluate progress through quarterly, bi-annual and annual reports. An impact evaluation, including a randomized control trial (RCT), for the Community Development Program was included in the design of the project. The result framework indicators were not aligned with the objectives of the project and focused heavily on outputs (16 intermediate indicators), rather than on outcomes (3 intermediate indicators). Indicators to measure the construction of facilities and (number of water points, health facilities, classrooms, bridges or markets constructed) and works (km of roads) had no target values or no base-line against which output, progress or impact could be measured. Some indicators were not clearly defined (“health facilities constructed, renovated, or equipped”, “sub-projects in which results/outcomes in terms of increased access/use of infrastructure were satisfactorily achieved”), or lacked reference to quality of the infrastructure itself or of the services provided with it (e.g. availability of qualified teachers or health care personnel, equipment, etc.). There were no indicators that monitored impacts on beneficiaries. The task team simplified and improved the indicators at the MTR in 2012 with disaggregated beneficiary indicators and target output indicators, but only formalized them a year later in the restructuring of the project in 2013. 28. M&E implementation. An international consultant helped set up a monitoring and evaluation system early on in the project, and the Bank team used a dashboard to track progress against inputs

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and activities. However, the project did not have an M&E Specialist as had been foreseen, and relied on the project coordinator to complete the progress reports. After the MTR a new monthly operational progress report was agreed that included specific reporting against the revised project indicators. Significant areas of progress or delays were also described in detail in AM and Bank supervision reports. The ICR team was not able to verify timeliness, accuracy and completeness from regional to national level, as regional records had been lost when regional bureau were looted during the 2013 crisis. The project completed a detailed baseline study with the Central-African Institute of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies (ICASEES) within the first year that allowed the project team to select the beneficiary communities, but dropped the Impact Evaluation component (date) due to security constraints. For the same reason, no beneficiary assessments were undertaken. 29. M&E utilization. The baseline study was used to identify beneficiary communities. The information generated and reported in the monthly operational and financial reports contributed to a close collaboration between the Bank team, the PCT, AGETIP-CAF and the field staff. However, there was little use of the M&E information at CNP level. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 30. Safeguards. The project was classified as an environmental category B project at appraisal and triggered OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement, and OP/BP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples. The project was processed under OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and an Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP) were developed, consulted and disclosed within the first year of project implementation. The IPP includes a detailed social assessment of Aka in CAR. There is no record that the Bank team provided safeguards capacity building or implementation support to qualified personnel at AGETIP-CAF or the PCT. AGETIP-CAF did not supervise or report on compliance with World Bank safeguards on an ongoing basis, and did not conduct the annual technical audits in which they would have to report on compliance with the safeguards. In Mambere Kadei, the project selected the construction of a pharmacy from the LDP in consultation with the Aka families that live in the area. None of the sub-projects resulted in the need for physical or economic displacement. The project was consistently rated satisfactory for overall safeguards until August 2014 when it was downgraded to moderately satisfactory because supervision missions to the field were no longer possible as a result of the security situation. 31. Procurement ratings in the ISR evolved significantly throughout the project implementation period. Procurement was rated moderately satisfactory for the first four ISR when the procurement plan included procurement of goods, equipment and the procurement of studies and consultancies, but was downgraded to moderately unsatisfactory in 2011 when capacity issues and slow management procedures contribute to a delay of the procurement of the rehabilitation and construction activities of the PAF. After the recruitment of a new procurement specialist in the PCT, the reorganization of the procurement processes within AGETIP following the MTR, and the procurement of INGO ACTED which would contract construction companies directly for the implementation of the LDF construction activities through the ‘envelope approach’, the quality and quantity of contracts increased dramatically and the rating was upgraded to satisfactory and highly satisfactory for the remaining 3 years of the project. A best practice note was issued by the Regional Procurement Manager based on the success of the LDF procurement9.

9 “Dealing with Fiduciary and Governance Challenges for CDD in FCS” – OPCS How-To-Notes series.

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32. Financial Management ratings evolved from moderately satisfactory in the period 2010 – 2013 to satisfactory from 2013 onwards. Financial reports and audit reports were produced regularly and on time. Issues that depressed the financial management ratings in the first 3 years included a slow procurement of the auditor in 2010, delays in the set-up of the PCT as a result of delays in the AfDB contribution of the financing, and delays in in DRF which resulted in budgetary constraints. Financial management was rated satisfactory at during the last supervision mission. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 33. The PCT will remain operational for at least another year to implement the AfDB financed activities in the project areas, and will ensure the completion of the two LDPs that were not finalized before the end of the project, and to ensure the equipment and transfer of the constructed school and health facilities to their respective line-ministries and local authorities to ensure that they are sustainably managed and maintained. 34. The need for basic social infrastructure remains high, and a CDD approach to rehabilitate or construct this infrastructure remains valid, particularly in those 24 communities in which the project supported the formation of CDCs and CDVs and developed LDPs, but where it did not finance the priorities that the community identified. There was consensus among the stakeholders that were interviewed for this ICR that in the medium term financing for the LDPs will be important. However, after the violent crisis, the internal displacement, the absence of state presence and services, as well as employment opportunities other than with armed groups, in the short term it is important that social cohesion is boosted through immediate tangible results. For this reason, a new project (LONDO) is being financed by the Bank that focuses on public infrastructure works that maximize opportunities for the employment of labor and local resources.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The overall relevance of the project is rated Substantial. 35. First, the relevance of project objectives is rated high because objectives under the project are highly consistent with the CAR Country Engagement Note (CEN) for FY16-17, in which key objective 3 is to provide Support to basic social service delivery in order to support the gradual return of social services beyond the current humanitarian relief, the return of government paid teachers and health workers, particularly outside Bangui, and support to basic social infrastructure. Similarly, building capacity to plan and manage local recovery is equally consistent with key objective 1 strengthening public sector capacity and enable the government to fulfill its core functions and gradually restore authority and legitimacy over the territory and population. In addition, as a most of the social infrastructure was built during and shortly after the crisis, the objectives have contributed to the CEN First Phase - Support to Stabilization: in which the immediate priority is to break out of the repeated cycles of violence, begin to build confidence in the transitional process, restore some basic functions of the state, and underpin reconciliation by providing some early tangible outcomes in support to livelihoods and basic social service provision. 36. At project approval, the objectives of the project were also supporting (i) The Government’s development priorities and strategy at the time of design, notably of Pillar 1 and 4 of the 2009-12 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which were resp. restoring security, consolidating peace and preventing conflict; and improving access to social services and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, (ii) the WB-AfDB Joint Interim Strategy Note (JIS) FY07-08 Pillar 2: Support human development with emphasis on the poor which focused on increasing the supply of and

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improving access to basic social services for the most vulnerable groups, and strengthening the technical capacity of decentralized communities in formulating their development policies and their management tools. 37. Second, relevance of project design is rated moderate. The project’s components’ outcomes and activities were essentially well designed to achieve the original PDO and its indirect peacebuilding objectives. The design, however, underestimated the ambitious geographical coverage of the project and the lack of pre-existing local development plans or data based upon which a rapid selection for priority construction of social infrastructure could be made. The analysis of alternatives and lessons learned from previous projects focused primarily on the CDD component, and less on the priority rehabilitation or construction of social infrastructure. The design of the results framework could have been more explicit on the phasing of the early construction of priority infrastructure and the community driven approach of infrastructure under the local development fund. 38. Third, the relevance of project implementation is rated substantial because of regular implementation support missions, timely key decisions at the start, MTR and restructuring of the project such as to start the priority needs assessment within 12 months of project launch, to create a dedicated project cell within AGETIP-CAF and contract an International NGO to speed up project implementation, to re-engage with key activities under OP 7.30 when other multilaterals did not, and to shift the focus away from CDD. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 39. The overall development objective of the Community Development Project consists of three separate-but-linked objectives in targeted areas of CAR:

(1) To rehabilitate social infrastructure; and (2) To improve the capacity of local stakeholders to plan and manage local recovery.

40. These PDOs are broad, and neither the original project outcome indicators nor the new, restructured project outcome indicators can easily capture the achievement of the objectives. Both restructured PDO Indicators’ target values were achieved at 100%: 1,005,314 direct project beneficiaries of which at least 30% or 301,591 female project beneficiaries. PDO1: Rehabilitate Social Infrastructure The achievement of this PDO is rated Moderate. 41. By the end of the project, 120 additional primary classrooms were built or rehabilitated (target 111), 78 improved community water points were constructed or rehabilitated (restructured target 76), 18 health posts and 2 community pharmacies were constructed or renovated (restructured target 21), 46 improved latrines were constructed (restructured target 58) and 16 other social public infrastructures (9 manioc drying areas, 4 warehouses, 2 playgrounds, and 1 bridge) were constructed or rehabilitated. The target values of the type and quantity of social infrastructure to be constructed or rehabilitated were only agreed at the MTR (June 2012) and formalized at the first Restructuring of the project in June 2013. The project achieved its objective of rehabilitating social infrastructure, but had a three minor shortcomings that affect its rating: 42. First, the revised project did not include outcome indicators to measure quality of construction, satisfactory maintenance or increased access or use. Because there are no technical audit reports, or technical supervision reports, and the security situation did not permit an ex-post evaluation,

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there is no evidence on the quality of the infrastructure. Second, to contribute to community trust and peacebuilding, the story-line of the design of the PDO included priority rehabilitation activities for completion within 12-18 months and a target that 50% of infrastructure activities were part of a LDP. Neither were achieved. Third, the construction delays and political crisis contributed to a delay in formally transferring the infrastructure to the relevant authorities, and some furniture and/or equipment was not in place at the end of the project. It is, however, expected that this will occur under the continuing financing of the AfDB project. PDO2: improve the capacity of local stakeholders to plan and manage local recovery The weighted achievement of this PDO2 is rated moderate10 and is comprised of a weighted rating of achievement towards the original PDO prior to the June 2013 project restructuring and rating of the achievement towards the revised PDO. Weighting is done pro rata the rate of the disbursement prior to and after the Restructuring of 30 June 2013: 57.23%11 43. The achievement of PDO2 vis-à-vis the original project objectives is rated moderate. The original key targets for this PDO2 were that 60% of communities in targeted areas (hence 61 out of a total of 102 communities in the targeted areas) would have LDPs in place. Only 34 were achieved by the end of the project (33%). Only 33 of these were formally adopted and publicly available (32% of a target of 50%). The target that 50% of villages receive capacity building support was never monitored, but given that only 443 VCDs from 36 communities participated in training, it is unlikely that these would add up to 50% of all villages within the targeted area. 44. The achievement of PDO2 vis-à-vis the revised project objectives is rated moderate as the Restructured Project formally revised the target for the participatory development of local development plans down to 36 and achieved the development of 34. Arrangements were made to ensure the finalization of the final two LDPs with financing and support from the AfDB and other development partners. 1,737 members from 443 VCDs and 36 CDCs received training in the planning of local development against revised targets of 1,800 (97% achieved). Only 22.71% of trainees were female (target 30%). In addition, the members of the 10 CDCs which had developed their local development plans by MTR were trained in techniques for the financing and management community projects, in maintaining infrastructure sustainably, and in school management techniques for those communities that had schools built12. 91 field agents of the Ministry of Social Affairs were trained to accompany communities in local development processes and 54 field agents of the Ministry of Rural Development were trained in participatory assessment methodology – key skills that will leave communities with improved capacity for future development planning. 3.3 Efficiency Efficiency is rated Moderate. 45. A comprehensive financial and economic analysis was not carried out for this ICR because of several reasons. First, no cost-benefit analysis was done at project entry. Second, in the project paper, and prior to the completion of the ICASEES study, the emphasis had been focused on smaller-scale rehabilitation activities of existing infrastructure and not on construction of new infrastructure. Third, there are few statistics or data available in CAR to do a comparative intra-

10 (2 x 0.57) + (3 x 0.43) = 2.43 / moderate 11 USD 4.74 million disbursed on 30 June 2013; USD 8.28 million total disbursement. 12 ACTED, Final Report.

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country cost analysis. The political crisis delayed or suspended many other projects for longer than this project and therefore could not be used to compare against. Similarly, Economic Rate of Return (ERR) analysis was not feasible for lack of direct beneficiary or usage data. Fourth, construction contracts varied significantly in terms of scope of works, and cost depended on a number of factors such as availability and distance to building materials, quality of access roads particularly during the wet season, and whether qualified local (regional) companies were available. This made ex-post comparison between contracts less straightforward. Furthermore, fifth, without technical audit reports it is not possible to assess the quality of the constructed infrastructure13. 46. Project efficiency was included in the design of the project through the objective to minimize administrative costs through: (i) Cost-sharing of PCT staff with the parallel-AfDB financed project; (ii) use of AGETIP-CAF structure as maître d’ouvrage délégué for the construction and rehabilitation activities; (iii) relying on NGOs and the private sector for the delivery of sub-projects; and (iv) the project followed vigorous fiduciary procedures to ensure cost efficiency. 47. Cost effectiveness. An analysis of a limited number of contracts that focused on the construction of specific infrastructure resulted in the following unit costs of RPF contracts procured by AGETIP-CAF: community water points US$9,209 per water point; schools US$ 68,908 per school or US$ 22,969 per classroom14; and construction of health posts US$69,731. The project’s unit cost per classroom is marginally (1.26%) cheaper than UNICEF which also had a school component in their program from 2012 to 2015 and had an average unit cost of US$23,259, but considerably higher than the Education Sector Development Project (P112321) average unit cost of US$ 19,519 for constructing a classroom in the period in the period of 2009 to 2012. Factors that could explain the Education Sector Development Project’s lower unit are elaborated in Annex 3. No similar projects were identified to compare the cost of health posts or water points. Looting of regional offices and the loss of project vehicles had a negative effect on cost efficiency. 49. Capacity Strengthening for Local Development cost US$ 0.78 million, around 10% of the operations total cost and only half of what was originally budgeted for this activity. It included the development of the necessary studies and manuals, vehicles and office equipment, and training for PIU, MDOD, central, regional and local stakeholders as well as the training and set up of VCDs and CDCs. This capacity building was crucial for a country that had only recently re-engaged with multilateral financing agencies, and important for the sustainability of the investments. In addition, the Project Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation cost nearly US$ 2 million or one quarter of the budget, demonstrating the high cost of operating in fragile and conflict-affected environments. 50. Efficiency of implementation was excellent following the MTR of 2012, but, as indicated in other sections, compromised by three factors. The most important one of these was the absence of local development plans and regional needs assessments upon which basis the priority construction would be identified. AGETIP-CAF’s internal management processes and use of National Competitive Bidding prior to the MTR contributed to the slower than planned implementation of the project, but could also have had a positive influence of the overall efficiency of the individual activities. The third factor was the political crisis with the suspension of project activities because of security concerns and OP 7.30, and with the absence of key PIU personnel as a result of AfDB’s

13 A lot of infrastructure was only built between April 2014 and April 2015, and it would have been difficult to commission a technical audit before the end of the project in May 2015 even regardless of the security and access issues.

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longer suspension of their activities. On the whole, the project was delayed with two extensions totaling 22 months. 51. This delay, however, would have been longer without the key decisions that were taken at the MTR. The first decision that was taken streamlined AGETIP-CAF project execution and procurement processes through the creation of a dedicated cell and led to a dramatic improvement of the performance of the MDOD in the project and organizational reform within AGETIP-CAF as a whole. The organizational reform benefitted the implementation of nearly all other Bank financed operations in the country that also work with AGETIP-CAF. The second decision was to develop and apply the innovative approach of “envelope procurement” through ACTED for the LDF construction and rehabilitation activities. This approach is considered best-practice and was featured a Bank OPCS Guidance How-To-Note on “Dealing with Fiduciary and Governance Challenges for CDD in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.” 52. Even though traditional measures of financial and economic analysis cannot fully quantify the efficiency of the project, no significant shortcomings in the operation were identified, and efficiency was clearly an area of focus both at project entry and throughout the operation. Efficiency of implementation was exceptional from 2012 – 2015, especially under the difficult circumstances of the political crisis. For these reasons, the project’s efficiency is rated Moderate. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 53. Rating: With a Substantial relevance, a Substantial rating on PDO1 and a Moderate rating on PDO2, and Substantial efficiency, the Overall Outcome Rating for this project is Moderately Unsatisfactory. This is consistent with the significant results achieved by the project, given CAR’s recent reengagement with multilateral banks when the project was developed, the overall fragility in the country throughout the life of the project, and the severity of the crisis in 2013 that led to the triggering of OP 7.30. This is also consistent with the project’s wide geographic scope and management choice to parallel finance with the AfDB as part of a wider joint interim strategy note.

Relevance Efficacy

Efficiency Outcome Rating Objectives Design PDO1 PDO2

Original Sub-ratings: High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate

Rounded Ratings Substantial Moderate Moderate Moderately

Unsatisfactory 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 54. Poverty Impacts. The project was designed to target vulnerable communities, particularly rural communities, in 102 communities spread over four of the seven regions of CAR, and a baseline study was developed in the first year of the project to identify and prioritize eligible communities in all four regions, based on the criteria from the PAD. After the MTR, the project focused its resources on 36 communities in two regions, while the AfDB financed project would focus on the remaining two. Consequently, project benefits reached the target population, but in a

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reduced geographical area. There is no information on the poverty reduction impact of the project as the impact evaluation study was not completed. 55. Gender Aspects: The project started gender disaggregated tracking of project results and activities from the 2012 MTR onwards. 394 trained members of VCD and CDC were women (22.7%), 5 female agents of the RDM were trained in participatory assessment methodology, and 40 women of the MAS were trained in accompanying VCDs and CDCs in local development processes. 56. Social Development: In the first year of implementation, the project developed an Indigenous Peoples Plan based on an in-depth social assessment of the Aka, their customs and living conditions. Even though tracking of project benefits to Aka or sub-project consultations with Aka communities was not part of the M&E system, 91 Aka are recorded as members of VCD and/or CDC; and at least one community pharmacy was constructed from the LDP after consultations with local Aka. Project design included an emphasis on consultative and participatory planning of local development planning in at least 60% of the targeted communities as well as a number of measures to monitor the functioning of representative coordination bodies. The reduction of the number of communes with LDPs to 34 and the overall shift away from CDD after the MTR reduced the social development impact of the project significantly. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 57. The project’s changes in the management and approval structure of AGETIP-CAF after the MTR in 2012 which led to increased productivity and implementation speed of the process was since replicated by other Bank-financed and development partner financed projects and has led to improved capacity and efficacy of AGETIP-CAF overall. This increased capacity enabled the Bank to select AGETIP-CAF in July 2015 as the implementing agency for a USD 20 million dollar “LONDO” Project with a national scope. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) No other unintended outcomes or impacts were observed. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 58. No beneficiary survey was held because of the security situation in the country during the ICR mission did not allow for travel to the beneficiary communities. 59. A Stakeholder Workshop was held on 17 August 2015 including representatives of the PCT, AGETIP-CAF, CNP, ACTED, and other agencies met during the ICR mission. Participants were very positive about the project, its implementation and their collaboration with the World Bank. Key comments focused on lessons learnt, a discussion of the findings of the borrower ICR, and the need for transition arrangements and future support of the social infrastructure that was built. Comments also included (i) the lack of coordination between the World Bank and AfDB supervision teams, (ii) the need for additional financing to finance construction activities identified in the LDPs of those communes 26 communes where there was no infrastructure built under the project, and (iii) the need to strengthen regional and local authorities’ capacity.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

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Rating: High 60. The risk to development outcome is rated high, because (i) the continuing volatile political and security situation in the country that may result in resumption of armed conflict from factors outside the control of the Bank or the international community, including a contested election, a coup d’état or general political instability; (ii) reliance on AfDB and other development partners’ continuing project support to equip constructed schools and health posts, transfer the infrastructure to the relevant local authorities/line ministries’ ownership and develop the final two Local Development Plans; (iii) current absence of government or donor commitment on continued funding for the implementation of the 34 Local Development Plans; (iv) long physical distances between villages/towns within communes, inherent to CAR, that would hinder the direct participation in future decision-making processes and, consequently, would erode the gains in trust in local and central authorities this project may have generated; (v) limited supervision and quality control, reliance on local sourcing of materials and reduced capacity building on the management and maintenance of community recovery activities – particularly since the 2013 security crisis risk affecting the long term lifespan of the infrastructure.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 61. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The project’s outcomes, components and activities were essentially well designed to respond to the needs of the country, but had key shortcomings as a result of rapid preparation as an emergency operation which led to delays in implementation, and issues with monitoring and evaluation. 62. The preparation and design were relevant to the country context, the Bank’s recently ended Joint Interim Strategy Note and the PRSP. The project was prepared as an emergency operation using OP 8.0 to support the peace process that was ongoing in 2009 and to support the Government in delivering quick results in the first year of the project cycle. The project was also aligned with the AfDB, in accordance with the JISN and the Government’s specific request. The fiduciary arrangements, in particular the selection of AGETIP-CAF as a project implementation entity for procurement and financial management to support the Ministry of Social Affairs was based on an in-depth assessment of the borrower’s capacity. Lessons learnt from previous projects and from similar situations in other fragile and conflict-affected countries were included in the design. 63. Shortcomings included: first, the mistaken assumption that there were existing local development plans or needs assessments from which sub-projects could be selected and delivered within the first 12-18 months of the project cycle; second, while the link between the PDO and project activities was clear, the design of the results framework did not support adequate monitoring and evaluation of the PDO, and lacked target values for the monitoring and evaluation of individual components15. The results framework was only formally revised during the first restructuring in June 2013; third, no cost-benefit analysis for the project was undertaken, neither during preparation nor in the first months of implementation.

15 The results framework was only formally revised during the first restructuring in June 2013.

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64. Two design choices, while valid at design, contributed to delays during implementation. First, lessons learnt from previous projects and from similar situations in other fragile and conflict-affected countries were limited to the CDD activities and did not take into account lessons learnt from projects where rapid construction of rural infrastructure was key. In this respect, the alternative of implementation of sub-projects through direct contracting of a UN agency or international NGO for the first year would have been an appropriate mitigation measure to prevent delays. Second, the randomization of the target communities and villages, in combination with the vast geographical overall target area and the limited financial resources in the project are not compatible with the underlying peacebuilding objectives of the project, unless there were a phased approach. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 65. First, compliance with safeguards policies was ensured with the development of high quality safeguards instruments within the first 12 months of project implementation and regular safeguards support and/or supervision missions in the early years of the project. Environmental safeguards supervision during the construction phase was too limited. 66. Second, regular implementation support missions throughout project implementation (total of 16 missions) and a Bangui based Bank procurement specialist contributed to high level of capacity building, timely support and provision of NO and close monitoring of fiduciary compliance. Stakeholders expressed their high satisfaction with the level of implementation support and responsiveness from the Bank at the stakeholder meeting. 67. Third, the Bank took appropriate corrective action at the Mid Term Review to address project design flaws, project delays, and context-specific challenges and to improve disbursement. The MTR, however, was a missed opportunity to revise the results framework, both in terms of the timing and in terms of including indicators that better captured the PDO. Many of the issues that were corrected at the MTR were already flagged in consecutive ISRs and AMs in the months and years before and should have been corrected more pro-actively. 68. Fourth, the project was set up to be closely aligned with the AfDB funded project. However, after the project was prepared, there was little collaboration with the AfDB in ensuring true complementarity, joint supervision missions or maintaining a coordinated implementation schedule. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. 69. The MTR took the necessary actions/decisions to correct the shortcomings in design and speed up the construction and rehabilitation of key social infrastructure. The Bank also remained closely engaged with the Borrower and the project implementation units throughout the 2013 crisis and triggering of OP 7.30, which allowed the start-up of activities following the crisis sooner than AfDB-funded activities and is key to having been able to implement nearly all the planned activities by its closure date of May 31, 2015. 5.2 Borrower Performance

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(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 70. First, the Government demonstrated ownership and commitment to achieving the development objectives of the PRSP and the project, and collaborated closely with the Bank during project preparation. 71. Second, the Government supported the proposed joint World Bank/AfDB approach through the establishment of an inter-ministerial steering committee on (date) that would oversee both projects and the appointment of key staff in a joint PIU. 72. Third, the size of the PNC (more info) and the high turnover in participating line-ministries’ representatives, as well as the absence of regional PNCs reduced the PNCs capacity for active steering of the project during the implementation and for an adequate handover of constructed facilities to local authorities for regular operation and maintenance after the closing of the project. 73. Fourth, the government remained committed and engaged to the project throughout the conflict, thereby contributing to completing the project in spite of the difficult country context. (b) Implementing Agencies Performance (PIU and AGETIP-CAF) Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 74. First, Initial “Moderately Unsatisfactory” ratings for Implementation Progress in the first 1.5 years of project implementation were attributed to a combination of delays as a result of delays in the approval of AfDB’s component financing, delays in identifying the reconstruction activities in absence of key assessments and local development plans, and delays in procurement as a result of complicated processes within AGETIP-CAF. Implementation Progress was consistently rated “Satisfactory” or “Moderately Satisfactory” (key technical staff, financial management, procurement, compliance). 75. Second, absence of environmental safeguards staff and detailed safeguards compliance supervision reports constitutes a significant shortcoming in the implementing agency’s performance. 76. Third, but it is recognized that the country context would have severely hampered regular safeguards field supervision. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 77. In spite of initial challenges to start rapid implementation of construction activities, both the Government and the Implementing Agencies demonstrated strong project ownership and commitment to achieving the PDO in an extremely challenging country context.

6. Lessons Learned

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78. In situations of urgent need of assistance and capacity constraints, a balance must be struck between the need for speed and the need for capacity building. Rapid implementation of the PRF was a key goal of the project, which was not achieved in part due to slow procurement of contractors by AGETIP-CAF before 2012. The lesson learned is that for the initial priority construction, the use of an NGO with substantial Bank experience on the ground as an implementing partner would avoid the delay of critical works. 79. Community Driven Development in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations requires costly additional institutional arrangements to accompany communities during the process and may result in it not resulting in the same cost efficiency benefits, participatory management approaches as it is usually associated with. 80. “Envelope procurement”, i.e. the procurement of contracts through a contracted intermediary is an important innovation that was piloted in this project. It increased the management and oversight capacity of the MDOD significantly and immediately, and greatly contributed to the implementation of the project. 81. Impact evaluations are key to learning from operations. However, in situations of great needs, a mismatch between the geographical scope and financing envelope of the project, and no sustained commitment for subsequent project phases, random selection of beneficiary communities is not easily understood or accepted by those communities that are left out. There was consensus among stakeholders that a more need-based selection and/or subsequent financing phases would have been preferred over the random selection. The impact evaluation was cancelled at the MTR, adding to the feeling of disappointment over the selection process. 82. Country office based staff, notably on procurement, and frequent intense project support missions greatly contributed to the implementation, coordination and technical assistance of the project. “Inverse missions” in which the client meets with the Bank mission in a third country, and frequent video-conferencing are crucial to continue Bank engagement during political crises such as the crisis that led to the triggering of OP 7.30 in 2013-14.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners A draft was circulated with the Government and Implementing Agency. Their comments are summarized in Annex 7.2.

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Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal

Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions) Percentage of

Appraisal

Total Baseline Cost 8.00 7.92

Physical Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 8.00 7.92

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00

Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 8.00 7.92

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00

IDA Grant 8.00 0.00 .00

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Annex 2: Outputs by Component This Annex presents a detailed overview of outputs per component complementing Section 3 of this ICR. Component 1: This component included training and capacity building activities, which sought to empower communities to prepare and implement development plans. These activities were far reaching in mobilizing the population and local authorities around development planning. 443 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and 34 Communal Development Committees (CDCs) were formed and 1,737 people were trained, 432 (22.7%) of which were women. The 34 CDCs were supported in the elaboration of participatory development plans. The development plans of last 2 communes were dropped as a result of a financial deficit caused by the crisis and the prolongation of the project operations. The trainings also involved members of municipal councils and civil servants of the implementing Ministry. 54 agents of the Ministry of Rural Development were formed in participatory assessment methodology. 91 agents of the Ministry of Social Affairs were formed on local development mobilization techniques. 36 agents of the relevant ministries were also formed in training of trainers methodology for the development of local development plans.

Component 1: Capacity Strengthening for Local Development

Completion Notes # of beneficiaries (Est)

Current Status

Local Development Plans developed through a participatory approach

34 out of 36 plans developed and approved

Completed

Members of municipal councils and village councils trained in local development

96% of target beneficiaries reached. 23% of participants were women

1,737 Completed

Component 2: The second component, known as the Priority Response Fund, included the implementation and disbursement of a Fund to finance small social infrastructure works to deliver urgent services and infrastructure in about 75 villages and communes. The objective of this component was to serve as a window of opportunity to deliver resources and encourage participation in the project while showing tangible dividends to the population. The PRF was predicated on a rapid community selection and project identification as a result of existing UN/NGO assessments and existing local development plans. However, it quickly became clear that this wasn´t the case and that assessments were largely incomplete/irrelevant to the project's activities, whilst local development plans had often been lost or simply not developed in the first place. This component saw an important turnaround after a number of changes were made during the Mid-Term Review (July 2012). These

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decisions included the bunching of technical studies for the PRF and the creation of a dedicated project cell. It should be noted that the outbreak in violence across the country did impact the implementation of the PRF. During the crisis and concurrent looting, all vehicles from the Project Coordination Team were stolen. The field agents of the Project Coordination Team were also discharged temporarily as the AfDB, which had left the country following the looting of their installations during the crisis, covered their salaries. The absence of field agents and means of transportation made the supervision of activities more difficult. Moreover, the displacement of the population and in particularly of local authorities hindered the handover of the structures built by the PRF to the communities. By project completion the PRF achieved 63 water points, 90 classrooms, 10 health centers, 36 sanitary blocks, 1 drying installation, and 1 bridge.

Component 2: Priority Response Fund (PRF)

Completion Notes # of structures / # of beneficiaries (est)

Current Status

Additional primary classrooms built or rehabilitated

- 90 classrooms (30 schools)

Completed

Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated

- 63 water points

Completed

Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped

- 10 health centers

Completed

Improved latrines constructed

- 36 latrine boxes

Completed

Other public social infrastructures constructed or rehabilitated

- 1 bridge 1 crop drying area

Completed

Component 3: The third component, known as the Local Development Fund, was destined to help targeted communes and villages access funds to finance the public and socio-economic investments identified during the local development planning process (Component 1). The component was originally expected to finance socio-economic investments in close to 40 communes and 80 villages. As a result of project restructuring and important disbursement delays, works for this component were implemented in only the 10 communes for which Development Plans were available at the time.

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In November 2012, in order to expedite the implementation of this component a special service agreement was signed between the project and two international NGOs (ACTED and COOPI). However, by April 2014 COOPI asked to be removed from the contract due to capacity constraints shifting its pending projects to ACTED. ACTED on its part did a commendable job in the implementation of the FDL by not just simply building infrastructure, but by involving and providing trainings to the local population. Specifically, ACTED undertook a Knowledge Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey, and implemented trainings of Parent Teacher Associations in the local schools, of techniques of agricultural product conservation, and executed a total sanitation campaign. The total number of training days amounted to 198. The contract with ACTED also included the equipment of the schools built. The infrastructure built as a part of the PDL included: 30 classrooms, 15 water points, 8 health care posts, 30 latrines, 2 communal pharmacies, 4 storage depots, 2 children playgrounds, and 8 crop drying areas.

Component 3: Local Development Fund

Completion Notes # of structures / # of beneficiaries (est)

Current Status

Primary classrooms built or rehabilitated

- 30 classrooms Completed

Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated

- 15 water points

Completed

Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped

- 8 health centers

Completed

Improved latrines constructed

- 30 individual latrines (10 latrine) boxes

Completed

Other public social infrastructures constructed or rehabilitated

- 2 communal pharmacies 4 storage depots 2 children´s playgrounds 8 crop drying areas

Completed

Component 4: The fourth and last component financed the management, monitoring and evaluation of the project. The objective was to build capacity within the project structures to carry out the necessary coordination, execution, monitoring and evaluation of the project. Decentralized teams of the

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Ministry of Social Affairs were equipped with means of transportation to facilitate access to isolated rural communities. An international consultant helped set up a monitoring and evaluation system early on in the project, and the Bank team used a dashboard to track progress against inputs and activities (starting in December 2012). However, the project never recruited an M&E Specialist as had been foreseen, and relied on the project coordinator to complete the progress reports. An impact evaluation, including a randomized control trial (RCT), for the Community Development Program was included in the design of the project. The project completed a detailed baseline study with the Central-African Institute of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies (ICASEES) within the first year that allowed the project team to select the beneficiary communities, but dropped the Impact Evaluation component due to security constraints. Through this component the project completed 31 monthly reports, 6 financial audits, 1 completion report, 43 monitoring of disbursements.

Component 4: Program management, Monitoring and Evaluation

Completion Notes # of beneficiaries (est)

Current Status

Monthly project monitoring reports

31 monthly reports - Completed

Monitoring of disbursements

43 monitoring of disbursements

- Completed

Financial audit 6 financial audits - Completed

Project completion report 1 completion report - Completed

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Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis)

This annex provides a background to rating of the project’s efficiency in terms of cost effectiveness and efficiency of implementation. A comprehensive financial and economic analysis was not carried out for this ICR because of several reasons. First, no cost-benefit analysis was done at project entry. Second, in the project paper, and prior to the completion of the ICASEES study, the emphasis had been focused on smaller-scale rehabilitation activities of existing infrastructure. Priority (RPF) investments were budgeted between US$ 12-$24,000, and local development (LDF) investments up to US$12,500 for a village, and up to US$ 50,000 for a commune. Construction of new infrastructure was not emphasized. Therefore comparison between budgeted amounts per commune or village at project entry and actuals spent is not useful. Third, there are few statistics or data available in CAR to do a comparative intra-country cost analysis. The political crisis delayed or suspended many other projects for longer than this project and therefore could not be used to compare against. Similarly, Economic Rate of Return (ERR) analysis was not feasible for lack of direct beneficiary or usage data. Fourth, construction contracts varied significantly in terms of scope of works, and cost depended on a number of factors such as availability and distance to building materials, quality of access roads particularly during the wet season, and whether qualified local (regional) companies were available. This made ex-post comparison between contracts less straightforward. Furthermore, fifth, without technical audit reports it is not possible to assess the quality of the constructed infrastructure. Inclusion of project efficiency in the design of the project. The project was designed to minimize administrative costs through: (i) Cost-sharing of PCT staff with the parallel-AfDB financed project; (ii) use of AGETIP-CAF structure as maître d’ouvrage délégué for the construction and rehabilitation activities; (iii) relying on NGOs and the private sector for the delivery of sub-projects; and (iv) the project followed vigorous fiduciary procedures to ensure cost efficiency. Cost effectiveness. An analysis of a limited number of contracts that focused on the construction of specific infrastructure resulted in the following unit costs of RPF contracts procured by AGETIP-CAF: community water points US$ 9,209 per water point16; schools US$ 68,908 per school or US$ 22,969 per classroom17; and construction of health posts US$ 69,731. Based on this limited analysis, there are a few assumptions that could be assumed for rating the efficiency of this project. It could be expected that the unit costs for schools are at the higher end of the average costs in the project, given that contractors were not able to apply economies of scale with other works in the same or close-by commune. The unit cost per classroom can be compared to UNICEF who also

16 Based on the cost of 61 waterpoints of a total of 76 built, spread over three contracts. This cost included the training of local repairmen. 17 This cost is based on 30 classrooms of a total of 111 built, spread over six contracts that focused on building schools only. Schools were constructed with 3 classrooms per school and pro-rata latrine facilities and classroom furniture. Management and supervision costs are not included in this estimate.

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implemented a school component from 2012 – 2015 and who built similar three-classroom schools. The project’s unit cost per classroom is marginally (1.26%) cheaper than UNICEF which also had a school component in their program from 2012 to 2015 and had an average unit cost of US$23,259.However, both UNICEF and the project’s costs are considerably higher than the Education Sector Development Project (P112321) average unit cost of US$ 19,519 for constructing a classroom in the period in the period of 2009 to 2012. The classrooms that were built under the Education Sector Development Project were similar in design. Factors that could explain their lower cost include (i) construction focused on areas closer to Bangui18, thereby reducing cost for Bangui based construction companies; (ii) the period 2009-2012 was a period of relative stability compared with the period 2012 – 2015; (iii) inflation between 2009 – 2012 was under 5%, while between 2012 – 2013 it was between 5 – 10%, reducing again to just under 5% in 2013, and then rising between 17 – 25% in 2014; (iv) the education project constructed or rehabilitated a total of 926 classrooms (versus 111 in the project) which could have resulted in significant economies of scales for the contractors; and (v) the shift away from a community driven development approach which usually is linked with cost savings in terms of management cost, procurement of local supplies and the use of (cheaper) local labor. No similar projects were identified to compare the cost of health posts or water points. The political crisis resulted in looting of regional offices and the loss of project vehicles. Insecurity and roadblocks also claimed the human loss of one life and the injury of another contractor’s employee. While other World Bank financed projects, as well as other development partners’ financed activities suffered looting and destruction of beneficiaries’ supplies, equipment and buildings, this project’s construction activities or resource materials were not looted during or after the crisis. Capacity Strengthening for Local Development cost US$ 0.8 million, around 10% of the operations total cost and only half of what was originally budgeted for this activity. It included the development of the necessary studies and manuals, vehicles and office equipment, and training for PIU, MDOD, central, regional and local stakeholders as well as the training and set up of VCDs and CDCs. This capacity building was crucial for a country that had only recently re-engaged with multilateral financing agencies, and important for the sustainability of the investments. Project Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation cost nearly US$ 2 million or one quarter of the budget, demonstrating the high cost of operating in fragile and conflict-affected environments. Efficiency of implementation. Efficiency of implementation was, as indicated in other sections, compromised by three factors. The most important one of these was the absence of local development plans and regional needs assessments upon which basis the priority construction would be identified. AGETIP-CAF’s internal management processes and use of National Competitive Bidding prior to the MTR contributed to the slower than planned implementation of the project, but could also have had a positive influence of the overall efficiency of the individual activities. The third factor was the political crisis with the suspension of project activities because of security concerns and OP 7.30, and with the absence of key PIU personnel as a result of AfDB’s longer suspension of their activities. On the whole, the project was delayed with two extensions totaling 22 months.

18 33 classrooms were built in Bangui, 21 in Region Centre; 24 in Centre-Est, 108 in Centre Sud, 69 in Region Sud and 72 in Region Sud Est under P111321)

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This delay, however, would have been longer without the key decisions that were taken at the MTR. The first decision that was taken streamlined AGETIP-CAF project execution and procurement processes through the creation of a dedicated cell and led to a dramatic improvement of the performance of the MDOD in the project and organizational reform within AGETIP-CAF as a whole. The organizational reform benefitted the implementation of nearly all other Bank financed operations in the country that also work with AGETIP-CAF. The second decision was to develop and apply the innovative approach of “envelope procurement” through ACTED for the LDF construction and rehabilitation activities. This approach is considered best-practice and was featured a Bank OPCS Guidance How-To-Note on “Dealing with Fiduciary and Governance Challenges for CDD in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.” Even though traditional measures of financial and economic analysis cannot fully quantify the efficiency of the project, no significant shortcomings in the operation were identified, and efficiency was clearly an area of focus both at project entry and throughout the operation. Efficiency of implementation was exceptional from 2012 – 2015, especially under the difficult circumstances of the political crisis. For these reasons, project efficiency is rated Modest.

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Annex 4 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending

Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGSO Legal

Ningayo Charles Donang Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement

Kossi R. Eguida Economist AFTP3 - HIS

Joseph-Antoine Ellong Senior Program Assistant GSURR Operations

Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Senior Environmental Specialist GEND

R Safeguards

Etienne NKoa Sr. Financial Management Specialist

AFTME - HIS

Financial Management

Ivan Rossignol Chief Technical Specialist GTCDR

Christopher Saunders Operations Officer GEEDR Operations

Supervision/ICR

Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGSO Legal

Patrick Bongotha Consultant GGODR

Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer WFALA Finance

Ningayo Charles Donang Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement

Joseph-Antoine Ellong Senior Program Assistant GSURR Operations

Lucienne M'Baipor Miayo Sr. Social Development Specialist GSURR Safeguards

Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Senior Environmental Specialist GEND

R Safeguards

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Christopher Saunders Operations Officer GEEDR Operations

Haoussia Tchaoussala Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY08 165.70

Supervision/ICR 802.40

Total: 968.10

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results

No beneficiary Survey was done.

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Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

A Stakeholder Workshop was held in Bangui on 17 August 2015 with representatives of the different stakeholders19 of the project. There was consensus amongst the participants that the project had been successful in the construction of social infrastructure and the development of Local Development Plans. Even though the crisis affected the delivery of activities and prices of construction materials and hampered field supervision, participants praised the continued engagement of the Bank Team throughout the crisis, and the courage and dedication of the contractors and project teams who continued to work where feasible, even under the most difficult of circumstances. Participants also stressed the importance of additional financing from the Bank or other financing institutions for the implementation of the Local Development Plans. Specific comments included: The resilience of the project and proactivity of staff should be commended. Project staff and local authorities were proactive in protecting project resources and infrastructure from looting and theft. Project staff and contractors, many of whom who had been technically unemployed due to the suspension of project activities under OP 7.30, were able to return to work immediately after the suspension was lifted and complete the project in spite of the volatile situation that the country continues to face. The design of the project corresponded to a longer-term vision for increasing state presence across the country. Government authorities understood the project as a longer-term process with different phases. Correspondingly, the random community selection methodology was presented to local stakeholders as the first phase of the process and that other communities would be selected in subsequent phases. The wide geographic reach of the capacity building component in villages and communes contrasts with the limited infrastructure works that ultimately only benefited a more modest number of communities. This contributed to creating expectations in communities that could ultimately not be fulfilled under the project. The project did not communicate the activities and achievements of the project enough to contribute to the peace-building goals of the project. Even though a communication plan was developed it was never fully implemented. The effective handover of infrastructure to local authorities was affected by the massive displacement caused by the crisis. State structures and local authorities were particularly affected by the conflict. Up to date, many local stakeholders have not returned to the regions.

Annex 7: Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 7.1 Executive Summary of the Borrower ICR:

19 Participants included representatives from AGETIP-CAF, the PCT, Bureaux de Controle, CNP, ACTED and the MEF.

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1. The Central African Republic has adopted both a document of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) covering the period 2008-2009 and a Partnership Joint Country Strategy Paper (DSPPC) for the period 2009-2012, developed jointly by the International Development Association (IDA / WB) and the African Development Bank (ADB). The PDCAGV fits perfectly under the two main documents and benefits parallel financing of both development partners for its implementation. 2. This Final Report describes the performance of the implementation of the project, the results recorded and the measures taken for their sustainability, the impact of exogenous factors and lessons learned. Innovative Approach 3. The agreement between IDA / WB and ADB in PDCAGV can be considered one of the extensions of the Joint Country Partnership Strategy (JCPS) to provide assistance to and encourage CAR on the path of reforms and to implement projects targeting development, improvement of living conditions of fragile and vulnerable populations and mitigate the risks of instability in the country. The agreement on the PDCAGV was materialized by: (i) the same Guardianship Project with the Government (MASPGAH), (ii) the same National Steering Committee (NSC), (iii) the same Project Management Unit (PMU ), (iv) use the same Project Implementation Manual (PEM) and the same manual of administrative managements, financial and accounting (MGAFC), (v) and if necessary synchronization of project supervision missions ground. This innovative joint approach is very beneficial and should inspired most development partners in CAR. Institutional Framework 4. The institutional framework has been set up under the provisions of the Grant Agreement and has significantly evolved over the implementation period. All structures have played their respective roles in relation to the exception of Regional Steering Committees which were never set in place implemented and the CSP that has no visibility since its inception. Moreover, despite the decree specifying the role and mission defined at the two focal points, their tasks outlined in the MEP, the interventions of the two focal points with the UEC were very small and not visible outside the Committee, signing the project accounts and the drafting of minutes of meetings of the NPC. The project results and impacts 5. PDCAGV partially covered 5 regions, 10 prefectures and 102 municipalities initially in the western and southern areas of the country. The results are as follows:

a) 446 CVD and 36 CDC established and operational; b) 36 including 34 PDL developed validated and adopted; c) 78 water points constructed or rehabilitated (65 wells, 12 springs and one well) d) 282 socio-community infrastructure rehabilitated and / or constructed (schools, school

latrines, kindergartens, drying areas, warehouses, community pharmacies, health posts, bridge etc.)

e) 1737 people are trained including 394 women (23%) out of a projected 1,800 people including 600 women (30%);

f) 54 agents of the MDR which 5 are women (9% against 40% expected) are trained in participatory assessment methodology;

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g) 91 field staff MASPGAH including 42% women were recycled on accompaniment techniques of self-development process;

h) 53 people trained on the MT which 5 are women (9% against 40% planned)

i) 36 frames (Social Affairs, Plan, Rural Development) which 4 are women (11.11%) received training of trainers on the technical development of PDL;

j) 119 middle managers trained, including 26 women (22% against 40% planned) k) 75 members of CVD and CDC trained including 20 women (27% against 40%

planned) l) ACTED under Component 3 of the MOG contract formed: (i) 47 officers including 14

women m) and (ii) 80 officers, including 26 women; n) 91 members of CVD are pygmies; o) CVD 2% of officers are pygmies and 1% CDC members offices; p) 29% of members of CVD are women. q) 32% of CDC members are women and 29% of board members are women r) Conducting a quantitative study of living conditions in rural areas.

6. Limits of LDP: This participatory approach had limitations due to the low value-added resource persons responsible for driving the development of the LDP process. He failed to express some useful sub-projects such as community boxes or community houses or subprojects clusters bearing high social impact, especially in some very remote areas. Administrators (UEC) received on-site training through "Knowing by Doing" which could have been supplemented by training courses or immersion to discuss and inquire projects with similar experiences and practices in other countries in the sub-region. Project Performance 7. Despite this unfavorable country environment, the relevance of sub-projects is carried throughout unequivocally. They respond to real social needs expressed following a participatory and collaborative approach leading to a real "capacity building", the constitution of VCD and CDC and development of LDP. 8. Given this proven relevance, impact generated by the Project (built and strengthened capacity, sub-projects through the FAP and made FDL) is important, both for the local population (VCD and CDC) and at the level of national and decentralized administrative authorities, and of central and decentralized technical services involved in the implementation. 9. Ownership of local infrastructure built and sustainability are on average quite good, but have some shortcomings resulting from the delay in the delivery of social animation and quality of certain social infrastructure failing conducting technical audits and in spite of the presence of control offices. Monitoring, evaluation and impact 10. The UEC had recruited a M&E expert at project start who did not stay long. Any attempt to UEC for the recruitment and retention of a replacement failed. Thus monitoring activities of the

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Project have not been the subject of particular attention. The monthly operational monitoring tables prepared by the UEC include the results data but these are not carried over into the quarterly reports prepared by the directors at regional level. 11. According to the provisions of the Project Document, reiterated through the various AMs, the results of monitoring and evaluation activities will be consolidated reports at the PNC and periodically communicated to the MAS to monitor the project, to anticipate the necessary steps and finally to adjust or modify as necessary. The consolidated reports on the monitoring and evaluation activities have not been established; but instead, the Coordinator regularly prepares the monthly tables of operational monitoring and evaluation with reference to the results recorded. This is one of the main weaknesses recorded, and which does not depend on coordination but because of the lack of a post in the M&E expert in the project. 12. Impact assessment based on a baseline and several comparisons between municipalities would have been conducted as follows: A. After the first phase: comparison of communities that received component FAP and the municipalities who have not received; B. after the second phase of the project: comparison of three (3) groups of communities:

1) Communes who received the FAP component 1st phase and 2nd phase FDL component; 2) Communes who received the FAP component in the first phase and have not received the

LDF component in 2nd phase; 3) Communes that have not received the FAP component in the first phase and neither the

LDF component in 2nd phase; C. after the third and final phase of the project: comparison of four (4) groups of municipalities:

1) Communes who received the FAP component 1st phase and 2nd phase FDL component; 2) Communes who received the FAP component in the first phase and have not received the

LDF component in 2nd phase; 3) Communes that have not received the FAP component in the first phase or the FDL 2nd

phase component and received the LDF component third phase; 4) Communes that have not received the FAP component 1st phase nor the LDF component

2nd phase, and neither the LDF component third phase; 13. In summary, the initial project design, very innovative in the short and medium term development approach (minimum 10 years) has been completely redesigned in a "project" approach in restructuring the project approved July 18, 2013. This new approach will be a little project of its kind founded in the early months of a participatory and collaborative approach. Strategy and Communication Plan 14. The communication strategy is a sub-component of the Project. The strategy and communication plan has been made and an expert was recruited to its implementation alongside the PMU. The Logo and flyers were produced and emissions at the rural radio stations were organized and field reports with this supervision mission teams. In short, a good information and communication strategy, guaranteeing the success of the project, its ownership by the beneficiaries and sustainability perspective. This momentum has unfortunately experienced a pause following the events occurred in December 2012. Since then, the communication on the project has faded even after the resumption current final quarter of 2013.

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� No radio interactive programs (appreciation opinions of beneficiaries and level of satisfaction);

� No press conferences sanctioning supervision missions and meetings of the NOC;

� No items members of the UEC and UERS in the press to inform about the process and the progress and achievements of the impacts on beneficiaries;

� No movies to trace the life of the Project; � No active website on the project at the UEC or Guardianship (course design); � No signs on the building sites of socio-community infrastructure created by the project in

five regions, with the exception of drillings rehabilitation work which signs convey information about the Project and are a good practice in information and communication.

15. A documentary information on the achievements of PDCAGV is necessary to the attention of the authorities of the Transition and Post Transition. This support may be used to renegotiate the following phases of the project as originally designed but with necessary adjustments in the light of lessons learned. 16. In addition to elicit a desired real ownership and sustainability, competitions could be organized to reward good practices in management and maintenance of social infrastructure at the VCT and CDC. Government actions and Performance 17. The Government has fulfilled its obligations under the Grant Agreement including :

� The implementation of the MEP, the MT MGAFC and acceptable to the World Bank; � Recruitment of the Project Coordinator and his technical staff (RRCF, SPM, SGF, SSE and

Regional Directors, etc.) satisfactory to the World Bank; � The realization of CGES, of the CPR, the PDPA, the ESMP adopted and published in terms

satisfactory to the World Bank; � The CMOD signed between MASPGAH and AGETIP CAF satisfactory to the World

Bank; 18. The Government represented by the MASPGAH and the World Bank have shown flexibility to make necessary modifications taking into account the realities and constraints of land compared to the basic texts of the Grant Agreement. 19. The Government has allocated to MASPGAH in the national budget, under the 201112 fiscal year, a specific credit line of 30 million CFA francs (US $ 65,400) in support PDCAGV. This amount was not fully disbursed in 2011 and the situation of the country from 2012, did not allow the MASPGAH authorities to renew the request. Following the hearing that Ms. MASPGAH has given us, a plea was made during budget debates so that a line of credit to be given to current PDCAGV this year 2015 and for the year 2016. 20. The NPC called Interministériel13 Steering Committee (ICC) in the Grant Agreement, is an offshoot of the Government to ensure the management of the whole project. The Office of the CNP is composed solely of authorities and officials of MASPGAH, which does not give the interdepartmental character.

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21. The Committee met seven (7) times during the period from July 2010 to May 2015, including (5) times chaired by Guardianship, Minister for Social Affairs. Reflecting the attention paid by the Government to the success of this Project. 22. Under the provisions of the Grant Agreement, the Ministry of the Beneficiary for Social Affairs is responsible for the overall supervision and control processes of the Project. The presidency of the NOC is assured by the Minister that Ministry Trusteeship. This Ministry has had its head seven (7) Ministres14 from the preparatory phase to the date of the Effective Implementation Project (July 2008-May 2015). This turnover élevé15 impacted very negatively on the smooth running of the Project Coordination still being mobilized to deliver the new political authorities in the economy Project 23. No communication was made to the Government by the Cabinet to account for the evolution of this important project, the MASPGAH, Guardianship Project and President of the NOC. Actions of the World Bank (IDA / WB): Performance and Impact 24. The diligence with which the WB has honored its obligations under the Grant Agreement has been very remarkable for a country considered Post-Conflict (preparation, implementation and project start) and has switched back in rupture constitutional order accompanied by bloody clashes social (Project ramp-up period) and became a country in crisis exit path (maturity period and end of the project). 25. The WB has shown flexibility by being open to adjustments in certain procedures and institutional arrangement in light of realities on the ground. The Operational Policy (OP 7.30) was implemented with efficiency and foresight, while ensuring protection of investment from the World Bank, the interests of the CAR and also concerned the concrete and tangible results of the Project on the ground, despite the crisis. 26. The BM has organized ten (10) Supervision missions on the ground and two supervision missions "reverse" held at the Representation of the World Bank in Yaoundé in June 2013 and January 2014. Four (4) mini-supervisions were organized during missions for the LONDO project in 2014 and 2015. About half a dozen video conference was held between 2013 and 2014 on the progress of the project in addition to supervision missions. There are two key periods:

(i) the period 2009-2012 where the quality of supervision missions is well established. These missions were perceived by the PMU as moments of mutual understanding of all aspects of the Project and defining the ways and means for the success of the project and in an approach that is both collaborative and educational. Almost systematic field visits during this start-up period before the crisis have enriched the approach to training to regional directors, officers CBI and other decentralized services involved under the approach "Knowing by doing ";

(ii) supervision missions of the second period 2013-2015 were mainly devoted to the restructuring of the project, the reallocation of funds and the review of the progress status of the components. The field visits were very rare in view of the security situation. Field visits would have allowed an enrichment of trade on the status of civil engineering projects panels and the use of technical audits on works in progress. The Help memories established at each of these supervision missions account for the gradual evolution of the Project and its growing power.

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27. ANO were treated quickly. The DRF and direct payments were processed in exceptional times. Cash Project has never been turned on despite the period of crisis and outbreak of the Operational Policy OP 7.30; 28. The support level Procedures and Procurement Plan was both dynamic, preventive and educational. Particular attention has been devoted to each of supervision missions, with specific notes on the subject. Without violating the Rules and Procedures of the WB in this regard, close monitoring and business intelligence system in place were effective ramparts during the period from November 2009 to September 2012, against the risk of collusion and maneuver. This dynamic accompaniment avoided high risks observed in this area in such a crisis environment. 29. The reports of annual financial audits have always been the subject of comments and the reports have been acceptable to the WB. 30. In view of the progress of the project and intervened crisis, WB, on request of the Government, approved the Restructuring Project July 18, 2013 and authorized July 30, 2013, the reallocation of Don between the components and the extension of the Grant Agreement on 31 July 2014. At the request of the Government, the World Bank has also agreed the new Project closing date to May 31, 2015. 31. Only one reallocation of the gift was passed July 30, 2013 until the closure of the Project. This shows control costs by component at the WB and the UEC. 32. On the assets of the WB, the project received only two (2) TTL. Indeed, the second TTL which took over from the first, was already part of the team of supervisions16 missions. So this is a very good continuity, asset which the Project has been able to benefit and profit. 33. The governance of PDCAGV was a mastery by the WB, as well as in the framework of procurement, that strategic guidance and monitoring of performance indicators, consistent with the revised framework for monitoring results. However, the WB has just been asleep for not insisting on carrying out technical audits in 2014 with the resumption of infrastructure components B (FAP) and C (FDL). Role of the Coordinator and Performance 34. The PMU Project has played a remarkable role in the conduct and success of the Project. The Coordinator of the UEC was a great facilitator in the Project, as the conduct of activities funded by the WB and the ADB management teams at both central (UEC) and regionally (EBU). The project has two focal points, all located in the same department Guardianship Project, which are actually "homologues17" Coordinator. Knowledge transfer was secured methodically and efficiently. Relations with the executives of the PMU and AGETIP CAF (MOD) were in a healthy atmosphere, atmosphere that allowed, despite the vicissitudes in the country, driving the project to a successful conclusion regarding funding WB. 35. Financial audits have been completed on time and submitted to the WB and Guardianship on time. The audit recommendations were generally implemented and progress has been observed from one year to another. The performance in the assets of SGF and accounting under the leadership of the Coordinator. 36. The Coordinator also able to play effectively its role of interface needed between WB, Project supervision and AGETIP CAF. Concerned about the economical and efficient management of the

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Project, the Coordinator appeared sometimes austere to members of the UEC and UERS. For example administrators could not be equipped with electronic cameras for reporting their field activities and the local housing the Project remained in harmony with the surrounding office buildings, equipped with the bare minimum. Performance of other stakeholders National Steering Committee (NOC) 38. The NPC was established by Decree No. 002 / MASSNF / DIR-CAB / DGAS / DDC / SPDC.10 of 29 January 2010. It is a framing member, and political orientation, methodological and monitoring that watches the proper execution of the project at the national level and transparency in the management and decision making. The decisions of the NOC are taken by consensus. The decisions, proposals and recommendations of the NPC are enforceable. 39. Since its inception, the NOC held seven (7) statutory meetings including a meeting on the mid-term review, held July 4, 2012. The meetings of the NPC are still penalized by a Reporting and recommendations submitted the execution of the UEC. The President and members of the Office of the NPC have often organized field visits during the startup period (before the crisis) to assess the capacity-building programs running state and infrastructure projects. The NOC has been little attention to the major concerns of the BM in the conduct of the project in terms of anticipation and suggestions for improving project performance on time and justify the continuation of subsequent phases of Projet18. AGETIP CAF: CMOD No. 18 signed between MASSNF and DG / AGETIP CAF June 5, 2009 40. AGETIP-CAF is involved in the implementation of PDCAGV through the signing of the CMOD No. 18 signed with the MASPGAH June 5, 2009 for a term of three years. Its mission is to achieve the components B, C and part of Component D PDCAGV. AGETIP FCA has the necessary means to carry out its mission. 41. Analysis of the CMOD No. 18 reveals among others: (i) Article 12: The MOD will make annually a Project Management Technology Audit by an independent auditor approved by the Guardianship (MASPGAH) - The work of AGETIP CAF and its subcontractor ACTED, have no yet the technical audit object during our visit in May 2015, and (ii) Article 14: the end of MOD's mission is sanctioned by the Discharge issued by the MO. AGETIP CAF must ensure that the issuance of the Discharge, sanctioning the end of the CMOD. 42. During the mid-term review, several recommendations were made, some of which are in line with organizational arrangements in order to make efficient AGETIP CAF. Close monitoring and technical and organizational support were decided by the NPC according to the WB. A cell has been created within AGETIP CAF and dedicated exclusively to the execution of PDCAGV. Two experts19 were recruited by the UEC to support AGETIP CAF regarding procurement and monitoring of civil works. Furthermore, AGETIP CAF, with the agreement of the World Bank, told the Group of NGO ACTED / COOPI, following an open tendering, project management globale20, including: (i) Part 1: Construction of Infrastructure (70% of mobilized resources); (ii) Component 2: Community Animation (10% of mobilized resources); (iii) Component 3: Capacity building of the decentralized services of the ministries (10% of resources mobilized) and (iv) the service provider's remuneration (10% of resources mobilized). 43. If the first part of the tasks entrusted to AGETIP CAF was accomplished with satisfaction and resulted in the establishment and operationalization of the PMU (part of component D), the second

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part of the mission regarding the implementation of components B (FAP) and C (FDL) did not give any expected satisfaction. The decisions from the mid-term review enabled AGETIP CAF meet somehow challenges. It appears more and more that AGETIP CAF through its period of growth crisis and seems also a victim of its bureaucracy and its lack of anticipation. 44. At the signing of the CMOD, no sub-project eligible under parts B and C are available. Contrary to the provisions of the Grant Agreement regarding the sub-projects financed on Component B (FAP), the first eligible sub-projects were not available in the end after the establishment of PDL21. ICASEES 45. ICASEES was empowered for the collection and processing of statistical data in the CAR. The investigation activities entrusted to ICASEES through the signing of contracts with the UEC are as follows:

a. a survey at the beginning of activities, to determine the baseline; b. a mid-term survey to assess progress and prepare for the revised project mid-term

and c. investigation at the end of the project to assess the final impact of the project.

46. The tasks of ICASEES have been completed to the satisfaction of the UEC and WB. ACTED COOPI Consortium 47. Consortium ACTED COOPI, (two instead of NGOs) was selected following an open tender for carrying out the work of the component C (FDL) subcontracting with AGETIP CAF (achieving socio-community infrastructures retained as a priority within ten PDL achieved first, community outreach and capacity building). The use of this formula is justified for several reasons including (i) the long delay by the Project, due in part by AGETIP CAF (bureaucracy and procurement) and the time taken for making PDL, and (ii) the risk incurred in the cancellation of the Grant Agreement if the situation continued with very low disbursement rates. The WB has approved such subcontracting against the specific procurement arrangements for post conflict countries. We have no knowledge of a consolidated final report of the mission ACTED. AGETIP CAF and the UEC must ensure at delivery that the works delivered meet the technical specifications and that schools and community pharmacies in this case are well equipped in accordance with contractual terms. Companies and impacts 48. Three companies were mobilized for the rehabilitation of boreholes and water projects. These companies have performed their duties satisfactorily in general and housing panels were installed a remarkable visibility and readability in rural areas. More than two dozen companies and two construction works of the controllers were mobilized for the rehabilitation / construction of community social infrastructure (FAP1 + 2 + 3 and FDL) whose beneficiaries are the CDC and CVD. Mobilized more companies have injected approximately 2.54 billion CFA francs in the national and local economy including about 508 millions25 under payroll. The work is completed mostly without litigation or proceedings pending in the courts. Economic and Financial Evaluation 49. As of May 31, 2015, the total amount of DRF is estimated at FCFA 4.023.667.507, representing a disbursement rate of 98.81% 26. This disbursement rate that approaches 100% is considered very satisfactory at the close of PDCAGV, despite the national context in which the PDCAGV evolved.

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50. On the assets of the UEC and SGF, supported by an active and dynamic monitoring of the WB TTL, financial governance PDCAGV in terms of employment (expenditure) has complied broadly, distribution Budget reallocated by component. 51. Project Financial Management has evolved positively. Moderately Satisfactory considered with Substantial risk level in previous supervision missions, the performance of financial management is considered Satisfactory and the level of risk is Moderate, during the supervision mission of October 2014. At the last supervision mission of April-May 2015, financial management is moderately satisfactory and financial management risk remains moderate. Conflicts recorded Complaints 52. PDCAGV did not register complaints of extreme gravity, or conflicts with staff throughout its execution. It is to the credit of the Coordinator and the PMU. Ongoing minor disputes are as follows:

1) Complaint against the company THE COCONUT: Construction of a primary school in the village BABAZA (common Ouakanga, S / Prefecture BERBERATI) inadvertently payment amounting to 1,555,663 CFA francs. File pending settlement at the prosecutor, near the Tribunal de Grande Instance BERBERATI. Amount expected from the Special Account: 1,555,663 CFA francs. The last supervision mission suggested referral by an official letter from the Minister of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation (MEPCI) refunds due by The Coconut;

2) Reimbursement of ineligible VAT: Total VAT ineligible and financial audits noted during

2011, 2012 and 2013, 1,074,154 CFA francs. Amount expected from the Special Account: 1,074,154 CFA francs by the Guardianship Project.

3) Suspension of some contract staff of the PMU:

� By Note No. 216 / PDCAGV / UEC / Coordo / 13 of August 14, 2013, the Coordinator has notified the Regional Directors, at SDLR and support agents, the suspension of their contract as of August 15, 2013 - Design: Trigger Operational Policy OP 7.30 WB with suspension of DRF and persistent state of insecurity in the country making impossible the continuation of activities in the regions covered by the PDCAGV.

� By Note of 2 May 2014 addressed to the Coordinator, the PDCAGV Staff Collective

who made contract suspension object and sub-form of a memorandum, requesting the reopening of the record and considered by the hierarchy of liquidated damages for covering period of suspension of the contracts: In the psychological shocks suffered by certain agents (theft and looting of personal belongings), it adds the professional shock due to the suspension of contracts for about 13 months - possible partial repair measures are desirable in negotiations with the agents involved.

Conclusions: Key Lessons and Recommendations 53. PDCAGV is a project well designed and adapted to the CAR policy conditions and poverty and crisis output reduction strategy. The area of intervention which is usually the rural area is the home to the most fragile and most vulnerable groups. High expectations placed in PDCAGV to restore hope to these people confronted daily with the effects of poverty and bad living. Although parallel financing of the Project by IDA and AfDB is a great opportunity beneficial both in its design and

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in its implementation. However, the Government of CAR has failed to totally enjoy the availability of these two donors to support the project. Despite the very unfavorable conditions in which the project has evolved and the outbreak of the Operational Policy OP 7.30, the WB has always shown a special interest in "saving the Project" and ensure its long-term implementation regarding its financing. Thus, the sliding of the closure of the project 22 months allowed to register at May 31, 2015 (closing date), a disbursement rate of around 100% compared to the Grant Agreement and the results up to the expectations. 54. PDCAGV, is a useful project, very useful in terms of objectives, approaches adopted for a strong involvement of the beneficiaries in implementation, given the fragile gains made though. If measurements are taken by a neighbor constitutionally elected Government to revive Cooperation and Partnership with the two donors for the implementation of phases 2 and 3 initially planned, the PDCAGV, have left a bitter taste of unfinished with CVD and CDC established and operational in the field. The foreseeable consequences of the project ended without the subsequent phases will be harmful to the population for the credibility of the Government to support them and provide them with well-being and conditions of access to basic socio-community infrastructure in rural areas. Lessons learned: LT1: Innovative Approach: the strong involvement of beneficiaries (CVD and CDC) in the Project implementation process is the guarantee of the success of the project, ownership and sustainability of the achievements and the mobilization of social groups around common interests of development. This requires time and a lot of time and cannot be done in a short time in the life of a project (3-5 years); LT2: Context political instability and social conflict: Preservation of most Project acquired during a period of unprecedented bloodshed. Recovery and driving forward the planned activities despite the risk of still palpable insecurity in some regions: Evidence that the PDCAGV is a project of common interest to the beneficiary groups (PDL, access to drinking water and sanitation, access to education and primary health care, access to kindergartens and establishment of participatory democracy at local conditions etc.). The PDCAGV gives proof that people can be mobilized around their common interest for their development. LT3: PDCAGV jointly supported by IDA / WB and ADF / ADB with a single management unit, using the same MEP and MGAFC and synchronization to the best project supervision missions in the field. Co-financing could complete this exceptional joint partnership. The result is a significant gap in the achievement of sub-projects financed by the two donors. A mixed opinion among beneficiaries emerges: The beneficiaries of the sub-projects financed by IDA have a positive view on the achievements of PDCAGV while the beneficiaries of the subprojects financed by ADB always hopeful (cases platforms multifunctional ADB-financed whose work has not yet started); LT4: Unrequited Project: No national counterpart (national budget) or counterparty to the CDC and CVD (direct beneficiaries): The sub-projects financed are priorities but their efficiency remains to be proven: built primary schools without equipment nor teachers and neither educational kits; Community pharmacies but without allocation of start-basic pharmaceutical products etc. The consideration at the national level without conditionality could have financed the complementary measures identified at the end of the project. LT5: Monitoring and evaluation, and the Communication on the Project have not been sufficiently taken into account and developed throughout the course of the Project. This has weakened a little knowledge of PDCAGV and visibility with both the Government and public opinion in general.

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Recommendations: R1: Perform a technical audit of built or rehabilitated followed datasheets facility infrastructure through infrastructure and transmitting to the Client (UEC - AGETIP CAF) before closing the ADF / ADB financing; R2 : Proceed with the official handover of infrastructure carried out MO (database and data sheets items) in accordance with the CMOD (UEC - AGETIP CAF - MASPGAH) before the end of 2015 (condition required for settlement the remaining 25% fee to AGETIP CAF29); R3: Carry out surveys to measure project performance indicators at the end of the first phase as stipulated in the Grant Agreement and the MEP with the possibility of financing the ADF / ADB (UEC - EBU - ICASEES); R4: Report to the Government by the Council of Ministers Communication on the achievements and prospects of PDCAGV (NOC-UEC-AGETIP CAF - MASPGAH); R5 : Initiate negotiations with the two donors (IDA / WB and ADF / ADB) and see their availability to continue the financing of Phases 2 and 3 of the project; (MASPGAH - UEC - Focal Points - AGETIP CAF); R6: To popularize the law on the Public Analyst and its implementing decrees to make the sector competitive public contracting authority delegation (Government - Development Partners). The opening to competition, creates a true emulation, the emergence of professional offices and practice fee rates below the maximum rate (10%) specified in the regulations in force; R7: Repair the extent possible the effects of psychological shocks suffered by professionals and some agents have been suspended due to force majeure and victims of the unrest. 7.2 Comments on the draft ICR: In general, the PCT is of the opinion that the ICR is acceptable. However, it requires the report to consider the comments and details below.

1. General comments on the evaluation of stakeholder performance The amount of resources and the extent of the area of intervention: it was not realistic to think that we can reach achievements that have a significant impact on the population with funding of $ 8,000,000 over an area of 102 communities.

Some of the performance indicators would only have been meaningful if the project had several phases, which would have allowed to assess the sustainability of achievements.

The randomized selection of beneficiaries was strongly recommended the Bank at the technical launch of the project in 2009 (see checklist of November 2009). This methodology resulted in more accurate indicator values than were in the PAD. The result of the baseline survey and the random selection allowed to quantify the targeted beneficiaries (number of towns, villages, people, infrastructure, PDL, etc.) and divided the interventions as follows: 18 communities (Capacity Building + PRF), 18 communities (Capacity Building + PRF + LDF), communities (Capacity

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Building + LDF) and 48 communities (Capacity Building only). After this stage the only question that remained was to define the content of the capacity building, particularly for those 48 communities that would not benefit from infrastructure rehabilitation either under PRF or LDF.

Because of the above process, the PRF infrastructure could be identified in October 2010, nearly 12 months after project start; thereby already having missed the goal of PRF reconstruction within 12-18 months after starting the project.

Following the execution of studies under the supervision of AGETIP, about 230 social facilities were to be rehabilitated under the RPF throughout the area of operations and finance with both IDA and ADF. Subsequently it was agreed between the donors and the Government that the IDA funding would cover infrastructure in regions 1 and 2, and AfDB in regions 4 and 6.

Borrower Performance: the delay induced by the method of selection of the FAP randomized infrastructure should not impact the performance evaluation of the implementing agencies.

2. Evaluation of the achievement of the PDO The assessment is made compared to previous targets in June 2013: PDO2: Enhancing the capacity of local beneficiaries in planning and managing local recovery. This assessment is not comprehensible if one is not based on values resulting from the process of selection of beneficiaries and choice of infrastructures to be rehabilitated by randomization. The PAD indicators were neither encrypted nor clearly defined. Following the selection of beneficiaries by randomization, the total number of common infrastructure to receive and FAP or FDL is 54. The total number of common FDL is 36. Why not take these values as starting values for evaluating the achievement of objectives? It is difficult to indicate the objective basis of evaluating the capacity of managing local recovery.

3. Post-completion Operation/ Next Phase The report makes some relevant observations: Social infrastructure needs are high and the CDD approach adopted by the project was a good approach.

There are 24 communities that have produced PDL and trained VDC / CDC but received no funding for their infrastructure priorities. What will we tell them to members of the VCD / CDC and the expectations that were raised through the development of these PDL if there is no next phase? The Government had expressed the will to realize the PDCAG project in phases.

In the short term, the LONDO project funded by the World Bank can help restore social cohesion. What can be considered for the long term?

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Annex 8: Comments of Co-Financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

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Annex 9: List of People Interviewed

Name Title Institution

Ferrier NDOLEGUIA Directeur du Bureau d'études et de contrôle ACG

ACG

Eve HACKIUS ACTED Country Director ACTED

Judicaël MONTINDA AGETIP-Chef de la Cellule dédiée au projet PDCAGV

AGETIP

Marcel NGANASSEM Directeur Général de l'AGETIP, Maître d'ouvrage délégué (MOD)

AGETIP

Jean-Chrysostome MORISSI Social Development Specialist African Development Bank

Pierrot BEGO LANZERET Directeur du Bureau d'études et de contrôle LE CRAYON,TEL: 75504380/ 75202434

Le Crayon

Emmanuel DJADA Inspecteur Central au Ministère des Affaires Sociales, Vice-président du Comité de Pilotage

MAS

Eugénie YARAFA Ministre des Affaires Sociales, Président du Comité de pilotage du Projet, Maître d'ouvrage

MAS

Evariste SIMBARAKIYE Project Coordinator MAS

Fred Martin AZENE Spécialiste en Développement communautaire (SDCR) du PDCAGV

MAS

Jean Claude BELLEKA Directeur Général des Etudes et de la Planification au Ministère des Affaires sociales, Rapporteur du Comité de Pilotage, Point focal du fiancement BAD, signataire sur les chèques et les DRF

MAS

Julienne FIOLENGA Administrateur de l'UER 1 MAS

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Sylvain MBETISSINGA Administrateur de l'UER 2 MAS

Irène POUNEGINGUI Assure le suivi du projet PDCAGV au Ministère de l'Economie et du Plan

Ministry of Economy and Planning

Germain Turenne NGONGA Directeur de l'entreprise MTC: 75050450

MTC

André ZOUDAMBA Directeur du Développement Communauaire, Rapporteur du Comité de Pilotage, Point focal du financement IDA, signataire sur le chèque et les DRF

PNC

Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Sr. Environmental Specialist World Bank

Evelyne Huguette Madozein Program Assistant World Bank

Haoussia Tchaoussala Procurement Specialist World Bank

Jan Weetjens Practice Manager World Bank

Jean-Christophe Carret Country Manager World Bank

Paul Bance Task Team Leader World Bank

Sophie Grumelard Social Development Specialist World Bank

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Annex 10: List of Background Documents Document Date

Project Appraisal Document March 17, 2009

Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (ISDS) - Appraisal Stage February 2009

Restructuring Paper June 30, 2013

Restructuring Paper July 25, 2014

Environmental and Social Management Plan March 2010

Resettlement Policy Framework March 2010

Indigenous Peoples Framework March 2010

Baseline Report for the Evaluation of the Support to Vulnerable Groups Community Development Project June 2012

Rapport d'Evaluation de Projet AfDB: Promotion Socioeconomique des Groupes Vulnerables September 22, 2008

Aide Memoire October 27 - October 4, 2008

Aide Memoire September 15 to 26, 2009

Aide Memoire November 8 to 24, 2009

Aide Memoire December 9 to 17, 2009

Aide Memoire May 5 to 20, 2010

Aide Memoire July 10 to 17, 2010

Aide Memoire October 19 to 23, 2010

Aide Memoire April 6 to 22, 2011


Aide Memoire December 7 to 22, 2011

Aide Memoire June 20 to July 5, 2012

Aide Memoire September 12 to 20, 2012

Aide Memoire June 15 to 22, 2013

Aide Memoire January 16 to 23, 2014


Aide Memoire April 21 to May 5, 2015

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Implementation Status and Results Reports Sequences 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, and

11

Rapport de l'Assistance a la Mise en Place du Systeme de Suivi - Evaluation du PDCAGV

Rapport Annuel de l'Exercice 2014 du PDCAGV




Manuel d'Execution du Projet (version finale) September 1, 2010

Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF-93956) Education For All - Fast Track Initiative (draft version) November 12, 2015

Rapport d'Evaluation de Cloture PDCAGV (version Finale) - Mr. Bachir Issiaka Oloude June 2015

Country Engagement Note for the Central African Republic July 13, 2015

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Annex 11: Map

Annex 11: Map

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World Bank Document · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 20, 2015) Currency Unit...

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