working paper - Technology & business or development · South African Post Office WORKING PAPER: 2...

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www.wits.ac.za/swop

By David Dickinson

working paperFEBRUARY 2015

Fighting their ownbattlesThe Mabarete and the End of Labour

Broking in the South African Post Office

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Fighting theirown battles

The Mabarete and the Endof Labour Broking in the

South African Post Office

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Fighting theirown battlesThe Mabarete and the Endof Labour Broking in theSouth African Post Office

WORKING PAPER: 2FEBRUARY 2015

David Dickinson is a Professor of Sociology at WITS University anda SWOP Research Associate.

This research was funded by grants from the Humanities Faculty Research Committee ofWits University and Wits RINC funds. Funding for the publication was provided by theFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Karl von Holdt, the Director of SWOP, was critical in findingthese funds and championing the project. Abnavien King provided administrative assistancefor the publication. I am grateful for the collegial advice and encouragement provided atthe Wits SWOP Research Associates meetings.


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Fighting Their Own Battles | The Mabarete and the End of Labour Broking in the South African Post Office

4 Labour Broking, Legislation, Unionsand Worker Mobilisation

contents

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5 Background: Labour Broking in theSouth African Post Office

5.1 SAPO as a State Owned Enterprise:Doing the Right Thing with Disastrous Results 10

5.2 Agencies and Labour Brokers in SAPO 10

5.3 Three for the Price of One! Conditions ofLabour Broker Employment 11

5.4 The Implications of Labour Broking for SAPO 13

5.5 Two Unequal Workforces 13

5.6 Labour Broking: A Dirty Secret in Plain Sight 14

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6 A History of the Mabarete

6.1 The Emergence of Casual WorkersCommittees in Gauteng 16

6.2 Come September: The Communications WorkersUnion (CWU) and Casual Workers 16

6.3 The 2009 Postal Strike: A Watershed 18

6.4 Exploring Every Avenue 18

6.5 We are the Union Ourselves! The Strike waveof mid-2011 and its defeat 21

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3 Methodology 07

2 Introduction 05

1 Acronyms 04


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8 Strategies and Tactics forPrecarious Workers

8.1 Does the Mabarete’s Struggle Matter? 30

8.2 Mobilising and Focusing Minds 31

8.3 Applying Pressure 32

8.4 Protecting Unprotected Strikes 34

8.5 Uniting Everybody Vs. Leading by Example 34

8.6 To Unionise or Not to Unionise? 34

30

9 Wider Reflections

9.1 Industrial Conflict in SAPO Since April 2012 37

9.2 DEPACU: A Tale of Two Cultures 38

9.3 Technologies of Struggle 38

9.4 Casual Workers’ Rebellions: South Africa’sBest Bet? 39

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10 References 40

11 Endnotes 42

7 The Mabarete Strike(December 2011 - April 2012)

7.1 The Strike that Ended Labour Broking inthe Post Office 23

7.2 A Focused Campaign 23

7.3 Mobilisation 24

7.4 Ho Tsoma (To Hunt): Preventing Delivery inTownships 26

7.5 Home Visits 27

7.6 Negotiations 28

7.7 After the Settlement 28

7.8 Evaluating the Mabarete Strike 29

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Fighting Their Own BattlesThe Mabarete and the End of Labour Broking in the South African Post Office04

AA: Entry level employment category created to accommodateprevious TES employees by SAPO

ANC: African National Congress

ANCYL: African National Congress Youth League

APC: African Peoples' Congress

BCEA: Basic Conditions of Employment Act

BEE: Black Economic Empowerment

CCMA: Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration

COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions

COSAWU: Commercial Services and Allied Workers Union

CWAO: Casual Workers Advice Office

CWU: Communications Workers Union

DEPACU: Democratic Postal and Communications Union

DSM: Democratic Socialist Movement

IICUSA: The Influential Information and Communications Union of South Africa

LEWUSA: Labour Equity General Workers Union of South Africa

LRA: Labour Relations Act

MBA: Masters of Business Administration degree

NACAWU: National Communications and Allied Workers Union

PPTE: Permanent Part Time Employee of SAPO

S32: Temporary employee of SAPO (refers to the relevant S32 form)

SACP: South African Communist Party

SAGWUTI: South African General Workers Union & Textile Industries

SAPWU: South African Postal Workers Union (becomes SAPAWU)

SAPAWU: South African Postal and Allied Workers Union

SAPO: South African Post Office

TAS: TAS Appointment and Management Services (a labour broking company)

TES: Temporary Employment Service (labour broker)

USO: Universal Service Obligation (provision of postal services nationally)

VUT: Vaal University of Technology

YCL: Young Communist League

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Acronyms


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This working paper outlines howcasual workers ended labourbroking in the South AfricanPostal Office (SAPO). There isnow acute awareness of theexplosive nature of SAPO’sindustrial relations and anincreasing understanding that atits root is the problem of casualworkers. This perception iscorrect: current industrial disputesin SAPO are, largely, the endgame of a long and frequentlybitter struggle to remove labourbrokers from the Post Office.

It is fashionable to argue that the Post Officehas lost its relevance with the developmentof information technology, this, however,overstates the case. The organization clearlyfaces enormous challenges stemming fromtechnological developments. Challenges thatprotracted strikes have accelerated. However,large sections of South Africa’s populationcontinue to rely on mail delivery and otherservices provided by SAPO. Moreover, thereis no purely technological reason why SAPOshould not remain an important organizationwithin the South African economy and society(albeit with a shifting service profile). There is,however, is a socio-technical crisis within theorganization; a dysfunctional combination ofthe organization’s operations, its managementand the workforce. A key component of thiscrisis is labour broking and its legacy which,as outlined in this report, resulted in acatastrophic rupture of workplace order.

Labour broking involves the placement ofworkers by a Temporary Employment Service(TES) in a client company. This triangularemployment relationship1 became increasinglycommon, and controversial, in South African.While there is a genuine need for agencies toprovide workers on a short-term basis, thesystem has been used to by-pass labourlegislation, notably though the constructionof ‘permanent-casuals’ (employees ontemporary contracts that are ‘rolled over’ yearafter year). Labour broking has created a classof precarious workers that makes up asignificant section of a working ‘underclass’that provides cheap labour for South Africancompanies. There has been an extensive andcontested debate over how this problemshould be addressed. After much delay, newlegislation aimed at curbing these abuses, hasbeen enacted. The extent to which thislegislation can and will curb the exploitationof vulnerable workers remains to be seen:there is considerable room for skepticism overthe institutional resources and political will toenforce the new regulations. There is less roomfor skepticism over the likely will of employersto circumvent the regulations.2

Given this, the success of labour brokeremployees, or casual workers,3 in endinglabour broking in SAPO provides an importantcase study. This working paper analyses howthis took place, the challenges that the SAPOcasual workers faced in organizing and thestrategies and tactics that led to their eventualvictory. Such lessons will hopefully be of value,not only in assisting the rebuilding of the PostOffice as an important national institution, butas a source of inspiration and guidance for allprecarious workers.

Following a description of the researchmethodology, the system of labour brokingthat developed into monstrous proportionswithin the Post Office is outlined. At its peakthere were upwards of 8,000 labour broker

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Introduction


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employees earning a quarter of the salary ofSAPO’s permanent employees whom theyworked alongside. Yet this army of secondclass workers remained practically invisible. Itwas a dirty secret.

The history of the key organization of casualworkers that ended this system, the Mabarete,is outlined within the wider, often chaotic,process of ‘worker committee’ organization inGauteng. This history reveals the extent towhich casual workers attempted to resolvetheir situation through the ‘proper channels.’Their experience showed, again and again,that every component of the South Africanindustrial relations system failed them.Eventually, they realized that they would haveto ‘fight their own battles.’

A detailed account of the Mabarete’s strike ofDecember 2011 to April 2012 outlines the keybattle in what amounted to a war againstlabour broking in the Post Office. Drawing onlessons learned in earlier struggles, theMabarete forced SAPO to negotiate the endof labour broking. This was an enormousachievement and one with few parallels. Giventhe need for other precarious workers to fighttheir own battles, this working paper outlinesand reflects on various tactics and strategiesused by the Mabarete.

Finally, a set of broader reflections looks brieflyat four important issues: the ongoing industrialconflict in SAPO; the complex process ofbalancing the cultural legacy of the workerscommittees and conventional unionism withinDEPACU, the successor organization to theMabarete; the transferability of the'technologies of struggle' that were developedto bring labour broking to an end by theMabarete; and the value that a wider processof such struggles would have for South Africansociety.


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This research project began in2009 when friends in Katlehongfound work in the Post Office.Only it turned out they weren’tworking for the Post Office, but,rather, in the Post Office asemployees of labour brokers.Initially, I watched events thoughtheir eyes (while also learning agreat deal about being apostman).

I first expanded my contact with SAPO casualworkers, beyond my group of township friends,when I joined a meeting of striking workers inJuly 2011. Thereafter, I sporadically attendeda range of their activities. In November 2013,I requested permission to interview leadersof the organization with a view to writing ahistory of the Mabarete. I wanted tocompliment accounts from below with theexperience of leadership.

In addition to interviewing key leaders of theMabarete and then DEPACU, I spend extensiveperiods of time with the organization duringthe course of two industrial disputes during2014. This opened up a wealth of researchavenues, including short interviews with rankand file Mabarete members, over the courseof long days, and on one occasion a night, atSAPO’s Centurion Head Office, Witspos,Germiston’s Golden Walk Mall car park andother locations. Driving leaders home at theend of a striking day was often a fruitful wayto hear candid reflections. As well as providinga wider range of perspectives on earlier strikes,participant observation gave me a betterunderstanding of how the strategies and

tactics, described in interviews, were carriedout on the ground.

The bulk of interviews were conducted withMabarete members or those who had joinedwith them. However, I additionally conductedinterviews with a number of individuals outsideof the organization who could provide differentperspectives on events. Those interviewedappear in the list of acknowledgements. Anumber of individuals were given a draft copyof this report and made valuable correctionsand inputs.

Workers committees leave only a faint trail inthe written archives of society. I am thereforeextremely grateful to Russel Mutavhatsindiand Papiki Mokoena who lent me theirpersonal records of numerous workercommittee meetings, along with various papersand documents. The Casual Workers AdviceCentre (CWAO) kindly gave me access to theirfile on SAPO casual workers. DesmondMoeketsi of IICUSA also provided me withvaluable documents.

Another important source of information wasthe court papers filed with the string of strikeinterdicts applied for by SAPO in the LabourCourt between 2009 and 2014. There wasalso the Vaal Workers Committee ownapplication to the Labour Court in 2011.Additional written sources included SAPO’sannual reports, its Employment Equity Reports(obtained from the Department of Labour),the South African Labour Bulletin, and variousnewspaper/media accounts of events.

Ethical permission for the research project wasgranted by the Wits Human Research EthicsCommittee. I avoided explicit discussions inwhich interviewees might render themselves,or others, vulnerable to legal action. Suchpractices are extensively documented in thevarious Labour Court cases brought by SAPO.

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Methodology


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Four

Labour Broking, Legislation, Unionsand Worker Mobilisation

Labour broking, defined as theprovision of temporaryemployment services (TES) in the1995 Labour Relations Act, is oneof many non-standard or atypicalemployment formats.

Typical employment (often referred to as thestandard employment relationship) is definedas permanent, full-time work, on premisesunder the control of the employer. Non-standard work deviates from these features inone or more ways and includes part time work,seasonal work, home work, informal work,subcontracting and labour broking.4

Labour broking is non standard in that theworker is employed by one company (thelabour broker or TES) but works on thepremises5 of another. This creates a triangularemployment relationship. The labour brokingcompany employs the individual and, via acommercial contract, supplies these workersto the client company. The worker does thework of the client, but is employed by thelabour broker.

There are different non-standard, triangularemployment types, including short-termplacements by agencies and outsourcing ofnon-core functions. The term labour broking,as used in this report, involves the placementof workers within SAPO’s core business (maildelivery) on a long term basis by TES, whoworked alongside permanent employees ofthe Post Office and who were supervised byPost Office line managers. In this situation,

workers became ‘permanent casuals.’ Theywere permanent because their employmentin SAPO was ongoing. They were casualsbecause they were not employees of the PostOffice (but of the labour broker) and becausetheir employ-ment was contingent on thecommercial contract between client and labourbroker continuing.

Some non-standard triangular employmentforms can be beneficial, in particularcircumstances, for companies and workers.6

By contrast labour broking, while providingcheap and flexible labour appears to havealways been accompanied by the underminingof conditions of employment, increasing workervulnerability, preventing union organization,creating tensions within the workforce, andcomplicating industrial relations.7 (Many ofthese problems are also present whenoutsourcing of non-core functions takes place.)This case study clearly illustrates how thenegative outcomes of labour broking becameincreasingly apparent within SAPO.Aggregated to the macro or national level,labour broking prevents the creation of decentwork, stifles socio-economic development,destroys social cohesion and weakensdemocracy.8

Following the introduction of the 1995 LRAthere was a massive increase in labour broking.9

This has often been attributed to ‘loopholes’in the legislation that business (and in this caseSAPO a state owned enterprise) was able toexploit. This is true, but the loopholes were,in large part, introduced when regulations onlabour brokers, previously included in the LRA


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of 1983,10 were dropped.11 It is also true thatthe closing of these legal loopholes has beenpainfully slow. The Department of Labour,COSATU, and the ruling party, was well awareof the growth of labour broking, and itsnegative consequences, for at least a decadebefore legislation, designed to close theseloopholes was enacted on 1st January 2015.12

As outlined by the Department of Labour, “themain thrust of the [LRA] amendments [onTES/labour broking] is to restrict theemployment of more vulnerable, lower-paidworkers by a temporary employment serviceto situations of genuine and relevant‘temporary work’....”13

Key amendments to the LRA include:

• The TES and client are jointly and severallyliable for contraventions of employmentlaws.

• Workers are treated as the employees ofthe client if they work for a period in excessof three months (with permittedexceptions). Termination of employmentto avoid this will be considered unfairdismissal

• After three months, there must be equalpay for equal value work.

Whether this long-anticipated closure of thelegal loopholes will bring an end to labourbroking remains to be seen. The attractivenessof labour broking to management of privateand public companies is in providing cheapand compliant labour. This suggests a likelyrear-guard defence of labour broking will takeplace on the ground.14 The limited capacityof the Department of Labour to enforcelegislation is widely acknowledge. Unions'response to labour broking has been less thanimpressive. COSATU15 and its affiliates havepursued a legislative response,16 even as theyhave complained about the Department ofLabour's inability to enforce existinglegislation.17 Indeed, as illustrated in the caseof CWU in this report, the response of unionsover labour broking has often been deeplyambiguous; high-profile calls for its banningaccompanied by accommodating on theground.

There has been limited research on howworkers, with or without the help of establishedunions, have mobilized against labourbroking.18 Given the probable limitations ofthe legislative response now in place, this isan important area that needs to be betterunderstood.


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Five

Background: Labour Broking in theSouth African Post Office

5.1 SAPO as a State OwnedEnterprise: Doing the RightThing with Disastrous Results

The post-apartheid government charged state-owned enterprises with a dual mandate: first,to roll out infrastructure that would supportdevelopment goals, and, second, to do thiswithout burdening state finances with the needfor subsidization. The Post Office’s key role indevelopment was the establishment of ‘pointsof service’ (retail post office facilities) and theprovision and servicing of physical addressesacross the country, or Universal ServiceObligation (USO). Previously, the luxury of maildelivery had been largely limited to the Whitepopulation and many households, especiallythose in mushrooming informal settlements,did not have an address, something thatseverely limited their ability to get credit oraccess services.19

Mail delivery is the largest section of the PostOffice, accounting for some 67 percent ofrevenue20 much of it generated from corporateclients such as banks, municipalities, storesselling on credit, and other companiesproviding paid for services, for example DSTVor distance education, such as UNISA. Whilenew technologies threaten the long-term futureof mail for the purpose of billing and accounts,many South Africans continue to rely on thepost. Large urban townships, in particular,provide profitable areas for postal deliveryand are likely to continue to do so for sometime to come. The mail delivery workforce isdominated by entry-level postmen and (far

fewer) postwomen.

The Post Office made extensive progress infulfilling its USO, resulting in an expansion ofits mail delivery workforce, and it turned aroundits finances from an approximate R1bn annualloss in the late 1990s to profits (excludingonce-off income and government subsidy)from 2005 to 2012 of between R471m andR22m. This was a considerable achievement,but it was short lived. The financial viability ofthe organization had been achieved, insignificant part, with unremitting emphasis oncutting costs. A major mechanism in whichexpenses were contained was the use ofTemporary Employment Services (TES) orlabour brokers. At its height the labour brokingsystem was saving the Post Office approxi-mately R380m a year in salaries.21 In addition,its overall labour costs were reduced by nothaving to provided benefits such as pensionsand medical aid contributions that had beennegotiated for permanent employees. In theshort term this made a significant contributionto the financial success of the organization. Inthe long term, it was disastrous; the labourbroking system created an explosive industrialrelations environment and destroyed prideand loyalty in the organization.22

5.2 Agencies and LabourBrokers in SAPO

TES or labour brokers were present in SAPOprior to 2000. They provided labour to mailcenters23 and acted as placement agenciesacross the organization when there was a needfor short term cover. Three companies, which


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had been approved by the organizationsSupply Chain Management division, weredominant: Kelly, Transman and Quest (a BEEsubsidiary company of Adcorp).

This situation changed in 2000 when newlyappointed management imposed amoratorium on entry level positions in theorganization. That moratorium was not liftedfor more than ten years. The combination ofnatural attrition and expanding postal deliveryservices initially stripped out the position ofleave substitute who used to cover for workerson leave or sick as those in these positionswere allocated ‘walks’ (delivery areas)previously covered by a permanent employeewho had retired, been dismissed or died.Initially, the need to ‘cover’ walks was managedthough splitting them among other workersfor which overtime was negotiated. However,this was more expensive than using workerssourced from labour brokers. Increasingly, thisbecame a permanent arrangement and, withthe moratorium on appointments still in place,workers placed by labour brokers came tooutnumber permanent workers in mail delivery.In some depots, particularly those wheredelivery to home addresses had beenexpanded, the only employee of the PostOffice was the supervisor who oversaw 10, 20,30 or more permanent casual postmen whowere, formally, employed by a number oflabour brokers.

The nature of the TES also changed over thisperiod. The only real requirement imposedwithin SAPO when contracting for labour wasthat the TES be BEE compliant. In response,Kelly established at least two BEE companies,Marula Staffing24 and Workforce Management25

as fronts to compete for what was a lucrativemarket. These organizations joined a plethoraof other companies that provided labour toSAPO.26

5.3 Three for the Price of One!Conditions of Labour BrokerEmployees in SAPO

Within Gauteng mail delivery, the dominantTES providing labour was TAS AppointmentServices, wholly owned and run by ColleenRamaphakela. In a 2011 interview with theVoice of Hope magazine,27 Ramaphakelaexplained that, ‘The recruitment industry waspredominantly white and...the governmenthad already introduced BEE programmes...inorder to enhance the economic participationof black people. I’d say that I’m blessed tohave been one of the few women whomanaged to seize the moment.’ Later in theinterview Ramaphakela stressed the need to‘ensure that your staff salaries are paidtimorously.’ Ramaphakela’s employees, placedin the Post Office, didn’t feel as blessed asshe did. A constant complaint was that salarieswere not paid on time. Nor were they alwayspaid in full.

TAS, like its many competitors, was itselfvulnerable. Unlike the normally understoodtriangular employment relationship in whicha labour broker has a commercial contractwith the client (here SAPO), TAS and otherbrokers supplied and billed for labour on amonthly basis, notwithstanding that they hadlong-term placements within mail delivery andelsewhere in SAPO. There was no commercialcontract beyond monthly invoices.28 The TESwere, in fact, price takers; what was authorizedby Regional SAPO offices, keen to controlcosts, didn’t necessary correspond to the timesheets filled in by employees on the ground.That was tough for the workers.

The often amateur management skills of theswarm of labour broking companies creatednumerous grievances and breaches of labourlaw. In theory the TES kept to the minimumstandards outlined in the BCEA (considerablylower than had been negotiated by CWU forpermanent employees of SAPO). In practiceit was often different. Many workers did not


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have written details (or a contract) ofemployment, a BCEA requirement,29 and ifthey did they were not provided a copy. Thus,TAS did not provide copies of workers’contracts even after ordered to do so by theDepartment of Labour in March 2007.30

Despite working alongside permanentlyemployed postal workers, and doing exactlythe same job, labour broker employees hadvery different terms and conditions ofemployment. They had no pension contri-butions, less leave days, less sick days, nohousing subsidy, they were not issued withPost Office uniforms and were provided withinadequate wet-weather clothing. Nor werethey entitled to an annual profit-linked, ‘gainsharing’ bonus paid to permanent workers.

However, the most visible difference betweenTES and SAPO employees was salaries.Monthly payments to TES postmen variedbecause of the number of days worked (whichvaried by month) and the hourly rate (whichvaried between TES). In rounded terms, by2011 a permanent postal worker’s salary wasR8,000 a month, but a labour broker wouldbe paid R4,000 a month to supply a worker,who would be paid R2,000. The Post Officesaved R4,000 a month, the TES had R2,000 amonth revenue per placed employee, theemployee managed with what was left.

The combined effect of savings on salaries,benefits and uniforms dramatically reducedSAPO’s wage bill, even when the TES’ monthlyplacement fees were paid. As one intervieweeexplained, ‘It was three for the price of one!’

This situation was maintained through thevulnerability of the casual workforce. What theTES did provide was a disciplinary service.Interviewed workers explained thatRamaphakela, while never available when theyhad a problem they wanted to discuss, wasquick to arrive for a disciplinary matter. Initially,workers were summarily dismissed without

hearings by labour broker owners. However,after one dismissed worker went to the CCMA,jointly citing the labour broker and SAPO, thePost Office insisted on a tightening up ofprocedures; hearings were now held andemployees were permitted to be representedby a colleague. By and large such hearingswere, however, formalities, as one intervieweeexplained, ‘it was just to... satisfy what the[LRA] Act requires, but once the Post Office[supervisor] said that they no longer want you,you are done.’

Attempts to organize unions were directlyblocked. Workers were told to their face thatif they joined a union they would be fired. Thenature of the employment relationship meantthat a supervisor could have an employeedismissed by simply picking up the phone andasking the TES for a replacement worker.Supervisors could decide who ate and whowent hungry. In such a situation raisingconcerns or grievances becomes perilous. Themultiplicity of labour brokers also made itharder for workers to organize. In additionalto outright anti-union stances on the part ofthe labour brokers, the multiple employers

Poster outlining working conditions of labour brokeremployees: Germison, 5th July 2011


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operating within single depots raised the barto union organization since negotiations wouldhave to be held with each TES separately.

A frequently employed description of thesystem of labour broking that has emerged isthat of slavery. While this can be disputed inacademic terms, in practice the conditions oflabour broker employees, especially whentrapped in this employment over long periodsof time, was akin to a form of slavery fromwhich escape seemed impossible.

5.4 The Implications of LabourBroking for SAPO

The explanatory memorandum to the LRAAmendment Bill (and now Act), outlines howthere were ‘problems and abusive practicesassociated with temporary employmentservices commonly referred to as ”labourbrokers.”‘31 It is clear that this was the case inthe Post Office; however it is important tonote the introduction of labour broking resultedin negative outcomes for the organization.

The multiplicity of labour brokers, the lack ofany real regulation by the Post Office, and theabsence of commercial contracts (beyondmonthly invoicing) provided fertile ground forkickbacks and corrupt relationships.32 It wasonly around 2011 that the sheer size of thelabour broking bill raised concerns amongsenior SAPO management and theorganization’s board, resulting in aninvestigation run by KPMG.

The labour broking system that emerged inSAPO was neither about placing workers forshort-term contracts, nor about outsourcingnon-core functions of the operation. Rather,the system was use to fill long-term positions,for well over a decade in some cases, at thecore of the operation’s business. Given thenature of mail delivery, which requires detailedlocal knowledge for both sorting and delivery,it was never feasible to use labour brokers astemporary employment services to cover forshort-term absences. Labour broking only

worked by providing permanent casuals. Indoing so, the Post Offices’ own recruitmentcriteria were undermined. Thus, previousrequirements for a matric pass and a cleancriminal record were not necessary foremployment within SAPO as a TES employee.

The massive savings that could be achievedthrough the use of labour brokers, in line withconstant pressure for cost cutting, provideda classic example of a ’race to the bottom’within the organizations. Corruption aside,incompetent management was able to meettheir targets, not as a result of their acumen,but at the expense of labour broker employeesdesperate for employment. At the same time,realities on the ground were increasingly beenhidden from what had become a centralizedmanagerial structure. Lower level managerscomplied with the targets set them, but hidhow this was being achieved from Head Office.

5.5 Two Unequal Workforces

The widespread establishment of labourbrokers within SAPO created two parallelworkforces. One was relatively privileged andunionized, the other was precarious andwithout representation. SAPOs industrialrelations environment was dominated by CWUbetween 1996 and 2012 as the only unionrecognized within the Post Office Mail Deliverybusiness.33 Only in 2012 was SAPWU (laterSAPAWU), formed by a breakaway from CWUin 2009, also recognized by SAPO.34 Excludingthe efforts of a handful of individuals, CWUmade little efforts to prevent the increasinguse of labour brokers (see Section 6.2). Nordid it make any real attempt to organize casualworkers either within SAPO or within theirrespective labour brokers.

Rank and file casual workers widely believedthat CWU officials were involved, along withSAPO management, in receiving kickbacksfrom competing labour brokers seeking toplace workers within the organization.35 Thosewho held office within CWU give less credenceto this explanation and rather put emphasis


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on CWU’s complacency within SAPO as theonly recognized union with an agency feeagreement in place,36 on the dominance ofTelkom-based union officials in CWU, it’s focuson the danger from the SAPWU breakawaywhich competed with it for the membershipof permanent employees, CWU’s focus onwider political issues (rather than the breadand butter issues of workers), and the difficultyof organizing casual workers given themultiplicity of labour brokers.

Further, it is clear that there was a reliance onthe part of unions, including CWU, to wait forCOSATU to deal with the issue of labourbroking at a national level. As early asCOSATU‘s 8th Congress in 2003, concernsover the ‘casualisation of quality jobs’ wasraised. In subsequent congresses, resolutionsdeepened the analysis of problems of labourbroking, a process that cumulated in calls forits banning by the federation. Indeed, ironically,CWU officials played a prominent role in anumber of high-profile campaigns anddemonstrations against labour broking, whiletheir union was doing next to nothing aboutit in their own back yard.37

On the ground, two unequal workforceslabouring side by side resulted in toxic work-place relationships. While there wereexceptions, the general experience of casualworkers was one of discrimination at the handsof supervisors and permanent co-workers. Thedifference in terms and conditions betweenthe two groups has already been outlined.Additionally, casual workers were vulnerableto exclusion and exploitation by co-workers.

The different pay days between the two groupsopened up an avenue of advantage forpermanents. They were paid on the 25th ofthe month; casuals were paid on the last dayof the month, and not infrequently later.Between these two dates, one group wasflush, the other skint. Occasionally, permanentworkers showed solidarity with interest free

loans to tide casuals over. More commonly,they charged interest or took it easy by payingcasuals, between R50 and R100, to deliver themail on their walk.

A tea allowance given to permanent workers,while objectively a small thing, had enormouspsychological impact. The monthly allowancewould be pooled and used to buy tea andcoffee. Casual workers did not have thisallowance. In a few depots supervisors insistedthat the purchased beverages be shared byall, but this was rarely the case. Generally, teaand coffee was for permanents only. Theresentment generated by this petty, intra-worker, discrimination cannot beunderestimated. It was frequently recounted,with bitterness, by interviewees as an exampleof what they had been fighting against.

5.6 Labour Broking: A DirtySecret in Plain Sight

Nobody sat down and designed the labourbroking system in the SAPO. Rather, it emergedfrom attempts to meet contradictoryimperatives, a sustained failure of governance,incompetent management, sclerotic unions,rapacious entrepreneurs, and an almostinexhaustible supply of people desperate foremployment.38 What was created dramaticallychanged the composition of SAPO’s workforce.Yet that change was concealed from view. By2011 some 8,000 workers were all but invisible.Although SAPO only submitted Employment

Poster: Challenging the value of labour brokers, Germison,July 5th 2011


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Equity reports from 2008, the data (Figure 1)shows how the statistically recorded workforceof the organization was gradually declining,since it excluded the increasing number oflabour broker employees. This constituted aclear breach of the Employment Equity Actthat requires companies to include TES workersemployed for longer than three months intheir equity reports.39 In 2013 some 8,000labour broker employees, who had been‘statistically disappeared’ from SAPO’sworkforce suddenly appeared as the April2012 agreement reached with the Mabareteunfolded. This marked the end of labourbroking in the Post Office, though, as exploredin Section 9.1, it did not bring about equalemployment conditions for the statisticallyreappeared.

The statistical leap that occurred when it wasfinally revealed, in 2013, that around 8,000previously unreported ‘non-permanent’workers were in the Post Office makes amockery of Employment Equity reporting.These workers, the employees of labourbrokers, had been invisible; not least in theirability to voice their concerns, a key issue forthis report. However, like most dirty secrets,it wasn’t that hard to see. Even if you didn’tvisit depots, or work in the finance offices

where the labour broker invoices wereprocessed, there were plenty of clues. Aspermanent workers were replaced by labourbroker employees, this was captured withinmanagerial systems as ’unfunded posts.’ By2011 this number was approximately 5,000.40

You didn’t need an MBA to ask how theorganization was managing to operate with5,000 vacant positions. But, like most dirtysecrets, the reality was that everybody knew;it was just that nobody wanted to say. ThePost Office’s dirty secrete covered an evergrowing lie. The lie was of course convenient;it was purchasing employees at ‘three for theprice of one.’ But, as is often the case, short-sighted actions generate long-term problems;the price of the lie was a catastrophic ruptureof workplace order when those who had beenenslaved finally rebelled.

Source: SAPO Employment Equity Reports


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Six

A History of the Mabarete6.1 The Emergence of Casual

Workers Committees inGauteng

The organisation of casual workers withinSAPO was long and complex. GautengProvince was, unsurprisingly the center of thisprocess; the province employs a significantproportion of the organizations employeeswho, given the province's urban geography,work and live in close proximity. Gauteng isalso the fast-paced province with intensecompetition over status and success. This isacutely felt by internal migrants from Limpopo,the Free State, Kwazulu-Natal and elsewherewho are consciously seeking a better life. Forlabour broker employees, with effectivesecond-class citizenship and wages that couldnot pay the monthly bills, let alone build afuture for themselves and their families, thesituation was not easy to accept.

Nevertheless, the establishment of what wereinitially called ‘Casuals Committees’ or simply‘Workers Committees,’ beginning as early as2005, was a highly fragmented, erratic andfluid process. At its simplest, two, sometimesrival sometimes merged, committees emerged.One was based on the West Rand and theother on the East Rand. This however, is asimplification. The East Rand was divided intotwo: a highly organized group of six depotsin the Tembisa area (known, confusingly asthe East Rand or, less confusingly, The TembisaLine41), and the 'Far East Rand,' the remainingand much large portion of the East Rand.42 Acommittee emerged in Pretoria that was linkedinitially to the West Rand and then to the FarEast Rand committee. Further, a committeein the Vaal area was linked to the West Rand

committee particularly the Soweto section,which itself was sometimes distinct from the‘Far West Rand’ committee members.

Even this oversimplifies matters; other partsof Gauteng, such as Johannesburg andRandburg, never established stablecommittees, but there was sporadicorganization and some industrial action inthese areas. Further, just because there was acommittee in a particular area didn’t meanthat casual workers would respond to acommittee’s call for action. Committees couldbe fractious (as illustrated by the changingconfigurations of support for different strikes),individual depots sometimes took their owncontrary decisions, and it was not uncommon,especially in the early phases of organization,for strike calls to be ignored or for strikes tocollapse almost as soon as they had begun.

This working paper focuses on the rise of theMabarete, the group forged in the 2011/2012strike, as the most effective organization toemerge and the group which can be creditedwith ending labour broking in the Post Office.

6.2 Come September: TheCommunications WorkersUnion (CWU) and CasualWorkers

The CWU, a COSATU affiliate, mounted noeffective opposition to the introduction oflabour brokers into the Post Office.43 Despitethis, casual workers, who were being employedin increasing numbers, looked to CWU toaddress their concerns. CWU was, after all,the only union operating in the Post Office.Casual workers were however not employed


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by the Post Office but by one of almost adozen labour brokers supplying labour. CWUdid not have a recognition agreement withthese labour brokers, nor did it make anyserious attempt to conclude such agreements.Thus, despite causal workers filling in CWUmembership forms, some on multipleoccasions, neither the Post Office, nor thelabour brokers deducted their unionsubscriptions.44 Indeed, the labour brokingcompanies generally took a hostile stance toany unionization threatening employees withdismissal should they unionize. As a result,casuals were never able to become bona fidemembers of CWU. Rather, until the point thatthey realized that CWU was not going to helpthem, but was in fact standing in their way,45

they acted as ‘supporters’ of CWU or as long-term ‘members not in good standing.’

After a CCMA case (see Section 5.3) labourbrokers were required by SAPO to holddisciplinary hearings, rather than summary

dismissals, CWU shop stewards assisted casualworkers at disciplinary hearings and in resolvingdepot level grievances. However, this was ascolleagues and not union officials. The uniondidn’t negotiate wages or conditions ofemployment,46 the casuals’ chief concern,which were set by the labour brokers (albeitin line with what SAPO dictated47). What CWUdid do, however, was to promise, from 2005,to bring labour broking to an end. Theirrepeated promises in this regard wereeventually ridiculed by casual workers as ‘ComeSeptember.’ Come September (approximatelywhen negotiations were concluded),permanent employees would get a salaryincrease48 and, despite promises, casualworkers remained casual workers.49

CWU repeatedly reached agreements withSAPO over labour brokers which aresummarized in Box 1. The problem was thatthese agreements were not enforced; a pointthat is self evident given their constant re-statement.

From the 2005/6 collective agreements between CWU and the Post Office outlined how therewould be a redeployment process in which first permanent part time employees (PPTEs), thenfixed-term SAPO employees (S32s) and then causal worker would be deployed into permanentpositions.

– The 2005/6 agreement set the deadline for completion for the 30th October 2005

– The 2006/7 agreement set the deadline for the end of December 2006

– The 2007/8 agreement set the deadline for 30th September 2007

– The 2008/9 agreement specified a ‘fast tracking’ of the process

– The 2009/10 agreement stated that the two sides would ‘engage on the conversion of currentemployees whose primary employer/s are Labour Brokers...into permanent positions withspecific focus on Mail Business Unit and using the criteria of two (2) years and longercontinuous service in the same position.’

– In a report back to members in February 2010 on discussions for the 2010/11 agreementCWU‘s Gauteng Provincial Office stated that ‘After CWU reiterated its position of theconversion of labour brokers’ employees...SAPO also confirmed their commitment andurgency derived from the level of the Board to address the matter speedily.’

– The 2011/12 agreement repeated the same clause contained in the 2009/10 agreementalmost verbatim: ‘The parties agree to the conversion of current labour broker employeesinto permanent positions using the criteria of 2 years and longer...’

BOX 1: CWU-SAPO Agreement over the end of labour broking


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6.3 The 2009 Postal Strike: AWatershed

In 2009, CWU called a national strike in thePost Office which casual workers, particularlyin Gauteng, enthusiastically joined, believingthat their conversion to permanent positionswas central to the strike. The strike endedmessily after several weeks and SAPO broughtan interdict against CWU when strikers in theWits region, primarily casuals, refused to goback to work.50 The settlement agreement hada clause on the conversion of casual workers,but this simply formed part of the long list ofun-kept agreements documented in Box 1.

Compared to later strikes, that of 2009 was‘soft.’ SAPO’s official end of strikecommunication outlined that ‘even at timeswhen the crowd was hurling abusivecomments, non-striking Sapoans maintainedtheir professionalism.’ When the strike didn’tin fact end, stones were thrown at the TshwaneMail Centre and some depots were damaged.However, the only recorded assault was onCWU’s second deputy president, MathapeloMphuti, by bittereinders who believed thatshe had sold them out.

For many casual workers the 2009 strike wasa watershed; their faith in CWU was nowexhausted. Some abandoned CWUcompletely; others maintained contact butkept their options open by ‘double footing’(building their own worker committees whilecontinuing to attend CWU meetings). RegionalCWU office bearers sympathetic to the casualworkers had agreed to demands from casualworkers that they send their ownrepresentatives to the monthly shop stewardcouncil meetings. Typically, depots would nowsend two representatives: the official shopsteward and a ‘member not in good standing’who would represent and report back to casualworkers. Many of these unofficial casual shopstewards attended the shop stewards council

meetings to get information; casualscommittee meetings, held in parks and otheropen spaces over weekends, now talked aboutthe need to ‘fight their own battles.’

Another outcome of the 2009 strike was theemergence of a second union in the PostOffice, the South African Postal Workers Unions(SAPWU). The union had been establishedprior to the strike, but dissatisfaction with howCWU had managed the strike, along with longrunning dissatisfaction with CWU, especiallyamong higher skilled employees, boosted thenew union’s membership. After years of CWU’srearguard actions within the companies IRsystem and in the courts, SAPWU achievedrecognition in the company. However, it initiallypaid no more attention to casual workers inthe organization than CWU.51

6.4 Exploring Every Avenue

Despite a growing realization that they wouldhave to fight their own battles, what is evidentis just how many attempts casual workersmade to resolve their problems within theSouth African constitutional framework; themuch praised inclusive post-1994 social pact.The number of organizations approached andstrategies attempted, summarized in Box 2,was multiplied because different casualscommittees ran through a range of initiatives,sometimes in parallel. Some of these werefleeting liaisons, others constituted sustainedengagement. The list reflects considerablepatience on the part of many individuals who,despite repeated setbacks, attempted to raisetheir plight in legitimate ways.


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Attempts to negotiate as workers committees

– Attempts to negotiate directly with the Post Office

– Attempts to negotiate with labour brokers, particularly TAS Appointments (2009 and 2010)as the largest labour broking company in Gauteng

Attempts to get official bodies to intervene/adjudicate

– Department of Labour/Minister, resulted in a Ministerial enquiry in 2007

– Department of Labour public hearings on labour broking: SAPO casual workers imputed intohearings held in Germiston and Sebokeng in October 2009

– CCMA

– Gauteng Premier

– Labour Court

– Minister of Communications

– The Public Protector

Attempts to get help from trade unions

– COSATU52

– COSAWU (now de-registered, was linked to DSM)

– LEWUSA (Labour Equity General Workers Union of South Africa)

– CWU (see section 6.2)

– SAGWUTI (South African General Workers Union & Textile Industries)

– SAPWU54 (South African Postal Workers Union, later SAPAWU)

Attempts by unions to get recognition with labour brokers

– Individual CWU office bearers in the Wits Region

– COSAWU

– SAGWUTI

Attempt to establish their own union

– National Communications and Allied Workers Union (NACAWU) was an initiative by the VaalCommittee. Registration was declined by the Department of Labour.

Political parties/organisations asked for assistance

– ANC

– ANCYL

– SACP

– YCL

– African Peoples’ Congress (APC)54

– Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM)55

Advice Centers

– The Germiston-based Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO) provided office facilities andresearch assistance from late 2011

BOX 2: Organisations Approached and Strategies Attemptedby Casual Workers


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Given the number of avenues explored it isnot possible to explore all in detail. However,of note was that attempts to enlist COSATU’shelp were perhaps the most frustrating. Amarch to COSATU House was organizedwithout the knowledge of CWU in May 2011.The COSATU officials that they met weresympathetic, but did little other than outlinethe national campaign COSATU was headingto ban labour brokers and refer them back toCWU, along with advise to follow the ‘properchannels.’ In the words of one of the workerleader, ‘COSATU was USELESS in capitalletters.’ Among the casual worker leadership,the view was that, like CWU, COSATU wascalling for the banning of labour brokers, butthat this amounted to no more than ‘singingthe same hymn again and again.’

The casual workers had, in fact, explored andexhausted the ‘proper channels’ available tothem. Initial attempts to raise the issues ofsalaries, benefits, uniforms and other concernswith the Post Office were first diverted to thelabour brokers as the causal workersemployees. The response from labour brokerswas that they were constrained by the termsof their contracts with SAPO. This establishedwhat was to become a familiar ‘pillar to post’strategy in which responsibility for casuals’grievances was denied.

The Vaal Workers Committee had since 2007attempted to explore proper channels. InMarch of that year, after much pestering, theDepartment of Labour established a MinisterialEnquiry56 that on the 20th February dealt withthe complaints raised by the committee againstTAS Appointments, by far the largest labourbroker in mail delivery in Gauteng. TAS wasfound guilty of only one of the ten complaints;that it had not provided employees withcontracts. It was ordered to do so by the 15thMarch 2007. None of the other complaintswere upheld. On the central issue of differentterms and conditions of employment the report

simply explained the status quo: ‘this issuewas clarified... the Post Office did not employthem [the casual workers] but rather outsourcedits services to TAS...better benefits should benegotiated with the agent [TAS] as theiremployer.’ In other words, the Department ofLabour perpetuated the pillar to post situation.

Eventually, in 2009, talks did take place withTAS. They were a one-sided affair that resultedin a 50 cent an hour pay increase beinggranted. In 2010 there were again talks butthey quickly stalled. It was explained by TASmanagement that the workers committee wasnot recognized ‘as per collective bargaining’and that salaries could not be increasedbecause of the ‘laws of labour broking.’

The Vaal Committee went to the CCMA. Theydrew on TAS’s failure to provide them withtheir contracts as instructed three years earlyand the deadlock in negotiations. What theywanted was a certificate of dispute that wouldallow them to mount a protected strike.However, the CCMA Commissioner said thatthe case was complex and instead told themto approach the Labour Court.57 Despite thedifficulties of such an undertaking, thecommittee, assisted by a student lawyer fromVUT,58 filed papers and the case was heard on2nd February 2011 in Johannesburg.59 JudgeLagrange, who, as an advocate hadrepresented SAPO over the 2009 strikeinterdict, seemed to have had little patiencewith the workers’ amateur approach to thebench. The matter was postponed sine die(indefinitely) and the applicants had a monthto re-file papers if the case was not to beclosed. Doggedly, the committee persevered.With assistance from the court’s pro bonooffice, they submitted a revised application.60

A second court date was set for August. Butby the time August came things were different.The strike wave of mid-2011, despite its defeat,


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had contrasted the long, frustrating and one-sided route of ‘proper procedures’ to thepower of taking to the streets.

What the casual workers now began to realizewas that for all the rhetoric of South Africanas a constitutional democracy they stoodoutside the industrial relations framework.They did not, in reality, legally exist and fewpeople were willing to help. Most promisesto assist petered out, or it became clear thatthe intention was to use casual workers aspawns in others’ agendas. Only a few organ-izations genuinely asked how they could helpthe casual workers who approached them.61

For the institutions of post-1994 South Africa:the CCMA, the Labour Court, the Departmentof Labour, the established unions, the rulingparty and its allies, government Ministers andothers, the casual workers of the Post Officewere an embarrassing manifestation of a dirtySouth African secret: an underclass of workerswithout rights. Or, in the handwritten notesfrom a casual workers meeting; ‘We are slavesused by everybody, but owned by nobody.’

6.5 We are the Union Ourselves!The Strike Wave of Mid-2011and its Defeat

Between June and August 2011 a series ofunprotected strikes by casual workers eruptedacross Gauteng. The most significant of theseoriginated in the Tembisa area. A workercommittee linking six postal depots, whichhad met regularly in a piece of open land,resolved to strike. This was not easy; on thefirst day only a handful of the 130 workers inthe six depots joined the strike. It took a weekto bring out the six depots. But with close tototal cessation of postal deliveries in theTembisa area, the strike spread rapidly acrossthe East Rand, Vaal, and isolated depots inthe West Rand. The leadership of the WestRand Committee, however, noticeably failed

to rally until the very end of the strike. Thiswas the first sustained casual workers strike.Workers who had initially planned to remainat work were brought out by delegations ofstrikers, often becoming enthusiastic strikersas they challenged years of frustration.Empowered by their own success they adoptedthe slogan, ‘We are the union ourselves!’ Theywould resolve their own problems.

The strike, however, crumbled, without a singleconcession. Labour Court interdicts broughtby the Post Office were key to this conclusion.62

Initially, SAPO cited the labour brokingcompanies, since its contract with them forlabour was not being honoured. When thelabour brokers proved that their best effortsto recruit replacement workers was impossiblebecause of intimidation, SAPO lawyers focusedon the strikers. Among the strike committeethere was confusion; some thought the casewas the one brought by the Vaal Committeeand that the Post Office that would be ‘ontrial.’ Striking workers turned up on theappointed day en mass.

When they arrived at the Labour Court thePost Office lawyer got the details of six strike

Labour Court Interdict


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leaders. These six now became the primaryrespondents for a second interdict. By thetime they realized their mistake it was too late;they were facing jail for contempt of court.Their initial defiance, recorded verbatim in thesecond interdict by the Post Office lawyers,now evaporated. In a humiliating climb-downthey turned to CWU, with the help of the WestRand Committee who still remained in contactwith the union, for representation in the court.On the 27th July, they apologized to the courtand were bound over for six months. The strikecollapsed.63

Although the strike ended in defeat, what theworkers committees had gained were valuablelessons. Three were prominent: the first wasto stay away from the courts, in future theleadership would remain hidden; the secondwas a realization that they needed to focuson the Post Office, and not the labour brokers,if they wanted to achieve their objectives, thethird came from piloting a series of techniquesand strategies to prevent mail delivery,particularly in townships. In short, they nowknew how to fight their own battles.


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7.1 The Strike that EndedLabour Broking in the PostOffice

The collapse of the mid-2011 strike routedand demoralized the worker committees. Theirdefeat was driven home when three workerleaders, believing wrongly that the LabourCourt had given the go ahead for talks toproceed, were dismissed by TAS after pointingout, to Post Office regional management, thatthe causes of the strike remained unresolved.64

While there was a tacit agreement among theleaders of the causal workers that they shouldsee out the Labour Court six month suspendedsentence before returning to the fray, the WestRand Workers Committee jumped the guncommencing another unprotected strike onthe 12th December 2011. The committee’stiming was driven by internal dynamics.Although they had largely stayed aloof fromthe Tembisa initiated strike, they had in May2011 mounted their own one-daydemonstration-cum-stayaway at COSATUHouse. TAS had implemented disciplinaryaction against those who had participated forabsconding. A handful of workers stood theirground and refused to apologize for theirabsence from work. They were dismissed. Withtheir backs against the wall they had launchedthe strike.

The timing of the strike played into the rivalrybetween committees that had plagued thecasuals’ organization since the very beginning.It also drove a wedge between those in thewider East Rand who had wanted to continuethe previous strike in defiance of the LabourCourt and those who had been cowed by the

interdict. In the end a few hundred strikers,down at one point to just 294, a figure thathas attained mythological status, remainedout in a long, bitter and violent, but alsoextraordinarily creative strike. While its fullramifications are still playing out, there is nodoubt that what it did achieve was the end oflabour broking in the Post Office.

7.2 A Focused Campaign

From the myriad strategies and campaignsthat had been tested in previous years, thestrikers distilled a program which they pursuedwith determination. Their focus was disruptingmail delivery across Gauteng. They were nolonger interested in talking to the labourbrokers. Rather, their aim was to push themaside and force the Post Office to take themon as permanent employees.

They were now no more interested in unionsupport than they were in applying for a strikecertificate. They were through with the systemthat had failed them. The structures of theworkers committee was now adapted to meetthe needs of the struggle that they prosecuted.The only leaders with any visibility wereprotected by ‘Chinese walls’ within the strikers’structure that provided them with plausibledeniability over actions that might take placethe ground. But overwhelmingly the strikeleaders were simply invisible. SAPO tried againto interdict the strike,65 but was now unableto pin down individuals; court interdicts wereignored and attempts by the Sherriff to servesummonses were met with denials that theindividual lived at the address. The success ofthe previous interdict was put down to theevidence provided by physical damage doneto Post Office property and in a macabre twist

Seven

294: The Mabarete Strike(December 2011 - April 2012)


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the strikers resolved that property would notbe damaged, instead people would be thetarget of their actions.66

On the ground, a process of trial and errorcreated a flexible field structure in which amyriad of roles emerged around personalcharacter, local knowledge, and street savvy.Codes of conduct were established, includingsecrecy to prevent advanced warning ofactivities that would reduce their effectiveness.Communication relied heavily on cell phones,including an ‘office phone’ that was rotatedaround the leadership and which provided acentralized point of communication withoutthe number linked to any individual.67 Whatemerged was a quasi-militarized and cohesivegroup. At some point the name Mabarete68

(The Berets) stuck. There are different accountsas to how this came about, but there isagreement that it was a reference to the thenMinister of Police, Bheki Cele’s paramilitaryTactical Response Team, nicknamed for theirberets, that operated in the townships meltingout corporal punishment. Nobody had aproblem in seeing a parallel between the twogroups.

At their peak there were perhaps 500Mabarete, overwhelmingly men. As the strikeprogressed, some succumbed to pressure andreturned to work, some found work elsewhere,and some became disheartened and driftedaway. By March 294 remained. All had beendismissed; most received notice via sms. Theycould now soldier on or accept total defeat.

Legally, there had been nothing stopping thelabour brokers replacing the strikers given thattheir action was unprotected. Now the strikerswere no longer even employees of the labourbrokers, however the impact of the strike wasnot based on the withdrawal of their labour,as industrial relations theory outlines, but ontheir proactive ability to disrupt the businessof the Post Office.

The prospect of success was not, however,immediately apparent, either to the Mabareteor to the majority of casual workers in Gautengwho remained at work. This strike failed tomatch the scale of the previous one when‘everybody’ (i.e. the majority of Gauteng casualworkers) was involved. Some people joinedthis strike for a day or two but then returnedto work, unconvinced or suspicious of theorganizers motives. As the strike dragged on,divisions hardened and with the exception ofa couple of East Rand depots that joined thestrike long after it was underway casual workersacross Gauteng divided into two hostilecamps.69

The Mabarete strike can be divided into four,sometimes overlapping, phases: mobilization,ho tsoma (hunting), home visits, and, finally,negotiations.

7.3 Mobilization

The initial phase of mobilizing involvedpersuading workers to join the strike. Theprimary concern in this regard was not inmaking a case for the strike; every casualworker well understood themselves to besecond class employees. They didn’t needconvincing that they had a raw deal. Rather,the major obstacle to joining a strike wascasuals’ vulnerability. In the absences of anyeffective industrial relations system, strikingequaled absconding and absconders wouldbe dismissed. Given this, joining a strikeamounted to convincingly showing that youhad to join. To strike you had demonstratethat you had no choice but to join the strike.

The initiating of a strike therefore consistedof what can be termed ‘mutual mobilization’- one group of workers would arrive at theworkplace of another group and ask them tojoin. In context, such requests, sometimesforcefully delivered, were best agreed. Whetherthe strike was genuinely supported would onlybecome apparent the next day; would the


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mobilized workers report back to work orreport to the strike assembly area?

The initial step in such mobilization was thetrickiest. It was a Catch 22 situation; youneeded a strike before you could have a strike.Even some of the best organized areas, suchas Tembisa, struggled with this step and hadto resort to ingenious ruses. Without theestablishment of personal networks within andbetween the workers committees, it is possiblethat this initial difficulty could never have beenovercome. The challenge that initialmobilization represents for vulnerable workersis one factor that accounts for the longgestation of industrial action among casualworkers in SAPO.

However, even with a group of workers on themarch from depot to a depot it was notautomatic that their arrival would see thecasuals there join the strike. It was morecomplicated than that. Mobilization generallyrequired coordinated internal and externalactivity. Casuals in the depot would alreadyknow that a group was coming. This wouldbe done though activists in contact by phone.The internal activist would prepare theirworkmates. Joining was then only a formality;they were covered from charges of absconding.

But they didn’t have to join, as the Mabaretestrike well illustrates. If casuals were opposedto participating they could lock the depotgates and keep out of sight until the strikersmoved on in frustration. And if such opendefiance was seen as too risky, there wasalways the option of joining the strike for theday and then drifting back to work.

Supervisors at the depots had only limitedinfluence on this initial process of mobilization.Some who sympathized with the casuals madethe process easy, others pragmatically stayedout of the way, only a few made the processdifficult. Supervisors real power to break astrike lay in dealing with strikers on a one-on-one basis by ringing them in the evening toexplain the consequences of their actions and,for example, telling them that they were theonly one of a handful in their depot still onstrike. Once a worker pitched back at work,they would not be able to re-join the strikeunless another mobilization exercise wasmounted.70

The Tembisa Line arrives at Witspos (July 2014)


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7.4 Ho Tsoma (To Hunt):Preventing Delivery in theTownships

Mobilization, and re-mobilization, took placeduring December of 2011 and January 2012with limited success: the majority of casualsremained at work and labour brokers werehiring replacement labour. Drawing on lessonsfrom the mid-2011 strike the Mabarete nowbegan to tsoma (hunt) in the townships. Inessence this involved groups of varying sizepatrolling townships to track down andconfront anybody delivering mail. Suchconfrontations ranged, depending oncircumstances, from warnings, to forcedstripping, to beatings.71 The key objective wasto prevent mail delivery by making it a riskyactivity; replacement labour, or amagundwane(scabs), and working employees, whethercasuals or permanents, were on notice thatthey risked humiliation or a hiding if theyventured out to deliver.

The successful implementation of this strategymultiplied the impact of a few hundred strikers.Though a combination of changing tactics,mobility and secrecy it was all but impossibleto know where the Mabarete were operatingon any particular day, or if, indeed, they wereoperating in several locations. Non-strikingpostmen and women could insist, on thegrounds of safety, that they could not deliver.Over large parts of Gauteng deliveries stoppedwith non-strikers turning up for work, butunable to deliver mail.

This was a new technique to apply pressureon the employer. Previously, the backbone ofpostal strikes had been the main sorting hubs,whose workers were always canvassed (byCWU) before industrial action was initiated.With the sorting hubs at a standstill no mailreaches the depots. The ho tsoma techniqueoperated lower down the mail system; at thefinal step in the process.

The geographical reach of this action waslimited by a number of factors. Striking casualworkers were tjhonne (broke) almost from thebeginning of the strike and the only transportthat they could access was the Metrorailsystem. For the most part this network linksGauteng townships, but even when it traversesCBDs or suburbs these areas were, generally,avoided. Groups of African men movingaround the township attract little attention,but in town and suburb alarm bells are soonringing and police alerted.

The technique therefore affected primarilytownship residence and, typically the mail theyreceive; municipal bills, store accounts, bankloan statements, DSTV subscriptions, UNISAstudy material and so on. Attempts were madeby the Mabarete to appeal for solidarity fromfellow township residents.72 There were alsocreative efforts to make the strike visiblebeyond the townships. The Post Office initiallyrefused to acknowledge that a strike wasoccurring. Rather, SAPO’s publiccommunications minimized the scale ofdisruption and denied that this was industrialaction but, rather, the criminal acts of a handfulof former workers.73 The casual workers hadbeen invisible when working and to afrustrating extent they remained invisible whenstriking.

One attempt to break this silence was whenthey joined COSATU’s national march againstlabour brokers and e-tolls during the strike.Unlike the other marchers who joined wearingunion T-shirts, the Mabarete ‘hijacked’ theeven by wearing SAPO bibs. They were theonly marchers to identify a company usinglabour brokers and the media focused on themto the embarrassment of the Post Office. TheMabarete also had to prove their strike to themajor clients of the Post Office whose mailwas piling up. On one occasions, withphotographs of UNISA study material sittingin depots strikers had gone to the university’s


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campus in Pretoria as students (which somewere) to complain that they weren’t gettingtheir course material because of the Post Officestrike.

As the UNISA ploy illustrates, the ho tsomatechnique was a means to an end: to get theirgrievances heard. That it involved violenceagainst co-workers, even within the contextof everyday township violence that they wereembedded in, was not something that sateasily with many of the Mabarete and a rangeof justifications were developed.74 At the sametime, the process of ho tsoma was also aliberating activity for many who, after years ofhumiliation, were now pitting their wits againstfar stronger forces. Not surprisingly, deepbonds of comradeship developed among theactive strikers.

7.5 Home Visits

Even as the Mabarete were able to disruptmail delivery, their message, primarily deliveredthough the punishment they meted out toamagundwane, was not getting through. Thestark reality was that the Post Office put littlevalue on its labour broker staff; whetherworking, striking, or in ICU wards. Moreover,the disruption caused by the Mabarete wasconfined to the townships; largely away fromelite scrutiny, SAPO’s strategy appeared to beto ride out the problem.

The change of tactics from ho tsoma to homevisits emerged over just three incidents. Thefirst was spontaneous. A group of strikers werepassing the Tembisa house where the motherof TAS’s owner, Colleen Ramaphakela, lived.They made a phone call to Ramaphakela tellingher where they were and that if she didn’tdrop her contract with the Post Office theywould be back. It was an act of bravado, butit ticked off the first of a trinity of targets; thelabour brokers, CWU, and SAPO management.

The second target for a home visit was CWU.The visit to Clyde Mervin’s house, then theChair of CWU’s Gauteng Region was planned.Several hundred strikers made their way to hishouse.75 Mervin wasn’t in, but members of hisfamily were and they were traumatized by theexperience. The message given to Mervin wasthat the casual workers were now fighting theirown battles; he should stay out of their strike.The Mabarete saw him as complicit with labourbroking. CWU was ‘indirectly oppressing’ them.

The third home that they visited was that ofE. T. Mpai, the SAPO Wits Region mailmanager, who lived in a gated complex onthe East Rand. Some strikers thought that hehad the power to hire, as they knew he hadto fire. They speculated that he might holdthe key to what was by March 2012 a desperatesituation. Senior leaders of the Mabarete wereaway seeking support elsewhere when thedecision was made in the strikers’ morningmeeting to take their message directly toMpai. They knew his address; postmen knoweverybody’s address. On arrival at thecomplex’s security boom they posed as Mpai’semployees who had come for unpaid wages.After a delay, and despite police being called,the security guards had little option to allowthem past. Mpai was not in, but as with thevisit to Mervin’s house, family members were.The thinly disguised message was that theywere hungry and would be coming back ‘toeat’ with Mpai. By chance, a working postmanwas delivering in the complex that wouldnormally have been seen as safe territory. Thestrikers left his bike on Mpai’s gate and tookthe unfortunate man with them.

The results were beyond their wildestexpectations. As interviewee after intervieweeexplained, the visit to Mpai’s house ‘changedeverything.’ They had not even reached theMetrorail station before a call, brokered viaan intermediatory, came through to the officephone; Mpai wanted to meet.


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7.6 Negotiations

Mpai could no longer go along with theorganization’s denial over labour broking; hisfamily was now on the front line of an industrialwar. He confronted senior management withthe situation and it was agreed to talk to theMabarete. The Mabarete were, however,despite their long campaign, unprepared fortalks. The skills that had been honed over thecourse of their struggle were not those ofnegotiation; the initial meeting broke downin an angry exchange.

The Mabarete turned to SAPWU,76 then stillseeking recognition from SAPO.77 The SAPWUteam, lead by Tutu Mokoena78 worked withthe leadership of the Mabarete, which hadnow coalesced into a group of nine, the ‘Top9,’79 and helped to shape their demand forpermanent positions into a form that SAPOcould take on board. The initial challenge,however, was management’s need to knowthat they were, in fact, talking to the strikers.The Mabarete had covered their tracks well.None of the Top 9 knew anything about thevisit to Mpai’s house. Even the person whohad taken the call on the office phone wasunknown to them. To resolve this problem itwas agreed that the group’s credentials wouldbe tested. The Mabarete marshaled theirmembers to sit in Germiston’s Golden Walkcar park for a week. No incidents were reportedand the management knew it was talking tothe right people.

After that agreement came quickly. There weretwo clauses, though nothing was put on paper.This is, of course, extremely unusual, especiallygiven the presence of experienced negotiatorson both sides. However, the negotiators facedthe problem of provoking CWU, still the onlyrecognized union in SAPO at the time, andthat the first clause breached existing collectivebargaining agreements.80 It was hoped tomanage the process discretely and quietly;81

a hope that quickly evaporated.

The first clause was that the Mabarete, all longsince fired from employment by the labourbrokers, would be employed directly on shortterm contracts by the Post Office. The S32status82 that they would be given would bepaid at a rate equal to the fee labour brokershad been paid. This was, more or less, costneutral for SAPO, but it meant an approximatedoubling of the Mabarete’s salary to someR4,000 a month. It was also agreed that thenewly appointed S32s would be converted topermanent positions within three months.

The second clause, insisted upon by theMabarete representatives, was that all labourbrokers employees would follow a similarprocess to that outlined for themselves in thefirst clause. The Post Office agreed,83 butargued that because of its contractualobligations it would have to give three monthsnotice to the labour brokers before thosecurrently working for them could follow thispath.84

7.7 After the Settlement

The first clause proceeded largely as planned.Since nobody, other than the Mabarete, knewwho their members were, they were asked tocompile a list of who should be re-employed.In the end a list of 411 individuals weresubmitted: the core 294 and those who hadleft the strike but were deemed to beamaqabane (comrades). The Mabaretereturned victorious to their old depots as S32employees of the Post Office. In the followingturbulent years most, though not all, of theMabarete have been converted into eitherpermanent or PPTE positions.85

The second clause, relating to the far largergroup, perhaps 8,000 strong, of labour brokeremployees in the Post Office proved moreproblematic. Almost immediately the Mabaretereturned as S32 employees many of those


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casual who had remained at work nowlaunched their own strike with the initialdemand that they all be employed aspermanents immediately.86 The ‘SecondStrikers’ adopted and developed the tacticspioneered by the Mabarete, a pattern thathas been repeated since by other groups.However, they returned to work in early Junewith a (written) agreement essentially in linewith that reached with the Mabarete. By July,four months after the Mabarete strike ended,all labour broker employees were convertedto S32 employees of the Post Office.

7.8 Evaluating the MabareteStrike

The Mabarete strike deserves the epitaph‘historic.’ It achieved, at least within the PostOffice, what the COSATU federation of sometwo million members and close links to theruling party had failed to achieve after almosta decade of campaigning. It represents oneof very few cases in South African Historywhere casual worker have successfullyorganized to end an exploitative system.Beyond this recognition the strike can beviewed in different ways. It was, without doubt,heroic. But viewed from the perspective of acornered igundwane (scab) it could be horrific.The strike needs to be placed within thecontext of the structural violence that thesystem of labour broking imposed uponthousands of Post Office employees andmillions of workers across South Africa.

Despite contestation over the details of thefinal negotiated settlement, the strike broughtabout an end to labour broking in the PostOffice. It was not, of course, the only factor inthis regard. Other forces, much larger thanthe 294 Mabarete strikers were pushing foran end to labour broking, or at least itsregulation. What propelled the Mabarete wasimpatience at the grindingly slow progressand a liturgy of broken promises. Indeed, even

after the strike settlement it is clear that PostOffice management had not abandonedlabour broking. In an addendum to the writtenMemorandum of Understanding with theSecond Strikers, written in June 2012, JanrasKotsi, then Group Executive of Mail Business,87

explained that 'the purpose of the...memorandum was to...create a suitableenvironment for the Post Office to developan appropriate strategy for labour brokerage.’88

However, any hope that the system of labourbroking that had developed over twelve or soyears in SAPO could somehow be salvagedwere misplaced. The Mabarete had let thegenie out of the bottle. Thereafter variousgroups within SAPO were to push, often incompetition, to finish what had been started.A process that is still unfolding.

The agreement reached between theMabarete and SAPO drew on the expertiseprovided by (then) SAPWU officials and officebearers. In particular they were able to putforward the strategy of insourcing, or cuttingout the ‘middle man’ of the labour brokingcompanies, which provide a much morepalatable approach (at least in what turnedout to be initial steps of a process) that theSAPO negotiators were able to ‘sell’ to theirprinciples in senior management.89 However,if there was a magic wand that transformedthe lives of labour broker employees in thePost Office it was the power resourcesengineered by the Mabarete.


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Eight

Strategies and Tactics forPrecarious Workers

8.1 Does the Mabarete’sStruggle Matter?

Exactly how many precarious workers, includingthose employed though labour brokers, thereare in South Africa is impossible to know.Clearly however, the labour broking industryis huge and, as the case of SAPO illustrates,it can operate at a massive level almost invisibleto official statistics. In addition to casual workersin the public and private sector we can addthe army of township-based stipend workerswhose situation is not very different. Thesepeople do real jobs, but for a fraction of thepay that others receive.

The LRA Amendment Act of 2014 is theproduct of a decade of debate and is designedto, ‘restrict the employment of morevulnerable, lower-paid workers by a temporaryemployment service to situations of genuineand relevant “temporary work.”’90

The Act introduces a number of significantreforms to TES:

– TES and client are jointly and severallyliable for contraventions of employmentlaws

– Employees are treated as the employeesof the client if they work for a period inexcess of three months (with permittedexceptions). Termination of employmentto avoid this will be considered as unfairdismissal

– After three months employment there mustbe equal pay for equal value work.

Should these reforms be enforced, labourbrokers would be reduced to assistingcompanies with short-term placements.91 Theimportant question, however, is whether thislegislation can and will be enforced.Enforcement of any labour regulation dependsprimarily on three agencies: companiesregulating their own activity, inspection by theDepartment of Labour, and the watchdogfunction of trade unions.

The case of casual workers in SAPO, andexperience elsewhere, makes for pessimismover the actual impact of these labour lawamendments. The Post Office, a state ownedentity, professes among it values that, ‘wetreat each other with respect, dignity, honestyand integrity’ and that ‘we recognise andreward individual contributions.’92 Clearly, noneof this actually meant anything; when it cameto employment practices there was just a dirtysecret. The Department of Labour failed theSAPO casual workers when approached (SeeSection 6.4), and it is common cause that theDepartment’s inspectorate is inadequate andunable to enforce existing legislation. Finally,CWU, a COSATU affiliate, was at bestslumbering while casual labour entered thePost Office. At worst, it was implicit inmaintaining the two-tier labour system. Thereis little reason to see why these factors shouldbe very different elsewhere.

Given this, it makes sense to outline the lessonsthat can be learned from the Mabarete’sexperience and which other precarious workerscould put into practice. While all workplacesare different and a direct translation of lessons


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should not be expected, some generalprinciples will be of assistance. One of thestriking features of the early years of casualorganisation in SAPO was the multiple andsometimes parallel initiatives that took placebecause different worker committees operatedin silos. This wasted time and effort as thewheel was re-invented, in some cases severaltimes. To help prevent this repetition a numberof key themes are briefly outlined.

8.2 Mobilising and FocusingMinds

For injustice to be challenged individuals mustshare a collective understanding of what iswrong. Moreover, this anger must be focused.Without this little will change. Rather,dissatisfaction will take the individualisedforms: grumbling, slander, sabotage, fraudand theft. Those employed by labour brokers

with SAPO quickly understood that they wereat the end of a raw deal, but it took almost adecade for this anger to be channelled in aneffective way. Despite constant mantras overthe South African Constitution and workers’rights, on the ground an extraordinary degreeof legitimacy has been given to labour brokers.This was reinforced by casuals’ fear of losingtheir jobs should they step out of line. A fearmade all the more real by the failure of theinstitutions charged with ensuring that thepost-apartheid labour system operate in theinterest of all workers. Labour broker’slegitimacy was, however, one largely claimedfor themselves. In the Op-Ed pages of BusinessDay this has come in the form of pious piecesby economists and business cheerleaders.93

On the ground, at the rough end of employ-ment relations, managers in mom n’ pop labourbrokers simply made up the law to suitthemselves and bluffed workers intocompliance.

Meeting of DEPACU members in Tembisa (July 2014)


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In SAPO such bluffing worked for a while.Initial protests were quickly suppressed bylabour brokers’ disciplinary procedures; workerspleaded ignorance and contritely apologised.They knew that if they didn’t they were out ofa job. It took time before they stood theirground. Sending workers from ‘pillar to post’also bought the labour brokers time. Indeedit was the confusion over who really wasresponsible for the casuals’ situation that longdelayed their rebellion. This confusion wasclearly stoked by individual managers, but thestate institutions charged with providing alevel industrial playing field; the Departmentof Labour, the CCMA and the Labour Court,effectively sat and on their hands and didnothing. In the end, through a long processof trial and error, the workers committeesrealised that they were wasting their time withthe labour brokers, the established unions andthe legal system: they needed to speak directlyto the organisation that they worked within.That was not easy, but it was the approachthat eventually worked.

The jointly and severally liable status of labourbroker and client in the amended LRA mayassist precarious workers in the future.However, the general lesson to be drawn fromthe Mabarete’s success is that action shouldnot be guided by the legal frameworks, but,should rather focus on the organisations, andindividuals within them, most susceptible topressure.

8.3 Applying Pressure

Any conflict between precarious workers andthe employer nexus: i.e. the labour broker(s),client company and, likely, established unions,is going to be asymmetric. Precarious workers,even when they have a focused strategy willbe at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, as theMarbarete’s victory demonstrates, suchstruggles can be won. If the legislativeframework is to be put aside (a point taken

up shortly), what remains in the conflictbetween management and workers is theirrespective power resources. Within classicalindustrial relations theory, workers key powerresource is the withdrawal of their labour. TheMabarete withdrew their labour, but it was notthis act that was their real power source. Rather,it was the way in which they were able to denythe Post Office its operational ability in largeareas of Gauteng. This denial of service restedonly in small part on the withdrawal of theirlabour. Of much more importance was theapplication of their labour in the ho tsomacampaign. Later, they applied pressuredifferently, targeting, after some trial and error,Post Office management, threatening themwith personal consequences. Consequencesthat the ho tsoma actions gave credibility.

Leaflet against labour brokers in SAPO (2011)


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Both these tactics involved the use or threatof violence. This did not sit comfortably withthe Mabarete leadership, but they saw noother option and this form of pressure wasonly applied after exhausting available legalchannels. Given this context, blanketcondemnation of violence as an instrument ofstruggle is likely to cut little ice. This isespecially so when delivered by individualswho live in relatively secure environments tothose who reside in townships where everydaylife is steeped in insecurity and violence.Indeed, such lectures only reveal thedisproportionate fear of violence that thesecure classes harbour; something illustratedby the instantaneous reaction to the homevisit of Mpai described in Section 7.5.

However, the Mabarete explored a wide rangeof actions not all of which involved violence.The UNISA ploy (see Section 7.4) is a goodexample of where they sought to embarrassthe Post Office and so advance their cause.Any effective struggle will make pragmaticevaluations over the effectiveness of allavailable strategies. The active (rather thanpassive) denial of service is almost certainlygoing to be high on any strategic agenda, butother options, such as shaming andreputational assaults have a part to play.

8.4 Protecting UnprotectedStrikes

As outlined in Section 6.4, despite strenuousefforts, it had been impossible for casualworkers in SAPO to mount a protected strike;the institutional and legal hurdles were tooonerous. In fact many Mabarete leaders cameto see the requirements necessary to organisea protected strike as mechanism to keep themenslaved. This in turn led to a wider cynicismover the practical value of the South AfricanConstitution. They came to see thatunprotected strikes were a more realistic formof struggle and one much more likely to bring

success. Their own experience vindicatedunprotected strikes and, drawing also on otherexamples, this became axiomatic to theirunderstanding of industrial relations.

Nevertheless, they were mindful of theirvulnerability, either to dismissal or imprison-ment. Although it was not their initial intention,the Mabarete ended up honing a range oftechniques to protect unprotected strikes; thatis ways in which to avoid the consequencesof mounting a strike without a CCMA certificateof dispute. These techniques included:

– Mounting ‘mutual mobilization’ in whichworkers in one operation bring out workersin another, geographically or otherwisedistinct, operation. This allows workers tolegitimately claim that they had no optionbut to join the strike.

– Focusing on key points of pressure, startingwith, though not restricted to, preventingthe operations of the company they workfor (and not the labour broker employer).

– Understanding that the impact of theiractivity is not limited to the withdrawal oftheir labour, but the application of theirlabour in ways that apply pressure on theirtargeted company/companies

– Continuing with the principle ofgeographical separation of applyingpressure which could lead to sanctions.

– Keeping leadership hidden from view toavoid victimisation and organisational‘decapitation.’

– Staying clear of legal processes.

– Establishing structures that allow leadersto plausibly deny involvement within anyactivity vulnerable to legal or othersanctions.

– Using communication mechanisms thatprevented activities been undermined bystrike participants leaking information.


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None of these techniques were entirelyoriginal. In different forms they have longformed part of the repertoire of industrialaction, protected and unprotected, in SouthAfrican and elsewhere. The Mabarete caseillustrates, however, how each group of workersneeds to learn them for themselves, and fortheir own context, if they are to be successfullyused.

A key feature of the Mabarete strike withinSAPO likely to differ from that of otherprecarious workers is the nature of the PostOffice as a workplace. First, multiple sites(particularly postal depots) in which there areconcentrations of workers facilitated mutualmobilization. Secondly, the delivery of mailprovided an extremely dispersed workplacewhich was in certain environments, noticeablyurban townships, almost impossible for SAPOto protect from Mabarete activity. To someextent these difficulties could be overcomeby casual workers based in different companies(whether employed by the same or differentlabour brokers) combining to achieve mutualmobilization and the application of pressure.

8.5 Uniting Everybody Vs.Leading by Example

The logic of united action is a powerful one;the more people standing together the greatertheir power. However, this is not an unqualifiedprinciple; the quest for unity can delay action,possibly indefinitely. Prior to the strikes of2011 and 2012, leaderships of the variousworker committees were constantly reachingout for help to a range of organisations. Whatthey realised again and again was that theirown concerns were subordinated to the plansof others. In the name of unity, they wereconstantly asked to fight other people’s battles.

Differing opinions as to the legitimacy of thesevarious claims on their own resources was amajor factor in preventing the workers

committees uniting with a common platform.Much time was wasted with changes instrategic direction, a problem compoundedby the autonomy of different workerscommittees. Indeed, in the end, unity amongPost Office causal workers in Gauteng (nevermind nationally) was not achieved. The highpoint of unity was the, unsuccessful, June/July2011 strike, but even this did not fully includeall the established workers committees.

In the end, it was a vanguard group, the 294members94 of the Mabarete, which broughtabout an end to labour broking in SAPO.Others then followed up on their success. Thisgrouping represented a degree of unitybetween many, though not all, leaders ofseveral workers committees, but it involvedonly a fraction of the casual labour force. Thepolitics of the underdog, such as precariousworkers, is always fraught. While unity shouldbe strived for this should not be to theexclusion of other consideration. It may benecessary for sub-sets of precarious workersto fight their own battle and, in doing so, showothers the way.

8.6 To Unionize or Not toUnionise?

The casual committees attempted very hardto join a recognised union. With the exceptionof a handful of regional office bearers, CWU,the only recognised union in SAPO until 2012,effectively rebuffed them. SAPWU, establishedin 2009, showed no interest in the casualworkers until March 2012 (see Section 7.6).

Labour Court notices, Witspos, September 2014


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The workers committee members joinedvarious registered unions, but none were ableto assist them. They even tried to set up theirown union, but had its registration denied bythe Department of Labour.

Their disenchantment with CWU, and otherunions, was uneven; the East Rand for example,struck out alone long before the West Rand.Eventually, however, all but a handful of leadersfrom the various workers committees realisedthat they were on their own. What thenemerged was a different form of organisationto a union as commonly understood anddefined in legislation. While this was out ofnecessity, it ended up providing an effectivevehicle for the successful Mabarete strike. Itsform was, like its membership, marginal.Meetings were held in liminal spaces; parkinglots, waste ground, public parks, and dustytownship football fields. Finances were raisedon an ad hoc basis with activists popping outcontributions from their own pockets.95 Mostimportantly however this structure enabled

the organisation to apply pressure and toprotect unprotected strikes. These strategiesand tactics were not possible for a registeredunion. The Mabarete strike could not havesucceeded if they had been organised as aunion.

One way to analyse this, in line with thevanguard role that the Marbarete played withinthe wider body of SAPO casual workers, isthat they were developing new forms of workerorganisation that could operate within aneconomy dominated by precarious forms oflabour. An extension of such an argument isthat such organisations form the nuclei ofrevolutionary formations opposed tocapitalism. Given the uncharted and turbulentterritory that South Africa is currently enteringthis thesis may have merit.

However, this was not the objective of theMabarete. Their primary goal was not topermanently cripple the Post Office, oroverturn the wider economic system that itserves. Their objective was to become full

Worker meeting, Tembisa (July 2014)


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members of the organisation or, as it wascolloquially expressed, ‘to enter the House ofthe Post Office.’ They wanted to be permanentworkers with the privileges that this entailed;primarily a wage on which they could raise afamily and build a better life.96 What theyneeded was a very different organisation thana registered union. Section 9.2 briefly outlineshow, having entered the House of the PostOffice, albeit not immediately with fullpermanent status, they re-formed, not withoutdifficulties, along the lines of a conventionalunion.

A second way of approaching the question ofappropriate organizational forms for casualworkers, one which helps explain why thelegacy organization to the Mabarete has hadto cope with a range of internal tensions, isto look at the nature of workers demands, inparticular the degree to which they arecommon across the organization’smembership.

In the early stages of casual workers’organization, different worker committeescompeted with each other and operated insilos. This was in part the result of geographicallocation and individual rivalry. However, it wasalso driven by a multiplicity of grievances thatdiffered from area to area, in part because oflocal SAPO and labour broker practices andin part because workers committees differedtactically over what was important. Thedemand that brought about unity was therealization by most, though not all, workerleaders that they needed to focus on endinglabour broking. This provided a platform forunited action.

With this demand secured, key demands againstarted to differ as workers were differentiatedby employment statuses within SAPO (S32s,later converted to AAs, PPTEs, and Permanentemployment categories). Dealing with theoften competing demands generated by thesedifferent positions has proved difficult for the

DEPACU union created by the merger of theMabarete and SAPWU officials and officebearers. Once the conversion to permanentpositions is fully complete, it should proveeasier to represent them with a conventionalunion format. Such an analysis suggests thatworkers need to carefully assess what form oforganization is appropriate for them in theirparticular situation.


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This working paper focuses onevents up until April 2012 andthe agreement to end labourbroking in the Post Office. Thissection briefly outlines four issuesof wider relevance.

These are the massive levels of industrialconflict in SAPO since April 2012, theconflicting traditions of the workers committeesand conventional union organization withinDEPACU, the successor organization to theMabarete, how the ‘technologies of struggle’developed by the Mabarete have been takenup by other groups within this conflict, andwhat the adoption of such struggles by othergroups of casual workers may mean for SouthAfrica.

9.1 Industrial Conflict in SAPOSince April 2012

Agreement between the Mabarete and SAPOin April 2012 did not bring industrial peace.Far from it. As has been outlined, the ‘Second

Strikers’ (labour broker employees who hadwaited out the Mabarete strike) immediatelytook to the streets on their own protractedstrike. Since then there has been an ongoingseries of strikes that have, withoutexaggeration, brought the Post Office to thepoint of collapse. All industrial relationsenvironments are characterized by periodconflict, but events in the Post Office had beenexceptional.

A significant component of this labour unresthas resulted from the incomplete nature ofthe April 2012 settlement. Simplifying, some8,000 labour broker employees were convertedto Post Office employees, initially as casual,S32s, and later at a newly created AA grade.The S32 and AA positions do not pay at thesame rate as the full-time permanent position.While the salaries of former labour brokeremployees have been improved there is notyet parity with the permanent employeesdespite them doing the same work. Simplifyingeven further, and using the 8:4:2 salary modeloutlined in Section 5.3, labour brokers weregetting a quarter loaf (compared to permanentemployees). After the Mabarete strike they

Nine

Wider Reflections

SAPO employees waiting to hear about conversion to permanent positions, Braamfontein, October 2014


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Fig 2: DEPACU logo featuring the 294 Mabarete legacy



got half a loaf. While it may be true that halfa loaf is better than no loaf, nobody will acceptreceiving half a loaf when others receive a fullloaf for doing the same job. Thus, much ofthe industrial conflict over the last two and ahalf years has been a continued push byworkers to obtain parity with their permanentcolleagues.

This process has been exacerbated by thepiecemeal and often chaotic approach to theproblem by SAPO management. While thePost Office is clearly in financial crisis, thesalaries increases of senior managers havedone nothing to dampen demands. Theprocess has also been fueled by thefragmentation of the workforce with, currently,three recognized unions and a number ofother groupings, including IICUSA,97 whichemerged from the Second Strikers, all seekingto recruit members. The full conversion topermanent status has become a point ofcompetition between these organizations.

The most recent agreement signed byDEPACU and SAPWU98 is for a two-yeartimetable to complete the conversion process.Whether this agreement will bring industrialpeace, given that both CWU and IICUSAcurrently remain outside the agreement,remains to be seen.

9.2 DEPACU: A Tale of TwoCultures

The Democratic Postal and CommunicationsUnion, DEPACU emerged from the Mabaretein partnership with a number of SAPWU (nowSAPAWU) officials and office bearers. TheMabarete origins of DEPACU are clearlydemonstrated within the organizations logo(Figure 2) with the legendary 294 number inthe center of a radiating signal.

While DEPACU is only one of severalorganizations representing workers withinSAPO its unique feature is the marriage

between these two very different cultures andways of working: worker committee activismand the structure of a registered andrecognized union.

The formation of this union in April 201499

opened up the question of when differentorganizational formats are most appropriate.As outlined in Section 7, the structuresdeveloped by the Mabarete were able toachieve objectives impossible for aconventional union. Those techniques becomeimpossible when a formal union structure isadopted, though other, different, advantagesare gained. Given the staggered process offull conversion within SAPO, there was nevergoing to be a ‘right’ time for such a trans-formation. Inevitably, there are tensions withinthe organization between these competingtraditions. The situation also provides, however,the potential for re-invigorated collective actionthat combines features pioneered by theMabarete along with the long-tested structureof registered unions.

9.3 Technologies of Struggle

Not all industrial conflict in SAPO since April2012 has been over the conversion process.Other significant causes of strife have beenpension funds and salaries. As well as thetactic of linking these and other demands tothe question of conversion, a further factor inexplaining the extraordinarily turbulentindustrial relations has been the diffusion oftechnologies of struggle initially developedby the Mabarete.


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It took an extensive process of trial and errorfor the Mabarete to develop effectivetechniques able to deny SAPO operationalability over large areas of Gauteng. However,once created and established as technologiesof struggle they are easily picked up and usedby other groups. Indeed, other groups havenot only adopted them but also adapted andimproved their effectiveness. Thus, forexample, the Second Strikers developed thetechnique of removing the 'strips' (on whichstreet names and house numbers are printed)from the presses where postal workers sortmail in the depots,100 an action that makessorting impossible until new strips are printedand issued.

In short, irrespective of the grievances at stake,any organization that can command a fewhundred determined strikers willing to takesome risks, can close down Post Officeoperations over significant areas of the country.Indeed, that is exactly what happened duringthe September to November 2014 period inwhich a series of groups mounted rotational,competing strikes using these techniques.

9.4 Casual Workers’ Rebellions:South Africa's Best Bet?

For those hopeful of radical restructuring ofSouth Africa’s economic system the turn ofthe Mabarete towards conventional unionismafter their victory may be disappointing;rebellion followed by incorporation rather thanrevolution. However, the impact of widespreadsuccess along the lines of the Mabarete’scampaign within SAPO should not beunderestimated. The single biggest problemfacing South Africa is economic inequality. Themost successful attempts to address this,through social grants, have mitigated thesituation, but not changed the underlyingdynamics. Moreover, they have contributedto widespread dependency which has broughtits own problems. The most effective way of

addressing inequality in South Africa may wellbe the upgrading of precarious workers’ jobs,in the public, private and voluntary sector.After all, they are doing real jobs, just notbeing paid real wages. A national minimumwage would be an important step in thisdirection, but just as we should not expectlegislation alone to end labour broking, weshould not expect legislation alone to bringabout a national minimum wage.101

Changing precarious work into decent work102

will inevitably necessitate income re-distribution if the chaos of hyper inflation isto be avoided. The record of the last twentyyears indicates with crystal clarity that the rich,both old and new, have no intention of handingover what they have. It will be up to casualworkers, fighting their own battles, to forcetheir hands. The Mabarete’s struggle hopefullyprovides both inspiration and guidance in thisregard.


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Kotsi, J. (2012). A Supplementary Memorandum to the Terms of Understanding. Communication.

Mataboge, M. (2013, 31st May). Empowerment Arm Accuses Kelly of Creative Accounting, Mail &Guardian.

Mhone, G.C.Z. (1998). Atypical Forms of Work and Employment and Their Policy Implications. IndustrialLaw Journal, 19(2), 197-213.

Mogalane, T. (2011, 7th September). Declaration of a Dispute. Communication.

Moune, B. (2012). EMPD Officer Electricuted on Train During Hostange Drama, Look Local KemptonPark. Retrieved 22/01/2015 from www.looklocal.zo.za/looklocal/content/en/kempton-park

Pike, R. (2012). Adcorp Integrated Annual Report 2012: Adcorp.

Rees, R. (2011). Organising Labour Broker Workers: The Case of GIWUSA at AEL and SAMWU inTshwane. Masters Thesis, University of the Witswatersrand/Global Labour University.


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SAPO. (2013). Post Office Integratred Annual Report 2013.

Schroeder, I. (2000). The Politics of the Proposed Labour Law Amendments. Monograph.

Shilubana, T. (2011). Empowered Women in Business. Voice of Hope, 9, 10.

Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury.

Theron, J. (2003). Employment Is Not What It Used To Be. Industrial Law Journal, 24, 1247-1282.

Theron, J. (2005). Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship.Industrial Law Journal, 26, 618-649.

Theron, J. (2008). The Shift to Services and Triangular Employment: Implications for Labour MarketReform. Industrial Law Journal, 29, 1-21.

Tomren, Ø. (2012). Challenges of Contingent Work: Unions and Labour Brokers in South Africa. MastersThesis, University of Oslo.

Von Holdt, K. (2010). Institutionalisation, Strike Violence and Local Moral Orders. Transformation, 72/3,127-151.

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Eleven

Endnotes1 See Section 4 for descriptions of the triangular

employment relationship created by the use ofTES.

2 And/or develop alternative cheap labourstrategies.

3 Casual worker was the commonly used term forlabour broker employees in SAPO and is usedthroughout this report. It should be notedhowever that there are different meanings thatcan be ascribed to the term ‘casual.’ Casual,often refers to part-time workers or shot-termcontract workers; in the case of SAPO labourbroker employees this was in general far fromthe case. Typically such ‘casuals’ were in fact‘permanent casuals.’ Further, with the end oflabour broking in SAPO these former labourbroker employees were taken into the Post Officeon short-term contracts. They were still therefore‘casuals’ but now casuals of the Post Office.

4 This list is not conclusive and more than onenon-standard criterion may be present in anysituation. See Benjamin and Department ofLabour (2011), Department of Labour (2004),(Theron, 2003, 2005, 2008) and Webster (2010)for explanations of non-standard employment.

5 Or under the control of the client company. Thisis, of course, relevant for SAPO since a significantpart of postmen/womens’ work is on the streets.

6 Benjamin and Department of Labour (2011) andMhone (1998).

7 Benjamin and Department of Labour (2011),Cohen (2008), Kenny (2004, 2007), Rees (2011)and Tomren (2012).

8 Standing (2011), Von Holdt (2010) and (Webster,2010).

9 Benjamin and Department of Labour (2011),Brandt (2013) and Pike (2012).

10 The LRA of 1956, amended in 1983.11 Benjamin and Department of Labour (2011).

Schroeder (2000) makes a more general argumentthat post 1994 labour legislation is, in fact, lessworker friendly than early regimes.

12 Department of Labour (2004) and Mhone (1998).13 Department of Labour (2012, p. 30).

14 Possibly combined with utilizing alterative cheapand vulnerable labour such as immigrants.

15 And NACTU, see COSATU and NACTU (2012).16 Albeit stronger that the enacted amendments

with the call for the banning of labour broking.17 COSATU (2009).18 See Rees (2011), Tomren (2012) and Von Holdt

and Webster (2008).19 The introduction of FICA and RICA requirements,

including providing proof of residence, furtherincreased the necessity of an address for effectivesocial inclusion.

20 2013/2014 financial year.21 This is based on approximately 8,000 full time

postal workers employed via labour brokers atan, again, approximate cost of R4,000 per monthcompared to the average entry level wage forpermanent employees of some R8,000 a month.

22 An outline of the governance failures that allowedthis tragedy to unfold lies beyond the scope ofthis research report.

23 Not always without problems. There was a strikeat Witspos by contracted labour, demanding tobe employed as permanent Post Office workers,shortly after it commenced operations in 1995.

24 Mataboge (2013).25 2010/5594: South Gauteng High Court. 11th

March 3010.26 At least 11 (and probably more) TES provided

labour to SAPO: TAS Appointment &Management Services, ITP, Marula Staffing,Autenmas Placements (ATM), VulavulaniTechnologies (VVT), T&T Appointments, T&L(which split to form TAS and T&T), WorkforceManagement, Quest Staffing Solutions, N.T.Ngidi Consulting and Interim Consulting.

27 Shilubana (2011).28 See J112/12. Labour Court. Pages 55 and 56 for

letters to N.T. Nigid and Marula to this effect.29 BCEA: S29.30 JS 1048/10: Labour Court.31 Clause 37 of Department of Labour (2012)

Memorandum of Objectives on Labour Relations


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Amendment Bill 2012.32 The extent to which this happened lies beyond

the scope of this working paper.33 CWU was formed by the merger of three unions:

POTWA, PEASA, and SAPTEA. Two other unionshad a presence in the Post office: the largelywhite PNL and SAPA. These latter unions weresqueezed out of SAPO when a 30% +1 criterionfor recognition was agreed between CWU andSAPO along with an agency shop agreement.PNL was later absorbed, within Telkom, into theSolidarity union.

34 The long period between SAPWU’s establish-ment in 2009 and its eventual recognition bySAPO in 2012 was largely the result of aprotracted rearguard campaign by CWU usingSAPO’s industrial relations system (for exampleraising the recognition threshold to 40% + 1)and the courts to thwart the breakaway.

35 Such a view would help explain why CWU failedto address what amounted to a hollowing outof its membership and financial base withinSAPO: each permanent worker replaced by acasual meant one less union member and oneless monthly subscription.

36 I.e. while employees of the Post Office couldelect not to join CWU, they would still have topay a monthly subscription, equal to that ofmembership, to cover expenses incurred byCWU in conducting collective bargaining on theirbehalf. They would not however be entitled torepresentation by the union in the event ofdisciplinary action.

37 I note the extensive and controversial outsourcedcleaning, maintenance and other services at myown university, Wits.

38 Again, the details of this process lie beyond thescope of this working paper.

39 Employment Equity Act: Section 57.40 The balance of the some 8,000 casual workers,

being accounted for by the dramatic expansionin postal delivery services.

41 The term Tembisa Line refers to the Metrorailinfrastructure which, as outlined, in Section 7played a critical role in the geography of thecasual workers struggles.

42 Adding further to the confusions is that thesespontaneous demarcations of worker organizationonly partly correspond with the organizationalsystem used by SAPO, which in turn does notcorrespond with those used by CWU.

43 Even when temporary employees (S32s) of thePost Office who were paid at the same rate aspermanent employees, including their ownmembers, were transferred to labour brokingcompanies with a massive cut in salaries.

44 With the exception of one of the smaller labourbrokers, ITP, which did agree to allow stop orders.

45 This was a staggered, oscillating and nevercomplete process, further complicated by the‘two footing strategy’ employed by casual workers(see Section 6.3) and the presence of individualofficials and office bearers in CWU who madestrenuous efforts to assist causal workers. Broadlyspeaking, the East Rand committees broke withCWU before the West Rand.

46 CWU did put casuals’ wages on the negotiatingtable on a number of occasions (in the form ofwhat SAPO would instruct labour brokers to pay).However, this demand would come off theagenda which proceeded to hammer outincreases in salaries and benefits for permanentworkers. CWU did not have a legal mandate tonegotiate on behalf of labour broker employeesand to do so in earnest would have been to limitwhat it could achieve for its membership.

47 SAPO imposed an effective common rate forlabour broker employees following problems inwhich workers hopped between different labourbrokers within a depot to exploit marginaldifferences in rates of pay. This provides yet moreevidence showing that the supposedindependence of the TES within SAPO was afiction.

48 Along with whatever increases in benefits werenegotiated and a payout from a gain sharingincentive scheme.

49 Some conversions to permanent positions weremade from 2005 onwards. However, the fewappointments that were made had no significantimpact on the number of casual workers. Inaddition to the strong economic incentives forcontinuing with the employment of casualworkers, they were at the bottom of the hierarchyin which conversion to permanent positions wasnegotiated. In 2005 they were third on the list,behind Permanent Part Time Employees (PPTEs)and Fixed Term Contracts (employees of SAPO)(S32s). By 2011 they were fourth in line with theaddition of Supernumerary Employees (resultingfrom restructuring within the organization) at thetop of the list.


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50 J 1905/09 SAPO vs. CWU. Labour Court.51 This was for similar reasons to CWU (see Section

6.2), though its membership profile furtherdistanced it from casual workers concentratedin entry level positions, such as postman (orwomen).

52 A direct approach in May 2011 was unsuccessful,strikers joined the 2012 COSATU march againstlabour broking, see Section 7.4.

53 SAPWU was initially viewed with suspicion bycasual workers. Later officials within SAPWUplayed a critical role in negotiations betweenthe Mabarete and SAPO in March 2012, seeSection 7.6.

54 The APC assisted, inter alia, with the 2012approach to the Minister of Communications.

55 The DSM made considerable, unsuccessful,efforts to unify workers committees.

56 Employees vs. Post Office G/S 8141. Departmentof Labour.

57 GA JB 28361-10. CCMA Vereeniging Office.58 Vaal University of Technology.59 J 1048/10 Workers Committee obo Members

vs. TAS Appointment and Management Services.Labour Court.

60 This was, in legal terms, only a marginalimprovement on the first attempt.

61 The clearest example here is the Germiston-based CWAO.

62 J 1208/11, J 1355/11 and J 1493/11. LabourCourt.

63 Though a strike in the Pretoria region, beginningin late July continued into August and was subjectto a third indict (J 1493/11)

64 Marcus Makhura, Mzwandile Mdlungu and PetrusMorenamele. Despite taking their case to theCCMA they were never re-instated.

65 J112/12. Labour Court,66 Like all rules, especially one operated by quasi-

secret structures, there were times when this rulewas compromised on the ground.

67 Communication in later strikes has madeextensive use of Whatsapp groups in additionto cell phones.

68 Alternatively Amabarete or The Berets.69 While permanent workers by and large remained

on the sidelines.70 This is another reason why striking workers were

expected to report for strike duty, rather than

limiting their strike activity to staying at home.In addition to the denial of postal services itprevented strikers from becoming isolated andbeing lured back to work by supervisors’ threats,allegations, and promises.

71 The extent of beatings is hard to establish givensecrecy in this regard. Numerous charges werelaid as a result of strike action. However, noneof these resulted in successful prosecution. Therewas one documented death during the strike.This was of a policeman who was electrocutedwhen he climbed onto a train in which strikerswere travelling and were believed to have‘hostages’ (i.e. strikebreakers) in their custody(Moune, 2012).

72 Thus, a leaflet produced by the ‘Post Office MailDelivery Strike Committee’ in February 2012explained that, ‘We know that our communitieshave been affected by our strike. Mail has notbeen delivered for weeks now...We regret thatour struggle against the Post Office bosses andtheir labour broker friends is affecting ourcommunities in this way...We ask for the supportof our communities against the Post Office...Donot accept mail from the Amagundwane (non-strikers or scabs) during the strike and ask themwhy they are not part of our struggle.’

73 Technically this was correct: the strikers had allbeen fired by the labour brokers.

74 These ranged from the pragmatic, ‘it wasn’t nice,but it was necessary’ through to sophisticated,creative and sometimes playful narratives thatblended religious ideas with class consciousness.

75 Again, as so often in this strike, cunning cameinto play. On arrival in the area they had reportedto the police station and asked for an escort,telling them they were going to see theiremployer. The police told them to proceed onthe basis that any group that came to ask forpermission wasn't going to cause problems.

76 CWU was in the words of one interviewee a ‘nogo area‘ for the Mabarete given their hostilestance to the union.

77 In particular they turned to a group within SAPWUbased around Tutu Mokoena, SAPWU’s legaladviser, and Wits regional office bearers: SiphiweNenzhelele, Malandela Radebe, BenjaminRakoto, and Seun Tshabalala. This group brokewith the National SAPWU leadership in 2013,following a long-running dispute within the union,and along with the Mabarete, who were for ashort while SAPWU members, formed DEPACU.


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78 Who had previously been an office bearer inCWU before becoming SAPWU’s legal adviser.

79 The Top 9, at that point, consisted of: ThabisoBopape, Caphus Chauke, Moraba Choshi, BhekiDlamini, Velaphi Mabena, Mkwabe Mabulane,Russel Mutavhatsindi, Alfred Mosito, and Sipho‘Levi’ Zwane.

80 Additionally it is likely that Post Officemanagement were seeking to buy time duringwhich time they would reduced the financialexposure of converting casuals to permanentsby reducing the headcount of the casualworkforce while they were still labour brokeremployees.

81 At least this was the agreement. On the side ofthe Mabarete/SAPWU negotiators there was thehope that a legal challenge in the CCMA bycasual workers not covered by the first clausewould result in a ruling of unfair labour practiceand the second clause being made an order ofcourt. In the event, as outlined in Section 7.7,casual workers outside of the Mabarete pursuedthis claim via industrial action.

82 S32 was the SAPO form used for short-termcontract employments. Historically, such positionswere paid at the same cost-to-company basis asthe equivalent permanent rate. The categorywas, however, re-invented with pay equivalentto what the labour brokers had been receiving.

83 Representatives on different sides of thisnegotiation give different accounts of how firmthis second clause was. However, irrespective ofthese differences, there has, since the agreement,been an ongoing process of conversions (seeSection 9.1).

84 This was based on legal advice, even thoughthey were operating monthly agreements withthe labour brokers. This further supports theargument that SAPO was buying time with theintention of reducing the headcount of causalworkers before conversions took place.

85 These PPTE posts were almost full-time positions;they were negotiated at seven (rather than eight)hours a day, with pro-rata benefits. In some areasof SAPO, PPTE positions, with a range of hoursstipulated, suit particular operationalrequirements. In this case, however, they werealways regarded as a stepping stone to full-timepermanent employment.

86 The unwritten agreement reached with theMabarete meant that reassurances overconversion, within three months if not

immediately, were difficult to make. In addition,issues of inter-group rivalry, along with the desirefor revenge over the beatings that had takenplace, also contributed to the ‘second strike.’

87 Kotsi was suspended from the Post Office inOctober 2014.

88 Kotsi (2012).89 Although this solution was brought in by SAPWU,

along with detailed knowledge of the financesinvolved, the idea had been floated, as early asSeptember 2011 by CWU which belatedlydeclared a dispute (though no action) over labourbroking (Mogalane, 2011).

90 Department of Labour, (2012: 30).91 And probably providing companies with a three

month ‘probation period’ for prospectiveemployees.

92 SAPO’s Vision, Mission & Values statement (SAPO,2013).

93 Such as Loane Sharp previously of Adcorp whoneglected to mention that her company was partof SAPO’s dirty secret, via their subsidiarycompany Quest Staffing Solutions.

94 See Sections 7.2 and 7.7 for a fuller explanationof the number of Mabarete.

95 Only in Tembisa, by far the best organized workercommittee, was it possible for levies to be raisedfrom all casual workers in the area rather thanonly those present at meetings.

96 What Lenin described as ‘trade unionconsciousness’ in What is to be Done? Thoughin this case, without having a union - at leastalong the lines of South Africa’s industrial relationslegislation.

97 The Influential Information and CommunicationsUnion of South Africa. The organization obtainedregistration with the Department of Labour on16th January 2015, but is not at the time ofpublication recognized by the Post Office.Nevertheless, it is a significant player withinSAPO’s industrial relations environment.

98 Leadership Forum Agreement: 14th November2014.

99 The Mabarete had previously joined SAPWUbefore a long-running tension in this organizationresulted in the creation of DEPACU.

100 Such an exercise involves, of course, enteringdepots without warning and in sufficient numbersto overwhelm any possible resistance. TheSecond Strikers preferred nickname of ‘The


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Stormers’ and motto, ‘A Storm is Coming’ refersto this technique of storming depots during thepost-Mabarete strike.

101 It is not hard to find case where sectoral wagedeterminations are massively undercut, in forexample the retail sector, even after inspectionsby Department of Labour officials.

102 See Webster, Budlender, and Orkin (2015Forthcoming) for a detailed exploration of whatconstitutes decent work.

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Fighting theirown battles

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