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Women, Work and Family in the Arab Region: Toward Economic Citizenship

Valentine M. Moghadam

Professor of Sociology and Director, International Affairs Program

Northeastern University Boston, MA 02115 USA v.moghadam@neu.edu

Prepared for Expert Group Meeting on

Protecting the Arab Family from Poverty: Employment, Social Integration and Intergenerational Solidarity

As part of 20th

Doha International Institute for Family Studies and Development, 2-3 June 2013 anniversary of the International Year of the Family (2014)

Session II: Towards Work-Family Balance

Introduction

Educational attainment and economic need are factors that contribute to female labor

supply, while the structure of the economy and the development strategy in place create

demand for female labor in both public and private sectors. Other factors that shape female

labor supply are age, marital status, and the presence of young children. Across the world,

as the female share of the global work force has grown to near parity with that of men, even

mothers of small children have achieved labor force attachment. And yet, the double burden

that they face is a matter of concern for policymakers and women’s rights advocates alike.

Moreover, this burden is complicated by social class. Upper-income women are able to

secure the services of a nanny or an expensive childcare center, which enables them to

remain at their professions. Such an option is not, however, available to most middle-class

women, and certainly not to women from working-class or low-income households. In

many countries where statutory paid maternity leaves are available, such leaves are

available only to women in the formal sector and they are of short duration, leaving working

mothers dissatisfied and anxious. Where mothers have the possibility of lengthy, unpaid

maternity leaves, their status in the workplace and possibility for advancement or promotion

may become diminished.

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The global economy, with its attendant flexible labor markets, places tremendous pressures

on families. In many of the core countries, real wages are flat or declining, hours worked

outside the home have been rising, and family leave policies are not generous – and this at a

time of unprecedented female labor force participation. For example, Sweden, Finland,

France, and Germany offer parents up to 156 weeks of leave; in contrast, Canada offers

only 10 weeks of leave, and the United States only 12 weeks of unpaid leave (Kittelson

2008). The global financial crisis, which led to home foreclosures and loss of jobs, placed

in sharp relief the vulnerabilities of many families. Meanwhile, the cost of university

education has increased, especially in the U.S. and U.K. These trends strain the labor

resources of families, often adversely affecting the ability of people to care for children or

older relatives (Dau-Schmidt and Brun 2006). As the older population of the core countries

expands, concerns about institutional and family care for the elderly has become a major

policy concern.

The trends outlined above have affected the Arab world as well, with some variations. The

population of young people remains much larger in the Arab world than in the core

countries, but fertility rates have been declining, with the expectation that the older

generation will expand in the decades ahead. Maternity leave policies are in place in MENA

countries, but they are not generous. As in other countries, Arab women are responsible for

the care of the home and children, though wealthy Arab women, like their Western

counterparts, may resort to a nanny, usually one from another country. One key difference,

however, is that women in the Arab region have yet to achieve labor market attachment, and

their labor force participation remains lower than in other world regions.

As recently as 2010, women’s activity rates were lowest in the MENA countries, when

compared with other developing or middle-income regions (see Table1). Educated women

are disproportionately represented in the formal labor markets, while the informal sector is

populated by the poor. Decent work and decent wages – as recommended by the

International Labour Organization (ILO) – alleviates and prevents poverty, and such

conditions certainly are needed to encourage women from low-income households to seek

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employment.1

But more is required, including policies and institutions that alleviate

women’s responsibilities for the care of children and the elderly. In addition, legal and

policy frameworks need to be in alignment: labor laws, family laws, and social policies

should complement and not contradict each other.

Table 1 about here

The paper provides an overview of the literature on women, work, and family and recent

discussion of the care economy, drawing also on T. H. Marshall’s conceptualization of

citizenship. The empirical part of the paper examines patterns and trends in women’s

employment across the Arab region since 1990, with some distinction between oil and non-

oil economies, and countries at different levels of human development. Data are also

presented on states’ ratification of international conventions pertaining to women, work,

and family (e.g., ILO conventions and CEDAW), and on maternity leave policies and other

institutional supports for maternal employment.

Key questions addressed are: what are the patterns and trends in female labor market

participation across Arab countries? What role is played by political economy, legal/policy

frameworks, human capital, and social norms in the variations across the region? Why are

Arab women from working-class or low-income households least likely to be part of the

formal labor force? Could the provision of quality childcare, family allowances, and paid

maternity leaves increase the labor force participation of married women with children?

What is the role of the state in enhancing women’s labor force participation, helping to

secure work-family balance, and ensuring women’s economic citizenship? Some references

to non-Arab countries at similar levels of development and income highlight similarities and

differences. I also offer some suggestions for women’s economic citizenship that would

balance work and family.

1 See http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm, which focuses on creating jobs; guaranteeing rights at work; extending social protection; promoting social dialogue.

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Women, Development, and the Social-Economic Rights of Citizenship

Social-economic rights constitute the third pillar of the rights of citizenship – the other two

being civil rights and political rights – and include an array of social and labor rights, from

the right to organize and form trade unions to the rights to education, training, health, and

welfare. In the Marshallian framework, social rights are those connected to education,

training, a decent standard of living, and good work conditions. They refer to the gains

made by labor movements in the early part of the 20th century and their codification in the

labor laws and social policies of welfare states, particularly around health, education,

vocational training, and social insurance. As Marshall (1950: 72) stated: “By the social

element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and

security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized

being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” In Marshall’s historical

analysis, social rights followed the civil and political rights established in the course of

democratic revolutions and struggles in the 18th and 19th

centuries. A summary of civil,

political and social rights of citizenship as per Marshall, with some minor adjustments, is

presented in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

In terms of international standards and norms, social/economic rights are found in the

International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). The

ICESCR prescribes the right of people to a freely chosen job; equitable and equal wages for

work of equal value; dignified working conditions for workers and their families;

professional training; equal opportunities for promotion; protection for families, especially

for children; maternity protection; protection of boys, girls, and teenagers against economic

exploitation. Social/economic rights also are found in conventions and declarations

promoted by the ILO, notably the four core labor standards represented by eight

conventions, which call for freedom of association and the prohibition of child labor, forced

labor, and discrimination in employment.2

2 See

www.ilo.org. See also Moghadam, Franzway, and Fonow 2011, especially the introductory chapter by the editors and ch. 2 by Moghadam.

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Women’s economic citizenship and social rights are defined in the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing

Platform for Action, and the Charter of Women Workers Rights of the International

Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU, now the ITUC). They are also inscribed in the

ILO conventions pertaining to maternity protection, non-discrimination, and equal

remuneration. Many countries have adopted these standards and inscribed them in national

laws. Thus, women workers may enjoy rights to paid maternity leave, crèches at the

workplace with nursing breaks to feed their babies, subsidized child care facilities in the

community, and retirement that is several years earlier than that of men. Women also may

be the beneficiaries of laws against discrimination in employment and pay, and against

sexual harassment.

Other social/economic rights for working women include vocational training, skills

upgrading, and opportunities for advancement; and prohibition of discrimination and sexual

harassment. Indeed, in MENA, major campaigns have been launched by women’s rights

groups against sexual harassment, and in some cases, governments have passed laws in

recognition of a working woman’s right to a healthy and dignified work environment free of

sexual harassment. 3

One of the most basic rights—the right to an occupation of one’s choice—spans civil and

social-economic rights in that it entails control over one’s own body for freedom of

movement and the ability to offer one’s labor power for various occupations and

professions. In a capitalist world, workers are free to move from one job to another,

although there are restrictions on labor mobility or migration across international borders.

For women, patriarchal constraints have historically constrained their mobility; control over

their bodies and mobility by male kin or the state have effectively limited their citizenship

rights, and the care work that women do across the world is typically unacknowledged as

“work.” In some cultural contexts, including the MENA region, family laws continue to

3 For details on such policies in the Maghreb, see Moghadam 2010; see also Moghadam 2013.

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place women under the protection—or control—of male kin and require that they obtain the

permission of their fathers or husbands to seek employment, sign a contract, or travel. In

addition, Muslim family law limits women’s portion of inherited family wealth, with the

result that women may be at a disadvantage, compared with males, when they try to start a

business. As such, women’s social rights are constrained and economic citizenship denied.

Economic citizenship is conventionally tied to work and employment. The position of

women within the labor market is frequently studied as an empirical measure of women’s

status. Access to remunerative work in the formal sector of the economy—as distinct from

informal-sector activities—is regarded by many researchers in the field of women-in-

development (WID) and gender-and-development (GAD) as an important indicator of

women’s social position and legal status. For those who argue that women’s economic

dependence on men is the root cause of their disadvantaged status, the gender composition

of the labor force and change in the structure of labor force rewards are key targets.

Employed women tend to have greater control over decision-making within the family;

households also benefit when women control income and spending, and the well-being of

children is increasingly linked to female education and income. Many women’s rights

advocates regard women’s involvement in paid employment as a pathway to social and

gender consciousness, autonomy, and empowerment. The societal benefits of increased

female employment include diminishing fertility rates and a more skilled and competitive

human resource base. Investment in women’s education and employment is increasingly

understood as integral to building the national human resource base.4

The Middle East and North Africa region has not figured prominently in the WID/GAD

literature, in part because of a common perception that religious and cultural factors shape

women’s lives more than do economic ones. Some scholars, however, have singled out the

oil economy, the neopatriarchal state, or rentierism as key determinants.5

4 The following list is by no means complete, but it is representative of the WID-GAD and sociology-of-gender perspective, which puts a premium on women’s integration into the paid labor force of the formal economy: Blumberg 1995; Chafetz 1984; Joekes 1987; Tiano 1987; Tinker 1990; Moghadam 1996b; Charles 2011. See also various contributions in Visvanathan 2011.

Indeed, there is a

5 I have discussed this scholarship in some detail in Moghadam 2013, ch. 1.

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longstanding literature on the economic and political effects of the “rentier state”, but less

has been written about its gender dynamics.6

When a state depends on “rents” (state-owned

oil, minerals, tourism, or waterways), it accrues vast wealth without needing to rely on

income taxes. The implications are both economic, in that diversification is forestalled, and

political, in that the state is less accountable to its citizenry. The oil economy plays a key

role in determining women’s employment in at least three ways. First, the oil sector is male-

intensive and capital-intensive. It employs relatively few workers overall, but they are

traditionally male. Second, a state’s receipt of oil revenues from export softens the incentive

to diversify the economy and open it up to labor-intensive, export-led manufacturing that

favors female employment (of the kind that has been characteristic of East and Southeast

Asian economies). Third, oil revenues enable high wages for male workers; at the

household level, that reality attenuates the need for women to seek employment.

The next section applies the framework sketched above to address the questions and issues

raised in the introductory section.

Women, Work and Family in MENA

In MENA, oil wealth did finance economic development (including infrastructural

development and state-owned industries), but in a lopsided fashion that also distorted the

labor force (Katouzian 1981; Karshenas 1990, 1995; Richards and Waterbury 1990). Apart

from the small Gulf countries, most of the large countries pursued import-substitution

industrialization (ISI), where machinery was imported to run local industries producing

consumer goods. This strategy was associated with an economic system characterized by

central planning and a large public sector. State expansion, economic development, oil

wealth, and the region’s increased integration within the world system combined to create

educational and employment opportunities for women in the Middle East.

6 The early writings were the following: Mahdavi 1972; Katouzian 1981; Beblawi and Luciano 1987. U.S. political scientist Michael Ross followed with a series of papers; see Ross 2001 and 2008.

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For relatively well-educated women, jobs in teaching, health, and welfare offered the

greatest possibilities. During the period of rapid growth (1960s-1080s), governments

instituted social security programs, and protective legislation for working mothers—such as

paid maternity leave and workplace nurseries—was in place in all MENA countries. This

was part of the social contract between the government and the governed, or what some

scholars have called the authoritarian bargain. That is, at a time when civil and political

rights were limited, the state did provide social rights, at least for those employed in the

state sector and their families (Karshenas and Moghadam 2006, esp. pp. 1-30).

Those countries rich in oil and poor in other resources chose an industrial strategy based on

petroleum products and petrochemicals. The industrialization of other countries followed a

typical pattern of ISI, although Algeria and Iraq remained dependent on oil revenues for

foreign exchange and to finance imports and development projects. MENA lagged behind

southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and east Asia in terms of the transition

from ISI to manufacturing for export. Oil revenues certainly were used for domestic

investment purposes, as Karshenas (1990, 1995) has argued, and an industrial labor force in

the manufacturing sector was also created. But investment in iron and steel plants,

petrochemicals, car assembly plants, and similar industries turned out to be costly and

inefficient, especially when the price of oil declined while the price of manufactured

imports did not.

What is more, and as I have argued since the early 1990s, a strategy that relied on oil, gas,

and imports of manufactures was heavily capital-intensive, minimized the use of labor, and

was not especially conducive to increased female employment. Thus in my early research, I

contrasted Iran and Algeria with Tunisia and Morocco, showing how the countries in the

region with the largest oil sectors or highest oil revenues had a far smaller female share of

paid employment (whether professional or manufacturing) than the non-oil economies. The

oil-rich Gulf countries, in particular, imported women workers from the Philippines and

elsewhere for work in hospitals, restaurants, hotels, and shops. 7

7 The argument was initially made in the first edition (1993) of my book Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Moghadam 2013), and subsequently in the following publications:

It seemed fair to conclude,

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as I did in my early writings, that across MENA, one effect of the oil economy in the period

1960s-1990s was that women had been “locked into” a patriarchal family unit.

If oil-based growth and capital-intensive production did not lead to a significant demand for

female labor, another factor in the relatively low levels of female employment during the

oil-boom era pertained to the high wages that accrued to workers in the region. An analysis

of wage trends by economist Massoud Karshenas showed that workers’ wages were higher

in most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa than they were in Asian

countries such as Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia (Karshenas and Moghadam 2001). Higher

wages earned by men served to limit the supply of job-seeking women during the oil-boom

years.

In sum, the oil economy and the ISI strategy reinforced what I have called the patriarchal

gender contract—the implicit and often explicit agreement that men are the breadwinners

and are responsible for financially maintaining wives, children, and elderly parents, and that

women are wives, homemakers, mothers, and caregivers (Moghadam 1998, ch. 1). The

patriarchal gender contract also justified men’s domination within the public sphere of

markets and the state and women’s concentration in the private sphere of the family.8

But what of non-oil economies? Why is the level of female paid employment low in Jordan,

Lebanon, and Syria? I offer two explanations. First, the concept of a regional oil economy is

a salient one, as made by a number of scholars. For although there are differences among

MENA countries in terms of economic structure and natural resource endowments, the

labor and capital flows across the region—especially during the 1970s—constituted a more

or less integrated regional oil economy. High wages accrued to male workers in non-oil

Moghadam 1995; 1998, esp. chap. 2; 2005a; 2005b. In 2008, Michael Ross made a similar argument, using quantitative methods. 8 It should be noted that the patriarchal gender contract prevailed in Western countries, too, but it was superseded by the imperatives of capitalist industrialization as well as the aspirations of women’s movements, which led to legal changes and policy reforms to counter discrimination and encourage women’s labor force participation.

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economies, in part due to their ability to migrate to the oil-rich countries for employment

and send back remittances.

The second reason for the difference between MENA and other regions is non-economic,

and may be summarized as a set of social institutions and norms that act as barriers to

female labor supply and demand. The patriarchal gender contract—the social norm of men

as breadwinners and women as wives and mothers – is inscribed in Muslim family law

(MFL), which I identify as a distinctive institutional obstacle to the growth of female labor

supply and demand and to female mobility. (See also Jutting et al., 2006.) Although much

research has uncovered the gap between the law and the lived reality, there does seem to be

a connection between the prevalence of MFL and the historically low rates of female labor

force participation and involvement in paid employment in MENA. In her historical study

of states, women’s rights, and kin-based solidarities in post-independence Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia, Mounira Charrad (2001) explained that patriarchal family law

reflected very real social and political conditions: it was founded on the strength of kin-

based relations. Provisions regarding obedience, maintenance, and inheritance imply that

wives are economic dependents. Even where MFL has been reformed, a cultural lag

remains, and conservative social norms may prevent women from seeking paid work

outside the home (Collectif 2003).

As in other parts of the world, Arab women’s formal rights of citizenship are based on two

pillars: (a) international treaties and norms and (b) national legislation, including

constitutions, family laws, and labor laws. As Table 3 makes clear, governments have

signed a number of key international instruments pertaining to women’s participation and

rights. However, such instruments are often weakly enforced, or they are rendered moot by

virtue of their conflict with some national legislation or interpretation of sharia. Similarly,

the labor laws that signify women as workers with certain rights are contradicted by Muslim

family law that places women under the authority of male kin and deny women equal access

to family wealth. As was noted above, the sociologist and theorist T. H. Marshall (1950)

identified the “right to work at an occupation of one’s choice” as a key civil right, won by

workers in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Later, historian Alice Kessler-Harris

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(2001) underscored this right as central to American women’s search for equity and

economic citizenship. Yet, even though the right to an occupation of one’s choice is

enshrined in the ICESCR, it is not present in all MENA countries. In Saudi Arabia, for

example, national legal frameworks do not give women the unqualified right to work,

women require the written permission of a spouse or male kin to travel, and they do not

have the right to drive.

Table 3 about here

In some countries or among certain social groups, MFL acts as a barrier to women’s

mobility and availability for work. In other cases, it is an anachronism, given the growth of

modern middle classes, along with an expanding population of urban, educated, and

employed women who are increasingly responsible for family welfare. This is the

population that has produced women’s rights groups calling for family law reform and its

transformation from patriarchal to egalitarian (see, e.g., Collectif 2003).

To summarize the discussion thus far, during most of the 20th century and into the present

century, Arab women’s civil, political, and social rights of citizenship were limited by law

and by tradition (Joseph 2000; Moghadam 2003; Karshenas and Moghadam 2006; UNDP

2006). Challenges to the social contract (or authoritarian bargain) and the patriarchal gender

contract began to emerge in the late 20th century. The challenges came in the form of the

structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which led to the privatization of

many social rights; the emergence of women’s rights movements critical of women’s

secondary citizenship; and broad globalization processes that undermined state authority

and encouraged civil society growth. As many studies have documented, rights and

privileges such as guaranteed public-sector employment for graduates were withdrawn in

the 1990s. Other social rights were adversely affected. School and university enrollment

rates went up, but the quality of education deteriorated significantly. The cost of living rose,

unemployment skyrocketed (especially among young, new college graduates), and real

wages stagnated. These are the socio-economic factors causally related to the Arab Spring

protests.

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Characteristics of the Female Labor Force

Women’s entry into the labor force in the MENA region was facilitated by state-sponsored

education and job opportunities in the expanding government sector and public services.

Formal/modern-sector employment, and especially opportunities in the civil service,

became an important source of status and livelihood for women and their families. In this

regard, the Middle East is not so different from other countries, for around the world the

public sector and government employment have provided women with jobs, benefits, and

security that may elude them in the private sphere. As Fatima Mernissi (1984: xx) once

remarked, “The North African woman of today usually dreams of having a steady, wage-

paying job with social security and health and retirement benefits, at a State institution;

these women don’t look to a man any longer for their survival, but to the State. While

perhaps not ideal, this is nevertheless a breakthrough, an erosion of tradition. It also partly

explains the Moroccan women’s active participation in the urbanization process: they are

leaving rural areas in numbers equaling men’s migrations, for a ‘better life’ in the cities—

and in European cities, as well.” Since Mernissi wrote these prescient words, more socio-

demographic changes have taken place, especially in the areas of tertiary enrollments, age at

first marriage, contraception prevalence, and fertility rates (see Table 4).

Table 4 about here

The socio-demographic changes differ across the countries, and as seen in Table 5, the Arab

countries also are at different levels of human development. While some countries are at

very high or high levels of human development, this status does not necessarily correlate

with high levels of female employment. In this section, the main features of Arab women’s

labor force participation and employment patterns that are emphasized are: (1) low

participation rates and female labor force shares; (2) occupational distribution; (3)

administrative and managerial presence; (4) age, marital, and household headship status;

and (5) high rates of unemployment. I then examine the special case of the countries in the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

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Table 5 about here

As we saw in Table 1, MENA women’s labor force participation rates are low by

international standards. The average rate of female participation grew from 22 percent in

1980–1985 to about 28 percent in 2005–2010, but that was still low compared to other

regions of the developing world, where women’s economic activity rates ranged from 45 to

62 percent.9 There were variations across the region, as well as in subregions. For example,

Algerian women’s labor force participation was about half the rate of Tunisian and

Moroccan women until after 2000. MENA countries that reported higher participation rates

than the regional average in 2000 were Tunisia at 37 percent and Morocco at 41 percent.10

Data from the ILO’s Global Employment Trends for Women 2012 show that the female

employment-to-population ratio was much smaller in the Middle East (15.3%) and North

Africa (19.7%) than for the world (47.8). Even South Asia had a higher figure for women

(30.4%).11

Turning now to the female share of the total labor force, Table 6 shows that female labor

force shares rose between 1990 and 2010 in most MENA countries but they declined in

Egypt, Kuwait, and Qatar. The comparison of participation rates and female employment

shares across countries should be treated with care because different countries may measure

the participation of female members of farming households differently; this can affect the

comparison of participation rates across countries, as well as trends in the same country

over time, as the share of adults in rural areas declines in the process of development.

However, the stark difference between the female participation rates in the MENA region

and other parts of the world—as seen in Table 1—goes beyond what can be explained by

measurement errors. 9 Data from ILO 1990, table 1, p. 60, as well as from the ILO’s Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1981, 1985, 1991, table 1. Figures for the 1990s are from the ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour Market (ILO 1999). On Lebanon, see Al-Raida 15, no. 82 (Summer 1998): 16, a special issue on women in the labor force, which reported that women’s share of employment was 20 percent. See also Moghadam 1995. 10 United Nations 2000, chart 5.2, p. 110; UNDP 2002, table 25. See also CAWTAR 2001, table A/27. 11 ILO 2012, Table 2, p. 12.

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Table 6 about here

Another feature pertains to occupational distribution. Employed women in MENA tend to

be concentrated in professional occupations, mainly in what are known as community,

social, and public services. Although the majority of the economically active female

population comes from the lower-income groups, those with access to paid employment

tend to be educated women from the middle classes. In the 1990s, a growing proportion of

public sector jobs came to be held by women: 35–39 percent in Kuwait and 27–31 percent

in Syria and Morocco (Alachkar 1996; Standing 1999). In the new century, these

proportions increased. Indeed, the data show a clear positive relationship between

educational attainment and involvement in paid jobs. Women with a university education

are disproportionately represented in the labor force, given that the university-educated

population is small compared to the total adult population. Such large proportions of

employed women with higher education attainment are found in the West Bank and Gaza (a

whopping 44.2 percent), Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran (roughly 30 percent).

Many of these women are employed as teachers, and in some countries, they have come to

constitute high proportions of the teaching staff at universities. According to data from the

World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2011, high percentages of female

instructors at the tertiary level are found in Tunisia (42 percent), and in Algeria and Qatar

(38 percent).

At the same time, women have been conspicuously absent from certain occupations, notably

in private sales and services and in the sectors of hotels, restaurants, and wholesale and

retail trade, at least according to official statistics for wage employment. Lebanon may be

an exception to this rule, given its traditionally large private sector and small public

sector.12

12 See, for example, Al-Raida 15, no. 82 (Summer 1998), a special issue on Lebanese women in the labor force. See also Doctor and Khoury 1991, p. 28; and Anker 1998, p. 166.

Apparently, women do not wish to enter sales work and service occupations in the

private sector. Ghazy Mujahid (1985: 115) explained women’s avoidance of such jobs in

terms of cultural norms: these occupations have the highest likelihood of indiscriminate

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contact with outsiders. It is also true that the merchant class has been typically male, and the

traditional urban markets—bazaars and souks—have been the province of men. Clerical

work, while common among women in Egypt and growing in other MENA countries, is still

not dominated by women as it tends to be in the West and in Latin America. Nursing has

not been considered an appropriate occupation for women in the Gulf countries, including

Saudi Arabia, and these countries have imported nurses from abroad. Across the MENA

region, it is uncommon for women to work in factories, with the exception of Tunisia and

Morocco in the 1990s. According to Laeticia Cairoli (1999, 2010), who studied the

garment industry in Fez in the 1990s, the industry is overwhelmingly female, although it

attracts mainly young, unmarried women.

A third feature is minimal female participation in administrative and managerial sectors of

the economy. In the late 1990s the percentages ranged from a low of under 6 percent in

Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria to 10–13 percent in Egypt and Tunisia; Morocco,

interestingly but inexplicably, reported a far higher female share of administrative and

managerial positions. In 2010, Bahrain reported the highest percentage (22 percent),

followed distantly by Kuwait, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, and the UAE (10–14 percent);

elsewhere in the region, the proportions were 5–9 percent, with Yemen trailing behind with

a mere 2 percent female share of total legislators, senior officials, and managers, according

to the 2011 Global Gender Gap Report. 13

A fourth feature pertains to the age, marital status, and household headship of women in the

workforce. A number of quantitative studies have examined factors such as marriage and

young children in relation to women and work, concluding that these factors play significant

roles in preventing women from participating in the labor market (Etemad Moghadam and

Naguib 2012). Young, unmarried women tend to dominate the workforce in Syria and

Jordan, although in Egypt a higher proportion of married women can be found. This social

reality seems to align with the patriarchal gender contract, as discussed above. The dual-

income household characteristic of Western countries and China is rarely found in MENA.

13 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2011, on-line version. The 1990s figures are from UNDP, Human Development Report 1998, table 3, p. 134.

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A fifth feature is high and persistent unemployment rates among women since the mid-

1990s, which I have referred to as the feminization of unemployment. Table 7 shows

unemployment rates for the female labor force as a whole and for university-educated

women, averaged over 2000–2010. As can be seen, with the notable exception of Kuwait,

the unemployment rates for women are very high, especially among women with university

education (who, as noted, also tend to predominate in the paid labor force). The likelihood

of being unemployed is considerably higher among women with university education than

among those with lower educational attainments. Unemployment among college-educated

women seems to be greater because their economic activity rate is higher than that of

women with secondary or primary education.

Table 7 about here

The relationship between education and employment has been widely discussed in the

literature. For example, Niels Spierings and Jeroen Smits (2007) show that a positive

correlation exists between higher education and female labor force participation in Egypt,

Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia (although they identify other contextual factors that

shape female labor supply as well). Less-educated women, in MENA at least, are less likely

than women with higher education to enter the labor force. At the same time, women with

higher education attainment appear to face obstacles and barriers in the workforce that their

educated male counterparts do not, such as a marginal position in some professions and

high unemployment rates. Class and gender issues are visible and salient in the data and

information on labor force participation, employment, and unemployment in the Middle

East and North Africa.

The Case of the Oil-Rich Gulf Countries

In the GCC countries, a common pattern is that almost the entire female labor force is

concentrated in the public sector. Female labor force participation data show relatively high

rates for some GCC countries: 43–50 percent in Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE. (Saudi Arabia is

17

much lower, at 22 percent.) That may be because non-nationals are counted or because of

the conflation of the female activity rate and the female share of public sector and civil

service employment.14

Female employment in the state sector—typically in education and healthcare—ranges

widely, from just under 50 percent in Kuwait and Bahrain to just over 30 percent in Qatar

and Oman to a low of 16 percent in Saudi Arabia. Assuming that female nationals in

Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain form a larger proportion of the native-born workforce than is

the case in other MENA countries (46 percent, 36 percent, and 33 percent, respectively),

what might explain the variation? Higher-education enrollment and attainment might

account for part of it (51 percent gross female enrollment at the university level in Bahrain,

though far less in Kuwait and Qatar), but the high wages and excellent work conditions in

the public sector—coupled with the presence of migrant workers to care for the household,

children, and the elderly—may be the incentives that draw the female nationals to the

employment sector. Indeed, Nora Ann Colton (2011) has stated that in Kuwait, on average,

there are two domestic workers per home.15

The Gulf region has a very high presence of

women migrant domestic workers, but so do Jordan and Lebanon (Esim and Smith 2004;

ILO 2005). However, the presence of household help is not a luxury enjoyed by all

professional women across MENA.

In recent years, GCC governments have sought to disaggregate nationals and non-nationals.

Because migrants take jobs in the private sector, which hires much more labor than the

public sector, they make up a larger share of the labor force than nationals. (The public

sector is reserved for citizens.) Data for 2008, for example, reveal that in Bahrain, migrants

constituted nearly 77 percent of the total labor force, whereas 23 percent of workers were

14 Confirmed in a personal communication with Dr. George Kossaifi, formerly of ESCWA, at the conference on Democratic Transition and Development in the Arab World, Stanford University, April 26–27, 2012. For example, according to another source, although Qatari women make up at least 33 percent of government employment, they are only 14 percent of the total labor force. See Kelly and Breslin 2010, p. 412. 15 Haya al-Mughni (in Kelly and Breslin 2010, p. 232) notes that Kuwait’s Labour Law, which specifies that a working day should be restricted to eight hours, does not apply to domestic workers, the majority of whom are women working long hours at low wages. Kuwaitis remain highly dependent on foreign labor—mostly from South and Southeast Asia—for domestic work.

18

native-born; in Oman the figures were 74.6 percent and 26 percent, respectively; in Qatar,

fully 94 percent versus 6 percent; and in Saudi Arabia, 50.6 percent and 49.4 percent. In

those countries, the vast majority of labor migrants are men, and their labor-force shares are

higher than those of native men everywhere but Saudi Arabia. With respect to women,

however, female nationals outnumber female labor migrants. In Kuwait in 2008, female

nationals constituted 46 percent of the native-born labor force, whereas female migrants

comprised just 23 percent of the total migrant labor force; in Bahrain the figures were 33

percent female share of the native-born labor force and 17 percent female labor migrant

share of the total foreign labor force; and in Qatar the respective figures were 36 percent

female nationals versus 8 percent female migrants. Only in Saudi Arabia were the figures

for native-born and migrant women workers relatively close, as well as low: 16 percent and

14 percent, respectively (Baldwin-Edwards 2011, table 2, p. 9).

At the same time, GCC countries follow the pattern I identified earlier as the feminization

of unemployment. In 2010–2011, female unemployment rates in Saudi Arabia and Qatar

were four to six times as high as those for males. They were highest in Bahrain: according

to the World Bank, 34 percent of women could not find jobs, compared to 7 percent of men.

Martin Baldwin-Edwards calculated the unemployment rate of Saudi women at nearly 27

percent in 2008. Youth unemployment rates were especially striking. Even though the total

unemployment rate for Saudi nationals was only 10 percent, for males aged 20 to 24 it was

considerably higher, at nearly 30 percent. For women of the same age group, unemployment

was a whopping 72 percent, and for women aged twenty-five to twenty-nine, fully 41.6

percent. There is anecdotal evidence of unemployment among nursing graduates in Saudi

Arabia.16

16 Presentation by Dr. Hatoon Ajwad al-Fassi, King Saud University, at the conference on Democratic Transition and Development in the Arab World, Stanford University, April 27, 2012 (my notes). See also Baldwin-Edwards 2011. His figure for Saudi women’s unemployment rate is higher than that reported in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2011, which estimates adult female unemployment at 16 percent. See also World Bank 2010, figure 7, p. 7, where the Saudi female unemployment rate (total, not age-specific) is about 12 percent.

Thus, in at least three of the GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain—

it is typical to find high unemployment of female graduates. Only in Kuwait are

unemployment rates low (under 5 percent, according to the World Bank), but women’s

unemployment is still higher than men’s.

19

How do the GCC countries compare with other Arab countries on ratification of

international treaties pertaining to social and economic rights? And in light of the huge

proportion of migrant labor in their economies, have the GCC countries signed on to the

UN’s convention on the protection of migrant workers and their families? Table 8 provides

the information. In short, the record is less than impressive.

Table 8 about here

Care Work, the Family, and Women’s Employment

While this paper has emphasized the importance of paid work for women, employment

must consist in what the ILO calls “decent work” and should be accompanied by social and

economic rights that recognize women’s double duty within the home as well as the

workplace. In particular, care work – whether for children or for the elderly – should be

regarded as socially useful labor that requires forms of support. Scholars have argued that

“the costs of producing future workers, developing their skills, maintaining their health, and

providing for them in old age should be construed as part of the costs of producing human

capital” (Folbre 2012: 282). Here we consider employed women who engage in such

reproductive labor that is socially useful and a contribution to human capital formation.

What might support for that combination of productive and reproductive work look like?

First, it is necessary to distinguish the different combinations of employment and care that

exist. Scholars have identified five categories of households with different earner-carer

arrangements (Pfau-Effinger 1999; Crompton 2006) that have been supported by the state,

the market, or family relations:

1. Male breadwinner/female carer

2. Male breadwinner/female part-time earner

3. Dual earner/state carer

4. Dual earner/marketized carer

5. Dual earner/dual carer

20

In the Arab region, where the social category of dual earner is not yet widespread, the first

category (male breadwinner/female homemakers) is probably the most prevalent, although

many lower-income households in which the wife/mother is involved in informal labor may

be identified as the second category (male breadwinner/female part-time earner). For the

Gulf countries, with their prevalence of domestic help drawn from migrant labor, a sixth

category might be introduced: “male breadwinner/ marketized carer.” Each of these

categories would require a different set of support mechanisms, whether from the state or

the market, as seen in Table 9.

Table 9 about here

Across the region, maternity leaves are in place, but they are not especially generous, and

for working-class women, they are not sufficient incentive to join the labor force. As seen

in Table 10, the length of paid maternity leave in 2011 ranged from a low of 7-8 weeks or

two months in Lebanon and Tunisia to 120 days or four months in Syria. No leave for

fathers of newborns is provided, except in the UAE, which provides three days of paternity

leave.17

In contrast, Norway provides nearly a year of fully paid maternity leave, with an

additional 12 weeks provided for the father, if he chooses to take it, at full pay. MENA’s

maternity leave policies are not substantially different from other countries in the table, such

as Argentina, China, Japan, and South Korea, but it should be noted that in these countries,

female labor force participation is considerably higher than in MENA, and both Argentina

and South Korea also provide subsidized daycare.

Table 10 about here

Arguments for work-family balance fall under at least two categories: those that make a

case for recognizing care work as socially useful labor that also contributes to human capital

17 According to the World’s Women 2010, Table 4.12 (p. 105), Algeria also offers 3 days of paid paternity leave.

21

formation, economic growth, or social development; and those premised on ethics or

justice. The failure to treat children as a public good – by failing to provide mothers with

paid maternity leaves, quality and affordable childcare, family allowances, and so on – are

under-investments in the family that could stall societal progress (Dau-Schmidt and Brun

2006; Folbre 2008). Arguments for “human capabilities”, “an ethic of care” and “gender

justice”, constitute an appeal for a world “where the daily caring of people for each other is

a valued premise of human existence” and for the establishment of institutions to reflect that

value (Tronto 1994: 178; see also Nussbaum 2000; Lister 2003). The concept of economic

citizenship, or the social rights of citizenship, bridges the two approaches in that it

recognizes both the economic and the ethical aspects of rights.

Social provisioning, whether through the market or the state, should support the viability of

households and families, the capacity of women to seek employment and enjoy family life,

and the rights of citizen-workers and migrant workers alike.18 Shorter working days for

parents of small children, and paid maternity leaves of at least six months in duration with

additional leave for fathers, would be policies to recognize care work as a social good, a

way to ensure parent-child bonding, a means to enable women’s labor force attachment, and

a pathway to gender equality. Parental leaves could be financed through a combination of

government, employee, and worker contributions. Care for the elderly – who in the future

will become a growing proportion of the population of some MENA countries – should be

compensated through family allowances or the provision of subsidized home care through

social insurance.19

At the same time, the ethics of care, as well as the requirements of

gender justice, call for the extension of labor rights, social insurance, and dignity for

domestic workers who provide care for children, the elderly, and private households.

18 In June 2011, the ILO – at its annual conference involving governments, employers’ associations and trade unions, and some 70 years after the issue was first taken up – adopted Convention 189, which will regulate wages and working conditions of domestic workers. See http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_161104.pdf. 19 Although the elderly population is still a fraction of the total population, it is expected to grow in line with lowered fertility rates. Care for the elderly is already a matter of social concern in Lebanon, although it remains largely the responsibility of women in the family. See Sugita, Esim, and Omeira 2009.

22

Social provision should not be limited to the major social insurance schemes and the safety

net, but also encompass family allowances, maternity/paternity/ family leaves, and a wide

range of services that enable families to survive and thrive and women to engage in both

paid employment and family life. Some bold steps are required. For example, to address the

needs and rights of lower-income women, to respond to the appeals of women’s rights

advocates for equality in the family, and to offer an alternative to the patriarchal gender

contract, governments should consider allocating family allowances to mothers and not

exclusively to fathers. These policies are, admittedly, costly for some of the poorer

countries in the region and controversial in some circles in all the countries. And yet, both

developmental and ethical considerations should prevail as these policies are discussed in

the legislatures and through social dialogues.

The policies as a whole would institutionalize social rights as theorized by Marshall, and

enable women to acquire economic citizenship. A summary list of social rights for women’s

economic citizenship in the Arab region might look like the following:20

• The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain the consent of a husband

or male relative;

• to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage and to control

one’s own income from gainful employment;

• to obtain a passport and travel abroad without permission of husband or male

relative;

• equality in family inheritance;

• to confer citizenship to children or a husband;

• to choose a residence/domicile;

• to participate in social, cultural, community, and union activities and decision-

making;

20 For details, see Moghadam 2013, ch. 3.

23

• education and skills upgrading, including affordable adult education and vocational

training;

• affordable healthcare and a healthy work environment;

• non-discrimination by employer, including equality in hiring and promotion, and

equal pay for equal work;

• the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace;

• recognition and valorization of care work: paid maternity leave and paternity leave;

subsidized and quality childcare; support for home-based elder care; decent wages

and training for childcare and eldercare workers.

Conclusions

Female labor force participation in MENA is still low in relation to that of other regions of

the world and, of course, in relation to male labor force participation. I have suggested an

explanatory framework that rests on a set of economic and non-economic factors and

forces: the oil economy and absence of diversification, and conservative social norms

codified in the region’s family laws. In addition, the state is not always favorable to the

advancement of women and their economic empowerment—especially when the state is

constituted by men holding patriarchal attitudes concerning women, work, and family. And

some states are held hostage to international financial forces, withholding the

social/economic rights of citizens in the name of an imposed neoliberal policy agenda.

Structural and institutional factors have impeded women’s progress in salaried employment,

entrepreneurship, and economic decision-making. In the wake of the Arab Spring and in

the context of democratic transitions, the challenges of the new governments include the

integration of an increasingly educated female population and women’s claims for

economic participation in the new policy frameworks.

More research is needed on the household division of labor by sex. Thus far it appears that

middle- class families in the Gulf countries, Lebanon and Jordan prefer reliance on foreign

imported domestic servants to shared housework; in Morocco, households still use native-

born maids. Elsewhere, families continue to exercise the traditional sexual division of

24

labor, whereby the women in the family are responsible for domestic tasks, childcare and

elder care. If current trends in female educational attainment, labor force participation, and

advocacy continue, it is highly likely that in the years ahead, we will witness women’s

rights groups focusing their campaigns on women’s double burden, family ethics, and social

policies for work-family balance. In the meantime, it would behoove governments to take a

closer look at the developmental and ethical aspects of women’s economic citizenship.

25

Table 1 MENA Women’s Labor Force Participation Rates in

Global Perspective, 1980-85 and 2005-2010 a

1980–1985 2005–2010

World 55.2 56.9

Latin America and Caribbean 39.6 54.6

East Asia and Pacific 69.6 69.3

South Asia 34.9 36.8

Sub-Saharan Africa 44.1 60.9

North America 61.5 69.1

Europe and Central Asia 58.5 61.4

MENA 22.1 27.9

Note: a. Percentage of female population aged 15–64.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank).

http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2, accessed April 2012.

26

Table 2. Civil, Political, and Social Rights of Citizenship: A Summary Illustration

Civil rights Political rights Social rights

Right to contract

Equal treatment under

the law

Freedom of expression

Freedom of religion

Right to privacy

Control over one’s body

Choice of residence

Choice of occupation

Right to vote

Right to run & hold office

To form or join a political

party or trade union

To engage in fund-raising

Nationality rights

Refugee and contract

worker rights

Minority rights

Dissident rights

Health services

Family allowances

Primary and secondary

schooling

Higher education

Vocational education

Compensatory rights

Social insurance

Paid maternity leave &

subsidized quality childcare

Source: Adapted from Marshall (1950, 1964) and Janoski (1998).

27

Table 3. International Conventions Signed by Selected MENA Countries, Year of Ratification

Convention Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979 (with or without reservations) Optional Protocol, 1999

1996

1996

1993

1985

1996

1981 1992

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995

Adopted Adopteda Adopteda Adopteda Adopteda a

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966

1989

a 1979

1969

1982 1975

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

1989 1979 1969 1982 1975

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families, 1990

2005

2003 — 1993

—

UNESCO Convention: Discrimination in education, 1960

1968 1968 1969 1962 1976

ILO Convention 111: Discrimination in employment/occupation, 1958

1969 1963 1959 1960 1963

ILO Convention 100: Equal remuneration for men and women for equal work, 1951

1962 1979 1968 1960 1966

ILO Conventions 87 & 98: Freedom of association and right to organize, 1948

1962 — 1957 1957, 1954 1968

ILO Convention 182: Worst forms of child labor

2001 2001 2000 2002 2000

ILO Convention 183: Maternity protection, 2000

— —

— — —

ILO Convention 156: Workers with Families Responsibilities, 1981

_

_ _ _ _

Note: a. Made general and interpretative statements or expressed reservations. Compiled from “A Summary of United Nations Agreements on Human Rights”, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html and the International Labour Organization NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:0::NO::: (accessed December 2012)

28

Table 4. Gendered Socio-Demographic Features

, MENA, circa 2010

Country Female tertiary

enrollments, 2011

Proportion female

teaching staff at tertiary

level, 2011

Age at first marriage, 2010

Contraceptive prevalence, % married women aged 15-49, 2005-09

Total Fertility Rate 2005-2010

Male Female

Algeria 34 38 33 29 61 2.4 Bahrain n.a. 33 30 26 62 2.7 Egypt 32 n.a. n.a. 23 60 2.9 Iran 49 19 26 24 79 1.8 Iraq n.a. n.a. 28 25 50 4.9 Israel 62 n.a. 29 26 n.a. 2.9 Jordan 38 24 29 25 59 3.3 Kuwait n.a. 27 30 25 52 2.3 Lebanon 58 38 31 27 58 1.9 Libya n.a. n.a. 32 29 45 2.7 Morocco 13 17 31 26 63 2.4 Oman 29 30 26 22 32 2.5 Qatar 32 38 28 26 43 2.4 Saudi Arabia 37 35 27 25 24 3.0 Syria n.a. n.a. 29 25 58 3.1 Tunisia 34 42 30 27 60 2.0 Turkey 34 40 n.a. 23 73 2.2 UAE n.a. 31 26 23 28 1.9 West Bank and Gaza

51 n.a. 27 23 50 4.7

Yemen n.a. 17 25 22 28 5.5 Notes: n.a. means data not available. Sources: Tertiary enrollment female: World Development Indicators http://data.worldbank.org/topic Proportion women instructors in higher education, World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2011, http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2011; Mean age at marriage: “Statistical Indicators on Men and Women,” United Nations, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm/tab2b.htm. Contraception prevalence and TFR: UNDP, Human Development Report 2011, tab.4.

29

Table 5. Political Economy and Human Development in Arab MENA, 2012

Very High

Human

Development

High Human

Development

Medium Human

Development

Low Human

Development

Oil economies Bahrain, Qatar,

UAE

Kuwait, Oman,

Saudi Arabia

Libya —

Mixed oil

economies

— Tunisia Algeria, Iraq,

Egypt, Syria

—

Non-oil

economies

Lebanon Jordan, Morocco,

Palestinian

Territories

Yemen

Source: Level of human development is based on each country’s ranking in the UNDP’s

2012 Human Development Report. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

30

Table 6. Female Share of Total Labor Force in MENA Countries, in

percent) 1990, 2010

1990 2010

Algeria 11.9 16.9

Bahrain 17.0 19.3

Egypt 26.5 24.2

Iraq 14.2 17.5

Jordan 14.0 18.0

Kuwait 26.9 23.9

Lebanon 21.1 25.5

Libya 17.7 28.0

Morocco 25.3 27.1

Oman 12.9 17.9

Qatar 14.4 12.4

Saudi Arabia 10.7 14.8

Syria 18.4 15.2

Tunisia 21.6 26.9

United Arab Emirates 9.7 14.5

West Bank and Gaza 12.5 17.8

Yemen 18.9 25.8

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank). http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4

31

Table 7

Average Female Unemployment Rates – Total and for University Graduates – in

Selected MENA Countries, average 2000–2010

Total University

Algeria 19.5 29.6

Kuwait 1.8 1.5

Lebanon 8.9 -

Libya 4.2 -

Morocco 11.2 33.3

Syria 20.2 31.2

Tunisia 16.7 26.6

UAE 7.2 9.7

West Bank/Gaza 20.6 34.7

Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank)

32

Table 8. Ratification of Women’s Rights, Labor Rights, and UN Human Rights Conventions by GCC

Countries, Year of Ratification, circa 2012

Convention Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979 (with or without reservations) Optional Protocol, 1999

6/2002

9/1994

2/2006

4/2009

9/2000

10/2004

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995

9/1995 9/1995 9/1995 9/1995

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966

9/2007 5/1996

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

9/2006 5/1996

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families, 1990

UNESCO Convention: Discrimination in education, 1960

1/1963 8/1973

ILO Convention 111: Discrimination in employment/occupation, 1958

9/2000 12/1966 8/1976 6/1978 6/2001

ILO Convention 100: Equal remuneration for men and women for equal work, 1951

6/1978 2/1997

ILO Conventions 87 & 98: Freedom of association and right to organize, 1948

9/1961

ILO Convention 182: Worst forms of child labor

3/2001 8/2000 6/2001 5/2000 10/2001 6/ 2001

ILO Convention 156: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981

ILO Convention 183: Maternity protection, 2000

ILO Convention 189: Domestic Workers, 2011

Note: a. Made general and interpretative statements or expressed reservations. Empty cells mean not ratified. Compiled from “A Summary of United Nations Agreements on Human Rights”, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html and the International Labour Organization NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:0::NO::: (accessed December 2012) http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/govstatements.html (accessed May 2013)

33

Table 9. Women, Work and Family Arrangements: Market and State Mechanisms

Form of Employment and

Gender/Class Relationship

Support Mechanisms from

the Market

Support Mechanisms from the

State

Male breadwinner/female carer Employer-provided social

security extended to wife/

mother

Family allowance; tax credit

Male breadwinner/ female part-

time earner

Employer-provided social

security extended to wife/

mother

Family allowance; social

insurance; subsidized child care

& pre-school centers

Male breadwinner/ marketized

carer

Employer-provided social

security extended to wife/

mother

Social support/labor rights

extended to domestic worker

Dual earner/state carer

Employer-provided social

security to both earners (if not

self-employed)

Family allowance; social

insurance; paid maternity leave;

subsidized child care & pre-

school centers; elder care

provision;

Dual earner/marketized carer

Employer-provided social

security to both earners (if not

self-employed); paid maternity

leave

Family allowance; tax credit

Dual earner/dual carer

Employer-provided social

security to both earners; paid

maternity/paternity/family leave

Family allowance; social

insurance; subsidized child care

& pre-school centers; elder care

provision; tax credit

Source: Author

Table 10 – Policies on Maternal Employment, MENA Countries, 2012

34

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