TitleThe Homicide Drop in England and Wales 2004-2014

Abstract

After decades of rising homicide rates in the late twentieth century, much of the

Western world witnessed a decline in homicide from the early-mid 1990s. In

England and Wales, homicide rates defied this trend and continued to rise for a

further decade, peaking in 2004 before declining year on year until 2014. The

late onset of the decline in England and Wales presents a quandary for dominant

explanations of the broader decline, and has yet to be theorised. This paper

presents a disaggregated analysis of the homicide drop in England and Wales,

identifying subtypes of homicide that appear to have driven the decline. The

findings indicate changes in lifestyle, routine activities and social/criminal

justice policy as the main drivers of the homicide drop, and contribute to

international theory on homicide trends.

Key words

Homicide decline, homicide drop, homicide trends

Word Count

8,506

AuthorsDr Caroline Miles and Dr Emily Buehler

Corresponding Author InstitutionDepartment of CriminologySchool of Social SciencesUniversity of ManchesterOxford RoadManchesterM13 9PL

Phone0161 2751151

Email Caroline.miles@manchester.ac.uk

1

Short BiographyCaroline Miles is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of

Manchester. Her research interests broadly focus on violence and homicide, with

specific interests in child to parent violence, risk assessment in domestic

violence and abuse, honour-based violence and abuse, domestic homicide,

parricide, and homicide trends.

Emily Buehler is a Research Officer at the Rees Centre within the Department of

Education at the University of Oxford. Her interests relate to the use of

quantitative methods for research at the intersection of criminology and

education, specifically considering analysis of administrative data, issues of

measurement, and topics of correctional education and work experiences.

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The Homicide Drop in England and Wales 2004-2014

Introduction

Homicide rates in England and Wales witnessed consecutive increases between

2014 and 20181, reportedly driven by an upturn in fatal knife attacks involving

teenagers (Ellis, 2019; Younge, 2018). This incline interrupted the longer-term

decline in homicide observed from the mid-2000s, that forms the basis of this

paper. The steady decrease in homicide in England and Wales between 2004 and

2014 followed a similar pattern to other parts of the Western world, including

the US, Australia, and much of Europe, where the sudden downturn in homicide

from the early-mid 1990s has been well-documented and theorised. The decline

in England and Wales began around a decade later and has yet to be the subject

of rigorous examination. Using data from the national Homicide Index database,

this paper presents the first detailed analysis of the homicide drop in England

and Wales and contributes to theory on homicide trends on both a national and

international level.

The over-arching finding is that in England and Wales, the decline in homicide

was observable across many types of homicide, but particularly evident in

particular subtypes: homicides involving younger suspects and victims;

occurring in public spaces; and involving intoxicated suspects and victims.

Geographically, the analysis revealed that the greatest decline occurred in

Greater London and Greater Manchester Although proportionately, numbers of

homicides decreased for both men and women; when calculated as rates within

the population of England and Wales, the analysis revealed that rates of female

suspects and victims remained stable throughout the period of decline, and that

the overall decrease was predominantly driven by declines in male homicide

suspects and victims. Similarly, although the percentage of homicides by sharp

instrument, compared to other methods of killing, have been steadily increasing

since the mid-2000s, the rate of homicides involving sharp instruments declined

between 2007 and 2014. In other words, despite decreasing of numbers knife-

related homicides (calculated as rates within the ever-growing population for

1 ONS (2019a) figures indicate that homicide numbers have fallen in the year ending June 2019

3

England and Wales), stabbings have accounted for a growing proportion of

illegal deaths for some time.

The paper begins by considering dominant approaches to understanding

homicide trends that have been used to explain the most recent decline in other

countries. These broadly incorporate cultural theories such as Elias’ (1994

[1939]) Civilising Process and Eisner’s (2001, 2008) ‘conduct of life’ theory; and

a variety of alternative explanations routed in Felson’s (1987) Routine Activity

theory, recognising the potential impact of various factors affecting lifestyle and

opportunities for fatal violence to occur. Explanations contextualising the

homicide drop with concurrent trends in non-lethal violence are also highlighted

as essential to understanding changes in homicide rates, as divergent trends in

fatal and non-fatal violence demand an alternative narrative to similar patterns

in homicide and other forms of violence (Lehti, 2014).

Cross-cultural research is paramount in developing theoretical frameworks

around homicide that are country-specific and capable of informing homicide

reduction strategies (Lehti, 2014; Soothill and Francis, 2012), and doing so

requires disaggregating national level homicide data. The paper achieves this

through presenting an analysis of homicide data for England and Wales

(covering the period 2003-2015), using data from the national Homicide Index

database. By observing whether the decline occurred across all types of

homicides or in particular subtypes, a more nuanced understanding is

developed. The key findings are discussed in context with concurrent trends in

non-lethal violence, the recent increase in homicide, and dominant theoretical

explanations. Rather than pointing towards a general decline in fatal violence

associated with traditional Eliasian (cultural pacification) theory, the findings

point to alternative explanations, namely changes in the lifestyle and routine

activities of particular groups; policies aimed at reducing particular subtypes of

homicide; and the broader expansion of security associated with the general

crime drop witnessed across the same period of time.

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Perspectives on homicide decline

Examining trends in homicide rates is key to explaining homicide. Through

observing peaks and troughs in homicide rates, one can correlate changes in

particular subtypes of homicide with extraneous factors and develop nuanced

understandings of what drivers or conditions facilitate or prevent fatal violence.

Following four decades of increasing homicide numbers, the mid-1990s saw a

sharp decline in homicide rates in many regions across the Western world,

contextualised by a broader ‘crime-drop’ which for many criminologists, had not

been foreseen (Reiner, 2016; Walby et al., 2016).

The unexpected decrease in homicide was most notable across several US cities,

which had previously been witnessing unprecedented rises in homicide rates

(Blumstein et al., 2000), but also occurred across much of the West, with England

and Wales representing somewhat an outlier, as the homicide rate here

continued to soar until 2004 (Shaw et al., 2005). Attempts to explain this

homicide drop draw upon a range of theoretical perspectives, some of which

derive from earlier explanations of the long-term historical decline in homicide

observed between the middle ages and mid-20th century, across much of the

Western world (Eisner, 2001; Elias, 1994 [1939]; Spierenberg, 2012), and others

focusing on contemporary changes in lifestyle and policy which may have

compromised the ‘opportunity’ for fatal violence to occur (Aebi and Linde, 2014;

Cohen and Felson, 1979; Lehti, 2014).

Cultural Approaches

Cultural theories have been dominant in explaining the long-term decline in

homicide, following Elias’ (1994 [1939]) theory of the Civilizing Process, which

postulated that throughout history, levels of violence in society have gradually

reduced as the State’s monopoly of power increased. Elias claimed that as a

result of the rise of centralised state governance, individuals became increasingly

economically dependent upon each other, were required to co-operate with each

other, and avoid public displays of violence. The increase in external social

control led, Elias argued, to a concomitant growth in internal self-control and

reluctance to engage in public conflict, which started in the upper echelons of

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society and gradually spread to the lower classes. In other words, the shift from

feudal society to one characterised by a monopolised state power and

consequent changes in the structure of the economy and society, meant that over

time, people became increasingly restrained and sensitised to violence, and levels

of violence (fatal and non-fatal) diminished.

Elias’ (1994 [1939]) theory was subsequently supported by empirical evidence

of the decline, primarily provided by Eisner (2001) and also Gurr (1981).

Eisner’s work also revealed that the majority of the decline was accounted for by

a reduction in ‘honour-based’ public killings between males. This tallied with

Verkko’s (1951, cited in Eisner, 2008) earlier work on homicide rates during the

first half of the 20th Century, which found that fluctuations were invariably

driven by changes in the volume of male-male killings. Verkko observed that

when homicide rates are high, the proportion of female victims tends to be low,

and vice versa. Spierenberg (2012) also highlights the gendered nature of

homicide trends, with high homicide rates characterised by high levels of male-

male homicide: ‘whenever and wherever homicide rates are high, this high level

nearly always results from a prevalence of fighting among men’ (p.32).

Eisner’s (2001, 2008) work has led contemporary understandings of the long-

term decline in homicide, and emphasised the importance of interpreting

homicide trends in context with social and cultural history. Despite broadly

supporting Elias’ model, Eisner also found contradictory evidence, including a

continuing decline in the homicide rate in England following the Glorious

Revolution of 1688, which challenged the monarchic absolutism and ought to

(according to Eliasian theory) have led to a subsequent rise in homicide rates:

‘these examples suggest that the dynamics of internal pacification do not depend

exclusively upon the absolutist social figuration emphasised by Elias’ (Eisner,

2001: 631). Eisner (2001, 2008) argued that the increase in state power was

insufficient in explaining the long-term decrease in homicide, and other cultural

developments must also be taken into account, including the increase in religion,

expansion of education, and a disciplining process associated with capitalism

(Eisner, 2001). He contended that, combined with the increase of state power,

6

these social changes led to increased self-control and laid the groundwork for ‘a

more orderly conduct of life’ (p.631).

In considering the more recent decline in homicide, Eisner (2008) argues against

country-level explanations, highlighting that they are insufficient in explaining

the consistency of the homicide decline across countries with heterogeneous

policies and economies. He again emphasises the importance of culture as ‘the

only phenomenon that travels fast enough to affect such vast areas roughly

simultaneously’ (2008: 311). Eisner (2008) suggests that, given that changes in

homicide rates are largely driven by variations in the volume of male-male

killings in public spaces, explanations need to focus on lifestyle, or the ‘conduct

of life’ of these men, and examine how homicide trends link to ‘change in norms

and expectations about how young men interact in public space’ (p.312).

According to cultural theories of homicide decline then, the decline in homicide

across much of the western world from the early-mid 1990s derived from

cultural changes affecting countries with similar norms and values, culminating

in a reduction in the number of male-male killings in public spaces. The

continuing increase in homicide numbers in England and Wales for another

decade presents a quandary for this perspective, given that it has historically

followed similar trends to other parts of the Western world, and shares many

similar cultural characteristics to countries where the decline began in the

1990s. In light of this, two key questions addressed in the analysis below are

first, the extent to which the latterly decline in homicide numbers in England and

Wales has been driven by a reduction in male-male killings, and secondly, has the

decline been driven by a reduction of homicides in public spaces?

Changes in lifestyles, routines and opportunities for fatal violence

Alternative explanations for the decline in homicide may be broadly considered

under the umbrella of routine activity theories, given that rather than focusing

on culture, they refer to macro and micro level factors that in some way serve to

facilitate or reduce the likelihood of fatal violence occurring. Many of these

explanations have focused on country-specific factors, such as changes in

7

population, economic trends, the legalisation of abortion, and the banning of lead

paint/fuel (Lehti, 2014). Indeed, Lehti (2014) emphasises the importance of

analysing country-specific trends in homicide and disaggregating homicide to

enable a nuanced understanding of ‘what kind of persons are dying, and in what

contexts they are dying and who are killing them’ (p.189). He reports that while

in some countries (Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland) the decrease was

observed across all major subtypes of homicide, the decline in other countries

(Sweden, Italy, Germany) was driven by a decrease in expressive homicides.

Lehti’s (2014) analysis of the homicide drop in Finland revealed that the decline

was mainly observed in male-male alcohol-related killings, and that there were

counter-trends in certain subtypes of homicide, including those involving young

female perpetrators. These counter-trends may be masked in aggregate level

analyses of homicide rates, and provide support for approaches focusing on

nation-specific, disaggregated homicide data.

Similarly, Aebi and Linde (2014) criticise theories based on assumptions of

homogeneity across Western countries (for example, in economic terms), and

associate the downward trend (like the upward trend in the late 20th century)

with changes in youth lifestyle and opportunities, brought about by changes in

social control, increased security, and the proliferation of the internet, which has

led to young people spending more time indoors. They also highlight that despite

numbers of male victims driving overall homicide trends, WHO data show that

from the mid-1960s, the number of female victims also increased (and

subsequently decreased) proportionately to the changes observed in male

victims. Moving away from Eisner’s (2008) account of the recent changes in

homicide, they conclude that ‘any explanations of the trends observed must

identify factors that have an influence on the victimization of both genders’ (Aebi

and Linde, 2014: 568).

One such explanation is the development of technology. The digital age has

brought along with it an increasing tendency to socialise online, which has

changed the social culture of many countries. The emergence and proliferation of

the internet since the mid-1990s has led to many young people spending large

8

amounts of time in private spaces, rather than socialising in public spaces (Aebi

and Linde, 2010). Additionally, the expansion of the dark web has led to the

introduction of cryptomarkets, which have to a certain extent reduced the

volume of face to face risky transactions (for example, surrounding firearm and

drug markets) and replaced them with less violent and conflict-ridden online

transactions (Morselli et al., 2017). It may be then, that certain subtypes of

homicide (i.e. public homicides involving young people, and those resulting from

firearm/drug-dealing conflicts) have declined as the use of the internet has

grown.

Another potential explanation for the decline in particular subtypes of homicide

is the effects of criminal justice policies. Indeed, the drop in the homicide rate in

North America, which was accompanied by a broader decline in violent and

property crimes, coincided with punitive criminal justice policies. Many

commentators accredited the zero-tolerance style policing introduced by Mayor

Guilliani of New York in the mid-1990s, although others explained the decline as

a result of the stabilising and declining crack cocaine market which had exploded

in the late 1980s and correlated with the late 1980s/early 1990s spike in

homicide rates across the US (Baumer et al., 1998; Blumstein et al., 2000;

Bowling, 1999).

In England and Wales, a similar zero-tolerance style of policing was introduced

in the late 1990s by the ‘New Labour’ government (Newburn and Jones, 2007),

approximately five years prior to the decline in homicide beginning in this

country. There were also a number of criminal justice interventions deliberately

implemented to reduce the number of homicides, following Brookman and

Maguire’s (2005) Home Office-funded research into the possibilities for reducing

homicide. Measures included staggering the closing times of pubs and clubs (to

avoid mass exodus), greater police presence in known hot spots, and greater use

of plastic glasses. Contemporaneously, CCTV has become increasingly

widespread, adding to the melting pot of situational crime prevention aimed at

reducing public crime and disorder (Zedner, 2007).

9

As the risk of terror attacks has become omnipresent, security through

surveillance and other forms of situational crime prevention have increased,

alongside developments in emergency service provision in high-risk areas

(Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Zedner, 2007). Hence, it is plausible that the homicide

drop in England and Wales has been driven to an extent by changes in ‘pre-

crime’ criminal justice policies (Zedner, 2007) that have served to reduce public

disorder and (fatal) violence. Criminologists trying to explain the more general

‘crime drop’ in England and Wales from the 1990s have posited the ‘security

hypothesis’ (Reiner, 2016) as one of the most plausible explanations for falls in

non-violent crime (such as property crime); however, the mass expansion of

technology and security has not been considered as a potential explanation for

falls in homicide. This is explored in the analysis below through examining the

location and circumstances of homicides.

Finally, advances in medical technology may have contributed to the reduction of

lethal violence. In recent years, there have been significant improvements in

emergency service response times, treatment, life support, and trauma response

(Harris et al. 2002), rendering serious assaults less likely to result in loss of life

(remaining ‘assaults’ rather than ‘homicides’). If homicide rates decline whilst

non-fatal assaults incline, one potential explanation is that fewer assaults are

leading to a homicide. This supports Lehti’s (2014) reminder of the importance

in analysing changes in homicide trends alongside trends in non-lethal violence,

as this provides a more accurate insight into changes in violent behaviour. The

recent decline in homicide observed across North America and Eastern Europe

was contextualised by a more general crime drop, however, in other areas in

Europe it was not. Lehti (2014) argues that a drop in homicide accompanied by a

drop in non-fatal violence proffers support for cultural explanations; whilst a

decline in homicide with no accompanying decline in general violence indicates

alternative explanations. This is explored in the analysis below through a

consideration of concurrent non-lethal violent trends in England and Wales

during the period of homicide decline. Equally, it is important to note that

increased sensitisation to violence could lead to fewer homicides alongside a

parallel increase in non-fatal violence - as people become more sensitive to

10

violence, the volume of petty violent incidents reported to the police may

increase, and inflate the number of violent offences via effective net widening.

The above review of literature on international homicide trends paints a

conflicting picture. On the one hand, simultaneous trends in aggregate homicide

levels across much of the Western world indicate culture as the predominant

explanation, given its ability to transgress national borders, country specific

economies and policies. On the other hand, analyses focusing on disaggregated,

national-level homicide trends, and examining homicide in context with broader

violence and crime patterns suggest that there are subtle differences in the

nature of country-specific trends. This may indicate a variety of driving forces

behind fluctuating homicide rates, including changes in routine activities, social

and criminal justice policies, and advances in medical technology (Aebi and

Linde, 2014; Lehti, 2014), all of which reduce the opportunity and likelihood of

fatal violence.

There is unquestionable merit in analysing national level homicide trends, and

disaggregating homicide in order to ascertain the types of individuals and

homicides driving change. In light of the diversion between the recent homicide

trend in England and Wales and other areas across the Western world, it is

particularly important to examine the nuances of the trend here, and contribute

to international theory on the most recent decline.

Homicide trends in England and Wales

The focus here is on understanding the recent decline in homicide in England

and Wales in context with dominant theories on homicide decline, rather than

explaining homicide per se.2 Homicide numbers in England and Wales have

historically been comparatively low and the homicide rate remains one of the

lowest in the world (Brookman, 2017) - the most recent figures indicate a rate of

12 per million population3 (ONS, 2019). Nonetheless, overall trends in England

2 For a full discussion of explanations of homicide in England and Wales, see Brookman (2005; 2017); and for overviews of the characteristics of homicide in England and Wales, see Brookman (2017) or Soothill and Francis (2012).3 Excluding the 96 Hillsborough victims of 1989.

11

and Wales have tracked closely alongside trends in other developed countries

(Brookman, 2017; Eisner, 2001, 2008; Gurr, 1981; Soothill and Francis, 2012),

steadily decreasing from the middle ages until the 1960s, before rising for

approximately four decades before peaking in 2004 and subsequently declining

until 2014. The analysis below covers the period from 1st April 2003

(immediately prior to the peak in rates) to 31st March 2015, just after the rate

had begun to rise again, at the same time as an upward trend has been witnessed

across many European countries (ONS, 2019) and US states (Rosenfeld, 2016).

Methods

Homicide data in England and Wales is recorded in the Home Office owned

Homicide Index (HI), which collates data from the 43 police forces and

documents details of the suspect and victim demographics as well as victim-

perpetrator relationship, incident characteristics and court outcomes. HI data

are considered to be some of the most detailed and robust data on homicide in

the world and are designated official statistics on homicide in England and Wales

(ONS, 2019). However, the database is not infallible, and is subject to missing

data, especially for multiple suspects and victims. The data are also subject to a

degree of inconsistency across forces, and some variables in the Index have been

documented as particularly prone to inaccuracy, for example, intoxication by

alcohol and/or drugs appears to be significantly under-recorded (Miles, 2012).

Despite these limitations, the Index still provides a good indication of long-term

patterns and changes over time. There have been a number of changes to

recording practices over the years, most recently following a review in 2000

(Moxon, 2001), which led to a number of changes being implemented and

improvements in recording practices (reflected in the data from 2007 onwards).

For this reason, the findings for some variables below (including intoxication)

are only based upon data from 2007 onwards, due to a large amount of missing

data prior to these changes.

The data on which the analysis below was conducted were obtained from the

Home Office in an anonymous excel spread sheet and converted into an SPSS

database for the purposes of analysis. Some of the analyses were also conducted

12

using R statistical software. A data cleaning process removed all erroneous and

duplicate data held within the raw database. This included removing all

homicides that had occurred prior to 1st April 2003 (homicides appear on the

database on the date when they are recorded by the police rather than the date

they occur); removing all cases ‘no longer recorded as homicide’ (for example,

incidents initially recorded as homicide but subsequently reclassified as suicide

or accidental death); and finally, removing three sets of data pertaining to unique

events involving multiple victims that would potentially skew the analyses. This

included removing all of the 52 London bombing victims who were killed on the

7th July 2005; 20 Morecambe Bay drowning victims, who were killed on the 5 th

May 2004; and 12 Cumbria shooting victims, who were killed on the 2nd June

2010.

Following this, there were a total of 11,264 observations, or rows of homicides in

the database. However, this included a large amount of duplicate data as the

database contained individual rows for each homicide victim and suspect. For

homicide events involving 5 victims, this meant that the suspect data would be

repeated 5 times, and similarly, for homicides involving only 1 victim but

multiple suspects, there would be a separate row for each suspect, duplicating

the victim data for each suspect row. To overcome this, three versions of the

database were created: a ‘suspect database’, containing a single observation for

each homicide suspect (excluding multiple victim data); a ‘victim database’,

containing a single observation for each victim (excluding multiple suspect data);

and an ‘event database’, containing a single observation for each homicide event

(excluding multiple victim and suspect data). The three respective databases

consisted of 7,462 unique homicide suspects4; 8,038 unique victims; and 7,770

homicide events. In the analyses below, suspect-based analyses were conducted

using the ‘suspect database’, victim-based analyses were conducted using the

‘victim database’, and event-analyses were conducted using the ‘event database’.

Findings

Figure 1 about here

4 There were 2,744 homicide victims for which there was no suspect data recorded in the Index.

13

As Figure 1 illustrates, the homicide rate in England and Wales began to decline

beginning in 20045, and continued to do so at a steady rate until 2014, when it

began to rise again. During this period, the homicide rate decreased from a high

of 14.38 per 1 million in the population to a low of 8.45. Through disaggregating

the homicide rate by geographic region (based upon police force area), it is clear

that the downward trend was driven by declines in particular regions, most

notably Greater London, the North West, and closely followed by the West

Midlands. Other areas, such as East Anglia and the South West, have seen

relatively stable (comparatively low) homicide rates throughout the period of

decline.

Figure 2 about here

In terms of the homicide location, the Index records whether the incident took

place in a public or private space, and what type of space. Due to changes in

recording procedures, the quality of data on homicide location improved

significantly from approximately 2007. As Figure 2 illustrates, prior to this the

majority of homicides were categorised as occurring in an ‘unknown location’.

This chart also shows a shift in the proportion of total homicide occurring in each

type of space; from 2007 to 2015, an increasing percentage of all homicides

occurred in residential locations. The line chart focusing on homicide rates in

each general location from 2007 onwards (Figure 3) illustrates variations in the

decline of homicides occurring in public and residential spaces. The rate of

homicides in public areas declined consistently until 2011 then remained

stagnate at about 3 homicides per million for the next three years, rising again

when the overall homicide rate increased in 2015.

A more detailed analysis of the locations of homicides revealed the rate of

victims killed in a ‘house or dwelling’ peaked in 2010 (0.62 homicides per

million), declined until 2014, and then began increasing again concomitantly

5 Analysis presented throughout refer to financial years (the period from the 1st April to the 31st March of each year). For brevity, they are referred to using the calendar year that dominates the given period. For instance, the 2004/2005 financial year is referred to as 2004.

14

with the overall homicide rate. Rates of those killed in a ‘street, footpath or

alleyway’ declined until 2012, reaching a low of 0.14 homicides per million

before starting to rise. Additionally, the rates of homicides in ‘open spaces’ or

around ‘licensed premises’ approximately halved from 2007 to 2015 (from 0.12

to 0.048 per million and from 0.098 to 0.46 per million, respectively).

Figure 3 about here

These findings indicate a subtle change in the nature of homicide over the period

of decline, with a reduction in homicide incidents in public and the overspill

areas of pubs and clubs. In 2007, a homicide resulting from a ‘fight, brawl, etc.’

was the most prevalent recorded circumstance (4 homicides per million). This

dropped to a low of 1.7 per million in 2014, representing the steepest decline of

any homicide circumstance, before beginning to rise again in 2015 (up to 2.36

per million). Homicides occurring in the course of another crime (such as a

robbery) also declined from 1.03 per million down to 0.63 per million in 2015.

Figure 4 about here

Corresponding to the decline in homicides occurring in public spaces, and those

involving fights and brawls, there was also a significant decline in the role of

drugs and alcohol as factors in homicides. Figure 4 shows the change in rates of

suspects and victims who were recorded as under the influence of alcohol, drugs,

or both at the time of the homicide. Rates of alcohol intoxication have fallen

dramatically for both victims and suspects, however for victims there have been

periods of increases in alcohol as a factor (from 2009 to 2011 and again after

2013) whereas this has been a consistent drop among homicide suspects. Rates

of illicit drug use or a combination of drugs and alcohol use among victims and

suspects at the time of the homicide have remained low and fairly consistent.

The analysis of method of homicides over time painted a more complex picture.

The rates of homicides involving shootings (firearms, crossbow) declined

substantially from a high rate of 1.37 per million in 2004 down to a low of 0.36

15

per million in 2014. There were also slight decreases in homicides involving a

blunt instrument (from a high of 1.34 per million in 2003 to a low point of 0.66 in

2013) and homicides by fire (peaking at 0.68 per million in 2004 and declining to

0.16 in 2014). Interestingly, rates of homicides involving some kind of beating

(hitting or kicking without a weapon, or causing to fall) increased until 2007 to

2.94 per million, and subsequently decreased until 2011 before beginning to rise

again. Homicides caused by sharp instruments also fluctuated during this period,

increasing to a high of 5 homicides per million in 2007 and then varying

annually, reaching a low of 3.2 per million in 2014.

Analysis of the victim-suspect relationship also failed to provide insight into

what underpinned the decline in homicide. The rates of homicides within several

categories reduced during the overall decline period of 2004 to 2014. For

example, acquaintance homicides declined from 4.47 per million to 2.28;

stranger homicides declined from 2.47 to 1.30; homicides involving current or

ex-partners declined from 2.28 to 1.65. However, for all categories there were

fluctuations from year to year; there were no discernible drops in any one

category, suggesting there has not been a marked change in the relationships

between homicide victims and suspects.

A key question of this analysis was the extent to which the overall drop in

homicide rates was driven by a reduction in male-male killing. When calculated

as percentages of overall homicides, the relative proportions of male and female

victim and suspects remained stable, with females consistently accounting for

around 30% of victims and 9% of suspects. However, when factoring in changes

in the overall population, it is clear that male-male homicides were

overwhelmingly driving the overall decline in England and Wales: Figure 5

displays the rates of male and female suspects and victims per million in the

population, illustrating that the rate of male suspects actually dropped nearly

63% from 2004 to 2015, and the rate of male victims decreased by 50% over this

period. However, the rates of female suspects and victims remained relatively

constant throughout the period of decline in homicides.

16

The analysis of suspect and victim ethnicity is dictated by fairly crude categories

that do not necessarily reflect the complexity of ethnicity and, for suspects, the

data is based upon self-classification. Notwithstanding this, the analysis revealed

that overall, the ethnicity proportions of both suspects and victims has remained

stable over the period of decline; whites making up approximately two thirds of

suspects and three quarters of victims.

Finally, the analysis of changes in suspect and victim characteristics over time

illustrated that the although the gap in median age of victims and suspects has

remained stable, with victims usually 7 or 8 years older than suspects; the

median age for both homicide suspects and victims has increased (Figure 6). 6

This indicates that the demographics of those involved in homicides have shifted

slightly; these events are not a phenomena limited to the ‘young’.

Figure 6 about here

The analyses presented above demonstrate the importance of looking beyond

aggregate homicide rates, in order to reveal subtle patterns in the disaggregated

data that allow the overall rate to be unpicked. In so doing, it appears that

although the decline between 2004 and 2014 was observed across a number of

homicide categories, it was particularly apparent in homicides involving young

intoxicated men, in public spaces. It also revealed that the steepest decline

occurred in Greater London, followed by other large cities. In order to further

examine this aspect of the decline, further analyses were conducted focusing

only on Greater London. The most noteworthy findings pertain to methods of

homicide, shedding some light on what drove the national picture during this

time.

Figure 7 about here

6 Although the age structure of the population in England and Wales is increasing, this increase in age of homicide suspects/victims is not consistent with these changes, which are more subtle and long-term. Recent figures from the Office for National Statistics (2019b) report that between 1998 and 2018, the proportion of the population aged 16-64 decreased from 63.6% to 62.7%, as the proportion of the population aged 65 and over has increased.

17

Figure 8 about here

As Figure 7 illustrates, during the period of decline, methods of homicide in

Greater London decreased across nearly every category, with the sharpest

decline observed in the rate of sharp instrument homicides. The rate of sharp

instrument homicide remains consistently higher for Greater London compared

to national levels (see Figure 8), and undoubtedly impacts upon national

patterns at the aggregate level. Between 2004 and 2014, the national rate

excluding Greater London decreased steadily, from a high of 4.3 homicides per

million to a low of 2.5 in 2014. In London however, rates of sharp instrument

homicide peaked in 2007 (driving a national level peak) and subsequently

experienced a major drop of 40% by 2009. Since then, there have been marginal

changes, however the rising numbers of fatal knife assaults in recent years,

which have been widely reported and the subject of much concern, are to a large

extent, on par with the concomitant population growth in London. Calculated as

a rate, sharp instrument homicides in London (and nationally) have actually

dropped considerably since the mid-2000s. Additionally, the rate of shootings in

London decreased from approximately 3.1 per million to 1 per million, and

similarly, the rates of homicides involving a blunt instrument dropped from 2.8

to 0.8 per million. The rates of homicides involving some form of beating

(hitting/kicking with no weapon, causing to fall) peaked in 2008 and have not

substantially altered since 2003.

While it is true that the rates of sharp instrument homicides in London decreased

between 2007 and 2014, it is interesting to note that the percentage of homicides

involving a sharp instrument increased from accounting for 34% of all homicides

in London in 2003, to 52% in 2015. In other words, within the broader context of

declining homicide (including those involving knives), fatal knife violence, in

London especially, has become the predominant method of homicide. This

finding is crucial in context with the current increase in homicides involving

knives that has been widely reported since the turn of 2015. Crucially, although

proportionally, knife-related homicides have been increasing, when calculated as

18

rates within the growing population, people are actually safer from knife crime

now than they were in 2007.

Discussion: Understanding the homicide drop in England and Wales

The homicide rate in England and Wales diminished steadily from its peak in

2004 to the year ending April 2014, when the rate began to increase again.

Importantly, this decline transgressed a period of economic boom and the

subsequent economic crisis (from 2007), which has been followed by long-term

recession, austerity and well-documented cuts to welfare and public services,

including the police force (Millie, 2014). This context raises questions about

economic and political theories of homicide trends (e.g. Currie, 1997; Hall and

McLean, 2009; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1999), although the current increase in

homicide in England and Wales has recently been theoretically attributed to the

social impact of austerity and neoliberalism (Ellis, 2019).

The homicide drop in England and Wales also began a decade later than in other

areas of the Western world, presenting a challenge to dominant theories.

According to popular cultural theories, changes in homicide simultaneously

occurring across developed countries are best explained by changes in culture

(Elias, 1994 [1939]; Eisner, 2001; 2008), particularly affecting the regulation of

young men in public spaces. It is unclear how the divergent trend witnessed in

England and Wales for approximately ten years is accounted for within such an

approach, given that it conceptually (and historically) belongs to the same group

of countries that share similar cultural trends. This reinforces the need for cross-

cultural and disaggregated homicide analyses, in order to develop country-

specific understandings of homicide trends.

The findings presented above illustrate that the decline in homicide numbers

observed across England and Wales was broad in the sense that there were

decreases in rates across many types of suspect/victim relationships and

demographic attributes, methods, locations, regions, and circumstances; but also

specific in that certain subtypes of homicide decreased more substantially than

others. The decline was most apparent in metropolitan areas (especially Greater

19

London and Greater Manchester), in homicides occurring in public places, in

homicides deriving from ‘fights and brawls’ and around licenced areas, in

homicide events involving intoxicated (by alcohol) suspects and victims, and in

homicides involving younger, male, suspects and victims. This indicates that a

reduction in fatal assaults arising from young men engaging in violence outside

pubs and clubs after consuming alcohol has, to a certain extent, driven the

decline.

Eisner (2001, 2008) argues that changes in homicide rates are explained by

changes in ‘conduct of life’, pertaining to expectations and moral codes

surrounding young men and their behaviour in public spaces. These findings

offer support to this theory, given the apparent decline of male-male homicides

occurring in public spaces and involving alcohol intoxication, which are also

contextualised by a concurrent decline in drinking for those aged 16-24 years

between 2005 and 2017 (ONS, 2018). However, rather than supporting cultural

change per se, or indeed Elias’ (1994 [1939]) concept of cultural pacification; the

findings also corroborate Aebi and Linde’s (2010; 2014) argument that homicide

changes are driven by more specific changes in lifestyle, norms and routine

activities (such as less frequent drinking in public places, increased socialising in

private, etc.).

This is further supported by the dominance of Greater London and Greater

Manchester (and to some extent, the West Midlands) in the decline, which

indicates something particular about these areas and their inhabitants. As

discussed earlier, since the turn of the century policing and criminal justice

policies have sought to reduce public disorder and crime, including zero

tolerance policing, problem-oriented policing, and situational crime prevention;

alongside specific policies aimed at homicide reduction and prevention

(recommended by Brookman and Maguire, 2005). Combined with this, the

increasing magnitude of the terror threat and accompanying focus on security

and ‘pre-crime’ measures (Zedner, 2007) has enhanced both levels of

surveillance and the capacity for emergency services to respond to incidents.

Concurrently, advances in medical technology and trauma response have

20

improved fatality rates (Harris et al., 2002). The effects of such measures are

likely to be more acute in urban areas identified as high-risk (in terms of levels of

violence/homicide and terror threats). It may be then, that a combination of

changes in lifestyle, physical and social environment, targeted criminal justice

policy and emergency responses to potentially lethal violent incidents effected a

reduction in lethal violence resulting from public, alcohol-related assaults

involving young men. This would also explain the increase in the proportion of

homicides taking place in private spaces, which have not been the focus of

security policies, would not have necessarily benefited from enhancements in

emergency service responses, and where more socialisation now takes place.

What remains unclear is how the more recent (2014-2018) increase in the

homicide rate fits in with such an explanation. Crime prevention and criminal

justice policies did not suddenly lapse, indeed, security measures and levels of

surveillance have never been higher. Furthermore, the recent upturn in homicide

challenges explanations of decline based on advances in medical technology.

(Aebi and Linde, 2014; Harris et al., 2002; Lehti, 2014). In the absence of

disaggregated homicide data for the past four years it is only possible to

speculate (and draw upon public reports) at this time that the current increase is

specific to a particular subtype of homicide, which appears to be fatal knife

attacks involving young men; tentatively linked to the increase in violence

associated with county lines7 and the long-term effects of austerity on vulnerable

young people (Ellis, 2019; Townsend, 2019; Younge, 2018).

The importance of disaggregating data not only by country, but by demographics

and contextual circumstances, is aptly demonstrated by the analyses focusing on

Greater London. Disaggregating the decline in homicide by geographical area

revealed that the overall decrease witnessed across England and Wales was

largely driven by a reduction in homicide numbers in London (followed by other

metropolitan areas), despite the growing population levels. Crucially, the

7 ‘County lines’ is the term used to describe a form of organized crime involving city drug dealers expanding their business to smaller, rural areas, and using child exploitation to run drugs and violence and to drive other drug dealers out of town. For further information see: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/drug-trafficking/county-lines

21

proportion of homicides in Greater London involving knives (and young males)

experienced a steady increase throughout the period of decline, however the

rates by population of knife-related homicide witnessed a dramatic drop

between 2007 and 2009, before stabilising. Focusing on aggregate rates of

homicide, and on proportions rather than rates then, can be misleading, as

evidenced by the media reporting of knife-homicide over the past five years.

Rather, the important question ought to be why, in the context of declining

numbers of homicides, are a growing proportion of illegal killings conducted

using knives?

Finally, an important question concerns whether there has been a more general

decrease in violence alongside the decline in homicide. The broader landscape of

non-lethal violence has been found to vary across other parts of Europe (Lehti,

2014) and is essential in understanding the full context of homicide trends.

Official statistics on non-fatal violent crime in England and Wales are reported by

the Office for National Statistics (ONS), who report on police recorded offences

and the annual Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW).

The latest report on violent crime indicates that alongside the decline in

homicide, forms of non-fatal violence have also witnessed a long-term steady

decline. The number of violent offences estimated by the CSEW peaked in 1995

at 3.8 million, and there has subsequently been a statistically significant 68%

reduction to 1.4 million violent offences estimated in the year ending March

2018 (ONS, 2019a). These figures suggest that violent crime as a whole declined

throughout the period of decline in homicide numbers, and thus refute the idea

that medical advances may explain a reduction in fatal assaults (one would

expect to see an increase in non-fatal violence if this was the case).

Importantly however, according to Walby et al. (2016), applying a ‘new

methodology’ to CSEW data whereby the cap on repeat victimisation is removed,

overall figures for violence indicate that it has been rising rather than decreasing

since 2009. This analysis revealed that violence against women and domestic

violence against women in particular has been rising since 2009. Violent crime

against men (overall) has been falling, however, domestic violence against men

22

has also been increasing since 2009. These findings not only reiterate the

importance of methodology and of disaggregating violence data, but also have

implications for the findings in this analysis. First, these figures suggest that the

decrease in homicide may not be wholly contextualised by a broader decline in

general violence, as would be expected by proponents of cultural theories.

Notwithstanding this, the fact that violence against men has been declining

supports both cultural theories and those based around changes in lifestyle and

routine activity theories (e.g. Eisner, 2001, 2008; Aebi and Linde, 2014).

Secondly, the enhancement of medical technology and emergency service

provision may be serving to reduce the number of homicides but simultaneously

leading to the inflation of non-fatal violent events. And thirdly, it may be that

factors serving to prevent ‘public’ homicide (such as criminal justice policies) are

leading to an increase in more private forms of violence and homicide, which ties

in with the observed increases in domestic violence (towards men and women)

reported by Walby et al. (2016) and the observed increase in proportions of

homicides occurring in private spaces.

Conclusion

Overall, a complex picture emerges. On the one hand, the most recent homicide

drop in England and Wales appears to have been general in that it is observable

across all categories. On the other hand, the patterns emerging through

disaggregated analysis of homicide data reveal that some subtypes of homicide

decreased more substantially than others, and point to one particular subtype of

homicide as a key driver in the decline – fatal assaults involving intoxicated

young men, in public spaces, deriving from fights and brawls. Crucially, the

decline has been much more apparent in metropolitan cities, with Greater

London experiencing the most dramatic decline in numbers, and importantly, a

reduction in the rate of homicide per population. Within the context of this

decline, the proportions of certain types of homicide have increased, including

those occurring in private spaces, and homicides involving knives.

23

The findings proffer little support for Elias’ (1994 [1939]) Civilizing Theory,

under which one might expect to observe a much more general and continuing

decline in homicide. Clearly, cultural norms and expectations of behaviour are

important, and to this extent, the findings resonate with Eisner’s (2001, 2008)

concept of ‘conduct of life’. However, the findings also indicate factors beyond

changes in cultural norms as key in explaining the decline in homicide. Rather

(or in combination with cultural explanations), the analysis revealed patterns

broadly supporting Aebi and Linde’s (2014) integration of lifestyle theory with

routine activities; that is, the findings indicate that a plethora of social and

criminal justice policies (including those aimed specifically at public forms of

homicide), lifestyle changes (brought about by cultural change but also major

advances in technology) and advances in emergency service and medical

responses may have combined to reduce the opportunities for fatal assaults.

To add to the complexity, the more recent increase in homicide in England and

Wales, recorded between 2014 and 2018, challenges this and other dominant

explanations of homicide decline. It also highlights the need to disaggregate

homicide into subtypes – as Brookman (2005; 2017) contends, different forms of

homicide demand different explanations – and so do trends in particular

subtypes. Although the absolute numbers and rates of knife-related homicide

decreased substantially during the period of decline, the proportion of all

homicides involving knives has increased. The implications are positive on the

one hand, indicating that media reports may have over-exaggerated the risk of

knife-violence. However, on the other hand, the predominance of knives as a

method of homicide (calculated as a percentage of the total) justifies an ongoing

focus on tackling knife-crime. Despite the limited data available on the 2014-

2018 increase, it appears that knives may be a driving factor, which would fit

with the findings reported here. There is plausible argument developing that the

increase may be linked to County Lines violence (Townsend, 2019) and a result

of the inevitable social implications of the expansion of neoliberalism and long-

term austerity witnessed in England and Wales since the economic crash in 2007

(Ellis, 2019). However, it is essential for further research to focus particularly on

the micro and macro dynamics of this subtype of homicide and the individuals

24

involved, in order to fully understand the context of fatal knife crime and develop

effective prevention strategies.

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Figures

Figure 1: Overall England and Wales Homicide Rate, 2003-2015

Figure 2: Homicide Location, 2003-2015

30

Figure 3: Homicide Location, 2007-2015

Figure 4: Drugs and Alcohol Intoxication for Suspects and Victims, 2007-2015

31

Figure 5: Gender of Suspects and Victims, 2003 to 2015

Figure 6: Median Age of Suspects and Victims, 2003-2015

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Figure 7: Method of Homicide in London, 2003 to 2015

Figure 8: Sharp Instrument Homicides: London compared to England & Wales

33