Volume 1 14 Risk Uncertainty in 2010 Dec 21 2009

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    BOECKHINVESTMENTSINC.,17501002SHERBROOKESTREETWEST,MONTREAL,QUEBEC.H3A3L6TEL.5149040551,[email protected]

    VOLUME 1.14

    DECEMBER21,2009

    There have been five overriding themes for

    our investment letters during the past year.

    Below we list and review them.

    1) Expanding liquidity drives financial

    markets, particularly when it occurs in the

    face of a sub-par but recovering economy

    and weak price inflation. This is the sweet

    spot in the cycle we so often talk about, and

    it is the best of all times for stock and

    corporate bond prices when perception of

    risk abates.

    2) The Great Reflation underway since

    late 2008 has done its first job - aborted

    what surely would have been a full scale

    depression at least on the scale of the 1930s.

    That was Act I.

    3) No one should believe that the huge

    reflation underway will make the economy

    and financial system whole again. The

    private sector debt excesses were far greater

    by 2008 than they were in 1929. A good part

    of the reflation effort is to transform private

    debt into public debt, and this will surely

    create another, different debt monster. As

    the year draws to a close, credit rating

    agencies are starting to downgrade

    sovereign debt and credit default swaps

    (CDSs) and are showing increased concern

    that some major developed countries are

    going to have problems servicing their debt

    (e.g. Japan, U.S., etc.).

    The markets are starting to tell us that

    Governments with brittle, over-extended

    fiscal positions will soon have to put in

    place credible fiscal consolidation -- tax

    increases, expenditure cuts, decline in

    services, etc. This means more deflation,

    more uncertainty.

    RISK & UNCERTAINTY IN 2010:

    Hopefully Some Return Too

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    4) Zero interest rates in the U.S. together

    with Federal Reserve asset purchases, much of

    it low quality, has done its job of inflating asset

    prices which improves balance sheets. Better

    financial markets greatly help capital raising

    ability, further strengthening balance sheets.

    As a result, they are much improved. The

    question is over sustainability. Fears of

    renewed asset bubbles have surfaced,

    complicating Fed and other central bank

    decision making. Do they risk tightening too

    soon or too late? Does a middle ground exist?

    Zero interest rates are an extreme anomaly and

    cannot last unless the U.S. economy remains

    permanently depressed and in deflation like

    Japan has been for 20 years. This seems

    unlikely but cannot be ruled out.

    5) The great flaw in the international

    monetary system has allowed the U.S. - the

    key reserve currency country in the world - to

    run up a $4 trillion tab with foreign central

    banks and has created excess liquidity and

    asset bubbles in countries buying those dollars.

    It has also contributed mightily to the

    destruction of savings and investment in the

    U.S., and has created massive disequilibria in

    the global economy and financial system.

    Economics 101 tells us clearly that all

    disequilibria eventually get corrected. The

    interesting questions are how and when? That

    will be the story for Act II of the drama and it

    hasnt been written yet.

    As the year 2009 draws to a close, there

    is clearly an aura of unreality. We barely

    survived a near-death experience nine months

    ago. However, the pain and the fear for most

    people were brief. It was not like the 10-year

    depression in the 1930s that changed attitudes

    for two generations. The recent experience

    probably won't change many peoples' attitudes

    at all, and may even have a perverse, moral

    hazard effect. If the U.S. and other

    governments are always going to bail out the

    banks and other over-indebted, overleveraged,

    reckless players, and stick the costs onto the

    sober and prudent, why not join the former? As

    Mark Whitehouse put it in a recent article,

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    "Let's default and go to Disneyland - the

    American dream - default and then rent."

    The music is playing again, people are

    up on the dance floor and the bankers

    (somewhat diminished in numbers) are getting

    rich once more and raising tens of billions of

    dollars in equity on the much-improved stock

    market to pay off their TARP loans so they can

    pay out mega bonuses. Meanwhile, the banks

    are sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars of

    bad loans with more to come (default lags can

    be long).

    The question for investors is - do you

    get up on the dance floor like everyone else

    and pretend that the crash was a bad dream?

    Or, do you pay attention to the unresolved

    problems, do a little dancing, but be ready to

    grab a chair when the music stops?

    A key point we have been making all

    year and will continue to do, is that the stock

    market in March 2009 met most of the criteria

    for a durable bottom. These were: good

    valuations, massive fear, very expansionary

    monetary policy and government through

    intervention, bailouts, and stimulus etc. to do

    whatever it takes to put air back in the burst

    balloon. Simply put, the government took the

    downside out of the economy and risk assets.

    The odds were very high that the

    market environment would be good for some

    time and it has stayed that way. However, the

    so-called fundamentals are very artificial - the

    stimulus, the subsidies (first-time home buyers,

    cash for clunkers, moratorium on foreclosures,

    etc.), the zero interest rates - none of that can

    last.

    A second key point we have been

    emphasizing is that no one knows what the

    underlying economic conditions are really like,

    and more important, what they will look like in

    6-12 months. No one knows how sensitive the

    still over leveraged economy is to a rise in

    interest rates. No one knows how long nervous

    foreign central banks will keep buying dollars.

    No one knows whether the recovery in asset

    prices might morph into a full-blown asset

    bubble. Or the reverse. No one knows when

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    sharply rising government debt: GDP ratios

    will hit the wall, as in the case of Greece.

    No one knows how much debt is too

    much. The private sector debt super cycle went

    through a process of steadily rising over 25

    years to reach 170% of GDP. All along the

    way, the same questions were being asked -

    how much is too much? The answer was: a lot

    more than most people thought. But when you

    get to the end, they dont ring a bell to give

    you a warning. Think of the elastic band

    analogy. You keep stretching it; it weakens

    gradually until a certain point. Along comes

    a shock and it snaps. That happened in 2008

    with the private debt structure. It will happen

    with the government debt if a credible plan is

    not put in place to bring it under control, but no

    one has any idea of when. It probably won't be

    for quite a while, but no one will give you a

    written guarantee.

    A third key point we strongly believe is

    that there is no long term any more for

    investors. It is totally inappropriate in this

    environment to think in terms of point

    estimates -- how high the stock market might

    go and how long it will keep rising. Estimates

    of numbers and time are useless and, in this

    highly uncertain world, no one should believe

    such forecasts.

    The issue is risk and uncertainty. The

    dilemma for investors as they face near-zero

    returns on safe, liquid, short-term assets is that

    if they want some return, they are necessarily

    driven to accept a level of risk that is

    uncomfortable and unknown. While this is

    always true, the difference going into 2010 is

    that a lot of things could go very wrong on

    very short notice. For most of the post-war

    period, that was not the case.

    Investment Conclusions

    Our take on the investment environment as the

    year draws to a close is as follows:

    1) We are not yet in a full-fledged asset

    bubble, although as we pointed out last month,

    gold and other commodities may be a lot closer

    to one. The recent correction in those markets

    is helpful and the injection of a little risk may

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    curb speculative juices for a while. Risk assets

    in most developed markets are still well below

    old highs. The exception is real estate outside

    the U.S. Quite a few markets are getting too

    hot for comfort.

    2) The Fed and other central banks will

    continue to talk of exit plans, but they are as

    concerned as we are that underlying economic

    conditions have been driven by artificial

    factors and are not nearly as strong as recent

    data suggests. Remember, the two most

    powerful influences driving Fed policy are

    first, unemployment, and second, elections.

    There is 10% unemployment and a much

    worse picture counting discouraged workers

    and structural unemployment. With a key

    election next year, the Fed will not be

    tightening any time soon.

    3) Foreign central banks will continue to

    hold their nose and buy enough dollars to

    prevent a collapse. Dollar erosion over time,

    with periodic rallies is a better bet. Moreover,

    dollar short positions are huge, so dont count

    out sharp counter-trend moves.

    4) The world will remain very

    deflationary for some years and Government

    bond yields are very low as a result. The risk is

    on the side of an increase, but it will likely be a

    gradual trend.

    5) There will be enough economic

    strength for awhile to support corporate credit.

    Spreads against Treasuries should be flat to

    down. That will continue to provide

    opportunities to enhance returns.

    6) The stock market environment will

    remain good for the time being. Profits have

    recovered substantially, liquidity is plentiful,

    and interest rates are so low that investors will

    continue to be driven to riskier assets - stocks,

    corporate bonds, commodities, emerging

    markets and probably gold, although that looks

    like a very speculative market.

    7) Markets of countries, ex. the U.S., with

    strong currencies, sound finances, stable

    politics and with commodities making up a

    large percentage of the GDP, should continue

    to do very well. Examples are Canada,

    Australia, Brazil, Columbia and Norway.

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    There are more. High-growth developing

    countries like China and India will also do

    well, but as valuations get stretched, volatility

    will increase a lot. Good entry points are

    essential.

    A final note - remember the U.S.

    reflation is an experiment never before

    performed in peacetime except in post-1989

    Japan. The lesson there is not very consoling.

    Japan never got past Act I - the avoidance of a

    depression. Act II, as we pointed out, is all

    about restoring equilibrium and returning to

    sustainable, non-inflationary growth. Japan has

    had less than 1% real growth for 20 years even

    with zero interest rates. Lack of growth has

    pushed the debt to GDP ratio close to 200%.

    Forget an easy solution; there does not seem to

    be any solution and ultimately there will be a

    yen collapse and a sharp rise in interest rates

    that will cause havoc with government debt.

    However, the U.S. is not Japan; there

    are many differences which we will explore in

    another letter. The point is that the U.S. is

    experimenting with the unknown. Act II of the

    Great Reflation lies ahead. Therefore,

    investors, as we have emphasized before, must

    look for milestones to assess whether

    underlying conditions are changing. The most

    important to watch are:

    1. The dollar

    2. Treasury bond yields

    3. Corporate credit spreads

    4. Credit defaults swaps on sovereign debt

    We have added the last one to our

    previous list because credit rating agencies are

    getting nervous and are still licking their

    wounds after their catastrophic performance

    prior to the crash of 2008. There are, of course,

    a variety of other milestones to watch which

    we will be monitoring. For the time being, we

    don't see any significant signs that the

    liquidity-driven improvement in asset markets

    won't continue into 2010. But remember, this is

    a risky, uncertain world; you should carry

    more liquidity than normal, be more risk

    averse if you are not in a position to recoup

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    losses easily and if you have taken a big hit to

    your net worth as a result of the crash.

    Tony & Rob BoeckhDecember 21, [email protected]

    *All chart data from IHS/Global Insights, andmay not be reproduced without writtenconsent.

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    Stocks

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    The

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    Commodities

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    The

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    Currencies

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    Interest Rates

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    CORPORATE SPREADS AND VIX