Volby v Řecku, kdo je kdo (dokument v AJ)

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    ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES ARE IN THE DISCLOSURE APPENDIX. FOR OTHER

    IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, PLEASE REFER TO https://firesearchdisclosure.credit-suisse.com .

    CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION

    Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access

    European Economics

    Preview of the Greek elections

    Less than a week before the Greek general election (May 6) the outcome

    remains uncertain. Support for the two main parties New Democracy (center-

    right) and PASOK (socialists) is at historical lows with the share of the protest

    vote and the undecided remaining very high. The latest polls published more

    than a week ago, suggest that although the New Democracy party is leading the

    polls, it will not be in a position to get a majority in parliament.

    A coalition government between New Democracy and PASOK is the most likely

    scenario in our view. Both parties have committed to support the EU/IMFprogramme. It is unclear however at this point, if such a coalition will enjoy a

    strong majority in parliament. Tensions among its members and strong

    opposition from the anti-bailout parties may question its stability.

    In the scenario under which New Democracy and PASOK fail to create a

    coalition government, a broader coalition with other parties that are not strong

    supporters of the EU/IMF programme might be attempted or else another

    election will follow suit. Both outcomes would add uncertainty and create doubts

    on the successful implementation of the programme reforms.

    Exhibit 1: Greek elections Opinion poll (Apr 19)

    29.4%

    12.6%

    20.0%18.3%

    13.1%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    35%

    Left/Far left PASOK New Democracy Right/far right Undecided

    32.6%

    Note: Left/far left and right/far right are an aggregation of several parties with lower than 10% of the votes.Source: Credit Suisse, MRB

    02 May 2012Economics Research

    http://www.credit-suisse.com/researchandanalytics

    Research Analysts

    Yiagos Alexopoulos

    +44 20 7888 7536

    yiagos.alex [email protected]

    Christel Aranda-Hassel

    +44 20 7888 1383

    [email protected]

    Steven Bry ce

    44 20 7883 7360

    [email protected]

    Violante Di C anossa

    +44 20 7883 4192

    [email protected]

    Nev ille Hill

    +44 20 7888 1334

    [email protected]

    Axel Lang

    +44 20 7883 3738

    ax [email protected]

    Giovanni Zanni

    +33 1 7039 0132

    [email protected]

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    02 May 2012

    European Econ omics 2

    Preview of the Greek elections

    Less than a week before the Greek general election (May 6) the outcome remains

    uncertain. Support for the two main parties New Democracy and PASOK is at

    historical lows (35%-40% against 78% in the 2009 election), with the share of the protest

    vote and the undecided remaining very high. The latest polls published more than a week

    ago (due to a restriction for publication of opinion polls two weeks before the elections),

    suggest that no single party will be in a position to get a majority in parliament, so a

    coalition government would be likely not something very common in the Greek political

    scene.

    Exhibit 2: Greek elections Opinion poll (Apr 19)% of v oters

    8.5%

    10.3%

    3.5%

    7.1%

    12.6%

    20.0%

    2.6%

    8.1%

    2.7%

    4.9%

    6.6%

    13.1%

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    KKE

    Syriz

    a

    Green

    s

    Dem

    ocratic

    Left

    PASO

    K

    NewDe

    mocracy

    Dem

    ocratic

    Allia

    nce

    Inde

    pend

    entG

    reek

    s

    LAOS

    Golde

    nDa

    wn

    Oth

    ers

    Unde

    cided

    32.6%

    Source: Credit Suisse, MRB

    Greek political system how does it work?

    The Greek parliament has 300 members, elected by a system of reinforced

    proportionality . Reinforced because the party that has the most votes is awarded 50

    additional seats (irrespective of its share of the votes) and for a party to be represented in

    parliament, it has to get at least 3% of the votes. Proportional, because the remaining

    250 seats are allocated proportionally to those parties that meet the 3% threshold. Based

    on the above, for a party to secure a majority of the seats (151 MPs), without having to

    rely on a number of parties not meeting the 3% threshold, needs to get at least 40.5% of

    the votes (i.e. 40.5% of 250 = 101 seats, plus the 50-seat majority premium). In practice,

    this percentage is lower, since it is unlikely for all parties participating in the election tomake it into parliament1.

    1 If for example 10% votes for parties that do not reach the 3% threshold, parliamentary seats will be allocated to the remaining90%, based on the parties respective shares.

    Yiagos Alexopoulos

    +44 20 7888 7536

    yiagos.alex [email protected]

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    02 May 2012

    European Econ omics 3

    Main political parties

    Exhibit 3 provides an overview of the main political parties in Greece and their stance

    towards euro membership and the EU/IMF programme.

    Exhibit 3: Overview of the main political parties in Greece

    Political party Political position/Ideology Euro membership EU/IMF programme Main proposals Poll share

    New Democracy Centre-right/conservative Follow the adjustment programme,

    adding more pro-growth measures

    21%-25%

    PASOK Centre-left/socialist Follow the adjustment programme 14%-19%

    Syriza Left-w ing Unilateral default inside the euro,

    abandon the adjustment programme

    9%-13%

    KKE Communist Default and ex it the euro 9%-11%

    Independent Greeks Right-wing Unilateral default inside the euro,

    abandon the adjustment programme

    8%-11%

    Democratic Left Centre-left to left-w ing Renegotiation of the adjustment

    programme

    6%-9%

    Golden Dawn Far-right Default and ex it the euro 4%-6%

    LAOS Right-wing Abandon the adjustment programme and

    agree on an ECB loan

    3%-4%

    Greens Left-w ing Renegotiation of the loan agreement 3%-4%

    Democratic Alliance Liberal Follow the adjustment programme,

    focusing on s tructural reforms

    2%-4%

    Note: The shares are based on the different opinion polls, after allocati on of the undecided voters. Undecided voters r epresent 13%-20%, while other parties not in the list above account for 5%-7% of the votes.Source: Credit Suisse

    Where things stand at the moment?

    At the moment, New Democracy is widely expected to win the elections, without however

    securing the majority in parliament, despite the 50-seat premium. If a coalition government

    was decided upon, the PASOK party would be the most likely candidate, given their

    common stance on the EU/IMF programme and their coexistence in the latest interimgovernment. However, some opinion polls, suggest that even in such a scenario, the two

    parties would not be in a position to have a majority in parliament, or have a weak majority

    at best. Adding to the complexity, the leader of the New Democracy party, Antonis

    Samaras, is strongly against the idea of a coalition government with PASOK. If an

    additional member for the coalition was to be looked for, Democratic Alliance a liberal

    party in favour of the reforms would be a likely candidate, however it is unclear whether

    it will reach the 3% threshold needed to get into parliament. From the remaining parties,

    the Democratic Left a pro-European party in favour of some reforms would be a

    possible candidate, however its rejection of the EU/IMF programme as it is and its refusal

    to participate in a New Democracy-PASOK coalition complicates the situation.

    The protest vote in this election is high, with up to ten parties getting into parliament five

    of which for the first time and ranging from far-right to far-left. Also the number ofundecided at 15-20% remains at high levels and would largely determine the outcome of

    the election. Political analysts suggest, that as the election date is approaching, the New

    Democracy and the PASOK party will manage to get back part of their traditional voters

    and hence their support would be slightly higher than what the latest opinion polls imply.

    It is worth noting that no coalition of parties without the participation of New Democracy

    seems likely, mainly due to the 50-seat premium that the New Democracy party will get

    and due to the fact that the rest of the votes are split among a collection of parties with

    strong ideological differences, ranging from far-right to far-left.

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    02 May 2012

    European Econ omics 4

    Timeline after the elections

    The election result will be known late at night on Sunday 6 May. Following that, if no party

    has the majority of the votes (which is the most likely scenario), the president will ask the

    leader of the first party in votes to try to form a government (e.g. through a coalition) that

    enjoys the confidence of the parliament. If this fails or the party withdraws from its right,

    then the second party is asked to do the same and so on. The process is repeated for the

    three largest parties and each one has a three-day deadline. If these attempts fail, thepresident calls the parliamentary leaders of the parties on a last attempt to form a broad

    coalition government. If that is also unsuccessful an interim government is formed that

    would lead the country to a new election within a month.

    Post-election scenarios

    Given that it is unlikely that after the elections a single party will have a clear majority,

    there are several scenarios that could play out. In the list below, we highlight those

    scenarios that in our view are the most likely ones.

    Scenario 1: New Democracy PASOK coalition. This is the most likely scenario, in our

    view. Despite their pre-election announcements in light of the international pressure and

    the lack of other alternatives the two parties are likely to form a coalition government.

    Based on the poll numbers if nothing fundamentally changes this would be a rather

    weak coalition. It is expected to implement the EU/IMF programme, however frictions

    between the coalition members are likely. It is also expected to face strong opposition by

    the anti-bailout parties, especially if it does not have the majority of the votes (lack of

    strong popular mandate). It would be a rather fragile government, whose stability would be

    largely determined from the economic outlook and the progress of the reforms, in our view.

    Scenario 2: Broader coalition with the participation of other parties as well. Either

    due to a lack of parliamentary majority of the above coalition or the need to enlarge the

    popular base, a smaller party might be asked to join the coalition, e.g. the Democratic Left

    or the Democratic Alliance. This will allow for a stronger parliamentary majority, but the

    dynamics are not as straightforward. Taking into consideration the different programme

    goals of the members of the coalition especially in the case of the Democratic Left the

    government might not be flexible enough to implement the agreed reforms and a lot of the

    measures might have to be watered down, in order to be passed in parliament.

    Scenario 3: New elections. If there is unwillingness from the New Democracy party to

    form a coalition government or attempts to do so fail, then new elections will follow suit.

    This outcome would be disruptive, at least in the short term, and questions regarding the

    implementation of the EU/IMF programme and Greeces existence in the euro will emerge.

    In the new election it is possible that, in fear of an ungoverned country, part of the protest

    vote will be shifted towards the main parties, resulting in a stronger government/coalition,

    that would be in a position to implement its mandate. However, if this is not the case, the

    risk of a disruptive development will materially increase.

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    FIXED INCOME RESEARCH > ECONOMICS RESEARCH > DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

    Dr. Neal Soss, Managing DirectorChief Economist and Global Head of Economics

    +1 212 325 3335

    Eric Miller, Managing Director

    Global Head of Fixed Income and Economic Research

    +1 212 538 6480

    EURO AREA AND UK ECONOMICS

    Neville Hill, Director

    Head of European Economics

    +44 20 7888 [email protected]

    Christel Aranda-Hassel, Director

    +44 20 7888 [email protected]

    Giovanni Zanni, Director

    European Economics Paris+33 1 70 39 [email protected]

    Violante di Canossa, Vice President

    +44 20 7883 [email protected]

    Axel Lang, Analyst

    +44 20 7883 [email protected]

    Steven Bryce, Analyst

    +44 20 7883 [email protected]

    Yiagos Alexopoulos, Analyst

    +44 20 7888 7536

    [email protected]

    US ECONOMICS

    Dr. Neal Soss, Managing Director

    Head of US Economics+1 212 325 [email protected]

    Jonathan Basile, Director

    +1 212 538 [email protected]

    Jay Feldman, Director

    +1 212 325 [email protected]

    Henry Mo, Director

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    Dana Saporta, Director

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    Jill Brown, Vice President

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    Isaac Lebwohl, Associate

    +1 212 538 [email protected]

    Peggy Riordan, Assistant Vice President

    +1 212 325 [email protected]

    ASIA

    JAPAN ECONOMICS

    Hiromichi Shirakawa, Managing Director

    +81 3 4550 [email protected]

    Takashi Shiono, Associate

    +81 3 4550 [email protected]

    NON-JAPAN ECONOMICSDong Tao, Managing Director

    Head of Non-Japan Asia Economics+852 2101 [email protected]

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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