Vision of Mody for Developed India

7/26/2019 Vision of Mody for Developed India

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But the more visible, dramatic, and violent tactics associated with Hindu nationalism has received

more attention, feels Tariq Thachil.

Seema Sirohi croll.in May 24,2016

Tariq Thachil, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, has the rarequality of main! "ry theory come alive #ith livin!, $reathin! e%amples from the

al#ays rich treasury of &n"ian politics. 'is first $oo,Elite Parties, Poor Voters: How

Social Services Win Votes in India, e%plores the reasons for the (haratiya )anata

*arty+s success amon! mar!inalise" &n"ians. Thachil $acs his research #ith
http://scroll.in/authors/475http://scroll.in/authors/475


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empirical "ata to sho# ho# an" #hy the ()*+s strate!y #ore". n" perhaps $ecause

he !re# up in &n"ia, his feel for the su$-ect is natural an" instinctive.

Thachil #as $orn in elhi an" after finishin! hi!h school from /asant /alley in the

capital, he complete" his $achelor+s "e!ree in economics at Stanfor", follo#e" $y a

master+s an" "octorate in !overnment at ornell. 'is *h "issertation #on three

a#ar"s. ast #ee, Thachil spoe at the arne!ie n"o#ment in 3ashin!ton on the

churn in &n"ian politics the "ecline of the on!ress *arty an" the rise of the ()* an"

re!ional parties.

Your book shows how the BJP may have come up with the ultimate winning

strategy for political parties: how to appeal to Dalits and Adivasis without

sacrificing upper caste elites. hat was the genesis of the strategy!

The ()* an" the 5ashtriya S#ayamseva San!h have sou!ht to reach out to

mar!inalise" !roups for "eca"es throu!h a variety of strate!ies, most of #hich have

"elivere" very limite" successes. The party has al#ays $een hi!hly a#are of its

reputation as a (rahmin7(ania8 party, an" therefore the necessity of e%pan"in! its

appeal amon! non7elite voters. &n the $oo, & emphasise one particular strate!y+s

efficacy in improvin! the ()*+s performance amon! lo#er castes9 the provision of

$asic social services $y seva :service; #in!s8 of the San!h *arivar.

an"

man7ma"e "isasters =the violence aroun" *artition>. The !roups & focus on Se#a

(harati an" /anvasi ?alyan shram are involve" in provi"in! every"ay service to

mar!inalise" communities. (oth #in!s #ere esta$lishe" many "eca"es a!o, $ut their

or!anisational footprint #as quite small. &t #as only in the 1@@0s that they proliferate"

su$stantially. &n the $oo, & ar!ue that this e%pansion #as a ey part of the ()*+s

e%pan"in! support amon! alits an" "ivasis in central &n"ia. qually important, &

sho# #hy the strate!y faile" to pro"uce similar successes in other &n"ian states.


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Did party stalwarts debate the issue at length and arrive at the idea of providing

services to the marginalised and winning hearts and minds! "r was it something

that emerged and was noticed as a strategy worth pursuing on a wider scale!

&n the early 1@@0s, 'in"u nationalists trie" a num$er of strate!ies to e%pan" the

profile of their party an" movement, only one of #hich #as the e%pansion of service.

The most famous an" #ell7stu"ie" strate!y #as the use of communal a!itations,

#hich came to national attention #ith the so7calle" 5am )anma$hoomi movement.

There #as hope that a!itations a!ainst perceive" Muslim a!!ressions #oul" serve to

unite 'in"us across castes "ivisions, an" $rin! lo#er castes into the fol". ? "vani+s

rath yatra even ma"e sym$olic !estures to#ar"s alits, such as choosin! a alit

citiAen to lay the foun"ation stone for the 5am temple.

(ut the limitations of this approach $ecame clear in the state assem$ly elections of

1@@B. The party lost $a"ly across five states in #hich it ha" e%pecte" to "o #ell.

senior ()* lea"er confesse" to me that the party #as so confi"ent of victory they

ha"n+t chale" out a strate!y for "efeat. These set$acs ma"e clear that the man"ir

a!itations ha" faile" to resonate #ith most lo#er caste voters.

?C Dovin"acharya, another senior party lea"er at the time, tol" me that it #as at that

time that many #ithin the ()* realise" the participation of lo#er castes in the

yo"hya movement ha" $een merely ceremonial, $ecause the strate!y provi"e" no

tan!i$le material !ains for these "isa"vanta!e" communities.

&n response, the ()* trie" other tactics, most nota$ly social en!ineerin!8 that is,

promotin! can"i"ates from mar!inalise" communities such as (an!aru a%man an"

Uma (harti. (ut this approach #as har" to sustain $ecause it #as too threatenin! to

upper castes. &t also #asn+t popular #ith the 5SS $ecause it #as a strate!y that

acno#le"!e" caste "ivisions $et#een 'in"us. The San!h "islies e%plicitly

politicin! on caste i"entities, $ecause this is seen as a $etrayal of 'in"utva+s central

messa!e of 'in"u unity.


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So the ()* face" a real "ilemma9 ho# to recruit lo#er castes #hile retainin! upper

castesE n" ho# to $alance the electoral nee"s of "emocratic competition #ith the

i"eolo!ical nee"s of its San!h partners. Service, & ar!ue in my $oo, helpe" $alance

these "eman"s.

First, a service strate!y provi"e" tan!i$le $enefits to the poor. Yet it "i"n+t involve

chan!in! can"i"ate lists or the official party platform in #ays that threatene" upper

caste interests. t the same time, seva8 #as very amena$le to the 5SS $ecause it #as

frame" as a counter to hristian missionaries an" their conversion efforts. Yet "espite

its importance, this strate!y has receive" far less scholarly an" pu$lic attention than

the more visi$le, "ramatic, an" violent tactics associate" #ith 'in"u nationalism.

hile the strategy worked this time around and seems like the best of both

worlds# is it sustainable over the long term! $ow long before the Dalits and

Adivasis begin to demand real representation in terms of seats!

The hey"ay of these or!anisations may have alrea"y passe". First, service

or!anisations #ere more useful in helpin! the ()* #in office than retain it. Co# the

()* is entrenche" as an incum$ent in many states an" in the central !overnment. s

an incum$ent, voters #ill -u"!e you $ase" on #hat you have "one in !overnment.

onsequently, the successful ()* units are those that use" the $reathrou!hs ena$le"

$y service #or to implement policies that $roa"en the party+s appeal. For e%ample, in

hhattis!arh, #here service !roups have $een very active, 5aman Sin!h has no#

consoli"ate" support $y e%pan"in! or improvin! particular !overnment schemes for

the poor.

Secon", the tenuous coalition that service helpe" $uil" is ri""le" #ith internal

tensions. &n particular, service net#ors have helpe" incorporate more alits an"

"ivasis #ithin movement an" party, $ut many of these personnel have !reater

political am$itions to serve as can"i"ates an" political lea"ers.


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These "eman"s are tricy for the ()* to meet, especially outsi"e of reserve"

constituencies #here my analysis foun" the party still rarely fiel"s alit an" "ivasi

can"i"ates. Some of these tensions #ere articulate" to me $y the first "ivasi state

presi"ent of the ()*. ccor"in! to him, senior lea"ers #ante" him to $e a ru$$er

stamp, an" #hen he refuse" to $e one, they ase" him to step "o#n. 'o# the party

#ill accommo"ate assertive lo#er caste an" tri$al lea"ers remains to $e seen.

%ince you are one of the few academics to study the BJP phenomenon# how do

you see &arendra 'odi# his rise# his seeming control over the party apparatus#

his detractors(!

s someone #ho has stu"ie" the ()*, let me focus on t#o points re!ar"in! the

implications of Mo"i+s rise for his o#n party.

First, Mo"i+s rise to $ecomin! a can"i"ate for prime ministership #ithin the ()* #as

far from inevita$le. &n fact, the first impressive feature of his ascent #as ho# he

si"eline" other conten"ers an" "issenters #ithin his o#n party. 5emem$er, the ()*

ha" a num$er of successful state7level lea"ers, inclu"in! multiple7term incum$ent

chief ministers in Ma"hya *ra"esh an" hhattis!arh. Further, there #ere real concerns

a$out Mo"i+s via$ility in a national campai!n, even #ithin his o#n party.

Follo#in! the ()*+s 2004 "efeat, there #as tal that the 2002 violence in Du-arat, an"

Mo"i+s polarisin! ste#ar"ship at the time, ha" hurt the party+s ima!e nationally. From

that moment, Mo"i+s a$ility to manouevre into pole position #as impressive. &n lar!e

part, his success stemme" from the support of ran an" file for him at party conclaves.

'is appeal for ()* aryaartas #as stron! enou!h to vault him over less polarisin!

conten"ers, an" even the opposition of a party !iant lie "vani.

Secon", the implications of Mo"i+s rise for his o#n party are quite mi%e". 3hile he

has "elivere" impressive short7term victories, the lon!7term consequences of his

remara$le centralisation of po#er are less clear. & "on+t thin #e have seen this much

centralise" control #ithin either the on!ress or ()* since &n"ira Dan"hi+s tenure.


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Senior lea"ers #ithin his o#n party an" even mem$ers of his ca$inet are completely

si"eline" an" re"uce" to fi!urehea"s. Such concentration of po#er is not in the ()*+s

$est interests in the lon! term.

*art of the ()*+s or!anisational a"vanta!e came from havin! a $roa" $ase an" a

relatively "eep $ench, $ut un"er Mo"i, this $ench has narro#e" consi"era$ly. Such a

narro#in! strate!y is "an!erous, $ecause it is hi!hly reliant on the popularity of a

sin!le in"ivi"ual. &f that in"ivi"ual falls from !race, the party fin"s itself far less

equippe" to recover.


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for the ()* "eclarin! that they are only #ith the ()* $ecause of Mo"i, that they are a

Mo"i sena. 'o# loyal #ill such #orers $e to the party $eyon" Mo"iE

Mo"i+s rise has also $e!un to shift the nature of po#er #ithin the ()* an" $roa"er

San!h *arivar. &t is #ell no#n that historically, the 5SS ha" loyal an" #ell7place"

personnel #ithin the ()* or!anisation. These #orers #oul" eep ta$s on #hat #as

happenin! #ithin the party an" report $ac. 3ith the rise of #orers #ho favour Mo"i

over the party an" the movement, this "ynamic is $ein! inverte". So Mo"i has $rou!ht

a !reat sur!e of electoral support for the ()*, $ut the rise of his personal cult "oes not

only have positive implications for the party.

$ow do you assess the overall communal situation in +ndia since 'odi became

prime minister! +s the e,uilibrium -if one can call it that in danger of being

disturbed to a degree that it cannot return to the way things were / not perfect#

but not erupting with a frightening regularity!

& shoul" preface these comments $y sayin! that my intensive stu"y of the ()* en"e"

in 2014, an" so many of these comments are ma"e as an en!a!e" o$server rather than

throu!h "eep scholarship. s an &n"ian citiAen, & am of course e%tremely concerne"

#ith the normalisation of hi!h levels of intolerance an" violence #ithin our country,

especially to#ar"s minority an" mar!inaliAe" communities. &t si!nals an acceptance

of violence $y the state or $y private citiAens as an appropriate response to

"ifference, $e they in cultural customs, reli!ious rituals, "ietary ha$its, an" perhaps

most perniciously, in political opinions. Such vicious ma-oritarian $ullyin! is a si!n of

"emocratic "ysfunction, not of vitality.

s a social scientist, & $elieve it is important to un"erstan" the relationship $et#een

this fri!htenin!ly re!ular8 violence an" our electe" !overnment. &n 2014, it #as

fashiona$le to interpret Mo"i+s campai!n as purely "evelopment7oriente", an" to

su!!est that the ne# !overnment+s rei!n #oul" $e mare" $y a laser7lie focus on

implementin! economic reforms an" infrastructural improvement. The implication


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#as that communal violence #oul" $e force" to the si"elines $y Mo"i+s

technocratic8 ()*.

This interpretation felt some#hat simplifie" at that time, as the 2014 campai!n tactics

use" $y the ()* varie" si!nificantly across states an" even "istricts. asteist an"

communal rhetoric #as far more central in the mit Shah7le" campai!n in #estern

Uttar *ra"esh than in nei!h$ourin! Ma"hya *ra"esh. (eyon" the campai!n, many of

us remaine" concerne" #ith the #i"er implications of ho# a Mo"i victory #oul"

em$ol"en 'in"utva har"liners. 3e #orrie" that har"liners #oul" rea" his victory as

vali"ation of their vie#s an" perspectives, an" as proof that they coul" act #ith

impunity. & $elieve the past t#o years have lar!ely -ustifie" these concerns. Much of

the ma-oritarian violence #e have #itnesse" since 2014 has to $e rea" in that li!ht.

&t is also critical for us to as #hy our prime minister has remaine" silent a!ainst such

ma-oritarian violenceE For all the tal of his reinvention8 from a har"line 5SS

activist to a "evelopment7oriente" *M, his reluctance to a"monish intolerance an"

violence a!ainst minorities has remaine" remara$ly consistent over the past several

years.

There are t#o e%planations that have $een offere" for Mo"i+s reluctance to spea out.

The first is that his silence is $ein! force" upon him $y har"liners #ithin the ()*75SS

ne%us. This ar!ument fails to e%plain ho# a prime minister #ho #as seen as all7

po#erful in "eliverin! a 2014 victory is no# su""enly so enfee$le" an" constraine"

#ithin his or!anisations. The other e%planation is that Mo"i "oesn+t see any reason to

spea out a!ainst ma-oritarianism an" ma-oritarian violence, $ecause he sees them as

i"eolo!ically -ustifie" actions.

Silence can $e seen as tacit approval, !iven in a #ay that allo#s his o#n pu$lic

rhetoric to remain oriente" to#ar"s a "evelopment7oriente" personal $ran". &f true,

this strate!y riss further em$ol"enin! ma-oritarian nationalism, an" in "oin! so

possi$ly "erailin! Mo"i+s o#n re$ran"in! efforts as a "evelopment7oriente"


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technocrat. This approach coul" "ama!e his lon!7term electoral am$itions. fter all,

availa$le survey evi"ence su!!ests the ()*+s support in 2014 ha" little to "o #ith

support for 'in"u nationalism amon! most voters, especially ne# supporters.

hat was your e0perience dealing with the BJP hierarchy and workers in the

field as someone with a 'uslim name! ere they pu11led or professional enough

to deal with you as an academic!

& am an atheist an" a son of atheists. omin! from a secular $ac!roun", my parents,

#ho are aca"emics, !ave me a Muslim name as a !esture to the inclusive potential of

&n"ian secularism. n" $ecause they lie" the name.

Yet, of course, in a practical sense, my name mars me as a Muslim. & cannot

imme"iately offer an e%planation of ho# & !ot my name to everyone & tal #ith, an"

nor is such an e%planation al#ays rea"ily un"erstan"a$le to all of them.

Senior party lea"ers, #ho are very $usy people, ten"e" not to care very much a$out

my personal $ac!roun". (ut of course & receive" questions a$out my $ac!roun"

from many people & intervie#e". Most often, & #as re!ar"e" as a curiosity. couple

of times & "i" !et questions that veere" to#ar"s hostility. & remem$er one occasion

#here & #as repeate"ly ase" $y a party #orer in 5aipur, 3hy aren+t you "oin!

your fiel" #or in 'y"era$a"E8


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Muslim.


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+artys success amon! mar!inalise" &n"ians. Thachil $acs his research #ithempirical "ata to sho# ho# an" #hy the )*+s strate!y #ore". -n" perhaps$ecause he !re# up in &n"ia, his feel for the su$ect is natural an" instinctive.

Thachil #as $orn in /elhi an" after (nishin! hi!h school from asant alley in thecapital, he complete" his $achelors "e!ree in economics at Stanfor", follo#e" $y amasters an" "octorate in !overnment at ornell. 'is +h/ "issertation #on three

a#ar"s. ast #ee, Thachil spoe at the arne!ie 3n"o#ment in ashin!ton on thechurn in &n"ian politics 5 the "ecline of the on!ress +arty an" the rise of the )*+an" re!ional parties.

Your book shows how the BJP may have come up with the ultimate winningstrategy for political parties: how to appeal to Dalits and Adivasis withoutsacricing upper caste elites !hat was the genesis of the strategy"

The )*+ an" the ashtriya S#ayamseva San!h have sou!ht to reach out tomar!inalise" !roups for "eca"es throu!h a variety of strate!ies, most of #hich have"elivere" very limite" successes. The party has al#ays $een hi!hly a#are of itsreputation as a 7)rahmin8)ania9 party, an" therefore the necessity of e%pan"in! itsappeal amon! non8elite voters. &n the $oo, & emphasise one particular strate!yse:cacy in improvin! the )*+s performance amon! lo#er castes; the provision of

$asic social services $y 7seva f course, the San!h has a lon! history of social service, $ut many of its earliere?orts #ere episo"ic, speci(cally relief e?orts for natural @cyclones an"earthquaesA an" man8ma"e "isasters @the violence aroun" +artitionA. The !roups &focus on 5 Se#a )harati an" anvasi Balyan -shram 5 are involve" in provi"in!every"ay service to mar!inalise" communities. )oth #in!s #ere esta$lishe" many"eca"es a!o, $ut their or!anisational footprint #as quite small. &t #as only in the1CC0s that they proliferate" su$stantially. &n the $oo, & ar!ue that this e%pansion#as a ey part of the )*+s e%pan"in! support amon! /alits an" -"ivasis in central&n"ia. 3qually important, & sho# #hy the strate!y faile" to pro"uce similar successesin other &n"ian states.Did party stalwarts debate the issue at length and arrive at the idea ofproviding services to the marginalised and winning hearts and minds" #rwas it something that emerged and was noticed as a strategy worthpursuing on a wider scale"&n the early 1CC0s, 'in"u nationalists trie" a num$er of strate!ies to e%pan" thepro(le of their party an" movement, only one of #hich #as the e%pansion ofservice. The most famous an" #ell8stu"ie" strate!y #as the use of communala!itations, #hich came to national attention #ith the so8calle" am *anma$hoomimovement. There #as hope that a!itations a!ainst perceive" Muslim a!!ressions#oul" serve to unite 'in"us across castes "ivisions, an" $rin! lo#er castes into thefol". B -"vanis rath yatra even ma"e sym$olic !estures to#ar"s /alits, such aschoosin! a /alit citiDen to lay the foun"ation stone for the am temple.)ut the limitations of this approach $ecame clear in the state assem$ly elections of1CCE. The party lost $a"ly across (ve states in #hich it ha" e%pecte" to "o #ell. -senior )*+ lea"er confesse" to me that the party #as so con("ent of victory theyha"nt chale" out a strate!y for "efeat. These set$acs ma"e clear that the man"ira!itations ha" faile" to resonate #ith most lo#er caste voters.BF Govin"acharya, another senior party lea"er at the time, tol" me that it #as atthat time that many #ithin the )*+ realise" the participation of lo#er castes in the-yo"hya movement ha" $een merely ceremonial, $ecause the strate!y provi"e" notan!i$le material !ains for these "isa"vanta!e" communities.


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&n response, the )*+ trie" other tactics, most nota$ly 7social en!ineerin!9 5 that is,promotin! can"i"ates from mar!inalise" communities such as )an!aru a%man an"Uma )harti. )ut this approach #as har" to sustain $ecause it #as too threatenin! toupper castes. &t also #asnt popular #ith the SS $ecause it #as a strate!y thatacno#le"!e" caste "ivisions $et#een 'in"us. The San!h "islies e%plicitlypoliticin! on caste i"entities, $ecause this is seen as a $etrayal of 'in"utvas

central messa!e of 'in"u unity.So the )*+ face" a real "ilemma; ho# to recruit lo#er castes #hile retainin! uppercastesH -n" ho# to $alance the electoral nee"s of "emocratic competition #ith thei"eolo!ical nee"s of its San!h partners. Service, & ar!ue in my $oo, helpe" $alancethese "eman"s.Iirst, a service strate!y provi"e" tan!i$le $ene(ts to the poor. Yet it "i"nt involvechan!in! can"i"ate lists or the o:cial party platform in #ays that threatene" uppercaste interests. -t the same time, 7seva9 #as very amena$le to the SS $ecause it#as frame" as a counter to hristian missionaries an" their conversion e?orts. Yet"espite its importance, this strate!y has receive" far less scholarly an" pu$licattention than the more visi$le, "ramatic, an" violent tactics associate" #ith 'in"unationalism.

!hile the strategy worked this time around and seems like the best ofboth worlds$ is it sustainable over the long term" %ow long before theDalits and Adivasis begin to demand real representation in terms of seats"

The hey"ay of these or!anisations may have alrea"y passe". Iirst, serviceor!anisations #ere more useful in helpin! the )*+ #in o:ce than retain it. Fo# the)*+ is entrenche" as an incum$ent in many states an" in the central !overnment.-s an incum$ent, voters #ill u"!e you $ase" on #hat you have "one in!overnment. onsequently, the successful )*+ units are those that use" the$reathrou!hs ena$le" $y service #or to implement policies that $roa"en thepartys appeal. Ior e%ample, in hhattis!arh, #here service !roups have $een veryactive, aman Sin!h has no# consoli"ate" support $y e%pan"in! or improvin!particular !overnment schemes for the poor.

Secon", the tenuous coalition that service helpe" $uil" is ri""le" #ith internaltensions. &n particular, service net#ors have helpe" incorporate more /alits an"-"ivasis #ithin movement an" party, $ut many of these personnel have !reaterpolitical am$itions 5 to serve as can"i"ates an" political lea"ers.

These "eman"s are tricy for the )*+ to meet, especially outsi"e of reserve"constituencies #here my analysis foun" the party still rarely (el"s /alit an" -"ivasican"i"ates. Some of these tensions #ere articulate" to me $y the (rst -"ivasi statepresi"ent of the )*+. -ccor"in! to him, senior lea"ers #ante" him to $e a ru$$erstamp, an" #hen he refuse" to $e one, they ase" him to step "o#n. 'o# the party#ill accommo"ate assertive lo#er caste an" tri$al lea"ers remains to $e seen.&ince you are one of the few academics to study the BJP phenomenon$how do you see 'arendra (odi$ his rise$ his seeming control over theparty apparatus$ his detractors)"-s someone #ho has stu"ie" the )*+, let me focus on t#o points re!ar"in! theimplications of Mo"is rise for his o#n party.Iirst, Mo"is rise to $ecomin! a can"i"ate for prime ministership #ithin the )*+ #asfar from inevita$le. &n fact, the (rst impressive feature of his ascent #as ho# hesi"eline" other conten"ers an" "issenters #ithin his o#n party. emem$er, the )*+ha" a num$er of successful state8level lea"ers, inclu"in! multiple8term incum$ent


13/15

chief ministers in Ma"hya +ra"esh an" hhattis!arh. Iurther, there #ere realconcerns a$out Mo"is via$ility in a national campai!n, even #ithin his o#n party.Iollo#in! the )*+s 2004 "efeat, there #as tal that the 2002 violence in Guarat,an" Mo"is polarisin! ste#ar"ship at the time, ha" hurt the partys ima!e nationally.Irom that moment, Mo"is a$ility to manouevre into pole position #as impressive. &nlar!e part, his success stemme" from the support of ran an" (le for him at party

conclaves. 'is appeal for )*+ aryaartas #as stron! enou!h to vault him over lesspolarisin! conten"ers, an" even the opposition of a party !iant lie -"vani.Secon", the implications of Mo"is rise for his o#n party are quite mi%e". hile hehas "elivere" impressive short8term victories, the lon!8term consequences of hisremara$le centralisation of po#er are less clear. & "ont thin #e have seen thismuch centralise" control #ithin either the on!ress or )*+ since &n"ira Gan"histenure. Senior lea"ers #ithin his o#n party an" even mem$ers of his ca$inet arecompletely si"eline" an" re"uce" to (!urehea"s. Such concentration of po#er isnot in the )*+s $est interests in the lon! term.+art of the )*+s or!anisational a"vanta!e came from havin! a $roa" $ase an" arelatively "eep $ench, $ut un"er Mo"i, this $ench has narro#e" consi"era$ly. Sucha narro#in! strate!y is "an!erous, $ecause it is hi!hly reliant on the popularity of a

sin!le in"ivi"ual. &f that in"ivi"ual falls from !race, the party (n"s itself far lessequippe" to recover. >nce a!ain, the on!ress e%perience un"er &n"ira Gan"hishoul" $e instructive for the )*+.

You said during your talk at the *arnegie +ndowment that the rise of (odiis viewed with ambivalence within the %indutva movement *an youelaborate"& thin that am$ivalence principally has to "o #ith his personal appeal, his cult ofpersonality. >n the one han", the SS 5 all the #ay up to


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%ow do you assess the overall communal situation in ,ndia since (odibecame prime minister" ,s the e-uilibrium .if one can call it that/ indanger of being disturbed to a degree that it cannot return to the waythings were 0 not perfect$ but not erupting with a frightening regularity"& shoul" preface these comments $y sayin! that my intensive stu"y of the )*+en"e" in 2014, an" so many of these comments are ma"e as an en!a!e" o$server

rather than throu!h "eep scholarship. -s an &n"ian citiDen, & am of course e%tremelyconcerne" #ith the normalisation of hi!h levels of intolerance an" violence #ithinour country, especially to#ar"s minority an" mar!inaliDe" communities. &t si!nalsan acceptance of violence 5 $y the state or $y private citiDens 5 as an appropriateresponse to "i?erence, $e they in cultural customs, reli!ious rituals, "ietary ha$its,an" perhaps most perniciously, in political opinions. Such vicious maoritarian$ullyin! is a si!n of "emocratic "ysfunction, not of vitality.-s a social scientist, & $elieve it is important to un"erstan" the relationship $et#eenthis 7fri!htenin!ly re!ular9 violence an" our electe" !overnment. &n 2014, it #asfashiona$le to interpret Mo"is campai!n as purely "evelopment8oriente", an" tosu!!est that the ne# !overnments rei!n #oul" $e mare" $y a laser8lie focus onimplementin! economic reforms an" infrastructural improvement. The implication

#as that communal violence #oul" $e force" to the si"elines $y Mo"is7technocratic9 )*+.

This interpretation felt some#hat simpli(e" at that time, as the 2014 campai!ntactics use" $y the )*+ varie" si!ni(cantly across states an" even "istricts. asteistan" communal rhetoric #as far more central in the -mit Shah8le" campai!n in#estern Uttar +ra"esh than in nei!h$ourin! Ma"hya +ra"esh. )eyon" the campai!n,many of us remaine" concerne" #ith the #i"er implications of ho# a Mo"i victory#oul" em$ol"en 'in"utva har"liners. e #orrie" that har"liners #oul" rea" hisvictory as vali"ation of their vie#s an" perspectives, an" as proof that they coul"act #ith impunity. & $elieve the past t#o years have lar!ely usti(e" these concerns.Much of the maoritarian violence #e have #itnesse" since 2014 has to $e rea" inthat li!ht.

&t is also critical for us to as #hy our prime minister has remaine" silent a!ainstsuch maoritarian violenceH Ior all the tal of his 7reinvention9 from a har"line SSactivist to a "evelopment8oriente" +M, his reluctance to a"monish intolerance an"violence a!ainst minorities has remaine" remara$ly consistent over the pastseveral years.

There are t#o e%planations that have $een o?ere" for Mo"is reluctance to speaout. The (rst is that his silence is $ein! force" upon him $y har"liners #ithin the)*+8SS ne%us. This ar!ument fails to e%plain ho# a prime minister #ho #as seen asall8po#erful in "eliverin! a 2014 victory is no# su""enly so enfee$le" an"constraine" #ithin his or!anisations. The other e%planation is that Mo"i "oesnt seeany reason to spea out a!ainst maoritarianism an" maoritarian violence, $ecausehe sees them as i"eolo!ically usti(e" actions.Silence can $e seen as tacit approval, !iven in a #ay that allo#s his o#n pu$licrhetoric to remain oriente" to#ar"s a "evelopment8oriente" personal $ran". &f true,this strate!y riss further em$ol"enin! maoritarian nationalism, an" in "oin! sopossi$ly "erailin! Mo"is o#n re$ran"in! e?orts as a "evelopment8oriente"technocrat. This approach coul" "ama!e his lon!8term electoral am$itions. -fter all,availa$le survey evi"ence su!!ests the )*+s support in 2014 ha" little to "o #ithsupport for 'in"u nationalism amon! most voters, especially ne# supporters.


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!hat was your e1perience dealing with the BJP hierarchy and workers inthe eld as someone with a (uslim name" !ere they pu22led orprofessional enough to deal with you as an academic"& am an atheist an" a son of atheists. omin! from a secular $ac!roun", myparents, #ho are aca"emics, !ave me a Muslim name as a !esture to the inclusivepotential of &n"ian secularism. -n" $ecause they lie" the name.

Yet, of course, in a practical sense, my name mars me as a Muslim. & cannotimme"iately o?er an e%planation of ho# & !ot my name to everyone & tal #ith, an"nor is such an e%planation al#ays rea"ily un"erstan"a$le to all of them.Senior party lea"ers, #ho are very $usy people, ten"e" not to care very much a$outmy personal $ac!roun". )ut of course & receive" questions a$out my $ac!roun"from many people & intervie#e". Most often, & #as re!ar"e" as a curiosity. - coupleof times & "i" !et questions that veere" to#ar"s hostility. & remem$er one occasion#here & #as repeate"ly ase" $y a party #orer in aipur, 7hy arent you "oin!your (el" #or in 'y"era$a"H9>ther times, their "isapproval too mil"ly amusin! forms 5 one intervie#ee eptcallin! me 7Tarun9. hen & clari(e" my name #as Tariq, he ust smile" an" sai",7Ior me, you are Tarun.9

-n" of course, as #ith many forms of research, you have to $e careful in ho# youapproach certain conversations. )ut & have to say most )*+ #orers #ere very#illin! to tal openly an" #ere in" a$out havin! me to their homes. +ersonally, &o#e a !reat "eal to them for $ein! #illin! to tal to me. & #oul"nt have $een a$leto "o this #or if they #ere uniformly hostile to#ar"s someone they @at least (rstAperceive" to $e Muslim. >f course, & am also heavily protecte" $y my economic an"social privile!e, an" my status as a professor at a US university.e welcome &our comments at [email protected].
mailto:?Subject=The%20social%20service%20wings%20of%20RSS%20played%20a%20big%20role%20in%20BJP%27s%20rise%20to%20power%3A%20Yale%20professor&[email protected]:?Subject=The%20social%20service%20wings%20of%20RSS%20played%20a%20big%20role%20in%20BJP%27s%20rise%20to%20power%3A%20Yale%20professor&[email protected]

Vision of Mody for Developed India

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