Vesey - Knowledge Without Observation

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Philosophical Review

Knowledge Without ObservationAuthor(s): G. N. A. VeseySource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr., 1963), pp. 198-212Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183104

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DISCUSSION

KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT OBSERVATION

I. MISS ANSCOMBE'S ACCOUNT

IN Section 5 of her book Intention'Miss G. E. M. Anscombe describes

"a rather strange case of causality": a person thinks he sees a face

at the window and this makes him jump. This is said to be a strange

case of causality because "the subject is able to give the cause . . . in

the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or theposition of his limbs."

What is this way of being able to state something? The answer,

given in Section 8 of the same book, is in terms of a way of knowing

things: "A man usually knows the position of his limbs without

observation."

Why is this knowledge said to be "without observation"?

It is without observation, because nothing shewshim the position of his limbs;it is not as if he were going by a tingle in his knee, which is the sign that it is

bent and not straight. When we can speak of separately describable sensa-tions, having which is in some senseour criterionfor saying something, then we

can speak of observing that thing; but this is not generally so when we know

the position of our limbs.

If this remarkis to be the basis of a definition of "knowledge without

observation," then it must be maintained not only that we can speak

of observing something when we can speak of "separately describable

sensations, having which is in some sense our criterion for saying

something," but also that we cannotspeak of observing something

unlesswe can speak of separately describable sensations, and so forth.

Otherwise, knowledge without observationwould not be differentiated

from knowledge by observation: both could occur in the absence of

separately describable sensations. So, if Miss Anscombe does intend

the remark to afford a definition of "knowledge without observation,"

then she is committed either to denying that when, say, a person sees

that something is red, he is observing that it is red, or to affirming

that even in seeing something to be red there are separatelydescribable

sensations.

If by the word "sensation"is meant something like a tingle (that is,

a bodily sensation), then it is false that I must have such sensations

I Ithaca, N.Y., 1957.

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KNO WLEDGE WITHOUT OBSERVATION

to be able to state that the thing is red. I might indeed have a peculiar

sensation in my eyes whenever I saw something red, but this would

be accidental. It would not be from having this sensation that I knew

the thing to be red (unless, of course, I was color-blind, and had

learned that when I had this sensation other people would call the

thing I was looking at "red").

Is Miss Anscombe using the word "sensation" so as to include

something else besides bodily sensations? It would seem so. In Section

28 of her book she writes:

It is not ordinarily possible to find anything that shews one that one's leg

is bent. It may indeed be that it is because one has sensations that oneknows this; but that does not mean that one knows it by identifying the sensa-tions one has. With the exterior senses it is usually possible to do this. I meanthat if a man says he saw a man standing in a certain place, or heard someone

moving about, or felt an insect crawling over him, it is possible at least to ask

whether he misjudged an appearance, a sound, or a feeling; that is, we cansay: Look, isn't this perhaps what you saw? and reproduce a visual effect ofwhich he may say "Yes, that is, or could be, what I saw, and I admit I can'tbe sure of more than that"; and the same with the sound or the feeling.

In a footnote, Miss Anscombe adds:

... the fact remains that one can distinguish between actually seeing a man,

and the appearances' being such that one says one is seeing, or saw, a man;and that one can describe or identify "what one saw" on such an occasion

without knowing e.g. that one really saw a reflection of oneself or a coat

hanging on a hook; now when one does so describe or identify "what one

saw," it is perfectly reasonable to call this: describing or identifying an appear-ance.

What is the implication of this for the case of seeing something to be

red? It might seem that it means that Miss Anscombe would say that

seeing something to be red is a case of knowledge by observation

because one can distinguish between how the thing appears to one

and how it in fact is, and describe the former without committing

oneself as to the latter. In other words, it might seem as if Miss

Anscombe meant, by the "separation" involved in her talk of "sepa-

rately describable sensations," the familiar separation of appearancefrom reality.

But this cannot really be what she would say, for she allows of the

same separation in the case of what is said to be known without obser-

vation. A person's leg may feel bent to him when it is lying straight

out.

About this, she writes:

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G. N. A. VESE-

If a man says that his leg is bent when it is lying straight out, it would beincorrect to say that he had misjudged an inner kinaesthetic appearance as anappearance of his leg bent, when in fact what was appearing to him was his leg

stretched out.

This gives rise to the question, why is it incorrect to say that one

has misjudged an appearance when one's leg feels bent but is not, but

not incorrect to say this when something looks red but is not?

In Intention Miss Anscombe does not say anything which provides

an answer to this question. What she does say is: "This topic is cer-

tainly a difficult one, deserving a fuller discussion."

In a paper, "On Sensations of Position," in Analysis (Vol. XXII,

i962), Miss Anscombe makes a contribution to this "fuller discussion."

In Intention, having introduced the notion of knowledge without

observation with reference to a person's knowledge of the position

of his limbs, she had gone on to say that a person knows without

observation that he has given a reflex kick when a doctor has tapped

his knee. She mentioned the expression, "that sensation which one

has in reflex kicking, when one's knee is tapped." In the Analysis paper

she writes, regarding this expression:

I did not want to object to this use of the word "sensation," but argued thatsuch a "sensation" could not be adduced in defence of the thesis that we doafter all know our bodily movements and positions by observation, becausethe sensation was not separable; elsewhere I implied that a sensation needed to

be "separately describable" if one observed a fact by means of the sensation.

Later she writes:

When I say: "the sensation (e.g. of giving a reflex kick) is not separable" I

mean that the internal description of the "sensation"-the description of thesense-content-is the very same as the description of the fact known; whenthis is so, I should deny that we can speak of observing that fact by means ofthe alleged sensation.

Does what Miss Anscombe says here provide an adequate means of

distinguishing between an object looking red and a leg feeling bent?

Unfortunately it does not. If one is asked to describe how one's leg

feels one gives the same answer ("bent") as one does if asked to

describe the position of one's leg. But, equally, if one is asked todescribe the appearance of something which looks red, one gives the

same answer ("red") as one does if asked to describe the object itself.

The formula "separately describable sensations" simply will not do

the work Miss Anscombe wants it to do.

The only remaining hint as to what Miss Anscombe means is

contained in the final paragraphs of the Analysis article. She says

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things which suggest that she would say that "red," used to describe

something seen, was the description of "a sense-content properly

speaking," whereas "bent," used to describehow one's leg feels, was

not. But she does not say how one is to discover what words are

descriptions of "sense-contents properly speaking," and what words

are not.

II. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT

The attempt to understandwhat MissAnscombe means by "knowl-

edge without observation" is like a treasure hunt. From "withoutobservation" to "without separately describable sensations" the trail

is clear. But beyond that point, the clues ("It is not possible to ask

whether one has misjudged an appearance," "The internal description

of the 'sensation'is the very same as the descriptionof the fact known,"

and so forth) seem o lead, not to any philosophical treasureat all, but to

the absurdity that seeing something to be red is knowledge without

observation. Obviously we have gotten onto the wrong track some-

where. But how?I think the answer must be this. Miss Anscombe intended us to

contrast (a) the way a person usually knows the position of his limbs,

not with (b) the way a person usually knows that something is red, but

with (c) the way a person usually knows, for example, that an insect

is crawling up the back of his neck. She simply overlooked the fact

that the description which servesto differentiate (a) from (c) does not

serve to differentiate (a) from (b). To that extent the clues were

inadequate, the treasure unattainable.If I am right about this, then either the game must be abandoned

or it must be reconstituted, with a set of clues which do enable a

player to differentiate between (a) and (b). The remainder of this

paper is an attempt at such a reconstitution. Whether or not the treas-

ure, such as it is, to which they lead, is the one Miss Anscombe had in

mind, only she can say.

The first task is to provide a means of distinguishing between (b) the

way a person usually knows that something is red and (c) the way aperson usually knows that an insect is crawling up the back of his

neck. There are, of course, a number of differences between these

ways of knowing. One is that one of them is by sight, the other by

"feeling." But this can hardly be relevant, for Miss Anscombe does not

distinguish between a man feeling an insect crawling over him, and a

man seeing a man standing in a certain place. What we require is a

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G. N. A. VESET

means of distinguishing between (b) and (c) which will enable us to

distinguish between seeing something to be red and seeing a man

standing ina

certain place. Is there any traditionalphilosophical

distinction which will serve this purpose?

Indeed there is: the distinction between what is, and what is not, the

"proper object" of the sense of sight. But is not this a notion which is

hopelessly demodd?One associates it with people like Berkeley. Can

what Berkeley said, in what was a New Theory f Vision250 years ago,

be relevant today? Can the notion of a "proper object" be given a

new (linguistic) look?

I think it can, and accordingly I propose to distinguish between whatI shall call a "proper-object"perception, and an "association-mediated"

perception. For purposes of exposition I shall take as my example

of an association-mediated perception, not a person's feeling an insect

crawling up the back of his neck, but a person's seeing the coldness of a

distant snow-covered mountain.

The possibility of making the distinction between what is, and what

is not, the proper object of a given mode of perception (sight, hearing,

and so forth) depends on the intelligibility of such a question as "Bywhat mode of perception does one learn what it is for an object to be

red?" This question must be understood in such as way that there is

only one possible answer, namely "By sight." Other answers would

indicate that the expression "what it is for an object to be red" had

been understood in a wider sense than that intended.

Suppose, for instance, it was said that if an object is red then it will

reflect light waves of a certain frequency, which can be measured

scientifically. One attempt to deal with this would be to ask: but whenwe say that something is red, do we meanthat it will satisfy certain

scientific tests? The trouble with this attempt is, of course, that we

do mean that it will satisfy these tests.Eversince it was discovered that

red things reflect light waves of a certain frequency it became pertinent

to ask of a thing whose color was suspect whether it satisfied the tests.

Perhapsit only looked red because it was being viewed under abnormal

conditions; the tests would tell. But is a thing's being red like a thing's

being poisonous, so that it is effectswhich matter? Is not a thing'slooking red an effect of its being red ? Well, yes, but there are effects

and effects. If a thing looked red to normal observers under normal

conditions, that would settle the matter.

I am not sure that we do use the word "red" in this way, so that

redness is a purely visual phenomenon. But we might. We might so

use it that only people with sight could be said to know its meaning.

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If we did, then seeing something to be red would be a proper-object

perception. Redness would be a proper object of sight. One would be

able to learn what it is for an object to be red only if one exercised

one's faculty of vision. The meaning of something being red would be

given by one's sense of sight.

Whether or not we do use any words so as to allow of an answer

to the question "What are the proper objects of sight (hearing, touch,

and so forth) ?" does not matter. All I require is that the notion should

be intelligible. For if it is intelligible then the statement that seeing

the coldness of a distant snow-covered mountain is not an instance of

proper-object perception will readily be understood. (For whether or

not coldness is thought to be the proper object of any other mode of

perception, it is hardly likely to be thought of as the proper object of

sight.) And that it is not an instance of proper-object perception is

part of the meaning of saying that seeing the coldness of a distant

mountain is an association-mediated perception.

The other part of the meaning of this is as follows. It is reasonable

to explain the person's ability to see the coldness of the mountain by

reference to the association, in his past experience, of two things:coldness, and some other quality of cold things-in this case, whiteness.

It is because of this association that he now sees the white thing as cold.

All that is being said here is that coldness has come to be associated

with whiteness, so that the present object's being seen as white is a

sufficient condition of its being seen as cold. It is not being said that

the person has to remember the occasion of his being simultaneously

aware of coldness and whiteness, or that he is conscious of inferring

the coldness from the whiteness, or even that he can himself explain,in terms of association, how it is that he sees the coldness of the moun-

tain. But one thing is requisite: that with which he associates coldness

must be something in his present experience to which he could attend

if he so desired. Otherwise it is not association-mediated perception.

Feeling an insect crawling up the back of one's neck differs from

seeing the coldness of a mountain in that, whereas someone might

say that coldness was the proper object of a mode of perception (ther-

matic awareness?), no one would be likely to accord this distinction toan insect. (Insects are obviously "common sensibles"-that is, they

can be seen, touched, heard, and so forth-but this does not affect what

I am saying. Feeling an insect crawling up the back of one's neck is no

less a case of association-mediated perception than is seeing the coldness

of a mountain.)

This must suffice to distinguish between (b), the way a person

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G. N. A. VESEY

usually knows that something is red, and (c), the way a person usually

knows that an insect is crawling up the back of his neck. Now let us

return to the central issue: how does (a), the way a person usuallyknows the position of his limbs, differ from (b) and (c) ?

It differs from (c) in that it is notan association-mediated perception.

(This was the point of all that Miss Anscombe said about there not

being "separately describable sensations.") And it differs from (b) in

that the position of one's limbs is not the proper object of kinesthesis.

Another way of putting this would be to say that while it is like

association-mediated perception in that what is perceived is not the

proper object of the mode of perception in operation, it is unlike it inthat there is nothing in the person's present experience to explain how

he can perceive what he perceives. This is not an easy combination

of characteristics to grasp. Is it adequately suggested by the title

"knowledge without observation"?

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE TITLE

"KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT OBSERVATION"

i. The word "observe" is a verb of perception, but it is neither

clearly just a perceptual task verb, like "watch" and "listen," nor

clearly just a perceptual achievement verb, like "see" and "hear."

As with the verb "witness," there is a noun, "observer," which seems

to take precedence over the verb. There is The ObserverCorps,The

Observer's ookof Birds,and so on. An observeris a person who watches

(listens, and so forth) and noteswhat he sees (hears, and so forth). Theverb "observe" might seem to have been introduced to provide an

answer in one word to the question "What does an observer do?"

rather as the verb "farm" might have been introduced to provide an

answer in one word to the question "What does a farmer do?" As a

consequence it is a bit artificial to talk of people observinghe position of

their limbs, even when they are looking at their limbs and noting their

position. But it does not seem to be any moreartificial to say of a

person who has been asked, as part of an experiment, to try to noticethe position his limbs are in when he wakes up, and who does so, but

without opening his eyes or making ajudgment on the basis of "sepa-

rately describablesensations,"that he has observedheir position. Conse-

quently, to say of such noticing that it is knowledge without observa-

tion is neither to say something the meaning of which is very clear,

nor is it to say something which is clearly true.

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2. The choice of the title "knowledge without observation" might

be taken to mean that Miss Anscombe would not say that a person

feelshis leg to be bent (or that his leg feels bent to him) when he knows

that it is bent without having to look at it or having to rely on feelings

of pressure and the like. It is evident from what she says in the Analysis

paper that this is not in fact Miss Anscombe's view. But I think that

Mr. 0. R. Jones, in his i960-i96i Aristotelian Society paper, "Things

Known without Observation," does take it to be her view. He describes

her view as being that we have "a mysterious acquaintance" with our

limbs, and he says that he is "baffled" as to what sort of mistake there

could be under these conditions. (Jones's bafflement reminds one ofArnaud's reaction to what Leibniz wrote about there being "a more

distinct expression" in one's soul of what happens in some parts of

one's body than of what happens in other parts.)

3. The title "knowledge without observation" readily lends itself

to a misunderstanding such that very many things, with which Miss

Anscombe is not concerned at all, can be said to be "known without

observation." For instance, Mr. A. R. Manser, in his i960-i96i

Aristotelian Society paper, "Pleasure," writes:

What I think Miss Anscombe intended the phrase "knowing without observa-

tion" to imply, and what I certainly intend to convey, is that the question

"How do you know?" in the sense of "What evidence can you cite for your

claim?" just doesn't apply in these cases.

This interpretation, in terms of the inapplicability of questions about

evidence, lets in a great deal. (Indeed, if one accepts what J. L. Austin

says about the proper use of the word "evidence," in Chapter Ten of

Sense and Sensibilia, it lets in practically everything.) If I said that Iwas thirsty, or that I felt hot or tired, or that I was enjoying digging in

the garden, or that I intended having a shower when I had finished, in

no case would questions about my evidence be applicable. On Man-

ser's account they would all be things I know without observation.

But in that case "knowledge without observation" would merely be a

synonym for "introspection."

4. (This is my main objection.) If what Miss Anscombe calls

"knowledge without observation" is to be understood in the mannerindicated at the end of the second section of this paper, then it would

seem that other members of the class of "things known without obser-

vation" will be (a) sounds heard as having their source in a certain

direction, and (b) objects seen as being further away than other

objects. Admittedly such perceptions are often association-mediated

perceptions (for example, we can tell that the balloon is going further

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G. N. A. VESEY

and further away from its seeming to get smaller and smaller) but

they are not exclusively so. Itwould seem thatwhen it is not association-

mediated perception MissAnscombe would have to say that it is not

observation. But it does not seem reasonable to say that a person has

not observedhat one object is further away than another just because

its looking further away than the other can only be explained by

reference to things of which he is not aware (for example, the features

of his sensory apparatus which enable him to see pictures in three

dimensions by using a stereoscope). To say that it is not observation

when a person tells the direction of the source of a sound simply by

by listening (and, perhaps, by turning his head slightly) seems to me to

be a gross misuse of the word "observation."

In short,what MissAnscombecalls "knowledgewithout observation"

seems to me to have nothing whatsoever to do either with observation

or with the absence of observation.

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TERMINOLOGY

I shall call what Miss Anscombe calls "knowledge without observa-

tion" "borrowed-meaning knowledge." This, at least, is a more

positive-sounding title and may suggest (i) that we are concerned with

questions about meaning, (ii) that the meaning of what is said to be

known is given otherwise than by the mode of perception in operation

(that is, that what is said to be known is not the proper object of that

mode of perception), and (iii) that, nevertheless, it is not the same

as association-mediated knowledge (for otherwise it would not havebeen given a different name).

But my real reason for calling it "borrowed-meaning knowledge" is

that I want to take the treasure hunt beyond the end Miss Anscombe

envisaged. I want to characterize a way of knowing things which is

related to the way in which we usually know the position of our limbs as

appropriating something is related to borrowing it.

In order to do this, let me first draw attention to one feature of

borrowed-meaning knowledge. What is said to be known (forexample,that one's leg is bent, that one object is further away than another,

that the source of a sound is to one's right, and so forth) is described

in such a way that a personwho was not capable of borrowed-meaning

knowledge would still be able to understand what is said to be known.

In "appropriated-meaning knowledge," as I shall call it, this is not

so. The description of what is said to be known is such that only a

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KNO WLEDGE WITHO UT OBSERVATION

person capable of the relevant kind of borrowed-meaning knowledge

could understand it. Anyone else would either not understand it, or

misunderstand it. In this respect appropriated-meaning knowledge

is like proper-object knowledge. (It differs from proper-object knowl-

edge in that what is known is not the proper object of the mode of

perception in operation, being dependent for its existence on the

conditions which make borrowed-meaning knowledge possible.)

A person who has merely borrowed something is answerable to the

person from whom he has borrowedit. A personwho has appropriated

something does not acknowledge any such obligation. He has taken

the thing over. Originally it belonged to the other person, but now,

through his having appropriatedit, it is his. These features, interpreted

in terms of meaning, are the features of an appropriated-meaning

description.

Let me now try to give body to this abstract account, with examples.

Suppose that I hear the source of a sound to be to my right, and that

this is not an instance of association-mediatedperception.I may describe

what I am aware of by saying that the source of the sound is to my

right. In that case what I say would be understood by a person whowas incapable of locating sounds merely by listening. But I might have

said that thesound s comingrom my right.This, I submit, could not be

properly understood by a person incapable of locating sounds merely

by listening.

In an article, "The Location of Sound," in Mind (LXVI, I957),

Mr. B. O'Shaughnessy writes:

Reality might conceivably have been such that no creature of any sort ever

at any time located sounds merely by listening to them. This would mean thatsounds would be said to have locality rather in the way in which smells have,so that we would make use of criteria like: (i) what produces the sound,(ii) does the sound grow louder as we get close to what we take to be its origin?

Suppose that just one person was able to locate sounds merely by

listening to them. He might say that he heard a sound as coming from

his right. People hearing him might say to him, "You mean you hear

a sound which is such that you can tell that the object producing

it is to your right, for example, that it is the sound made by trafficand you know the main road to be to your right." If he said that this

was not what he meant, they might say to him, "You mean you hear a

sound and, in some way which can be explained only by the psychol-

ogists, you just know that it is produced by some object to your

right." If he said, "No, I hearthe soundas comingrom myright," they

would be as much at a loss as we should be if someone said he smelled

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G. N. A. VESEY

a smellas comingromhisrightand denied that this was a matter of tellingfromwhat kind of a smell it was that it came from his right, or a matter

of telling from where the smell was stronger where it came from, or a

matter of smelling the smell and "just knowing" where it came from.

Another example. Suppose that I feel a new pair of shoes pinching

my feet. Instead of saying that I can feel that they are pinching me,

I may say that I have feeling, of being pinched, in myfeet.(Advocates of

the local sign theory of the location of bodily sensations will say that

this is an association-mediated perception, but I do not find their

arguments plausible. I have given my reasons in a paper, "The Loca-

tion of Bodily Sensations," in Mind [LXX, i96i].) A person

who was incapable of borrowed-meaning knowledge of where things

were pressing on his body would not be able to understand this. It

would be a case of appropriated-meaning knowledge.

Sometimes it may not be easy to think up an appropriated-meaning

description. This is so in the case of distance perception by sight.

.Suppose that an object is receding from us and that we are aware

that it is receding otherwise than by virtue of an association. In other

words, we have borrowed-meaning knowledge that it is receding.What is the corresponding appropriated-meaning description? I do

not think there is any phrase in regular use. If pressed, I would say

that we are aware of the "increasing visual depth" of the object.

What is known, in appropriated-meaning knowledge, might be

described as a visual phenomenon but not the proper object of vision,

an auditory phenomenon but not the proper object of hearing, a

kinesthetic phenomenon but not the proper object of kinesthesis, and

so forth. It is no more necessarily something about which a personcannot be mistaken than is the possession by an object of what is a

proper object of a given mode of perception. For example, people can,

and often do, disagreewith one another about the direction fromwhich

-asound is coming. We might use an appropriated-meaningdescription

in such a way that it would not be allowed that a person could be

mistaken; but that would be for other reasons than simply that it was

an appropriated-meaning description. For instance, we might say

that a person could not be mistaken about the location of a bodilysensation. If we did this, I suppose it would be for some such reason

as the following. Two or more people can tell, by listening, that the

source of a sound is to their right. But only I can tell, by kinesthesis,

that my shoes are pinching me. Hence, whereas I am not the sole

authority on the direction from which sounds are coming, I am the

'sole authority when it comes to my own bodily sensations. This is a

208




reason (though not, I would think, a very good one) for saying that I

cannot be mistaken about the location of my bodily sensations.

V. KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN

INTENTIONAL MOVEMENTS

The treasureat the end of Miss Anscombe's treasure hunt is, as the

title of her book suggests, an insight into the nature of an intentional

action. Intentional actions are members of the class of things known

without observation. Having rejected her account of, and her title for,this way of knowing things, what can I say on this topic?

The question for me is: when someone moves some part of his

body-say, one of his hands-intentionally, is his knowledge that it is

in a state of motion proper-object knowledge, or association-mediated

knowledge, or borrowed-meaning knowledge?

For it to be proper-object knowledge it would have to be the case

that what it is for a hand to be in motion is something the meaning

of which is given by the experience of moving it. This is clearly notso. A hand's being in motion is as much something to be understood

in terms of what can be seen and touched as is a billiard ball's beingin motion, and a person need never have moved himself to understand

what it is for a billiard ball to be in motion.

Is it association-mediatedknowledge? This is a question about which

there has been, and still is, a great deal of controversy.There are those

who say that a person's knowledge that his hand is in motion, when

he moves it, is based on a learned association, between an "act ofvolition," on the one hand, and the motion of the bodily part, on the

other. They produce what are, on the face of it, plausible argumentsfor

their view. There are others, including myself ("Volition," Philosophy

[XXXVI, i96i]), who dispute that this is so, and question the

validity of the arguments. It is not a matter which can be dealt with

both adequately and, at the same time, briefly. I shall therefore not

attempt to deal with it at all here, but merely state my own conclusion.

This is that a person can know that his hand moved, when he movedit, solely by virtue of the fact that he moved it. In Aristotelian terms

(Physics,Book 8, Chapter 5), he is the "original cause" of the move-

ment, and no "instrumental cause" intervenes between him and the

movement.

For it to be borrowed-meaning knowledge it would have to be the

case that while the meaning of what was said to be known would be

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given otherwise than by the experience of moving, yet the knowledge

would not be by virtue of a learned association. This, I think, is so.

If we grant that a person's knowledge that his hand is in motion,

when he moves it, is borrowed-meaningknowledge, then it would seem

reasonable to expect to find a corresponding appropriated-meaning

description of what he knows. Is there such a description? Some would

say that there is, and that it employs the word "wills": "he wills the

movement to take place." My objection to this answer is that it can so

easily be taken to mean that an instrumental cause does intervene

between the person and the movement. That is, it is an answer which

seems to assimilate a person'smoving his hand to his causing something

to happen by doing something else, as, for instance, he may cause

tears to come to his eyes by thinking of something sad.

Is there a form of words in current English which does not convey

this suggestion, the suggestion that the person does something else to

make his hand move? I do not think so. But I can see no reason why

this should deter us from introducing a form of words to fill the gap.

At one time there may have been no words to describe what I have

called "visual depth." We might say that at that time people did nothave the concept ofvisual depth. They acquired it when some philos-

opher started talking of it and they accepted this talk as meaningful,

as filling a gap in their conceptual scheme, a gap which until then they

may not have recognized as such. Language grows, and it is philos-

ophers who grow it.

I suggestwe might say of somebody: "So far as he, but not necessarily

his hand, was concerned, he moved his hand." This will either strike

one as nonsense, or it will be accepted as meaningful. If it strikes one asnonsense it is likely to be for the same kind of reason as Freud's talk of

unconscious desires struck some people as nonsense. That is, it will be

said that "A moved his hand" entails "A's hand moved," so it is

logically impossible for a person to move his hand without its moving.

VI. WIDER ISSUES: THE EMBODIED MIND

Does what I have been saying have any bearing on any of thetraditional "problems of philosophy"? Does it enable us to see any

of the traditional issues in a new light?

I think it does. It provides a means of stating, in an articulate

fashion, what a number of philosophers seem to have felt, but never

been able to express very clearly, about the way in which the mind is

embodied.

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Consider, for instance, what Descartes says on this topic in his lettersto PrincessElizabeth von der Pfalz. In a letter dated 21 May i643, he

wrote:There are two facts about the human soul on which there depends any knowl-edge we may have as to its nature: first, that it is conscious; secondly, that,being united to a body, it is able to act and suffer along with it. Of the secondfact I said almost nothing [in the Meditations];my aim was simply to make thefirst properly understood; for my main object was to prove the distinctionof soul and body; and to this end only the first was serviceable, the secondmight have been prejudicial.

How are we to understand the manner in which the soul is "unitedto a body"? In his letter of 28 June i643, Descartes answered thisquestion as follows:

What belongs to the union of soul and body can be understood only in anobscure way either by pure intellect or even when the intellect is aided byimagination, but is understood very clearly by means of the senses. Conse-quently, those who never do philosophise and make use only of their senseshave no doubt that the soul moves the body and the body acts on the soul;

indeed they consider the two as a single thing, i.e. they conceive of theirunion; for to conceive of the union between two things is to conceive of themas a single thing.

Later in the same letter he wrote:

It seems to me that the human mind is incapable of distinctly conceiving boththe distinction between body and soul and their union, at one and the sametime; for that requires our conceiving them as a single thing and simultane-

ously conceiving them as two things, which is self-contradictory. I supposedthat your Highness still had very much in mind the arguments proving thedistinction of soul and body; and I did not wish to ask you to lay them aside,in order to represent to yourself that notion of their union which everybodyalways has in himself without doing philosophy-viz. that there is one singleperson who has at once body and consciousness, so that this consciousnesscan move the body and be aware of the events that happen to it.

I suggest that what Descartes meant when he said that the soul and

body are "united," and that this is something which is "understoodvery clearly by means of the senses," could be expressed as follows.

It is not the case that, when I feel a touch as a touch on some part of

my body, this is association-mediated perception.And it is not the case

that, when I move some part of my body, my knowledge that that

part of my body is in motion is association-mediated knowledge. In

neither case do I first have to learn of the association of one thing,

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some quality of a mental event, with another, some disturbance or

movement of some part of my body, and later put this learned associa-

tion to use. My awareness of myself as embodied is not mediated:

it is immediate. It is an instance, not of association-mediated but of

borrowed-meaning knowledge.

G. N. A. VESEY

University f London

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Vesey - Knowledge Without Observation

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