VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time

Ahmed Khurshid, Xuan Zou, Wenxuan Zhou, Matthew Caesar, P. Brighten Godfrey

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)

April 16, 2013

ONS 2013

Open Networking Summit

Challenges in Network Debugging

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http://groups.geni.net/geni/chrome/site/thumbnails/wiki/TangoGENI/OF-VLAN3715_1000.jpg

Complex interactions

Misconfigurations

Unforeseen bugs

Difficult to test the entire network state

space before deployment

Effects of Network Errors • Allow unauthorized

packets to enter a secured zone in a network

• Make services and the infrastructure prone to attacks

• Make critical services unavailable

• Affect network performance

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?

Network

Network Debugging Techniques

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Configuration Verification Traffic/Flow Monitoring

Software using Cisco NetFlow http://snmp.co.uk/scrutinizer/

Limitations of Configuration Verification

• Prediction is difficult

– Various configuration languages

– Dynamic distributed protocols

• Prediction misses implementation bugs in control plane

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Configuration

Control plane

Data-plane state

Network behavior

Input

Predicted

Our Approach: Data-plane Verification

• Less prediction

• Closer to actual network behavior

• Unified analysis for multiple control-plane protocols

• Can catch control-plane implementation bugs

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Configuration

Control plane

Data-plane state

Network behavior

Input

Predicted

Data Plane Verification in Action

• Our first tool, Anteater*, uses data plane verification technique to debug network operations

• We evaluated Anteater with UIUC campus network

– 178 routers

– 1,627 FIB entries per router (mean)

• It revealed 23 real bugs in 2 hours

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* Haohui Mai, Ahmed Khurshid, Rachit Agarwal, Matthew Caesar, P. Brighten Godfrey, and Samuel T. King, "Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater", ACM SIGCOMM, August 2011.

Finds problems after they occur and (potentially)

cause damage

Can we run verification in real time?

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Block dangerous changes

Provide immediate warning

Checking network-wide invariants in real time as the network evolves

Need to verify new updates at high speeds

Challenges in Real-Time Verification

• Challenge 1: Obtaining real-time view of network

– Solution: Utilize the centralized data-plane view available in an SDN (Software-Defined Network)

• Challenge 2: Verification speed

– Solution: Off-the-shelf techniques?

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No, too slow!

Our Tool: VeriFlow

• VeriFlow checks network-wide invariants in real time using data-plane state – Absence of routing loops and black holes, access

control violations, etc.

• Provides a set of functions to write custom query algorithms – Check forwarding behavior of specific packet sets – Verify effects of potential changes

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VeriFlow

New rules

VeriFlow Operation

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Network Controller

Generate equivalence

classes

Generate forwarding

graphs Run queries

Diagnosis report • Type of invariant violation • Affected set of packets

Rules violating network invariant(s)

Good rules

Limit the Search Space

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VeriFlow

Generate Equivalence Classes

Updates

Equivalence class: Packets experiencing the same forwarding actions throughout the network.

Fwd’ing rules

Equiv. classes

0.0.0.0/1 64.0.0.0/3

1 2 3 4

0.0.0.0/0

Experiment

• Simulated an IP network using a Rocketfuel topology – 172 routers

• Replayed Route Views BGP traces – 5 million RIB entries – 90K BGP updates

• Checked for loops and black holes

• Microbenchmarked each phase of VeriFlow’s operation

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Performance Result

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97.8% of the updates were verified within 1 millisecond

Experiment (cont.)

• Mininet OpenFlow network – Rocketfuel topology with 172 switches, one host per switch

• NOX controller, learning switch application

• TCP connections between random pairs of hosts

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NOX Controller + Switch Application

VeriFlow TCP SYN

Effect on Flow Table Update Throughput

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Up

dat

e th

rou

ghp

ut

(msg

/sec

)

Overhead of VeriFlow is low

Conclusion

• VeriFlow achieves real-time verification – A layer between SDN controller and network devices – Handles multiple packet header fields efficiently – Runs queries within hundreds of microseconds – Exposes an API for writing custom invariants

• Future work – Handling packet transformations efficiently – Dealing with multiple controllers

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Thank you

khurshi1@illinois.edu

http://www.cs.illinois.edu/~khurshi1

Backup Slides

Data Plane Verification in Action • FlowChecker [Al-Shaer et al., SafeConfig 2010]

– Uses BDD-based model checker

• Anteater [Mai et al., SIGCOMM 2011] – Uses SAT-based model checking – Revealed 23 real bugs in the UIUC campus network

• Header Space Analysis [Kazemian et al., NSDI 2012] – Uses set-based custom algorithm – Found multiple loops in the Stanford backbone network

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Find problems after they occur and

(potentially) cause damage

Running time: Several seconds to a few hours

Computing Equivalence Classes

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(device, rule) pairs

(don’t care/wildcard)

2. Represent Forwarding Behavior

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VeriFlow

Generate Forwarding Graphs

Generate Equivalence Classes

Updates

All the info to answer queries!

Equivalence Class 1

Equivalence Class 2

3. Run Query to Check Invariants

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VeriFlow

Generate Forwarding Graphs

Generate Equivalence Classes

Run Queries Updates

Black holes, Routing loops, Isolation of multiple VLANs, Access control policies

Good rules Bad rules

Diagnosis report

•Type of invariant violation •Affected set of packets

API to write custom invariants

• VeriFlow provides a set of functions to write custom query algorithms – Gives access to the affected set of equivalence classes and

their forwarding graphs

– Verification becomes a standard graph traversal algorithm

• Can be used to – Check forwarding behavior of specific packet sets

– Verify effects of potential changes

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Performance Result

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97.8% of the updates were verified within 1 millisecond

Effect of Equivalence Class Count

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Number of ECs strongly influences verification time

Number of ECs affected by new rule

Effect of Multiple Header Fields

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Data link source

Data link destination

Network source

Network destination

Data link type

More fields -> More equivalence classes -> Longer verification time

Related Work • Header space analysis: Static checking for networks, NSDI 2012

• A NICE way to test OpenFlow applications, NSDI 2012

• Abstractions for network update, SIGCOMM 2012

• Debugging the data plane with Anteater, SIGCOMM 2011

• Can the production network be the testbed?, OSDI 2010

• FlowChecker: Configuration analysis and verification of federated OpenFlow infrastructures, SafeConfig 2010

• Network configuration in a box: Towards end-to-end verification of network reachability and security, ICNP 2009

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Demo Network

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A(1)

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A(1)

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A(1)

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Name(ID)

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