Vegetius and His Times

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VEGETIUS AND HIS TIMES

Past discussions on Vegetius' epitoma rei militaris have tended to focus on two questions. The first of these concerns thedating of the work, with the general consensus favouring either Theodosius I or Valentinian III as the emperor for whom itwas written. The second revolves around the debate on whether the antiqua legio that is described in Book Two is afabrication, constructed from a variety of sources by Vegetius, or whether it existed in reality; and, if it did exist, to whatdate it can be assigned.[i]

However in this work I intend in the main to avoid these questions whenever possible and concentrate instead upon whatrelevance the work had to the period in which it was written, and to consider whether the recommendations therein werein any way implementable in the context of the late-fourth or early- fifth century Roman Empire. [i] On dating of the work, see footnote 2; on the reality and dating of the antiqua legio, see e.g. Parker, H.M.D. 'TheAntiqua Legio of Vegetius', Classical Quarterly 26 137-49.DatingThe first problem when dealing with Vegetius concerns that of the dating of the piece. As I have already stated, I do notintend to go into the various proposed dates in depth; all I intend to say here is that I believe that the proposition in favour

of dating the work to the reign of Theodosius I carries more conviction, mainly due to those arguments put forward byMilner in his introduction to the translation.[2] I therefore intend to concentrate the discussion on those points relevant toconditions prevailing in the reign of Theodosius, noting in passing any main differences between the situation under hisrule and that of Valentinian III. This is due to the fact that the piece may date to the later reign and so may lead to amajor change in the interpretation of the work.Recent ViewsThe other main point of interest in the Epitoma has been what Goffart has described as the dismissal of the fundamentalconcepts of recruitment, training and fortification emphasised by Vegetius.[3] This he ascribes to the Industrial Revolutionand the idea in the industrialised and economically-minded West that any attempt at mechanisation and economicadjustment can, in light of the past three centuries, be seen as foresight on the part of an ancient author; in this case'Anonymous' and the de rebus bellicis, written around A.D. 370.An example of this bias can be seen in Vogt, where Anonymous' treatise is given sixty three lines of flattering textwhereas Vegetius is given only three lines - and these are used to discredit him by comparison with Anonymous.[4]Furthermore, Vegetius' emphasis on the legions of the past, whether these are real or conjectural units, now results inderision from authors such as Vogt who see him as an antiquarian who 'continues to advocate the old, long outdatedmilitary system and thinks solely in terms of defensive warfare.'[5] In my view this is a completely unsatisfactory state ofaffairs. Such a very biased attitude has resulted in the impractical (and in some cases ridiculous) inventions ofAnonymous being given precedence over Vegetius' proposals, and so the ideas of Vegetius regarding training andmorale are dismissed without consideration. The situation is utterly unacceptable; training and morale are two of the most basic tenets of warfare and can be seen as

two of the main reasons behind the rise of Rome, not to mention the later victories of disciplined and heavilyoutnumbered European troops against Third World states during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Vegetius'theories on these matters can be seen as relevant not simply to his own but to all periods of history. Furthermore, thethought that he was 'reintroducing' an old measure is also debatable; 'By the fifth-century, the gap between past andpresent was so great that someone recommending the old-time legionary organisation was, in effect, an innovator,proposing a sharp break with current military tradition and a new start in a different direction'[6] and in my opinion thetime-lapse between the two periods is too often forgotten by historians and classicists alike.As Goffart notes, the '....downfall of Vegetius was when it fell into the hands of military historians who judged him on hishistorical accuracy.'[7] The unfortunate repercussion of these judgements has been the dismissal of his work and theapparent amazement that he was still seen in the seventeenth century as one of the basic military handbooks. Thus he isdescribed by Gordon as 'Vegetius and his trite maxims', with the conclusion that '....what the Renaissance generalsderived from [him] was only the generalised advice....that to a lay mind seems self-evident.'[8] The emphasis on the

phrase 'lay mind' to my mind sums up the basic fault with this argument. Gordon is working in a period where the study ofwarfare, but not its practice, is accepted as a norm and where a large number of books are dedicated to its teaching. Theresult is that many of the maxims in Vegetius are to modern eyes simplistic. On the other hand, what appears to be beingforgotten here is that there was little access to material of this nature until comparatively recently, and that, furthermore,what appears to an armchair historian as basic and self-evident whilst sitting in a library is likely to be groped for in panicwhen the same individual is faced with an actual battle where he is expected to make instantaneous decisions.

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The straight-forward and basic maxims given by Vegetius are of the kind that can be remembered easily and are relevantto most (if not all) battlefield situations from his era to the present. This is what explains Vegetius' use as a militarymanual, and modern dismissal can therefore be seen as failing to take into account the salient factors.Having cast doubts upon some of the modern interpretations of the pertinence of Vegetius I will now attempt toreinterpret the evidence in order to look at his work in respect to his own era. As the work in question is concerned withmilitary matters, it seems reasonable to start with the topic needing the greatest coverage.

The ArmyMilner states in his introduction that the Epitoma is 'not a true Art of War, but a political and strategic tract.... acommentary on present day inadequacies.'[9] There is no doubt that this is the case, yet Milner also claims that it is'..evident that the driving force behind Vegetius' reforms was to down-grade the role of all non-Roman ethnic forces.'[10]The error here lies not in the overall effect that Vegetius' reforms would have had (as, if implemented, they would haveplaced the legions once again above the auxilia in status), but in the assumed motive behind the reforms. I believe thatthe epitoma reveals that Vegetius does not want to down-grade the non-Romans, but to up-grade the role of the legions,which are to be once again manned solely by citizens. At first glance, the idea may appear to be pedantry of the highestorder, yet by looking at the epitoma from the different perspective a whole new interpretation of the work appears.

Firstly, taking into account the idea that Vegetius is trying to raise the status and change the role of the legions ratherthan dismiss the auxilia, it is notable that there are many opportunities within the work to question the reliability of theauxilia that are ignored. Although it may be postulated that saying them in a Germanic-oriented court would have beenrisky, there can be no doubt that it would have been possible to angle references so that the any powerful German'stribal loyalties could be circumvented and anger avoided.[11] This can be best illustrated when we look at where Milner states that the epitoma highlights the '..doubts cast on thereliability and training of foreign auxilia.'[12] There is only one sentence in the entire work where Vegetius clearly andunequivocally states that the auxilia might be disloyal, and this is in III.9 where all matters relating to pre-battlepreparations are covered. The sentence, 'What is the loyalty and courage of our auxilia?', follows questions on the loyaltyand bravery of the enemy's forces and precedes questions on the morale of the Roman army, and so should be seen asa comment within the context of the passage and not be taken in isolation as a criticism. In addition, at II.3 Vegetiusattacks the entry of Roman citizens into the auxilia, so if he is consistently questioning the loyalty of the auxilia, then he

must de facto be seen as questioning the loyalty of the Roman citizens themselves, which hardly seems likely given thenature of the work.[13]On the point of the upgrading of the legions it is also significant that in Book Three Vegetius uses the order legio, auxiliaand vexillatio instead of the ranking order in his own time of auxilia, vexillatio and legio, and I believe this to be a crucialhint as to the real motive behind his reorganisation.[14]On the matter of the loyalty of the auxilia one final statement needs clarification, as in this matter the dating of the textcan be seen as crucial. There is no mention by Ammianus of any cases of anti-barbarian feeling by the Romans exceptin the panic engendered by Adrianople, yet by the time of Valentinian III it appears that there is a large body of feelingagainst non-Roman troops. It is feasible that the change of attitude was due to the defection of up to 30,000 barbariantroops to the Visigoths under Alaric following the execution of Stilicho in 408. If this is the case, then it is likely thatVegetius' concern solely over the role of the non-Roman forces can be seen as reflecting the mood in the earlier reign ofTheodosius. Historians such as Milner are allocating later beliefs to a work for which it is not necessarily applicable.Vegetius' repeated references to the loss of the ability to build marching camps can also be questioned. A comparisonwith Ammianus Marcellinus shows that, far from reinforcing this view, Ammianus may be seen as giving evidence to thecontrary. There are frequent mentions of 'camps' in Ammianus, and although doubts remain as to whether Ammianus'camps were traditional Roman marching camps, with one being invariably constructed at the end of aday's march, the evidence does appear to point to Vegetius being mistaken on this point.[15]If Vegetius is mistaken, it may be the result of his not being associated with the army in an official capacity and so havingcontact only with those units in permanent attendance upon the emperor. Furthermore, Vegetius is criticizing the inabilityof the legions to construct marching-camps. The auxilia had never been expected to do so. In theory, non-citizens couldnot serve in the legions, so the loss of this ability by the legions cannot be assigned to the use ofbarbarians. As a consequence, Milner's theory that the phenomenon is an illustration of barbarian recruitsaffecting the efficiency of the Roman legions is no longer tenable.[16]The fact that he was not in close contact with the field forces may also be behind Vegetius' impression that the troopswere allowed by Gratian to stop wearing armour and helmets, a claim dismissed by Gordon as 'sheer nonsense'.[17]. Apossible interpretation is that Vegetius is basing his views on the (hypothesised) petitioning by the guard units that they




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be allowed to stop wearing armour when on ceremonial duty in the presence of the emperor. Such a reinterpretationdoes cause a problem, since Vegetius' following comment relates thatthe lack of armourwas the reason behind thelosses to the Goths, with the unprotected infantry simply being mown down by Gothic archers. But on the other hand thisalso can be explained: given that Vegetius was a patriotic Roman, the lack of armour would be a sensible reason behindthe long-running problems with the Goths, as it would in some way explain both the dramatic loss at Adrianople and theensuing military problems associated with the defeat. The alternative would be to admit possibleRoman inferiority.Consequently, it may be seen as a convenient excuse for current problems, in which case it is possible that Vegetius'statement that the army was allowed by Gratian to discard their armour may not be wholly accurate: it actually refers to

only a small proportion of the Roman forces, and then only when on parade duty.A continuing reassessment of the work can also lead to a change in the interpretation of Vegetius' statement that theearlier legion did not need auxilia. A straightforward reading of the chapter in question reinforces just that impression, butthere is a difficulty with this interpretation. Although Vegetius states categorically that the auxiliashould not be required,as the ancient army had its own integral light troops,earlier in the same chapter he states that they were both useful andomnipresent. The apparent contradiction can, however, be solved if we see Vegetius as referring to a situation akin toArrian's Ektaxis Kontra Alanoi, in which the auxilia play a secondary role to the legions by supporting them on the wingsand being ready to pursue whilst the legions bear the brunt of the fighting. This interpretation may be seen as beingreinforced by the statement that the Romans conquered the world thanks to their legions, coupled with the idea that the'auxilia were always joined to the (old) legions in battle as light troops.' Whichever way that the chapter is viewed, thatVegetius saw the need for an 'integrated' army reflects highly upon the clarity of his vision and, as Ferrill remarked, in thisrespect he rises far above his modern military critics.[18]

As a consequence of the above discussion, the theory expressed by Milner that Vegetius is a criticism of thebarbarianisation of the auxilia can now be seen as mistaken. The work is actually an attack on the incorrect use of theauxilia as elite reserves and a censure on their greatly exaggerated social rating in that they now rank higher than thelegions.PoliticsThe Roman court is usually perceived to have been composed of a mix of Germanic and Roman high-ranking officials bythis period of the empire. The result has been to see the Roman military service as permeated with large numbers of non-Romans whose loyalty has been questioned, since it was split between the empire and their 'Germanic' relatives.[19]Jones has pointed out that, 'After Stilicho's fall the supreme command was never, as far as we know, held by a German,

yet according to Cameron Stilicho was 'one of the first' barbarian generals who came to play a 'critical role in imperialpolitics.'[20] The confusion is further compounded by the fact that Stilicho was in fact only half-Vandal and in his outlookwas wholly Roman: it is hard to believe that a 'barbarian' leader, 'without allowing his barbarian bodyguard to defend him,voluntarily submitted to the party sent to Ravenna to arrest and execute him.'[21] The solution to the dilemma lies not inthe answer to the question 'who was a German?', but in the question 'what was the difference between a 'Germanic'leader such as Stilicho and a 'Roman' leader like Aetius?' The answer appears to be that there is no differencewhatsoever, as the downfall of both Stilicho and Aetius seem to have been brought about by their association with'barbarians outside the rule of the empire'.[22] The idea that Stilicho was a barbarian is therefore mistaken, as hisreaction to his arrest was the same as that of the highest-regarded citizens of the earlier Republic and Empire. The factthat his troops rebelled after the massacre of their families by Roman citizens is hardly surprising and should not belinked in any way to his actions.[23]There is no mention in Vegetius of any of the problems associated with having Germanic commanders of high rank withinthe army. It may be possible to view his statement that the cavalry had advanced thanks to Germanic influence was aploy aimed at pleasing high-ranking German officials, yetthishardly seems likely given the overall tone of the work.[24]The result is that Vegetius can nowhere be seen ashighlighting or criticisingthe influence of German generals within theRoman framework.The corresponding conclusion is that the role of such generals has probably been vastly overplayedby historians. The role of the Germanic leaders in the Fall of the West can only be seen to start with the downfall ofStilicho, a Roman, and the release upon the West of large Germanic armies led by Germans whose loyalty to the stateand whose presence at court was minimal, and who cannot in any way be equated with non-Romans serving the empirefrom within the framework of the military hierarchy.Society, Finance and Recruitment'The great flaw ..(of Vegetius) ..is that the army could not be treated in isolation from its social context.'[25] Byemphasising the societal difference between the late empire and the late republic/early empire Gordon highlights oneaspect of Vegetius that is particularly striking. Far from putting forward ways in which any shortage of recruits can beovercome, in the proposed legion there are five cohorts which are of standard, quingenary size and one which is ofdouble, milliary strength. All of these are 'picked troops': far from there being a shortage of recruits, Vegetius is




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concerned with the quality of the conscripts.[26] That he fails to acknowledge any problems in obtaining enough troopsfor the army is surprising given that the theorem of manpower shortage is now entrenched in works on the period, almostentirely due to the repeated legislation of the emperors bearing on the raising of recruits.[27]At first glance the situation appears to be a case of Vegetius ignoring the realities around him, but there is a way ofexplaining the conundrum. The introduction of the legislation by Diocletian can be taken as being part of hisreorganisation of the armed forces in which he enlarged the army. This resulted in his needing large numbers of recruitsin a short period of time, and consequently he enacted the law in order to raise the troops needed.

The retention of the legislation is usually seen as a desperate measure by later emperors attempting to keep the army atthe necessary strength to fulfil its duties. On the other hand, it could be for different reasons entirely. Due to theoverwhelming and corrupt bureaucracy the later emperors are generally depicted as being short of revenue for therunning of the empire, yet as Jones notes the levy was not recruited every year from every province: instead a tax (theaurum tironicum) was exacted.[28] As a consequence, it is possible to hypothesise that the legislation became simply away of gathering extra revenue. If this was the case, then the failure of Vegetius to mention the problem is explained, asis the reasoning behind the decision by Valens to allow the Tervingi to settle in Roman territory: they would supply troopsand so 'instead of the levy of soldiers which was contributed annually by each province, there would accrue to thetreasuries a vast amount of gold.'[29] Furthermore, a novel of Valentinian III dated to 444 in which he 'openly admits that his plans for a larger army are beingfrustrated by the fact that the revenues do not suffice to provide food and clothing for the existing forces, much less for

the new recruits that are being enrolled' also adds weight to the idea that the problem was more one of finance thanrecruitment.[30] The concept is reinforced by two further novels '...dated 440 and 443, [which] suggest that in the West alevy of recruits was by this time an emergency measure, specially decreed.'[31] Consequently, rather than being a pieceof legislation attempting to secure recruits for the army, its constant repetition may have been a cover used by emperorsdesperate to raise the revenues which they sorely needed.When discussing the finances of the empire, the hypothesis that the epitoma was an attack upon the financial policy ofthe emperor can also be mooted. Vegetius makes it clear that to his mind the hiring of mercenaries was an inferior policyto that of training recruits.[32] Again, the theme running through the work at this point is seen as being that ofreintroducing the old, legionary practices and of recruiting within the empire itself, yet it should not to be overlooked thatVegetius reaffirms the notion that there is no recruiting problem within the empire. What is even more interesting is thatthe repetition of ideas on finance and cost-cutting fit in well with Sablayrolles idea (following Neumann) that 'Vegece etait.... sans doute comes sacrorum largitionem' (Vegetius was .. without a doubt the 'Comes Sacrorum Largitionem) and so

in charge of Imperial finaces. If this was the case, then it explains comments within Vegetius such as 'skills can achieveanything as long as adequate funding is not spared', since Vegetius would be familiar with financial affairs and it is inthese matters that he is most qualified to speak.[33]Having postulated that one of the reasons behind the work was to criticise the economic policy of the emperor, with theperception by Vegetius that a 'bad and good army cost the same', we now move on to the one persistent and undeniablecriticism of Vegetius; namely, the perceived lack of training within the army.[34]TrainingAs was just stated, 'Vegetius chief criticism....of the Roman army of his day continually revolves around.... the inferiorityof recruits and the lack of training which they are given.'[35] That Vegetius states this is without doubt and there isnowhere within the work that this complaint does not loom large, with the consequence that the later army has oftenbeen seen as inferior in training, and hence quality, to the legions of the later Republic and early Empire. Vegetius'validity notwithstanding, historians have recently begun to question the accuracy of the concept, with the result thatVegetius' comments on lack of training are now being held up to question. A leading proponent of the new school is Ferrill, who doubts Vegetius for the reason that '.....even defeated Romanarmies inflicted heavy losses as their discipline meant that they did not quickly run away.'[36] The observation is a validone, and the result is that there appear to be irreconcilable differences between historians such as Ferrill, and Vegetius.On the other hand, a solution has already been offered to the quandary. This is the proposal that Vegetius was onlyfamiliar with the guard units stationed permanently around the emperor. From the time of Constantine it appears that the greater number of guard units were either the 'elite' of the army or wereraised from non-Roman peoples, usually of Germanic origin. Even from the early period of the empire there werecomplaints about the efficiency of the Praetorian Guard. By the time of Vegetius Romans serving in the guard unitswereprobably not career soldiers but men who had purchasedtheir 'commissions'. They are unlikely to have accepted therigours of vigourous training. Furthermore, as barbarian unitsmay havebeenexpected to fight in their traditional manner,with little need for training, the notion that these elite units were severely lacking in discipline and training is hardlysurprising. Therefore the claim that Roman '....defeats were due to failure in leadership, not training, discipline or morale




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as at Adrianople the army stood and fought' can be explained and accepted.[37] As a final validation of the point, the passage in Ammianus describing the battle of Adrianople carries some weight;[38]'While all scattered in flight over unknown paths, the emperor, hedged about by dire terrors, and slowly treading overheaps of corpses, took refuge with the lancers and the Mattiari, who, so long as the vast numbers of the enemy could besustained, had stood unshaken with bodies firmly planted On seeing him Trajanus cried that all hope was gone, unlessthe emperor, abandoned by his bodyguard, should at least be protected by his foreign auxiliaries. On hearing this thegeneral called Victor hastened to bring quickly to the emperor's aid the Batavi, who had been posted not far off as a

reserve force; but when he could find none of them he retired and went away. An d in the same way Richomeres andSaturninus made their escape from danger.'On the other hand, the rehabilitation of the later army is not yet complete. Even one of its chief proponents stillsubconsciously discounts them as a fighting force. For example, Ferrill states that between 406 and 410 Roman infantrycould not stand up to the barbarian forces, which is a clear contradiction of the preceding sentence where the problem isnot one of standing up to the enemy, but of not having the discipline to pursue the enemy.[39] Having now investigated the subject, it appears that Vegetius' complaints on the need to train the army may not bereferring to the whole army, but only to those around the emperor, with the ensuing conclusion that in this, his maincriticism, Vegetius may be in error.

Strategy and TacticsOne of the main features of the epitoma is Vegetius' advice on strategy and tactics. Due to problems of space, only thosebearing most on topics concerning general tactics - with special relation to the period in which he was writing - will becovered. It was noted above that many of his maxims on warfare have been dismissed as trivial and self-evident, and thishas already been questioned.[40] What is undeniable is the relevance of his advice concerning 'guerrilla' warfare.[41] When covering the period after the arrival of the Tervingi in the empire and their subsequent revolt, Ammianus furnishesevidencewhich suggests that the most effective counter to the presence of enemy forces is by harassment rather than astraightforward battle - a concept which is reinforced in hindsight by the defeat and death of the emperor Valens atAdrianople.[42] As a consequence, it is possible to see Vegetius' proposals as a continuation of Ammianus' narrative andnote that the advice was followed with success throughout the remainder of the Western Empire: whenever there was aproblem with barbarian infiltration, the first attempts to nullify it seem to have been by 'scorched earth' tactics.[43]

The emphasis placed by Vegetius on guerrilla warfare can be coupled with the obvious advice on how not to be caughtoff-guard oneself. Yet the repeated idea that the Roman forces were expected to be outnumbered, whilst possibly tosome degree a literary topoi, appears to have been the case in reality.[44]Yet whilst looking at the piece's relevance to its period, these factors, whilst obvious, are often overlooked for just thatreason. In many cases, such as Julian's campaigns in Gaul, the number of Germanic warriors causing problems withtheir raids appear to have been comparatively small, and in these cases, as in Ammianus, Vegetius gives the mosteffective response as being the ambush of the invaders rather than any attempt to instigate a formal battle.[45] Howeverthe factor of the small size of these forces could disguise the fact that they could coalesce to form a large army, ashappened before Adrianople. Therefore, the advice in Vegetius may have more than one purpose. The ambush of the enemy could give victory at lesscost to oneself, it would bolster the morale of your own troops if they are repeatedly victorious in even small campaigns,and the ambush could be utilised as a method of keeping the enemy forces dispersed whilst they are dealt withpiecemeal. Furthermore, the advice can serve as a reminder that after Adrianople the Romans would be less inclined torisk a formal battle. The strategy appears to have been exactly that propounded later by Vegetius of engaging the enemyin small, easily won combats in which the morale of the army was restored. Consequently, the relevance of the text to theperiod after Adrianople cannot be too highly stressed. The work offers a clear insight into the minds of the Romanaristocracy after the disaster and gives a clear, and surprisingly sharp, series of instructions on how to reverse both theloss of the morale of the army, and to begin to win back lost ground.Also within the context of Adrianople, the chapter concerned with the precautions to be used in battle give examples,such as dust-storms, that actually occurred during the course of the conflict. Therefore, the advice is not only relevant butcan be taken as a strong indictment of both Valens' and his military advisors' conduct on the day of the battle.[46]Other aspects of warfareSiege Warfare




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On the subject of cities and sieges Vegetius includes thirty chapters of Book Four. As the chapters cover most of theproblems associated with siege warfare in all periods of the empire, I do not intend to cover this topic in a great deal ofdepth. There is only one point throughout the passages in question which I intend to comment on; namely, that ideas onsiege warfare may be classed as more appropriate to the East than the West. The western 'barbarians' were (and are)notorious for their inability to besiege cities, but to say that it is therefore inappropriate in a Western book is to completelymiss the mark.[47] The fact that the situation in question may never arise does not mean that it never will. Furthermore, itis also necessary to include the chapters for completeness, and therefore any claims that the passages may be irrelevantare completely unfounded.

The CavalryAs has already been noted, Vegetius does not include a detailed section on the training and deployment of cavalry,declaring that there is nothing 'to be gained from books' on such matters.[48] This in part is due to the influence of non-Romans such as Goths and Alans, but this is only in equipment, not in the art of war.[49] That the Goths, Alans andHuns were classed as cavalry par excellence needs no explanation, especially when it is possible that the later changefrom the traditionally-armed Roman cavalry to mounted troops with bow may have been due to the specific influence ofthe Huns following their use by Aetius and their absorption into the army after the break up of the Hunnic empire. Yet the fact that these events came after Vegetius leads to questions concerning the situation in his period. Unfortunatelythe evidence is very slight and there is no direct proof of any greater ability of lthe ater cavalry when compared to earliertroops. However, the fact that the cavalry were now ranked so highly may, simply by their elevation, show that they were

at least accepted as being an improvement on their earlier counterparts.[50]The NavyThat the cavalry are classed so highly is a striking contrast to the navy, where his criticism is scathing. The remarks areaimed not at the inefficiency of the fleet when it existed, but at the fact that the fleet was usually allowed to rot after it haddone its job and no new one was built in its place until an emergency arose in which one was needed. Apart from apossible use as proof that the work was written before the Vandals acquired Africa and a fleet - as they are nowherementioned in the text - the passage is evidence of Vegetius' foresight, pertinence and common-sense. When the Vandalsgained possession of a fleet the Romans found it difficult to counter them, both before and after their sacking of Rome.Civilian and Military Division

Within the text there are two major criticisms of the conduct of the citizens with regard to armed service. The first of thesestates that a proportion of the populace are diverted 'partly to the enjoyment of private leisure, partly to civiliancareers.'[51] In part at least this was the result of a continuation of the policy of Diocletian, in that there was a distinctivesplit between civilian and military careers, the result of which was the funnelling of individuals into one sphere or theother, with very little cross-career moves allowed. As a consequence, many individuals that may have been militarilygifted entered the civilian sector and were lost to the army. Vegetius appears to have recognised this, and to have furthernoted that to many the lure of a civilian career was that they would remain civilians and avoid the tough regime of thearmy camp. A further jibe at the idleness of the modern citizen was that when they could be induced to join the military,many joined the auxilia and not the legions; ' the labour of serving in them (the legions) is great, the arms areheavier, the duties more frequent, the discipline more severe. To avoid this many flock to the auxilia, where the sweat isless and the rewards come sooner.'[52]As a measure to restore things to their rightful place, Vegetius proposes throughout the work that the citizens be allowedto serve only in the legions. Furthermore, Vegetius criticises the use of literate troops for both 'special services' and for'private business', especially in regard to their being retained at public expense to serve private interests. Apart frombeing a practice he dislikes - since it is linked to his financial post and here we return to the idea of expenses being paidfor no return to the state - it again reinforces Vegetius' dislike for idleness within and disdain for the main body of thecitizenry.[53]The Empire of Valentinian IIISo far the main thrust of the argument has been directed towards the assumption that the work was written in the reign ofTheodosius I, and I have attempted to highlight in the course of the investigation where reassessment is needed to relatethe piece to the later period, but there is one area where this has not yet been attempted, and this concerns the maindifference between the two periods. In the time of Theodosius the empire was whole and united, but by Valentinian'sreign the Germans held most of Gaul, Spain and North Africa, and the Empire had been irrevocably split between Eastand West.As a final note, throughout the work the promotion of the antiqua legio is prominent. In Book 1 (at I.1) Vegetius compares




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the modern Romans with the Gauls, Germans, Spaniards , Africans and Greeks of antiquity. This can beinterpreted simply as being a direct comparison with the great enemies of the past. Yet the territories these ancientenemies occupied were by Vegetius' day mainly occupied by Germanic forces, or were part of the separate EasternEmpire. It may be possible, therefore, to see in Vegetius' proposals a desire to return to the form of army which hadconquered these areas in previous centuries. In this way, the West would reconquer lost territory, regain her previousmajesty, and provide a lesson in the use of armed force to the East.

ConclusionWe now have to arrive at an answer to the question of whether the reforms suggested by Vegetius were applicable, andof whether the work is relevant in the era in which it was composed. In answer to the first question, the main obstacle that the reforms would have had to overcome would have been theconditioning of the citizen body to the contemporary system. Dismissal of modern assumptions concerning lack ofrecruits results in the theory that adequate manpower for the project would have been available, yet there may still havebeen a problem thanks, as Vegetius himself observes, to the fact that citizens now preferred to serve in either a civiliancapacity, or at worst, the auxilia. Here we can perceive one of Vegetius' main faults: his blindness to the fact thatattitudes had changed since the early empire. The outcome of any attempted reform may have resulted in a real lack ofrecruits and an active avoidance throughout the empire of military service.

Although it is nowhere implicitly stated in the work, Vegetius appears to have been aware of the far fewer number oflegions in the earlier periods. His acknowledgement of the fact may be alluded to at III.1, where he allots variousnumbers of troops for campaigns of different severity. It is possible that he assumes that there would be little need for new recruits, since the large number of men needed toform the older, larger legions could be raised simply by reassigning citizens already serving in existing units, including theauxilia. On the other hand, Valentinian III attempted to expand the army and failed due to lack of capital. This neitherhints at problems with recruits nor does it necessarily mean that Theodosius would have suffered the same cash-flowproblem with the resources of the whole empire behind him. As a result of these observations, I believe that therestoration of the antiqua legio was, in isolation, feasible. Yet the fact that these aspects of reform were possible should not blind us to the realisation that the reformation of thelegion, whilst in itself a simple thing, would have resulted in unimaginable problems when it came to reorganising the

logistics and other apparatus that was currently in existence for the running of a completely different army. The reformsusually credited to Diocletian must be seen, not in the light of a single, momentous event, but as the culmination of a longseries of minor reforms which gradually transformed the whole army to a point where what Diocletian did was mainly tofinalise the details of a continuous evolution that had been in progress for over a century. When seen from thisperspective, it is soon realised that although in principle the reforms proposed by Vegetius would have been feasible, anyattempt to change the whole structure of the military machine in one bound would have resulted in grave disruptionswhich are likely to have left the empire completely at the mercy of its enemies.[54]As a final point on the matter of reform, we must turn to the reign of Justinian and his successors. Justinianspolicies can be seen as the beginning of a reversal of the policies of Diocletian and Constantine. The uniting the civilianand military roles in one post reminiscent of the earlier provincial governors - can be taken as a realisation thatin some respects the older system was preferable, and may be seen as a vindication of Vegetius' ideas. Yet the fact thatneither Justinian nor any of his successors reverted to the old legionary-based army may also be a recognition that thetime for the legions had passed and that there was no return. That the piece is relevant to the period of its writing can be seen without doubt. Although in several areas Vegetius maybe mistaken, such as the suggested request to Gratian that army be allowed to discard their armour, I find that the furtherone delves into the work the more questions it raises on the assumptions that have been made by modern historians.One example of this is the assumed difficulty of recruiting, which is nowhere mentioned in the text. The work also raisesquestions about theories on the ethnic composition of the army and its officers, as there are no allusions to Germanicleaders anywhere within the text which, along with the other matters already mentioned. This leads me to believe thatwhere Vegetius and modern authorities disagree with each other about contemporary values and events, it is Vegetiusthat is likely to be the more correct and relevant on most counts. Ian Hughes [1] On dating of the work, see footnote 2; on the reality and dating of the antiqua legio, see e.g. Parker, H.M.D. 'TheAntiqua Legio of Vegetius', Classical Quarterly 26 137-49.[2] For a summary of the evidence, see R. Sablayrolles, 'Bibliographie sur l'Epitoma Rei Militaris', Cahiers du Groupe de




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Reserches sur l'Armee Romaine et les Provinces III (1984) 139-46. I am most inclined to follow Theodosius as thereferences in the work to Rome seem to indicate, as Milner points out (e.g. iv, pref.), that Rome appears to represent asymbol of inviolability, and the date must therefore be pre-410 and its sacking by Alaric.[3] Goffart, W. Rome's Fall and After, London, 1989 49.[4] Vogt, J. The Decline of Rome, London, 1993 153-55.[5] Ibid. 153-55.[6] Goffart, Rome's Fall..., 1989 75.[7] Ibid. 72.

[8] Gordon, C.D. 'Vegetius and his Proposed Reforms of the Army', in Evans, J.A.S. (Ed), Polis and Imperium: Studies inHonour of Edward Togo Salmon Toronto 1974 45-48.[9] Milner, N.P., Vegetius; Epitome of Military Science, Liverpool 1996 Introduction, xxviii.[10] Ibid. xxix.[11] I believe that the 'Germans' were not the homogenous group that they are usually taken to be. Historians such asGoffart (Rome's Fall..., 1989 111-133) have begun to question the relevance of the term 'Germanic' being used to coverall tribes between the North Sea and the Black Sea as this implies a theoretical idea of unity amongst them that isnowhere in evidence until the Carolingian period. Consequently, the idea that, for example, the Goths may not want tofight the Franks as they were both 'Germanic', or that Burgundian leaders at court would be angered by slights cast atthe Alamanni can be dismissed.[12] Milner, Vegetius 1996 xxix.[13] Ammianus makes few references to disloyalty in Germanic troops; eg.xiv, 10.7 (alleged);xxix, 5.20; xxxi, 10.3

[14] e.g. Veg. III, 4; III, 10[15] e.g. Amm. Marc. probable earthworks; xv, 4.9, xviiii, 2.11, xxiv, 4.6, xxiv, 5 12: mention of Praetorian Gate; xxv, 6.7:shields only; xxiv, 8.7.[16] Milner, Vegetius 1996 xxix.[17] Veg. I.20; Gordon in Evans, Polis and Imperium 1974 42.[18] Ferrill, A The Fall of the Roman Empire, 1986 128.[19] see above, footnote 11.[20] Jones, A.H.M. Later Roman Empire, 1990 177: Cameron, A. The Later Roman Empire 1993 102. The argument alsoignores the fact that Aetius was half Scythian.[21] Cameron, A. The Later Roman Empire 1993 149[22] Jones, A.H.M. Later Roman Empire, 1990 175ff.[23] e.g. Cameron, A. The Later Roman Empire, 1993 149.[24] Veg. I.20; III.21.

[25] Gordon in Evans, Polis and Imperium, 1974 44[26] Veg. I, Chaps. 1-7.[27] e.g. Jones, A.H.M. 1990 201; 619.[28] Jones, A.H.M. Roman Empire, 1990 615.[29] Jones, A.H.M. Roman Empire, 1990 619.[30] Jones, A.H.M. Roman Empire, 1990 619; Amm. Marc. xxi, 4.4.[31] Jones, A.H.M. Roman Empire 1990 201; 619.[32] Veg. I.28[33] Veg. II.18.[34] Veg. II.3[35] Gordon in Evans, Polis and Imperium, 1974 51.[36]Ferrill, A., The Fall... 1986 29.[37] Ibid. 65[38] Amm. Marc. xxxi, 13.8-10.[39] Ferrill, A. The Fall... 1986 129.[40] see above.[41] Veg. III, 9-10.[42] Amm. Marc. xxxi, passim.[43] For example, the Gothic inroads into the western empire under Wallia which were controlled, at least to some extent,by cutting the Gothic supplies and starving them into submission. In this context, it is an unremarked phenomenon thatafter Adrianople the Romans very rarely indulged in face-to-face battles, and what is more surprising is that when theydid they usually emerged victorious, despite the poor modern reputation of their troops; commentators on the Fall of theWest very rarely attempt to explain this fact.[44] Care on march, III.6; outnumbered, III.20.[45] Amm. Marc. xxxi, passim; Veg. III, 9-10[46] Veg. III.11. refs to Amm.[47] An example of siege warfare in the West is that of Adrianople following the battle.[48] Veg. III.26.[49] Veg. I.20.[50] It is interesting to note that, despite their reputation, they are depicted in a less than favourable light in Amm. Marc.e.g. xxv, 1.7-9 (a cavalry unit which had given ground forced to march with the baggage); xxvi, 12.37 (the rout of the right-




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wing cavalry at Argentoratum).[51] Veg. I.28.[52] Veg. II.3.[53] Veg. II.19.[54] The situation is reminiscent of the reforms that were under way in Russia prior to the German invasion in 1941 whichallowed the German army to penetrate Russia to such devastating effect.

BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary SourcesAmmianus MarcellinusVegetiusSecondary SourcesBarnes, T.D. 'The Date of Vegetius' Phoenix 33(1979) 254-7

Birley, E. The Roman Army Papers 1929-1986 Amsterdam 1988Cameron, A. The Later Roman Empire London 1993Ferrill, A. The Fall of the Roman Empire; the Military Explanation London 1986Gauld, W.W. 'Vegetius on Roman Scout-Boats' Antiquity 64 (1990) 402-6.Goffart, W. Rome's Fall and After London 1989Gordon, C.D. 'Vegetius and his Proposed Reforms of the Army' INEvans, J.A.S. Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon Toronto 1

Jones, A.H.M. The Later Roman Empire (2 Vols) Oxford 1990Ladner, G.B. 'On Roman Attitudes Towards Barbarians in Late Antiquity' Lactor 7 (1976) 1-26.Milner, N.P. Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science Liverpool 1996Parker, H.M.D. 'The Antiqua Legio of Vegetius' Classical Quarterly 26 137-49Sablayrolles, R. 'Bibliographie sur l'Epitoma Rei Militaris de Vegece' Cahiers du Groupe de Reserches surRomaine et lesrovinces III (1984) 139-46.Vogt, J. The Decline of Rome London 1993



Vegetius and His Times

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