KENJI ITO*

Values of “pure science”: Nishina Yoshio’s wartime discourse betweennationalism and physics, 1940-1945

HSPS, Volume 33, Part 1, pages 61-86. ISSN 0890-9997. ©2002 by The Regents of the University ofCalifornia. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to Rights and Permissions,University of California Press, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

*Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo, 4-6-1Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904, Japan; kenjiito@post.harvard.edu. Japanese per-sonal names are written in the traditional order (family name first, given name second),except when they appear as authors of writings in European languages. Romanization ofJapanese words generally follows Kenkyûsha’s New Japanese-English dictionary, but incase of personal names, I used the person’s preferred form when I am aware of it. I usedcircumflexes to indicate long vowels. I would like to thank Alexis de Greiff, David Kaiser,Gentarô Katô,and Keiko Nagase-Reimet.1. On complementarity, see, Henry J. Folse, The philosophy of Niels Bohr: The frame workof complementarity (Amsterdam, 1985); Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s philosophy of physics(Cambridge, 1987); Gerald Holton, Thematic origins of scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein(Cambridge, 1988), 99-146.2. Oskar Klein and Yoshio Nishina, “Über die Streuung von Strahlung durch freie Elektronennach der neuen relativstischen Quantendynamik von Dirac,” Zeitschrift für Physik, 52 (1929),853-868; Yoshio Nishina, “Die Polarisation der Comptonstreuung nach der DiracschenTheorie des Elektrons,” Zeitschrift für Physik, 52 (1929), 869-877; Yazaki Yuji, “Klein-Nishina no kôshiki dôshutsu no katei: Riken no Nishina shiryô wo chûshin ni, (How wasthe Klein-Nishina formula derived?: Based mainly on the source materials of Y. Nishina inRiken),” Kagakushi kenkyû , 41 (1992), 81-91, 129-137.3. Like the Germans, the Japanese did not get far enough to have to decide whether to builda bomb or a reactor; therefore, “nuclear power project” is more appropriate than “atomicbomb project” for their endeavor.

NISHINA YOSHIO FOUND in 1940 a new application of Niels Bohr’s“complementarity.”1 Nishina had studied in Copenhagen between 1923 and 1928.His most important work was in theoretical physics, relativistic treatments ofCompton scattering, particularly the so-called Klein-Nishina formula.2 After hisreturn to Japan in late 1928, Nishina built a strong school of atomic physics. Basedat the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (or Riken) in Tokyo, Nishinamentored many able young physicists, among others the later Nobel laureateTomonaga Sin-itiro, and laid the foundation for the development of modern phys-ics in Japan. During the war, as Japan’s supreme authority of atomic physics, Nishinaled one of the principal wartime nuclear power projects.3

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Nishina’s adaptation of complementarity appeared in an article in December1940. In this article, Nishina pointed out two apparently contradictory claims: Whileuntil recently the problem of the “overemphasis of science” had been loudly criti-cized, now everyone called for “promotion of science.” Nishina suggested thatthese claims were in a complementary relation in Niels Bohr’s sense. The appar-ently incompatible views had different areas of applicability. The problem of theoveremphasis of science should be addressed in the matter of mind, while the pro-motion of science should be advocated in the material issues. These two were notalways clearly distinguished, just as the position and momentum of an electronwas not always exactly determined. According to Nishina, in the matter of “mind,”Japan had traditional beautiful morality and spirituality, whereas in the matter of“science,” Japan had been underdeveloped.4

In about a year, immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, Nishina applied asimilar logic on the issue of national defense. Nishina claimed that, while the re-cent achievements of the Japanese army were, “evidently,” mainly made possibleby the superior “spirit” and training of the “loyal and brave” Japanese soldiers,what was similarly important was the weaponry and military equipment developedby Japanese military engineers. Although the “spirit” played an important role,these material conditions should not be neglected. Therefore, he concluded, Japanshould not rely on her “superior” spirit, but also try to develop her science andtechnology so that Japanese soldiers would be equipped with these two weapons,mental and material.5

Thus, in a way Niels Bohr probably never imagined, Nishina appropriated hismentor’s pet idea for political propaganda. But exactly for what? Was Nishina afellow traveler of the Japanese fascists, or was he taking advantage of Japan’smilitary adventure to fund and advance science? Although the wartime Japanesenuclear power project receives much less publicity today than its German counter-part, similar moral questions can be discussed concerning Japanese scientists’ actsduring the war. In this paper, I establish Nishina Yoshio’s moral attitude toward thewar on the basis of his large corpus of popular writings from 1940 to 1945 regard-ing science and war. I analyze these writings in terms of the question posed above:Was he collaborating for Japan’s war effort, or making the war an excuse to pro-mote “pure science”?

Some literature on the subject exists. Hirosige Tetu, in his classic study of theinstitutionalization of science in modern Japan, depicts Nishina as one of the mostactive proponents for the mobilization of science for war, who, moreover, remainedcheekily in power after the war.6 Yamazaki Masakatsu, another Japanese historianof science, in his work on Nishina’s nuclear energy project, suggests that Nishina

4. Nishina Yoshio,”Sôhosei to busshin ichinyo,” Chisei, 3 (Dec 1940), 162-167.5. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa sensô to kagaku gijutsu no shinkô,” Waseda Daigaku shimbun(14 Jan 1942), 3.6. Hirosige Tetu, Kagaku no shakaishi: Kindai Nihon no kagaku taisei (Tokyo, 1973), 168,210, 278.

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7. Mark Walker, Nazi science: Myth, truth and the German atomic bomb (New York,1995), 2.8. Nishina Yoshio, “Senjika no kiso kagaku,” Chûôkôron, 57:657 (May 1942), 95. Nishinaused the words kiso kagaku (basic or fundamental science) and junsui kagaku (pure sci-ence) interchangeably. I use the word “pure science” to refer to both.9. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary modernism: Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar andthe Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984).10. This classification roughly follows Mimasaka Tarô, Fujita Chikamasa, and WatanabeKiyoshi, Yokoahma jiken (Tokyo, 1977).

used military research as a “shield” to protect young scientists in Japan from beingdrafted by the military. Nishina’s disciples, including Tomonaga Sin-itiro, heldsimilar views. In his studies on science in Nazi Germany, Mark Walker depictsmost of his actors in “shades of gray.” 7 I limn Nishina’s portrait in a similar way.

Nishina identified himself as a scientist (or rather a practitioner of what hecalled “pure science”). He defined “pure” or “fundamental science” as the investi-gation of nature with the sole purpose of deepening knowledge about it, whereasthe goal of applied science was to use the results of “pure science” for the benefitof people.8 He considered it his task to work for a deeper understanding of nature,not to find useful applications of science. However, Nishina was an ardent nation-alist, who had an extremely strong sense of responsibility for the fate of his coun-try. The two commitments did not necessarily pose a dilemma for Nishina; hebelieved his argument that “pure science” was good for his country, if not neces-sarily for winning the current war.

Jeffrey Herf, in his book Reactionary modernism, points out the tenuous rela-tions between nationalism and appreciation of science and technology in early-20th century Germany, where politically conservative “mandarins” had to endorsescience and technology because of their utility for the nation.9 Wartime Japan light-ened a similar tension between science and political conservatism.

1. WARTIME THOUGHT CONTROL IN JAPAN AND THE “SLAVE’S LANGUAGE”

Wartime publications should not be taken at face value since Japanese authorshad to express cryptically whatever discontent they felt. Accounts written after thewar help us no more, since they often contain apologia and post hoc justificationof wartime collaboration with the Japanese military, which was summarily stig-matized in postwar pacifist Japan. Nishina’s wartime writings might appear shock-ingly jingoistic. We need to realize, however, that he wrote under a strict censor-ship. From 1940 to 1945, Japanese newspapers and magazines were strictly super-vised by the military and government. Thought control stood in the frontline of“ideological warfare” (shisôsen). The government had six main means to enforceits control on periodicals.10

The Book Censorship Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry

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11. Hatanaka Shigeo, Oboegaki Shôwa shuppan dan’atsu shôshi (Tokyo, 1965), 176.12. Ibid., 58.13. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63.14. Nakamura Tomoko, Yokohama jiken no hitobito (Tokyo, 1979), 244-245.

(Naimushô Keihokyoku Toshoken’etsuka) took charge of censoring publication.After September 1941, the censorship took place before circulation. The publish-ers submitted manuscripts to the Censorship Section, which, if it spied problems,called up the publisher a few days later. The censors might merely admonish thepublisher, or order deletion of some parts of the manuscript, or ban its circulationaltogether. If the materials to be deleted in part were already printed, the publisherhad to tear out the banned pages. Prior clearance did not guarantee that the publi-cation had no major fault, however. The Censorship Section or another branch ofthe government or the military might criticize it later, and even press criminalcharges on the publisher and the author for a work that had passed the censorship.If the book or magazine was already on sale, all the employees of the publishingcompany had to go to the police stations, which had confiscated the material fromthe bookstores, in order to tear off the banned pages under the supervision of thethought police.11

The second means of control was blacklisting authors. The thought police en-listed volunteer informers from the publishing and academic worlds, identifieddangerous authors, and urged the publishers to refuse their work. The police had acomprehensive card index of writers and encouraged the publishers consult it.12

The police resorted to this tactic because the style of the resistance literature didnot always allow the police to indict the authors.13

Third, the military often resorted to a more direct intervention. The CabinetInformation Bureau (Naikaku Jôhô Bu; hereafter CIB) or the military would callup the editors of major magazines and tell them what to write and what not towrite. Established in 1941 as successor of the Cabinet Information Division, CIBcentralized Japan’s information control. Upon its inauguration, it incorporated theBook Censorship Section of the Home Ministry Police Bureau. Military personneloccupied many of CIB’s posts. At the same time, the Army Information Division(Rikugun Jôhôbu) continued its operation to release and manipulate military-re-lated information, holding regular meetings with magazine editors. At such meet-ings, an army officer would read aloud comments on recent issues of the majormagazines, evaluating their degree of collaboration with the military. By keepingscorecards of the publishing companies’ contribution with the war against the UnitedStates and making the results known, the Japanese military pressured publishersinto conformity. The military also applied a carrot, almost literally, along with itssticks. At the same time, these meetings were the opportunities of business enter-tainment. At these meetings the publishers enjoyed, at the military’s cost, com-paratively extravagant meals when the food supply was extremely tight.14

Fourth, the government regulated publishing companies through the distribu-tion of paper. A draft plan of the distribution of paper was devised by the Japanese

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15. Janice Matsumura, More than a momentary nightmare: The Yokohama incident andwartime Japan (Ithaca, 1998).16. Mimasaka et al. (ref. 10), 184-193.17. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63; Nakamura (ref. 14), 27-28.18. Nakamura (ref. 14).

Association of Publishing Cultures (later the Japanese Association of Publishing).Although apparently a non-governmental organization, the association’s presidentsand council members were appointed by the government and served as its accom-plices. Moreover, as a part of industrial reorganization, which the wartime emer-gency justified, the government had the power to liquidate uncooperative publish-ing companies. It targeted influential publishers of a liberal bent, such asChûôkôronsha and Kaizôsha, for which Nishina often wrote. These companiesreceived increasingly less paper, and were eventually encouraged to “dissolve them-selves voluntarily,” which they did in 1944, although (or possibly because) by thentheir once influential and prestigious magazines, Kaizô and Chûôkôron, had be-come totally aligned with the official ideology.

Fifth, the government and the military persuaded some authors, editors, andpublishers to join their ideological campaign. These fellow travelers would pub-lish attacks against a certain article, author, or idea. Profit being their principalconcern, most publishing companies, including large commercial ones likeKôdansha, only cooperated with the government. Some right-wing intellectuals orentrepreneurs and publishing companies established by them enthusiastically at-tacked liberal and resistant publishers and authors.

Finally, the government would resort to arrest and torture of authors and edi-tors. It did not apply this measure often until later in the war except against com-munists, but the danger was always there since anyone could be accused of beinga communist. During the Yokohama Incident (1942 to 1945), the Kanagawa thoughtpolice made a series of arrests with warrants issued by the Yokohama district attor-ney and based on a charge of attempts at reconstruction of the Japanese Commu-nist Party.15 It started with the arrests of Mr. and Mrs. Kawada, returnees from theUnited States, and was built on a piece of a photograph taken at a party wheredissident author Hosokawa Karoku treated the young magazine editors in his home-town. More than thirty people, many of them editors employed by liberal publish-ers, were arrested. The unsanitary conditions and poor food in the detention roomswere life threatening. A new inmate in ill health might die in a few months. Hordesof bedbugs and fleas assaulted the prisoners every night; the lice were more be-nign since experienced prisoners could catch them. When all of Japan was starv-ing, inmates could expect only the worst food possible.16 Suspected thought crimi-nals also had to undergo interrogations with physical and mental torture. The ac-cused in the Yokohama Incident had nothing to say to satisfy their inquisitors, whowere often sadistic.17 The torture by the thought police resulted in four deaths injail and two deaths immediately after release.18

Inconsistency and lack of effective organization in Japan’s “totalitarianism”

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19. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 62-63.20. Ibid., 68.21. Ibid., 68-69.22. Ibid., 68-69.

caused similar incoherence in its thought control. The censorship varied arbitrarilyand inconsistently between censoring organs. For example, the army severely criti-cized the writings of the so-called Kyoto School philosophers, who held an ideal-ist, neo-Kantian, Hegelian position with a Buddhist flavor. Two of its representa-tives, Nishida Kitarô and Tanabe Hajime, praised Japan’s political system, theinvasion of China, and the war against the United States. Their justification of thewar brought them many ardent admirers, even in the Navy. The Army, however,condemned the way they justified the war as “too Western.” Because of the Amy’sstrong antagonism toward the Navy, the Navy’s support did not help the KyotoSchool philosophers.19

Two days after Pearl Harbor, on December 9, 1941, the CIB summoned anemergency meeting. An officer from the Book Section read out a memorandum tomagazine editors. Its first part directed:20

1. Emphasize that the Japanese Empire had no choice but to wage war againstAmerica and Britain to survive and preserve its prestige.2. Argue that the true cause of the war was the selfish ambition of the enemy forworld domination.3. Emphasize that the new world order is based on the ideal of the “whole worldunder one roof,” and aims to put every country in its rightful place.

The second part of the memorandum elaborates and instructed the journal editorshow to mislead the Japanese people into believing that Japan was winning the warand that continuing the fight would have victory. The editors should:21

1. Strongly emphasize not only that the war will turn out well, but also that Japanhas an absolute strategic advantage.2. Give people confidence in national strength, especially the national economicpower.3. Try to expose political, economic, and military weaknesses of Japan’s enemies,use and undermine their self-confidence and neutral countries’ reliance on them.4. Imbue our people with firmly rooted animosity against America and Britain. Atthe same time, try to obliterate from their minds any notion of dependence onthese countries.5. Prepare people for a long war.

Then, the memorandum details the kinds of writings that require “special precau-tions.” The censors banned not only all criticism against the government and themilitary, but also any suggestion of differences of opinions within Japan. The righ-teousness of the war should never be doubted. At the same time, the hope for apeace must be suppressed. The editors should avoid:22

1. Any discourse that distorts the true meaning of the war, and libels the rightful

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23. Ibid., 69-70; William Miles Fletcher III, The search for a new order: Intellectuals andfascism in prewar Japan (Chapel Hill, 1983), chapt. 7.24. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 171-172.25. Hatanaka (ref. 11), 80, 185.

attitude of the Empire.2. Any discourse that distorts the origin of the war, and libels the acts of thegovernment or the Supreme Command.3. Any argument suggesting that the government expected aid in the war fromGermany or Italy.4. Any suggestion of a conflict of opinions between the government and the mili-tary.5. Any indication that people are not following government instructions or thatnational opinion is divided.6. Any hint of disturbances in China, Manchuria, or other colonies.7. Any statement that might foster antiwar sentiment or war weariness.8. Any encouragement of antimilitarism.9. Any argument that might demoralize the people (The authorities consider anysuggestion for a concession to the United States and Britain or a cease-fire asvery dangerous. The strictest precaution is required).10. Any argument that might disturb domestic security.11. Any argument that distorts the true meaning of the foundation of the EastAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere by claiming that our country had territorial ambi-tions, to attain which we would inevitably resort to force.

That in effect prohibited all criticism of the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,”the official euphemism for Japan’s occupied territories.23

Most magazine editors acquiesced, gave up their independence, and acceptedthe terms imposed by the government and the military while occasionally express-ing their views and publishing opinions they approved. Similarly, authors whoopposed government policies tried to hint at their positions within the imposedlimitations or remained silent. One such author recollected that, during the PacificWar, he had had to use “slave’s language,” the language imposed by the govern-ment, hoping that readers would decipher his true intent under its militaristic dis-guise.24

Since editors knew the censorship rules, authors allowed them to revise theirwritings. Editors might change titles to fit the political situation, as when Hatanaka,as an editor of Chûôkôron, changed Shimizu Ikutarô’s article, “Amerikanizumu”(Americanism), to “Teki toshiteno amerikanizumu” (Americanism as enemy). Theychanged an assertion of a fact into a conditional statement. They deleted problem-atic paragraphs and restored coherence by changing wording. They inserted jingo-istic adjectives and adverbs. Rather than taking offense, authors appreciated theeditors’ revisions for protecting them from the thought police.25

Nishina chose to write within the imposed limitations. Along with other Japa-nese intellectuals, he had to employ “slave’s language” to continue writing and to

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attempt to improve the situation. His militaristic and nationalistic language shouldnot be taken at face value. Still, it would be a mistake to project the image ofpostwar pacifist Japanese scientists backward and to regard everything Nishinawrote as an antiwar statement in disguise or as an opinion forced from him againsthis true intent. Another point to keep in mind is Nishina’s reputation for sincerity.After the war, when president of Kagaku Kenkyûjo (a private company reorga-nized from Riken), its employees’ union accused its management of “insincerity.”The charge was a ritual of labor disputes that nobody took seriously. Nishina,however, did take it seriously, and refused negotiation until the union apologized.26

Nishina’s rhetoric often took the following form. He started with nationalisticstatements about Japan’s “amazing” military strength or the imperial family, andpraised the “loyal and brave” Japanese soldiers. Then he presented his views, of-ten not as his own, but as “what the enemies would think,” or “what was com-monly perceived in the United States.” In another rhetorical move, he would ap-propriate official propaganda to declare his opinions about the promotion of sci-ence. Critics of the regime frequently compared the propaganda of the allegedAsian paradise to the actual situation, tacitly criticizing the government and themilitary of their failure to meet the advertised ideals. It is therefore a mistake tothink that Nishina supported Japan’s aggression in Asia simply because he re-peated the term “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

2. PRE-PACIFIC-WAR YEARS: PRO-AMERICANISM AND MOBILIZATION OFSCIENCE

Nishina’s writings in 1940 and 1941 display his nationalism and his argumentsfor the wartime promotion of “pure science” and mobilization of science, for hisappreciation of American science and technology, but also his high esteem for the“sound ideas” of the American “intellectual class.”

During the first months of 1940 the Japanese military manipulated public opin-ion against Britain, but tried not to antagonize America. In the United States, how-ever, voices protested against exporting war-related materials to Japan for use againstChina and worried about the war’s damage on U.S. interests there. In January1940, the Trade Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Statesand Japan expired six months after the U.S. government declared its intention notto renew it. This action was meant to warn Japan against further violation of theNine-Power Pact of 1922 that affirmed China’ sovereignty and independence. Lapseof the treaty also would enable the U.S. to restrict its export of strategic materials

26. Koizumi Kenkichirô, “Yôroppa ryûgaku jidai no Nishina Yoshio,” Shizen (Nov 1976),58-67); Tomonaga Sin-itiro, Yamazaki Fumio, Takeuchi Masa, Sakata Shôichi, NakayamaHiromi, and Tamaki Hidehiko, “Zadan: Nishina sensei wo shinonde,” Hirakareta kenkyûjoto shidôsha tachi, Tomoanga Sin-itiro chosakushû, Vol. 6 (Tokyo, 1982 [1961] ), 57-151,on 89; Tomonaga et al., all disciples of Nishina agreed that “insincere” was a most inap-propriate description of Nishina.

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27. J.L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and his laboratory: A history of theLawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1989). American scientists’ impressionsof Japanese physicists as depicted in this book make an interesting contrast to Nishina’sview of American scientists.28. Nishina Yoshio, “1939-nen Nôberu butsurigakushô jushôsha, Rôrensu,” Kagaku chishiki,20:1 (Jan 1940), 110-114, on 114.29. Nishina Yoshio, “Amerika no kagaku,” Risô, 14:6 (Jun 1940), 655-666, on 655.30. Ibid., 666.

to Japan. Although trade between the two countries did not at first change much,relations deteriorated rapidly during 1940. Japan marched into French Indochinain August and signed an alliance with the Axis countries in September. The previ-ous June the United States had banned the export to Japan of scrap iron and air-plane fuel; the ban spread to all forms of iron and other metals in December.

In 1940, the Japanese government allowed journalists to write favorably aboutthe United States. The award of the Nobel prize in physics to Ernest Lawrence latein 1939 gave Nishina Yoshio an opportunity to write about American science.27 Inan article of 1940, Nishina recalled Lawrence’s willingness to help foreign scien-tists, including Nishina and other Japanese physicists to build cyclotrons, and praisedLawrence in the highest terms:28

I have never met Lawrence in person. Yet, as appears from his letters and work,he must combine harmoniously a passion for science, a boldness of ideas typicalof Americans, an ability to carry out those ideas, and indefatigable dili-gence....Moreover, he has a generous mind that deals fairly with people and hesincerely enjoys helping others. This is why he is so respected.

Later the same year, Nishina praised the rapid development of science throughoutthe United States, likening it to the “beauty of hundreds of flowers blooming inspring time.” The flourishing of science and technology in the United States was ageneral good for “world culture”—provided that “the American people remainsound. Otherwise, the United States might abuse its tremendous scientific capa-bilities, which would lead to horrifying results.” Nishina’s balanced conclusionreflected the uncertain situation of mid-1940. “I do not see any such tendencyamong the American people today, but I do not know about the distant future.”29

It was Ernest Lawrence who gave him hope that the American people (or its“intellectual class”) would not abuse its strength:30

I was totally moved by Lawrence’s letters, which showed his sincere desire thatscientists collaborate with one other across national boundaries for the advance-ment of science. Of course, not all Americans are like Lawrence. Yet, for the sakeof the international scientific community, it is a matter of congratulations that atleast one person like Lawrence exists. Although still young, he, being a Nobellaureate, will eventually have an important position in the American physics com-munity. The fact that he behaves as he does means that America’s scientific com-munity and intellectual class have been developing in a healthy way. I know afew other Americans, and all of them are men of sound ideas.

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Exaggerating the superiority of other countries in certain respects is a commonstrategy in Japan to promote a certain field. Nishina frequently mentioned scienceand technology in the United States as the goal toward which Japan should aim,the example for Japan to follow. Nishina himself followed Lawrence’s style ofscientific research, high energy physics through large instruments, which requiredoutside financial support and, therefore, effective advertisement. Yet, in his articleabout science in the United States, he praised the American “intellectual class”and ranked science in the United States as a world good, which he would not havedone had he intended merely to promote science in Japan. Nishina did not write sofavorably about Germany and Italy, even after Japan’s alliance with them. At thefirst news of the alliance, Nishina was heard to say, “So, Japan has joined theworld’s rascals.”31

Nishina’s pro-Americanism of 1940 suggests that he opposed Japan’s attackon the United States as strategically or logistically foolish and as personally offen-sive, and that he disapproved of Japanese racial chauvinism. Nishina resorted tothe dualism of mind and matter to avoid a direct confrontation with the officialideology. However, he could not have found the alleged superiority of the “Japa-nese race” persuasive. He candidly admitted Japan’s inferiority to the United Statesin scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities. In particular, most of itsphysics was second rate.32

Nonetheless, much of Nishina’s writings sound jingoistic. He repeated war-time slogans by the Japanese government, such as the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”(Dai tôa kyôeiken) or the “Advanced Defense State” (Kôdokokubô kokka). In December 1941, presumably before Pearl Harbor attack, hewrote concerning the economic blockade by the United States, Britain, China, andthe Netherlands:33

Faced with this development, everyone keenly realized that we have to rely onour own power to defend our country. We have to build with our own hands anadvanced defense state, and achieve the self-sufficiency of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. We must devote all of our knowledge, blood, and materials, tomake a great march toward the ideal of our country....For this purpose, we cancertainly rely on our Japanese spirit inherited from our ancestors. We firmly be-lieve that our sincere patriotism and loyalty are unsurpassed in the world. I haveno doubt that these qualities are essential for the defense state, as shown by all theinternational warfare we have experienced shows.

31. Kobayashi Minoru, “Riron kenkyû,” in Tamaki Hidehiko and Ezawa Hiroshi eds., Nihonno genshi butsurigaku no akebono (Tokyo, 1990), 98-103, on 103.32. Ishihara Shinobu, Nishina Yoshio, et al., “Kagaku zatsudan,” Kaizô, 22 (Jul 1940), 498-424, on 402; Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to kotoba,” Shinano kyôiku, 55 (Sep 1941), 20-39, 37.33. Nishina Yoshio, “Kankô no kotoba,” Zukai kagaku (Dec 1941), 2. This is the prefacethat Nishina gave to a popular science magazine Zukai kagaku (originally intended to be aseries of books). I write more on this magazine below.

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After this appeal to nationalistic sentiment comes a reference to the state of Japan’sscience and a cry to improve it:34

Yet, are these [spirit, patriotism, and loyalty] enough for us to complete the Ad-vanced Defense State, and to win all wars? Do they guarantee that we have thenatural resources to establish the self-sufficiency of the East Asian Co-ProsperitySphere? Having seen the armaments and cultures of world powers with highlyadvanced science and technology, and the degree of progress of science and tech-nology in our country, we cannot help feeling that we should give our very besteffort to science and technology.

The content of this paragraph was dangerous. It is likely that the preceding ultra-nationalistic assertions were intended as protection.

Nishina’s effort to promote “pure science” coincided with the mobilization ofscience in Japan. By 1940, the battles in China begun on July 7, 1937, had becomea full-scale war that Japan was rapidly depleting their already scarce resources.Wartime economical control tightened, lowering the standard of Japanese domes-tic life. From May to September in 1939, a clash between Japan’s Kwantung Armyand Soviet Union’s mechanized troops under the command of Georgii K. Zhukovalong the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, ended in a completevictory for Russia.35 The Japanese newspapers reported this incident as a victory:the “power of spirit” of the Japanese soldiers withstood the “mechanical force” ofthe Russian Red Army. Nonetheless, the defeat, along with the example ofGermany’s Blitzkrieg, seems to have convinced some of the Japanese high com-mand of the urgency of mechanization and modernization of Japan’s armament36

According to Hirosige Tetu, Japan’s serious mobilization of science to warstarted in 1940, with the “outline of the plan for science mobilization” (kagakudôin keikaku yôkô), which the cabinet approved in April of 1940.37 In May of thenext year, the cabinet approved a more detailed “General plan for the establish-ment of a new science and technology system.” This move, championed by “re-formist bureaucrats” including nationalistic engineers like Miyamoto Takenosuke,coincided with efforts to support Prince Konoe’s administration and to end thestalemate in China.38

34. Ibid.35. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (2 vols., Stanford, 1985).36. “Nomonhan jiken no zenbô: Kyôi! Waga shôhei no seishinryoku, sorengun no kikairyokuni dôô taikô,” in Shimbun shûsei: Shôwashi no shôgen [1939] (Tokyo, 1985), 451-452.37. Some mobilization had been underway since the mid-1930s; Kawamura Yutaka, “KyûNihon Kaigun no denpa heiki kaihatsu katei wo jirei toshita dai niji taisenki Nihon nokagaku gijutsu dôin ni kansuru bunseki” (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Ph. D. Disserta-tion, 2001), chapt. 2.38. Masakatsu Yamazaki, “The mobilization of science and technology during the secondworld war in Japan: A historical study of the activities of the Technology Board based uponthe files of Tadashiro Inoue,” Historia scientiarum, 5 (1995), 167-181, on 167-168;Kawamura (ref. 38), 43-44; Hirosige (ref. 5), 451-452; Ôyodo Shôichi, Miyamoto Takenosuke

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Against this background, in 1941, Nishina Yoshio began writing about scienceand war. He saw in it a great opportunity to reconcile his identity as a scientist withhis nationalistic sentiments. He promoted “pure science” (nuclear physics) in atime of scarce resources as he argued for the need for science and engineering inmodern warfare.39 His argument for “pure science” sounded three themes. Oneconcerned the use of science in cultural politics, especially in the occupied territo-ries. In 1940, in relation to the science policy in China, Nishina suggested im-pressing the Chinese with Japan’s scientific achievements “to make them obedi-ent:” and he suggested building a scientific institution to employ them, “and dogreat work.”40 Secondly, Nishina pushed science as the key to technology. “Fromthe industrial perspective of the development of the East Asian Co-ProsperitySphere...technology in our country requires a great leap. And the basis of technol-ogy is none other than science.”41 Most importantly, Nishina stressed the impor-tance of science and technology in developing weaponry. He used the possibilityof unleashing nuclear power as an argument for pursuing “pure science.” He ob-served that nuclear energy had become the “focus of the American scientific world,”and that American laboratories specializing in the field no longer received foreignvisitors.42 Implicit here is Nishina’s assumption that “pure scientific” research mightresult in a “wonder weapon,” not in improving existing conventional weaponry.

Returning to his defense of “pure science,” Nishina pointed to its increasedimportance as the import of new technologies ceased in wartime Japan.43 Tostrengthen this argument, Nishina appropriated the official propaganda of the“Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Japan had been able to develop itsindustry despite her poor scientific capability, he said, because it relied on im-ported science and technology. Japan had to develop its own science and technol-ogy and establish advanced scientific research traditions to make the “East AsianCo-Prosperity Sphere” truly self-sufficient.44

to kagaku gijutsu gysôsei (Tokyo, 1989). It is not clear whether there was a direct causalrelation between the Nomonhan Incident (the defeat in Manchuria) or Germanly’s Blitz-krieg and this plan.39. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to sensô,” Chisei (April 1941), 22-29, on 27.40. Ishihara and Nishina (ref. 32), 422. Nishina lectured in Manchuria in January 1942;Nishina Yoshio, “‘Kagaku no Manshû’ shikan: Manshûkoku Kyôwakai KagakugijutsuRengôbukai ni nozomite,” Kagaku asahi (May 1942), 106-107, on 106. The lecture wasorganized by Manshûkoku Kyôwakai (a Japanese organization for anti-communist propa-ganda and war mobilization in Manchûria, and the intended audience was probably Japa-nese scientsts.41. Nishina (ref. 39), 22; Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku to gijutsu no shinkô,” Kaizô (Jan 1941),356-361, on 360.42. Nishina (ibid.), 358-59.43. Nishina (ref. 39), 27.44. Nishina Yoshio et al., “Nihon kagaku no genjô (zadankai),” Bungakukai (May 1941):50-64, on 56 and 59; Nishina (ref. 32), 36.

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It would take time for pure research to bear a fruit. Nishina warned against the“illusion” that science, given financial and material inputs, would soon return re-sults in national defense or industrial expansion. “Unlike what lay people, politi-cians, and the military people unfamiliar with science expect, science is not magic.”45

Human and material resources and the proper organizational and institutional con-ditions would be useless if the “environment” were not suitable. A suitable envi-ronment shaped by an appropriate scientific “tradition,” and high standards, wouldinduce great discoveries and inventions, and nurture “geniuses.” The geniuses wouldenhance the tradition further, improving the environment, and producing moretalented individuals. “Science is a form of national culture that requires a highdegree of human intellect, and cannot be built in a short time.”46 Just like the EastAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a strong scientific tradition could not be built in ashort time. A long-term planning and development of “pure science,” as well asreform of science education would be required.47

In view of the international situation, Nishina advocated a two-fold approach.One, the ordinary way, would study basic issues in science as freely as possible.The other, research mobilized for the national emergency, should be tightly con-trolled. If the situation became serious enough, pure scientific research might betemporarily suspended: “scientists in fundamental research might have to be movedto the kinds of research directly relevant to national defense.”48 Balance and orga-nization in the allocation of human resources would be essential. Organization ofscience should take into consideration both short-term and long-term planning.Nishina extended his vision into the next decade. “If we think of five or ten yearsfrom now, it seems that blindly stopping pure science, however useless pure sci-ence might appear at this point, might turn out harmful in future. The problem is inwhat ratio we should put our effort in pure science and in engineering that can beof immediate practical use.”49

Further to his long-term planning, Nishina became involved in a popular sci-ence magazine. Raising the national scientific standard would strengthen the na-tion. Writing on “Science and national defense” (Kagaku to kokubô) for a maga-zine for educators, Nishina stressed that Japanese people should learn to think andbehave scientifically.50 In December 1941, the publishing company Chûôkôronshastarted a new popular science magazine called Science illustrated (Zukai kagaku),and Nishina became its advisory editor (kanshûsha). He described its aims in itsfirst issue:51

45. Nishina, “Kagaku” (ref. 41), 359.46. Nishina Yoshio, “Dentô,” Kagaku, 10:10 (Sep 1940), 1.47. Nishina (ref. 33), 2.48. Nishina (ref. 41), 361.49. In a discussion sponsored by a literary magazine Bungakukai in May 1941, NishinaYoshio et al., “Nihon kagaku no genjô (zadankai),” Bungakukai (1941) May 1941, 50-62,on 52.50. Nishina (ref. 32), 37-38.51. Nishina (ref. 33), 2.

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The purpose of Science Illustrated is to realize the easiest and most effectivemethod to understand science. A single image often helps ordinary people attain adeep understanding more than a large number of abstract texts. I believe that theillustrated explanations in this magazine will greatly nourish the curiosity andcreativity of its readers.

It would be a great satisfaction to me if this method removed the antipathytoward science held by many Japanese people, especially by women. That wouldhave a great impact on science education for children, and help construct thescientific basis of the Japanese people. It is therefore one way to contribute to thecountry through science.

Nishina worked hard for the magazine. In 1940 Husimi, a young lecturer in phys-ics at Osaka University, received a telegram from Nishina asking him to be presentat the Osaka Station at a specified time the next day. Although he had never spokento Nishina, Husimi dutifully went to the station to meet him, wondering what busi-ness this leading figure in physics had with him. At the station, Nishina askedHusimi to write for Science illustrated.52

Nishina took very seriously the responsibility of scientists in the constructionof the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Asked how to establish a self-sufficientscience and technology for the “East Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere,” Nishina sim-ply answered, “We must do our best.” Asked what was specifically needed, hesaid, “Spirit—every engineer and scientist first needs to achieve self-awareness(jikakusuru).” 53 Ironically, here Nishina came close to those who advocated mili-tary spiritualism, who held that Japan, with superior spirit, could not lose the war.

3. JAPAN’S BLITZKRIEG

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and on the British flotilla in Southeast Asia onDecember 7, 1941 were great tactical successes. The Japanese Navy and Armyscored many victories during the next few months. Hong Kong fell on December25, 1941; Manila, January 2, 1942; Batavia, March 5; and Rangoon, May 27. Al-though Nishina though it a blunder to challenge the United States, he did not ex-press a pessimistic view of the war and was probably pleased with Japan’s initialtactical gains. At the same time, however, he repeatedly warned that the Allieswould eventually strike back with their superior scientific and industrial capabili-ties. Scientists must therefore work for future, not for immediate needs. Hence hecontinued to advocate mobilization of science and to promote “pure science.”

If we can trust Ogura Shimbi’s reminiscence, Nishina initially opposed waragainst the United States. “When people were carried away by the victories ofearly battles, Dr. Nishina’s first words were, ‘They started a stupid war. They do

52. Husimi Kôdi, “Jidai no ko ka,” Shizen (Mar 1971 [1951]), supplement, 300-go kinensôshûroku, Nishina Yoshio, Yukawa Hideki, Tomonaga Sin-itiro, Sakata Shôichi, 45-46,on 45.53. Nishina et al. (ref. 44), 55-56.

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such a thing, because they are really ignorant of America’s strength. Japan is goingto be in a big trouble’.”54 As an illustration of the industrial strength of the UnitedStates, Nishina told Ogura about his experience with cyclotron construction. TheJapanese manufacturer could not make a vacuum pump with the necessary speci-fications. Nishina had to instruct the company engineers personally, and it stilltook half a year. “In the United States,” Nishina said, “one could get such a thingby a single telephone call. They are so much ahead of us in everything. We need torealize that Japan is challenging such a country in a war.”55

In his published writings, of course, Nishina did not criticize the war. He wrote,in line with official propaganda: “Our great Japanese Empire, with an emperor ofunbroken lineage and one hundred million people of unparalleled royalty and brav-ery, is going to change the course of world history.”56 “The war has just begun.Making the Greater East Asia that we have won a truly orderly and healthy para-dise, a living world of Asians, can only be accomplished by many battles and wars,which will be imposed on our offspring for several generations.”57 Nishina alsorepeated the usual praises of Japan’s military exploits: “The great achievements ofour navy in these early battles had no equal in the past....The strength of our forceis unfathomable.” In another place, he wrote about the “great military achieve-ments that exceeded all expectations.”58 “The success of this unprecedented greatenterprise depends on our confidence and preparedness. We should overcomewhatever hardship we might encounter, and we must earnestly try to achieve thegoal.”59 “The series of victories of the Imperial Army during this half a year wastruly unparalleled. The force of our nation has brought all of East Asia under ourcontrol, and our victories ranged from Madagascar to the West, and the AleutianIslands to the East....We have experienced in these eight months what our ances-tors experienced only over many generations.”60 In this article, of 1942, from ananthology published by the propaganda bureau of the Imperial Rule AssistanceAssociation (Taisei yokusankai), Nishina quoted Manyôshû, a poem composed inthe 8th century: “I, thy humble subject/Live not in vain, having seen/Both heaven

54. Ogura Shimbi, “Sensei to watashi: Dokyumentarî sukecchi,” Shizen (Mar 1971 [1951]),supplement, 300-go kinen sôshûroku, Nishina Yoshio, Yukawa Hideki, Tomonaga Sin-itiro,Sakata Shôichi, 51-54, on 51. Japanese who knew the United States generally opposed thewar; Saburô Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A critical perspective on Japan’s role inWorld War II (New York, 1978).55. Ogura Shimbi (ref. 54), 51-52.56. Nishina Yoshio, “Kokuryoku no zôkyô he: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (1),”Asahi Shimbun, 1 Jan 1942, 8.57. Nishina Yoshio, “Kumichô no kansô,” in Zuihitsushû: Watashi no tonarigumi, edited byTaisei yokusankai sendenbu (Tokyo, 1942), 39.58. Nishina Yoshio, “Sensô no zento to kagakusha,” Kagaku, 13:1 (Jan 1943), 1.59. Nishina (ref. 56).60. Ibid.

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and earth prosper/In this glorious age of thine.”61 Citing an old poem came close tojingoism. Furthermore, contrary to all the other articles in the anthology, Nishina’smentioned Japan’s early victories. The other articles concerned trifling mattersabout the neighborhood associations to which the anthology was devoted. Henceit is likely that the nationalism he expressed was genuine.

Still Nishina maintained his high regard for the United States. After Pearl Har-bor, although he could no longer praise Americans openly, Nishina continued tostress the industrial strength and scientific superiority of the United States. Hearranged to have a collection of his articles on science and war published during1942. Its advertisement in June read: “This book is the first anthology of articlesby Dr. Nishina, the final authority of science in Japan. It discusses science andnational defense, and the author’s sincere concern over the fate of the country fillsthe entire volume. Wait for its publication.” The book turned out to be too lauda-tory to the United States to pass the censorship.62

Nishina carefully avoided expressing a pessimistic view as his own. He got hispoint across by supposing what the “enemies” would think:63

They probably think that our national strength has already greatly diminishedafter four years and a half of war in China. They would think that our nationalstrength would further decrease as the war continues while they expand theirarmaments greatly with their natural resources and mechanical power, and planto fight after they complete their rearmament. I do not know whether this willhappen in two or three years. Yet, we must be prepared for such a possibility. Wemust, therefore, not just fight, but also build up our national strength to be able toconfront our enemies.

The argument continued: “Because of the initial victories, people seem to be en-raptured. If people think that enemies are easy, that would be a great mistake.” “Itwas a common perception in the United States since before the war, that if theyfight Japan, they will lose battles at first, but, with their rich resources, can con-tinue fighting until they eventually win.” “In a few years, shipbuilding capacity ofthe United States will reach a few million tons per year. Once they achieve this,their defeat in Hawaii will be nothing. It is not easy to plan against it, but we musttry to do so. This will not be achieved in a short time. Truly, we need to be preparedfor a prolonged war.”64 Even if Japan won the war, Nishina wrote a month later, thestruggle would continue for a century:65

61. Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkôkai, ed., The Manyôshû: The Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkôkaitranslation of one thousand poems with the texts in romaji with a new foreword by DonaldKeene (New York, 1965), 197.62. Quoted in Ezawa Hiroshi, “Nishina Yoshio nenpu,” in Tamaki and Ezawa, eds. (ref. 32),273-300, on 292; Ogura (ref. 54), 52.63. Nishina (ref. 56).64. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa sensô to kagaku gijutsu,” Kaizô (Jan 1942), 159-160, on 159;Nishina (ref. 5), 3.65. Nishina Yoshio, “Yokusan senkyo to kagaku gijutsu,” Chûôkôron, 57 (Apr 1942), 184.

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America and Britain, with their rich resources and advanced science and technol-ogy, will start a full-scale expansion of their armaments, and challenge us to adecisive battle. Even if they lose this battle, they will watch for an opportunity toregain their lost supremacy, probably for a century. Our country, as the leader ofEast Asia, has an important duty to maintain perpetual peace in Asia.

The war with the United States did not force Nishina to change his earlier claimsabout “pure science.”66

[It] should not be neglected even in wartime. In particular, since it is generallysupposed that the East Asian War will be prolonged, we need to develop purescience during the war, nourish creative engineering with its results, and inventsuitable new weapons....As we fight, we need to plan for the management of thepostwar era. The first priority for our postwar reign is to make the enemy submit.In other words, we will need a Japanese culture, which will make the enemy obeyus sincerely. Otherwise, it will be impossible to gain their complete respect.

At the same time, Nishina repeated his argument that Japan’s “powerful” culturewould help control Asian people in the occupied territories. “By telling the worldthat we are strong not only at fighting, we can strengthen our leading place in itstransformation of the world.”67

The occupied territories made a good case for “pure science.” The best way tobuild up Japan’s national strength was “to develop the south and exploit its naturalresources.” Then, “the important thing is technology for resource develop-ment....[T]here might be unexpected problems in actual developments. In such acase, we should mobilize scientists and engineers to resolve the problems.”68 Weap-ons development made an even better argument:69

As I wrote, military equipment does not differ much between them and us. There-fore, each country will do its best to improve [what they have]. In such a situa-tion, the progress of pure science matters a great deal. For example, in order toimprove a certain weapon, engineers would improve its design and materials,almost to the limit. And when everything appears to have been done, it is often anew phenomenon or a new material that makes a breakthrough.

Often the breakthrough would occur through pure science. “I only emphasize thatwe should correct the preconception that pure science is useless in war. We are inthe age when today’s pure science can be used to improve tomorrow’s technol-

66. Nishina (ref. 5), 3.67. Nishina Yoshio, “Kyôryoku bunka no sôzô: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (3),”Asahi Shimbun (3 Jan 1942), 8.68. Nishina Yoshio, “Nanpô shigen no kaihatsu: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (2),”Asahi Shimbun (2 Jan 1942), 8; the same argument in: Nishina (ref. 8), 97.69. Nishina (ref. 8), 98.

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ogy.”70 “[In] all occupations, the last blood of the Japanese people should be ex-hausted. In the field of science, anything useful, whether people or things, shouldbe devoted to win the war.”71

4. LATE WAR YEARS, FROM LATE-1942 TO AUGUST 1945.

The tide began to change with the battle of Midway on June 4-5, 1942, wherethe Japanese Imperial Navy lost four of its airplane carriers and its superiority inthe Pacific. The news was not disclosed to the public. Two months later, the U.S.landed on Guadalcanal, which the Japanese abandoned on December 31. On May29, 1943, American forces recaptured Attu Island in the Aleutian chain. The anni-hilation of its garrison was reported as “gyokusa” or honorable death, the firstpublic announcement of Japan’s serious loss released by the Imperial GeneralHeadquarter.72

Nishina became more explicit about the scientific and technological superior-ity of the Allies. He did not state that Japan would lose the war, but implied it.Nevertheless he called for mobilization of science even more emphatically. Ap-parently he considered it his duty to do his best for Japan’s war effort and con-ceded that applied science should now have priority over pure science. At the sametime, however, he attempted to preserve scientific manpower for pure science, byinsisting on “the best use of human resources.”

In October 1942 Nishina pointed out that his predictions about the superiorindustrial and technological capabilities of the Allies had come true. On March 17,1943, he wrote that the change of tide had become apparent even to lay peopleafter the battle of Guadalcanal.73

In the technology of mass production, one must admit that the United States ismore advanced than Japan. Factories for the mass production of automobiles canbe immediately converted to produce airplanes. Even before the war, the UnitedStates produced more copper and iron than any other country. Therefore, we shouldtake seriously when they say that they can produce 120,000 airplanes a year, andbuild 8,000,000 tons of ships.

Once again he protected himself by putting his diagnosis in the mouth of the en-emy. In March 1943 he wrote:74

Americans believe in numbers. They therefore blindly believe that since theirproduction surpasses ours, the final victory will be theirs. In order to vanquish

70. Ibid.71. Nishina (ref. 68),72. “Attu tô ni kôgun no shinzui wo hakki,” Asahi shimbun (31 May 1943).73. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu no kessen (jô): Fudan no kenshin kenkyû, Shin heikino jumyô ha mijikashi,” Asahi shimbun (17 Mar 1943), 1.74. Ibid.

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them, therefore, empty propaganda and debates are of no use. We need either toreduce their production or to drastically increase ours. In either way, only whenthe difference of industrial capacity has become much smaller than it is now cana long-lasting peace in East Asia be realized.

It was total war. “Now is the time for Japanese people to rise and fight in the realsense. The thought sets the blood racing in the veins of us in the home front.” “Weneed not fear even if our enemies are building an amazing war machine....What wefear is overestimating our forces and forgetting to prepare for our defense and theattack to come.”75

During the war, the eighth day of each month was called “Taishô Hôtaibi”(The day of the Imperial Rescript [of war]). Taketani Mituo and Takeuchi Masaremember that on December 8, 1943, Nishina summoned all the members of hisgroup and read out the emperor’s proclamation of the war. Then he told them thatscientists should work for the country. His young colleagues had begun to feel thewar coming into their research.76 The previous March he had said: “We must mo-bilize all knowledge to augment our military power. Consequently, we might haveto move researchers in pure science into applied science. We might have no choiceother than discontinuing the progress of pure science. We cannot help it. The fateof our country depends on the increase of military power; the final battle will comein the near future.”77 “I am not claiming that research in basic principles is of nouse. In today’s emergency situation, we just do not have time for it. When the warsituation improves, we should push forward basic research and work hard to raisethe national standard of science and technology.”78

He grew increasingly shrill. In January 1945 he called for a total mobiliza-tion:79

Now we have to make use of everything in the country to maintain our advantage.In science and technology, we should do our best to mobilize all organizations, allknowledge, all equipment, in the most effective way to contribute to ourvictory....When every stick and stone must be used to increase our fighting capa-bilities, researchers should have a lot to offer in terms of human and materialresources. The important thing is to use them as effectively as possible, and not tocommit the folly of employing a steam hammer to crack a nut.

75. Nishina (ref. 57), and resp., Nishina Yoshio, “Hisshô hissei: Kengaku nimo messhihôkô,”Asahi shimbun (30 Oct 1942), 8.76. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, ed., Shôwashi no tennô, Vol. 4 (Tokyo, 1968), 165; TakeuchiMasa, “Nishina kenkyûshitsu monogatari,” in Tamaki and Ezawa, eds. (ref. 31), 209-222,on 221.77. Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu no kessen (ge): Genba e chinô doôin, gijutsusha nokyôryoku koso kyûmu,” Asahi shimbun (18 Mar 1943), 1.78. Yagi Hidetsugu and Nishina Yoshio, “Taidan kessen e kagaku wo dôin seyo,” Shûkanasahi (11 Apr 1943), 13. A similar point appears in Nishina Yoshio, “Kagaku gijutsu nosenryokuka,” Kagaku asahi (Jan 1945), 13.79. Nishina (ref. 75).

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80. Nishina (ref. 57); Walter Grunden, “Science under the rising sun: Weapons develop-ment and the organization of scientific research in World War II Japan” (Ph. D. dissertation,University of California Santa Barbara, 1998); Kawamura (ref. 37).81. Ogura (ref. 54), 52.82. Tomonaga Sin-itiro, et al., “Taidan riken jidai no omoide,” in Hirakareta kenkyûjo toshidôsha tachi, Vol. 6, Tomonaga Sin-itiro chosakushû (Tokyo, 1982), 183-221, on 211.83. Despite seemingly definitive rebuttals, Robert Wilcox’s, Japan’s secret war: Japan’srace against time to build its own atomic bomb, updated edn. (New York, 1985, 1995), isstill accepted, e.g., by Philip Henshall, The nuclear axis: Germany, Japan and the atombomb race, 1949-1945 (Stroud, 2000). For criticisms see Walter Grunden, “Hungnam andthe Japanese atomic bomb,” Intelligence and national security, 13:2 (1998), 32-60; MorrisF. Low, “Japan’s secret war? Instant scientific manpower and Japan’s World War II atomicbomb project,” Annals of science, 47 (1990), 347- 360. John Dower, “‘NI’ and ‘F’: Japan’swartime atomic bomb research,” Japan in war and peace: Selected essays (New York,1993), 55-100. For other sources on Japan’s wartime nuclear power project see: KeikoNagase-Reimer, Forschungen zur Nutzung der Kernenergie in Japan, 1938-1945 (Marburg,forthcoming); Grunden (ref. 80). The Pacific War Research Society (Bungei Shunjû SenshiKenkyûkai), The day man lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945 (Palo Alto, 1972).84. Japanese scientists used slow neutrons to calculate the critical mass, indicating that theydid not know how to design a nuclear bomb. See Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Dainiji sekaitansenji no nihon no genbaku kaihatsu,” Nihon butsurigakkai shi, 56:8 (2001), 584-590; YamazakiMasakatsu and Fukai Yûzô, “Dainijitaisenki niokeru Nihon no kakukenkyû shiryô (1):Rikugun Dainizôheishô nitaisuru Nishina Yoshio no hôkokukiroku: 1943-nen 7-gatsu kara1944-nen 11-gatsu,” Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 2 (1999), 45-54; Yamazai Masakatsu,Fukai Yûzô, Satomi Shirô, “Tokyo Daini Rikugun Zôheishô nitaisuru Nishina Yoshio nohôkoku”, Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (2000), 53-72; Fukai Yûzô, “Kyûgun itaku‘Ni-gô keiakku’ niokeru rinkai keisan,” Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (2000), 1-24;Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Riken no genshi bakudan: Hitotsu no gensô ‘Kanzen nenshô’ kôsô,”

But he did not subscribe to sending scientists into battle. “To take scientists awayto a job unrelated to their specialty makes no use of their talents.”80 Ogura Shimbicaptured Nishina’s sentiments in the fall of 1944:81 “We are aboard on a sinkingship called ‘Japan.’ Seeing water coming in, we cannot just stand by and look on it.The natural thing to do would be to bail or pump. Honestly, I often feel anger. Butthinking this way, I do not speak my feelings.” Nishina was preparing a life vest. Ifwe can trust Tomonaga’s recollection, Nishina attempted to maintain Japan’s sci-entific research standard and to protect its personnel for postwar development.82

5. THE NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT

Although much has been written about Japan’s wartime nuclear power projects,we still do not have a definitive study of it.83 It is now established that the nuclearpower project in Japan had no chance of success and that even the Japanese did nottake it seriously. Further studies by Yamazaki Masakatsu and Fukai Yûzô on Nishinaand others’ work on atomic energy during the war demonstrate how little Nishina’sgroup accomplished.84 Their performance may indicate their lack of ability, re-

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sources, and efficient organization, or their disinclination to achieve the goal. KeikoNagase-Reimer shows that Nishina doubted that the Japanese could build a bombduring the war. According to her, Nishina maintained this view throughout thewar, but the Army interpreted it differently as time went on.85 In fact, the changingwar situation forced him to change his attitude toward the construction of the bomb.

The project for nuclear power began in Nishina’s group in 1940. The staff wassmall and did not increase by much. The leader, Takeuchi Masa, one of Nishina’searliest disciples, came from the unprestigious Tokyo Technical Higher School(Today’s Tokyo Institute of Technology, which despite its humble origins, is oneof the best technical universities in Japan). He made himself an able experimental-ist under Nishina’s tutelage. He placed Takeuchi on the nuclear power project,keeping graduates from more important universities for the pure science, of cos-mic-ray physics and cyclotron construction. Nishina also assigned leftist membersof his group to the nuclear power project. Taketani Mituo and Tamaki Hidehiko,with their leftist inclinations, were in danger of being arrested or sent to the mostdangerous battlefields. The nuclear power project gave them a relatively safe ha-ven.

Chemistry plays an essential role in the construction of atomic bombs. Nishinarecruited Kigoshi Kunihiko, then a fresh graduate from the chemistry departmentof Tokyo Imperial University, who had intended to work with the chemist IimoriRian at Riken. Nishina installed Kigoshi as the chief chemist in the nuclear powerproject in October 1942.86 Kigoshi’s research, of essential importance to the con-struction of an atomic bomb, was conducted with the clumsiness of a student ex-periment. Kigoshi did not know how to produce the fluorine necessary to makeuranium hexafluoride for the separation of uranium isotopes. Since fluorine is ex-tremely corrosive, he began in mid-1943 by designing and building a specialelectrosis tank made of magnesium. The tank produced much less fluorine than heexpected and needed. Eventually, he consulted a specialist at Tôhoku Universityand learned that he needed only to run the electrosis overnight and the tank wouldbegin producing fluorine in the morning. The next step was to produce metal ura-nium, for which Japan did not have an industrial technique. Kigoshi managed toproduce uranium powder by chemical processes from what little uranium com-pounds he had. Since powdered uranium catches fire very easily, he needed tomelt it in a vacuum, but he lacked the necessary apparatus. He tried to make ura-nium hexafluoride by adding fluorine to the powdered uranium. He got a big ex-plosion. He saved himself from blindness only because he turned his eyes awayfrom the tube to answer a question at the moment of the explosion.87

Kagaku gijutsu bunka ronsô, no. 3 (200), 25-32; Fukai Yûzô, “Nishina Yoshio hakase nokangaete ita genshiro,” Nihon genshiryokugakkai-shi, 42 (2000), 194-195.85. Nagase-Reimer (ref. 83).86. Yomiuri Shimbunsha (ref. 76), 101-103.87. Ibid., 105-110.

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As this incident may indicate, Nishina was less than enthusiastic about theproject during the first year of the Pacific War. He did not reply to the Army’squestion about the feasibility of an atomic bomb until 1943; he answered it wastheoretically possible. Kigoshi remembers that Nishina did not appear to be in ahurry when he joined the group in October 1942. Nishina told Kigoshi, “do it atyour own pace” (ma bochibochi yarusa).88 Nishina seems to have started the nuclearpower project as long-term pure science. He did not expect much from this projectand did not assign the best of his group to it.

Nishina’s attitude began to change late in 1943 or early 1944. According toKigoshi, Nishina then barked at him “What are you doing? Can you make it ornot?” Kigoshi replied nonchalantly, “I can’t.” Everyone expected that Nishina wouldshout, “then quit!” Instead he changed his tone and said, “keep doing it anyway.”89

This incident suggests Nishina’s ambivalence. As the situation deteriorated, heprobably promoted his nuclear project in his mind from remotely promising re-search to a serious military project whose success was crucial to Japan’s victory.Because of his position as chief of the project and his earlier statements about theutility of pure science, Nishina had to do his best to complete it, even though heknew he could not suceed. And of course he knew that the a-bomb project wouldprotect young physicists and maintain a pure science research tradition.

On August 6, 1945, Nishina received news that Hiroshima had been bombedwith a new kind of weapon. Since he did not think that even the United Statescould build a nuclear weapon so quickly, he postponed comment. Nishina wasasked by the military, probably its antiwar faction, to investigate the ruin ofHiroshima. A day before leaving for Hiroshima, he left a note to Tamaki Hidehiko,a young theorist who had calculated the critical mass of U235. Nishina wrote: “IfTruman is telling the truth, it is now the time for those involved in the Ni-Project tocommit hara-kiri....The reports that reached the general headquarter so far cor-roborate what Truman said....If it is the case, American and British scientists crushedthe scientists of Riken’s Building 49 [the building for the nuclear power research].This implies that the personality of the American and British scientists surpassedthe (jinkakn) of the scientists of Building 49.”90

For Nishina, committing suicide together with his unfortunate young collabo-rators was an appropriate conclusion. He had made clear that scientists were re-sponsible for maintaining standards of scientific research during the war and fordeveloping military technologies. The U.S. atomic bombs disgraced Nishina’sgroup. Moral problems about the use of nuclear weapons against civilians prob-ably did not occur to the members of the Ni-project. There is no indication that

88. Ibid., 101.89. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 111-112.90. Nishina Yoshio, A letter to Tamaki Hidehiko (7 Aug 1945), in Genshi bakudan: HiroshimaNagasaki no shashin to kiroku, ed. Nishina Kinen Zaidan (Tokyo, 1973), 55. Nishina andhis disciples did not kill themselves. They thought they should instead take advantage ofthe unique opportunity to study the effects of the atomic bomb.

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Nishina or anyone in his group had any scruple about atomic bombs until they sawwhat damage they could cause.91 When Kigoshi succeeded in producing uraniumhexafluoride, he stayed overnight at the institute so he would be able to tell thegood news to Nishina first thing in the morning. Although their achievement wasvastly different in scale, they were not unlike the American scientists in Los Alamoswho celebrated the success of the Trinity Experiment with a party.92

Once again the question whether Nishina undertook the atomic bomb projectwas to protect his disciples from the draft or persecution must be raised. Here aretwo straws in the wind. Nishina involved leftist students in the project, but not hisbest theorist Tomonaga, who was physically unqualified for a military service.93

Hence no need to protect him. Again, Arakatsu Bunsaku, a professor of physics atKyoto University and chief of the Navy’s atomic bomb project stated after thewar:94

When we accepted this research, there were only a few young scientists and stu-dents. The army took them away freely. I wanted to keep those few young scien-tists and students in our department by any means, and allow them to continuetheir studies. By doing the atomic bomb research, I thought that I would no longerhave to send young scientists to the battlefield. The truth was it was too late, butat least I thought that I no longer had to let them die anymore. Without such a“compensation,” I could not possibly have undertaken such a project. Nishinathought in the same way.

Whatever his intentions, the project did provide a relatively safe haven for hisstudents and young scientists worked for it for no other reason than to evade thedraft. Kigoshi joined because Nishina told him if he studied uranium hexafluoride,he would not have to go to the army. Taketani confessed to the same motive. In1944, when some members of the Nishina group began to discuss whether theyshould continue the work, Taketani insisted that they should; otherwise they wouldbe sent to war. The Ni-project was a golden opportunity to continue scientificresearch.95

Taniguchi Hatsuzô, who was the chief of the engineering department of the airforce (kôhon gijutsu buchô) until 1943, remembers that Nishina often asked him,“I wonder if we can spend money on such an uncertain project when soldiers are

91. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 207. Yamamoto Yôichi, a former Army engineering officer, remem-bered that the planned target after July 1944 was the U.S. military base in Saipan. Thechoice was not made to avoid civilian targets but because they wanted to knock out theairfield for mainland bombing. Hosaka Masayasu, Shôgeki no senji hishi: Genshibakudanno kansei wo isoge (Tokyo, 1983), 20.92. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 112; Richard P. Feynman, Surely you’re joking Mr. Feynman!: Adven-tures of a curious character (New York, 1985), 118.93. Tomonaga (ref. 82), 211.94. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 219.95. Ibid., 103, 170-171.

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having a hard time in the South.” Taniguchi persuaded him that even if they couldnot build the atomic bomb during the war, the research might be useful later for thedevelopment of atomic energy. Nishina agreed, but soon he would return with thesame question.96 After the war, an Army engineering officer blamed Nishina forhis lack of commitment. According to him, Nishina did not intend to build anatomic bomb; he merely did the research that he wanted to do on the military’smoney, and kept his disciples from the front. In fact, after 1943 Nishina pursuedthe project seriously, not because he had any possibility of realizing it, but becausehe was obliged to. As a scientist in Japan, he had a responsibility to try. He had aproblem about wasting precious resources in an uncertain project when soldierswere dying, but the remote possibility of building a weapon of mass destructiondid not concern him.

6. BETWEEN SCIENCE AND NATIONALISM

Nishina keenly felt his obligation to his country. His nationalistic statementsexpressed his genuine feelings. After the war Nishina’s son, Kôjirô wrote that hisfather had a strong sense of responsibility typical of those who were born in theMeiji Era. “While troubled with his collaboration in Japan’s war against the coun-tries of his friends, my father did his best in the task that he took upon himself.This aspect of Nishina can be confirmed by various sources on his earlier life.”97

Although Nishina might not have supported Japan’s military government, hesympathized with and admired the Japanese soldiers and felt obliged to contributeto the country himself as they did. He had many personal connections to the Japa-nese military and repeatedly praised the “loyal and brave” rank and file. NishinaKôjirô: “My father criticized sentimental war propaganda from the scientific pointof view, but he was moved by the reported words and deeds of kamikaze pilots.”98

The other son Nishina Yûichirô recollects that when they heard on the radio areport of the annihilation of the garrison in Attu Island in May 1943, Nishina sat inhis chair, arms folded, with tears in his eyes. From that day, he repeatedly said,“we are all going to die.”

Nishina also identified strongly with “pure science.” He had an agenda andvalues as a member of the scientific community. In contrast to most other promi-nent Japanese scientists, Nishina needed to convince the public and his sponsorsof the values of pure science. Most other senior scientists held a secure position atan imperial (national) university and conducted only low-budget experiments.99

96. Ibid., 207.97. Kenji Ito, “Making sense of ryôshiron (quantum theory): Introduction of quantum me-chanics into Japan, 1920-1940” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2002), chapt. 6.98. Nishina Kôjirô, “Chichi no nichijô no gendô,” Nihon butusui gakkai shi, 45:10 (Oct1990), 726-727, on 727.99. An exception, Kikuchi Seishi’s group at Osaka Imperial University, constructed cyclo-trons in the 1930s. The Kikuchi group had a funding from a group of industrialists in Osaka,

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Nishina held a position at the prestigious but financially insecure Riken, and con-ducted expensive large-scale collaborative research in nuclear physics. He raisedsupport to construct a 27-inch cyclotron in 1937, the first working cyclotron out-side the United States.100 He needed to continue to advertise “pure science” toobtain funding for his research in this new proto-“Big Science.” From 1937 andthroughout the war years, Nishina’s group worked on a 60-inch cyclotron. Nishinaobtained financial support from the government, the military, and philanthropicfoundations.101

As a scientist, Nishina considered it his principal role to advance “pure sci-ence” in Japan. Tomonaga Sin-itiro remembers that Nishina often said, “we mightwin or lose the war. But when the war is over, and communication with foreigncountries restored, our scientific research during the war should not have beeninferior to those of other countries. We should be able to take pride in what wehave done during the war.”102 Taketani Mituo remembers that Nishina said thesame thing at Riken’s semi-annual conference soon after the Pearl Harbor attack.103

In writing, Nishina made the same argument, although he assumed that Japan wasgoing to win. “When the war is over, and we open the box, if Japan’s science ismuch inferior to those of other countries, we scientists must take the blame andthen no amount of apology will be enough.”104 Perhaps for this reason Nishinagave Tomonaga, his most talented disciple, special consideration. Tomonaga’s re-search during this and later periods conducted in isolation from foreign scholarsdid bear fruit, his renormalization theory, which amazed American and Europeanphysicists.

In sum, Nishina was a conscientious and sincere man who tried to reconcile hisidentity as a scientist and his obligation to the country. He was no pacifist. Headvocated mobilizing science for Japan’s military adventure and worked for mili-tary projects. He was no cosmopolitan. He advocated “pure science” as a benefitto his country. He worked for Japan not because he supported her military aggres-sion, or because he would personally gain from the war, but because, as a man witha strong sense of responsibility, he could not stand by. He tried to curb Japan’stendency toward a fanatical nationalism and to do his best to better the situation.But the language in his writings, whatever his true intent, tended to justify and

presumably through the electrical engineer Yagi Hidetsugu, who chaired the university’sdepartment of physics.100. Heilbron and Seidel (ref. 27), 317-319.101. Financially, the Ni-Project seems to have been inseparable from the Nuclear PhysicsLaboratory, the main task of which was to build the cyclotron.102. Tomonaga (ref. 82), 221.103. Yomiuri (ref. 76), 164.104. Nishina Yoshio, “Daitôa no saiken to junsuikagaku,” Kagaku, 12:3 (Mar 1942), 1; alsoin Nishina Yoshio, “Rekkoku no kisokagaku,” Zukai kagaku (June 1942), 2; Nishina Yoshio,“Nanpô shigen no kaihatsu: Kôko no taigyô to waga kagakujin (2),” Asahi Shimbun (2 Jan1942), 8, also in Nishina (ref. 8), 97.

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strengthen Japan’s militaristic regime and its policies. And he never publicly ex-pressed sympathy toward the Asian people under Japan’s occupation.

From the safe haven of the present world, it is easy to blame Nishina.. Nishina,in fact, blamed himself. According to his son Kôjirô, Nishina repeatedly said, “Weall lacked the courage to stop the war,” in a tone both rueful and indignant.105 True,had the Japanese leaders, the Emperor Hirohito in particular, mustered the courageto risk their lives against terrorism and resisted the threat from the military, theremight not have been a war in the Pacific.

105. Nishina Kôjirô (ref. 98), 726.

KENJI ITOValues of “pure science”: Nishina Yoshio’s wartime discourse between nationalismand physics, 1940-1945ABSTRACT:This paper discusses Nishina Yoshio’s attitude toward World War II and scientific researchduring the war. Nishina was the leading Japanese physicist in interwar Japan and the chiefscientist of Japan’s wartime nuclear power project. The paper describes how Nishina wascaught between conflicting norms of his professional and national identities and how hetried to resolve the conflicts.