USSBS Report 58, Effect of Air Attack on Kyoto OCR

8/6/2019 USSBS Report 58, Effect of Air Attack on Kyoto OCR

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THE. UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC j30MBING SURVEY

EFFECTS OF AIR ATTACK

ON

OSAKA-KOBE-KYOTO

Urban Areas DivisionDates of Survey:

November-December 1945

Date of Publication

June 1947



INTRODUCTION AN D SUMMARY

n

The Os ak a re gio n includes Osaka, Kobe andyoto-three of Japan's six major cities-and arober of smaller war production centers. Asith the rest of Japan proper, air operationsainst this region h a d t he i r impact on an econy alreadyunder greatstrain as a result of inade

uateskilled labor, materials and industr ia l equip-ent o f a ll types. Furthermore, because of basicanges i n J a pa n 's strategic pOSItion and severe

eclines in availability of ra w materials, this serisly weakened industrial system was undergoingfundamental transit ion. Prior to in i ti a t io n o f

ir attacks, it was changing from a max imumevel war economy, emphasizing production ofuch slowly-completed offensive war i tems as airraft carriers', tanks a n d h ea vy ordnances to a'cyclone-cellar" economy c o nc e nt r at i ng o n p rouction of essential items for defense o f t h e home

·slands.In the absence of advanced planning these prob-

lems o f t r a ns i t i on exposed serious organizationaland economic weaknesses even before B-29 operations b e ga n to test Jap[j,n's capacity to take punishment. Our i n i ti a l s t ra t eg i c air a t ta c ks f rom

the Marianas forced wholesale dispersal and reorganization of aircraft a n d re la t ed production,putting new claims on th e country's overburdenedinternal transport system an d her rapidly-disappearing stocks of general machinery, electricalequipment, building materials, etc. I t is againstthis background that U. S. attacks on Japaneseurban areas must be assessed. These a t ta c ks n o tonly crippled efforts to complete readjustmentswhich would permit sustained output o f t h e most

,urgent war items at reduced level, but also causedenormous losses o f in d u st r i al e q uip me n t a n d production resources. .The most compelling r e su l t o fmass attacks, however, was th e effect on t h e u rb anpopulations and on the pattern of governmentand business controls.

Disruption of housing, public utilities and essential supporting services occurred on so vast a scalethat organizedeffort was paralyzed. Japan's evident inability to ma int a in essential a c tiv i ty a n deffectively resist our air power s we pt a wa y a llhope of victory; U n de r t h e conditions which existed by July 1945 it was obvious that continuedresistance promised nothing'but additional p ~ n ishment. The wa rh a d , indeed, been brought hometo th e enemy.

THE OSAKA REGION

The Osaka region covers a broad cross-sectionof c e nt r a l Ho ns h u , the m ai n i sl an d o f Japan.I t includes seven of the country's basic politicalsubdivisions corresponding t o o u r states, a n d th re eo f i t s six principal metropolitan areas. The easte r n t i e r o f four prefectures bordering the Nagoyaregion was re la t ive ly unimportant from an economic or strategic standpoint . Fukui prefecture;on the north coast of the is land, is a mountainousarea with one sizable inland trading center-thec a pi t a l c i ty of the same name-and th e JapanSea port o f Ts ur u ga , w hi ch rose to considerableimportance as a t r a ns s h ip p in g p o int d l l ri n g th el a s tmo n ths o f thewar. Shiga prefectureincludest h e r ic h L ak e, B iw a a gr i cu l tu r al bas in e as t ofKy oto b u t , despite t.he existence of several large·textile mills, ha d no significant role in war indust ry. Nara prefecture, s ou th o f K yo to a n d east ofOsaka, was l ikewise o f l i tt l e s tr at eg ic i nt er es t ,a l t ho u g h imp o rt a n t fo r th e region's food requirements. Wakayama prefecture included much oft h e ru gg e d Kii Peninsula southeast of Osaka, butaside from a few fishing ports and two oil refin

eries all economic activity there was concentratedi n t he capital city. Two l a rg e branch factorieso f w a r p l an t s in Osaka and Kobe had been established in Wa ka y am a C it y a n d these, along withport facilities a n d o t he r i n du s tr y, enhanced it starget importance. F uk ui , Tsu ru ga a nd Wak ayama were the only towns in these four outlyingp r e f e c t u r ~ sincluded in t h e Twen t i eth AF incend i ar y p r og r am a ga i ns t secondary urban centersd u ri n g t h e last eight weeks of t he Pacific war.Precision attacks on th e two oil refineries southof Wakayama complete the record of air operations in these sections, aside from fighter sweepsand scattered "last-resort" bombings.

Ky o to p ref e ctu re included th e ancierit capital

c it y w it h i ts l ar ge p op ul at io n a nd considerableindustrial developments as well as t h e Ma iz u ruNaval Base-a secondar.y ins ta l la tio i lf rom thes t an d po i nt o f n a va l s h ip bu i ld in g but th e country's major convoy control point a n d o p e ra t i ngbase on the Japan Sea. Neither Ky<1to nor Maizuru received any scheduled a t t a c k ~ ,althoughB-29s repeatedly minedthe coastal waters between'Maizuru and Tsuruga. Aside from a few mili taryinstalla t ions and one aircraft assembly plant , out-

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lying districts of Kyoto prefecture ha d developed 'few wa r indus tries . Dispersa l act ivi t ies fromOsaka and Nagoya into t he m an y text i le millsnear Ky o to Ci ty and into "bomb-proof" rural siteswereintensified during 1945 buthadnot progressedf a r p r io r t o the attack period.

. Hyogo prefecture, the westermnost i n t he region, cut completely across the island an d was ofconsiderable strategic i n t e r ~ s t ,bu t practical ly allits war industry was concentrated in a narrow beltalong t1J.e Inland Sea west of Osaka. The 15-mile

coastal strip between Kobe, the prefectural capital,an d Osaka was almost continuously built up. D i ~

rectly adjoining Osaka City was th e heavy industry town of Amagasaki, andwar plan ts dotted thedistr ic t t o t h e n or t h a s w e ll a s the chain of suburban developments stretching west to Kobe. Alongwith Kobe, all these towns facing Osaka Bay suff er ed c on si de ra bl y f ro in i nc en di ar y . a tt ac ks .Amagasaki was d am ag ed as a part of ' t he l as turban ra id on Osaka; Mikage, Ashiya and Nishinomiya w ere hi t in t he u rb an areao.perationagainst the la t te r city and in the last Kobe attack.

West of Kobe along t he I nl an d Sea weret wo o t he r urban area targets-Akashi, with itsaircraft and other war plants, and Himeji, im

portant industr ia l a nd t ra di ng center for theHarima district o f t he I n la n d Sea coast. Textilemills i n H im ej i h ad been converted t o a i rc r af tassembly and other war prQduction a nd t he adjoining port town o f S hi ka ma included severalchemical and basic metal p la nt s . D irec tl y to thewest at Hirohata was Japan's newest integratedsteelworks, a major element in the basic industryo f the region; and several largefabricating, chemical an d electrical equipment enterprises ha d beenestablished near by. There wa s o ne importantordnance plant and a c he mica l w orks a lo ng thecoast between Himej i and Akashi, but otherwisepractically all manufacturing activi ty wes t ofKobe was crowded into the towns already mentioned. Except for the Hiroha ta steelworks theseenterprises a l l depended heavily upon materialsand components supplied from Kobe and O s a k a ~

Thus in Hyogo prefecture, there was cons iderable war indus try located outside the capitalcity. Except for a i rcra f t assembly and basic steelproduction, this represented a small part of th et ot al . A ls o, the activities of practically all manu-.facturing units located i n t he secondary cities ofHyogo prefecture were intimately related to oper-

2

ations performed in Kobe and in themetropolis, Osaka. Like Kobe, Osaka 'sdiate neighbor, Amagasaki, had large basic ~ . u \ . " , , , _ ~

tr y and end-product plants and the" otherban towns along t h e b a y between Osaka and Kobe

containeda largenumber o f w a r production units.All of this activi ty was highly i n t e g r a t ~ dandaside from aircraft assembly plants in Akashi andHimeji, end-product industrial activi ty elsewherein the prefecture' was relatively insignificant.Even if the 1945 dispersal program ha d been suc

cessfully completed,t h e re s t i ll

would havebeen

a high degree of concentration in congested urbancenters.

Osaka prefecture , unlike other sections of theregion, d id n ot include extensive unpopulatedmountain areas. It s boundaries were confined to

the r i c h a g ri c u ltu r al plain which surroundedOsaka City to t h e n o r th , east and south, and it was

dottedwith satellite towns. An elaboratenetworkof roads and electric interurban lines linked thesesuburbs w it h t he c it y i tsel f. A n u mb e r o f largewar plants had developed in suburbs around thecity and along Osaka Bay to the south, althoughSakai, directly south of Osaka, was the only largesatellite t o wn wi th in the prefec ture . As alreadyindicated, Amagasaki and other suburbs in Hyogo'prefecture to the w es t w ere a ls o c lo se ly l inke dto Osaka.

In aircraft, shipbuilding, ordnance, machinery,electrical equipment, alid' other industrial fieldsessential to Japanese war production, the Osakaregion had a vital responsibility. With few ex

ceptions, end-product and support ing industrieswere located in the region's principal urbancenters.

Japan's a i rcra f t indus try was well representedin the Osaka region, a l th o u gh b o th the Nagoyaand Tokyo regions were re la t ive ly more importan t in this field. Two major aircraft concernshadthe i r principal operations here. Three Kawa

nishi a i rf rame and subassembly plants werelo

cated between Osaka and Kobe andthe company'sfourth unit w a ~established in H i me j i. P ri n ci p alKawasaki engine and a i rf rame operations wereconcentrated just west of Akashi and this com

pany also opera ted large component plants inKobe, Sakai, a nd t he Osaka suburbs.

L at e i n 1944, Mitsubishi Aircraft began to ex

pand its parts production in Kyoto 'and to undertake wholesale transfer of engine assembly plants

that c i ty f ro m Nagoya. Japan Internationalraft also operated parts plants in Kyoto to

e i ts assembly uni t just south o f t he city andbuilding light engines for. trainers in Amaki. Fo r t he w a r period as a whole , the Osakaonwas credited with about 25 percent of comaircraft production and abol!-t 20 percent of

'ne output. Of great importance f o r J a pa n 's1 air effort were the two Sumitomo aircrafteller plants in Osaka and neighboring Ama7

'aki which, together, supplied 40 perce nt ofy combat propellers and virtually all of those

uired f or N av y p lan es . M os t of the coments and fabricating plants which supported

s a ct ivi ty w ere located in the region's threeincipal cities and these also contributed t o t heal assembly plants in Nagoya and elsewhere inpan.

Shipbuilding was also a m aj or i nd us tr y i n t heaka region. Shipyards here accounted forout 28 percent of Japan's new construction andajor repairs d ur i ng t he w a r period, almost 16

rcent of the total being performed in Kobe andpercent in Osaka. On a tonnage basis, addi

'ons t o t he J a p an e s e Na vy represented only one-nth o f wa rt ime me rc h an t s h ipb u i ld in g but this

act ion was re la t ive ly much more impor tan t inrms of cost and strategic value. The Osakagion t ur n ed o ut 22 percent of all naval con:ruction. Almost40 percent of all wart ime addions to the Japanese Navy were constructed atval bases located outs ide this region, but prite yards in Kobe and Osaka each accounted for

opercent of th e to ta l wi th the rest o f t h e region'share being built at the Maizuru Naval Base.

Th us b o th in naval and merchant shipbuilding,e O sa ka reg ion ha d a major position. ExceptI' t h e Ma iz u ru Na va l Base and one yard in Ama-

asaki, all these fac i li t ies were concentrated insaka and Kobe. This region also h ad an im

portant part in the wartime program for construc

tion of small wooden vessels. Roughly a fifth ofall boatways and all tonnage launched in thiscategory were in the Osaka region a nd a n evenhigher proportion of the engines required forsuch craft wereproduced here. These small boatyards werescattered among small harborsthroughout t h e m ai n islands o f J a pa n . Osaka City wasthe only point where a cons iderable amount ofsuch building was concentrated in one town andthis metropolis a lso had ' many smail producers

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of gas and diesel engines' for boats built in thisregion and elsewhere along t h e I n la n d Sea.

The Osaka region was somewhat less importantin the field of ordnance. Except for t h e Ma izu ruBase, there w ere n o major nava l establishmentsor arsenals located here but Osaka and surrounding suburbs included many private p l ~ n t ssupplying'ordnance items, mines and similar material tothe Navy. The Osaka Army A r s ~ n a lwas one ofthe largest ground ordnance establishments in the

. Empire and, w it h i ts near-by branch plants andprivate subcontractors, accounted for almost onefifth of all Army requirements. Two la rge shellloading plants were located south of Kyoto andthe production of ordnance components and ai rarmament i te ms w as c ar ri ed on in that city andin all centers around Osaka Bay.

The considerable development o f a i rc r af t andordnance components production in cities of thisr eg io n wa s a l og ic al outgrowth o r t he p re wa rindustrial pattern. Osaka ha d been the machineryand general equipment workshop for Japan andthis position ha d been reinforced by the largeheavy industries of Kobe and the many l igh t precision machinery enterprises of Kyoto. Roughlya third o f J a pa n 's wartime capacity f or m a ki n gmachine tools and general industrial equipment.was located in this reg ion -by fa r t h e g r ea te rpart of it in Osaka. Similarly, 24 percent ofJapanese electrical equipment production' o r i g ~

inated here, with 14percent concentrated in OsakaCity, seven percent in Kobe, a nd t he balance inKyoto ..

Approximately the same p at te rn o f regionalimportance a nd u rb an concentration existed insuch o th er a u x il i a ry f ie lds as industrial rubberproducts and in drugs and general chemicals. Inthe field of basic metals, the region was relativelyunimpor tant for preliminary ore reduction andrefining. Bu t Osaka was a major fabricatingcenter for non-ferrous metals refined elsewhere.A similar pattern existed in i ronand steel. Except

f or t he new i n t eg ra te d i ro n and s tee l mil l nearHimej i, the region's bas ic s teel p rod u c tio n wa sless extensive than the forging, rolling and fabricrating activities carried on at Osaka, ;Kobe andAmagasaki. About 6 perce nt of . the country'sopen-hearth s teel capacity was locatel! in Kobeand a lmos t a s muc h more in Osaka anf] Amagasaki, bu t in order to economize on transport, ironand steelproductionwas increasingly concentratedelsewhere. . '



Much of the region's impol'tancefor basicmanufacturing a nd f or m il it ar y end-products was anoutgrowth of its central position- for Empire aswell as Home Island communications. Kobe wasthe connecting p oi nt f or J ap an 's key east-westrail lines and had been Japan's major prewar oversea port. Osaka, even more than Kobe, t o o ~onadded i mp or ta nc e as a wartime transshipmentpoint for overseas mili tary supplies as well as forimports of v i t al r a w materials.

To an increas ing extent, a l l th rough the war"

military agencies used Osaka as a center for finalinspection, p a ck in g a n d storage of outbound military shipments. Even during 1945, when convoytraffic was no longer feasible from Osaka, muchof the mili tary supplies destined for the supportof forces overseas orin Western Honshu and Kyushu were assembled here and t h en f or wa rd ed b yrail.

In this process of handling. inbound an d outbound transshipments dur ing the war, there wassteadily growing part ic ipation of Osaka's industr y as wel l as its warehouses, and port facilities.After direc t waterborne traffic to Tokyo andNagoya had to be halted in o r de r t o avoid submarine losses, many additional minor but essential processing operations came to be performedin Osaka. This development considerably extended the utilization of Osaka's many small factories and workshops, although these already hada vital role in subcontracting fo rma jo r war plantsin and around Osaka City.

The network o f r ail lines around O sa ka ineluded many local interurban rou te s a s w el l· asthe east-west trunk lines already mentioned.' Inaddition, there were cross-island routes leading tothe. Japan Sea coast from KyotG, Osaka, Kobe,and H im ej i. L ik e t he m ai n east-west lines, however, their traffic was dependent, to a major extent,upon a s ingle marshalling yard in Osaka's northeast outskirts-the largest i n J a pa n . Especiallyafter traffic t h rou g h th e Inland Sea ha d been cut

down byB-29 mining, main-line rail traffic wasseverely strained at this p oi nt . A m os t s er io usproblem toward the end of the war was the adequate maintenance of rai lway roll ing stock. Theregion's facilities for new construction and repairwere concentrated in a few l a rg e u n i ts that sust ~ i n e dheavy damage in a re a a tt ac ks o n O sa kaan d K obe. Exc ep t. for the internal damage andd i s l o c a t i ~ nwithin these two cities; a considerableamountof freight haulage couldhave been main-

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tained despite t runkline rail interruptions andmining through use of interurban rail routes. andlighters and other small wooden craft along thInland Sea coas t .· These normally important e l e ~

ments in local and inter-city traffic proved highlyvulnerable in the general breakdown of urbanfunctions.

This section has outl ined t he p a tt e rn of eco-

nomic concentration in the Osaka region and itsgeneral contribution to the Japanese war eCon-

omy. Both in t e rms o f mi l it a ry end-products and

support ingindustr ia l activity, the role of the largeurban centers has been stressed. Their adminis_.trative importancewas equally great. Aside froma f ew aircraft assembly plants,generally situatedoutside the urban areas, these industr ia l concen-

trations presented the region 's most a tt ract ivet a rg e t s fo r Air Force planners, especially for in-

cendiary bombing. The following section outlinesthe development of·· B-29 operations against theJapanese homeland and the role of urban area andother attacks in the Osaka region.

U. S. Air Effort against the Osaka Region

Aside from a few tactical sweeps during the lastweeks o f t he war by fighters from I wo an d fromNavy carriers, all U .S . ai r operations in the Osakaregion were conducted b y th e Twen t i eth AF withB-29s based in the Marianas.. Map 2 gives ageneral p ic tu r e o f the operation area an d indicatest h e r el at i ve weight of e ffor t a imed a ga in st t heOsaka region. Targets in this region includedurban areas, aircraft plants, petroleum refineries,and one arsenal. Mining campaigns were also

c a rr i ed o u t in the Inland Sea and Japan Sea'ap-proaches to the region's ports. . ' .

B-29 operations were i n i ti a te d f ro m th e Marianas toward the end' of November 1944 but themain effort d id n ot g et started until March 1945.

During t h is p r el i mi n ar y p er io d o f training andorganization, 20 missions were carried out againstt h e J a p an e s e homeland. Sixteen were precisionattacks on pr ior i ty a i rc ra f t plants and four involved trial use of incendiaries against industrial.concentrations and congested urban a rea s. Onehigh-explosive mission hit t h e Ka wa s ak i a i rc r af tplant located at Akashi, just west of Kobe, earlyin January 1945 and one test incendiary raid hita waterfront industr ia l area in K obe on 4 Feb ruary. Otherwise, the Osaka region escaped Twen-

' t ieth AF attentions, except for occasional reconnaissance missions, unti l the second phase of our

. OSTOK

CJ•RYUKYUS·

· o ~OKINAWA•

NOV 1944 - AUG 1945

XXI BOMBER COMMANDAREA OF OPERATIONS

TOTAL OSAKA REGION

155253 TONS 321612 7 0 5 9 SORTIE S 3830

MILEAGE (NAUTIC AL)• , Io MO ~ o

5

'.,'

MARCUSo·

~ _ ~ o I S .

IS.



operations was initiated on 9 M arch . B y t ha t'time, B-29 s t rength i n the Marianas had beenbuilt u p f ro m 119 to 385, despite relatively highlosses, and enough munitions had arrived to permit a trial of the mass incendiary techniqueagainst Japan's major urban concentrations.

Between 10 and 20 March four key industrialand administrative centers were hit in large-scalelow-level incendiary_ attacks-Tokyo, Nagoya,and the main war production cities of the Osakaregion, Osaka and Kobe. The success of these

missions produced an immediate reorientation oft h e Twen t i eth AF strategic plan. The followingquotation from an official operation s summary emphasizes the revolutionary change in cost factorsa s w el l a s in the results achieved. Previous higha l t it u d e d a y lig h t missiuns had been p l ag u ed b yair opposition and weather problems affectingbombing accuracy, and loss ratios had averaged- .more than five percent. .

I n j us t ten days, the entire picture changed. Flyingindividually, bombing at night from alti tudes averaging 7,000 feet, the B-29s burned a path of destructionthrough the f ou r p ri nc ip al c it ie s o f J ap an . T hi rt ytwo square miles o f th e mo st p o ten t wa r industry concentrations were destroyed. I n t ha t ten days, theXXI Bomber Gommand, with an average of 380 as

signed aircraft, :flew 1,595 sorties (75 percent as manyas had been flown i n t he preceding 3 % mo nth s) , declivering 9,365 tons of incendiary bombs (three timesthe tonnage dropped in the preceding3% months) ,a t

a c os t of .9 percent o f t he participating crews, thelowest loss rate yet attained.

The conclusion to b e drawn from this "blitz" andthe implications for future planningwere inescapable.By lowering the bombing altitude, the effectiveness ofeach B - 29 w as inc r ea s ed tremendously. Bomb loadsmore than d o u b ~ e d; using radar methods, the weatherceased to bea ser ious f acto r ; t h e n u mb er of@aircraftdropping on theprimary target soaredfrom 58 percentto 92 percent; enemyfighter opposition was negligible;decreased bombing altitudemeant less operating strainw hi ch a dd ed u p t o m or e s or ti es p er ai rcraft ; crewmorale rose with each attack and IwoJima provideda refugefor the battle-damagedand those lowon fuel.

Japan's urban industr ial concentrations had beenproved highly vulnerable to destructron by incendiarya tt ac k. A ft er a careful analysis of the bombing results, p r ep a ra t io n s w ere made immediately for anextensive incendiary effort agains t the remaining important industr ial areas of Japan with a v ie w towardforcing h e r s u r r en d er p r io r to invasion day.

The basic planof subordinating strategic bombing to the projected surface invasion could not bealtered, b u t t he place o f u r ba n a tt ac ks w as nowfirmly established in operational planning. To

6

quoteagain:

During periodswhen the weather forecastindicated a reasonable chance of visual OOIllbinl!:l'l\hditions, attacks were scheduled against key 1l10.UStrilllobjectives with high-explosivebombs and, When viSU 1

bombing conditions w ere n o t in di cat ed by foreca atweather, the urban indus tr ial areas were attack:dwith incendiary bombs, employing radar bombingmethods. Th us tw o p a ra l le l systems. of targets Weredeveloped: the key industrial objectives such as air.craft plants, arsenals, oil ins tallations and marshal_ling y ar ds a s one system, a nd t he u rb an industrialconcentrationsas the other. The war began to assUllIe"short term"aspects. General LeMay believed thatall-out a i r a t ta c k couldforce Japan to surrender priorto the planned invasion and, a t t he calculated risk ofexhaustingall available crews, he committedthe COllI-

mand accordingly. In accordance with this plan, everyeffort w a s m ad e t o e xp ed it e t he s hi pm en t of largequantities or incendiary munitions from the U. S . tothe Marianas bases.

Subsequent strategic operations by the Twentieth AF c an be grouped in six partially over-lapping phases: completion of t he u rb an attackprogram against the main industrial centers; ex-tension o f t he incendiary program to smaller cit-ies; mining of coastal waters and key harbors;continued policing o f t he aircraft industry; precisionattackson other industries regarded as essen-tial to preparations for invas ion; and, fina lly,the atomic bomb attacks. Unti l the last 8 weekso f t he war, . th e t im in g o f these operations wasdrastically affected by the chronic shortage ofincendiary bomhs a nd t he necessity of divertingeffort t o s up po rt tile Okinawa invasion. Thus,the urban area program against key cities couldnot be.completed until 15 June-more than threemonths after initiation. This delay w as mostserious i n t he case o f t he Osaka and Kobe schedule, where more than seventy-five days intervenedbetwe en a tt ac ks . Some mines w ere dropped att h e e n d of March b u t t h e main program to interdict Inland Sea an d Japan Sea shipping was notini t ia ted until May. Exceptionally favorable

weather i n J u ne made it possible to mount twentydaylight formation high explosive a t ta c ks th a tmonth, but only onewas possible during July andonly three days c ou ld be so use d before the. surrender in August.

D u ri ng t h e intensive period of opera t ions-9March to 14 August 1945-approximately twentytwo percent of Twentieth AF effort was devotedto precision high explosive attacks, almost seventypercent to urban attacks, a nd t he balance to min-

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1 the wide range of manufacturingtant y a mo ng ,0 k 'sfor militaryand civilian use p e r f o r ~ e dby sa a

k_

, ".. ". 6 200 registered' factorres and worr emaml llg "shops.

Many of these manufacturing units , :ere verys mal l. M or e than 9,000 o f t he ,16,000, lIT operat ion before the March attack employed less than10 p ro duct ive w orke rs e ac h a n ~accounted fo r

1 10 percent o f t ot al industrral employment.~ n Y t h eother hand 46 concerns with more than1 000 workers each (including the Osaka ArmyArsenal with more than 38,000) together e m p ~ o y e ~a third o f t he city total. From the. s t a n ~ p ~ l l l t0

area attacks, the critical element II I thIS llldust r i a l pa t te rn is the very widespread dependence

f larO'e and middle-sized concerns on components

o b . b 0 k' malland maintenanceitems supphed y s ~ a ss

, d ' ' t s T ll e di sr u pt i on of tIns complexpro UClllg um . dand highly vulnerable pattern is ~ e n e r a l l ya gree .to have been one o f t h e most crUCIal results of oUI

attacks., Altogether some 4,200 industrial structures areofficially listed as destroyed or seriously d a ~ a g e din the 14 March at tack, which burned ,out ~ o r e

than 8 square miles i n t h e h e ar t of the CIty, krlled

1 t 4 000 inhabitants and dehoused 500,000.amos , 50000A lmos t 2 000 factories and more than , em-ployees ~ e r eremoved f r o ~police rolls at once,b u t d ur in g t he 10-week perlOd before O ~ a k aw,as ,

. tt k e d a n oth er 1 700 manufacturlllg umtsagaIn a a c " " , 'dwere found to be completely o,,:-t of operatIo.n, an _,

an additional 16,000 workers were dropped frompayrolls. Of more importance tha:r the n u m b ~ r ' ;

f ' dl'vI'duals carried on payrolls IS the drop l ,o II I f '1 d t' ' eattendance ra,tes, since workers who aI, e 0 r -port a f t ~ rat tacks were n o r ~ a l ~ ye a r ~ I e dfo r amonth or two by concerns stIll II I bUSllle.ss . A t ~

tendance in' most plants prior to .b o m b ~ n g ~ avaried between 80 and 90 percent,WIth a CIty-WIdeaverage of 82 percent. Althoughthe March attackdid not take place unti l the 14th, average attendance rates for the c it y a s a w ho le dropped to 71,percent with no subsequent improvement . In

terms of manpower actually available, the averagen u mb e r a p p ea r ing fo r wo rk in ~ a r c hdropped to10 percent of the previqus normallllthe mostheavily hi t district (reflecting s h u t ~ o w n s .as w,ell asevacuation) a nd t o 80 percent II I n e a : - b ~llldustrial sections which drew on such d ~ t r r c t s f o

labor. By May, attendance figures.werfe only 12percent o f t he pre-bombing normal 111 the hardest

ffects o f U rba n Attack on Osaka

O k 't h a 1940 population of 3.2 million,sa a, WI . , d t ' 1k d after Tokyo as Japan's leadlllg II I us rIa

~:ommercial center. ,With a t ot al o f

~ 6 , 1 5 5

eo'istered factories and workshops a nd a n l l l d u s ~

fal l ab or fo rce of 505,000 before the, Marc

b· Osaka was reO'arded as partIcularlyom lngs, , bil l o rt an t f or a ir cr af t components, o.rdnance,

~ i n eengines and shipbuilding, m a c h ~ n ~t o o ~ s

d g en er al m ac hi ne ry. , A lt ho u. gh n o , alrcra ~

sembly plants were located w i t h l I ~the CIty ~ o ~'h f th of Osaka's industrral workers II I

an one- our . d4 600 factories and workshops contrrbute

orne , , T th sandirectly to the aircraft l l l d u s ~ r y ..wo o u .

and four hundred manufacturlllg umtsemployll lgore than a fifth of the i n d u s ~ r i a l l a ~ o rforce con-

ributed to ordnance productIon.whIle 1,000 con-

d a slxt h of all industrralworkers werecerns an

elated to shipbuilding. _,

An additional 12 percent employed by 1,800shops were engaged in machinery ~ n dmetal fab, t' 0' work not exclusively aSSIgnable to onerIca lllb ' . t" d

of t h e th r ee war industries prevIously men lOne .In addition t o t he more than 75 p e r c e n t , ~ f~ l l

industrial'labor thus accounted for, such p r r o r ~ t y

items as electrical equipment and instrume:r:ts, llldustrial belt ing a n d b ut yl alcohol loom Impor-

S on war production would'haveconsequence ke rouch more dec is ive ha d r i o t u ~ b a nattac s,

ell d reduced industrial productlOn and, reea Yirero ents . ,1'1 at tacks on secondary urban centers, hke

Ie most o f t he precision targets, came soose on • d ft th '

t the cessation of hostilities an a er 0 erose 0 d ' t" t

t h d al ready beo'un to re uce ac IVI yelllen s a < b . 1 d

, , d' ffi It' to determine then actua anrat It IS 1 CU " fti • 1 ' t Precision attacks on ancratelltla lmpac. d d

t t A kashi 'mdHimeji had already re uceall s a c , , bl b f th

Teo'ate war p ro du ct io n c on sl de ra y e ~ r e e

. ~ a n battacks. Sakai and Himej i, in partIcular,d 1 , dy f' elt the effec,t s o f u rb an attacks on

a a rea dbsaka and Kobe. Bu t w he th er m e as ur e y po:v er

, p'tl'on or by contribution to war productlOn,llSunl, .

t te secondary cities were relatlv.ely ummpor ance t for a few dist inct fac torres . Under, con-

, , p 't ' by July 1945 it is clear that theItlOns eXlS lllg , , dt f these secondary urban attacks ha as

pac 0 ; " f i ' Snch psychological and politIcal slgm cance. adid direc t effec t. on aggregate war produ<{tlonroughout the region. ,

on Japan but only one-seventh of a l l B-29T h e i ni ti al p re cl sion a tt ac ks a ga in st a ir c

assembly plants in this region were highly e : t i ~ ~ _

tive. The one ,follow-up a t t ack-a t Akashi---.was unnecessary since operations there had beenabandoned in favor of other dispersed si tes .E x_cept for th is one plant, which was attacked earlyi n " Ja n ua r y 1945 , p re ci sion ope ra ti ons Weremounted only a ft er t he indirect effects of areaattacks and dispersal efforts ha d already considerably reduced output. This program' was effective in virtually eliminating final assemblyactivi_ties at the region's main units.

Th e r ef inery a tt ac ks c ause d a great dea l ofphysical damage bu t d id n ot affect the Japanese,fuel position. Two refineries depended entirelyo n imp or t e d crude a nd h a d already been reducedto nominal status, and efforts to produce syntheticfuel at the Amagasaki unit 'had not proved significant. , Spil lover damage was extens ive in thisattackbut mainly affectedpower plantsand a steel,m il l a lr ea dy i dl e as a r es ul t of the decline in activity after the Ma rch a rea attacks and the concentration of remaining s tee l production elsewhere. Three precision at tacks were direc tedagainst the Osaka Army Arsenal a n d t he Sumitomo aircraft propeller and metal fabricatingcomplex in Osaka. The 26 June attack waslargelyineffec tive due to cloud condit ions which forceduse o f r ad ar u n de r h i gh l y unfavorable circumstances. The 24 July attack caused very extensive(damage t o t he Sumitomo complex and moderated am ag e t o the a rs en al . A fi nal e ff or t a gai ns tthe arsenal on the last day of th e war was highlysuccessful from the standpoint of physical damage, but t h e M a rc h a nd J un e urban at tacks hadreduced activity to a small percentage of the previous level long before these precision operations,Similarly, operations ha d ceased at the Sumitomoprofleller works prior to the effective 26 July attack and reduced output at dispersa l s ites wasa l r ea d y u n d er w ay. S te el and l igh t metals fab

ricating here was brought to a standstill by thisattack and would have crippled a i rcra f t and ordnance output if t he w a r ha d continued.

In contrast to the petroleum attacks, the miningproblem in the approaches to Osaka and Kobeand elsewhere i n t he I nl an d Sea, h ad a n immediate and serious effect on bulk commodity movementsessentialto local i n du s t ry. Effo r ts to divertma in la nd impo r t s through harbors on the northcoast were also frustrated to a considerable extent.

8

J

i ng a nd t o Kyushu airfield attacks i n s up po rt o fOkinawa. Urban attacks represented seventy-fivepercent of al l efforts against the Osaka region,but munitions shortages forced delay of t h i s p rogram u nt il t he l as t ten weeks o f t he war. Afterthe s ingle a t tacks on Osaka and Kobe in March,these cit ies were not again disturbed until June.About half the total damage was thusnot achieveduntil a t wo and one-half months' period of gracehad been provided these cities for reorganizationand, dispersa l. Especia l ly in Osaka, most of th elarger industrial facilities were st i l l in tac t a f te rthe single March raid.

During the last eight weeks o f t he war, B-29strength reached more than twice the level prevailing in March and ample incendiary bombswere finally available. In this period over 8,000sorties, lifting 54,000 tons, weredispatched against

, secondary urban centers. This effort compared, with 6,960 sorties; lifting 41,600 tons, a g a in s t t h efive major urban centers dur ing the 9 March-15June'period. Seventy-six square miles of built-upurban areas were burned in the secondary seriesrepresenting the substantial destruction of fiftytwo cities and par tia l damage to six others. '

Seven missions were dispatched to secondarycities in the Osaka region and, in each case, the

level of damage was' sufficient to eliminate theplanned target area from further consideration.Nine hundred forty-seven aircraft participated,dropping 7,480 tons of incendiaries, and only twop la ne s w ere los t. The se a tt ac ks w ere a ll carriedo u t f ro m th ree to six weeks before the surrender.

Before 'final appraisal of t h e B- 2 9 programagainst major Japanese centers, brief commentis required on precision at tacks in the Osaka region. Of high explosive attacks, six were directedagainst five aircraft assembly p lan ts-one early inJanuary and the others dur ing June 1945; threepetroleum refineries were h i t - o n e in Amagasakia n d t he others near Wakayama--:toward the endo f t he campaign; and th e Osaka Army A r s ~ n a l

and Sumitomo aircraft propeller and metal fp,bri ~

cating complex were targets oil tHree occasionsbetween 24 J un e a nd the surrender. Togetherwith almost 100 mining sorties, the 1,200 sortiesagainst these targets complete the list of operations in the Osaka region. As already mentioned,947 sorties were involved i n t he secondary urbanattacks, and 1,585 part icipated in the Osaka andKobe urban attacks . Altogether, a t tacks on thisregion involved one-fifth of al l tonnage dropped



plummeted following the 5 June raid. Consumption that month w as 7 mil li on KW H and a further slight decline occurred i n J ul y with o nl y 4million KW H being consumed in August. Physicaldamage to major plants was very heavy a n d la bo rproplemsseriously reduced prospects for recoveryafter March.

Conclusion

Against the backgroundof general inadequaciesi n t he J a pa n e se wa r economy, it is clear that the

urban area attacks on Osaka and Kobe had a decisive and continuing effect on the level of industrial activity in these ma jo r wa r p rod u ct ion centers. The consequences of these attacks werecommunicated t o o the r in d us t r ia l towns in this regionwith varying. force a n d r a pi d it y in acco,rdancewi th th e ir relative position i n t h e war productionstructure.

Th e a re a a tt ac ks o n Tok yo a nd o th er m aj orproduction centers ha d repercussions on essentialactivity in Osaka and Kobe, just as productionfailures t h er e m ad e themselves felt elsewhere.Fo r example, output a t t he Osaka Army Arsenal,that city's largest producing unit , dropped almost50 percent from the previous level i n A pr i l 1945and continued declining thereafter not because ofphysical damage or shortages in basic materialsbut due t o t he breakdown in its elaborate subcontracting system. Prod u ct io n o f a n t i- a i rc r a ftguns, the arsenal's top priori ty ' i tem in 1945, wasreduced drastically because fire-control apparatusmanufactured in Tokyo w as n o longe r rec eive daf ter the March area at tacks on that city.

As was emphasized a t t he outse t, a rea at tacksha d their impact on economy dominated by shortages of almost every k in d, w i th n o s ur pl us availa bl e t o u se i n p re pa ra ti on f or o r a dj us tm en t t othe tremendousshock of area bombing. This econ-

. omy w as further handicapped by administrativeconfusion and a l ac k of realistic planning whichgreatly exaggerated the difficulties inherent in a

situation where heroic measures of emergency readjustment were required. At this moment communications a n d in t ern a l t r a ns p o rt a t io n in themain cities were temporari ly paralyzed a n ~manyof th e controlling administrative offices destroyed.

The decline i n J a pa n 's r a w ma te r ia l positiona nd t he breakdown in th e coal program' ha d already resulted in. considerable declines, in basicproduction before March 1945. I t i s c le ar thatthese would have been a decisiveelement in reduc-

11

KOBE ATTACKS

a's experience under area attack differs inI respects from that of Kobe, port and in

ial center located 25 miles west at the northmargin of Osaka Bay. Japan's sixth largest

ith a 1940 population of sl ightly under oneon, Kobe ha d been particularly importanttransshipment p o in t fo r overseas and coastal

but also ha d large marine engine and shiping enterprises, with related steel fabricating

ities, a n d ma jo r producers of ordnance, elec1 equipment a n d ra i lr o a d rolling stock and

bel' tires. A lo ng w i th these few large units,e were many small plants engaged in producof machinery and machine tools and comnts for the aircraft , shipbuilding and ord

ce industries. Comparedwith Osaka, however,e industry was highly concentrated. Twods of the Kobe industrial htbor force workedea factory u n it s a n d 80 percent in fifty unitsloying more than 500 workers each. A thirdsaka's t o t al l a bo r force was in 46 plants but

y 41 percent were in units with more than 500h while 28 percent were in workshops employless than 50 each. Of some155,000 registered

ustrial workers, 57,000 worked in shipyards,.000 i n m et al fabrication, 22,000 produced air-.ft components and 18,000 were in ordnance.

small trial of incendiaries against one Kobetrict in February damaged several importanttories, b ut t he ma in a t ta c ks occurred on 17

arch and 5 June. Some spillover residentialmage resulted from operations against nearby .jectives on 11 May and 5 Au gu s t. Al to g eth er

.2 square miles were burned over with 6,400 inabitants killed and more than 450,000 dehoused.Imost 40 percent of total industrial floorspaceas burned out. Industrial labor carr ied onfacry payrolls declined from 188,000 before the

tacks to 133,000 in April and 86,000 b y th e wa r' snd.Monthly industrial electric power consumption

ropped from a pre-attack average of 30 millionto 23 J:P.illion i n F e br u ar y ( as a r es ul t of

amage t o one ma jor in d us t r ia l complex) an d° 17 million KW H in M arch . C on sumptiondropped slightly in April and recovered to 18

illion KW H in May during the 13 week lullbetween attacks, and industr ia l use of power aga,in

following each a tt ac k w i th no significantry.

space destruction t o l arg er p la nt s, t h e s e ' ,were fa r more effective. Of ten 'II" InISSf t f ' d ' ' . ' mI Ion 's .ee o · m u st rI al r oo f a re a (as m qUare, I easured fr ....aerIa photographs) destroyed in Osaka b om

at tack s, alm ost 9 m il li on was des t d .YurbanA ' . roye In J. ~ o ~ gmaJor categorIes, aircraft propeller ~ e .

bUIldmg and marine engines were m s, ~ h l P _

affected. ~ n~ e r m s 'of current o u t p ~ : tt ~ : v e r e l yhe avy dechne m electri cal eq ui pmen t ,very .and components which was e n f o r c ~ d ~ a C h I ~ e r yp ~ a n tdamage, deserves cons iderat ion y ~ r e c tWIthgeneral damage to production e ". ong~ e f e c t ~ dall prospects fo r c a rry ing t 1 : ~ u m ~ n t;histlVe dIspersal and repair of even th g e e c ~f "I" e most ur. aCl Itles or reorganization of critical b gent_mg networks. . su contract_

Another 2,450 of th e city's 12 350 f t ·k h , , ' . , ac OrIes andw? r .so p s stI l l m ope ra tion before 1 June .e l I m m ~ t ~ dfrom police records that month : : rea ~addItIOnal 1,300 were scratched in J ul dclal factory payrolls declined from 439 ~ o o O f f i

1 J ~ n eto 376,000 at the end o f t he month , ~ ~another 70,000 w orke rs bein • dro WI

records during July At t dg f Ped from the

accordingly. From' a p r e ~ ~ o ~ ~ : 'gures declinedpercent whi h d g average of 82.t .d c r o p p e d to 70 percent after attack

CI.y- WI e attendance in June was only 63 'WIth a further decline i n J ul y to 61 percentM h . percent.d o nt l y i nd us tr ia l pow er c onsumption had

ropped 25 percent in March after 'th fi tattack .th . e rs areamonth WI . a . sl Ight c on tinu ing dec line in the

s o f A pr Il a nd May I d t ' Isum t" f . n us rIa gas con-

p IOJ? olIowed almost exactly th .tern Th J ' . e same p at-

. e une raIds were follow.ed by a I

than.,20 percent decline f or t he m on th f ro m t ~ ~K ~ e v l O u slevel of i n d ~ s t r i a Jpower consumption:In t ; u ~ Opercent drop I:r: the industr ial use of gas.

y gas consymptlOn d rop p ed a g ain to 25:;ercent of the pre-June level a n d th e electricpower

gure tumbled to 7 mill ion KW H 16of the r J or percent

. p e- une level and 7 percent of the rateprIOr t o t he first a re a a t ta ck i n M harc .

~ t o g le t he r a re a r ai ds on O sa ka des troyed o rserIOUS y dama d .. d . ' ge an estImated 25 percent of totalm u st rI al fl. oo rs pac e some 8 4 00 . d t ' It . d . ' , m us rIa struc-ures a ~ 5,000 factory units of all sizes. Durin

the perIod of January-July 1945 I'nd t ' I gl' II d ' us rIa payo s ,ropped from 505 000 to 307 000 dk ' , an aver-

~ g ; o ~ ~ r; h at:endance ro ug h ly f rom 475,000 toas ;ef l ' t d .e e v ~ ~of general industrial activity

ec e m utIlIty data indI'cates d " deClSlve e-

hit d is tr ic t o f t he c it y a s against 86 percent int h o ~ en e ar b :y. E mp l oy me nt actually increaseddurmg th e raIdperiod at many priority suburbanplants. Or?nance factories in particular mana ge d t o mamtain a preferred position unti l thesurrender.

I ~ d u s t r i a lp o ~ e rconsumption o f f e ~ s- the bestavaIlable measure of what effects th e ph . Idamaa b ' . YSICa, ~ e ,a senteeIsm, a n d d i sru pt ion o f t he pro-

. d u c ~ I O ns t r ~ c t u r er e su l t in g f rom a rea a t ta c ks hadon mdustrlal output. With a considerable butnormal seasonal fluctuation, mon thly in d us t r ia l

power consumption in Osaka City had remainedf r o m , l ~ t e1943 through November 1944 at around76 mIllIon KW H Af t I' .

. . er a sIgh t mcrease in De-?ember 1944, there w as a d rop to 72million KW H~ nJanuary and to 69 million in February, reflectmg seasonal. po,:er s tringency as well as the firstmarked declIne m activity. Al tho u g h th e re weretwo weeks of normal operations before Osaka was: . t t a c ~ e don 14 March, industrial power consump. I ? ~ ,o ~ t h ewhole month amounted to only 52~ I IOn WH an d th e figure for April was slightlyess. Lack of f u ~ t h ~ rbombing provided s t il l an

other m o ~ t hfor mdICations of recovery, but Ma .consumptIOn was only 51 million KWH. Y

Similarly, industr ia l gas ~ o n s u m p t i o nwh' h

had averaged 12 million M3 pe r nionth un't'1'1

:cd944 d th ' mI -an en declmed g rad u a lly to 1011' '11'by Febr . 72 mI IOn

" uary 1945 under a rationing system that

de ~ I m m a t e dall consumersexcept thosecontributI'ngIrectly t "'II' 0 prIOrIty war items, d ro pp ed t o 711

mI IOn M3 in M h d ' 72th . arc. an remamed practically

e s am e m April d M. ~ . an .ay. To summarize, thism ~ d - m o n t hraId m March wasfollowed by roughly~ 5 percent d ro p i n t he monthly average of in-

~ : ~ r l a lc o n s u ~ p t i o nfor ga s and electric power~ I no apprecIable recovery d u ri n g t h e followmg twdo an d one-half months when no attacks occurre .

10

Th e June at tacks on Osaka extended thof d a m a b d e areation of ge . e!on. the. 8 s quare mil e central sec-d' t ' the CIty mto the heavily industrialized

IS trICtA t o t he southwest, west, n o rt h a nd n o rt h-wes . total of 8 538 t. , onswere dropped on 1 7~ ~ ~ ; 5~ ~ l : ' b u ~ n i n gou t slightly less than 8 s q u ~ r :t' i g a out 5,650 and' dehousing an addilOna 500,000. As in the case of gross d a m a g ~

~ : : : ;th ed

n ~ m b e rof industrial structures listed as

th°tYhe Mln.these three attacks was slightly less

an e arch fig -4 20 . .ure ., O. In terms of floor-



ing over-all industr ia l activity within a fewmonths. Bu t as measured by electric power consumption, the level of activity in the intermediateand final assembly levels o f w ar production remained aL a relatively high level. Examinationof individual factory data provides the completebreakdown i n t he r ep ai r and dispersal programafter heavy attacks provide one important yardstick of Japanese capacity and resilience. Therewas virtually no recovery in general industr ia lactivity even where a considerable p e rio d in t ervenedbetween area attacks. Labor problems weregenerally regarded as of f i rs t magnitude, a longwith dislocations of local support ing services.

The following reports discuss the complex iiltereffects of such elements as breakdown in thesystem of labor and materials allocation, the creeping effect on basic production of coal a n d t he reduction in supply of many industr ia l materialsa nd t he inability to make emergency reallocationsof these crucial items. Th e effect attendance andlabor efficiency of dehousing, food shortages, andtransport delays is discussed along with a host ofsuch underlying problems as the decline in freightmovement and the heavy destruction in warehousesof semi-finished and finished goods. There i s n o

12

question t ha t many of these factors would.been opera tive to a c onside ra bl e e xt en t .absence of area attacks. B ut i t is also clear:th.their cumulative i m pa ct o n war production«magnified substantiallyas a result of th e enorm.()destruction and disruption in the main c i t i ~..

Finally, it must be p o int e d o u t that whilethanalysis has largely been confined in these repoto the effects of area at tacks on industrial actii t y, t h er e i s n o q ue st io n but that the growidisintegration of public discipline as reflected iItthe growth of industr ia l absenteeism and blackmarket operations was a factor of real official COIl-

cern in t he l as t months of the war, quite asidef ro m i ts economic implications. Post-raid ab-senteeism was usually even higher among adm.in=istrative and management personnel than amongworkers, a n d ma ny concerns ma de n o effort to getbackinto production after the June attacks. Theseconsiderations are also of crucial importance inassessing the country's position i n t h e critical lastdays of the war. Economic collapse wasimminentbut the prospects for securing capitulation priorto the scheduled ground invasion may very wellh a ve h in ge d on popular react ions to our over-whelming application of a ir power.

I. OSAKA REPORT

C· ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Ity ----------------------Air Operations against Osaka _

Utilities and Public Serv ices-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport and Storage Facilities _

Fuel and Indus t r ia l M a t e r i a l s - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - ~ - - - - -

The Structure of Indus t ry in Osaka--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Industrial Dispersal and Repai r -----'-------

Industrial Labor -------------------------------------------------- ~ - -

Production Trends -------------------------------------------

..

13

Page

1524395072

8790104113



THE CITY

a after Tokyo th e l e ad ing in d us t r ia l a n d, " "stratlVe center and most populous CIty ofhad also become, by 1941, th e third largesti tuated on th e northeastern shore of Osakaich forms th e eastern l im it o f t he Inlande c ity had long been th e economic focal

of t h e c e nt r al Ho n sh u region. In additionadjoining industrial suburbs o f S ak ai a nd

aSfLki,two of Japan's six largest c i t i es

and Kobe-and several smaller cities ofular significance f or w ar production, arein the populous low land area surroundingand along near-by shores o f t he I nl an d'

Osaka 's location, midway between Tokyohimonoseki o n t h e m ai n Tok ai do r ai l ro a dt t he h ea d o f t he Inland Sea, made ~ t th eercial a nd i nd us tr ia l h ea rt o f J ap an . In'on, t h e ' h ar bo r a n d i nd u st ri a l facilities of, the most important prewar port of Japan,less than 20 miles to the west. Osaka wasideally s it ua te d t o process a n d t r an s sh i pes moving directly overseas o r t hr ou gh t hected waters o f t h e Inland Sea aswell as thosed by rail f rom o th er regions.

saka's highway connections with Amagasaki,K ~ b e ,Akashi a n d H i me j i t o t he west and withKxoto to t h e n o rth ea s t were th e best in Japan.Inl'addition to a complex, suburban and regionalrail network, t h rou g h ra i l facilities ou t of Osakawere also of t h e h igh e st caliber. Th e followingtable gives t h e r a il distance from Osaka of somek ~ ycenters:

Mt1es

Tokyo 345Shimonoseki-Moji 335Hiroshima 210Nagoya 118lCyoto 28lCobe 20,

Osaka, like the five o th er ma jor J a pa n es e cen

ters, averaged roughly 1,300 miles from th e Marianas bases where strategic air attacks originated.If the war ha d continued u n t i l Ok in a wa basedB-29s were over Osaka, th e distance would haveaveraged about 650 miles , as against almost 850for Tokyo and 750 for Nagoya. In c o nt r as t t oothermajorurban centers, Osaka wasa poor radartarget f o r t h e t yp e s o f equipment available duringmost o f t he operations period. Th e followingtable gives approximate air distances from various

15

U. S. bomber bases to Osaka:. '

Mi l e s

Chengtu 1,625(}uam 1,350Saipan 1,270Iwo Jima ..: 660Okinawa -'____________ 660

Osaka is at t h e m o ut h o f t h e Yodo river, whichprovides water access and a road-rail corridor toKyoto some 30 miles northeast. Mountain ridges

approximately'15

milesn o rt h a n d

easto f t h e

cityconverge around Kyoto and limit th e densely sett led Osaka plain. A continuous ly built-up coastalstr ip extends west to Kobe. Th e built-up area ofOsaka ci ty i tself is roughly elliptical 'and extendssome 10 mileseast f rom th e wa te r fro n t a n d almost13 miles north-south, merging with Amagasaki

'and Sakai. Total a r ea wi thin th e c ity l imit s i s59.8 square miles.

In addition to the v ar ious del ta a rms of the'Yodo river which segment m uc h o f t h e city area',there is an elaborate canal system which is essential to t he city's internal transportation. Thiscanal system also provided th e basis for Osaka'sf ut i le p l an o f defense against incendiary attack.Osaka, unlike Tokyo, had never suffered seriousearthquake damage a n d th ere has been relativelyl i t t le modern reconstruction. The medieval patterns of narrow streets (usually 20 feet or less)prevailed everywhere except for a f e w ma in avenues c u t t h ro u gh at i nt er va ls o n a rectangularplan. Wide avenues a re l imi t ed in number, themost important being Midotsugi which bisects thecentral commercial district. This 144-foot avenuewas constructed in 1927 to connect th e main Osakarai lroad stat ion at t h e n o rt h edge o f t h e c en tr alcommercial district w i th t h e Namba railroad station at i t s s o uth edge. In 1935, Osaka's one subway was constructed u nd er t he f ul l l en g th o f t hi sthoroug"hfare. In b u i l t ~ u pOsaka, for all of itssize, there were but t h r ee v e ry small parks and

few other open spaces, aside from waterways.Layout o f t he City (Map 1)

Th e land-use p a tt er n i n Osaka was rela tivelysimp le-a large central commercial a re a w i th i tscluster o f mo de rn mu lt i st o ry fire-resistant struc-' ~

tures, s u rro un d ed o n the northeast, nortih, west,and southwest b y in d us t r ia l zones, and "by lesscongested better class residence areas o n t he eastand southeast. All sections o f t he city ha d large



ection.

struction of all firebreaks, a total of.77,568 housesand 815 other buildings were pulled down. Fire.break activi ty was u n d er Ho me Min is t ry instruc-t i o n a n d· f elLinto fo u r dist inc t periods . The firstd a t ed f rom January 1944, when rather leisurelywork on about 5 miles of breaks, each about 150-200 fee t w ide, w as s t ar te d. The se w ere intendedprimarily to protect thecentral core of the city, andat the same time served t o b rea k up densely built-up areas . Special firebreaks were cons tructedaround a f ew p l an t s a nd u t il i ty installations.

The second period of firebreak constructioll,s tar t ing in June 1944, was carried on with greatere ne rgy. M os t o f t h e w o r k during this period wasdone i n t he waterfront heavy industry area forthe protection o f t he main Sumitomo works andthe Hitachi shipyard, the city's two largest indus-trial units i n t he a i rc r af t and 'shipbuilding cate-g or ie s. A few l inea l f ir eb re aks a ls o w ere addedat this time, and work on others was speeded up.

The th i rd period of construction was started inFebruary 1945, after· B-29 at tacks were well un-der way and a trial use o f o ur light incendiarybomb on the Kope waterfront had indicated what

might be expected in mass urban a tt ac ks . A fewlineal firebreaks were s t a rt e d a n d the natural pro-tection o f t he canals was· utilized in the hurriedcreation of addit ional firebreaks w i th i n t h e cen-tral commercial residential district. The indus-trial section to t h e n o rt h o f t he central commercialresidential area and the i n t eru rb a n ra i lwa y sta-tions were also given attention. Work under thisprogram was not completed by 14 M ~ , r c h ,the dateof the first attack.

16

PHOTO 3.-Typical pre-a t tack view of c o n ~ e s t e dOsaka industrial d i st r ic t . P r a ct i c al l y a l lsuch structures p r ov e d h i gh l y v u l ne r a bl e t o incend iarya t tack .

The Firebreak Pattern (Map 2)

Th e rivers and canals of Osaka had alwaysserved as natural firebreaks, and the wartimeprotection program was based on them. In the con-

residential populations, wi th th e greatest densitiesin the commercial a n d a d join ing in d us t r ia l sect io ns . Fac to ri es and workshops using up to 15horsepower were regularly permitted in commercialand residential zones.

Adjoining the wharf and warehouse district ont h e wa ter f ron t were the main Clusters of heavyindustry along the Aj i a nd K iz u a rm s of th eYodo r iver. Warehouse s and fac tories extendalong t r i bu t a ri e s a n d canals almost to the commercial heart of the city, where k e y la n dma rk sa re t he pub li c bui ld ings on N akano island in ariver tributary running through the center o f t hecity, a nd t he western-type buildings i n t he business distr ic t surrounding the island. Around thisc en t ra l g ro u p o f m ul t is t or y fire-resistant buildings, there was a larger district of commercialand light industry structures. Th e ci ty profi lew as f la t and marked by the short chimneys ofthe thousands of small factories and workshopsscattered through the commercial and residentialsections. The city's most conspicuous landmarkis the moat-surrounded Osaka castle to the easto f t h e business district. Clustered around it werethe numerousfactory buildings of the Osaka Armyarsenal as well as extensive Army depot and administrative facilities. Ma in p re fe c tur a l buildings were also located near the cas tle, as was thelocal radio broadcas ting headquarters .



in many respects the commercial heart of theJapanese empire, playing a major role in textilesand o th er e x p or t indus tries . However, as Japanturned from overseas trade to war preparationsi n t h e five years from 1935 to 1940, Osaka showedo nl y a slight increase in population as comparedwith the large increase in m a ny o t he r cities andsecondary war industry centers. The populationof Osaka was 3,254,380 in 1940 bu t decreased 13percent to 2,833,344 in February 1944 and another3 percent to about 2,736,000 in November, whenB-29 operations a g ain s t Ho n sh u got underway.

Aside from conscription, most of this drop reflected the decline in commercial activity andcivilian indus try and a p a ra l le l g rowth of. newindustry in the suburbs a nd i n near-by "boom"towns where a ir c ra f t a nd ordnance plants ha dbeen established.

On the eve o f t he March 1945 attack, Osaka 'spopulation had dropped considerably below the2.7 million figure of the previous November, dueto some further transfer of labor to war plants inthe suburbs and n.ear-by towns, a nd t o large-scalepre-raid evacuation of children and ':unemployabIes." A t t ha t time, the birth rate was 2.3 pe rthousand of population, andthe death rate was 2.8per thousand. Theapparent decline inbirths from

t he r at e of 3.9 per thousand i n F e br ua r y 1944,was p a rt ly d ue to the policy o f e ar ly evacuationof pregnant women. The death rate increase fromt he r a te of l . ~per thousand in February 1944 isattributed t o w ar t im e increases iIi accidents anddisease. (Exhibit 1 presents vital statistics forthe October 1943-August 1945 period.)

A s o f F eb ru ar y W44, the last date o n w hichaccurate population figures are available, slightlyless than 4 percent of the totalpopulat ion of Japanlived in O sa ka ci ty. A lm os t 9 p er ce nt l iv ed inthe surrounding districts i n c lu d ing s u b urb anOsaka, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures.

,With an average populat ion dens i ty of about

45,000 persons per s qu are mil e, O sa ka ' ranked

among th e three most densely populated cities ofJapan. Most compactwere the c.entralcommercialdistrict and the mixed residential-industrial districts directly to the southeast, south and southwest, where the p o p ~ l a t i o ndensity was estjmatedto average 81,000 persons pel ' square mile: Thepopulation density of the most congested" areasof Tokyo in 1940 ranged up to 130,000 pe r squaremile, and den si ti es a lmos t a s high were to be

19

34252280249

81r;

Num ber o fother

buildings

9,04614,582

9,75744,183

77,568

- Num ber o fhouseseriod

protec t ion efforts continu(}d on a largerer t h e Ma rch 1945' r a id a n d extended into

. Th e wo rk done in t h i s p e r io d was mainlyto railroads (by clearing bands along the

f-way through congestedareas) and aroundu al k ey plants (ordnance, aircraft com-

ts and utilities), hospitals and district policeTh e wo rk was st i l l done under prefectural

s, bu t t he A rm y a nd Navy selected the facto be protected. Large numbers of tempoidle factory workers were used and most

:results were obtained between March andAfter June , there was progressively less

n w it h w h at a pp ea re d t o be futile efforts.following taple lists the number oJ build

orndown i n t h e firebreak program :1

1 Sourc,e: O s ak a p o lice bureau, November 1945.

~ 1 1the firebreak construction program, concreteb ~ l l d i n g sin th e p at h of the firebreaks were not

torn down. The owners 0'"1:the destroyed frameb ~ i l d i n g swere recompensed at the rate of ·200yelrper t subo , a fair prewar price for new constJfuction but quite inadequate for replacement atpl'evailing black market rates in 1945.

The firebreak and fire defense program provedunsuccessful. Until March it had been carriedout on tl1e assumption that only a few planescouldpenetrate any urban area at one time and thatbombs would be aimed at small scattered targets.However, the March a n d J u ne attacks blanketedwhole districts, generating conflagration-typefires011 both sides of firebreaks that merged and frequently spread fa r beyond the hi t areas. AuthoritieS were utterly unprepared to cope with the first

attack or improvise new measures. FIrebreaksand organized protection f o r i n di v id u al p la nt s ,however, were sometimes effective, especially inlimiting damage to warehouses and auxiliarybUildings.

Population and Housing (Map 3, Exhibit 1)

Second only to Tokyo in population, Osaka was

1945

EXHIBIT

POPULATION STATISTICS. OSAKA .CITY

12,000

! \- - - " BIRTHS

il - - - - OEATHS

1\10,000

\\1/,OOO

\I

1\I \

"'r-.I ,

I\I

"6,000

I \ ,,\ V \ I : \

" ~ , ~ I)«, , I

- / "I I \

I 1\ r--..I I \I

I \ 1--- " 1\, \

I \ /I

I I/ ....- \ I

/ " I4 , 0 0 0

II

, - /

\, \

__1/ " , \, I \, \

'",- ~

2,000

\ 1/

o N 0 I" F M A M ~ ~ A 'S 0 N ° r ~" M A M ~ ~ A

1943 1944



These industrial floorspace estimates were care-fully checked on t h e g ro u nd in Nagoya and de-

1 For t ha t month prefectural p o lice r eco r d s l i s t 16,155 manufactur·ing units, the b a l ~ n c eof 2,478 in c lud in g r o u gh ly 500 uti l i ty units(power p l an t s, c a r b a r n s, r e p ai r s h o ps e tc . ) and 2,000 separate dockand warehouse facilities.

LEGEND

P E RSO N S P E R SQUARE MILE

M : { ~ 2 0 , 0 0 0 - 3 0 , 0 0 0

m l ~ : J 5 0 , 0 0 0 - 7 0 , 0 0 0

.D 7 0 , 0 0 0 - 8 0 , 0 0 0

.g 9 5 , 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 , 0 0 0

MA P OF OSAKA

MAP 3

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

MILES

RE STRICTED

o-O S A K A

OF POPULATION1940

193.871.1

25.196.035.6

161.2

Total Industrial Percent

1:270.0141.4

127.7324.5149'.7603.4

In February 1945 th e estimated population.ure of 2,142,480 gives an average of 4 personseach r e ~ i d e n t i a lu ni t a nd a bo ut n in e p er stture. Th i s s l i g ht decrease in average occupawhich occurred despite the d o ub l in g u p result·f ro m t he firebreak program, represents wart'shifting of population, conscription for the lllitary and emergency service, evacuation of schochildren, and increased deaths due t o wartidisease:.

Non-Residential.Structures

A l on g w i th some 275,000 residential buildini n F e br u ar y 1944, there were 16,416 industrialunits lis,ted as occupying 120,900 industrial strllc.tures of all sizes, an average of 7.4 buildingsunit. Most of these units were, of course, smallworkshops occupying one structure each, many of

which also housed the owner's family. In Feb.ruary 1945 1 there were 18,633 industrial units(reflecting expansion and dispersal) and 122,608industria l .buildings, an average of 6.6 buildings.In the same period, from February 1944 to Feb.ruary 1945, t h e n u mb e ro f o th er types of buildings(stores, theaters, commercial and unused build.ings) decreased from an estimated 102,000 to an

estimated 73,000. This'decrease is lv,rgely attrib.

utable t o t he firebreak<>policy. Another yardstick'by which Osaka 's pre-attack stock of buildingscan be measured is th e Jo in t Targe t Group's roofcoverage data obtained f rom a e ri a l photography.To ta l ro of coverage-industrial, commercial, resi.d e nt i a l a n d other-within t h e c it y was estimatedat 603 mill ion sq ft, of which 161 mill ion sq it,or slightly more than 26 percent, was determinedto be industrial. Comparable d a ta fo r other J apa-nese industrial centers, in millions of square feet,follows:

Tokyo _KawasakL -- - _y okohama:..._--- . : ~ _Nagoya _I{obe _Osaka : _

NiShi ~ _ .

Minami .Naniwa _Teno jL _Taisho . _Nishinari _

found in limited sections of Osaka. Th e mostreliable data on population d en si ty i s b as ed o nthe 1940 census a n d M a p 3 presents d a ta f o r eachward as the boundaries were then defined. (Comparative material i s p re se nt ed o n Map 4 of theKobe r e po r t f o r Kobe and the adjoining suburbsof Amagasaki and Sakai, as w el l as fo r Os ak a .)Densities for parts o f t he l ar ge O sa ka w ar ds located on t he n or th ea st a nd southeast outskirtswere much higher than their average figures indicate.

Relative densities t en de d t o r em ai n t he same

during the 1940-1945 period in Osaka althought h e n o rt he as t sections experienced considerableexpansion of l i g h t in d us t ry a n d some population,while the more congested areas were most affectedb y th e wa rt ime s h i f t s of population out of Osaka.Concerning these changes, Map 5 and accompanying table should be consulted. In part, these present material not directly comparablewith Map 3because several of t h e l a rg e r p r ew a r w ar ds weredivided in 1942. Comparable population data forthe congested central wards whose boundarieswerenot changed, follows: .

Ward

During this period, Osaka 's t o ta l p o pu l at i on .dropped about 15 percent.

In February 1944, when accurate statistics werelast collected, Osaka had 691,867 residential units.E x ac t d at a on t he n um be r o f residential buildings were not available: but it is estimated b y t heJapanese that there was an average of 2% dwellingunits per buildiilg or a total of 275,000 residenti albuildings in Osaka. While th e better-class districts had many detached single-unit houses, mostof Osaka's populace lived in 2-story multi-familyrow-type structures. Withthe firebreak construction policy resulting in a continual decline in the.number of buildings, t h e p ref e ctu r al office esti·mated that there were 538,000 ~ e s ~ d e n t i a lunits an J215,000, residenti al buildings in Osaka as of thoend of February 1945, just before th e first ar.::;", .attack.

20



termined t o be a cc urat e within 2 percent. The, estimates of industrial roof coverage include only

industrial-type structures, warehouses and auxiliary facilities. Home workshops, schools, etc., areexcluded.

Building Construction

In the' central commercial use zone, aside fromthe new ferro-concrete structures, many Osakabuildings were of woodconstruction withtile roofs-precisely t he t yp e f or which our small incendiary bombs were designed. There were also some

equally vulnerablebrick'buildings with load-bearing walls,wooden floors andraf te rs ,and t i le roofs.Outside th e central bus iness dis tr ict , only schooland policebuildings were concrete or brick, exceptfor factories.

Theindustrial sections contained a few scattered"fireproof" ferro-concrete structures, bu t asidefrom. these, the -larger factories and warehousesha d main buildings of brick and wood or l ightsteel framework with composition or corrugatediron s id in g. M os t o f t he auxiliary and smallerindustrial buildings were indistinguishable fromthe residential and home-industry variety-woodframe, wood o r m ud walls, and tile roofs.

Residential buildings"almost without exceptionwere of wood construction w it h t il e roofs. Inthe more congested d i s tr i ct s , p r ac t i ca l l y a l l suchstructures were small 2-story warehouses for residential storage. These warehouses ha d foot-thickwalls of mud and straw, wooden floors and t i leroo fs . U nles s hi t directly with a fj.re bomb whichpierced th e roof, these warehouses general ly survived a rea a t ta c ks even where all surroundingstructures were levelled. '

Few steps had been t a k en fo r protection of essential buildings against incendiary attack, although.various protect ive measures ha d been ordered.Some vital equipment in power plants, substations,g a ~works, etc., were protected by so-called bombproof walls. 'Many key industrial plants also undertook some measures. Most of these walls weremade of wooden planks filled in with sand, butsome were made of reinforced concrete with wallsabout ten feet h ig h. S uc h measures were generally successful in protecting compact ~ q u i p m e n t

against high-explosive fragments bu t were or l i t t leuse, where incendiaries found combustible materials to feed upon. Incendiary-proof roofs weret o be built over power plant equipment, but 'the

deficiency of ironmadetms"impossible an:2 or 3 samples were finished, T h ~mos t edefensive measures for industrial establishowever, proved to be the clearing of perifirebreaks and the isolation of essential workwithin each plant compound through remo .storage and auxiliary buildings.

Summary: The Osaka Urba? Complex

Despite its shortcomings as a radarurban area of Osaka obviously offered one

. most vulnerable and valuable objectives forscale incendiary attack. The denselybuilt-uptral core of the c ity w as the commercial and aministrative nerve center of central Japan anhouse d a lmos t a third o f t he city's populatiSurrounding this most congested central areaonly a s ma ll s ec ti on of which ha d fire-resistaferro-concrete buildings----:were Osaka's industrialsections, most of which also conta ined a high percentage of vulnerable residential and small factory areas. With few exceptions, Osaka's largerindustr ia l enterprises and warehouse facilitieswere susceptible to incendiary damage and werelocated in these congested districts. Even moresubject to damage were the thousands of smallfactories and w orks hops w hich s uppl i ed com-

ponents to Osaka 's key war plants. 'The city's port facilities, which ha d been de

veloped so extensively just ' prior t o t he war, hadplayed a major role in suppor t ingJapan 's operations i n t he S ou th Pacific and Southeast Asia.The v01ume of traffic th roughthepor thad declinedheavily in 1945. Bu t what shipping could stillbe maintained th rough the protected I n l ~ n dSearoute was of critical importance t o t he Nagoyaand Tokyo regions as well as to Osaka, when conv oys c ou ld no longer be pushed through the openw at er s t o t ho se e as te rn p or ts . O sa ka 's ability-to handle water-borne freight depended in large

'- part upon a lighterage system usin: g storage andtransshipment faci l it ies a long canals within the

most built-up sections o f t he c it y. T he se samefacilities played a crit ica l role i n t he city's internal transport system, the effective functioning ofwhich was,particularly important because of thehigh degree of subcontractin'g prevailing in Osakawar industry.

Osaka's industrial significance is discussed indetail in subsequent sections. A s J a pa n 's secondlargest manufacturing center, the city ha d become PHOTO 6 . - ' r he commercial heart o f O sa k a. L o ok i ng s o ut h .

2223

- - - " - - - - ~ - ~ - " " . . . . . - - . . , . . . . - - - - - -



EXHIBIT 2

.'.

ON OSAKA

25

MAYP RIL13

MARCH

~ H EBOMBS

l)=;=liNCENDIARY BOMBS

BOMBING RAIDS

1945

50 0

1000

2000

~(\JI")

(/) I'-

Z -0....

1500

2500

30003. Date .7 June 1945 (day)Numbero f p lanes 409 (20,500 altutudejDurat ion 1 minute, 19 secondsTy pe a n d w e i g h t o f bombs 796.6 tons HE

1,7\-)5 tons IB

4. Date 15 June 1945 (day)Number of planes '144 (21,500 altitude)Durat ion " __ 2 minutes, 11 seCOndsTy p e a n d ~ e i i J : i T o f b o l l l b s - _ - _ - _ -__ ~ 3 , 1 5 7 . 3t o n s I B

Four a r ea a t ta c k s

1. Date ~ ~ 13 March 1945 (night)Numbero f p lanes - - - - .275 (7,000 altitude)Durat ion 3 minutes, 28 secondsType an d weigh to f b o m b s _ - - ~ - - 1 , 7 3 2 - 6t o ns I B

2. Date -'- ~ i Jl\ne 1945 (day)

Number of planes :158 (24,000altitude)Durat ion 1 minute, 32 secondsTy pe a n d 'weight of bombs __· 81.2tons HE

2,706.9 tons IB

Source: Twentieth . AF, Ope r at i onal Summaries.

the 1 ~ u n edaylight mission, which was heai'ichallenged by Japanese fighters, and two each't he ot he r attacks. Twenty-four planes IV

claimed b y o ur gunners on l J une. Only tB-29s werelost in the subsequent precision attacout of 562 participating.

7'h1'ee precision attacks

A. Date 26 June 1945 (day)Numbero f p lanes .68 (22,000 altitude)Durat ion 1 minute, 36 secondsType an d weight of bombs 382.0 tons HE

(Ob ject ive : Sumitomo Ligh t Meta ls Company)

Date .26 June 1945 (day)N u m b er o f p l a n e s _ ~ :..112 (23,000 altitude)Durat ion 58 secondsType and weigh to f bombs 758.0 tons HE

(Objective: OsakaArmy Arsenal)

B. Date ~ __ _'_-- .24 July (day )Numbero f p lanes ,82 (21,000 altitude)Durat ion ~ _'_ 31 secondsTy pe a n d w e i g h t o f bombs 488.0 tons HE

(Ob jec t ive : Sumitomo Ligh t Meta lsCompany)

Date 24 July 1945Numbero f p lanes _'_ 153 (21,500 altitude)Durat ion .43 secondsTy pe a n d w e i g h t o f bombs 1010.0 tons HE .

(Ob jec tive : OsakaArmy Arsenal)

C. Date '- _'_ 14 August 1945(day)Number of planes .147 (23,500 altitude)Dura tion 45 secondsT;ype a n d w e i g h t o f bombs 706.5 tons HE

(Ob ject ive : Osaka ArmyArsenal)

In a d di t i on to these heavy area and precisioi1~ t t a c k s ,B -29s a ls o dropped mines in the approaches to Osaka harbOr. Fighter sweeps werec()nducted over-suburban sections during th e lastweeks of the war by both carrier-based planes andA rm y c r af t bas ed o n I wo . J i m a ~These t a c t ~ c a l

operations did not involve any substantial bomb

AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST OSAKA

24

o n ~of the key p oi nt s f or war production. Thesite of a principal aircraft propeller w orks , alarge Army arsenal and impor tan t shipbuildingand repa i r yards , Osaka played a major role inthese fields. Bu t its peculiar importance to theJapanese w'ar economy stemmed from its product i on o f components, machinery and machine toolsrequired for aircraft and other _end-military products assembled elsewhere. Disruption of Osaka'sindustrial output could be expected t o h av e important repercussions on the activity o f m a n y keywar plants in near-by suburbs and other cities.

As the major center for general industr ia l equipment , Osaka had a c ruci al rol e i n t he dispersala nd r e pa ir p ro gr a m forced upon Japan b y o urinitial pattern OT precision ai r at tacks . Osaka'scontinuing contribution was essential if, despitegrowing shortages of materials and skilledJabor,Japan attempted to organize its war i n d us t ry fo ra sustained and costlyresistance to inv'asion.

The Pattern of Air Attacks

Initial B-29 operations from the Marianas didnot touchOsaka o r t h e Osaka region. During late1944 and early 1945, operations were concentrated,

\ on aircraft plants but only one of these i n t h is 'region was hit. In Febmary, Kobe had a sStmpleof what was to come: Bu t not until M ar ch d i dthe pa t te rn suddenly change. Along witJh Tokyo,Nagoya, and near-by Kobe, Osaka was attackedin mid-March in the XX I Bomber Command'sfirst series of large-scale incendiary operations.Bu t the c ity w as not visited again until June.After this lull of more than 75 days, the otherthreeOsaka area attacks were mounted on the 1st, 7th,and 15th o f J u ne . Aside from scattered tacticalfights, the only subsequent ai r operationswere precision attacks directed against Osaka's large ArmyArsenal andthe important Sumitomo aircraft propeller works on 26 June, 24 July, and 14 August.

Altogether, 10,270 tons of bombs (92 percent

incendiaries) were dropped in area attacks onOsaka-l,732 tons d ur in g t he n ig ht o f lqMarchand 8,538 tons in th e three June daylight attacks.The three subsequent precision a tt ac ks o n t woOsaka targets a c c o u n t ~ d 'for some 3,344 tons ofhigh-explosive. Listed below are the attackswhichwere carried outby the Twentieth Air Forceagainst Osaka. O f t h e 1,586 B-29s overOsaka int he f ou r u rb an attacks, only 16 were 1 0 st - 12 i n



26

1 Includes 6 s t r a f ing a t t a cks i n suburbs.2 Includes 2 strafing at tacks.Source: Osaka prefectural police.

1942_____________________ 1 151943______________________ 6194L_____________________ l' 20

at e x ten d ing d a ma g e to the mixed res ideindustr ia l districts surrounding the central secdestroyed in Marchand also affected Amag,city directly north. The 1 June attack of 21

f 'tons, wh ic h b u rne d o u t a gr.oss area 0 3.1 squamiles to the west an d north of the March damagresulted in 3,112 k il le d a nd t ot al casualties14,084, with another 218,680 being dehoused.estimated 66,817 structures were destroyed or se.

riously damaged. An area of 2.2 square milesmostly in th e northern sec tor-was affected' b"the following week's attack of 2,592tons, in which

2,059 persons were killed among total casualtiesof 8,873 and 56,576 structures of all types were de.stroyed or damaged. This was the only area at.tack including a sizable amount of high-explosivebombs . Osaka 's l as t a re a a t ta c k of 3,157 tons on

15 June was divided between the southern andnorthwestern sections and also' caused considerabledamage in adjacent Amagasaki city. The dam·a ge d a re a a dd ed in Osaka t o ta ll e d 2 % squaremiles with 475 killed o u t o f 2,927 casualties, 53,327buildings destroyed o r d a ma g ed and 181,636 de·housed.

Additional damage t o O sa ka occurred in connection with precision attacks on 26 June, 24 Julyand 14August. Spil lover from the 10 July urbanattack on Sakai dehoused another 3,500 in Osaka.Altogether, these a rea a n d precision attacks, alongwith isolated bombing by reconnais'sance planesand some eight tactical strikes, brought death to'12,620 Osaka residents in a total of 45,881 casualties. According to police records, some 321,935buildings including 8,500 industrial structures arelisted as totally destroyed an d 1,224,533 personswere dehoused. At the end o f the war about950,000 Osaka inhabitants were st i l l in residenceouto'f a prewar population of 3.2 ntil l ions and apre-attack population estimated at 2.2 million.

The p r in c ip a l i m pa ct o f t h e M a rc h a tt ac k fellon t h e a d min i s tr a ti v e a n d h u ma n resoll(j'es of theO sa ka w ar machine a nd i ts s up po rt in g publicservices, while t he J u ne at tacks were most effective a ~ a i n s tthe city's productive facilities. Thedestruction in March of most business offices, including several control association hea;dquartersa n d th e re g ion a l offices o f t h e Munitions Ministry,ha d a paralyzing effect on t he c it y a nd regionwhich was never overcome. But·many small shipy a rds a n d important factory distr ic ts on the southern and western edges of the commercial zonewerealso destroyed i n th i s f i rs ta t tack. Aside frO]11

Alertst tac ks A lar mseriod

Note. "Attacks" include all occasions when HE or incend iar ies fell within the city. "Alarms" include a l l o c c as i o n s.when warn ingso f imminent bombing attacks were sounded." A le r t s" c o ve r all p er io ds w he n e ne my p la n es w e re officia l ly repor ted approach ing over the d ist r ict , inc luding them a n y f a l se alarms following the Doolittle raid.. PracticeARP drills ar e not included.

tonnage, but were effective in causing brief alarmsand frequent interruptions in activity. Th e Osakaarea attack of 15 June causedconsiderable damagein near-by Amagasaki. An area a t t ac k o f 10 Julyagainst the town of Sakai, directly south of Osaka,a lso caused some sl ight damage i n t he southernmargin of Osaka. Th e followinK table summarizes data on all attacks, warnings, a n d a le rt s :

Dec. 1944 1 1 7Jan. 1945 _________________13 10 23.Feb. 1945 4 9 56Mar. 1945 1 1 2']Apr. 1945 29May 1945 32Jun. 1945 .:._________ 4 4 23Ju l . 1945______ ___________ 4 '1 6 32Aug. 1945 2 2 6 22

Effectiveness of Effort (Map 4)

The M a rc h a t ta ck a ga i ns t Osaka was concentrated on the heart of the city including the areas

. of greatest housing density, the bulk of the commercialsection, and adjoining small industr ia l districts. The 1,732 tons of incendiaries dropped ina p er io d o f t hr ee h ou rs b u rn e d over an a re a o froughly 8.1 square miles..!-by fa r the most effectiveper ton, in terms of casualties and gross physicaldamage, of the fo u r a r ea a tt ack s. A t h ir d o f t heair-raid deaths and roughly half of the totalburned-over Q,reas in Os ak a d a ted f rom th i s in i t ia lattack. Prefectural casualty figures l ist 3,987.dead, 8,466 i n jur e d, a n d 678 missing -a t ot al o f13,131 or about 7.5 casualties per ton. Slightly

~ o r ethan 501,000 persons were dehoused...,....,.-almost25".percent of the pre-raid population-and some425,000 left the city dur ing the 11-week periodbefore Osakawas again attacked. Exactly 134,744residential and industr ia l s tructures were l isteda s to t al l y destroyed and 1,363 partially destroyed-a t o ta l o f 136,107 or almost 80 p er t on o f bombsdropped.

The u rb a n a re a a t t ac k s o f 1, 7 and 15 June aimed



ning order. Th ro ug h ra i l facilities were unhamp er ed a n d practically a ll t he port installationswere untouched. Th e ensuing 75-day periodprovidedan opportunity for recovery andpreparationfo r fu r the r ' attacks that contrasted s h arp ly wi th

the experience of Tokyo-Kawasaki and Nagoya,where heavy attacks fol lowed each other at frequent intervals.

The June attacks extended t h e a re a o f d am ag ei nt o a ll t h e i n du s tr i al districts s u rro un d ing th eburned-out central section. A l th o ug h t h e 'totalarea burned over in' t h e th r ee June attacks onlyequalled that achieved in one March attack, thelevel of industrial damage wasmuch g r e a ~ e r .OfOsaka's t ot al i nd us tr ia l r oo f coverage (over

27

the disruptionof communications and administration a n d th e elimination of many suppliers of critical components and special industrial equipment,the Marchattack caused heavy damage to internaltransport and s torage facil it ies. Despite t he 2 %

months lul l af ter this attack, the dislocation ofinternal t ransport result ing from t h e a t ta c k neverwas alleviated. Nevertheless, the city's major productive facilities remained i n t h e g re at er part intact. Bu t f or t h e dependence upon small subcontractors, these would not have been seriously handicapped, except f or t em po ra ry absenteeism.Af te r th e Ma rc h attack, t h e ma in mu nic ip a l prefectural and military headquarters were stillfunctioning. Th e principal w a r p l an t s were i n r un -

PHOTO 7 ,-Aeria l view o f O s a k a just before the first attack. The most conspicuous landmarkis Osaka Army Arsenal and military and prefectural h e a dq u a rt e rs . We st o f th e Castle , arectangular network of canals and thoroughfares marks out the cen tra l commercial dist r ic t . S u rr o u nd i ng this dis tr ict are the ci ty 's var ious industrial sections.

area atlGac:.k!in near-byagainstalso ca"US{\Q

m argi n o fizes data

Dec. 1944Jan . 1945Feb. 1945Mar. 1945Apr. 1945May 1945Jun. 1945Jul. 1945

Th etrated onof gre:atestmercialtricts. Thea periodroughly 8.1

per ton, in fl" ::if;;:

damage, ofair-raid



"'\

PHOTO S.-Osaka after t h e M a rc h incellcliary attack. More than seven square miles w a s b u r ne d over, ineJuding most ofthe central business dis tr ictand industr ial areas t o t h e south and southwest.

160,000,000 sq ft as calculated from aerial photo-graphs) , 25 percent was destroyed i n a ll ai r opera-tions, bu t almost 90 percent was estimated to havebeen i n ta ct u n ti l t h e .Tune attacks. If t h e l a rge rw a r p l a n ts h a d n ot depended upon small factoriesan d workshops for components and could have

28

coped with other indirect effects o f t he :Ylarchattack,there should have been little decline before.Tnne in essential activity or a prompt recovery.Even as a r es ul t o f t he June attacks, the degreeof decl ine was fa r beyond the level of physicaldamage to productive facilities.

PHOTO 9 . - 0v e r the Osaka waterfront 1 June 1945. Two Japanese antiaircraft phosphorous bombs arest' ) en burst ing .

Many large vessels are visible at a n c h or w i th i n the harbor. ~ .

29



/

111

22

Number ofo t he r

build ings

Number ofindustrialb u i l d i ~ g s

r:

50,135

1,580

Number ofresidentialbuild ings

Completelydestroye d __.

Badly damaged ,

Date of Raid : 15 June 1945 (2 .49 sqttare milesdest1'oyed ordamaged)

Date o f R a i d : 7 Jtme 1945 (2 .21 squa-re miles des troyed ordamaged)

Number of Number of Number ofresidential industrial otherbuildings build ings build ings

Completely destroYed ___ 54,287 } { 241,022

Badly damaged ________ 1,240 3

d d 0" 'ally throuO"hout the northernPHOTO 10 . - 0 saka on 10 June . The first two June incendiary attacks e xt en de a ma ge " en er x ended d:mage to the south-

and western indus tr ial dis tr icts and ' along the water f ron t . Th e la s t a t t ack o n 1 5 June e, twest, north o f O s ak a c as t le an d n o rth of the broad Yodo river. .

91

11

Number ofother

build ings

{1,629

Num be r o findustrialbuild ings

64,152

934

Number ofresidentialbuild ings

Total Indus tr ialroof a rea P er ce nt of r o o f a r eadamaged total damaged

Osaka 211 35 40Kobe _______ 83 56 13Nagoya _____ 130 40 38r.rokyo______ 508 40 50Kawasaki 56 35 16Yokohama __ ,I , 73 57 8

to five t imes that achieved in the other key ci

Bu t Osaka ranked next to the bottom in termpercentage of to ta l indus tr ia l floor area dam'-2 5 percent as compared with 37 percent inand 40 percent in Nagoya. The following tsummarizes physical damage d a ta f or t he sixtel 'S as calcula ted from aeria l photographyJoint Target Group:

Date o f R a id: 13 March 1 9 45 (8. 1 sqtfa1'e miles destroyedor damaged)

Physical damage[In millions o f . squa r e f e e t ]

Physical Damage'

Damage to Buildings.-In the nine raidsdiscussion, 310,095 residential buildings werestroyed and 11,582 residentia l bui ldings werebadly damaged. In the same raids 8,531 indus"trial buildings were destroyed o r b ad ly damaged(no breakdown of these two categories was pos-s ible), 1 ,855 buildings of other t ypes w ere de-stroyed and 108 were badly damaged. Out of atotal b u i lt - u p a rea of 59.8 square miles, of which20 square miles represented the p lanned targetarea, 15.6 square miles was burned o ver. A t ab u·lation of damage by ra, id follows: (Source: CityQuestionnaire, November 1945.)

Date o f R a id: 1 June 1 9 45 (3. 5 square mi les des troyed ordamaged)

N um be r o f N um be r o f Number ofresidential industrial otherbuild ings buildings build ings,

Completelydes troyed ___ 134,744 } { 1,5564,222

Badly damaged ________ 1,363 56

Completelydestroyed _

Badly damaged _

Exten"to f a r e a Commentdamage

Code Locationnumber 1

O s a k a # l Castledistrict .

Moderate NW a n d S W p ar t of a r e a heavi ly d am ag ed , but Osaka Arsenal, g r oupso f small factoriesand residential. d i st r ic t s i nr e ma i nd e r o f area relativelyundamaged.

Osaka #2 N waterfront do Dou btfu l target for a r e a re-a tt ac k; i mp or ta nt t ar ge tso n ly s l ig h tly damaged but offair and lo w co m b us t ib il i ty ;othel' small g r ou p s o f factories remain.

Osaka indttstrial concentrations

Osaka #3 S waterfront do Northern p ar t heavily dam-aged; ' several significant targ et s a lo ng S a n d SE siderelatively undamaged buth av e lo w co m b u st ib i li ty ..

Osaka #4 S c e n t r a L do NW p ar t heavily damaged; SWp ar t o n ly s l ig h tl y damagedbut has very low target value.

Osaka #5 N central Heavy E n t ir e a r e a heavily damaged;. -" , r e m a i n ing i n s ta l l a t ions too

(" iso lated for a r e a a t t a c k .

Osaka #6 NW' d i s t r i ~ L _Sl ighL Area h a s b e e n l i gh t ly damagedt h r oughou t, bu t l a r ge d i s t r i c t sof r e lat iv e ly d en s e industrialresidential occupancy remain.

Osaka #7 Centrai Heavy , Bulk of a r e a destroyed; thewaterfront . few r e m a i n ing i n s t al l a t i ons

in S p ar t have low targetvalue.

. .

There still remained undamaged target areas oflimited size but considerable industrial importanceaf te r the June attacks. The precision attacks dealtwith the twomost important wa r plants in Osaka,although areaattacks had already cut the i rou tputdrastically-more by indirect means thanby plantdamage. Bu t especially in northern O sa ka , o nboth sides of the Yodo river, s izable dis tr icts ofsmall and medium-sized factories remained. Thepriority urban industrial concentrations as established b y t he Joint Target G ro u p a re identifiedand outl ined onMaps 1 and 4. The accompanying

table indicates their estimated target value afterthe June area at tacks . Concentra t ions No. 1 andNo.2 suffered heavily i n the subsequent precisionattacks.

1 Refer to Maps 1 and 4.

Compared with othermajor industrialand population centers,total extent of physical damagein Osaka was approximately half that sustainedby Tokyo a nd f ro m l1j2 to 4 times that achievedi n t he four other major cities. P e r c e n t a g e w i s ~ ,

however, the level of damage in Osaka was lowest o f t he s ix key centers attacked-35 percent, ascompared with 56 percent in near-by Kobe and57percent in Yokohama. Gross d ~ m a g eto industrial floorspace in Osaka was 20 percent less than,in Tokyo, slightly more t h an i n Nagoya and three

30 31



24 JUL 14 AUG

'"...

~~ . - IFn 0

I ~ !!? ~ 1 1 ' 7 ) f'" ~n CD

!!? '"

26 JUN5 JUN

~ . ' .

E XH IB IT 3

an additional 44.5 percent of the arsenal roof ·area

as w el l a s 1,038 other near-by buildings-practically all warehouses and barracks.

Compensation for Damage ...

The lYovernment made a flat payment of ¥1,000to the ol::>wnerof each destroyedhouse and ¥500 forthe loss of household possessions, uhless the losseswere covered by insurance: Partial payments w?rem ad e f o r partially damaged houses. The receIptof this government compensation or insurance,paid promptly af ter the raids, contributed to war-

33

&o p o o , I . . IZi - - - -U>o ' ' * - - -_ t_ .. - - - - - l - ~ - - _ + _~ RESIDENTIAL UNITS --I~oDon _ INDUSTRIAL UNITS

ont=.

1 J : j · · ~ ~ · · ~ - - ~ : l - - - ~ h 9 1 r - - - - l r - O ;- - - + - 0 ALL OTHERS2,50 nl

30,00

~ :::67,500U.·i(;. i t - - - - + - ~ - - - - l - - - - - - - + - - - - - t - - ' - - - ~ - - - -

CD

I 36,000 [J7.oIL

BOMB DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS IN OSAKA CITY

NUMBER OF BUILDINGS DESTROYED 8 BADLY DAMAGED

1945

13 MAil 1 JI'N

7,50(

15,000

Sumitomo and at O sa ka a rs enal . A t o ta l o f 460

buildings, of which 3.3 percent were industrial,were destroyed by 1,498 tons of high explosives.Bombs were effectively concentrated with visualand radar aiming. About 77.5 percent of the roofarea of Sumitomo was destroyed or damaged and10.2 percent o f t h e ro of a r ea of Osakaarsenal wasdestroyed or damaged.

Th e a t t ac k of 14 August, just before the closeof the war, wasaimed at Osaka arsenalonceagain.A total of 706.5 tons of high explosives destroyed

Osaka's war economy. In t h i s a t t ac k 65,872 builil}gs of all kinds were destroyed, .2.5 percentwhich were classed as industrial, in a d d i t i o n ~

manylarge wharves and warehouses. vVith 2,788.tons of bombs (97 percent incendiaries ) beinused, an average of 23.6 buildings was destroYedby e a c ~ton of bombs. An a re a o f 3.15 squaremiles was des troyed or damaged. The declinein effectiveness is partially d ue t o the fact thatareas b u rn e d o u t in March prevented th e confla.gration from spreading east with the wind.

The 7 June 1945 raid hit the area to the northo f t he central commercial zone, at points overlap_p in g t he northern a r ~ a saffected b y the 1 Juner ai d. M os t o f t h is a re a a ls o w as z oned as an in-dustrial area. In t h i s r a id , 55,333 buildings, ofwhich 1.8 percent were classed as industrial, Weredestroyed by 2,592.2 tons of bombs, 44.4 percentoi which were incendiaries. The physical effec-tiveness o f t he attack canbe measured by the factthat an average of 21.3 buildings was destroyedby every t on o f bombs. An a re a o f 2.21 squaremiles was destroyed or damaged . .

The areas hi t on 15 June 1945 were more scat-t ered . Some lay in the extreme northern sectiono f t he city and in adjoining Amagasaki and were

classified asindustr ia l ;

others werein the

south-eastern and southern sections and were mostlyclassed as residential, a l th o ug h th e re were manyolder home-industries in that s ec tion . A tot al of51,275 buildings, 2.9 percent of which were industrial, were destroyed by 3,157.3 tons of incendiarybombs or an average of 16.2 buildings per ton.An area of 2.49 miles was qestroyed or damaged.

The 26 June 1945 attack consisted o f t wi n pre-cision raids aimed at Sumitomo Light MetalsCompany in the western section o f t he city and atOsaka arsenal , immedia tely to the east of Osakacastle. Ba d visibility was responsible for considerable dispersion of effort. The Osaka arsenalprovided no effective radar response and bombsintended for it were scattered widely over the in-d u s tr i al d i s tr i ct to the north and east. Of the5,351 buildings destroyed, 2.8 percent were indust ri al . A bo ut 1,140 tons of high explosives wereused in these attacks. An average of 4.69 buildings was destroyed by each to n of bombs. Al-though no appreciable damage was infl icted onOsaka arsenal , 11.3 percent of the roof a re a ofSumitomo was destroyed or damaged.

The 24 July 1945 attacks were again aimed at

Number of Number 0.' Number ofresidential industr ial otherbuild ings build ings build ings

Completely destroyed ___ 5,351 } { 25155Badlydamaged ________ 5,394 13

IN u m b er o f Num ber o f . N u m be l ' o fresidential industr ial otherbuild ings build ings build ings

Completely d e s t r o y e d _ ~ _417 1 { 28

J 15Badly damaged _____ --__ 237 3

Number of Number of Number ofresidential industr ial otherbuild ings build ings build ings

Completely destroyed ___ 1,009 l { 209Badlydamaged ________ 834 J 0

Date o f R a id : 14 August 1945 (44.5 percent of roo f areaof Osaka arsenal destroyed or damaged)

Date o f R a id : 26 Ju.ne1945 (11.3 percent o f r oo f area ofSumitomo Dight Metals destroyed or damaged " no appreciable damage t o O sa ka arsenal)

32

Date o f R a id : 24 Ju ly 1945 (77.5 percent o f r o of area ofSumitomo Light Metals destroyed or damaged,' 10.2percent o f r oo f area of Osaka arsenal des troyed ordamaged)

Distribution of Damage (Map 4)

The 13 March 1945 raid, aimed at the center ofOsaka city, hit approximately the same area aswas zoned fo r commercial use. The exact patterno f r ai d qamage is"indicated on Map 4. A totalof 140,522 buildin gs of al l kinds (3 percent c lass if ie d a s industrial) was destroyed. I t should be

-, noted parenthetically here 'that those buildingsused b ot h f or dwellings a nd f or small industriesare entered under the industrial category only ifthey have 10 or more employees . Those employing less are classed as residential buildings. Inthis ra id , most des truct ive of all those aimed atOsaka, 1,732.6 tons of in<;endiaries were u se d; a naverage of 81.1 buildings was destroyed or dam

aged per ton. Thereafter, no bombs were droppedon Osaka for more than 75 days-un t i l 1 June.

The 1 June 1945 raid was aimed at the a re a tothe west and north of the section hi t i n t he firsta re a raid. This w as c la ss ed a s industrial andcommercial and was b ui lt u p solidly with smallfactories and dwellings intermingled. The western area, lying between the center o f t he city andthe waterfront, was particularly important to



PHOTO n . - T h e M i na t o d i st r ic t . L o ok i ng northeas t toward Osaka castle across a l mo s t e i g ht m i le s o f uni n te r ru p te d d es tr uc ti on . P ho to t ak e n from c e nt e r o f densely p o p ul a te d s o u th w e st i n d us t r ia l district.Concrete firehouse w as g u tt ed b u t r em ai ne d standing.

PHOTO 12.-The Minato d ist r ic t . A closer view of gu t ted mach ine shops i n t h e s a me d i s tr i c t p i c t ur e d i n P h o to n .

Construc t ion was un ifo rmly wood, composition, a n d s h ee t m et a l t h ro u gh o ut t hi s section. D a ma g e d a t e sfrom the 1 June a t ta c k . N ot e s h a ck s bu i l t by fo rmer residen ts out o f s a lv a ge d s h ee t m e ta l .

34

ation. Payments. for damage to fa.ctoriesequipment in home-industries were to be

fter the war.

cion of Protective Measures

s sufficient to summarize t h ~reasons whyres taken previously for the protection of

'nO's aO'ainst area attacks proved'remarkably1:>. I:>

ctive. Within ta rge t areas that were effec-. blanketed, firebreaks did not halt the progf the flames because bombs fell on eithersidee' firebreaks and kindled fires of conflagraproportions. The fire department ha d or-

zed volunteer groups throughout the c ity tolement its facilities but these proved woeinadequate. In a l l t h e re were about 350 ofO'roups w it h a n average membership of 190

• 1:> Each group ha d 3 or 4 portable gasolineered pumps, buckets of sand and water,hooksropes fo r p u l l in g d o wn wooden buildings, and

e r s imple e qu ipme nt . O nly the engines wereplied by the city, the rest being provided byvolunteer group itself. Individual houseownwererequired to have water tanks which could

kept e i theron the roof or at the entrance door.container was required for each dwelling unitthe multi-family buildings.

In many congested areas and alongside impornt buildings, concrete s t at i c wa te r ponds were

uilt by the city. Moreover,along the city's riversand canals, whichare generallyshallow,provision~ a smade to providedeep water sumps for use infire fighting. Because of the general distributionpf canals, no attempt was made to rely upon the

'city water system. .,

Factories weresupposed to beprotected not onlyby the volunteer groups but also by fire watcherswho .slept in the facto ry. A quaint note in firefighting was indicated by the .suggestion that thequilts in w hi ch t he y s le pt c ou ld b e w et te d andthrown over a fire bomb to help extinguish it. Allfactories were f u r t h ~ rprotected by water contain

ers and fire extinguishers, but o nl y a f ew of themore important plants ha d modern fire fightingequipment or trained crews for its operation.

In areas of mixedfactories and residences, threefourths· of the regular fire engines were assignedto the protection of factories, and one-fourthaided by the volunteer groups, to dw.ellings. Facilities assigned to the houses d id n ot have muchfunction other than attempting to prevent the fire

35

from spreading. Attempts to quench the flamesof the individual house were left to the attentionof the i n d i v i d ~ a lhouseholder, aided by his neighbors in the volunteer group.

Classed by types of buildings, it canbe said thatmost flat-roof ferro-concrete buildings were notstructurally damaged in the attacks, even thoughmany of these, apparently intact on the exterior,ha d been gutted where bombs ha d entered thebuildings through windows or where fire spreadfrom adjoining structures. Brick buildings witht i le roofs were burned out, and steel-frame buildings with light-steel framework and compositionor c or ruga te d- iron s id in g w ere g eneral ly d es troyed, where contents were at all combustible.Many' o f t he residential warehouses of m ud a ndstraw construction were not destroyed.

Emergency groups , pol ice and fire u ni ts a ndArmy forces were used for street and debris clearance. However, the lines of authority were notclear, a nd t he work w as d one grudgingly andslowly. Fo r example, police would take responsibility for a wall only after it ha d fallen andobstructed the public highway. If it were totteringand endangering passers-by, theydid not consider it their responsibility. Fo r reasons such asthis, clean-up work did not progressvery rapidly,and was completed only on' the main highwaysleading th rough the city and on streetcar routes.Factory damage was in most cases the concern ofthe staff.

Rebuilding .andReconstruction

No deta i led s tat ist ics were obta inable , but theamount of rebuilding and reconstruction after theraids was very slight compared with the averageof construction for the p e rio d f rom October 1943to September 1944. This decline was attr ibutedto an acute shortage o f b u il d in g materials andmanpo we r. M os t material w as des troy ed . U seof building materials for residential structureswas prohibited from the beginning of ·1945 eX,ceptfor emergency barracks for factory workers.

Because of the critical shortage o f b u i ld in g repair materials, an allocations system ha d beenset u p w it h t he prefectural police passing uponall requests fo r b u i ld in g materials and cert ifying

.f,£the a mo un ts n ee de d. H ow ev er, a ter approvalhad been obtained, allocations were'iusually madeon a "firs t come, first served" bas is , and suppliesproved'to be critically inadequate, especially in



• KILLED

R INJURED

D MISSING

~ BOMBED OUT. : ....: ..

• EVACUATED

RAID CASUALTIES INOSAKA CITY

AI R

. : ..,450,000 I - - ~ - j l ! ! : ' i i l - 'i I l " " r- t - - - - - i:.' ,n-

.' l>l.'. ""

13 MARCH

E XHIB IT 4

50 , 000 I - - - - ~

400,000 1----,....

"""".L - - ~ ~ ~ - - + - - - - - + - . c . . - ~ - - - - i ~ - - - - t - - 00,000 ..

100 , 000 I - - - - ~

150 , 000 I-----v.; ;

3 0 0 ,O O O I-- - - ' , o ! ' ; :

350 , 000 1 -- - -1 ' . " . ; ; 1

200,000 I - - - ~

2 5 0 , O , O O I - - - - r ;

201466193

2,9692,522

396122

o2,2841,921

373792

5140,78234,665

1 S o u r ce : Ci ty q u es t io n n a i re , N o v emb er 1945.

Date of raid: 7 June 1945.Killed___________________________________ 1,468Injured --:..--____________________________ 5,454Missing ---------_________________________ 260Dehoused --_____________________________ 195,682Evacuated - 156,330

Date of raid: 15 June 1945.Killed ------____________________________ 425Injured -.----____________________________ 1,371Missing-----____________________________ 56Dehoused -- - 173,923Evacuated -- 147,835

Date of raid: 26 June 1945.Killed _Injured : _Missing ~ _Dehoused _Evacuated _

D ate o f r a id : 24 July 1945.Killed _Injured ~ _Missing _Dehoused _ ~ _Evacuated _

D a t e o f raid: 14 August 1945. .Killed _Injured _Missing _Dehoused _Evacuated ~ _

The Decline in Population (Map 5)

At the end o f t he war Osaka had only 30 per.cent o f i ts 1940 population of 3,254,380. From apopulation of about 2,736,000 in November 1944

P H O TO 13 .-The N i s hi d i st r i ct . S c ho o l b u il d in g in. south industrial district tha tappeared i n ae ri a l photographs to be intact following the M a rc h a tt a ck . T h esteel-frame plant on t h e r igh t w a s a ls o g u tt e d but a p pe a rs t o b e i nt ac t .

June. No general ly effec tive policy of governm en t a id f or l ab or on bombed-out buildings wasestablished. Nor was there !tny organized policyon debris/Clearance.' What l i t t le w as d on e washandled by the individual householder and factoryowner except along main streets a nd i n a few pri01'ity fa.ctories.

Casualties and Evacuation

Summary of Oasualty Data (Exhibit .4).-Airattack casualties in Osaka totalled 45,881, of whom12,620 w ere l is te d a s dea d or missing. In the 7operations under discussion, a t o ta l o f 9,914 persons were kil led, 27,037 were injured and 2,115were missing. In addition 1,134,552 w ere dehoused and 891,347 were evacuated. It shouldbe noted that most o f t he evacuated group camefrom those who had been previously dehoused.A tttbulation of official casualty statistics by raidfollows :1

Date of raid: 13 March 1945.Killed - - - - - - - ~ ~ _ 3,969Injured ------___________________________ 8,466Missing - - - - - - ~ _ 678Dehoused ----___________________________ 500,404Evacuated - ~ - 425,343

Date of raid: 1 June 1945.Killed -------___________________________ 3,083Injured - - - - - - -_ 10,035Missing ~ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _877Dehoused - - - - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _218,508Evacuated -----------------------_______122 ,731

3637



when B-29 operations started, and of about2,142,000 at the end of February 1945, there wasa further decline in the citY's population of about505,OQO a s, a res ul t o f t he 15 March raid. This,resulted f rom th e dehousing of more than 500,000,the death of almost 4,000, a nd t he disfctppearanceof 7.00. The June area attacks brought a furtherdecline of approximately 635,000, including about629,000 who were dehoused, 5,000 killed and 1,000listed as missing.

The effect of these operations wassupplementedby decline resulting from t h e l at er precision attacks, w i th t h e result t h at a t the end of hostilitiesin August, thetotal population of the city of Osakawas only 988,281, less than half i t s M ar ch 1945population and about 38 percent of its November1944 population, which had already been thinnedby voluntary evacuation d ur in g t he w ar years.Different wards lost varying percentages of popula ti o n f rom a maximum of 96 percent i n t he central district most completely destroyed (Naniwa)to a minimum of 20 percent in the southeast outskir ts (Higashisumiyoshi) . Detailed figures arepresented in t h e t a bl e accompanying Map 5. ,Ofthe pre-raid population, 53 percent were dehousedand 42 percent were evacuated. About one-halfof onepercent were killed, one and one-third per

cent in jured and one-tenth of one percent listedas missing.

Effectiveness of ARP Measures (Exhibit 5)

The first area raid o n O sa ka (13 March), besides causing the heaviest property damage, alsoresulted in t h e l arge st t o ta l casual t ies as well asthe heaviest p e r t on o f bombs. The decline in casualties in subsequent raids came in part from thescattered patterns of attack and from burnt-outa re as w hich s erve d as refuge areas for personswho might have otherwise been overcome. Butthe change in official policy and popular behaviorw as a primary factor. Beforethe first attack, thepopulace was told to stay at their homes and fight

the flames. Thereafter, people were advised tos ave the ms elve s w he n a hea vy attack developed.Professional firemen and volunteers also became'more concerned with saving their equipment, personal property'and lives t ha n i n preventing thespread of the flames. The air-raid shelters, little'more than covered foxholes, were general ly unused, and were total ly inadequate in size, numberand protection. The situation in Japan thus dif-

38

fered basically from that in Germany. Thern o us e o f th e shelters n ig ht a f te r night,efforts were made to make them habitable.tailed study of civil defense problems in Osis presented i n U S S B S Pacific Report NO.8.

One o f t he most serious problems that deoped in connection with air defenseadministion was the question of air a le rt a nd warnipolicy. After frequent H-29 appearances winitiated, it beca'me gravely disrupting to esstial' production and public services to havequent alarms sounded. Exhibit 5 summarizesd

on elapsed time and number of alerts and alari n t he Osaka district. The lul l during April anM ay a nd t he subsequent barrage of 'warning alli n t er rup t ion s a r e clearly indicated.

The civil defense system proved inadequate fothe job involved. It had been set up on the asumption that the bombs would be aimed at limited target areas. The officials,'therefore, were noprepared for a n a t t ac k o f t h e size of the 13 Marcraid and even if they had been, they would haybeen unable to cope with such an attack with theequipment available. Loss of eguipmentand personnel i n t he first raid fatally disorganized sub-sequent c ~ v i ldefense' organization.

E m e r ~ e n c yEvacuation and Rehousing

Evacuation both before and af ter the raids wason a voluntary basis except for the evacuation ofcertain school groups which had been made mandatory d ~ r i n gth e latter part of 1944. Voluntaryevacuation of those unnecessary f or t he economiclife of the community was urged, but o nl y a fewleft before the raids. Fo r example, 80 percent ofthose dehoused by the firebreak construction policy continued to live in Osaka, thereby adding tothe overcrowding of the remaining buildings. I tshould benoted that the massevacuation followingthe Marchand June attacks increased black-marketing, shortages of food i n t he cities and transportation difficulties. These indirect consequenceso f t he attacks ha d a d ra st ic effe ct on the moraleof industrial workers especially when their families were evacuated.

P l an s f or emergency housing were made afterthe raids but were never carried ou t. So me t emporary hous ing was provided for a few days inbuildings st i l l intact. A few large emergencylean-to's were set u p i n some districts, but it wasnecessary for those who were dehoused either to

~ decrease 2

Evacuated

40,24922,13551,40547,96415,77820,59940,84627,00621,14819,81619,94341,03333,90030,812

35,77353,80419,78037,63129,194

, \ 21,526• I 18,554

67,723,J 722,619L_---'\ necessary

"'l the local'lese activii ! i ~ e n tchap

" L ~ k a ' sutili't'\portation;

,'j •

hsumptlOn: ' ~

' lerag e rate

, t ~ c l i n e dalb that the, 11' until 14,'Icontinued

hly 40 per:trhere was

' , ~ . } r i ~ ge a r ~ y, i pt lO n d Id

!before the'Ibled. Bu t' \ 'drops in.etato direct:\ and gen-, he decline"I'. Btry, massd'the greater;;.\ ., ~ s u m p t l O

~ j repair ofq .

,., ~ factOrIes

"broduction/ ~ ~ r a c t i c> ~ pby fail-

,, .

I



40,24922,13551,40547,96415,77820,59940,84627,006

21,14819,81619,94341,03333,90030,81235,77353,80419,78037,63129,19421,52618,55467,723

722,619

48,09466,52525,87146,41851,86487,143

157,15350,222

62,29950,559102,310

32,77117,51525,91727,51324,69313,410

7,271114,695

'6 ,0067,108

38,041963,398

Reasons for decrease 2

Bombed-out Evacuated

Pe r c e n t

201737221211

627

18134

234867515664646278804338

Remaining

22,01419,97844,74626,663

8,99713,18912,91628,493

18,45410,4754,749

21,56148,829

117,11165,339

101,18659,57378,579·70,90295,082

101,78479,317

1,049,937 1

continue essential war activity a t t he necessarylevel. In additioll, factors other t ha n t he localareaattacks placeddiffering limits ontheseactivities during the attack period. The present chapter discusses effects o f t h e attacks on Osaka's utilities and public services other than transportation.

In February 1945 electric power consumptionin Osaka was only slightly below th e average ratefor the previous 18 months. B ut i t declined atmost 30 percent in March despite the fact that theurban attack that month did not occur until 14March. In other words,use of electricitycontinuedat a high level until the attack bu t wasonly 40 percent of normal for the rest of March. There wassignificantrecoveryfrom this low rate during earlyApril,· bu t on a monthly bas is consumption didnot move fa r above th e March average before theJune attacks, after which it again tumbled. Bu tonly to the s l ightest extent can these drops inactivity followingthe attacksbe ascribed to direct

physical damage to power distribution and generating facilities. Rather it reflects the declinein consumption of electricity by industry, masst ransportat ion and households. Byfar thegreaterpart of this declinewas in industrial consumption.

There was,considerable evidence that repair ofdamage to electrical equipment within factoriesw as a major obstacle to restorationt: of productionin plants hit by incendiaries, but ' in practicallyno case was essential production held u p b y fail-

88,34194,66077,27694,38267,642

107,742197,999

77,228

83,44770,375122,253

73,80451,41556,72963,28878,49733,19044,90243,88927,53225,662

105,7641,686,017

RemainingP op ul at io n p op ul at io n

decrease Sept. 1945

39

110,357114,638122,022121,045

76,639120,931210,915105,721101,901

80,850127,002

95,365100,244-173,840128,625179,583

92,763123,481114,791122,614127,446185,081

2,735,954

EstimatedpopulationNov. 1944

O s aka p re-a tt ack an d p o s t -a t t ack p o p u l a t io n

Distr ictnames

UTILITIES AND PUBLIC SERVICES

1 Police ,records indicate 998,000 i n t h e city 14 August 1945.2 Inhabitan ts "bombed-out" include those killed, in jured and de

housed. T h os e " ' ;vacu ated " in c lu d e a l l o thers who le f t b e f or e andduring the attack period.

Source: Osaka p,;,efecture.

find permanent shelter with relatives or friends in

other unburned sections o f t h e city or to be evacuated to the country, Post-raid transportation wasprovided free for' those being evacuated. Transportation of household goods was limited to 'whatcould be carried.

Emergency food and some clothing were provided from government stocks for periods of from5 to 10 days after the raids. Supplies provedinadequate during the June raids, however. A comparativelyr,udimentaryfirst-aid system wasmaintained, but was handicapped by a l ac k of medicines, ambulances, and bed capacity in those hospitals which survived the raids.

. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~N i s h i _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Minato ~ _

~ ( f E I ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~yodO ~ ,

N i S h i y o d o g a w a - ~ - - - - - - - - - - : . . ._I I i g a s h ~ y o d ? g a w a - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,IIigashmarl _Ikeno ~ _Asahi _Joto _

~ ~ ~ ~ o s h i . : - . : - . : - . : - . : - ~ ~ . : - ~ . : - ~ ~ ~ ~ . : - . : - . : - . : - . : - ~ ~ = ~ ~ . : - ~ ~ ~ ~HigashiSUmiyoshL _NishinarL _

Total _

Summary

Aside from the enormousdestruction of housingand factory buildings, the most serious direct effects o f t he Osaka urban attacks were sustainedby the city's public services, including transportand communications facilities. There were widedifferences in the extent to which the various services suffered physical-damage and were disrupted.Likewise, there was considerable variation in theeffect of s uc h d is rupt ion on the c ity' s a bi li ty to

when2,142,000 ata further505,000 asresultedthe deathof 7-00.decline of629,000listed as

Theby declinetacks, within August,Was onlypopulation1944 t J V I J U " " .

byDifferentlationtral U i : O ; L r l l ~ ( ;

to a mlnllnuJskirtspresentedthe, pn l - r2LIC!,f);""

and 42 p e J ' c ~ i ) _•• -..."'"

of o n l e e ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~ ~ 1 m i j ;;'!; '!.cent iJ

as missing.

The .:firstsides c a U S J n ~

resulted inthe heaviestalties inscatteredareaswho mightthe changew as a prlln:a:rl:populacethe flames.save t h E ~ m : 3 e l l l ~ t

more COJICerI1sonal pr(meirlspread ofmore thanused, andand p r < ) t e ( ~ t i d i



Electric Power

There can be n o que st ion a bout the immediateand decisive effects of urban attacks on the use ofelectricity in Osaka. Exhibit 6 makes that clear.In February 1945, electric. power "was being con"sumed in Osaka at a d-aily rate onlj slightlybelowthe average for the previous eighteen months.

. Power consumption had reached a record peakof

firms, trade associations and administrative agenci es w ere d es troy ed or damaged, when majorchanges in production schedules were necessaryan d a dispersal program was underway, it becamenecessary to depend upon runner instead of normal communicat ions channels . Because of theconcomitant breakdown of internaltransport, t h ~

time required f or t he simple business .operationsoften became a m a tt er o f hours or even weeks.

Other public services-including sanitation,.welfare and educational facilities, then largelyconverted towar works-and the normal functioning of public offices, also suffered heavily as aresult o f u rb a n attacks and, all this contributedto the breakdown of essential services. Of specialimportance was the destruction of one of two mainpublic markets and hea vy damag e to the other,coupled with damage to local food dis tr ibut ioncenters and warehouses. This destruction ha d amajor p ar t i n the breakdown of food rationinga nd t he consequent g ro wt h o f t he black markets

and industrial absenteeism.

P H O TO 14 .-Waterfron t i n du s tr i al a r ea . A f te r f ac tor i es an d row houses inthis congested section were des troyed in the 1 June' attack, large lean-tos tructures were erected to shelter survivors until evacuation cou ld be

completed,

41

suffered other damage that prevented production.The main impact of this gas problem accordinglyfell upon suburban war plan ts that depended ongas for heat-treating andkindred processes,main lyin the production of ordnance items and aircraft

components.

Thi s gas p roblem bec ame much more s er iousafter the June a tt ac ks w he n h ea vy lea ka ge w asextended t o a ll p ar ts o f t he system, and was further aggravated by cons iderable damage to gasholders and gas works. Many other factors werethen operating to limit production formany plantsbut the gas s ho rt ag e w as the direct productionloss factor for a l imit e d n u mbe r of critical war

plants.The water system suffered comparably from

ieakage and was completely inoperative for twoweeks after damage to pumping equipment in the7 June area attack. Bu t many· key plants hadindependent sources for industrial use, so themaineffect of water shortages fe ll on individuals , whohad t o cue up at available wells or t ak e t he i rchances on the highly contaminated surface water.Wit h i ts m an y canals, Osaka placed no rel ianceon the water system for fire fighting.

O f p ro fo un d effec t on the city and regionaleconomy was the serious breakdown in al l formsof communications. Already under grea t s t ra in,these were totally incapable of continuing a semblance o f n or ma l service a f te r t he area attacks.Thus at a t ime when the central records of many

TOTALUGPR-MAY

1945

E XHI BI T 5

the Osaka region were able to function after theJune : a ids , th is heavy phys ica l damage ha d no .e ~ e c tm O s a ~ aor elsewhere on industrial productlOn or essentIal public services.. The area at tackson Osaka did cause a very critIcal shortage of u t il i ty gas , despi te a somewhatcomparable decline in to ta l d em an d. G as w as al-:eady beingseverely rationed so that essential war

mdustry was direc tly affec ted when widespreadleakage f o ~ l ~ w i n gthe March attack cQnsiderablyreduc ed a va Il ab le gas s uppl ie s. S ince a ll fue lswere crit ica l ly short , including coal suitable forgas-making, this loss of fuel gas was most seriousbut there was insufficient labor to cope with thethousands o ~ l ea ka ge p oi nt s. No s at is fa ct or y~ e a n sof cut tmg off leakageareas and still silpplymg key plants was possible either: Bu t as in thecase of electric power failures, many consumers:

MAREBAN.E€

1944

500 r - - - - ~ ~ - - - ~ - - - - - -

1,500 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -

U>UJI-

....J : > 2 ,500 r - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ zo : EI- Z

~ 2 ,000 I - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - . : - ~ -I-

1,000 r - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - . - - - -

3 , 5 0 0 r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ -

4 , O O O r - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -

AIR RAID WARNINGS

(OSAKA C I T Y )~ , 5 0 0 r - - ; ; ~ = - - - " : " " - _ - - - - = - = - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - -~ ALARM~ ALERT

ures i n t he power distribution network. DamaO"eto utility facilities in burned-out areas was hea' :ybu t c o ~ l dusually be restored long before essential~ s e r sm the district were able to resume productIO:r:, . a ~ t h ? u ~ ~it may have delayed plant repa i ractIvItIes IllltIally in some cases.

T he n et effect o f t he i ni ti al u rb an attacks onOsaka and. K o b ~was.such .that an enormouspower

surplus eXIsted m thIS regIOn after March. LarO"ethermal generating stations i n a nd a ro un d O s a k ~f o ~ m e r l y v i t a lt o w a r industry, did ultimately s u s ~t am ' h ea vy d am ag e a s a r es ul t of precision andarea attacks b u t a l l suchstations had closed downa f te r t he March urban incendiary' operations beca:use outlying hydro plants could thereafter supp l ~far more power than was required. Thus, inS P l t ~o f t he f ac t that only 49 percent of a ll g en- .eratmg facilities in the power system supplying

40

3 , 000 r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = - - - - - - - ' - - -



The local power company took understandablepr ide in its record of maintaining service to pri01'ity plants during the attack period, in spite ofinadequate stocks of replacement materials andfa r too few skilled linemen. Bu t in many cases,the prompt restoration of service did not meanthat essential production could be as promptlyresumed,for the power company's responsibilitiesended at the factory boundary and there weremany cases where plant damage was l imited to

.auxi l ia ry buildings 'which included t h e p la nt 's

own t ransformer and switchboard apparatus. Repair and replacement of such equipment was upto the factory officials in the case ofpriority plants.While a sys tem of "flying squadrons" to surveyand repair such damage in priority plants hadbeen organized in Osaka under the regional officeof the Munitions Ministry, the scheme operatedmainlyon paper, especially af ter theJune attacks.The only skil led electricians actual ly availablefor s uc h w ork w ere tho se not already employedin l arg e w ar plants-independent artisans andsmall shop workers. While some effective emergency work was done af te r the March a t ta c k b ysuch "flying squadrons," the organization brokedown completely i n J un e because fixtures and

equipment were scarce and most of t he skilledworkers rel ied upon either disappeared or were

pre-empted through black market channels.Thus, plant interviews established that damage

to electrical apparatus was relatively high withinfactories hi t by incendiaries and that such damage proved to bemuch harder t o r e p ai r than mostother types. Bu t the electric power problem inO sa ka was a matter of internal plant damagethere was relativelylittle evidence of delay on thepart of the power company in restoring serviceto essential users after attacks. Furthermore, asdiscussed above, the decline in industrial powerconsumption following urban a tt ac ks c re at ed alarge over-all surplus of electric power in theOsaka region. Th an k s to th i s surplus, Osaka andother sections of thIS region were not at a ll a ffected by the very considerable damage to powergenerating facilities in or n ea r t h e city.

Osaka obtained its e le ct ri c pow er f rom a g enerating network w hich s uppl ie d a ll of centralHonshu west of the Tokyo region/including nearby Kobe, Himeji and Kyoto a s i7el l a s N agoyat o t he east and various points a long the Japan.sea including the Maizuru naval base. Roughly

ese abrupt declinesbe attributed to a breakin the system of power supply. In fact, the

t consequence of area attacks-not only in theof Osaka b u t i n all Japanese urban cen tersan immediate a nd s h ar p drop in manufacg and the creation of an enormous surplus

lee tric power. Before the mid-March incen-; i J . i ' ~ r yattacks on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe; t . ~ ~ r ehad been s t r ic t r a ti o nin g o f electric power; ~ a l lthese regions, even though scarcities in such

> ~ a s i cmateria ls as sa lt and bauxite had already~ : e g u nto reduce some of the nation's high-priority~ l l 1 kpower requirements. B u t a f te r these initialattacks on the four majorwar production centers,there was such a widespread and immediate decline in industrial power consumption that all thelarge thermal generatingstations in central J apan_.were shut down at once. After mid-March, outlying hydroelectric stations were more than ableto meetall remaining demands, especially as theiroutput was then rising to a maximum during thespring run-off period. B y J ul y, when streamflow began to slacken, further attacks on t h e ma incenters had already reduced power consumptionfar below the minimum level of hydroelectric outputand t h u s th e power surplus continued to grow.

In fact, a number of priority factories in the Osakaregion were by that time trying to install electricheating elements in their boilers so as to becomeentirely independent o f f u rt he r coal deliveries.Many other end-product firms considerably reduced their coal consumption during this period,through greater use of electric furnaces and electric welding.

The decline of electricity distribution, then, wasa reflection of industria l collapse of Osaka, notthedirect result of damage to the power network.Although damage to local distributing facilities, .including secondary transformer s ta t ions , wasvery heavy in burned-out sections of the city, thefactories served by such facil i ties a lso were usu

ally damaged. Important high-tension lines wererepaired or replaced within a few day s after eachattack, even where that involved stringing newcircuits to individual priority p la nt s. S uc h interruptions of priority service were relatively fewand caused little disruption of·production, sinceactivity i n t he plants so affected was usually disorganized by absenteeism and other factors fora few days fol lowing each attack even where theplants t h e ~ s e l v e ssustained no direct damage.

EXHIBIT 6

o n l ~62 million kilowatt-hours were used in Osaka'durIn?",the whole of that month . Ave ra ge dai lyelectrIqty consumption for March was thus almost30 per?ent l e s ~than in February. Industrial consumptIOn durIng the first thirteen pre-attack daysof March had averaged more than twice that forthe rest of the month.

Even more spectacular declines occurred aftert ~ eJune attacks on Osaka. Industrial consumptIon of power in July was only one-sixth of th e~ a ylevel and barely 7 percent of thera te prevail-mg before th e March attack' B t . 'th. u In neI er case

20 .000

30.000

10 .000

42

o

80.000

90.000

100.000

1 I 0 . 0 0 0 r - - - - - - - - _ - . . . , ; . . __ -=- _

70 .000

J:~ 60.000~

en

boo 50 .000

ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION OSAKA

100 million kilowatt-hours in December 1944 withthe all-out production s pu rt o f that m on th a ndhad d r ~ p p e dback almost to 90 million k i I o - ~ a t t h o u r ~

In January, as e ve ry eff ort was m ad e t ocurtaIl non-priori ty power use durin a the ds ' d b rye a s ~ nperIO of greatest stringency and a s p ro -ductIon cutbacks , w e r ~forced on some basic proce s ~ o r s .But consIderIng the shorter month, electrIC power Was used at a s l ightly h ia he r r at e i nFebruary and likewise t h r ~ u g hthe first 13 daysof March. Nevertheless, the effect on power con-'sumers, of the 14March area at tack was such that

43

f ili i h bh lf h i h k



45

in the area attacks of March and June. The Marchd amag e w as res t ri ct ed to a few g as mains and toinnumerable service outlets, bu t extensive damagew as a ls o done to the three local generating worksi n t he J un e attacks. Th e main Osaka works wasapproximately 25 percent damaged in the 7 Juneand 15 June area raids, heavy damage occurringmainly to gas-holders with a total capacity of3,000,000 cubic feet a nd t o auxiliary equipment.The Seimi works was 10 percent damaged in the1 June incendiary ra id andaga in there washeavy

damage to g a s ~ h o l d e r sof 2,000,000 cubic fee t capacity. The precision attack against the near-bySumitomo complex on 26 June inflicted 20 percent·damage on the Torishima gas w orks . The se esti",mates of damage were supplied b y t he Osaka GasCompa ny officials. Though damage to productionfacilities was relatively light, output was temporarily reduced even at current low levels, and subsequent opera tions were continually jeopardizedby the loss of storage facilities.

The system leakage caused b y t h e a ir r ai ds wasa definite and seriouB aggravation o f t he existingshortage. This shortage was felt even bythe mostessential consumers, especially those i n t he outskirts not otherwise subject to many effects of the

area0

attacks. Due to leakage it was often impossible to main tain sufficient pressure to suburbanplants for days at a time during the last months

. o f t he war. As a consequence, ordnance and aircraft components production w as s )f ious ly c ur-t a iled in certain large plants. .

According to gas company o f f i c i a l ~ ,repair aC-tivities' were handicapped by shortages of skilled

P H O TO 15 .-Two s tandby power plants in w est e rn O sak a loom up oversurrounding burned-out industrial area. One plant sus tained consid-

erable damage.

more rigorously than electric power,even for highpriority users. Primarily because of the area attacks, there was never sufficient gas to meet essential requirements af ter March 1945. This shortage h a d i t s main effect upon producers of militaryend-products. Non-industrial u se rs w ho beforethe w ar took 80. percent of production were reduced to 40 percent by the end of 1944. FromMay 1944 until February 1945 gas consumptionfell by ove r 25 percent, bu t the cut representedprincipally forced reductions in non-industrialuse. After March, practical ly all industrial usewas accounted for by large ordnance and a i rcra f t

. component plants and domestic consumption: wasbrought to a halt in June.

Contrary t o t h e situation in electric power, con-sumption fell during the attack period because insufficient gas was available, not on account of reduced demand. The primary reasons for this wereleakage af te r the area attacks and damage to plantfacilities. The coal s u p ply fo r gas production also

. declined d ur in g t he a tt ac k p er io d b o th in quantity and quali ty, as lower grades of Kyushu coalreplaced. former Hokkaido and other supplies.Production of gas in Osaka fe ll from 19 million

cubic meters i n t he m on th o f February 1945 to'15.2 million in April and 6.4 million inJu ly. Con-sumption,however, fell even more duringthis period, from 18.3 million i n F e br ua r y t o 11.1 million i n A p r i l a n d t o 2.4 million i n J ul y, t h e difference between production and consumption beingthe result of leakage i n t h e distributing system.

This l ea ka ge w as due to extensive damage toindividual outlets, to gas-holders a n d t o pipelines

, Generating facilities in theurbhIghly vulnerable In s ' an centers pras the building of' blast ;altlelSof predcautio

nst' aroun som

a mg and substations' equipment and iroe

geo:er two or three pieces of generatin a n l'

all' attack damage to g t' g pparah enera mg facilitie: e ry eavy. ?n e o f t h e very large thermal s~ nAmagasaln WllS virtually destroyed . ~w.o others seriously damao-ed in h' a n ,

s ~ n l l o v e rfrom the p r e c i s i o ~attack ~ h : x P l o S i011 refinery in May 1945 A near-. . nother ther 1e r at m g p l an t i n Osaka was 20 pe t ma gi n t he 7 June area att k B rcen ~ e s t r o y

1 'a c .

ut as preVI 1p a me d, none of these pIa t . ous y e. n s were op t'c ou ld have bee n nee de d a f te r t he M era mgarea attacks. arc urba

The Osaka powerauthorities a . 'most of all the destruction of fccoldu:gly fearecstations controllino- a l l ' .our prImary subo mcommg hyd 1 'power. If al l four, located in th . b {o e ectrl<?saka, could have been pu t o u ~s ~ fur s a I : o ~ n dSImultaneously indust ' I . d . commISSIOn., ' rIa pro uctlOn de d'on electrIC power would h· b pen mg

fta ve e en a ffec te d

a er th e March area att k E " evencause dam ac . ach area raId did, age to several secondary substatio

no lastmg effect resu l ted" ns butcapacity at the substat" sInceffielther remaining

, IOns su ced f thqmred load or t' I' . or e re-

o

Ie- mes to other dstations could be utI'lI' d Th un amaged sub-z e. e on lydof t he p r im a ry subst t' amage to onesweep by carrier plan:s ~ o n soccurred in a July

Gas (Exhibi ts 7, 8)

. In one sense the 'be regarded a ~th : r o , w m ~shortage of coal mayOsaka's p r o d u c t i ~ na s ~ cr : ; ~ ~ nf or t he decline inargued, however th 0 u 1 1 Y gas . I t may be

o available' to p e r ~ I ' t a t t h e r e h w a h ~always ample coal, a muc Ighe t f

ductIon, provided t he a ut h .t' l' ra e 0 pro-so to a lloc at e e xi st in t OrI Ies would choosethat supplies of gl o ~ n a g e s .Bu t the fact is

coa wIth pro 'properties were not a l w . . per ~ a s - m a k m gquantity .F th ays avaIlable m sufficient

. ur ermore, the Osaklacked laro-e stocks h a gas plantselectric p;wer P l a ~ : s u c~ st ~ e r eprovided the keydependent on s teady ' d a ~ .,ey were accordinglyporary d i s r ' e Iverles. Thus even tem-

Precautio uptIon o ~port and ra il activity forced

nary curtaIlment.

In general, it must be concl d d t l · "_on o-as prod t' b f u e la t the hunts

o . uc IOn e o re thea t ta ksequence of a d ' . . c s were the con-. eClSlOn to ratIOn gas. supply far

44

h a lf t he generating capacity i n t hi s netw k'accounted for b ma . or wascated alono- y ,ny hydroelectric plants 10-

o mountam streams 50 to 150 'Inortheast. The remainder of electric mI eswas generated b I . power needsN y arge. coal-burning 1 t '

.agoya ,and key cities o f t he Osaka re .p an s .mc lpal ly m A ma ga sa ki , d irec tl y ad' , g ~ o n - o p r m on the north. In part tl t ]ommg saka

t. ' lese seam gen t'

s at lO ns w ere ope ra te d t 1 e ra m gi ~hydro output but as ~ h : u 6 ~ a ~ m e . n tvari.ationsglOn expanded . a mdustrlal re-

e· m prewar year 't h ·bs ar y to a dd la rge " b a s e - I o a d ' ~1 t as. een neces-y.ear-round operations. How . s ~ mp la nt s f ortImecoal strin o-ency powe ever, . u ~t o t he war-0 . ' l' consumptl . 0 kand neighboring cities sti l l tended t o O ~ I ~sa aseasonal variations i n h yd I t ' o. ow the. roe ec rIC outp t 'tlpeaks, m t he s pr in g a nd f al l " we t " m u , WI 1

I ~ w sII I August-September a u d t h e "d o ~ t h sa ~ do January, February and March. ry mont s

A sys tem of ra tioningand . "power had be ' , e , prIOrItIes for electric, en mstItuted m December 1939 I

creasmg demands of . d - . n-war m us try and thpect of reduced coal su lie . e prosrationing in October 1 ~ : 3s , ~ ~to more severeonly the m ore ' ,W I the result thatelectric.pO"\ver t ~ ~ y P ~ : e a d n t d P l a I I : l t sreceived a ll t he

e w n e m a n y h d t bserve power "hol'd " . a 0 0 -

Under th is decree l ays or, s ta gg er l oa d peaks.

altogether or s e v ~ r ~ ~ s ~ : ~ : ~ ~ ~ t : ~ e r sT : ere c ~ t?ffsystem was thus use d a s ad " e prIOrItyeVlCefor t "non-essential industry as well th res rIctmgserving coal. as e means of con-

Because of th is n ee d t o s av e c oal hefficiency therm 1 t t' . , t e older Iow-a s a IOns wIth' 0 k .u.sed as little as possible duri :

nth

saa CItywere

CIty depended 1 'I g e w ar b ut t helea VI y on th h' h .steam plants located on th ree Ig . -effiCIencyAmagasaki TI . e waterfront m near-byexpanded i I ~t h e l ~ 1 : ~ ~ 7 : t : n ~ t : ~ l a dbeen steadilyresented one o f t he world' f ar years and repof powe -0 - ' s, argest concentrations

l' oeneratmg capaCIty. Until th Mattacks on Kobe and Osak e archoperating at a hio'h level ; h t l : - e ~ eplants were alllocal war econo; b' ell' I mportance to thecoal s tocks on h a ~ ; a : i t ~g ; l l l ~ e d?y th? enormous

ued II' , 1 e lVerles bemg contI'n

we mto 1945 d ' .for · the d I' , esplte other priority claimsec mm g suppl A .

later only a f t ' Yf: s WIll be discussed, rac IOn 0 tl t kreallocated to 1" 't l es e s oc s w er e e ve r

March attacks 1.~ r IY w ~ rplants, even af ter thew ould n a, made It obvious that the plants

ever agam operate.



t . endiarv attack.. . d h'O"hly vulnerable 0 mc •P H O TO l 6 . - Bus termmals pIove I.,

. ~ . 1 aimed at minimizing losses. ik t e r m i ~ a l1 an O s ak a thoroughfare. DIo;peIsa . of three modern hIgh-capaCIty

T>HOTO l7 . -St reetcars dispersed a .ong h 'conf iaO"ra tio ns developed. Remams _JC • • distl'lcts w e r e ' ., t

fires proved ineffectlve m t b h'nd this burned-out fac ory.. 1 nO" the s tree e 1streetcars may beseen a 0 .,

~ r o v i d e so n ~ y .the r o u ~ h e s t.measure .of,the disl'up,tlOn to mUl1lc1pal serVIces, It does gIVe some indi_cation o f t he magnitude. Ta ke n b y itself, no OUe

type of service is critically significant but wheu·considered i n l ig ht o f concomitant disruption toother public utilities and services, the picthre ofgeneral organizational collapse becomes clear. In

this se tt ing the decline of al l supporting ser,v-icestakes on broader significance. Each factor helpedcontribute to the growth of confusion, generalwar-weariness and absenteeism. Each contributedto the steady reductionof the city's resilience andits ability to maintain even a minimum level ofessential war production.

TRANSPORT AND STORAGE FACILITIES

Summary

While several o f t he essential public servicesalready discussed were seriously disorganized byurban attacks,damage to local transport and stor-

. age. facilities undoubtedly had the most severeconsequences on the generaleconomic l i fe of Osakaand in particular on essential production. Amongthe various public services, local transportation istreated separately in t h i s c h ap te r in connectionwith general transport facilities. Our first conc ern i s with the breakdown of passenger trafficfacilities wi thin th e city, b ut t he local movementand storage of goods was even more severely disrupted. The effect of the attacks in this respectfel l upon one o f t he weakest underlying elementsi n t he Japanese industrial p ictu re- the growingshortages of basic commodities a nd o f bulk transport facilities. Bu t 10cQ,1transport arid handlingdifficulties following the attacks affected all stagesof production. Their immediate and drastic effect on current outputof end military items causedth e greatest concern.

Direct damage to Osaka transport and storagefacilities had repercussions on production withinand around the c ity a s w el l as e ls ew he re in theregion. Indirectly also, urban damage to shipa nd r a il r e pa ir facilities a nd t he administrativeand manpower p rob le ms g rowin g out o f theseattacks, aggravated otherwise existingdifficulties with maritime a nd r ai l transport facilitiesthroughout the region. In appraising these gene ral s h ipp in g and rail transport problems during

- the attack period, both the decline i n u rb an industrial activity and local consequences of the

part of jndustry in this region to obta in materials, labor, repairs, transport priorities, o r a n ything .else needed to res tore production, requiredrepeated contacts with various government agencies in Osaka. These , i n t ur n, h ad to·deal witheach other and with Tokyo. When communication facUities were impaired, the effect on industrial and bus iness activity was thus immediateand substantial.

Other Public Services

Perhaps the most serious consequences o f th eurban attacks among other public services was thewidespread destruction of food stocks and fooddistributiOli centers; Bu t damage occurred tomany public administrative buildings and to var i o l ~ sservices u n d er p re fe c tu r a l and municipaljurisdiction. Although the main -prefecturalbuildings a nd t he city hall escaped, Osaka's threeo th er p r inc ip al municipal office buildings wereburned out , as w ere 6 o f t he 11 other large buildings in which principal wartime administrativeoffices w ere loc at ed . A ls o, n ine of the 18 wardoffices, four. of the seven labor exchanges, fouro f t he eight main warehouses for city supplies, aswel l as the most important general municipalworkshop, were d e ~ t r o y e d .Furthermore, six out

of ten dormitories for city employees and 1,900of some 4,000 other dwellings-many of them alsominor offices-provided for men employed at various munic ipalpos tswere also on the burned-outlist. Both principal public markets and manyfood distribution centers were destroyed or damaged. Of 163 facilities h a v in g to do with publichealth and welfare, 74 were completely destroyed,as were 25 o f t he 43 clinics and emergency hospitals , s ix o f t he city's 16 general hospitals and48 of the87 day-nurseries for children of workingw o m e n ~

Prior to air a tt ac ks ove r a t hi rd o f the city's409 main school buildings ha d been converted forwar indus try or w ere being u se d as p ub li c offices

and indus t r ia l t ra in ing centers. The dispersalprogram continued to utilize additional,structuresthroughout t he w ar period. But 211-more thanhal f-o f these structures were rendered unusableby bombing,including 126 total ly destroyed. Firedamage usually included records and equipment,so that r e ~ e s t a b l i s h m e n tof such funct ions elsewhere was most difficult.

While a mere cata logue of facilities destroyed

5051

B-29 mine-laying p ro gr am a n d o th er e x te rna l fi i h d it tt d th d (1) A truck association made u p o f 29 trucking



B-29 mine laying p ro gr am a n d o th er e x te rna lpressures on transportation will require consideration.

Osaka'smass transport systemsuffered the graves t dis ruption, which contributed in large measure to t h e a l a rmin g g ro wth of absenteeism amongthose industrial workers remaining a f te r t he attacks, a n d t hu s played a conspicuous role in reducing economic activity. This breakdown in thenormal means for movement within the ci ty wasalso a major f a cto r in t en s i fy in g the effects ofdamage-to business and government offices and

to communications. The process of replacing destroyed records, relocating offices and substi tut ingmanual transferof orders and information for thenormal rel iance on central files and control systems and c o m m u n i c a t ~ o nby telephone, telegraphand mai l -a l l this would have been difficult enouO"h

tohad transport fac i li t ies been unimpaired. Sincemany dis tr icts were no longer served by streetcarafter th e March attack and travel delays of severalhours were routine on those routes st i l l operating,it became extremelydifficulteven to trace the movements of offices and individuals or to organizethe many group conferences that were essential toJapanese administrative and business procedure.The extensive destruction of bicycles r ul ed o ut

even this basic Japanese method of travel and:communicat ion to a considerable extent . AfterMarch, l i t t le use could be made of motor vehiclesdue to damage and t o f ue l and repai r problems.

Bu t aside from the movement of people andpapers, wartime Osaka also had ~ stupendous taskin the movement of goods. Practically every major producer in O sa ka r el ie d o n a l a rge n u mb e rof smaller factories and workshops f or t he production of components and accessories, with materials being supplied by t he p a re n t company in

. exchange for finished items. In many cases suchsubcontractors iil turn f ar me d o u t part o f t h ei roperations. Thus there had developed an enormous ly complex system for delivering materials

and semi-finished items whiGh could permi t of nointerruption if end-product output were to bemaintained.

Few subcontractors had large storage facilities,and the only means of enforcing allocation andproduction schedule and minimizing black-marketdivers ion was to keep inventories at a minimumt h rou g h o ut th e subcontracting network. Such 'asystem Ilecessarily meant that materials and semi-

52

finished items were scattered among thousandsmall factory warehouses. In addition Osak h0.

1 . a am an y a rg e warehouses connected with theand wi th large enterprises and military agen P?Th f '1" Clegese aCI ItIes were used extensively for sto .of materials and semi-finished goods as w e ~ a g e

f or t he assembly of mi li tary shipments. as

In addition to i n c e n d ~ a r ydestruction. of lIIanysmall s torage sheds whIch had been required"the movement of materials and semi-finished i t e ~

to a nd from subcontractors, over 60 percent ofOsaka 's large harbor warehouse facilities inclt d. . , I.

mg theIr contents,were burnedout or heavily dam.a g ~ d ."These warehouses ha d been constructedprImarIly t o s erve t ~ eport and 'ra i l transship.ment movements, but they alsoserviced many localp roduce rs . A ltogethe r, more than 207,000 tonsof food, finished goods, and materials-in-processwere destroyed in these central warehouses_roughly. 30 percent i n t he Ma rch a rea attack andt h e r e ma ind e r in June. Coupled with the enor-mous damageto goods s tored at factory sites, suchlosses ha d a large part in bringing on the collapseof war end-product output in Osaka ..

In Osaka's internal transport system, motor ve-

hicles had always played a minor role. Asidefrom motor tricycles, wheelbarrows and horse-c ar ts w hi ch m ov ed a s u rpr i s in g a mou n t of allsmaller metal components and civilian Q'oods-f:eight movement was primarily by b a rg : on theCIty'S many canals. In addition to internal trans-fers, most bulk i tems were also Jightered to andfrom ships in Osaka harbor, a nd to t he near-bytowns of Sakai, Amagasaki and Ko be. O ve r halfthe available tugs and 40 perce nt of availablel i gh te rs w ere hea vi ly damaged in area attacks.Coupled with d a ~ a g eto ship repair facilities, thisdestruction resulted in a crit ica l transport break-down.

Overseas and coastal shipping through Osakaheld up remarkably well as compared with otherport s unti l 1945, when reallocation of availables hi pp in g t o s af er routes was cons iderably ex-t ende d. M uc h of t h ~decline in tonnage receiptsduring th e latter part of 1944 ha d been relatedto the decision t o h al t steel production at Osakaand c once nt ra te s uc h ope ra ti ons elsewhere.Freight transshipment through Osaka also fellsteadily. The decline during 1945 was especiallyserious with respect to receipts essent ial to localindustry a nd i n this decline t h e B-2 9 minin g pro-gram was the decisive element.

t:effect of the raids on r ai l a nd ,rail-ship.• ts through Osaka ci ty and port was lessl l l e n . . 1 d' t

than on internal transport. Lltt e Hece e was d on e t o r ai l equipment o r r ig ht -o falthough there weresome delays duringJuneJuly and i n t r ai n m o v e m e n ~ st ~ r o u g h? s ~ k a

damage to rail commulllcatIOn faCIlItIes._aid declines in ' rai l a ct ivi t y w ere very serespeciallY i n J un e, b u t principally reflected

s, e to 'plants .s tores, and in te rna l transporta g ' .lities and general urban d ~ s r u p ~ i o n .Themam

t of the at tacks on r a I l f r eIg h t movement

ac . .I"

1t

thus due primarily to the d ec lm e m I g 1 eraged .trucking facilities to move f r e i ~ h t~ o andn1 stations a nd t r an s it sheds , whICh tIed up

S and delayed in and out movements. T h ~portCltr , . 'already operating at a much reduced rate m~ : : 5because of the shortage of shipping a? d th e~ f f e e tof mining. Except when there were lI:suffident hands to load and unload cars, the raIlwayuthorities were always able to clear the wharves

It . . • d dt ~ n dfreight stations of incommg goo s an .usu-mycould make deliveries to key plants a ~ dportareas promptly. However, the at tacks dId contribute to delays in handling, both through d ~ m

~ g eto port facilities an.d. t h r o u ~ h.absenteelsm,which a g g ra v at e d th e CrItIcal shlppmg shortage

by increasing the time required to load and unloadvessels.

Street Railway and Motor Transport

The disruption by area r ai d s o f the various facilities for internal transportation probably wasmore important in its effect on essential industrythan any f a cto r o th er than direct plant d a m ~ g e .

The post-raid food crisis, industrial absenteeIsm,and the collapse of r ep a ir a nd dispersal effortsare all traceable in part to failures of internaltransportation caused directly by the urban attacks. The results o f t h e four area a n d th ree precision high-explosive attacks On O sa ka a re s ummarized in the subsequent dismlssion, sincedamage

breakdowns b y i n di v id ua l r ai d s a re unavailable,but practically all damage w as of incendiaryorigin. .

rIn addition to streetcars and the city's one sub

way, t h e O sa ka transportation b u r ~ a u ,a b r ~ I ~ c h; of the prefectural administration, ha d s u ~ e r v l s I O n

lover all other means of mass transportatIOn servI ing Osaka except the main steam and interurbanl railways. Under its direction were:

(1) A truck association made u p o f 29 truckingcompanies. .

(2) A bus a ss oc ia ti on c ompr is ing 11 bus com-panies.

(3 ) A p as se ng er car association made up of30 taxi companies.

(4) Ferries connecting the various waterfront

industrial districts.A g en eral priority system ha d been enforced ast o u se of trucks, buses, and pas se nger c ar s. R equests for transportation were.submitted .by. thefactory or business to the prIvate aSSOCIatIOns,

which ha d to obtain official approval before granting s e r ~ i c e .Aside from the militar!, o nl y a f ewpriority industrial concerns ha d theIr own motorvehicles and adequate fuel allowances.

Prior t o t h e first area raid in March, the operat ion of buses, trucks and cars ha d fallen to inade-'quate ly low levels asa resul t of s h o r ~ a g e sof parts,labor and fuel. Even streetcar mamtenance wasa l re a dy u n d er great strain, only 433 'o f a ll 833passenger streetcars. i n t he ci ty being i n t op operating condition before t h e M a rc h attack. However the subvvay system was in good shape andover' 300 of-the surf;:ce-cars-iu"LTS"e-weremodernh igh-ca pa ci ty types . Ski l le d repair labor wasespecially scarce fo r o th er t y p e ~of l ~ c a ltransport,

a nd h ad caused drastic reductIOns m the volumeand quality o f r e pa ir work. Bus lines h l 1 C ! ; l : > _

curtailed and no regular public l ines were mstIt ~ e dt ~ s e r v ethe new plants established duringthe war in th e outskirts of O sa ka . H ow ever,buses, trucks, or cars were specially allocated tospecific plants and factory areas as deemed necessary by the prefectural authorities.

The area at tacks of March and June 1945 virtually paralyzed the existing s ~ s t e mof i n ~ s stransportation facilities by destructIOn of r o l l m ~stock,trolley wires and supports, and other eqUIpment.Fur thermore the attacks considerably delayed resumption of ~ e r v i c eby a g g r ~ v a t i I ~ ~ ~ a bd i f f i ~ u

ties and destruction of repaIr faCIlItIes, materIals

and parts . Besides heavy damage to equipment,15 o f t he 45 Osaka supply warehouses and centralrepair shops in Osaka for streetcars, buses, t r u c ~ s

and cars were destroyed. After t h e Ma rch raId,repair delays occurred while 15 otl}er warehousesa nd r e pa ir works were· hastily .d i s f e r s ~ dto newlocations. Nineteen o f t he ferrIes movmg people.and light vehicles between the various segmentso f t he i nd us tr ia l w at er f ro nt were destroyed or

53,I

a central commercial-residential district alldamaged Destruction of boat repair yards and



55

Warehouse and Harbor Facilities

Osaka ha d become one of the most. i m p o r ~ n ~

p o rt s o f Japan in spite of a shal :o w h a r b o ~ :~ ~ e. dlI'ghteraO"e o f m os t freIght. Du r g

reqUIre 0 . d f ior-war deep-water wharfage was r es er ve . o r pI'1 f

' " nt m U C l 0ity mili tary shipments',and m a ~ ye V ~ s ~ k aplants

thebulk shipments m ov mg t o o r r omde e nded on use of lighters and local canals. Ton-

~ ehandled through Osaka harbor r e a c h e ~a peaknag . M 1944 due to partIcularlyof 1 322000 tons m ay dh e a ~ o ~ t b o u n dmili tary shipments. O s a ~ ahabeenYone o f t he principal oversea ports d U r I ; ~ \the

e ri o d o f s o ut h wa rd expansion, but. as ~ I 1 aryp . t d elI'ned and raw materIals Importsslnpmen s e " .' d h

t off traffic inbound and o ut bo un eacwere cu , . k b f re

.fell considerably below the wartIme pea e o .

the March urban attack. Relatively, however, t ~ n s

dro was far less t ha n a t Kobe and o th er maJ o r~ s Th e principal reason for the subsequent

pOl ' . . ' 1 ' the Twentieth AF IncatastrophIc declme ay m J aneseland Sea mining program, and r e s u l t a n ~ape

. administrative decisions divert ing relatively moreof what shipping was left t o o t he r ports., !I0wever delays in handling freight at ? s a ~ adId ~ u t

d ' on the utilization of that slnppmg whIchown . d d ~ dfurther

continued to reach the port , an so a.to the decline in unloadings andloadmgs.

'nals severely d amag ed in u r ban a t tacks ,P H O TO 1 8 A . -O n e o f man y Osaka, s t r e e t c ~ r~ e r ~ ~ l e a r l Yindicates the building density pre-

This pre-attack photo o f t he MI?ato te,rmma .'l'ne< I'n this importantindus trIal sectIOn. . 'va l

l b .After t h e Ma rch a t ta c k, the street railw;y s y ~ -

was almost completely paralyzed an wee stem d before even a skele ton service could be repasse t "s tu b" l in es outside the areas of~ o r e d . : x c e r n ~ : h e rp er io d o f p ar al ys is covered

amtag f' June although a f ew l in es th rough themos 0 , d re sooncentral section previously destroye we B table to start m ov in g w or ke rs a cr os s t ow n. . u

ly a few districts were served at all a nd I t was~ : m U : o npractice at peak periods f o r h o pe fu l p a-

f ' ore hours as antrons to queue up or one or m 1alternative to : v a l k i n ~for miles to a n ~f r ~ m h : ~ ~ ~ ~ThrouO"h serVIce con£mued to be serIOUS y N

d t' l the surrender. Even as late as 0-cappe un I . , . , t (tovember 1945, only half of the CIty s rou es -taIling 116 kilometers) ha d been restored.labnld

t many c ar s a val a ethere were only 30 percen a s , .t ofwithless than 20 percent the car rymg capaCI y

. b f the March attack.those operatmg e ore . t t. Interurban passengertrafficwas very Impor ~ n

for Osaka a n d t h e many electric lines c ~ n n e c t I ~ g

other cities i n t he region were not ~ e r l O u s l ym-

t f d 't h by the at tacks . These hnes not onlyer ere WI . . . . . h ral and

aided cons iderably m servlCmg ~ e r I pe , . ,suburban sections of the city after m ~ e r n a lf a C I ~ I

ties collapsed bu t proved e x t r e m e l ~Important.m

fl f f a u p p h es fo r remam-maintaining the ow 0 00 singinhabitants.

a central commercial-residential district all, ,qui red a twice-daily cross-town labor migof wholesale proportions that the streetcar syn e ve r p ro vid ed after 14 March 1945. Withmost congested districts depopulated, thosed i d n o t flee altogether had to relocate in the ousections. Thereafter, delays of hours were entailin g e t t in g to and from work. Even for suburworkers relying on the mainline and interurbarailway fac il i ties , which were not hindered sriously in the ir operation, it wasnecessaryto hiklong distances or queue up for local service. Th

collapse of local public t ransportat ion was thua major factor in industrial'absenteeism and tlgeneral decline in efficiency' that grew steadil

I until t h e s u rr e nd e r. . Prev iou s to 14 M arch thstreetcar system ha d also been used extensivelin movement of rationed food and priority freight

,during off-peak hours . Since te lephone and tele-graph facilities were severely disrupted by thearea raids, mu ch mo re t r a ve l fo r communicationspurposes also became necessary at the same timethat it became'almost impossible. O nl y t h e onesubway line remained as an adequate transportation link, and it served only a l imi t e d a rea in thecenter of the city, t raversing one part o f t h e com-mercial-residential area w hich w as largely de-stroyed in March.

The disruption of street rai lway services was socomplete because p rac t i ca l ly a l l lines in the ex-tensive network crossed the areas da;naged inM ar ch a nd others burned over in June. Sincep rac t ic a ll y a l l b u i ldin g s along the main streetscollapsed or b u rne d to the ground, overhead wir-ing, supports and auxiliary electric apparatuswere all destroyed o r r e nd e re d unusable. -Altogether, over 90 percent of street rai lway mileagewas'located in burned-out areas and most of theessential auxiliary ~ q u i p m e n twas total ly de-stroyed or r e qu i re d v e ry extensive repairs. Inaddition, trackage was destroyed where 16bridgesb u rn e d o u t and at -30 other points where highexplosive damage was sustained.

Very heavy damage also occurred to rollingstock, 358 cars out o f a t ot al o f 833 being de-stroyed by incendiaries, m a ny o f them in car-shedfires. In a d d it i o n to the heavy damage t ~ repairshops, car barns and material yards discussed previously, employees' barracks were also burned atthree terminals, contributing seriously to desertions and absenteeism, and'(thus delaying repairseven f u r t h e r . "

54

damaged. Destruction of boat repair yards ando th e r s h ip pin g delayed their replacement. Thisloss was part icularly serious as it forced detoursof several miles fo r workmen and for those moving goods from one i n d u st r i al d i s tr i ct t o another.

The trucking situation is illustrative of thet h re e -wa y imp ac t o f u rb an attacks-on equipment, repair f a c i l i t i ~ sand administration. Priorto the raids scarcely one-fourth of a l l t ru ck s inOsaka were operating regularly, due to fue l restrictions andthe need for repairs. About 20 percent of all trucks were destroyed i n a ir r a id s , i n

c lu din g ma n y being held for emergency use, ancfof those remaining, the percentage able to operate was even smaller than before March.

i The s h o rt a g e o f t ruc k s a l re a dy ha d constituted, the weakest l ink in Osaka's local t ransportat ion

Isystem, although of relatively' minor significancei n t ot al f re ig ht movement. However, trucking

. I ha d a vital auxil iary role and thus contributed inlarge m ~ l r e k >theCIecline in railroad efficiency-especially in June-since insufficient trucks wereavailable to move priority goods to and from railfreight stations. La ck o f t ruc k s also greatly comp l i ca t ed th e local food transport and distr ibutionproblem after Ma rc h , th er e by in t en s i fy in g labortroubles and general administrative collapse. The

trucking s h o rt a ge ma de dispersal o f e q uip me n tor materials al l but impossible for most firms andhandicapped industr ia l repair activity after raids.

In s pi t e o f the official priority sys tem, a largepart of available t r u ck in g fa c il i t i es - e sp e c i al l yafter the. March attack-operated in th e blackma rk e t , u s ua l ly fo r unessential purposes. Underexisting conditions, the official controls proved ineffective. A f t ~ reach incendiary ~ t t a c k ,there wasmuch illegal use of t r uc ks f o r removal from thecity of personal belongings and raid victims andfor black-market food handling. Moreover, allocation of t rucking facilities for priority freightmovement had never been u n if o rm o r f ul l y integrated, since some private c ompa nies as w el l a sArmy andN avy plants owned and controlled theirown vehicles. In general,local needsseem t o h a vebeen sacrificed t o in t e ru rb an movement o f p r io rity items i n t he emergency allocation o f t ru ck in gafter March.

(

.The cOlla Pse of.local mass-.transportat.ion ~ a c i l i

tieswas fa r more Important, however, than dIsrupt io n o f a ut o and t rucking service. Osaka industry, as Maps i-and 4 indicate ,was located around

\

commIsSIOner Thereafter efficiency wasP i 1945 li h h dl d t f h



59

". , d s t r uc t i on o f goods i n s to r ag e and on ;P H O TO 22 . - I n addItIon to heav;) e N attempt w a s m a d e t o s a l-

wharves, industrial damage was a l ~ osevere. I 0

v a ge e q u ip m en t i n s h op s s u ch as thIS.

. th harbor area N o te m a n y.• " 't'cularly heavy to warehouses an d p lan t s lU e .

PHOTO 21 .-The 1 June attack \ \ as par I . . 'l i g ht e r s u s e d t o transship goods frolll vessels at anchor.

commIsSIOner. Thereafter, efficiency wasmated to have dropped as follows:

Labor productiVity-Osaka harborMonth E t J i c ~

March 1944 80April 1945 -- 175May 1945 ,-- 70,'June 1945 260'July 1945 ~ 50August 1945 45

1 First month after March area at tack.2 ' r h re e a r e a at tacks.

In addition, absenteeism and desertions rose to

an alarming extent after March and much timew as los t in ai r alerts. Attempts were made to

alleviate the situation b y t he use of Chinese andKorean coolies a nd w ar prisoners . Also, effortSwere m a de t o keep labor by paying extra-legalwages and giving special ·benefits i n t he way ofextra rations. After 1 June,there was no housingor transportation left" i n t he main port district,so these measures were generally unsuccessful intheir aim of insur ing an adequate harbor laborforce, even f or t he much reduced level of activity.

The raids ha d other and more direct effects onfreight handling. Unloadings and loadingss t o p p ~ dfor a minimum period of 48 hours at thet ime of e ac h a tt ac k. A ls o, ove r one-third of theheU:vy cranes in the harbor district and 13 of its 22

mechanical Joading and conveying facilities werepermanently pu t o ut o f act ion. Destruct ion ofsome water p um ps i n t he harbor district causedinundation of those p ar ts o f t he area below sealevel , caus ing some damage to warehouses andforcing many dock workers to move o ut o f emer-gency barracks that ha d been erected after theattacks of 13 March and 1 June.

Moreover, destruction or damaging of 60 per-cent of Osaka's warehouse facilities in the Jourlarge area raids often left insufficient storage ·andhandling space for incoming and outgoing car-goes even a t t h e reduced volume of traffic. Thesituation was grave after each o f t h e attacks, andeven worse cumulatively for it led to considerablespoilage during periods of d is rupt ion . A ft erJune, ship-shore transportthrough Osaka port wasso disorganized that the prompt transshipment ofg oo ds bec ame a lmos t impos sibl e. A ltogethe r4,360,000 square feet out o ~ 7,500,000 square feeto f p or t warehousing was df;maged or destroyed.In addition,' 207,000 tons of goods were renderedunusablewhen damageoccurred to thesewarehousefacilities. ,About 30 percent of such goods weredestroyed in March a nd t he remainder in June.

-Total

Monthcargo Total L ig ht er ag e L ab or Other

handled delays delays delays delays 1

(OOO'sm e t . t ons)

Per- Per- Per-Days cent Days cent Days cent

July 1944_,___ 1,010 80 21 26 19 24 40 50Oct. 1944- ___, 825 106 68 65 25 23 13 12Feb. 1945____ 639 236 78 33 32 13 110 47

Prior to 1945 lighters handled most of the cargomoved by large steamers, only 15-20 percent of thetonnage, principally military supplies, being handled at wharves. 'I n 1945, with the great declinein maritime activity, wharves were used for 20-25percent o f t he tonnage. Bu t during the last twoweeks, B-29 mine laying of theinnerharbor forcedall steamers to be loaded and unloaded by lighter.

Available lighters and dockside labor were being used t o t he l im it before t he a ir attacks wereinstituted. The following data supplied b y t heOsaka harbor commissioner gives some idea of

the relative growth prior to air attacks of portcongestion due to cargo handling problems andthe importance of these two factors in such growth,despite the decline in total tonnage movements,

Ship days l.ost in l o a di n g a n d un load ing -Osaka harbor

, 1 Delays i n ' a r r i va l ',of scheduled shipments, convoy-assembly, equipment breakdowns, etc.

After March these shortages played an increasingly important role-despite the progressive decline of sh ipp ing -r igh t u p u nt il t he surrender.The June attacks only reinforced difficulties thathad already become critical after March.

Lighterage facilities in Osaka harbor had beendeficient t hr ou gh ou t t he w a r period as a re su ltboth of an insufficient number of lighters and ashottage of labor and materials for r e pa i r a n dupkeep. This situation was affected critically byarea attack damageto 200,000 tons of lighters outof a June 1944 total of 512,000 tons and to 162 outof 307 towboats.

Despite the substantial delays a t tr ibu ted tolighter deficiencies, port authorities consideredthat labor problems constituted the greatest single factor limiting the effecdve use of Osaka portfacilities during the ra id period. Food shortages,the shortage of skilled labor, and the general disorganizationresult ingfrom air raids causedseveredrops in harbor labor efficiency. Taking 90 to 100(for individual and seasonal range) as an indexof prewar labor productivity-freight handledper man-hour worked-the pre-attack efficiency of 'harbor labor wasplaced at 80 bythe Osaka harbor

58

effective lighterage. As developed in the preceds. Thanks to the network of canals, goodsgoods i n f ; 3 t o r a g ~and to m a n u f a c t u ~ , i n gThese losses were classified by, the Osaka harbor



ing section, these fac il i ties were never adequateafter the urban attacks started, despite the heavydecline in traffic af ter January 1945.

Exhibit 11 clearly indicates the relative pre,dominance of incoming traffic, which representedapproximately two-thirds o f t he t ot al throughoutthe peak period of 1944-1945 except for one monthwhen outbound military shipments were particularly heavy. Incoming receipts dur ing the firsth al f o f 1944 included an u n us u al ly l a rg e p rop o rt ion of transshipment traffic d ive r te d f rom o th erports. There ' was a sharp decline in July to anew level of receipts which was then maintainedthrough 'January 1945. In par t, th is lower levelwas t he ' consequence of reduced i m po rt s f ro mmainland areas but primarily it followed fromthe decision to concentra te bas ic meta ls produc-

TOTAL SHIPBORNE FREIGHT - OSAKA CITY

,

,..- ~ V V I'v INCOMING

I -

.I \ ' ~ r--.....

\/ V ~

1\I \I

V . I

\ c:: OUTGOING

1\\("1> . ,

II

\I \ , ~

" " I \

f\- . _ , , ~ , , .\I "

",

\ . - - - ,,',1/

.

\' ," 1, .... " " ' ,' - - - ,

1\ \\ f- _

"'"\ ".... -,.

" .....

;.""...,,

"", ;

'I-., - ............

-oOCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY J Ul 'l ' J UL AUG SEP OCT NOV, DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

1943 1944 .1945

61

d be lig'htered directly betvveen many Osakats a nd t he harbor. Thus, at the expense ofcongestion, Japanese authori t ies preferred to

'mize t h e r e ha n d lin g in v olv ed in transshipt via Kobe.saka's relatively limited prewar wharfage

Id not be much extended but deepening of thebor area made possible accommodation of con~ r a b l etonnage at anchor. As long as sufficientterage and handling facilities were available,

oni ing cargoes could be lightered directly totories, to large central warehouses and railwayminals, or to near-by industrial suburbs. Osakaered similar advantages for outbound traffic(I., accordingly, ha d become th e center of muchrmy a nd N av y f o rw ar d in g activity. Bu t the

reat bulk of Osaka port activity depended on

EXHIBIT II

100,000

100,000

400POO

aoo,ooo

500,000

600,000

200POO

goods and to g

this disorganization was o b s e r v e a . $ r ~ s p e c i a l r'rI ' 'd" 1" " Y III8'>rowmg e a ys m t h e movement of eSSellt'f '1 E ' IalreIgIt. ,-,ven WIth a greatly r educ ed tot al d _m a nd f or local freight service, remaining fa ' l ~. . m ~

tIes p ro ve d g rav e ly ma de q ua te th rou g ho u t therest o f t he war.

Estimatedvalue

yen135,000,000

15,000,00014,000,00084,000,000

t ons70,000"50,()OO20;00067,000

To n n ag edestroyedy p e o f commodity

comrnissioner as follows:

Destruot'ion of'goodsjn,}fiarbor w a r ~ h o u s e s

Machinery and metal products __.Clothing and textilesFoodstuffs - - - - - - - - - -O t h e r - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Shipping

. Japan's shipping position as it affected Osaka

These include only items underjur'isdiction of the ~ a ~ ~as/ t w ~ si n t u rn affected by developmentsharbor commission at time of destruction. In ad- WIt m ~ Ie CIty-will be c onside re d f rom two

dition, there was extensive damage to military standpomts. The over-all decline in maritimestores" foodstocks and other e ss en ti al i te ms con- traffi c through Osaka must be examined in rela-

- t r ~ l l e dby'Osaka Army arsenal and b y o th e r official tion to local and regional 'activity. Bu t also, theagencies. Likewise, damage to factory warehouses external factors responsible f or t h is decline mustan9:' contents is not included. be reviewed, part icularly the decision in J al1uary

I ~ i i i sdifficult to isolate the effects of the damage 1945 t o d i ve rt traffic t o o t he r and more protectedto port facilitiesjust discussed from external fac- ports a nd t he B-'-29 mining program initiated int o r ~ ~ 1 i i n i t i n gmaritime traffic through Os aka, s uch l ocal wa ter s a t t he beginning of May.as mining,and f rom th e in d i r ec t effects of t h e a r ea Exhibit 11 presents tonnage d at a o n maritimeattacks on port operations, including i nt en si fi ed s hi pm en ts in and out of Osaka harbordurinO' the

~ . d blabor problems and lack oflighters for u nl oa di ng . perlO of analysis. Whereas sllChother majorAl l of these were interrelated and simultaneously J a p an e s e p o r ts as Kobe, Yokohama, Tokyo andoperative,d uring the attack period. However it Nagoya had l os t hea vi ly as c ompa re d with pre-is c l ~ a r t h a t , d i ~ , ¢ 6 t l yan d indirectly, t h ~urban war years, Osaka c o n t i E : E ~ dto be a major pointrai.9-s p l a y e d " . ~ , s i g n i f i c a n tP a r t i n the d e t ~ r i o r a t i o nfor receipts of importd'ttii\dustrial materials and

o f p or t activity, for t h ey p re ve nt ed t h e effic ient organizt t tion of outbound military COl1voys. Inuse ofwhat large-draught shipping was st i l l avail- 1944 marit imeactivi ty reached new wartime peaksable to move priority tonnage to and from Osaka. as practically all mainland and South Seas traf-

The effect of damage to lighters, warehouses and fic was d iv er te d a wa y f ro m N ag oy a and Tokyohandling facilities di d reduce the impor tan t but b a y p o rt s in response to the submarine menace,dwindling amount of traffic through Osaka port. As discussed i n t he Kobe repor t and in the report

. B u t o f f ar greater;.influenceon essential manufac- of t heUSSBS, Transportation Division, trans-turing and other a £ ~ ~ i v i t i e si n t h e city was the con- ~ h i p m e h tthrough Osaka permitted such traffic tocomitant breakdo\¥Il i;1,of i n ~ ~ r n f l : l< tr an s po rt b y ~ ; m g v e .by way o f t he protected Inland Sea andwater. As p r e v i o ~ § M r * ~ e i s c u s ~ ~ , ~ , , ; ; O s a k a ' s,.elabo- ....Chjna coast routes.rate canal system E ~ r I P t l t t r , g . · ~ t J l l z . i l P o v e m e n t s · b y" With t h e a p p al l i ng loss of o v e r ~ ; ~ , a stonnage onwater between most l c e Y " : f a c t o r r e s T ~ n dmany of southern convoy routes, it became increasinglytheir subcontractors as well as to r ai l a nd h ar bo r urgent to avoid the unnecessary risks involved intransshipment points. ' , , ' th e Pacific ocean approaches to major industrial

The breakdown of land transport in ¥atchand centers easto£Osaka. Osaka thus took on much

the pre-emption of facilities thereafter hl'dispersal of the essential traffic t ha t otherwise would haveefforts placed even greater burdens on this service moved eastward by water, but also overshadowedin connection with componentai ld finjsll.ed product near-by'Kobe, whose extensive harbor and transitmovements. Bu t a s i g n i f i c a n t J r ~ - a e t i o l lof av ai l- faci lit ies ha d always formerly been more exten-able lighterage w as a ls o des tr6yed on 17 March ~ ' i s i v e l Y l l t i l i z e d .This concentration of port activand a total of 40 percent b y J u n e . The concurrent,,:,jity at Osaka rather tl..tR1IJ(obe permitted a some-destruction of boat repair facilities magnified the what s h or t er r ai l h au l f o r transit traffic to easterneffect of this loss on i n t ern al f r eig h t m o v e m ~ n t .centers but it ,vas p r ima r i ly th e consequence ofB e c ~ w 3 eof simulbmeous widespread damage to Osaka's dominant role in processing e s ~ e n t i a l,,,ar



the average r ~ t efor .the October 1943-September1944 base perIOd untIl the end of 1 ~ 4 4 .Th e totald r ~ p p e d.to 40 p e rce n t o f th i s averake in 'Februal:y1 9 ~ 5a s Impor ts f rom Formosa ceased and mostslupments from K or ea a n d M an ch ur ia were diverted to north coast p'orts There was . 1f 0 . . a reVlVao s a k a r.eceIpts to 52 percent i n M ar ch b ut asteady declme thereafter. In the l a st fu ll montho f t he war, official food imports at Osaka wereonl y a f o ~ r t hof the base period average.

TransshIpments throuo'h Osak f ' 1f b , a 0 Importeeoods formerly had constituteda large part of this

traffic. These ceased altogether i n Fe b ru a ry andthereafter waterborne food receI'pts 't 1I I . represen eekoca s u p p ~ ~ e sbrought by s ma ll craft from Shi-

- oku ,Awa JI I s l an d a n d various II1I"nd S . tTl I ' ,. ea pom s., l e s e o ~ a lsupphes were maintained at a bet te r

l a te d ur m g 1945 than is indicated by official fig-

MA P 6 .-Terra in lllodel of Os a k a -Ko b e -K oto are ' . .areas are clearly indicated. y, a, showmg raI lway and road network .

~ nt h . e ~ esections readily accessible to the threemaJ?r cItIes of the region. These citieswere also relatr:ely fortunate with respect to their normal pro-t e m s o ur c es - fi s h a nd seaweed Food I'f . ' supp Iesrom the Inland Sea and from Lake BI'Wt . a were

n o c ur ta Il ed b y t h re a t of submarine activity orto t l ~ esame extent by fuel shortages, as were t l ~ o s e

ob.tamed f ro m t he Pacific ocean, source of supp h ~ sf? r ? ther major cities. Although few o f t h e

regIOns mhabitants could afford such far 'tl . e, an-~ leI' p r o t e l l ~Source was available directly acrosssalm ~ a yon Awaji Island, J a p ~ n ' smost impor

tant daIry ~ n dcattle center outside of Hokkaido.Bu t despIte a relatively favorable position with

r es pe ct to loc al food s uppl ie s t Il e O s"k o •I d . " . ,. regIOn: ~ : r e. w I ~ hJ a ~ a nas a whole a dependence upon

A S I ~ t I Cma mla n d fo r rice a nd o th er staplesFood shIpments at Osaka were maintained a b o v ~

Intensively cultivated lowland

, for food receipts t r ipled at Sa ka i h a rb o r,cUy south of Osaka, and at other near-byor por ts , Al so , b la ck -marke t ope ra ti on s in

d had become so prevalent by t h is t i me thatas impossible t o t r ac e movements of food intoka by r ai l a nd r oa d t ra ns po rt . A s described

USSBS Re p or t No. 42, the practice of organng food-purchasing expeditions to surrounding

ns and farming areas by local householders, bytory representatives a n d b y professional blackrket operators had becomeso general by March

5 that a considerable partof

the riceand prac-

cally a ll o f the other foods consumed in Osaka,oved t h rou g h in formal channels.

.' During the attack period, then, rail traffic inoodstuffs represented the onlyfirm element i n a ntherwise confused picture since overseas imports

ceased at Osaka and produce from near-by areaseeped into th e city with no adequate bas is for

estimation. F oo d i m po rt s f ro m K or ea a n d Manchuria were at record levels until t he l as t fewweeks o f t he war. As every effort was m ad e t obuild up domestic food stocks w i th t h e volume ofshippilng still available, such imports were all han

through ports on the Japan Sea, includingsome i n t h e O s a ka region. Thus Osaka and Kobebegan to receive some mainland imports -by' railinstead of themselves acting as major transshipment points for such foodstuffs.

An examination of c ar lo ad in g d at a f or t heOsaka region shows that rail movement of foods t uf f s- i nc l ud i ng i m po rt s a n d local productionoriginating in this region-remained above the1944 average u n t il Ma rc h 1945. A sl ight dip inthat month and i n A pr i l was followed by record,May movements almost 25 percent above the 1944level . ' Ca r shortages a n d h a n dl in g delays, as wellas a reduct ion o f m a in l an d i m po rt s because ofB-29 mine laying, brought a slight fall in June,but July carloadings were again slightly abovethe 1944 average. In the l igh t of available stocksand harvest prospects in the Osaka region, authorities were confident at the time of surrenderthat sufficient Lood would have been available foranother year even if mainland imports had beencut off.

As unessential inhabitants were forced o u t in torural areas, food supplies readily accessible t o t he'urban centers were believed more than adequatein volume t o ma int a in those engaged in essentialindustrial activity. The food crisis which did de-

velop after t h e u rb an attacks was the immediater es ul t o f t he breakdown i n u rb an distributionmachinery rather than an a b s o l u t ~or prospectivefood shortage. Raid damage to food s tocks wastemporarily serious but these s tocks could havebeen replaced. Th e physical facilities fo r b r in gin g a va il ab le food to u rb an in d us t r ia l workerscontinued to function and were so extensivelydeveloped w i th i n t h e region as to defy completedisruption. Bu t especially after June, local machinery fo r u t i li z in g these facilities failed as didth e

general level'of

civic disciplinethat

wouldhave been essentia l to its operation-even in theabsence of such widespread urban destruction.

Thus for Osaka and for the surrounding regionit must be concluded that , in volume, food receiptswere maintained above the criticallevel andapparently could have been well into 1946-giveneffective utilization of t h e r e ma inin g stocks andth e readily' accessible farm production. Smallwooden craft continued to b ri ng i n some foodfrom near-by Inland Sea points. Fish a n d o th ermarine food supplies were maintained relativelywell, and the rai lroads managed to h a nd le r emaining food imports as w el l a s a rec ord volumeof traffic in domestically produced agriculturalproducts.

oj

In order to maintain priori ty traffic i n t h e categories already discussed, t h e r a i lr o ad administration ha d to curtai l other movements considerablyduring 1945. In some cases t h e b u rde n was easedby reducing cross-haulage. , This was especiallyeffective with respect to building materials andc e rt a in o the r categories but it could not be expected to compensate i n t h e longer hauls involvedin the movement of coal and basic metal productsas Inland Sea maritime traffic declined. 'Whilemuch lumber continued to a r riv e b y wa te r d u r in g1945, other building materials movements fell offseriously even,before th e decline i n s hi p movements. Th u s th ere was a rela tively small burdenfor the rai lroads to absorb. Rail carloadings ofbuilding materials t h rou g h ou t th e Osaka regiondeclined more than 20 percent d u r in g th e l a s t halfof 1944 f rom th e peak levels o f th e s p r in g months.The decline continued into 1945 a l th o ug h th erewas a sharp increase d u r in g Ma y re la t ed to thedispersal effort and to emergency d ~ f e n s eprojects.

Machinery ha d always moved i:4 considerablepart by r a il a nd tonnage loading figures for theregion remained s teady t h ro u gh t h e first three

70

71

;

Other Industrial Materials alm<?st impossible t o a vo id de'aling with broke



Other Industrial Materials

As previously emphasized, the Munitions Minis try organization at the regional level lackedadequate inspection facilities even with respect tobulk commodities a nd , i n a ny event, was preoccu(·p ie d w it h servicing the aircraft industry. Regional control association offices had no real authori ty except in respect to executing allocationdecisions received f ro m Tok yo a n d t h is was par- .ticularly the case outside the b l ~ l kcommodity field.Navy officials never sympathized with efforts toextend civilian authori ty over their procurementp ro g ra ms a nd t h e Osaka Army Arsenal officialswere openly utilizing black market techniques, as\vell as their independent allocations, to expeditetheir various programs.

In s uc h a s i t ua t io n o f u n ce r ta inty a n d possibleshortage, every o pe ra to r t r ie d t o b ui l d u p stocksof maintenance,items as well as materials, a nd t ohoard even those for which he had no immediateor long-run use, to be use d i n t r ad in g. Earlierin the war, such o p e r a t i o I ~ shad been frownednpon evenbetweenfinancial affiliates. Bu t as g e n ~

era 1 weaknesses o f t he Munitions Ministry cont rol scheme became more evident and that agencybecame preoccupied with the problems o f t h e aircraft industry interchange of materials was officially encouraged. The Na vy th u s encouraged itscontractors i n t he electrical equipment field to organize a clearing house for interchange of scarceitems, similar to th e informal arrangement amongshipbuilders. These schemes gradually extendedf ro m b ul k m at er ia ls t o a ll o th er i nd us tr ia l requirements. Such interchange was supposed to beg e are d to th e official allocation system but, in fact,transactions were carried on to an increasing ext e nt w i th o ut a ny notification to government officials other than t h e Na vy inspectors at t h e p l an t sconcerned. Bu t th e practice of unofficial tradingbecame even more widespread, extending fa r beyond part icular units of one concern o r t r us t , orproducers ofsimilar end products. Especially this

w as the , casein maintenance items essential tocontinued output but n ot r eq ui re d i n l ar ge b ul ka nd t hu s difficult to c on trol . The se , i te ms f requently were produced by small firms not favored

. by exist ing priori ty regulations for labor and materials. Thus such p rod u ct s t e nd e d to disappear'from the regularmarket, especially when th e prospect o f a ir attacks began to loom and purchasingagents were busy b u i ld in g u p reserves. It became

alm<?st impossible t o a vo id de aling with brokef or ma ny i tems, despite th e official campa'!against such operators.

Th u s, in late 1944 when air attacks came-whedeliveries were interrupted, stocks destroyed, production changes ordered, dispersa l efforts sud

. denly u n de r ta k en , a n d e qu ipme nt repai rs a t:tempted-there was n o c e nt r al data on the actualamount and location of supplies or on currentpipeline conditions f o r m an y critically importantitems. During 1945, top officials in Tokyo mayhave been preoccupied with over-all figures on t h ~ .

country 's already serious and prospectively critica l posi t ion in coking coal, pi g aluminum, oro t he r b ul k commodities. Bu t such commoditieswere not the most critical problems to the factorym an ag er s a n d p ub li c a ut ho ri t ie s directly concerned wi th ma in t a in in g curren't output in theOsaka region. Output ·of those war items deemedessential to the newly announced s tra tegy of" a rm i ng t h e one hundred mil li on w ho fea r notdeath". was usually covered b y e x is t in g stocks ofbasic materials, bu t after t h e M ar ch 1945 attack,main te n an c e a n d o th er in d us t r ia l products provided th e critical supply difficulties.

At most levels of production, inventories ofbasic materials were p i l i ng u p at an alarming .rateafter March 1945 b u t c ur re nt o u tp u t was oftens tal led ·for need of maintenance supplies, spare

.parts, special lubricants, construction materials,b u i ld in g h a rdwa re and tools, electrical fixtures,belting, and similar items. Th e official allocationssystem lacked t h e in te g ra t io n , th e authority, thei n fo rm at i on o r t h e flexibility to deal effectivelyeven wi th th e b u lk commodities, let alone the manyother i tems which provided th e real k'[oducti0l1bottlenecks during 1945. Thus, eyen wl,)hout thet r a ns p o r t a n d communicationsproblems, the damage to control association offices and MunitionsMinistry records i n th i s region, the situation wouldhave become increasingly serious. The controlsystem which exis ted on p a p er a n d operated during 1943-44 through systematic violation of itss p ir i t a n d regulations was c e rt a in to b rea k downu nd er t he i mp ac t o f ai r a t ta c ks wh ic h affectedall levels of p ro du ct i on a n d a ll inCiustries contdbuting to essential war production. Ins teadof cushioning th e effect of B-29 attacks, this system contributed to the general industrial breakdown. It s peculiar vulnerabil i ty to th e dislocations r e su l t in g f rom th e urban raids helped prevent efficient utilization of available resources.

. , "northeast across the central businef,s district t o , ~ a r ~PHOTO 23 .- ' rhe administrative heart of the Osaka r e g l ~ n. , L ~ ~ : ~ n ~ i r e C t l Vin front of the castle, whileArmy h e a d q U a ~ t e r s

'h c on s ic uo u s white p refec tu ra l c en e r IS . . Note tha t m o st o f the concrete buslllessO S ~ k f : ~ : a ~ ~ l e e ~o ~t ~ eA r ~ yarsenal ex tend widely around t h i ~~ ~ m ~ ~ :l : : : l : ; ~ ~ e nbusiness structures were completely~ c l l d i n g Svisible in this p i c tu r e h a v e been gutte:, S t e ~ e t e l ~ : l . lIn this d ist r ic t were l o ca t ed m a ny o f th'e factory h ~ ~ d ~

destroyed and even m a ny b r i ck ~ t r : l c t u r e s c O l l a ~ ~ e~ c ~ :r e s p ~ ' n s i b l efor war p r od u c ti o n i n O s ak a an d th e s,:rroun mq u ar t er s a s w e ll as t r ad e aSSOCIatIOns a nd p u IC 0

region, Almost 25 percent of Osaka/s i n d us t r ia l l a bo rTHE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY IN force of over half a mil li on w as devoted to t h ~.

. . OSAKA aircraft industry although no final assembly t o ~

W E omy lace wI'thI'Il tIle city, b ut i n ordnance output t. eThe Place of Osaka in Japan's ar con p f" ' Osaka Army arsenal was both a ma nu a c turmg

Osaka ranked second among J aI?an s SIX prm- and final assembly p o in t f or r ou g hl y ~ O p ~ r c ~ n t. 1 ban-centers in size, populatIOn and agg re -, A 'd f 1 IpbUlldmO'clpa ur e • I 1 ' o f a rm y requirements. SI e r ~ ms 1 '"

gate contribution to war productIOn. n s up - and ordnance, th e wartime industnal ~ o l eof Osakab 'ld' 0' where the c ity p ro duce d a bout a t e ~ t h th

Ul

In"" " 1 . 1 P was p r ima r i ly a n int,ermediate on,e-between eof t he n a tio n's wa rt ime to t al , m e ectrlCa equI - 1 d th finalb t e sev prI'mary reduction of basic m a t ~ n as an e e

men t w he re t h e p rop o r ti o n was a ou on.- -th ' d in machine tool and g ~ n e r a lmachmery assembly o f mi l it a ry end-products.

en ,a n e h' d 0 k as i t s e l f ' t sshipwhere the rat io reachedone-t I I ' , sa a,we Osaka 's posi t ion as a m a ~ o ro v ~ r s e a sl an -'a major factor. It s position w a s a ~ s oI mp or ta nt m en t p oi nt became increasmgly I m p ~ r t a ~ tas the

In' many oth,er s,upport.ing industrIal fi,elds ~ n ~ d and as traffic was dlVerted awayh hb ~ wa r progresse Th

in basic metals fabricatmg, a l t h o u ~nelg orm", from exposed routes t o Nag o ya and Toky o. . . ,usAmagasaki and Kobe. also made Important con- O sa ka 's ex ten si ve storage and lighterage faCIlItIestribution to local reqUlrements.

8687

certain recognizedshortcomings this materialpid d l ti l l d t i t

were utilized to organize outbound mili tary shipf d d i h



PHOTO 25. -Pos t-attack view in s am e d is tr ic t. E xc e pt f or occasional concrete st ruc tu res, only burned-ou t t ransfo rmers

al l (1 ill(lustrial d e br i s m a r k t h e location o ~f o rm e r s m al l f a ct o ri e s a n d workshops. .

24 T. I sl lbcontract . ino- d ist r ic t i n O s ak a Medium sized factories depended h e av i ly u p on s m al l workshops,

PHOTO . - yplca '" . .most of them located in two-story wooden structures.40,635

38,81023,2279,852

15,27453,472

155,22152,35622,00015,03514,73451,096.

208,70743,12953,59863,34226,35522,283

. All Over 500 150 to 500 Under 50plants em p lo y ees em plo y ees employees

504,563134,29598,825

88,22956,363

126,851

All industry _______ 16,061 94 1,415 13,552Aircraf t - - - - - - - - - 4,647 20 464 4,163Ordnance ________. 2,400 20 227 2,153Shipbuilding _____ 992 26 Yl38 828Metalfab r ica t ion_ . 1,807 14 ii)4 1,619Other ____________ 6,215 14 412 4,789

Pl a n t size

AUip.qustry _ ~__ ' c _ _

AircrMt . __ . __.Ordnance .Shipbuilding _;lVle!al fabrication_Other __ - - - ~ - - - - - -

N UM BE R O F P L AN T U N IT S

vided a rela tively clear and accurate picturerthe industrial pattern in- Osaka. . 0

The factory labor data provides a fa irly acerate i n di c at i on o f th e functional pattern in Osak

U

both in terms of t h ~ t y p eo f a ct iv it y a nd the siaof plalltunits. Of almost 505,000 workersin Osakplants, according to the registration data for J ~ h U

ary 1945, roughly 134,000 were in plants Con

tributing primarily to the aircraft industry, 9900to armament, 88,000 to shipbuilding and 50:00to o th er me ta l f a br i ca t in g . Almost 127,000 Were

in other types of manufacturing, including chemi_cals, e lectrical equipment , rubber, leather andwoodworking and all consumers goods industries.The distribution according to plant size is clearlysuggested by t he t ot al figures f or al l manufac_turing. Plant units employing over 500 each had208,707 of Osaka's total industrial labor force.At the other extreme 140,635 were i n p l an t unitsemploying less than 50 each.

The following tables summarIze t h i s d a t a:

Aggregate indus t r i al employment[OSAKA JANUARY 1945]

Th e above divisions, as between industries, arenecessarily arb it ra ry in many cases-since many

,units, large and small, contributed to more thanone category. Particularly with respect to small

plants listed as contributing to the aircraft industry, :there was considerable exaggeration, sincemany black market workshops ma na g ed to identify t h e m s e l v e ~ w i t ht h i s in d us t ry to assure them'selves a priority:r:ation status, although makingonly a token contributioli: Nevertheless, authorities regarded theseclassificationsas generally acCU-

rate. Th e h ig h p rop o rt i o n o f employmentin s111allunits is of p : t r t 1 c ~ l l a ri n t ~ r e s tfor it contrasts

ments of goods processed i n t h e E as te rn centersa s w el l as in the Osaka region. .

In aggregate industr ia l capacity and activity,Osakaranked closely behind Tokyo and fa r ahead .of o the r J a pa n es e centers. Bu t like Tokyo andKyoto, Osaka had a, considerable amount of lowerpriority and nonessential industry which had beenpartly curtailed and partly converted during thewar. Nevertheless, t h e f ac t that Osaka ha d fivet imes the aggregate labor force of Kobe at thebeginning of 1945 a nd f ou r times t h e in d us t r ia l

floorspu-ce of that city, provided a fairly accuratemeasure of i ts re lat ivepos i tion. Kobe and Nagoyamore complete ly concentra ted on p r io r it y w arproduction but Osaka had a vital support ing rolefor end-products elsewhere in a dd i ti o n t o i t s o wn ,direct contribution.

Therole of Osaka as Japan's second administrative center has already been discussed and will receive further c o n s i d e r a t ~ o nin la ter sections. Bothf o r t h e O sa ka region a nd f o r m i li t ar y a n d t ra nsport functions extending considerably beyond itsboundaries, administrative agencies located in .Osaka city had come t o h av e a predominant position during the war. T hu s i n t erm s o f i ts bas iceconomic contribution and as a vital element in

the n e two rk o f mi l i ta ry and civilian administrat ion, Osaka's posi t ion in the Japanese war economy was o f m a jo r importance.

The Pattern of Industry in Osaka

Data obtained from the prefectural police authori t iesprovided relatively complete informationon factory size and function in Osaka during thelast phase of the war, when practically al l avai l

.able labor had been mobilized and plant recon-version reached i ts peak. In connection with theprogram for distr ibution of food r a ti o n s to workers at each factory, the police required detailedinformation on payrolls and attendance. Recordsfor five months during 1945 were i'elatively com

plete, thanks to the practice o f s to rin g the original data i n u n d erg ro u n d vaults at each districtpolice station. From these records, locatauthorities compiled tables f o r t h e survey specifying thenumbero£ plant units ~ n dt he n um be r o f listedemployees assigned to eacJl of fiye general manufacturing categories. Su'ch tables were preparedfor each police d i s tr i ct o f Osaka covering JtUlua ry, Ma rc h , May, .Tune and July 19h5. D::-s'11te

88I,.

'sharply with conditions. prevailing in Kobe and However, the program of expansion undertak



p y p gmost other cities. "Even in Kyoto, most of thosec o n tr ib ut in g to war production were in largerunits.

Employment in very small workshops deservesparticular attention because these units were themost common vict ims of incendiary attacks andformed the bottom layer o f t he local subcontracting pattern. The following fable' indicates thenumber of registered employees in manufacturingu n i ts wi th t e n employees or less as of January 1945.

Numbe r Pe rc ent Numbe r P erc entIndustrial categ ory o f p l a n t o f a l l of of all

units l : n i t s . w or ke rs w or ke rs

Aircraf t - - - - - - - - - 2,410 51 14,301 10Ordnance ....._____ 1,264 53 7,810 8Shipbuilding 318 32 6,948 7Metalfab r ica t ion .. 886 49 3,784 6Other _____ : . .. - 3,994 64 19,060 15

I t is evident that there is considerable variation between industries as t o t h e role of thesesmallworkshops. In t h e a gg re ga te t he y representedbarely 10 percent of the total labor force and aconsiderable .smaller proportion of total powerconsumption and output.

While over 9,000 of Osaka's 16,000 productronunits thus accounted for o nl y a tenth of its ind u s tr i a l l a bo r force, 46 p l an t s w i th over 1,000workers each employed a th ird of the city's industrial wo rk er s. T he se u ni ts , starting with theOsaka Army arsenal and its 38,000 workers, werethe most critical elements in local war productionbut al l depended to a considerable e x te n t u p oncomponents and subcontracting functions prov ide d b y smaller units.

INDUSTRIAL DISPERSAL AN D REPAIR

The following discussion of dispersal and repair problems deals in some detail with.the onemajor-and f u t i l e ~ a t t e m p tt o m od if y the production structure previously described, and to adjust it to the conditions which arose during theattack period. Noserious effort to reduce existingwar industry vulnerabilities was even consideredin the Osaka region unti l 1945. The program undertaken a f te r t he Ma rc h u rb an attacks revealedbasic flaws in t h e s t ruc tu re o f w ar production asw el l as i n t he administrat ive machinery whichwas supposed t o p rov id e means fo r a d jus t i n g essential a c tiv it y to the new and critical conditions.

, p g pby key war industries before and after PearlIIa:bor !lad done much ~ o reduce t he r is k o f damageto aIrcraft andcertam other end-product activit,in urban attacks. Execution of t h i s p rog ram w;relatively successful. I t had been undertaken noion.st.rategic grounds . bu t as a mea ns for utilizingeXIstmg pools of skrlled labor and nonessentialfactory floorspace suitable for convers ion. Butsuch d i s ~ ~ r s e dexpansion did not basically modifythe tradItronal dependence of Japanese industryon subcontractors crowded i nt o t he m aj or cities.B y t he t ime serious attention wa s g iv en t o theorganization of subcontracting complexes nearl a rg e o u t ly in g e n d-p ro d uc t war plants, the general shortages oflabor, building materials,indust r ial fixtures and equipment presentedoverwhelming obstacles. Administrative machinery adequatefor the task was woefully lacking .

Th e last-minute effort t o u n d er t a ke large-scaledispersal from Japan's major cit ies was handic ap pe d b y t h e prior need f or p la ci n g m aj o r aircraft production facilities beyond reach of _precision attack. Japan gambled on its ability" tomaintain current output unti l the last minuteandstill disperse effectively i n t h e event that our strategic bombing program proved' successful. That

gamble would have been dubious u n de r t h e mostfavorable circumstances. The destruct ion of sohigh a proportion of Japan's stock of capitalequipment in mass incendiary attacks doomed allhopes f or p r om pt execution o f t he a ir cr af t dis-

. persal program. The disorganization of the laborforce and th e whole economy prevented effectiveutilization o f t he generous t i m e - i n t ~ . ( w a lgrantedurban industries in the Osaka Region betweenMarch a nd J un e 1945. E xc ep t f or a few keyunits, the June a t ta c ks c a u gh t priority factoriesdisorganized and st i l l "a t risk" in congested urbanindustrial areas. The repairprogram, like that fordispersal, was doomedbecause of the high measureof physical "destruction and the overwhelming disorganization o f u rb an life and official administration.

Dispersal-The First Phase

Prior to the invasion of t he Marianas, therewere few advocates of industrial dispersal amongmili tary and industr ia l leaders . Complacencyabout military prospects, preoccupation with maximizin g o u tpu t , and lack of a w a r e n e ~ sas to themanifold organizational and economic difficulties

90

. t h o ro u g h fa r e a n d s u b wa y. . of Soo'o depar tmen t s t or e , o n roam 1 . 1 nt were

PHOTO 26 -Dispersa l pa r ex<:ellell<:e. p : 'ewar V l l e ~ \ ~ h i ; l i I ; O 'opera tions o f Surnitorno aircraft prope leI p ac r o s s i n ~ ,cen tra l IHlsilles,., di,.,trict. ~ ) f : I ~ e " ' . : l n . c: l f ~ e rs u r ~ o u n d i n ga r ea h ad been burned over.

I"t o tl-ll'" \ 'il 'tuallv hfJlllbpl'oof ::;tluc ur elllovec HI ~ .

. ' orner of the depar tmen t sto re sub-basement.P H O TO 27.-1\Iachine tool operatIOns m one c

91



f inal assembly act ivi t ies or more comple1\::assembly operations to existing sub-assembly"

t l t bl t li h th i f

take place during this period before the Marianaslandings shocked the a utho ri t ie s into a ct ion.



,. " lec t r ic equ ipmen t , compressors, and punch pre:,;:,;e:,;

PHOTO 31.-],jxposed m a\ :h me t oo ls, e L nts of dl'smantledequipment were also. th' d' p e ' s a l site arge amou .

waiting near ano el IS 1 . . , 'b . tes Only' priority factories <;ould obtamto h e s e en await;ng transportatIOn flom Ul an SI . , ,fac i l it ies capab le o f moving heavy' equipment.

, . f m an c ou nt ry r oa ds near O s ak a l i n ed with heavyPHOTO 30.-Unfimshed b u sm e ss , O n e 0 ~ Y ., I e d i n t u nn e li n g led t o e x t en s iv e useo k A'my A rs en a l D el a ys m vo v

equ ipmen t f rom sa a 1 . • rUle of this ambitious program was completedo f s m al l factories and farmhouses. :relY 1 " s than lacl{ of bu i ld ing materials,before the s u r re n d er. L a b or difficultIes w e re l e ss sellOU < .

electrical fixtures, and auxiliary equipment.

parts plants , were able to accomplish their eafprograms with s at i sfac to ry fac il it y. Such n /factory developments-and also the rapidly copleted neighborhood expansion-dispersals' undetaken by many smaller Osaka firms-had littnegative effect upon current production. Sinthe firms involvedwere already producing at thhighest rates, temporary production losses, if anwere in terms of potential rather than actual outp u t - f o r example, higher plant utilization at thoriginal site through three-shift ope ra ti on . I

most cases , shortages of labor and supervisorpersonnel ru l ed a g ain s t more intelisive use of theoriginal plant. .

Although all major companies succeeded inc a rr y in g o ut t he i r dispersed expansion plans inthis region, they encountered serious difficultiesin transporting machinery and materials. Especially in la te 1943 an'd 1944, it became increasingly difficult to 'obtain a sufficient amount of dependable truck transportation. The armed forceswere reluctant to lend their vehicles and blackmarket charter prices were very high even earlyin the war. Thus suchfirms were forced to dependmainly upon their own resources. They wereequally dependent upon their own employees for

much of the necessary labor. Construction workers, like building materials, became progressivelyscarcer. Even where exis t ing faci li t ies were being converted, there frequently was much difficulty in taking care of housing and transport ofworkers. .

Advanced dispersal was accomplished Jl th difficulty and at the expense of some current production. I t laid claim on already scarce labor,transport, a n d ma te r i al resources. Bu t it is clearthat a more general dispersal program could havebeen accomplished during t h is p er i od withoutcreating serious d i s l o ~ a t i o n sin the region's econ-

-omy. At the price of some current production,the most important p\oduction facilities couldhave been rendered less vulnerable before 1945,whenshortages were moreacute anda i r raids werein progress. Th i s f a il u r e to disperse-or even toorganize plans for d i s p e r s a l ~ d u r i n gthis periodfrom 1942 t o l at e 1914 represents a serious andbasic error and contributed to many o f t he production difficulties experienced during th e attackperiod.

There w as no ove r-al l d is pe rs al p ol ic y in effectnor was there any government agency chargedwith supervising and maintaining recordsconcerning that dispersa l which did occur. Nevertheless, the records of individual companies duringthis period indicate t he n a tu r e a n d magnitude ofthe dispersal, and it is possible t o d ra w certainvalid conclusions.

Dispersal i n t he Osakaregion during this 194244 period was confined entirely to la rge producers-principally aircraft, electrical equipment, and

machine tool concerns. As indicated above,practically all such activity was incidenta l to expansion. Inasmuch as dispersa l was undertaken onthe ini t ia t ive and responsibility of the individualcompanies, only the largest companies could comman d t he necessary materials, transportation,capital and labor to undertake these plant developments. T he A rm y and Navy were far moreinterested in maintaining current production levels to the exclusion o f a l l other considerations, andcontinued to ~ o i c eassurances as t o t he ir capabilities for defending priority factories from airattack.

Accordingly, plants located within Osaka Citywere not encouraged to move unless as part' o f a n

expansion program that could not otherwise besatisfied. Thus, with few exceptions, firms withinOsaka City took over near-by avai lable factoryspace when necessary, or, more often, made sub-

. contracting arrangements with additional establ ished firms located i n t he city a n d t hu s equallyvulnerable to large-scale urban attacks .. In thecases of local expansion which cal led for readjustments of equipment, movements were generally over relatively short distances. Transportation was thus largely confined to trucks, barges,and carts, the la t te r being the most reliable. Inthe cases where major conversion was required, ittook from two to ' four months before prductionwas underway at the new sites.

A mo ng t he l a rg e p r o d u c ~ r sof pr ior i ty items,mos t w ere a ble to accomplish all the expansiondispersal that they underook during this period.Mitsubishi Electric andShimazu Engineeringboth reported their programs o f p l an t expansionsatisfactorily completed. Kawasaki Aircraft,Kawanishi A ir c ra ft , a nd Sumitomo Propeller,whose dispersa l projects cons is ted of extending

94 95

lispersal in 1945 received only promises of future repayment.o ve r a p e rio d f ro m 10 April 1945 t o 9 sites. In every case, ra tes of production on an



The second p h a ~ eo f in d us t r ia l d i s p e r s ~ lwas1rried out to escape precision and urban areattacks a nd t o minimize damage already inflictedn i n d us t ry f rom such attacks. In late Novembernd December of 1944 a few large companies in1.e Tok yo a re a w er e d ir ec te d t o disperse-and1.en only 'a f ter protracted ' debate in official andusiness circles. It was not unti l 23 February945 that a final decision was m ad e b y the govrnment in Tokyo to. d is pe rs e on a planned naLonal basis.

On 12 March 1 9 4 5 ~ t h r e edays after the catasrophic 9 March ' a rea a t t ac k on Tokyo-a "Cenral Counter Planning. H ~ a d q u a r t e r s 'o f Prod u cion and Defense" w a s o r g ~ n i z e din the Muniions M i n i s t r ~to s u p e r v i s e ' ~ m denforce dispersalf ,all key wa'!' ;,industry i n J a pa n . This agencyunctioned t h ro u gh t h e regional headquarters ofheMunitions Ministry, one of which was locatedtl Osaka City. Fo r the country as a w ho le , the,rganization p l an n ed t o move key elements in1.ajor war industries to 1,575 dispersed sites, 1,191,f these were located above ground, 132 semi-unlerground, and 252 underground. In addition, itvas p la nn e d to disperse thousands of small pro~ u c e ~ s ,essential fo r ma in t a in in g components deIverles, on the initiative of regional authorities.~ o p.pr iori ty was given the aircraft industry, in-,ludmg producers of engines, airframes, propel~ r s ,and aircraft ordnance .. Seeond priority was~ l v ~ n ~ oproducers of communications equipment,m t l ~ a l r c r a f tordnance, "special attack" weapons,:pecml steel, anti-friction bearinO"smachine tools

• • b "

~ r l t l c a lchemicals, and aviation gasoline.

The Ho me Is l an d s \ ve re to be d iv ided into s ixmtonomous and increasingly self-sufficient re~ i o n sso that production couldcontinue in the areaslOt immediately attacked, i n t he event o f Al l ie dandings elsewhere in Japan. The Osaka area/Vas des igna te d a s one of the s ix regions withtdministration centered in Osaka City. Within~ a c ~region the 10calMunitioi:ts Ministry officialstsslgned a district into whicp-, each plant wa s t o

ove, the choice of the exact site being left 'to the~ o m p a n y ' sdiscretion. The Industrial EquipmentBoard of the Munitions Ministry was to purchase)1 ' lease the sites a n d p rov ide subsidies for dis

ersal expenses. Although a few producers , such1S the Osaka Army Arsenal, did receive their acGual f un ds f or t hi s purpose, private companies

f a i lu r e to advance fu nd s a d de d to the reluct. . ' anCeo f m an y compames to move.

The dispersedsites were to belocated on 0"1'011 d. bl b n ,

smta e f o r u n de rg r ou n d a n d semi-underoTo ;1. I I ' b I n l ~ lmsta atlOns ,;here possible, and usually in placeswheresomesmtable factory buildino'swere alread. •

b 'Y

II I eXIstence. . The companies were to move and_ ~ t a r tproductIOn on a temporary basis in the buildmgs at t ~ enew site until permanent undergToundo r o t he r mstallations were completed. All facilit ies were ultimately t o be moved i nt o the COlll-

~ l e t e ~dispersal p la nt s a n d buildings at th e origmal SIte were to be abandoned. Adminis tra t iveresearch, a n d o th er offices, as w el l as s u p p l e l l l e n ~

tary workers' billets and fac i li t ies were to be setup in. existing structures at the site or nearby.Thus all operations o f t he concerns covered wereto be removed f ro m t h e former sites in congestedurban areas and a t i me l i mi t of s ix months wasstipulated !o r completion o f t h e e n t ir e progralll.

With respect to production, the Government es-timated that losses of only 20 percent would beaveraged during the s ix mon ths per iod w hi le the 'progra:m :was under way. This estimatewas highlyunreahstlc. The private estimates of individualcompanies were considerably h i gh e r a n d turnedout t o b e fa r more accurate. Fo r example, Sumit ~ m oPropeller, which produced 66 percent of allaIrcraft propellers i n J a pa n , estimated'dispersalof its four major plants would cut production asfollows untilthe newsites were functioning: Osakaplant 90 percent; Amagasaki plant 30 PEi'Fcent;Shizuoka plant 40 percent; Tsu plant 60 p ~ i c e n t .

On 1 April 1945,' the n a t io n al o rd er was issuedfor the dispersal of first priority fac tories . Thiswas followed by a second order on 16 May 1945for. the dispersal of second priority factories. InJuly 1945 a final national order was issued directing the dispersal o f a ll war factories not specifically covered by previous orders. Actually manyof the most important aircraft, communications,ordnance, and electrical equipment producerswere unofficially informed of specific directivesa f f e c t i n ~them before they were issued, and somecompames were already i n t h e process of movingwhen the o rders w ere o ff ic ial ly a nnounc ed . Inaddit ionto the large companies affected in Osaka,400 small manufacturers i n t he city received dispersal orders i n i t ia t e d b y the regional MunitionsMinistry office. These local orders were issued at

I

o ve r a p e rio d f ro m 10 April 1945 t o 9ugust 1945 i n a n a t t emp t to s t a gg e r the dispersal

activities. It will be recal led that Osaka's firsturban attack occurred in mid-March a n d th e othersinthe first half o f J u ne . .'. I t is extremely difficult to es timate how much

lof the ambit ious plan described above was ever.·.·l..ealized. The Osaka office of the Munitions Min<,iistry retained few' records and the adequacy of

even these is open to serious question. The officeswere reestablished in M ar ch a n d J u ne a f te r suc

cessive raid damage and much of the available datahad to be reconstructed by appeals to Tokyo and

. to plant records-where possible. Companieswerereluctant to repor t the ir failure to comply withdispersal orders or"to resume output as scheduled.When officialinquiries weremade, they almost uniformly over-estimated how :much they really ha daccomplished. Actually if machinery was movedto anew site bu t not installed, or was evenenroute,i t was reported as "dispersed" and was thus regarded by the responsible authorities in their offi-cial reports to Tokyo. Similarly, if employeeswere no longer reporting a t t he o r ig in al p l a nt , o rsimply h ad l ef t t he ir homes because of the ai rraids, they also were reported as dispersed-which

indeed they were h qt n ot quite i n t he way theGovernment had intended.

Of the 400 small companies in Osaka Citywhich were ordered to disperse, 183 reported dispersal in progress at the time of s u rr e n de r wi thvarying degrees of completion ranging from 10percent to a few w ho reported 100 percent . Thesefirms claimed to have dispersed a total of 13,043machines and about 18,000 employees.. The remaining 217 companies reported no dispersa l accomplished at t h e wa r' s e nd . N o a cc urat e data isavailable as to the number of dispersed companies that g ot i n to anything more than token production again, but from a s a mp l ing o f in d ivid u alcaSBS, an estimate of 15 percent to 20 percent for

this region would a p pe ar t o be generous. Thosecompanies which were able to \start productiona t d is pe rs ed s it es w ere w ho lly u na ble t o r eg ai nold rates of output.

In summary, the p ro gra m fo r dispersal of smallcompanies from Osaka City was a fa ilure . Fiftyfour percent of the companies accomplished nodispersal at a ll des pi te o rder s to d o s o, and o f t h e46 percent w.hich did report some activity, only afraction were able to start production at their new

y , pover-all o r p e r man-hour basis were substantiallylower than at the old sites. The experience of thesmall companies in Osaka City was t y p ic a l o f theeffect of dispersal on all companies i n t he region:Such activi ty was not u n de rt a ke n t o a ny e xt e ntin Kobe; Thenet result of dispersal efforts amongsmall plants was to increase the difficulties of thelarge priority factories for which they were, inmost case13, subcontracting. The program furtherdisorganized transport,decreased thetotal numberof machines in production and, therefore, over-alloutput at a mos t c ri ti ca l per iod. Finally theseefforts encouraged a wholesalebreakdown in labor

discipline.

Dispersal of the larger companies in the Osakareg io n w as l es s c ha ot ic during th is period bu tha d the same net effect upon production. Kawasaki Aircraft earlier ha d been fairly successful indispersing by converting two sub-assembly plantsand parts producers to final assembly plants. Bu ta f te r t he Ak a sh i a t t ac k i n J a nu a ry 1945, it endeavored to reestablish its airframe assembly facil i ties on a "bomb-proof" bas is and a ls o to pu tits Fuatami engine plant underground andinto thewoods, emphasizingtunnels,scattered smallbuildings, a n d o l d mines f o r i t s shops. When the war,ended, 1,200,000 square' feet out of a planned1,900,000 square feet of new construction ha d beencompleted a nd t he company considered i ts d is -'persal 60 percent complete. B u t i t ha d not begunmov in gon a large scale to the new sites and s h o r t ~

ages o f a u xi l i ary equipment and construction materials made it clear that production w ou ld b e 'seriously hindered.

The effects. of a i r a t tacks are significant a n d a r eil lustrated by the dispersal ot' the Naruo plant ofKawanishi Aircraft-located midway betweenOsaka and Kobe-which produced over 3 percentof all 1944combat airframes. In the first monthsof 1945 the company began to disperse certain '

operations. In April 1945 it built 72 planes withthe prospect of improved output as componenta n d l ab or problems following the March urbanattacks on nearby cities were" overGome. B ut i nMay 1945, production fell 61 percent andtpe company attr ibuted the drop almost entirelY,to dispersal difficulties. ,O n 9 June 1945 the' N aruoplant was heavily hi t for the first t i me a n d thecompany immediately accelerated its dispersalefforts. The combined effects of dispersal and the

96 97 1

air attacks during the J une- August 1945 period tack period l is ted transportat ion as tl .'lelr si Ib l k

worse within Osaka City itself. The seriouso f t h e local t ransportat ion situation is illus

ed b y the case of Sumitomo Propeller which

later offered themselves for black ma rk e t r a t esas common labor at dispersal sites after fleeingOsaka and gett ing established i n r u ra l areas. Bu t



were to hold production down to 23 planes againsta, planned 320, Heavy urban raids almost invar ~ a b l yf o ~ c e dcompanies to attempt to speed upd l s p e r s ~ lII I p r o g r ~ s sat the expense of whateverp:oductIOn was bemg maintained a nd h a d ' an ind:rect effect o f f u rt h er dislocating the entire regIOnal economy.

. ~ h er e c ~ r ~ sof other representative l ~ r g efirms'mdlCate s ~ m I l a rresults. Mitsubishi Electr ic atKobe was ,able to accomplish 35 percent o f itsp l ~ ~ n e d

dIspersal. The Osaka Army ArsenalorI¥mally planned t o d is pe rs e o nly five p erce ntof Its t o ~ a loperating capacity because o f t he nat ur e o f I ts heavy equipment, but completed only25 percent of this relatively modest ini t ia l effortb y t he end of the war; despite its priority command on labor" tr,ansport , and other facilities.T e ~local t o p p r IOn ty anti-aircraft ordnance fac-t.ones under the control of the Osaka A 1r n ® a w ~

a, e to effect an ~ v e r a g eof 56 percent of plannedd l s p ~ r s a l .Bu t WIthevery possible advantage,productIOn rates averaged only 17 percent of th ts ~ h e d u l e d ,fo r mid-Au gu s t a t the new install:~ I O n s .ThIrty other companies,engaged in makinguses, shells, and various aircraft an d ordnance

par ts under th e direction o f t he Osak A 1b u t n o t 0" f i ' . a rsena,, bl ven rst claIm on all requirements, ac-c ~ m p l I s h e dan a v e r a ~ eof 42 percent of planneddIspersal and productIOn at the end of the warhadreached 30.3 percent o f t h at planned. .

Failure of the Dispersal Program

. D i s p ~ r s a lunde:rtaken prior to late 1944 was suc~ e s s f u l mthemam because it w as on a s ma ll s ca lem terms of t h ' .. , h 1.e regIOn s w o e economy. Little

ew constructIOn was necessary and th d' t1 e IS anceslR:o v ed w er e r el at iv el y s ho rt . ShortaO'es of~ k I l l e dl ab ?r a nd materials were not as g;eat asm the closmg year of the war Eh' h . . very company

.w ~ c a tt e mp t ed t o disperse during the attackpenod encountered many serious dI'ffi It'Th d'ffi l' . cu Ies.

,ese 1 eu t Ie s a ro se from two main sources~ I ~ S t ,there were extreme shortages of such e s s e n ~

olfa s a.s t ransportat ion, labor and materials-alltt W ~ l C hwere greatly intensified b y t he u rb an

a , ac t S ~ c o n ~ l y ,there were bas ic errors and~ : s c ~ , c U l a ~ I O n sm pol ic y, planning, and admins ra IOn 0 the emergency dispersal program.

. As n o ~ e dearlier, practically all companies trymg to dIsperse out of Osaka C it y d ur in g t he at-

greatest bott leneck. Motor transport ng et d

. was alrea 1o ve r a xe w he n d is pe rs al began on aI , cyT k . < alge sc I

ruc s general ly w ere in disrepair d a e.. . an poo Imamtamed. N o c ompa ny w as a ble to o b t ' l' yt h a t i t needed. Fuel was s h ~ r tfor i n d u s t r i a ~ ~ naUo",:ners ~ n d ,while a few favored compa;l ieruckcelved aId from the Army and N ' ~ re-t < avy, mlhta'mo or pools were n o t ma de f ul ly av ail abl e b Iy.the armed forces were l ikewise short of f elcaus

e

tr u k D' . , ue andc s. Irect mIlItary needs aswell a tlf A ' , < S le nee 1o .rmy Arsenals a nd t he ir affiliates we .c screaSI O' P' . , r e In-n o. rlVat e c om pa me s c ou ld not loal tl "facilities legitimately to other f irms f the1 leu'

dor e same

r e a s o n s , ~ nf ew c ompa nies c ou ld a fford to h itrucks m the b la ck marke t. Fee s up to 2 000 te?er. ~ a yprecluded their use by al l save ' w e a l ~ I ~ I ~mdlvlduals who were removing val bl Y

d fua e personal

goo s rom the urban areas. <

Wherethey .couldbe obtained,ox and horse cartswere more relIable but were not suitable for 10

~ l a u l s ,a round t r ip o f as l i t t le as ten miles r e q u ~ ~mg from 12 to 2 ~hours. Transportation of equipm ~ n tand mater:als from factories t o r a il r o ad termmals, and agam f ro m t h e rural railroad sI'dI't th ' ngso e new SItes ,was largely dependentupon thesetypes of transportation. I t was i n t he faI'1 ft

, .' ure

0

ransportatIOn w l t h ~ n.osaka and other centers thatmost firms had theIr greatest difficulties. Moreover, roads and facilities a:t th e new sites were frequently unsatisfactory for heavy transportation,

, The railroads were similarly overbtl"):dened durmg. the attack period. Breakdowns,v of loadin o

e q U l p ~ e n t a ~ dcars became frequent and r e p a i r ~were mcreasmO'ly d'ffi It d '' . b 1 cu an tIme-consuminO'

ue to ~ shortage of skilledlabor. But, in general,~ h e r aI lw ay co ul d mo ve everything that wasoaded. Temporary delays after heavy raids were

no t of g r ~ a tmagnitude but car tie-ups in Osakaa n ~at dIspersal s ites were most serious . Machmery and materials frequently remained out in~ h eweather for many days and even weeks await-mO'tr t '0 anspor atIOn to and from railcarsand plants..amage to machinery was often very extensive

smce adequate prot t' l 'ec :on wa s a ck mg , L oa di ngand unloadmg of trams a n d t r uc ks Ise

' b l was a so an ou s p ro em b ec ause cranes and labor were

_:ven more sca:r'ce than the transport facilitiesthem~ l v e s - e s p e c I a l l yat the dispersal sites. This se

r ~ e sof rela,ted problems was formidable at mostdIspersal SItes but, taken toO'etller they d. , seeme

ed b y the case of Sumitomo Propeller whichgiven most c o n v e ~ i e n tnear-by sites a nd t op

m on transport facilities. This h igh pr ior itylllpanyestimated t h a t i f t r a n s p o r t ~ t i o nha d beenUy a v a i l ~ b l eit could have completed dispersali ts Osaka p la nt i n h al f t he time actual ly re

ired. The Amagasaki works of th is firm couldve completeddispersal by August instead of De

beI' 1945 as was es timated at the time o f t he

rrender.There were also m an y l ab o r problems in con

ection with dispersal. Each firm was· usuallyorced to rely upon its own labor fo rce. Th e'

armed forces; the Munitions Ministry, and ansociation of leading contrac tors were all suposed t o a id in the program but their help .:was

'very slightbefore June and most negligible thereafter. In Kobe the system fo r r e cru i ti n g t r an s -port and construction labor b ro ke d ow n completely a f te r t he Ma rch a t t ac k a nd t he situationwas a lmos t a s s er ious in Osaka. In all Japanonly 38 million man-days of labor were officiallydiverted to dispersal during 1945. A fe w O sa kaproducers received mili tary a id , a s in the case ofKawanishi Aircraft whose Fukuchiyama dispersal plant was b u i l t f o r it by the Navy. Troops

and civiliansmobilizedfo r b u i ld in g

defenses wereassigned t o ai d several o t he r t o p priority firms.'But i n t he few cases where sufficient bodies weremade available o th er l a b or problems arose that'will be considered below.

Factory w orke rs w hose homes w ere 'not destroyed i n t he u rb an attacks ha d l i t t le desire tomove from their homes because billets and foodwere usually more scarce a t t he new sites t ha n i nOsaka. They preferred.to forage for food indi: idua l ly ra ther than concentrate in large groups111 a: small rural settlement where local facilitiesand transport were inadequate. F e w c ~ m c e r n s

could assure their bombed-out workers adequatequarters, Fear of raids and food shortages thus

'led to increased absentee,ism' at the v er y t im elabor was needed most t o h el p in OfO'anizinO' dis-0

persal an d maintaining saggingproduction levels,for raid victims turned to relatives or establishedfactories outside t he u rb an areas. A ft er t heMarch raid on Osaka, it was impossible to prevent large numbers of employees from leavingthe city, and dispersa l was further crippled.Many workers who deserted their posts in Osaka

many were l o a th to r e ma in /at their assigned Osaka factories and r i s k s u mma ry t ransfe r to a s it ewhere l iving conditions might be intolerable.

T he t hi rd great difficulty was in materialsshortages-principally construction materials andf ixtures. Cement was very scarce. Logging operations were e:x:panded in the region but therewa s a s ho rt ag e of personnel to process it intofinished lumber. Many O sa ka s aw mi ll s w eredestroyed i n t he March attack along with largelumber stocks. Shortage of electrical equipment,vQ>lves, belting and other specialized fixtures wasthe major problem for t ho se w ho w er e ab le tomeet their needs fo r l a b or and construction materials. Apparently this class of shortages-enorm ou sl y i nc re as ed as a r es ul t of damage in theOsaka and Kobeincendiary attacks-proved to bet1:le most critical obstacles to restoration of outp ut a t the d is pe rs al s it es . M uc h e qu ipme nt w asdamaged in t r an si t a nd several firms ha d theirchief trouble with moving delicate machinery forwhich they w ere una ble to procure an adequatesupply of packing and cra ting materials .. Repairproblems were frequently unsolvable at dispersalsites and constituted a n o th e r ma jor p rod u ct io n

obstacle.

In terms of policy and planning on a g o v ~ r nmental level, it is indisputable tl;tat dispersal wasundertaken too late. The reluctance o f t h e armedforces a nd o f some companies to sacrifice product io n t o dispersal continued r ig ht u p u nt il thetime when t he a ir a tt ac ks force d s ome a ct ion.Despite these ai r attacks, there were s t il l manycompanies whi'ch would n o t s u pp o rt the governmen t' s pol ic y. Some, p l ag u ed b y shortages and

. rising costs, preferred to use u p t he ir existinginventories and take on black market work untildam,age would enable t he m t o collect on theirinsurance. When directed to disperse a certainpercentage of their.production equipment, manywould thus move their most nonessential equipment , leaving their vital machinery untouchedand still in production. There was no effec tivemachinery to enforce dispersal orders andlegitimate excuses were always at hand.

The administration o f t he prO'gram was likewise faul ty. Basical ly, t h e re wa smo coordinatedpriorities system for dispersal requirements.Thus,when the key plants contributing to the:

99

98

were virtually impossible to obtain unless something more than official orders were offered to th erepair companies. Japan International Aircraft ,

re increasing rapidly due to natural deterioran and to mishandling by the incompetent and

attempted t o us e their best labor on r e p a i r 'e c t s . On l y t he l ar ge producers-the 0 prokfi " " aIrcraft

aircraft i n du s tr y i n Osaka-and all d d< ' regal' e ase s s e n t l a l ~ a t t e m p t e dto disperse s imultaneously

t l l d i t



The Official Equipment Repair Program

In M ay o f 1 9 44 , at t h e i n s ti g at i on o f the Munitions Ministry, the Precision Machinery ControlAssociation ha d established the Kosaku Kikai,a mac hine ry repair c le ar ing house w hich w ascomposed of member firms and designed to copewith damaged machinery for companies in warproduction. Two branches of the f irm w ere s et

up i n t he Osaka reg ion ,one in Yodogawa-Ku, acongested area of small machinery concerns, andt h e o t he r in the suburbs. The Yodogawa establishment was formerly an important private plantwhich ha d been engaged in repairing machineryt h rou g h ou t th e · war. "

After ,Tune 1944, when it became a b r an ch o ft h e K os ak u K ik ai , t h is Yodogawa plant rebuilt

p co pa es. Japa ,for example, obtained quick repairs only by systematically providing special inducements to va-

. rious officials and repai r companies.O sa ka w as p a rt i c ul a r ly fo r tu n a te in that 20

percent of the country 's machine tool capacityand 34 percent of all c a p ac i ty fo r other product ion machinery was located i n t he Osaka region,main ly wi thin the c it y. H en ce , priori ty Osakacompanies couldhope to obta in skil led r e p ai r a idand t o d ra w u po n a large stock of 'equipment.

Nevertheless, repair h el p f ro m Osaka's machinetool industry was confined to a few large firmsand was not generally effective. This wasin it ia l ly due to the decision of the government inmid-1944 to c onve rt mos t of the machine tooli nd us tr y t o direct p ro du ct io n o f w ar materials-mainly ordnance items-rather than to cont i n ue p rod u ct ion o f machine tools. By late 1944,well over 20 percent of th e industry"was in direc t .production of w ar materia ls and, no allocationso f ma te r ia l s were m ad e f or machine tool production in th e first half of 1945. T hu s p reoccupied, the industry was s wamp ed whendispersal a nd r ep ai r demands. began to sky-rocket at the end of 1944 and early in1945. When heavy l{rban damage occurred to

the smaller machine tool p rod u ce r s a n d subcontractors who had b een c ou nt ed o n t o h an dl eequipment r ep ai r s f o r victims of' precision attacks, Osaka's relative a d va n tag e f ro m th e standp oi nt o f r ep ai r p ot en ti al turned into a s er ious

handicap.

ski lled personnel which all indus tries werereed to use in increas ing numbers as th e warogres sed . T he a ir attacks on Osaka City ander urban areas, a n d u po n a few large aircraft

ants in th e region, greatly intensiped these'oblems. Under air attacks, i ~ l d u s t f y ~ w ; p , scononted both with severe d a m a g ~to mllb'yl.,oL itsn equipment and shops and with the loss <;>fportant sources of s p are p a rt s , skilled labot,'d machine replacements . Recuperabi l i ty va-

ied wi th th e company's own resources in th e wayf .equipment and skHled labor, i t s p r ior i t y stand

'ng w it h t h e Munitions Ministry a n d t he armedforces, and, to a considerable degree, w it h t heingenuity of management. Labor problems werea paramount consideration at almost every point.

Th e la rg e r, h igh priority firms in this region,.such as Kawasaki Aircraft, Sumitomo and M i t s u ~

bishi, maintained their own repair teams andpools of machines from which parts and replacements were drawn. Fo r example,after th e firstra id on Kawasaki 's Akashi worki'l, the cqrnpanywas able to handle 'repairs on two"-thirdsof d ~ m - · 'aged machines and i ts losses were further compensated by the timely receipt of 66 new highcapacity machine tools previously ordered.

Companies such as Mitsubishi Electric at Kobewhich were part of a large concern received .aidfrom other affiliates and, i n t ur n, were able toprovide direct assistanc'e. In this case, Mitsubishi Electric received aid from the MitsubishiMachine Tool Company a nd f ro m Mitsubishi'sKobe shipyard. In turn, its engineers and skilledworkers aided in p la nn in g a n d executing electrical repair projects elsewhere.

In some cases , replacements were secured by 'buying out smaller firms which had been damaged and were unable to continue production, orby cannabilizing nonessential p l an t s f or fixtures.But most of these installations ha d already beenstripped before 1945. Also, large firms at timeswere unable to get machinetool producers such asOsaka Kiko, largest «oncern in th e region, to sendrepair teams a n d s p ar e parts to their damagecl .plants and, infrequently, to supply machine replacements. In the absence of official backingplus additional inducements, the smaller, lowpriori ty firms were entirely dependent upon theirown labor force and resources for repairs, andequipment replacements and technical assistance

rms I ~ partIcular-received any s ubst an ti al h ' .from eIther t he M in is tr y o r t he a rmed for elpThe smaller companies accomplished vel' /es .and that only with difficulty and b y, Ittlevarious illegal methods. y resortlllg to

It should be noted at the outset tllat' 't f an mvenory 0 p o s t ~ a t t a c krepair or replacement f-

company's plant and equipment is not a 0 aaccurate c r i t e ~ i o n .o f p r o d ~ c t i v er e c u p e r ~ t ~ ~ I YMany compames d Id n o t complete feasible re ,y,?n all partially damaO"ed machiner A pall'S: ' and other labor difficnlties from:;:une : ; : ~ ; -

ougust 1945 were so acute that m an y p l an t ObICIals felt that there would have b ' f f i . ffi-en msu Clentpersonnel to opera te th e repaired' machin~ ~ ~ u 1 hall damaged equipment had been r : : t : ~ e :

.JISt essness" thus affected manao-emellt d O ' .II ' < b eCISIOnsa ~ we as w ork er e ~ C I ~ n c y .Also, dispersal effortsfrequently took prIOrIty over repair and mf i ~ m sconcentrated on removing undamao-ed ~ ~ ~s ~ ~ h t l Y Idamaged machinery to dispersal sites ando ,er p aces ~ f

0 safety r a th e r t h an t r yi n g to re-paIr at t h e o r lg mal site. Nevertheless 't 0 Ith t th . , ,1 IS C ear

a ~ recuperabIlIty of industry w as s ligh t inth e perIOd from March to August 1945 Th 'due in I - . IS was

o arge part to shortages of repair parts

.s kIlled l a ?o r, a n d inefficient administrat ion of t h ~ew repaIr facilities.?n e ~ f t h e m aj o r fact.ors i n t he appallin de-

~ e r I O r h a t I o nof available production resourcesgdur-mg t e attack period was the effect of 'I corrOSIOn~ n ~ t y p e ~of machinery ~ m delectrical ~ w t u r e s

Durmg perIods of exposure following J:ttacks.u ~ to the heavy absenteeism and confusion fol

lowmg a t t ~ c k s ,mino r ro o f damage often l ed t osevere eqUIpment d a m a ~ ethat Gould have beenp ~ e v e n ~ e db y p ro mp t measures. The followin o~ I S c u s s I . o nd e v o ~ e sm ai n a tt en ti o n t o t h e m e a s u r e ~

~ ~ maJor r e pa I r o f complex machinery and m'lc l l n ~too ls . A ctua lly, this represented only (a~ r : c t I O n a lpart o,f the recuperation problem facm o any plant whIch sustainedincendiary damao'e .as p l a n ~p ~ o t o g r a p h s'in this and other USSBS~ ~ ~ o r ~ smdlcate. ,A final section sketches part of

lIS general repaIr problem in terms of a plantsample undertaken in Osaka.

.Even prior to the air a tt ac ks on O sa ka indus -trIes there were fa d 't l 0 'd'ffi l'

0oce WI 1 constantly mcreasing

1 GU t Ies m r e pa I r a n d replacement of machin-ery. Breakdown rates of al l types of equipment

operators found t l ~ e m s e l v e scompeting d i s a s t r o u s ~l y f or transportatIon, materials, e x t ra l a bo r andg ~ v e r n ~ e n ~aid. "'\iVhilethe aircraft industr; wass ~ I l ltrYI,ng frantically to move, th e second nat I o , n a ~dIspersal 0

o r ~ e rwa s s en t out and other,prIOrIty compames m the region began their dis?ersal also. Their efforts succeeded only in addmg t o t h e confusion.

Quite, aside from lack of personnel and fromvery serIOUS c o m m u n i ~ a t i o n stroubles, supervisionan d e ~ l f o r c e m ~ n tof dIspersal orders could not beanythmg but meffectual. The MunitI;ons M' 0

t d ' " mlS• ryan . ItS regIOnal offices had nominal a u t h o r ~ t y

but thIS me an t l i t tl e to plant manao-ers durI'noth °d ' 0 be r ~ I 1?erIOd. They were incl ined to fol low'the dIrectIOns o f t he mili tary service for whicht ~ e y .: e r e p ro du ci n g a nd t h ro u gh whose "expedlte.rs they received such p rac t ic a l a id as wasavaIlable. T h e m i li t ar y agencies, i n t ur n, em?arked on a p ro gra m o f favoring their own m o ~ tl l n p o r t a ~ tproducers and protecting their ownproductIOn.

~ h e~ i v a l r y i ~dispersal, like t ha t i n the alloc a t I ~ nof materIals, seriously damaged the authorIty of th e Munitions Ministry and m ad e a~ h a m b l e sof the priori ty system-encourag

m?" the fur ther g ro w th o f "black market" operatIOns ~ y all concerned.' F i na l ly , p l an n in g a ndsche.dulmg was unrealistic and few governmentoffiCIals seem t o h av e a nt ic ip at ed t h e difficulties~ a u s e ~by, hasty and wholesale dispersal, particut r lY m lIght of the basic dislocations resultingrom the h e ~ v yurban area raids. Estimates of

the productIOn losses due to dispersal an d t ls c h e d u l e ~? o ~ p l e t i o ndates were always high:;o v e r - o p ~ I m l s t I cat all levels o f a ut h or it y a n d fewcompames took the government's fio-ures seriouslyor expected t he ir s t o be accepted bat face value.

Industrial Repair 'I n du s tr y i n Osaka demonstrated l i t t l b ' l ' tt o ' e a l l Y.recuperate from th e mountin o air attacks

whICh began in March '1945 Th oe government-sponsored r ~ p a i rs ys te m w as poo rly o rgan iz edand wholly m ~ d e q u a t eto car ry o ut an efficientt h o ro u g h re pa I r p ro gra m 'f h '' , <. e program w as so

adly a d m l m ~ t e r e d~ h ~ tmos t c ompa nies p referre;d. to a V ? I ~o b tammg re pa i rs t hr o ug h t h eMumtIOns Mlmstry in Osaka. The shortage oflabor. was very acute despite the fact that themachme tool companies which d id r ep ai r w or k

100 101

1

Percent

June-Dec 1944 50Ja n 1945 -40Feb 1945 52

machines' and farmed out a large volume ofor repairs to other small shops. The suburb h h



Repair data5,'£59 Osaka shop units

Feb 1945 52Ma r 1945 ~ 40Ap r 1945 ~ ~ 5May. 1945 . l l

Ju n 1945 -' 20Jul1945 ~ 1

Altogether, the Munitions Ministry approved requests during 1945 f or t he r ep ai r o f 2,776 majormachines and was able to complete repair of 879machines th rough i t s facilities before the end of

the war. The above figures from Munitions Ministry sources in no sense reflect an accurate estimate af ter February 1945 o f t he number of machines in priority plants needing repairs.General In du st ri al Reconstruction' .

An indication of repa i r accomplished in OsakaCity may be obta ined from the following table.A sample examinat ion was undertaken in Osakao f r e pa ir histories for 5,259 damaged shop unitsin nine industrial and one miscellaneous categories. The study indicates that 2,579 out of these5,259 shops were abandoned and no repairs wereat tempted, while 1,462 shops continued product io n w it h equipment remaining undamaged oreasily repairable. O f t he 1,038 other shop units ,the roof coverings were replaced on 320 bu t equip-

branch itself rebuilt a to ta l of 1,064 machineseen September 1944 and Augus t 1945.der the official plan, companies which suf

'd damage or equipment breakdowns reportedhe Munitions Ministry headquarters in Osaka.ch would order i t s repai r affiliate to send re-'r t ea ms to the damaged plant. These teamsde recommendations to the Munitions Minis. which could authorize some machine tool or, .

pair company to start operations. In practice,e sys tem was ineffic ient and time consuming,en before the attacks s ta rt ed , a n d m an y firmsankly stated that t he y p re fe r re d t o obta in re-. ,irs f rom o th er private sources or to under takeem i n t h ei r own shops, rather than become inlved in negotiations with the Munitions Minis-y. It i s ea sy to see why this system brokewn after communications were disrupted andany official records destroyed.The fact was· that the aircraft industry alone'as accorded· a high enough priority to obtain

,ny real a id f ro m t he Munitions Ministry. TheMunitions Ministry regional headquarters atOsaka furnished the following data on the percentage of machi1Yes repaired before the surrender' compared w it h t he number of machines for

which repair requests were approved:

'" 0>:"

~. ~ «

t f l . g ~ ~ 00

! J. r o ~ " < : f \

~+' o l : r ~eo » "

00 ~>: .s 1=:0 00 8 ~ 0

0

'"00 -'" '"

+,0 """ ~ 8 Q)"O ot - - >: ...

' H . . . >:0. . ~ ' " ~ w·.... oo ~ . " g 0 0300 00

030. 030. . . s ~ ~ . ~. PI.-I . S ~ · 8 ~, ~ o . _ . < : ~ :='" ~

800 >:,.; 0 ' < : ~ · S ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ' Q ) Q ) 8 ~ £ ~ t 6 ' '" . "@

P< •"",

«' " 'd00 .~ ~ + ' ' ' ' '" 0' • ~ . E~ 8 "'t- . ~ E ~ 0 0 ' " §o 15

:;;:"" «.-< .<:-< ~ : > r;iQ.lt- .<:-< ;iii""0 UJ

~ . 0 Po< Eo<- - - - - - -- - -Disposition:Shopsabandoned _____________________ 803 51 217 33 153 445 340 12 498 27 2,579

Undamaged part continued in production 556 39 131 28 106 219 220 8 320 18 1,642

Hoof coveringon ly rep laced ___________ 122 4 32 1 14 94 8 1 44 0 320

Structural damage repaired; shopsrestored ___________________________ 85 0 43 0 1 63 43 3 54 1 293

Site cleared. New pu ild ing erec ted ____ -' 94 10 13 4 17 41 64 58 8 309

New site _____________________________ 34 0 18 0

- - - - -

5 7 1240 0 116

Total shopsdamaged _____________________________________ -------------------=====------------5,259

Hepair group:Firm's own genera l labor and construc-

t ionstaff __________________________ 5 3 3 0 7 8 ~ 5 1 3 3 0 83

Firms' own product ive l aboL __________ 88 8 35 1 1 36 103 3 36 ~ 279

Private construction workers __________ 54 9 10 4 15 51 84 - - - - - - 81 0 318

Facilities provided oy government "departments ______________________ 128 0 56 0 5 52 - - - - - - - - - - - - 67 2 310

Facilities provided by armed forces _____ 8 0 0 0 5 4 3 20

Total s h op s w h e re repair was attempted ________________________________ - = - - = - - = - _ - _ - _ - = - - = - - = - - = - - = 1,010

PHOTO 32.-Hepai r of incendiary damao'e was freL a c k o f e l ec t ri c a l cable and fixt . " ' b ' q u e nt l y r e g ar d e d as impossible." U le s, eltlllO" and a -T " .garded as greater obstacles th I b '" UXl I d l Y eqUipment were re-

• c an a o r a nd buildi 0" t · · 'd a m ag e f r o m e x p os u re w a s a . f . n", rna enals shortages but. maJor actor II I redl . 0" th 'eqUipment in Osaka. lClll", e total s t oc k o f capital

PHOTO 33.-Another t yp e o f repair problem Colla .buildings no t only causecl hea d . pSlllg roof iStructures in lal'O"er'. vy amaO"e to eq . '"eqUipment. '" Ulpment but delayed salvage of

102 103;r

gram was considerably more successful and therewas general agreement that work discipline andproductivity remained much higher among thisgroup during 1945 than among other employees.

bel' of resident adult workers was already de-"'Ilg slightly b ut t he first great drop was occaed by the March urban -at tack which alone

h lf illi id f h h l

information is a vailable to determine the Y>

pattern of developments and to establish t l ~ e n e .

m ~ n t.could not be restored. In 309 ca ses a newbUIldmg was erected 011 the cleared site and 116

h



105

g p g g p yB y t h e end of 1944,some 120,000 students had beenassigned f or w ar work, although th is last sourceof labor was also pract ica lly exhausted by that

time.Despite the impressive number of bodies thus

made available f or w ar work, it proved impos-; s ib le to u ti li ze this labor power efficiently. Basic

problems prior t o t he attacks 'Yere the lack ofsufficient supervisory personnel and shortcomingsin the labor allocation machinery. Fe w concerns

had effective training programs and, in manycases, the newly ass igned manpower lacked thephysical stamina required for heavywork as wellas any experience with machinery or general factory operations. Plant managers were critical ofthe labor al locat ion system on such counts as wellas with respect to a l leged favorit ism in meetingmanpower requests.

I t is clear, however, that much could have beendone to insure more effective utilization of avail

; a bl e industrial labor, skilled and unskilled.· As" in th e case of other production resources, the lack

of integrated control over labor utilization resulted in labor hoard ing and pi ra t ing , and encouraged t he g ro wt h o f a l a b or "b l ac k ma rke t , "

especially among subcontractors and smaller warp la nt s, as wel l as am on g freight handlers andconstruction wo.-rkers. Thus, while. a sufficient

. number of bodies were mobilized f or w ar work,the military conscription program had producedcritical shortages in skilled categories and supervisory personneL Under these circumstances, itproved extremely difficult to maintain reasonable

. standards of productivity as the existing industrial labor force was progress ively diluted.

D u ri n g t he a tt ac k period, these chronic problems o f t ra i ni n g a nd labor efficiency faded in toinsignificance as compared with raid-induced desertion and absenteeism. There w as a 40 percentdecline in Osaka factory payrolls between January and July 1945, 15 percent of which followedt he M ar ch a re a a tt ac k. Bu t at tendance ra tesamon a those who rem ained on th e payrolls

b ·

dropped from a January 1945 average of 79 per-cent to a July average of 59 percent. ~ h u s ,according to official.figures compiled by tl\e prefectural police on an individual plant basis, dailyaverage adult attendance at Osaka factories de-

a half-million residents of the c i ty homeless.May 1945 there were only 349,000 adult resits employed in manufacturing as compared

th 482,000 the previous November. M a n ~ofbse left homeless in March found new lodgmgs"undamaged sections of the city or i n t he sub-

and r et ur ne d t o t he ir former places ofployment, but problems of transporta.tion and'no'conditions were powerful factors m reduc

their subsequent contribut ion to local ecomic act ivi ty. These dis locat ions in the localbor force a ls o a ffec te d many i m po rt a nt w a r.ants located in th e suburbs and at considerable'stance f ro m t he city.Despite t he m aj or readjustments forced upon

Ie local labor force b y t he i ni ti al u r ba n a tt ac kMarch 1945, there w as very little change in

he percentage distribution of employed residentsmong the various industries. B y M ay 1945, d e ~

pite t he s ha r p decline in total n ~ m b e r sas c.omared with November 1944, there ha d been slIght. declines in shipbuilding, i n t he i ro n a nd

industry, and in less essent ia l indus tries .employment in t he a i rc r af t i nd us tr y in

y!>c,rea:sed only from 19 to 20.6 per cent, b ut i n ord-the increase was from 17 to 20.3 percent .

many general machinery and machineplants barely raised their 13.5 percent share

of the local industrial labor force. Thus as faras Osaka residents were concerned, there was li t

evidence during th is critical period of anyre-allocation of industrial man-

power, except among those contributing directlyto ordnance output.

The program for recruiting additional labor inOsaka will be described in some detail, along withthe machinery for assuring appropriate allocation. As a resul t of a short-sighted military conscription policy, almost every Osaka industry wasseriously handicapped by the shortage of skilledworkers. By 1944 the available supply of male

adults suitable for forced assignment to w ar industry had beeil practically e xhau st ed . The reafter sucyessive programs for mobilizing womenand s tudents were undertaken. Th e female conscription program was not v er y s ucc ess fu L Aconsiderable percentage of those assigned fa iledto remain at work and a high proportion desertedafter the first air attack. The s tudent labor pro-

c al r ol e of labor difficulties durin a th CrItP

. d B ' I " b e atta~ l ' l o . aSlCa ly, this information is of th

k I ~ d s :general census figures and month-to-more.stImates of employment amona Osaka 'd nt

IIb reSI ents

payro and attendance data use d by thtural police in distributing factory food

eprte.fec

t I t I ' ra 10o p an s o ca ted I ~ Osaka; and adult payroll an"man-hour productIOn figures returned in USSBfactory questionnaires. The first category' d'c ~ t e sthe general availability a nd t r ad e dist ~ ~1

tIOn o f l ab or w it hi n t he city, but suppliesa ~ ~ u ~ l

figures for only two mon ths N ovembe r 1944May 1945; t]J.e second c a t e ~ o r yof i n f o r n l a ~ ~ ~covers actual factory employment by dist . tt f .. . rIC andype 0 actIvIty during January March M

June and July 1"945; the f i n a l c a t e ~ o r yc o v ~ r s : I ; 'O c ~ o b e r1 9 4 ~ - A u g u s t1945 period for all factoreumts returnmg. completed questionnaires. ThYfirst. two c ~ t e g o r I e sare principally util ized in thi:sectIOn whIlethe questionnaire data on labor will?8 p r e s e n t ~ dalong with month-by-month trendsm productIOn and power consumption.

There are ~ w omajor aspects o f t he pre-attackmanpo,:er pIct"?re to be presented-the generaltrends m the SIze and distribution o f t he laborforce a.nd the measures taken for m o b i l i ~ i n gand~ l l o c a t m ?additional manpower to meet the growmg reqUIrements of local industry. In generalemployment among adult residents of O s a k ~

re.ached a peak early in 1944 and thereafter dec!med gradually in response to military 1J'pscriptIOn all;d transfer of some workers to wa:i-' plantselsewhere. In addition, the local labor force mayh a ~ ebeen somewhat reduced duringlitte 1944 andear y 1945 as a resul t o f t he firebreak programa ~ dvoluntary .evacuation. Osaka was provided'Ylth an extensIve network of in te rurban electricl me s so that a large number of local residents~ o r ~ a l l ycommuted to factories outside the citylImIts and .likeyvise many of those employed inl?cal factol'lesand offices were domiciled at a con

SIderable distance f rom the city. Indications arethat roughly the same amount of labor was "imported" and "exported" each day.

. As d ~ v e l o p e dearlier i n t hi s report, total adultmdustl'lal employment within Osaka City reachedIx: ore than 5 0 0 , ~ 0 0in January 1945. The proport ~ o nof t .hose m manufac tur ing had graduallyrIsen durmg 1944 from 57 percent o f t ot al gainful employment to 67 percent by early 1945. The

104

INDUSTRIAL LABOR

v ~ i l et he r e a re certain serious limitations inwartIme data on manpower in -Osaka, sufficient

~ h o p swere dispersed to new sites and n ~ wbuildmgs cpnstructed.

In only 83. cases _were shop repairs undertakenby constl'l:ctIOn staffs already i n t he employ ofthe.operatmg. company. In 279 cases firms usedtheIr productIVe l ab ot f or r e pa i r purposes. Another 308. shops were repaired by private outsidecOl:structIOn workers. In 1,010 cases where rep a I ~ r s.were. attempted, 670 shops' repair efforts~ T e r eorgamzed entirely by the owners themselves.r h r ~ eh un dr e d a nd t en shop units were aided inrePa.lr thr?ugh government facilities and only 20r ~ c e I v e daId from the armed forces. Of the 322shops r e p ~ i r e dwith al l types of government aid,136 ~ e r em th e high-priority aircraft industry.Machme tool makers and shipbuilders were theonly o t ~ e rcategories receiving significant governmentaId.

The. end of the. war found the dispersal prog r a ~m O sak a C It y and region still underway.Bu t It had been steadily fallin a behind scheduleand was ~ n c r e a s i n g l yhampered

b

as a result of airattacks ~ n t h ~urban areas. T he n et result ofundertakmg dIspersal in 1945 was to reduce furt h e ~ 'the productive capacities o f i nd us tr y i n t hi sregIOn. As a whole , it represented a net loss to

t ~ l e Japanese war effort despi te certain exceptIOnal .cases of effec tive execution. Tn view ofthe facility with which urban a re as w ere beinga ~ t a c k e dand the damage these raids were causingdIrectly and indirectly to the war productionprogram and to the economy as a whole it is notreasonable to assume that dispersal out ~ fOsakaand ~ o b ecould have been s u c c ~ s s f u l l yconcluded,even I f t h e w ar h ad continued.

The basic error w as one o f t im in g and, oncethe program was undertaken, this error was compounded b y t h e maladministration o f t he reaion'sresources. Even' i n t he absence' of urban attacks,t he p ro gr a m w ou ld h av e b ee n' g rav e ly h a n dicapped,. althoug.h certain categories o f o ut pu tmIght have revIved after mid-1945. With theenormous losses of equipment v it al t o t he dispersal.effort a nd t he general dislocation-especiallyas It affected l a ~ o ra v a i l a ~ b i l i t yand local transport - the 1945 dIspersal program was doomed.

clined from almost 400,000 i n J an ua ry 1945 to304,000, or 78 percent, i n M ay and to 178,000, or45 percent, i n J ul y. There is good reason to be

was a contil iued decline during Apr il and M:although there were no attacks , fol lowed by: aother sharp raid-induced decline i n J un e whie



45 percent, i n J ul y. There is good reason to believe that these official figures fail to reflect muchof the unauthorized absence which developedafter the M ar ch a tt a ck a nd especially after May.

These declines in attendance ha d a muchgreater impact on s ome industrial districts ando n c e rt a in in d us t ri e s than on others , but a conc o mit a n t d ro p in productivity was generally apparent. In the face of increas ing shortages of·materials and components, these labor problemswere generally instrumental in preventing utilization o f t he resources available. The consequentdislocations were. multiplied by a particularlyserious d ro p i n t h e a mo u nt of casual labor noi'mally employed i n th e movement of goods andsemi-finished items between production u ni ts . R epair efforts were serious ly delayed in damaged,plants for the same reason. In this connection, amost serious consequence of the urban attackswas the general failure of workers to repor t a f terheavy ra ids . In many cases, the effect of relat ivelysuperficial damageto equipment was greatly i nc re as ed a s a result of subsequent corrosion'and weathering that might have been preventedby p ro mp t protective measures. Thus, whatmight have been re la t ive ly s imple repair taskscame t o r e qu i t e major equipment overhauls. Similarly, the dispersal program 'was not only delayed bu t involved considerable damage to equipment as a result of labor shortages . Desert ion,absenteeism and "listlessness" came to be domi- 'nant obstacles at all stages of the war productionp ro gr am . O nl y a f ew f av or ed plants located inth e suburbs and able to solve their workers' housi ng a nd food problems m an ag ed t o keep labordifficulties from becoming major limiting factorsduring the last months o f t he war.

Employment Trends in Osaka

Total e mp loymen t a mong Osaka residentsreached a peak in early 1944 of 830,000. Thisfigure represented almost 40 percent of the city'spopulation a t t he time. A downward t re nd i nover-all employment first became evident as earlyas February 1944, however, and continuedthroughout the r es t o f the war. Before the firstarea attack on Osaka in March 1945, there weres t i ll a b ou t 750,000 employed inhabitants. Totalemployment is e s timate d to h a v e d ro pp e d immediately to 650,000 a ft er t hi s first raid, whichburned out over half a mill ion res idents . There

other sharp raid-induced decline i n J un e whiedepressed the to ta l employment figure well below450,000. There was a steady but less drastic fallin employment thereafte r up to the e nd of thewar.

The s l ~ g h tdecline in I ~ e s i d e n temployment fig-m es d ur m g 1944 had b ee n a result of militaryconscription and of transfer from non-essentialemployment to war jobs elsewhere . Some volun-tary evacuat ion also took place during the firsttwo months of 1945. Fluctuations in employmentfigures after March 1945 are more or l ~ s swhatwould be expected in view of the raid pattern_severe drops following the M ar ch a n d June at-tacks with more gradual declines i n t he intervals.

As developed l at er i n this section, industrialemployment within Osaka, includ,ing productionworkers,' supervisory personnel and office help,reached more than 500,000 in January 1945. Thes te ad y r is e in indus tr ial labor during 1943-44reflected t ~ l enet increase in production workersdespite military conscription and transfers toplants located outside the city. During the sameperiod" total adult employment was declininga mon g Os ak a residents but mobilization of laborfrom non-essential occupations and from hithertounemployed groups b ro ug ht w ar indus tries al a rg e s u p ply of additional workers. Bu t problems of mobilizing and utilizing such materialcreated serious production problems, even beforet h ~attack p e r i o ~ .The. marke:l increme tr of l ~ n

skIlled workers m most factones partly .'Jxplamsthe decline i n t he quality and efficiency of laborin t h e l a st phase o f t he war.

Before examining problems of recruitment andallocation, it w il l be we ll to review the over-allchanges in employment among Osaka residents.Two p oi n ts call for emphasis. As ah;eady suggested, industrial employment became increasingly important as w ar p la nt s b ui lt u p t he ir staffs

, at the expense of non-essential activity. 'Whilemany peacetime manufacturing enterprises closeddown, others converted to w ar production, oftenas subcontractors. At the same time, non-industrial activity i n t he city was steadily' curtailed,thus freeing addit ional labor. The following table indicates the percentage relationship betweenindustrial employment a nd t ot al employment ofOsaka residents for periods before and after theattacks.

P H O TO 34 .-Indust ria l chaos in northwest Osalm.

P H O TO 35.-Bul'l1ed-out a r ea i n southwest industrial district.

106 107



i n g a t machines set u p i n school buildings. Working t ime was considered as school t ime in s o fa r asacademic credits were concerned. In August 1944an extension of the l a w p ro v id ed f o r the draft

Iture, or regarded as. necessary at home.in other groups were not mobilized in pracThus, registered prostitutes were exempted

padded their requirements. Believing the . .the r e ~ u ~ s t ,r a th e r t h an its urgency, w o ~ ~ z edetermmmg they hoped that f d-p

tactics and. l a bo r h o a rd in g on the part of zealousp l a n ~officIals a nd m il it a ry "expediters." Them e ~ I t a b l econsequence was a labor "black mar



111

an extension of the l a w p ro v id ed f o r the draftof students from the two lower "grades of middleschools and even from primary schools, as well asfrom the lower grades of special t r ad e a nd tech-nical schools.

Student workers p ut in e tg ht h o u rs a day atnominal wages, with night shif ts permitted whereperiod.ic health checks at the factories resulted inofficial approval. Students were t ra ined for the irjobswhile on the factory payroll , often in specialtraining centers established i n t he schools. Aircraft, heavy industry, shipbuilding and the machine industries were the chief recipients of stud en t l a bo r in Osaka. By November 1944, theg re at ma jor i t y of s tude nt s w ho w ere s ub je ct tomobilization ha d been drafted.

Student conscription was generally consideredthe most successful of a l l l a b o r mobilization measures, due primarily to the fact that students weredrafted and allotted by class groups under directcontrol of teachers. Consequently, they wereeasier to control and thei r morale during the ra idperiod w as muc h better than that of other conscript groupS. In the few cases where food andhous ing were properly handled, their disciplineand productivity usually remained high. Else

where, dur ing the March-May period when laborstandards so g eneral ly d et er io ra te d, studentgroups almost universally ha d attendance recordsconsiderably better than other production or man-agement groups.

In July 1945, the factory s tudents corps wase s t a b l i s h ~ din Osaka in a bela ted attempt to revive student attendance, which ha d f al l en offdrastically in most esta,bl ishments as a resul t ofthe June raids and the attendant transport andliving problems. T h e F a ct or y Students Corpsscheme attempted to meet these problemsby placing all student workers in dormitories and providing a ll food and other essentials, so that attendance and produ0tion quotas could be r igidly

enforced. B y t he end o f t he war, however, no tmore than 10 percent of those students remainingi n t h e city actually lived in such dormitories, withmuch of th is figure representing students who, asa resul t o f t h e J u ne bombings, had been tlehousedand ha d found no alternat ive place to live. Inother words, the original program fo r ma in t a ining group discipline and distinct s tu d en t wo rk

Source of conscr ip tees

Residential area.do

Civilian and nonessentialactivities.

Residential area.

10,0009,0006,000

6,500

Numberordered

to reporte r iod o fconscription

saka as essentia l for morale. G ei sh as w ereded but proved completely unsatisfactory asstrial workers because of their previous highing power and because they were not tem

entally suitable for war work. Only aboutpercent o f t he t ot al female population was

.ally affected by this· p r og ra m. A lt o ge th erroxiina te ly 30,000 women were actual ly oreed to report for faotory work in Osaka Preture, o f which some 19,500 were drawn from

hin the O sa ka c it y l im it s. A summary o f t heults achieved from various assignment ordersresented b elow: .

~ o v .1943-11ug. 1944~ U g .1944-Jan. 1 9 ~ 5..tUg. 1944-J an. 1945

Jan. 1945-Mar. 1945

Prefectural officials estima ted that 70 to 80 percent,R!thewomen ordered to report in Osaka actually

complied. After the Ma rch a rea a t t ac k th ey estiillated that not more than h al f o f these returned

to their assigned factories. Du e t o t he destruction of branch labor offices, evacuation, and subsequent administrative breakdown, no furtherconscription of women was attempted in Osakaafter March.

Student Labor OonscriptionStudents ha d been used fo r t e mp o rary work,

mostly in agriculture, but also to a certain extentin factories, since the b eg i nn i ng o f the war.They were r ~ c r u i t e dfor such temporary jobsthrough the prefectural education officials uponrequest from the Prefectural Labor Office. Duringthis early phase, not more than 1,000 studentswere so ,employed at one time in Osaka.

Although.a Student Labor Mobilization Decreewas n o t p ro mu lg at e d unti l Augus t 1944, actualconscriptions of students for permanent war workwas initiated at Osaka i n A pr il 1944. In thatmonth, a l l s tudents in the three to p grades ofOsaka middle schools and in t h e h i gh e r classesof technical and trade schools were d ra ft ed . S tudents were usual ly conscripted and assigned tojobs as class groups, in some cases actually work-

Conscription of Women

. In November 1943, the vVelfare Ministry adVIsed the prefectural governments to mobilizelocal women for factory work through a Women'sVolunteer Corps. After a t ri a l p e di ' d d .which the plan ;vas. judged to be f ~ l s i b l ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~Corps was fully mstItuted in Au O'ust 1944 F -

males . fro m 14 to 40 years of a g ~were d ~ a f t e ~a c ~ o r d m gto t he . t yp e o f work in w hich the yaIready were employed or accordingto residentialarea for those not previously employed C' '1'd . . ' IVI ranan non-essentIal factories employing 50 or morewomen workers were required, in Auo'ust 1944to supply 20 per cent of such e m p l o y ~ e sto t h ~C or ps fo r. a ll ot me nt t o wa r indus tries . . Thisdraf t, ne t tmg about 6,000 workers in Osaka, wast ~ l e .

?nly one made on w omen e mploye es f romCIVIlIan and non-essential industry. All otherwomen drafted into the so-called Volunteer Corpswere drawn by residential areas from those notcurrently employed.

Local branches were established by the Prefectural Labor Office to conscript a l l unmarriedwomen between 14 and 40 years of age who weren o t a l re ad y employed in business, i n du s tr y, o r

determmmg, they hoped that .f . d p.distribution o f t he labor a v a i l ~ b ; ewpreoportlona'

11 . re madean ~ -round face-savmg solution, at least arth e Ir a c tu a l needs would be s atisfied. p t 0

Thus, in Osaka as in o th er in d us t r ia lthere was a ~inflation o f t he p ap er d e m : ~ ~ t ~ :labor, especIally af ter mi li t ary conscript'ster:>ped up in 1944. Controlling o f f i c i a ~ ~"WastheIr efforts tryin O' to collect mol' d pentb d" ° e an mOl'

o Ies WIthout regard to the fundamental be

lem-:the effective utilization of industriall ~ ~ :

SolutIOn of this problem would h' . r.f l ' ave reqUIredcare· u aSSIgnment in terms of job requiremenand equally careful plant-by-plant inspection ~labo: use. Such a program, although frequentlconSIdered b y c er ta in O sa ka officials Ileve y. 1 ' I' "WasserIOUS y wttempted. Available 1 b .. h' a or materIalWIt m the age l imits stipulated became l. 1 d'ffi ncreas-mg y 1 c ul t t o p rovide . ""\Vell before a tt k t t d . rea a -ac s s ar e m 1945, the supply of male .1 b . conscrIpta or m the Osaka. region had almost disap-

pea re d. The re fo re , the conscription of wornand students had been intensified to fill . endquotas. reqUIre

m e I t a b l econsequence was a labor black market a nd t he lack of central knowledge requiredfor prompt control and reallocation of labor resources af ter the B-29 attacks commenced.

. P r e f e c t ~ r a lofficials also found t h e ~ s e l v e shan~ l C a p p e dm draf ting and allocating labor due toI ~ o r a n c eof .the diverse labor problems in indiv l d u ~ lfactOrIes under their jurisdiction. Inevitab ly, m o rd er t o j ud ge the merits of competingrequests for labor, the prefecture became de

pende:r:t.uponthe

adviceof

localArmy

_andNavy

authorItIes, p a r t i c . u l ~ r l ythe supervisory personnel attached to prIOrIty plants. The self interestof these ~ f f i c i a l s ,w ho w ere naturally most c o n ~

cerned w I ~ hlabor problems in the particularp ~ a n t swhIch they supervised, colored their adv ~ ~ ~to t ~ e ~ ~ e f e c t u r a lauthorities a:n.d mitigatedaoamst JUdICIOUS appraisal of o th er l e ai t ima terequests. °

. B e l ~ t e d l yr ~ a l i z i n gthe need for more representatIve. and mdependent local control, the gove r n m e ~ tI:r: July 1944established a Committee forC o o r d m ~ t I O non labor mobilization problems in" ~ a : ' lregIOn, ~ s .p ar t. o f t h e general program for1 eownal admmlstratIOn i n te gr at i on S uc h a' t " com-~ I tee, m c l u d i ~ ~o ~ c i a l sfrom local offices of' allo?vernment mIlllstrIeS which controlled or superVIsed waJ;' J ? l a ~ t s ,and advisory representativesfrom the Ra Il ro ad Ad min i s t ra t i on and SeaT r ~ n ~ p o r tBureau, was empowered to make finald e c l s I . o n ~on the allocation a nd d r af t in g o f workers wlthm the Osaka region. However, the reluctance o ~ the c e n t r a ~government to forego com-·p l e ~ e l yItS 'prerogatIves was evident in a provisow h ~ c hreta:ned the Welfa re Ministry as the finalar,blt:r. of m t e r - r ~ g i o n a lmanpower matters, thus 'p l o v I ~ m ga means for well-situated companies too v e r r I ~ elocal and regional authori t ies on laborallocatIOn problems.

P r e . f e c t ~ r a land regional authorities thus almost mevlt.ably came to consider the l a rg e st a n d·

most effec tIvely backed reques t as the mos t imp o ~ t a n t .Officials -were empowered to inspect factorIes as a check on the m e r ~ t sof individual laborr e q u e ~ t sand were supposed to c om ba t l abhoardmg. This power was seldom used s i n c ~~ :personnel were assigned f or t he purpose . Consequently, most factory managers, aware"that theywould not receive 100 per cent of th .

. 'err requests

m VIew of existing labor scarcities, consistently

110

USSBS Report 58, Effect of Air Attack on Kyoto OCR

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