USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ussbs-report-79-ships-bombardment-survey-party 1/9

/ / )



U. S. Stratogic Bombing Survey

Report "I Ship" Bomb.rdment Survey Party

~

ICONFIDENTIAL

FonEWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey

was establish d by the Secretary of War on 3

November, 19'14, pursuant to a Directive from

the late President Roosevelt. Us mission was

to conduct an impartial and expert study of the

effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be

used in connection with ail' attacks on Japan

and to establish a basis for evaluating the irn-

portance and potential ities of air power as an

inst rument of military s tra tegy , f or p lann ing

the future development of the United States

armed forces, and for det ermi ni ng fut ure eco-

nomi c policies with respect to the national de-

fense. A summary report and some 200 sup-

porfing reports containing the f ind ings of theSurvey in Germany have been publi shed .

On Hi August 1945, President Truman re-

quested that the Survey conduct a similar

study of the effects of all types of air attack in

the war against Japan, submitt ing repor ts in

duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the

Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Sur-

vey dur ing i ts Japanese phase were :

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman

Paul R Nitae, Vice-Chairman

Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman

Waltel' Wilds, Secretary

Harry L. Bowman,

J. K. Galbraith,

Ransis Likert,

Fr ank A. McNamee,

Fred Searls, Jr.

Monroe Spaght,

Dr. LOllis R. Thompson,

Theodore P. Wright, Directors

The Survey 's complement provided fOI" 300

civilians, 350 officers, and 5 0 enlisted men.

The military segrn nt of the organization was

drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 per

cent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40pel' cent. Bo h the Army and the Javy gave

the Survey all possible assistance ill furnishing

men, supp lies, t ransport and informat ion. The

Survey operated f rom headquarters established

in Tokyo early in September, 19~5, with sub-

headquar ter s in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and

Nagasaki , and with mobile teams opera ting in

other part s of Japan, the i slands of the Pacific,

and the Asiat ic ma in land.

It was possible to reconstruct much of war-

time Japanese military planning and execution,

engagement by engagement and campaign by

campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate

s tatist ics on Japan's economy and war-produc-

tion plant by plant, and industry by Industry.

In addi tion , stud ie were conduc ted on Japan' s

overall strategic pl ans and the background of

her ent ry into the war, the inter nal d is cussions

and negot iations leading to her acceptance of

uncondi t ional sur rende r, the cour se of heal th

and morale among the civili an population. the

e ff ec tiveness of the Japanese civi li an def ense

organizat ion and the effects of the atomic

bombs. Separate repor ts will be issued covering

each phase of the tudv.

The Survey int errogated more than 700 Jap-

anese military, government and industrial offi-

cials. It also recovered and translated many

documents which have no only been useful to

the Survey, but will a lso f urn ish data valuable

for other studies. Arrangements are beingmade to tUI"l1 over the Survey' s fl Ies to a per-

rnanent government agency where t hey wi ll be

a vailable fOI' fur ther examination and dis tr ibu-

tion.

PAGE i



. . .: r . :: r . :e!.~eo!4. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .: r :. . .. . .: r :: r :e r e. . .. : . .

. . .. . . ._.: r :~.

~

U . S . S I ,a l eq i c B Q " b in q S " r ve r

Repor t o f Ship,:' Bombard",ent Survay Party

CONFIDENTIAL

ACKNOWLE,DGMENT

Data presented herein were gathered almost enti rely in the

field during the period 2 October to 25 November 1945 by member s

of the Ships' Bombardment SUI 'Vey Party, l is ted below, each of

whom made important contri but ions to the report which foll ows:

Cap t. N. A. Chap in , USN

Lt. R. G. Grassy, USNR

Lt. J. D. Coker , USNR

Lt. M. E . Pauley , USNR

Lt. C.W. Shumake r, USNRLt. (jg) J.L. Decker, USNR

Lt. (jg) O. Sutermeister, US1>."R

Lt . (jg) H . V . Allen, r-,USNH

Ens. T. M..Nolen, USNR

Ens. W. K. Kreider, USNR

Walke)', T. L., Sp(X)lc

Bleckman, M. , P h o j) .f ic

Get tys, R. A., Pholl'llc

Eanson, D. W., Pho~nc .

Asadoor ian, R., Pho:1l'I1c

F uU er , H . K ., Y 2eMitchell, L. I ., .Sp(X) 3c

Schlessinger, A. J., Slc

Scanlon, C. J., Sic

Gato, W. R., Sgt., AUS

Hanamura, G. R. , S/Sg'l;, AUS

Price, S . V. , Cpl. , AUS

III connection with preparation of this report, acknowledgment

is made to the Offi ce of the Chief of Naval Operati ons for publica-

tion arrangements ; to the Printing Division of the Executive Off ice

of the Secret:aI 'Y of t he Navy f O I " valuable techn ical adv ice andassistance in printing; to the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Depart -

ment, fo r a id in prepa ring ' man, ' d rawings and sketches ; and to the

War Department for making available photographic processing

mater ials and facilities.

PAGE iii



~. . .. . . .. . . .~

~

. . .~

~~. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . .: t :

:t~:t:

U . S . S!,aiegio Bombing Survey

Report ef Ship" Bombordmen! Surv,ey P.rty

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

FOREWORD, INTRODUCTION, CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL SUMMARY

ENCLOSURE (A); STUDY OF KA.\\fAlSHl AREA

ENCLOSURE (E): STUDY OF HAMAlI1ATSU AREA

ENCLOSURE (C): STUDY OF HITACHI AREA

ENCLOSURE (0); STUDY OF RAKODATE AREA

ENCLOSURE (E); STUDY OF MORORAN AREA

ENCLOSURE {F}: STUDY OF SHIMIZU AREA

ENCLOSURE (G); STUDY OFSHlONOMISAIU AREA

ENCLOSORE (H); STUDY OF I'mJIMA SAl{[ AREA

ENCLOSURE (I): COlVlMENTS AND DATA ON EFFECTIVENESS OF AiiIl \IUNITION

ENCLOSURE (J): COMll' IENTS AND DATA ON ACCURACY OF FIRfNGS

ENCLOSURE [K): EFFECT OF SURFACE BOl\ffiARDMENTS ON JAPA}.rESE WAR

POTENTIAL

PAG~ v



CONFIDeNTIAL. S. Slrategic8ombi"9 Su.~.y

Repor!of Ship. Bombardment Surveyh,ty

INTRODUCTION

Immediately fo llowing the end of host il it ies

the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and

Pacific Ocean Areas, commenced gathering data

and assembling personnel for evaluation of

naval surface bombardments of J apan by means

of f ield observations, In accordance with recom-

mendati ons of the Commaudel' -in"Chief and

Chief of Naval Opera tions a rrangements were

made for this study to be made by the U. S.

Strategic Bombing Survey .. The Ships' Born.

bardment SUl"ey Part y was formed and oper-a ted d ir ec tly unde r the Sen ior Nava l Member of

the U. S. Strategic Bombing Sun'e,Y.

Tbis repor t i s designed to cover in det ail all

res ults of ships' bornbardmen ts of Japan proper.

Eaeh enclosure of the report i s summarized inorder to make gener al r esul ts quick ly and eas ily

accessible. The great volume of detail has

been ineluded to make avai lable a ll factual da ta

gathered which might prove useful i n future

studies of naval bombardments of i ndustrial

ins ta ll at ions on shore , and in developments to

improve weapons and techn iques used in such

attacks.

PAG E yjj



. .. . .. . .. .- r -

~. . .. . .~

t

~

: c

t. . . .. . . .".

".. .".

I J ! I '

U,S , Slr • .Iegic Bombing Survey

Rep" r+ ,of Ship. ' Sombardmenl Survey Party

CONFIDE~mAL

CONCLUSIONS

Surface bornbardm eots of Japa 0 proper took

place shortly befcra the Japanese sur render . Iti s not probablethat the economic consequences

of these at taekl l wer e fe lt on the figh ting f ront s

befo r e th e wa I' ended, but there is evid s nee to

indicate that the attacks, in combination with

ether pressures being applied, had considerable

InHuence in lowering th e will to con tinue thewar of the local populations which were sub-

ieted t o gunfire from heavy ships,

Had th e wa t' continu ed, it is es tirnated that

about twenty-two per cent of total Japanese

pig iren production (which in the absence of

further attacks on the steel industry could

othe rwis e have been expected >Inthe ensuing

year) would have been lost because of the

effects of three attacks against pl ants o.f the

iron and steel industry, assuming that the con-dition of the Japanese economy at the time of

the attack continued throughout Blat year.

other surface bombardments appear to have

had l it tl e e ff ec t on the Japanese economic st ruc-

ture as a whole, except to the extent to which

th,ey centr ibuted to increased labor absenteeism

and red u ced labor pre d ue ti vity in the IIteasattacked.

This report demonst rates the v it al ro le which

intelligence informat ion plays in shore born-

bar dment, and the neces si ty fo r ma in tenanea of

an organ iza tion which , among other func tions.

is capable of Identifying key industries in the

enemy's wartime eeonomy, designating the

most vulnerable points of attacks, providing

detailed information on targets seleded for

as sa u l t, and asse ss ing r es uIts.

The Kamalsh l Works of J apan Ir on Company,

Ltd., as 11 result of two bombardments, Incur red

very considerable physical damage, and a 108s

of production equi valent to fromeigh t to twelvemonths' output. Yet no major building in this

],eavy industrial plant was destroyed because

the grea tes t concentration of hHs did nctei xceed

thl rtv-s even per 200 yard square, In the bom-

bardments genem]]y the density of hits was

much lower, pos slbty because of the techn ique

of aiming at different buildings scattered

throughout a target area, or intentionally

spreading the fall of shot to cover an ent ire

target, under the assumption that both aeeur-

acy of f ring and e ffect ivenes s ofamm uni tion

would be greater than t hey actuall y proved tobe, Data en the effectiveness of projectiles in

Enclosure (I) indicate that about forty-two

direct Ilits by sixteen-inch high capacity pro-

ict iles would be required to cause fifty per

cent st ructura l damage to a heavy stee l-framed

building approximately 600 feet long and 150

feet wide. It is concluded that doctrine and

techniques. for attacking industrial targets withsh ips can be conside rably improved by furthe r

st u dy bas e d. Oil rea ppraisal s of weapon effec-

t iveness andaccuracy of firing under varying

conditions, It also appears th a t, although Ieng

and medium range attacks by both da,yand

night can infl ic t conside rable damage, dest ruc-

t ion of p lant s of hel lvy indush 'Y bysuch a tt acks

is not to be expected unless either a very large

amount of ammunition is allotted to the task

or muchgreater accuracy i s obtained. Experi-

ence has shown that it is possible to raise the

l evel of accuracy at theexpense of increasing

the hazard to the firing ships by using shorter

ranges and prolonging firing periods. The ex-

ten t to IVWeh these measu res can be adop ted

will therefore usually be governed by the broad

s tra teg ic a sp ects of th e war as we]] as th e Im-

mediate tact ica l si tuation.

The Ramamatsl l and HH:a ,ehia reas were sub-

jected to hi gh explosi ve and incendiary bomb-

ing as well as to surface bombardment, andstudy of these areas th us permit ted a ce rt aln

degree of compari son of the re la tive e l'Eect ive-

ness of these forms of attack, Because of tile

highly combustible nature of the majority of

the tar get s, I lre s ini ti at ed by incendjm'Y bomb-

ing clearly caused the greatea t amoun t of dam-age. Although a considerable number of fil,{!S

was associated with high exp losive bombing

and gllnfil'f! there were many instances in whichdetonat ion of h igh explos ives defini te ly d id not

in] tiate fires di rectly, even when occurring in

struetures of light wood and paper construction.

it therefore seems probable that, in generat

PAGE I



U. s. S t ,a t eg i c B omb in g Su r ve y

Repor lol S~ips' Bomb" r dmen t SolVey p.•rty

tires initiated by high explosives were caused

b:\' overturning of cooking fi res. st riking of

VQ IIItiIe and inflammabl e liquids or gases , short

clreui ts, etc. Itappear s tha t development of

major ca libe r incendiar y ammuni tion i s war-ranted, and is a n eeessi ty if sh ips are to be

used. :in the future for large scale bombardment

of industrial piant s Or urban a reas.

Its concluded that high explosive projectiles

or bombs are most efficiently used when di-

rected agains t t arget s which ar e h ighly r es ist -

an t eo burn ing. Ag-a inst heavy s teel -framed

butldinga, individual 2,000 pound bombs seem

to be approxima tel :\ ' eigh t t imes as e !fect ive

as s ixteen-ineh high capacity projectiles in pro-

du cing damage when mean a reas of e ffect ive-

nessare compared. Ser ious f ragmen t damage

f rom bombs seems to be conf ined largely to the

immediate vicinity of each hit, while the heavy

f ragments from pro jec ti le s proved capable ofdamaging machines at considerable distances.

Both missiles showed themsel Vel; to be capable

of damaging the heaviest types of industrial

structures. Choice of weapon against suchtarget s. would seem to be governed largely by

deciding whether, in specific circumstances, suf-

PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

l le ient hits can most easily be delivered by ships

or p i noes, and wei ghing the rela t i v e t:is k ~n-

vnIved. Since repor ts of gunnery exerCIses 10-

dicate that at least ninety per cent of hits on

ind iv idua l l arge bui ld ings i s to be expaeted atshort ranges, as compared to an average of

somethi ng legs th lUI 0n e per cent in these

bombardmen ts,i t i s appa rent tha t th i s type of

attackcan be devas tating with great economy

of ammunition and effor t when cireurnstances

permit its use. It is of COU1 ·5O evident that,

considering the enemy economy as a whele, only

II sma ll percen tage of impor tant t arget s will

u s u a l t y be wi thin reach of IItack by sh i ps.

'The damaging cf feet of indiviiiualeigh t-ine h

ani! smaller "pl"ojctiles appears to be roo smallto maH e thelr use prOTIable aga ins t plant s of

heavy industry unless a very great number of

i ll ts cn iad iv idual bui ldings can be obtain ed , o r

unless harassment and not destruction i s thel'I1MJ t desi:red. Incendiary arumunit<ion in the

sma ller ca libe rs , however , should produce r e-

sults comparable to those obtained by incendi-

ary bombing, if used aga inst u r ban a reascr

other inflammable targets.

~. . . .. . .~. . . .. . . .. . . .

. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .~. . . .. . .~. . . .

. .~~

CONFIDENTIAL. S. SlrategieBombin.g· Survey

Reper ! o f Ship,' Bembar·dme.nl Survey P.rty

GENERAL SmfMARY

Units of the Thinl Fleet attacked selected

targets. with gunfi re in the ar eas of Karnaiah i,

Hamamatsn , Hitachi , MU1·oran, Sh imizu . Sh i-

enomisaki and Nojima Saki . The primary task

of the first fOUl· named a ttacks was bombard-

men t, and tl,e principal compo n e nts of tag k

units which executed them were, in general,

fast battleships and heavy cruisers. Attacks on

Shimizu, Shionomisaki and Nojima Saki were

secondary tasks car ried out during anti-ship-

'Ping sweeps. They were accomplished" by light

cruisers and destroyers except that the bom-

bardment of Shimizu was eJ:ecuted by destroy-

ers only.

The general mission ass igned to the attacking

units by Commander Third Fleet was to bom-

bard certain vital areas of Japanese malnland

in order to des troy v ital indust ri es , demora li ze

transport ation, and l ower t he will to resist ofthe Japanese people.

Karnaishi, Muroran and Nojima Saki were

not a tt acked by ai rel lCcep t by cover ing and

spot ting p lanes accompanying fi ring sh ips, and

at MU1·01"anby cer tain car rier planes engaged

primarily in a strike on snipping in Tsugaru

S trai ts, 0 ther areas vis ited by th i s su rvey party

were subj ected to maj or a il : atta cks as well as

sur faee bombardment, making it necessary tostudy a ll damage to sh ips' t arget s in these a reas

in order to differentiate damage caused by

bombing and gunfire,

At Hitachi and Hamamatsu British task

un it s took p ll l·t in the bombardments but ope r-

abed independently. HMS NEWFOUNDLAND

and HMNZS GAMBIA participated in the sec-

ond bombardment of Kamaishi.

Carrier planes attacked the Hakodata-Aornoni

railway fer ry system 14-15 July, 1911.5.Because

no other nava l uni t o f the Survey was scheduled

to visit Hakodate, t hi s. survey party studied

the e lf·ect o f these s trike s, a lthough ships' gun-

fire played 110 part in them.

The two bombardments of Kamaishi caused

damage which , aecor ding to Japanese offi cial s,

would have required repairs costing about s ixty-

f ive pel"cent of the total . value of physical assets

to r es to re the p lant to i ts p re- at tack condit ion.

Had the Japanese. "planned to continue full scale

prod uct ion i t i ll estimat ed that the equivalen t

of rromeigh t to twelve months' p roduct ion a t

the pre-attack rate would have been lost, be-

c a . use of th e cornbin ed elf,ects of gu n fire and

the crit i cal condi tion of th e .Japan ese economy.

Fi res ini ti at ed by gunfi re extensive ly damaged

the town of Karnai sh i. Re frlge ra ti cn p lant s and

other facilities of the considerable fishing in-

dustry there were destroyed by these fin's.

Widespread damage had been infl lc ted on. the

Hamamatsu nell: by ail " attacks pri or to thesurface bombardment, Gunii.re damaged surviv-

ing' buiIdings. and. equipman t of t he ImperialGovernment Railway Hamamatsu Locomotive

WOl:kS and inca paei ta ted tills el emen t of tile

transport ation system for about three months .

Projectiles :falling in tb.e ra ilway yards caused

interruption of through traffic on the Tokaidomain line forabout t hree days. Slight damage

was also 'inflicted on plants of the Japan "Musical

Instrument Manufacturing Company, Asano

Heavy Industr ial Company, Suzuki Loom Comp-

any, Ltd., Nakajima Airplane Company, Ltd ..

and al l a naval barr acks . . Damage to dwellings,gas, electrical and telephone facilities, and

wa. te r works , al ready extensive thr ough a ir a t-

tacks, was considerably augmented by gunfire .

In Hitachi the Kaigan Plant, which was the

largest plant and head office of the Hitachi

Works of the Hitachi Manufacturing Company,

had been heavily damaged by a B-29 high ex-

plosives' a ttack prior to surface bombardment,

Itwas the re fo re not I[ target for gunfire , Ships '

gunfire moderately damaged the Taga Works

and Mito Works of Hitachi Manufacturing

Company and slightly damaged Yamate Plant

of the Hitachi WOl".ksof Hitachi :NLanuiac.turing

Company and the copper refining section of

Hitaehi Mine. In addition, projectiles, falling in

the urban ar ea caused cons ider ab le damage tohousing and to telephone, power, water and

gas facilities. However, the most extensive

damage In tills urban area was caused by a

B-29 incend ia ry at tack which took place about

one day aftar th e s urface bornba rdment, an d

destroyed 01 " damaged about s even ty-e ight per

cen t of the buil t-u p area, Some Japanese offi -

PAGE 3



U, S,Str.logic Bombing Survey

Report 01 S~ip" Bomb.. dmonl Surv. y Par ty

c ial s conside red tha t the eff ec tiveness of the

inceod ia ry a ttack was increased by the surface

bombardment, because many persons who had

fled from the eitv were no available to fightfires, These of fi~ial s wer e impress ed by this

apparent coordination between our sur face and

air forces.

Targets for surface bombardrnent in the

Muroran a rea were the \Vanish i I ron Works of

Japan Iron Company, Ltd, and the Muroran

Work of Japan Steel Company. Ltd. It ise st imated tha t, had the war continued, damage

inflicted on the former target would have re-

sulted in 10 of production equivalent to about

two and one half months' output of coke, and a

sligh tIl' smaller loss of pig iron, Loss in pro-

duction at the latter target attributable toe ffect s o f bombardment can be roundly tated

as about fo rty per cent o f one month 's output .

10 the eity, damage by gunfire interrup ted rail-way service for three days, and double track

service was not res tored for 'five days . The c ity

water supply was disrupted for about one week,

elect ri c power supp ly for abou t two days, and

damage to the telephone system required about

two months for repair. Itwas reported bl' theJapanese that a total of 2,541 houses was de-

stroyed or damaged. Carner planes had pre-

viou Iy sunk severa l sh ips fa the har bor, dam-

aged a shipyard, and destroyed the only fish

refrigerating plant in the city,

The Shimizu areas had suffered heavily f rom

air attacks prior to bombardment b." destroy-

ers . Gunfire caused slight damage to the Slum-izu Works of the Japan Light Met.'l.LsCompany,

Ltd" to the himizu Works of the Honen OilCompany, L td" and in the urban ana increasedexi st ing damage to telephone and power sys-

tems, Japana e officials reported that a totalof 118 buildings were destroyed or damaged bygunfire,

Targets in the Shionomisaki area were aseaplane base , emergency a irAeld and radiostatinn, and were til-ed on by light ~ruil!ers and

destroyers. S light damage inf licted Onthe sea-

plane base did not affect its operation, Only

one sma ll s tructure and no planes were on theai rfi eld, which was l ight !y h it and rece ived no

sign ifi can t damage. The r ad io stat ion was not

P AG E 4

CONFIDENTIAL

hit, This region consisted largely of open f ields

and hills . Two small vil lages were Dot targets.

Damage to buildings was limited to about seven

destroyed and IIfew others damaged. An inter-e st ing inc iden t in thi s a rea was the finding of

a pattern of U, S, aer ial mines in a field about

one mile from the sea,

A radar station on the crest of a ridge behind

Nojima Saki Lighthcuse, fired on by light

cruisers, was uot hit. Fall of shot was prin-

cil>allyin rice paddies and in a small village

between the radar stat ion and the l ighthouse ,

In thevill.age twenty-two of a total of 180

houses were r eported dest royed or damaged.

Telephone and power service were inter rupted

for a short period.

In the Hakcdate-Aomori area the carrier

p lane st rike on the rai lway fe rry system proved

to have been most effective. Of twelve railway

fe rri es eigh t were sunk, two wer e beached andflooded , and two unde r repai r were damaged.

Thus all railway ferries were inoperable Im-

mediately following this strike. Of 272 sma ll

muter sailers engaged in transporting coal be-

tween Hakodate and Aomor i 149 were repor ted

sunk or damaged. In addition ten steel cargo

ships were reported sunk and seven damaged,

It is estimated that tile most important im-media te eff ec t o f the st rike WaSa reduct ion in

monthly coal shipments between Hokkaido and

Honsh U of at least 115,000 and probably 160,000

metric tons, Inthe city of Hakcdate 397 houses

were reported destroyed in a liI'e initiated bybombs, and n few other structures were dam,

aged, Water power , telephone and transpor-

tation facil it ies were not s ignificantly affected.

Effectiveness of ammunition, calculated from

data in this report, indicates that the a vel'age

amount of structural damage caused by a six-

teen-inch high capacity IlrojecL;1 llit is about

1,400 square feet in heavy steel framed bui l d-

ings, and about 3,200 square feet in wooden

~tructul'~S, Co rr'esponding figure s fo r eigh t-

inch projectiles are about ZEro SqUIIl'!l' f ee t and

400 square feet. 'L'll e equh'alent f igure fo "

heavy steel frame buildings calculated in the

same m.IIn.nel'for the averag 2 ,000 pound GP

bomb h'~ 18 8,800 square feet. The mean area

of e,ffe~tlVeneS8of I I s ixteen-i ller , high capacitypro ject il e fo r s er ious damage (des troyed p lus

. . .. . . .

. . . . .. . .

U , S . Str~togic BDmb ing Su r v ey

Report of Ship. Bomb4rdmcnt Survey P4r ty

CONFIDENTIAL

heavy damage) against machi ne tools is 4,900

square feet as contrasted to 8,500 square feet

fo r H 1,000 pound bomb.

'I'wenty-seven targets consist ing of ind usti-ial

plants 01' housing a reas were fi red on by heavyships. Of these twenty-two were hit. In day-

light Brings by bat tl esh ips the size of the aver -

age target was about 1.5 million square yards,

or 39.6 of the 200 ym'd squares used on born-

bardment charts. The average percentage of

shot s fi red which fe ll wi th in target boundaries

was 24.9, at an average range 0 28,300 yards,

The approximate average error of the mean

point of impact of shots directed at all targets

during daylight was 249 yards in range and 209

yards in deflection, During night firings by

bat tl esh ips, a t an average range of 24 ,740 yards

and against targets averaging half a million

square yards or 14,8 200 yard squares in size,

the average percentage of bits obtained was

21.6 and the average error of mean point 0' £impact was 280 yards in range and 468 yards

in deflection, The average accuracy of heavy

cruiser firings was slightly less than the aver-

age accuracy obtained by battleships .

The greates t effect of sur face bombardments

on Japanese war potent ial re su lt ed from t lu 'ee

attacks upon two iron and steel works. Itis

e st ima ted that these a tt acks would have caused

a production loss of about 220,000 tons of pig

iron during the year following the attacks, had

the war con tinued under economic condit ions

existing' at the time of the attacks, This Quan-

tity of pig iron is about twenty-two per cent

of the total Japanese production which would

otherwise have been expected in that period,

assuming no further attacks on these plants.

Resu lt s o f bombardments of armament p lant s,

and factories of the electrical, aircrafb, non-

ferrous metals and machine tool industries

were of substantially less significance to the

Japanese economy as a who le .Interrogations Seemed to indicate that even

city and plant officials knew little of what

was transpiring away from their own local-

i ti es . For thi s reason surface bombardments

caused people to wonder what had happened

to their own ships and plane, and with the

realization that 0111 ' ships could approach the

shores of Japan with impunity they knew

with certainty that the progress of the war

was even more unfavorable than they had

suspected. People who had b en subjected

to both major bombing and gunfire in va ri-

ably stated, sometimes without being ques-

tioned, that gunf ir e was more terr ify ing thanei ther HE or incend ia ry bombing , WIlen asked

why they were of this opinion the most

common answer was that there was normally

ample warning before major air attacks, and

the duration of the danger could he judged by

the arriva l and depar tur e of the planes . Surface

bombardments , however , usually came without

warning, the fan of projectiles was more pro-

longed, and people were perplexed and confused

by tile UnCerL'l. inty of where the attack was

coming fr om and how long they would be forced

to endure it . .Although due allowance must be

made for the well known propensity of the

Japanese to provide the answer which they

think an interrogator desi re s, tatements at-

t ributed to them above l ir e consi st ent with. thetenor of statements made to interrogators by

prisoners of war who had undergone bo h

born bin g and gunfire a ttacks in th II Cen tral

Pacific island campaigns, and appear to have

cons iderable bas is in fact ,

This survey party visited Kamal hi, Muroran

and Hakoda te ea rly in October 194';;. In these

localities fear on the part of the inhabitants

was vel'y noticeable, This was particularly

evident a t Muroran, which this par ty vis ited

before arr ival o f the occupation troops, where

women and girls remained in hiding until the

party had been there several day .

In northe rn Japan the ma jori ty of o lder OO}'S

and young men maintained an attitude of aloof

bu t passive . an tipathy , When the party reached

Hamamatsu in the south, this feeling, if it ever

existed in Hamarna tsu, had changed to an ap-

pearance of universal interest and se mingfriendliness,

City and plant officials ever"J'where made

every ef fo r~ to provide and an ticipate requ ire-

ments of the Survey, and in some instances

worked all night to produce needed data. Oc -

casional ly i t was d iffi cul t to conv ince them tha t

the party could not accept gifts Ill" at tend en-

tertainmen ts. The cooperation and in terest

which they d isp layed was part icu la rly sur pr is-

lng in view of the damage which had been

inflicted on thelr establishments,

PAGE S



U. s. Sirol "9i ~ .Bombi"9 5 Uf'.Y

Repor t 01 S h ip " B om b. r dm . n ! S " rv ey P a rt y

CONFIDENTIAL

.LIST OF REPOftTS

OF

UNITED STA:TES STRATEGIC .BOMBING SURVEY

European War

T~ I:! ran_G«[Il~ Uilt a1 . !..I.dIn I ': .i . . MbIQU T lQ I (j If ~ I2Il .....dH I) ( B t >Y l. i dr. ur f t~ rn th.. (~m\1UL II;C:n' I I! ! I . R. .po.lU nu;mb;u. 1

i ! ! _ , &.lid : ! : I 1I!a.JL : t : . ~ l M. u~ . .. e d ' ram U: I~ SUl)llririlemflllu Q r ,D(K;I",I,~m~UI. GOVoRmmUl L Prl fl t . . in. i I I : ' 0111ee, W"l .b1 ft , ino~ . D . c. PC!:i"ItIo~·lIiQ1] '0 ~ l! l ll . .b .~ l i I! ml l1 l: 1. in t: Nt lO ru m. .y ib~ b.d b y w rlU"1i l'Q t l J i I ! ! ' Mllldq ..... r J' 1 or th~ S\lr"Vt)" : GtlI .wl!Ur Point-. WuhiJl8"-to '!!:!. D. 0.

1 TtJ~ tJrlilted :S"'&U!!!O Stn I.rJd.:: Bo~ 11~ SI. l ",oI !!y~ SLJ .m.m.a r: rR:.(IOr (E.urc!l)iI!G. W ILI"I

Tl!, . . Ul:lrleo;l, SatH Strlli.ll ;itf~ &mbllllR" Su l"f t: J" : O . . ..e r- .l lR lf 1on . ~EL N ~1 I Wu ~

:!i Tho R ffoct.. a.r Sln.t8 jlk Bombnll !: 1 , 1 ; !J lllil= Ge:rmIlr.JWI:rEcGJII!J!!1,-

AIR,CR~-FT0 I " ' ~ [ O . " I i i( B " . D h l '. I aU ! : n . . 1 : 1 . 1 1B : r iu I .d l .l

.A!rll;.-.U. iD-j. .g!o~ b:idy.f l7 R4!port

I . ~ ~I V!.&iLI to vutQU T~t (Sl) da R DOr )

"I"'~m.~ 1 B . . . . . . . . .ct!

JUn~1"II ~1n;:T'..rt !Lnd A o w co E n ~n C !: Wo.ro_, Ieu: ..u. GI!.nflllIl. n,:v:8,.1. M,uc.b!fi~lIWlrl!;~G 11 'b U HlI!!itubJid·,. Glirm.alll :rA II C M.Do..Icl!I.'l .cJfDb.u. r: m :p H. I .. ei l l si ;l [ {MMh' IJ }.

Gum.lU!Ii Gotb ..~ W i id 6r .. , . .. brlk,. A O. (;OthlL. Glin:aan,f

10 Foc),;! ! WuLf A l r t= l "B . . . P I _ EI",moR[I~G~rJ1:I~n:y

{

onr••t i Il ! II~nJ I M~.: .Hntr~l1 A C. P.rt A

If.Ilgbl,l:,1i::. G.nn.u;r P.. rt. AA pl )e ~ dI [ " 1C 'J I 1 n. 1]:.1

l! Domlll!l W[t~q. Fl'iedriCob:tl:LaI-l!b .i; .MUlIll;br (JqrQ1IUl

l ll : G II !! -d l. ar d F t ~l Il ll lr W . . rk e G [] 11 . H. Kqllil:l,. GII.D"IY

1 4 W 1 li :1 I 1I !! _! '" .N1!lI:ul~';t4r Fhl;;=lll!!-ll:lt"li"lit"k.o-. WE.,nl l l l ' Neu.II:t.lldt.A"WI .

"o;h;io : f ! ~ -e-o Bnllu.h

Ii) B.. .. .. .nl l .N~C F1ugrnct.l;ir:tR-'WU'u C. [J b If. Brunl(w:I~k.Gv!Y1anJ'

I iii M.ltc-.t-D :uwc:h!!:rd D·~J"II:.n."G1k-liG m b H. T".l!II:b!l" G"rn.III$IT RIIVlr .1J Mo-t.Q1'w.ol"t:. i [f .. . :E:iac-CllI.cb. I I : DLl r~bc f . .G l ll rm:an" .LS e a .. f "o ! :t ' l& o C "b ~ MlI!-tOJ"ll!:I:I !Iuik.ii / f . . G ( BM W) iM lin llt!b. (ill!!:rm.n:v1Ii HII!!:r.ialtl:!oI!lF 'l a I f l 0 t Cen.III".rrkll:.~M!I. Ce:rnt..I i ,1

U h : ' I 1 :l . k . . 1 I " orb

t ? ; ~ U ~ ~ ' G ' : :m U ; ; ,. 1n d [It., I ,~ : ~ ~ h . A ~ ~ ~ ~ L : f D:1 Verll:in.i&!1,! ! DI!!lItIdill:" MIt,.slrerkli. l1Lht .,I l -dm. G~~mlLll:r!:! M~... HII"~Iilb.~h:&t!:. ' t :O m .. ! H . ~ :t n: IR ._ r. . .rm.llilllJ""! i Ii Ah .lm . r [ l ll o Jml "Uk. C rc b : Fi . _ P [ I LT .I h ~l I. Z . J!it~lIrr-R!d, ~rmU.Y

!04 £ilibJ'LJlld.er Clllillll G ill b ,H. "udwl~b.n!oIf.n. Cillrm ..n.,.~, LLH.ldll.fI"b..q ZIII"P]MIIII I a m b H. F rf_. ..~ It=b !l lhd~11 OJi

BlKJIiI:l.Jl~ (l!Ir!1l.,n:y

: ! I ! I Wfol.rln~ W.r_rh A G . U he , - G 1 !F " D I " ' ! l ; ; r

:!~ Rlld!Jlph. R . ii .u l ~n b . .~l"! L I" 1. :: b 1 :f !l ~l II II Ki uR re J~ _ S o ll l1 ~:r:I.

OIlFCIIIA[J.:riUI Lhn .. .wc lk . VUl!in. li ti 4 Ahlmll ll . ..11Iw.l k. A n. Lu~n"l1.

Ci!rtl:l"I]:T29 V~- rl tl rL [l t . . . . 1 l .aub;~h ll l MI II tJ aU. . r ke . H IH lt1" rT ll~' !" lm, G l: rm.[ I- 1i I { Io ~U~CloI ! . t " MII I \1 II ,n. . . r k .. A O. DLlr.!!.tI W~t.. il.tI.--.Bi!rl[n If

W.SI: I . . O l r m . . lJJ'

.tn~ mJU i2: U I V IS l O :' li

: ~ l ~~~~ [ ,~M: :~ " ' J t: r n!~ :r t E~e .c t . . l 0 ' Ar! ! :i& lJo roMn fC (J: t I.I .mburg.

M A DII I l ..UI i i. .I !hud.J' Q-' 01111 EJ ' ' I' e l! :t . I .:.f Al'II!!ii BambLI]:JjI:W_l.!~~rt.al

i J o l i {I D~~~~:r! S 'l .: ~d7 0 ' tb~ ~r:rfttol cf A . ~ . RcmMnK

U .1\ 1:J...u.1l, ,1, j: : S t L . l . d : r of "h oi ! ! E l IT -r t 't l -Df A, III Bombli.ir:Soi1rLlI,..n

loll It. ~~l:I! lI!!~dStl;!d,. .,t t b._ . EI i!!~t.. (If A>n !).ombinlol;

' 07 A D ~~ ~l ~~ 1. StLJ .1b' jJf lt l... ~ f " c : 1 oCr Al'U &mbiJ1,1{ oCIlI

: I I " A L..~:~~~t llJy 1 ; 1 0 ' tbll!! Ejifl ii '!:t l l l or Araill. Bambhil:IJ on

Iv A IjrEIII. !!i itud,,. 0 L b ii ! E ': 1 t1 b ! :L 1 ( d A.rer BtJ.rnMI"!,Il 6 r .1 R I tI ' Il I I •

. A ,o . lb l ,l l " • • f1Q~_b[;lm. l...:!I~ld~. RI I Jr . . . .n. J iOot"tI"!"l l lnd.-Oboll.h..U~I!I1. &1~"·!.I!_nru~t. ,iilnd [lr!m:lli!lII

P AG E 6

CI~'_.lA; .i OEr n" iSR 1 )[ \ lS1O:"I I

an GI. i ~h LI1 I)d o Dh·lIlon-Fi[:j:l!,l ~~t n " t

-'1.1 C:'01':'i ;" r1_"" ""~d R O-H

4'! Bonn f 1ald Fh: lJori4::!i, 'lI .11noV\1!1' " 1 - ' 1 I : 1 ! . : I , ~R~'IDtt

:~ ::d~ld:.I :~~~~~eW':I~;;tVQ-[..Tu~: 'Viii . u,.Ii . A.uBiII!;)l;Irl!: Pill l l-d r-r( ' ln ..t. . 7 1 1- : ! H' pt .lD I Ant .B I II I n lil!!,v.rln. 'e " t t fY

48- G~r;r.IIlLn EII!H::t.~~,I!d El"jl,!:lllmlllnt In~uIfL") 1l1ll~~l. .. ) B row n BO,"lln, -!l i t ChI. Mannhem,Ksr"I"!.III. G(tnii.nn~

~~ O]J tl~.1~r~~~~·~I'::~I::i'~~l;u:;;~~l~cd:UE~:;~~I~~

&.1 T ibe Ge.rmfLn AbrIBIIJ..e Indu~tri !!2 MiI . f~ t" .n-d S'chml1:H. OlJcnbflll~h CI"hM:l!lilli. C~mmny

I~IItl.F,~I~llolll UIIII.1ull

lilt 'fll@ GII!!.fm.!ltl A,nU.Prl ~ll(ll"!! 'B'!:J!,!"'Enl;:s lnd UIITY

M "_~_~~" 'T - h n~1!i!,~h.

'101 M:II.t=bll:lll! ! ' Tool. & ~.!L~h.lfi '!;ry En c.[I Ib.1 EiluIJlmi.!n~.s Iii i!!la~h.ln~ ToilIoQlIr..-U.....~I.) I" ( ;jr ;:Ir rr I&nyI i - 6 - H~rm.H.n . K - fl l lI - 0 1 ; 1 "_ . CglgJ(".11I!. Gormnny1ii7 Gon~ ; u'. d ~ ii: alh . • .nJ, Orhmb.l liM, O(! rmll.nyl iB N - II I~ t li i , U r. IQ I 1! . fuIJKJg.rt. on Millin, GlI!!rm_il_l:If

MI[ , t IAH, ; M"I I ,LVSI: ii , D I\ l l .5LO,N

5 11 T b Il= 1 q r & L of thi!i GII!!_r"mll.nA! ["f.g.r l l :( tIHI· V.'WC~lJOflli '(GroutJ.o-w) e.• 'mtl~lg :nIl.l AI r FOlc l ll R . .,c flf 0 ~t".II!tlcfi

i ! i i " Z W~l !I t! i. r F .C t .o .NI I t l CO_h\bll!.t BomI;.,IIrdml!lIIl 01 oyl U -QJI . n

t.b" E;I]opH.rI. Tl~i!lIIt~sa: Bo OJ bl.~.. AClCurRej, OS. i\ j \ P F tc :! !Vy -Bind M~dlulI"! Oomblll l l I

111tb!! ETO- a ; " , On ~rillUon . : : I f RAP BD I " !1 ! ;t . IQ j ( f

II;tOU~\l:E .i)1,\ 'H'IO,"I,]

M~ui~..l Br.n!!'"

ali Tha E - .l I ( !- t :t . o r . D!pmli!:n;IC t 1 HII!~IU"! lind M!I!dlc!J1 ( l'a nj l i nOlr . rnl . l l)

~UNn-.II)NS nltlg!o ....

11"I!!"O":r In.d:u~lrf l! .! 'lF1l~1.

o I _ j I ! i i Th.iI!!C:okln;it I n~ I II LI f H :@" ioO rl .g r GIUIIl ii .tl lfJ CGtJ [ i l l : PlAnt. !1!IIpo-l:1. No. l. S~IIII:iL._Ini l A . n . G ., &: n. Q . i ! ! G\lul l o-ffllun~h.glll..,_te, ObI!!~hl!,ul,ll l. C(I.rM!Ln,yCi I) jo1r ill !!,dr ll l !h~AIhil l" J IIIt"t- l!. Rb I!hdl&UH.I OIlll"[fI1II0 Y

' T i l N..q[lldleb-e~ EEiiQnwerk~ A. G. N"eutlkl";h!n, ,OIr .mlI ,Y

g rt l l lc:.b.~_r,l .: i!: "HUffiIUHI GOQr A O. ,Ir.nll!ndll~r. C:;1[II '. '1III l . I:I.Y

13 ~:~;t;r~bT~r~~tt 1IU6~1~~~ktll;k '~[:~~I'~I!;I~I'C':~~IkI:lY~~ g'~~~~llIlAdC~Up~~~~~~LrGlInr::!~![; A (. Dorhn U.nLl.GI!rnu ny

' I 'G n 0 a . ~ ~ : : ~ yO)llirn ('\ 1(11" C.UI;ill.llll1lr,lIIbdl.;lI.Utlll A !;. J)Dt=hl~m,

' L J I ~! I ' t l

"'.~,

""..~lot1 0 1 ) 2

I.'10"

' O S" " ,Il?

l O .

'" ".11

U~U j:

U4U.[)

" .L17

~ 1 1 1 : 1

. . . '"l:!C

I~. . l:!2. . l~S

l " : : ! i A. . 12ii. . 126;

~l~il2s1 2 .

~ ':i~. . . ",Ht!

~ U:l

wi! ' 1,:)4

~

~

InUf)

. _ .. , . .

u. S . S ', ~' eg i e B om b' in g ' S u rv ey

Repor t of Sh i p, ' B om b .r dm en l Survey Par ty

:!ii~Lr:II.II '\[1I.1loBnlll,.,b

( - " L " :$u bmIl.I 'L[l III ' 1 n r l U; l U 'V R . 1 !l 1 ,( u ·t

M.~I lit.,·lIIur-!ltJ.r]k A'I.I;l(ilbui. lrr,Numb~rJ{ 1\ G, A u if,.lllhllril.G-r"rlTl-l!ln.)

1~I~hm ! ! I ll r l Vol i l l i S.h 'm l 'A .t ' c ll l i ; " ' I ' ! ! r n b u . . _. GI!IJ'iylnn_"I h: :I " . . lCho....~L " ' k ! l ! i It. C. KllI!l, n i l ] r,mfl,o;yDC,tnhl!!: s~blrr und "M.ii.II; :1-!lnICQh.l:!l 'l l . Bremen. GOrTTll ln,),Pr-1,~dll.;::h KlnpfJ r:oIj-_rTn.i!!~I.w-!!!r"U• Kil!], (ico.r-mJlln,),

JIowlu dlliWlirlc"ll A . G " l il !mbu~, G(t rmJlJl .)Subm.~lIn!l! / I o n . . AC : : l T I b l y : S ] ll ~ ~ 'a r . f ' a_ . I '" C ' . G e r" r .I : I. I Ii . ll f

B~l I I l! r Vulki it il . V IQ~~8! lulk. G ll l r:ml lny

Unlm.ll!r.!i P" iii~h

O~dn IHI ee 1 1 ' 1 d U I I Y R .o I~ g. r

f~r5~dt!h. J i ; : I"IJ 1I11 t;rl~lIgjllW(tr.ke A G. MIl"dei :mr" . G'!!r:rnll!1o.Yl lb.:!humll!.r "\i~r4:[1]:!"i l l ll" Gl;ulIt:IItJ lffLbr lk IllUon A G. Bcehum,

r.lJrm.n),

]hQIII::"lJl "[lU ~hn. ~."nlil!l. GermanyJt.I;"lti_tnot ...I~lJor,lIIg, Dmr..Bo!!d( i lr . G f !- l n I I J ) '

fh: ~Jnlll,nn (ioll!rlngo W (!rli:e. BffiUn;(!.::hw~i~. H i l . 1 I 1 I ! -[ iJur'. C ~ r ~

man,).HuJ n G'H'l"rA~b e M iU . (' :b I n (! ;_ 1 :1 a u , f hi .: r i( l . .. .g-t". G-e:P"ii I! ! I!J"1O!..l.l .t:n.bI,.abr lk Frhjdt!:eb K"UP , :&!.IIIJ"!. G"-tl I 'i i:Ll lny

OIL DIVISfO,"i

OJ! DI IM' IDO "F1nn] RC'lJbm.

01 t O i l S 'L o [l F 1 I1 II II 1 ,R.lipo n, A rlj)~:lid l !l !J.i.gwdo.r . ElILploliLv lI!lI. Sl)( !oi!:.~. r ' RI ) : k ! . I I !ll.fld J G I . . . . PIIq ~...,I1""[1l:!1.wnr GiIb~.!I'.M [ld Smth j \, ! :! t ! •MI :nT !\ l "d . .! nlll~1(jI11.# l)

Um.!( !J l[Iotmd .lifl ld DL!,) IoCl"...I!.I.,..tni1.. Ii i r:rc~U! (!ii!!!"~.mIlS'I'Iio(l, G'~r:mlu' on InduHtr-.) '. MI~!.nl,,-OrT!L1 nl!:lpl~":" ' t- @A m 7 19M I [lllItedal R.ci)C ~t ........Ch 1:;[11.111:-1111

AnH[I-r:i_[drwlf!i-ilti!i MIIHlilllblJ1:}r fI m b H . loc-LJr.I Germl!l.n~- : : f i . I) IU; t ld i r ( l1l !

B llu[lkl)h(!: I il! ! lI :P:ln A G. :I:;II t,,;.u.mJ Bcbfen, a(!:rmlLn~W _! !t i ' ' '~ !II ,n A G '. LUlh:kl!!ndo". G!!lmll.n~LudwlJ::!!hllr ltl ...~OJ,PIL. '!,,ork.J 00 [ C Fti.rbl!nllldu!IItr.eo i\ G,

l, .;..! '! Iwtj;r.ll hlfilln. Gc-nonan;r

011 n~"IiII..;;Rubr(Hj1 l fydr-g. ....II!.Il .!,lgl l 1?hmt,. Rcti;J:OI~~&}".IiJ'mlllonJ', V-flLt. V!:,I_ u"

RJ'INL ,n- -Oilo!-llg M,.Inl:lr-lll.i:I;K!I""erkli! A £:, Hfl.jbu~j{ Rf! '(I"I" r } •

fIoIIIm.u~.If, G!:!rmn.~Rh"l i I fI . nn ll . l . OA l lK" M~n(!LlI.loawil!r~e A G. c.["4I~~r.f."J"k Rdlhlll.ty.

)1unbUI'I l . Cc-nn;\D)lth ~nlLni.g. Ollu,lf MIr .I (! -_ t1 \IQ~ !wMl r. : A , t1. W!Ih l l: " tmll l~ u~1I"IhFl[le.ry. HIiJ 1buTj1,.Ul!rMli_lll"

6~w lI l k IL~h " t VI t= "l ,Q-t " . CUl l lOr t. -: l ;t i il l~ -= I. O IQ:nTl lI I ll ,) r VoJ . I&' : Vj)I. Ir

.EurQ-IIIi!"lru~h.j} ' fnn I t . tm_.: : :-eru i i . 1 . ) TJ'nn,!I([HlI1. A G. 1:1 Ikm bu;r~.G~jMIlr..:r

Ellanc A I fl lt i .nh. \V o I ; l '! , " 'I ( Q ~ \ G. 1iJli r-b IJ rJC l ~I 3 0uy. Ham tJ.ur~.G~;fr !II!1)

Met.!"u..:=(ik R bc - 1 "o U 5 R 1 S) , n' l .i : l! ! lt i !! 0 ' ] 1, PI:III.[Il-,lftl. ! '&'"pt. 11

illIhiul" IJ:n,lIIrJ1

Deu ll li t= he 0 L l t ll lb p G lIMm1 Co. , J :l lI .n l! l. u o n M~! n " G~ rm tm~Gi:mtfnll!nlkl l3umi1W(I"~~. HII!.DOII!JI. GI!I"J[lIIIIY

1 : 1 : u~liII Syr..hll:t hi: n . , . \ ; l b ol P In .1 ~

Mnb!;~rt ..1.B~j;'(;II'' -DO S l n tan Rubb~ ]o,uulit!'y

l·"~[HTI!!!nI~ U~rI"~

EI(! ktm Cb-eIJl. I. lI:hc:I . . ..IIJ'I ii. . oM ! . . I [ 1t=11 GIIII 'RI anySlI!hl1l(!ncblttlc :£;!I j"I~IO!ilva P~l I. n , L br no ll ll i! . S IImn pl ,o ir We. rk ol !

G h. b !-I, BlI.d -3:tlI:r ;emerl, Germll.nyPI.[UI\.a. D r D,)rlll.mlt A G , V fj lr M_i 1I ~. AIIred N!IIIbll!!l Q Cu••

T m· tl !l d' ol "' . C I I I u..iLtltti.l. D OMr r : ! ] 111:1 OUrLl!bll!rll:, ("oi-I!rm.IHi.Y1JoI!ullichl:!: SIIn!rlR:lI!llcm [II! n m b H. .Kr. ~bul!II:. C".erm&n},

Q V EU , H. 1 .. . ' Et :O ,' li O! \' l I G E :f · . ..U-,.s OJ ,? I s" ION

O"l!r.n II EcO-rLO m i(l Elf ~(I"LI myb.or~ .R.epor1:

~ ~: ;~ ~ i~ li l8 ~I .I .~ k~ ~.U. (I ~: :: .: : : :: :: lSll :b ll :~ ~~l~~ .~

J ti !i rt i "i [H i C 4} oI !- rl t l1 IWC I: i" kl l_ _ , , • • •• , I IIgmrdMe t,hqFoo.d fi.il l ld A.::rd!l luIlll.lI _ _ • • • , • • , • •• J IIIbl ; J oY" !""(:l liog"L

lU,~IC\L I),o\MAG£ lH\JSJO~-

V J LLIB.(!D,lIb IL lJ ' AI r d r>f tT .I-i !I. Parli li . ~1II1!1lcn,,!~rofl ld Hoel) fi.lr f.ru·dil" ~tll l ,inC1l. ~hdum

CONFIDENTIAL

tu~':~:~:~~:~~:· ..~ :~~.:. ':.~~::a.J lr.o.lII-dR.ep&.I.r 'ilil"dl!l. N.mQI". tkl{~umSubm.rlu! Pens, Bre~~..'I~"JII~!t

P.owd lP! r Pl.iih ii Afi l:oill! lJ"ro.lII,_ F....."!eoPowd~ r PI .n fl lt , 'B.,.:rKG'-!"Ii!.C.f 'nmt=(f

Geld II" PI;ii,nt.R+ !.,1:gtl .t. l II:_!l ')I ',I: L ~ ~ . .. & I KI 'l lm}~"iSL .lH..I!_l~eVII:· .tr ;.!IInGrgyll. !i l!tl ." F"r.l l il ]~

C.Ij,Dfli:i:: co t[ thgl"!ot !".

Limo~, .PnmuJdr~"(It!:ll "t~.. Wut.OIT. GlIiftIIDnt-F4!lT.IIinoit, f ',r.,ncol!!(",jrig.mlll ( I '~ f iU I I of . l -l l . A.e:ro- En.ildl'lii F . . .: :h )r )" . ~ M il lO .. . Fnf~1II

.!tl!l:u:l!tlli..llb~r Bell.r~n.1Ir HIII.u PIu r, RIJ. I ! :I . p . . ~h. ~-Irm Po, . -

l.o1.lf.! nrE;![!;Il l. A lr ar . .. .L P li ll .c r , 1 "0 ul lI )u lR . F r .m :oS. ~. C. A. S. E.. AI-r~"ii1.h. PI.Ii.,,- TII;II...r~~"~f 'nncll! ! 'A . 1 . A . .. \:i :r .=r lLti. Pl. 1:1. Tg.u.IDUIC. :Pn!II.I C : . .

V W!apon. L n . L ! ) n . d . . .. .

Ct,:r A :r ei l u 1 K n! :' lI Ih lPub,.l1olA r ! Fl IIIM $41~r. i n GIIII"'mLIIo:rGa ld-l!n.blM'K' Tb er-!"I!,.J Ei:;-(:rilC POw.:u :s " aUo n, l Lt I .. IPI; 1 1 ' +

Cel".I'f .I.i i lI.I"BHlDwlillero ' TI ra Q .f or r n . ..r , , j i : Sw'j l .dl i:[J.,~ St..t! 0 1 : 1 , .Bn r

r:.e.rtn~l"!Y

tTl! ':; O~~:;'R:::B~fd~~hB.~M'::~.III~IP.n:tR I-lWA; , B , rl d ,! r -l ! . E l ~ li r . G l ir r L U n .vGUlil.l.-DrT-W-lirkl! W ' ~ :m a :r . W o I i. lm . .. . CIi.rm!LnyH(!.I]u::til!l i r I Soh l l G !ri I H. ~"Ii~tGI!i!"JJI.~!:I.A ' roB SU ' r' Y o! ! IJ " a t . p_['Tj j . . .t:~!i Cl:iirmll\n,.

H•.1GIILII A:. H..I( IIvt !" ~k"rn._tI y

.M A N W.e. r- 1:~ "OiAlbul"-S" .• / \ l rJlbI,TI: ' . G1Il"m.r.l1'Fr~lI!dt"_(.hKruN A G. £.a.MP. G... .manj'EM.... ld;lll:~hlfi~;nw.g-rI.;Jt. G m "b H. Helt.l!rblld~. C~rmlir.yATe M_ ~'J1 b L G m b B • .It OI]( IIU C~_m" r

£rlA MIIi]~'I1_ln~:n,"""-I!I"ke G m b- H_. Mo-~kli.u. Gi!rm.o.nl":a:lll_Y~ri:!!ch.. I)lotoll!.nKC!Tkl!. DurJ'll!r.b oR, ti1il"Ifii ,il .l l.YM h "a -I ~ O( !' ~l -l li t= h C' M o ro l 'l l! !' n ~! !r ik l i. G m b H. 1 " 1 1 '0 1 ; 1; . .. G . . ..m.[I,~SI.!blYlaLinlll P ! - M Di!!lJ.tIi~b.e,..W!rr.. H.II!mburlr. (""otrJJ•iJy

oM I;I,l ti~iSt.orred Strud:UR!l... R.li.1:Cur.:. G·~I"m.ILfi:V00 nUrllintAl_1 '0 1l.m.mlW1!.t"ke..I iin.aliu. (iG.TlP.. qyKaRel M aJii.h.. 1H1L1i!: " 'lIl.Njj. ~."lJel. -Gltrmll.R;J

Ammonta.kWli.k"-_e,. M I r bm- l , ! !~ . GIIIJ'm.n,~BroW"rL " B - I : ; I , ' @ : . t! IIIl 0111. IMlMlnhll!lm. K . . . . iU1 . ; ILl . GlP!nn.al lJ'"Ad;lim OtJoel ;\ ,G. F I: ~ 1I I1 b . . rm . GlI!!lmll.n,.0'1II_1mIIj j-I"-BIIIf!'II: A G. tTnbzrt:lILrkhl!llrl" Ge: rm4 .DJ'"V ii h :f II t In 5 1 ,! b m ll T ln 1 l A & 6l 1 1m b -I ,. • . F " a r . R '@ . CIi"_rm.nyV,I,)IIc!!!K",r;::Jroll~rll .... Fatlenlll!!:."b-e.Il.. ,C@"mljlllj

:ElnIlw.. " vlil .d\lc~ III,~ Bic:l~f~J.d.. G rm a JI

SM I I I ~ 1 I 1 . 1; d . 1!o H owaldu.wlP!rl!1!. H •.rnbuk"II!t.Glji:l"Miiny:BIobrn ._nd Vn.B\! SMJiI.J'..rd.:li. H.I!Ifnbll"~. G~rrt4CY

1J.n.lrnll!r r Benz A C, M iil.1:I_1IIh.!!.l~ .:-ei:.I:iJ !L[I,y..s:rnthll!!tf~ Oll Pl:l.tll. M~rb«k.QlI.m bun> GlII:nmm.J"GiI!!!ot uudulI_tc. VJf!l!tlr. ( ! _ . . . . . l "gop !ii:!l.g1~l ~ o TJ" - J 1J "

Iilo!l!.lmu "H1,npbl.cI, PCoI"I."l I; . Ulm. t: 'l IIrmll l .fI->'RuhfOotl .HydJ'I;I~I!IJ;!!!.tE on 1'!.;;:J t. BeU"-.gp"-Bo".. Gtirml!l I ¥

t . .r~ .. .tl n:::hltll, l!~,=[1 'llll"ell:lkill A. G• .Ne-u Idl~h.I!fI, Germ.UIJRti.nwlI)t V~lII,l3q"t 1 1 . 1 1 . .Alto[Lb(!ot::itl!.n. Gl!rmanJRA 1 '1 .. ", ." ' y! lI Id Y - :: , a t. A lm .b y C 1I , GI!2"l l l l i l . IIIJ'Oiitlrn.,~tlllln l> ;R. ,ftD,~nH,>n.bL ~. Gl!rlnlLlUI" n l I R: m [tt! on CumlL!:!; C~ti.e-.Il fI .t": alJ'bll!ll~nd\l~t~h, LurIwllid.ll.r-!ft. Germ ..I'I. ', V'lfil, r di :

"Tol. TJlt,o"LI[IdhoCn 1 : 0 M a r. t. h .I Lm :o ~ Y ,l ud . U ] _t 'i :' J~ C : e ~. .i iL r. i: Y

I G F"i l. rt l< linl .1 Iu . tf I ! I! , Le.VUIwIl~. GI'Tm_ii.f.lY

Che.milli~hc-. WlI!!rikll!!-.HulI!l.i. Cii-nrui.ny

u;II l im'ber.A' M ..J lb l _ 1J i{ Yaz:Li. Of-e_mblllr llC.nl!!rm n:l

i Lo t=omvt lV '1I Sb"p . . . ,od \ \r 1.11 fI :. ! I .t HAamm. ,~"III!"8"~:!i

Tli.iL"~ 10 HTATlQS O J \ . .i : . - ll n.'Ii

TIIa.RJiPorh.Uo1.! Dlvt..Lo.~ ,Rlifju;ltnAil Opo-rntlclUI 0 Rr th1!l Brt!r.i_fl_ot!rPIQIII& fOI I . 1)f &mbn.ll tn R I in' d Jn~l .II lI t _E ,r ... 111 ! F t~~ . . .. . .

bu C ' K ' . N L.Lmber..: .I_!! l M,lI:f.1~b DVWun.L( j lrm UL Lbi=-emaUye. Indu u) D li ri ns r l h~ W IL k"WP!hrmfoht 1\"111..11101 e r l h . .. .Coeo"t l ,I R;alln.lJ!,JIII

~'T!L_ni~ ,nl\I,I~lnS

C~r-rtJ.II1I F'_.l'! l'l:! lrh: Utl l LLIMI lmJ :u .t .:1J ' R li L lC l" tI i . 1 i ( I o in Vol. J "CUlltJ.fJji Dl"liIlon pllLn .. RoI!_porll l i-il lO ~J) In V:oI. 'n ··U,lltUea IUdtlio1.! Pl. l Ii . R II Ioc rt . ··'g1 Rb~II"!!~lI:h~W(!_o;UII.II.:It=h-il E ekt r s. !l -l IrK li r t ~ \. r.

PAGE 7

USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party

Documents

Transcript of USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party