Using role theory better to understand EU Presidencies (and their role in ESDP) [UACES Paper]

8/7/2019 Using role theory better to understand EU Presidencies (and their role in ESDP) [UACES Paper]

1/30

40th

UACES Annual Conference 2010

Exchanging Ideas on Europe: Europe at a Crossroads

6-8 September 2010, Bruges

Using role theory better to understand EU Presidencies

(and their role in ESDP)

Natlia Leal

PhD Candidate

School of Politics and International Relations

University of Kent at Canterbury, UK

[email protected]

[Draft version; do NOT quote without authors permission.]

Abstract

For at least a smaller group of scholars within the broader field of European Politics, the

Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union has constituted an extremely

interesting topic of research. One the most common findings is how different one Presidency can

be from another, whether in terms of their influence in the policy process and their policy

performance or even simply in terms of their generally perceived (in)success. I argue that these

differences in behaviour can also be seen within each Presidency, across different policy fields but

even within a single policy area.

This paper suggests that these variations in behaviour (between but mostly within different

Presidencies) can be explained using a framework adapted from role theory, which complements

the more traditional European integration approaches. In order to do so, this paper explores in

particular the role of the Presidency in the area of ESDP.

With the support ofFundao para a Cincia e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal.


2/30

UACES Annual Conference 2010 Natlia Leal

2

I. IntroductionIn recent decades, and particularly after the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, the office

of the Presidency has become a rather fashionable research topic. The Presidency,

however, has been an element of the European integration process since its very beginningin the 1950s, even if its contours have kept evolving over time. Until the entry into force of

the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, it was an office held exclusively by the Member

states, on a rotational basis, and since 1999 its competences also extended into the area of

ESDP, a policy area that is mostly concerned with crisis management1.

Individual Member States behaviour and performance as Presidency-holders,

however, has been very diverse. These variations are also visible across and within specific

policy areas, the main reason why this paper focuses mainly in the particular domain of

ESDP. Existing literature on the Presidency and on foreign policy explains these variations

in distinct (and sometimes incompatible) ways. This paper argues that a different analytical

framework based on role theory can better help understand these role variations. The

added-value of role theory is that it allows for the combination of elements stemming from

different theoretical perspectives into a single consolidated framework, adaptable to

different actors and policy areas.

II. The Presidency: tasks and variations in behaviour andperformance

For at least a decade since the establishment of ESDP in 1999, the Presidency of the

Council of Ministers of the European Union (or simply the Presidency) was characterised

as a single and neutral entity, deploying national resources, and always in the hands of the

Council (CEU 2006: 3-5), whose competences extended over into the ESDP domain as

well.

1 In 1999, the European Council directly and explicitly linked ESDP to crisis management: In pursuit of our

Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy,

we are convinced that the Council should have ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict

prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union [TEU], the Petersberg

tasks. (European Council 1999). In fact, by 1999 the Petersberg tasks initially defined in 1992 under the

WEU and encompassing humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in

crisis management, including peacemaking (article 17(2) of the old TEU) had already been incorporated

into the EU. It is no surprise therefore to see that authors such as Alistair Shepherd would conclude thatESDP has always been essentially about conflict management (Shepherd 2008: 6), an expression that is

often used in academia as a synonym of crisis management.


3/30


3

Up until December 2009 (that is, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), the

Presidency was held exclusively by each of the Member States of the Union, for periods of

six months, on a rotational basis previously agreed by the Council. Though Council

meetings have over the course of EU history been divided in different configurations, in

legal terms there has only ever been one Council and, therefore, a single Presidency. In

theory, it was expected that the Member State holding this office would strive to promote

and defend common European interests with the highest degree of impartiality, suppressing

national interests as a point of principle (even if there could be a significant congruence

between states national and the communitys supranational interests). The presumption,

further, has always been that Member States would apply their own human and financial

resources to the office of the Presidency. The last word though always belonged to the

Member States collectively represented in the Council, who was needed to approve

substantive decisions (often put forward by the Presidency) and, further, could even

challenge the Presidencys procedural determinations.

Without doubt, the office of the Presidency gave each Member State the opportunity

directly to influence the conduct of European affairs, including in the area of ESDP.

Member States, though, took up this opportunity to varying degrees and with varying

interests in mind. For many scholars, the norm, arguably, was for changes in the Member

State holding the Presidency to usher in a different set of national interests and priorities,

and correspondingly a different EU Presidency position, every six months. However, by

holding the Presidency, Member States were equally invited to take up the common

interest of the Union and to protect its shared values and understandings, even to the extent

of promoting further coordination and integration. In the end, then, this office

simultaneously gave Member States a means of exerting some degree of control over the

Union and challenged them to safeguard its supranational outlook and share these

community ideals (see Wallace, 1985).

This dual interpretation of the Presidency takes its cue from the set of tasks a

Presidency is expected (by national governments, EU institutions and others) to perform.

Since the establishment of ESDP in 1999 up until 2009, the time frame of this research, the

tasks of the Presidency remained fairly stable. The formal tasks assigned to the Presidency

were mainly three:

- Organizing and chairing all meetings of the European Council, the Council of

the European Union and its preparatory committees and working groups


4/30


4

- Representing the Council in its dealings with other EU institutions and bodies,

such as the European Commission and the European Parliament [and]

- Representing the European Union in international organizations and relations

with countries outside the European Union2

At first sight, these tightly defined tasks would appear to grant the Presidency very

little space to exert its influence. Indeed, due to its nature and formal functions, the

Presidency had been repeatedly described as a virtually powerless institution (as having

responsabilit sans pouvoir), being deprived of any explicit decision- or policy-making

powers. Critics have claimed it lacks any power of initiative, inertly inheriting the agenda

of its predecessors and being bound by external events beyond its control; its activities are

further typically frustrated by its short run-time of six months (cf. Tallberg 2003).

However, such claims rely on a very narrow interpretation of the Presidencys functions,

powers and potential influence over the adoption and content of certain decisions, which

far surpass what has been committed to official documents. Wallace even notes that the

few rules that have been institutionalised tend merely to codify long-established

practices, with Member States in particular evincing reluctance to formalise the

Presidencys more political roles (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006b, Wallace 1985).

Therefore, a considerable margin exists for different interpretations of the extent of the

Presidencys functions and powers.

Elgstrm, for example, interprets these functions relatively widely, taking the view

that the Presidencys tasks comprise four mainfunctions: administration and co-ordination,

setting political priorities, mediation, and representation (Elgstrm 2003: 4-7)3. The first

and last reflect the statements of the formal Rules of Procedure4, while the others bulk out

unwritten functions based on practice rather than legal obligations, while constituting

very crucial means for influence. Elgstrm also argues for the existence of three

Presidency norms guiding the behaviour of any Presidency: neutrality and impartiality,

effectiveness (in terms of accomplishing a large number of decisions during its stint in

power (Elgstrm 2006: 178)) and consensus-building (Elgstrm 2006). In addition, apart

from preparing and chairing all the Council meetings and representing the Council

2 This quotation is from a statement that has been repeated (at times literally copied) on several Presidencies

websites, such as the former 2007 German Presidency (Germany 2007?) or the 2008 Slovenian (Slovenia

2008?).3 Other authors have divided these functions in different ways. For instance, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace

(2006a) propose that the Presidencys main functions include the following: as business manager, manager of

foreign policy, promoter of initiatives, package-broker, liaison point, and collective representative.4 Article 18(1) of the TEU also clearly stated that The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters

coming within the common foreign and security policy.


5/30


5

(internally) and the EU (externally), the Presidencies were also expected to provide a sense

of leadership to the overall Union (cf. Metcalfe 1998) as well as to promote a general

search for consensus over the topics on the agenda.Other authors have listed these roles

and functions in different ways but generally cover the same bases as Elgstrm5.

Differences seem to pertain more to nomenclature and task/function-grouping rather than

any supposed substance in terms of what the Presidencys roles actually are.

In the end, these functions conferred a considerable margin of manoeuvre on the

Presidency, although Member States were free to prioritize some functions over others

across different policy areas and according to their more immediate sense of national and

international priorities.

It is no surprise, therefore, to see that, even though Presidential tasks have remained

fairly stable in the decade between 1999 and 2009, the perceived behaviour and

performance of different Member States Presidencies (both according to academic

literature6

and other) has varied considerably, as has the relevance attributed to ESDP

during their time at the helm. During this decade, it is possible to find Presidencies that

were generally perceived as rather successful (e.g. Belgium in 2001, Ireland in 2004 or

France in 2008) and others whose final record was far more mixed (such as France in

2000, Spain in 2002 and Italy in 2003); Presidencies praised for their efficiency and

professionalism (such as Finland in 1999 or Denmark in 2002) or for their commitment

towards the presidential duties (e.g. Portugal in 2000, cf. Paasilehto 2002: 210), and

others that were not as neutral and were seen to pursue national interests over and above

the good conduct of EU business (Drake 2001: 455) such as the French Presidency of

2000. Similarly, there were Presidencies perceived as confident leaders (such as the 2007

German Presidency), and others that were criticized for their lack of vision and

innovation (Ojanen & Vuohula 2007: 19), such as the 2006 Finish Presidency, at fault for

5Kirchner, for instance, suggests that the Presidency performs four distinct functions the administrative, the

initiating, the co-ordinating, and the representational (Kirchner 1992), whereas Westlake and Galloway claim

that [t]he modern presidency is at one and the same time manager, promoter of political initiatives, package-

broker, honest broker, representative to and from the other Community institutions, spokesman for the

Council and for the Union, and an international actor. (Westlake & Galloway 2004: 334, cf. also Westlake

1999). In turn, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006a: 141 and following; first edition from 1997) propose that

the main responsibilities of the Presidency can be divided into those of business manager, manager of foreign

policy, promoter of initiatives, package-broker, liaison point, and collective representative. (See also Kietz

2008, Tallberg 2008: 187, Thomson 2008, Quaglia & Moxon-Browne 2006, Schout & Vanhoonacker 2006,

Tallberg 2006: 43)6 Cf., for instance, the individual assessments regarding each Presidency published in the JCMSs annual

review.


6/30


6

being too consensus-oriented, [...] listening too patiently to other delegations and [...]

lacking resolve (cf. Elgstrm 2002: 47) such as the 2001 Swedish Presidency or even seen

as unfit to lead on at least certain dossiers such as Slovenias 2008 Presidency regarding

the financial stability domain (Kajn 2009: 94). There were some Presidencies that

explicitly included security and defence (that is, ESDP) among its main priorities (e.g.

Portugal in 2000 and France both in 2000 and 2008) and others that did not; in fact, most

others referred only (if at all) to a more general concern with the EUs role in the world.

Finally, there were Presidencies that, independently of their general performance, oversaw

important developments in ESDP (e.g. Finland in 1999, Portugal in 2000, Sweden in 2001,

Greece in 2003, Ireland in 2004, the UK in 2005 and Germany in 2007) and some others

that left no specific mark (such as Italy 2003).

The Presidency characteristic pattern of behaviour that is, its role (Jackson 1972,

Biddle & Thomas 1966, Singer 1965) as well as its perceived performance while at the

helm have thus revealed considerable variations. These variations can be observed in at

least four different levels: between the different Member States, between Presidencies of

the same Member State at different times, within an individual Presidency across different

policy areas7, and even within single policy domains.

Because these variations may go down to the policy level and general behaviour may

not be consistent with behaviour and performance in specific policy areas, it is important to

analyse Presidencies from a particular policy perspective. In this paper, ESDP is used as a

case-study and therefore the centre of attention. In fact, though not all Presidencies in the

decade 1999-2009 received the same amount of praise (and/or criticism), they all

contributed in a greater or lesser degree to the evolution of ESDP. As Nicole Gnesotto (in

ISS 2006: 10) well notes:

because it is not closely integrated into EU structures and is administered on an

essentially intergovernmental level, EU foreign and security policy is shielded de facto

from institutional and political crises emanating from within the EU. It can therefore

continue to evolve in response to regional crises (e.g. Darfur), external demands and

pressures (e.g. Aceh), or the EUs own economic constraints (the arms market): what is

paramount in these areas is the consensual agreement of the member states, expressed at

the initiative of a few or with the assent of all. On the other hand, precisely because it

depends solely on the goodwill on member states, the EUs security policy remains fragile

as it is permanently subject to alteration: should the commitment of member states falter

for whatever reason (lack of budgetary or human resources, various external pressures,

7

See, for example, Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006: 361): the Italian presidencys performance acrosspolicy areas and policy locations was uneven [...]. This contrasts with the consistency and stability of the

Irish presidency.


7/30


7

domestic policy priorities, electoral shifts) the entire foreign policy of the EU would be

deprived of its major driving impetus.

Indeed, the EUs policy priorities seem to move according to the inputs (including

the interests) of its institutions, Member States and external actors, as well as in responseto international events, but over the years ESDP seems to have maintained a certain

momentum. Gnesotto in fact also added that:

ESDPs rude good health also shows that the Member States, despite their major

differences over the reform, purpose and budget of the European Union, now share a

common vision of their strategic responsibility and of the overriding necessity for the

Union to influence the political evolution of the world. (Gnesotto in ISS 2007: 11)

III. Accounting for variationsA question remains though: why do Presidencies behave differently? The perceived

role variations illustrated above do not show a clear pattern of Presidencies specific

behaviours and performances: the typical divisions, for example, between big and small,

new and old (and more or less experienced in the Presidency), Nordic or Mediterranean

Member States, do not seem enough to account for actual differences in Presidency

behaviour. Neither do these variations align with a division between those presenting

themselves as good Europeans and those Member States apparently less concerned with

projecting national interests into the European agenda.

Different sets of literature tend to attribute these differences to distinct elements. To

the best of my knowledge only one author has explicitly linked the behaviour of the

Presidency with role theory Ole Elgstrm and one other had used this approach to

investigate broader foreign policy within the EU context Lisbeth Aggestam.

Nevertheless, literature on the Presidency frequently refers to the idea of internal and

external factors affecting the Presidencys behaviour, performance, effectiveness,

success or overall role.

Schout and Vanhoonackers (2006), for instance, refer to the notions of external

demand and internal supply on Presidency actions, placing a certain emphasis on the

ability to match demand and supply in determining the perceived success of any given

Presidency. They also mention several elements their contingent factors or pulls and

pushes that could affect this match. These include the EU context and the Presidency-

holding Member States domestic environment and, more specifically, the degree towhich a topic has been explored (new versus old), the level of trust in the chair, the


8/30


8

presence of other brokers in the system, the shadow of the future, and the political

sensitivity of a topic as external variables and the importance of the topic to the country

in the chair, [the] preferences and commitments of key players, the level of preparations,

and sensitivities between coalition partners as internal (Schout & Vanhoonacker 2006:

1060-1061).

Kirchner is also quite specific in inventorying factors relevant to Presidency

effectiveness in decision-making: a time factor (the duration period and semester in which

the Presidency took place), the (procedural and issue-related) experience of the country,

the countrys size (associated with resources, national interests, and communication

chains), commitment to integration and to achieving agreement, and collaboration with

other EU institutions (Kirchner 1992). Quaglia and Moxon-Browne point to intangible

factors beyond country size or political and economic weight, such as as knowledge of

EU affairs (process expertise, content expertise and information); political credibility and

reputation; and general attitudes towards European integration (Quaglia & Moxon-

Browne 2006: 349). Thomson (2008) claims that the extent of Presidencies influence is

dependent on variables such as the voting procedure in question or distance between other

Member States and the Presidencys preferences, among others. Elgstrm (2006) suggests

three features in particular influence the Presidencys enactment of its roles: the

institutional design of the EU chairmanship, the Councils formal decision-making rules

and the power resources associated to the chair (namely, access to information and control

over negotiation procedures).

In the end, it seems clear that most these authors accept that Presidencys

performance varies according to several factors, either more material or more intangible

and related either to the broader (international or EU) context, to features inherent to the

Presidency, or to an individual Member States characteristics.

In addition, literature on foreign policy suggests (other) factors that may affect an

actors behaviour; though not applied to the topics of this paper, some of these authors

have borrowed concepts from role theory. The first major work to use concepts and

assumptions from role theory to analyse political behaviour was K. J. Holstis seminal

1970 article National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Holsti proposes a

concept of national role conception as better describing and explaining foreign policy

behaviour, contending the role performance (decisions and actions) of governments may

be explained primarily by reference to the policy-makers own conceptions of their

nations role in a region or in the international system as a whole (Holsti 1970: 240). In


9/30


9

arguing for the relevance of role theory in foreign policy analysis, the articles empirical

survey explored the number, types, characteristics and distribution of national role

conceptions, ending up with a count of at least seventeen different national role

conceptions.8

Holsti concludes role theory, transposed to the international context, offers

a framework for describing national role performance and role conceptions and for

exploring the sources of those role conceptions (Holsti 1970: 246-47) (section IV below

better explores these notions). This paper strives to put together a similar role theory

framework, though one fitted to a different actor and context, that is, to the Presidencys

role in ESDP. By stressing linkages between role performance, role conceptions and role

expectations, role theory opens up an avenue for exploring the sources of certain role

concepts as variables accounting for their variation.

For instance, in his 1970 article Holsti reviews the then literature in seeking to

identify the major sources of national role conceptions. He elicits therefrom (in his view)

an improved model more closely fitted to the study of foreign policy behaviour. Holstis

model, in Figure 1, is supposed to show the relation between (national) role conceptions,

role expectations (role prescriptions, in Holstis nomenclature) and role performance, on

one hand, and the main sources of both role conceptions and role expectations, as listed by

the literature in the field at that time, on the other.

For Holsti, role conceptions are largely a product of a nations socialization process

and the influence of its history, culture and societal characteristics (in Aggestam 2006:

21). In Figure 1, however, he decomposes those elements into more specific factors,

namely: location, state (his relevant actors) resources, capabilities, socio-economic needs,

national values, ideology, traditional roles, public opinion, personality and political needs9.

8 Holstis national role conceptions were namely: bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional

protector, active independent, liberator supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, mediator-

integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal

development, isolate, and protectee.9

For example, the role of mediator-integrator would result from the traditional national role of that state,from its cultural-ethnic composition, a traditional non-involvement in conflicts and its geographic location

(Holsti 1970).


10/30


10

Figure 1. Holstis Role Theory and Foreign Policy: National Role Conceptions and Prescriptions (...)

Source: Holsti (1970: 245).

Even though Holsti does not work the point, Figure 1 also suggests the impact that

the sources of role expectations can have on role conceptions. Such sources include

system structure, system-wide values, general legal principles, treaty commitments,

informal understandings and world opinion.

Other foreign policy authors seem to support the idea that the sources of roles are

both internal (they arise from actors own characteristics) and external (they take a read on

the broader political context and existing international structures)10

. In addition, sources

may be both material and ideational. Wish (1987), for example, refers to national

attributes, defending the idea that these were directly associated with role conceptions and

foreign policy behaviour:

10 Organizational theorists such as Alvin Bertrand (1972), who tried to explain the concrete acts of man,

refer for example to personality, cultural and situational variables of the ego and the alters. If applied at theforeign policy level of analysis, these seem to coincide to a great extent with internal (national attributes) and

external (culture and situation) aspects.


11/30


11

national attributes affect foreign policy behavior both directly and indirectly.

Directly, national attributes affect the amount of resources that can be used in the

execution of national actions and [functions] as factors affecting the nations ability to

utilize the nations resources (East et al cited in Wish 1987: 96).

She continues:

Decision makers consider their national capabilities when formulating their national

role conceptions, which in turn provide guidelines and standards for their foreign policy

behaviour. Thus, national attributes provide a major source for the formulation of national

role conceptions and in this manner are also indirectly related to foreign policy. (Wish

1987: 96)

Following other researchers, Wish proceeds to propose three main national

characteristics influencing foreign policy behaviour size or capability, economic

development, and political orientation or accountability claiming empirically to

demonstrate (positive or negative) (cor)relations between these national attributes, national

role conceptions11

and foreign policy behaviour.

In another empirical study, Hermann and Hermann suggested that the behaviour of

foreign policy ultimate decision units is influenced by internal and external variables to

those actors, stressing, however, that the configuration and dynamics of such an ultimate

decision unit help shape the substance of foreign policy behavior (Hermann & Hermann

1989: 362). Their emphasis thus falls on the internal features of policy units as a relevantinput aspects influencing policy outcomes.

12

More recently, Valerie Hudson has paid particular attention to the motivations of

behaviour. While working mainly with the concept of culture13

as a source of foreign

policy action templates or behavioral dispositions (Hudson 1999: 767), she elaborates

motivations within different dimensions, counting a number of elements as motivations

11 More specifically, Wish (1987: 261-67) identifies the following variables or sources of (national) role

conceptions: international status, motivational role orientation (individualistic, cooperative, competitive, or

mixed), role issue or substantive problem area (territorial/defence, ideological, political/diplomatic, universal

values, economic), and size and modernity indicators (including population, total area, agricultural area,

energy consumption, gross national product, total military manpower, and total defence expenditures).12

To explain foreign policy decisions Hermann and Herman (1989) consider variables such as context

sensitivity, difficulty in reaching agreement, and the nature of relationship(s) among actors. They also

attempt to measure foreign policy behaviour based on: affect (hostility or friendships towards other

governments), commitment (the degree to which a governments current actions limit its future options

either through the allocation of resources or the generation of expectations in others) and instruments of

statecraft (the skills and resources used in the formation and implementation of foreign policy) (Hermann

& Hermann 1989: 379-80).13 She defined culture simply as a preestablished set of behavioral competencies, which in turn form

behavioral dispositions (Hudson 1999: 767).


12/30


12

and thus potentially shapers of behaviour. She mentions under this head the relevance of

strategic culture, whose scholars, she claims:

pointed to cultural and historical differences predisposing each nation to the choice it

actually made, simultaneously noting the inevitable anxiety these choices would cause inthe other nation. [] Strategic culture, then, probes for motivations that go deeper than the

bureaucratic structures of nations or even contemporary interpretations of national

ideology. (Hudson 1999: 769)

Further:

A nation's leaders rise in part because they articulate a vision of the nation's role in

world affairs that corresponds to deep, cultural beliefs about the nation. These beliefs are

rooted in the "heroic history" of the nation, formative events and personalities of the distant

and recent past, notable successes and failures, and culturally derived desiderata of personal

and national conduct. Furthermore, role expectations may arise from external sources as well.The position or status one's own nation holds in the community of nations may over time

solidify into more concrete role expectations held not only by one's own fellow citizens, but by

other nations and entities within the international system. The role expectations held by others

about your nation may thus also be a strong motivation to enact action templates. (Hudson

1999: 769)

The sources of role conceptions and expectations that Hudson refers to are thus not

so different from Holstis, playing over both internal (national) and external features that

affect a nations behaviour. Indeed, though their concrete categorizations may vary, most

foreign policy analysis authors point to similar types and sources of roles, either inherent to

the actor or characterising his context.

Even though this paper does not concern itself with national role conceptions per se,

because the office of the Presidency is occupied by different EU Member States on a

rotational basis, it is interesting to note the above-mentioned sources that affect the way

individual nation-states conceive their own role. Overall this literature does seem to

support the idea that the origins of roles are situated both at the actor- and at a more

structural or institutional level. In the end, however, this research is not about Member

States in their own person but rather while wearing the garb of the Presidency, so some

adaptations are necessary. Nor does the paper concern foreign policy per se, though the

conduct of ESDP as a policy area at a European (that is, inter-national) level enshrined

within a European foreign policy context means that this literature may also be of service

in identifying sources of role variations in this ESDP domain.


13/30


13

IV. Role theory as an alternative: basic assumptions andconcepts

Without ignoring the relevant contributions from the literature on the Presidency and

on foreign policy referred to above, role theory can offer an alternative and applied

framework to account for Presidency role variation, a framework that combines and

consolidates elements from different theoretical perspectives.

Role theory, though, is not actually a theory but rather a perspective or a framework

of analysis that pulls together a set of concepts and assumptions about human behaviour,

taking stock of the factors that may affect expected behaviour and their actual effect14

.

Sarbin and Allen (1968: 489) may score a hit, analytically speaking, in claiming that

theory here is used to denote a set of propositions employing a consistent idiom that

guides the search for facts [] The test of a scientific theory, of course, is not whether it is

true but whether it is useful. Role theorys multidisciplinary nature and wide scope of

application grant it an extremely interesting explanatory potential; such a wide variety of

possible applications represents, indeed, one of role theorys biggest advantages and one of

its major handicaps. Since there is no general role theory, it can only be useful if properly

adjusted for a specific time period and social/political context. This paper puts in a claim

for the usefulness of role theory in analysing the Presidency role in ESDP, as better

explained below.

Above all, role theory relies on the assumption that actual behaviour and

performance are shaped both by ones own and others expectations of ones behaviour. In

simplified form: Performance and behaviour = (own) conceptions + (others)

expectations.

The notion of role, like that of actor, was initially borrowed from the

theatrical/dramaturgical context (Sarbin & Allen 1968: 488-489) to describe the way in

which an actor was expected to behave or perform. It assumed the existence of scripts

defining what actors could and should do. Contemporary role theory does not contradict

this idea but suggests far more specific role concepts, which not only propose different

14 Magid (1980: 312-13) stresses that within role theory [a]ttention is drawn particularly to the ways in

which the behavior of individuals is shaped by the demands and rules of others in society; by the sanctions

(negative and positive) that are associate with the conforming or deviant behavior of individuals; and by thesubjective evaluation which individuals make of the appropriateness of their own behavior and that of others,

generally and in particular social situations.


14/30


14

ways to look at role but divide the notion into different dimensions.15

In fact, certain role

concepts quickly became popular for their simplicity, relation to existing theories, utility,

ease of operationalization, democratic ideology and heuristic values (Biddle 1961), aspects

that facilitated their practical application in different fields of research.

Starting with the more general notion of role, its traditional definition associates it

with an actors characteristic patterns of behaviour given a certain position or situation

(Jackson 1972, Biddle & Thomas 1966, Singer 1965). Elgstrm and Smith, for example,

build on this basic idea to suggest that roles should be seen as patterns of expected or

appropriate behaviour (Elgstrm 2006: 172, Elgstrm & Smith 2006: 5), while at the same

time allowing room for agency (Elgstrm & Smith 2006: 5). Consequently, the concept

of role provides an essential link between agent and structure (Aggestam 1999); role

theory hence allows both for the development of approaches relating to the ideational

basis of policy and for the evaluation of material policy concerns and actions (Elgstrm &

Smith 2006: 5).

If the general interpretation already tends to propose a link between role and

position, Elgstrm further establishes an association between role and a logic of

appropriateness. However, as visible as the logic of appropriateness is in many individual

Presidencies behaviour, this paper argues that that logic alone cannot account for all

Presidency behaviour; indeed, many Presidencies have also been seen to behave according

to a logic of expected consequences (that is, aiming above all to achieve results).

Therefore, Elgstrms interpretation of role as applied to the Presidency goes too far, or is

at best incomplete. A logic of appropriateness could well, on investigation, predominate

over a logic of consequences; but that is different from recognising the constant and

difficult interplay between the two. In this sense, in this paper role would better be seen

simply as a pattern of behaviour associated with a position, whether this reflects

appropriate behaviour or not.

However, more than the concept ofrole itself, which is easily best by confusion, this

paper builds on those ofrole expectations, role conceptions and role performance, some of

the most important and more recurrent concepts in role theory, all of which pertinent to the

role of the Presidency in ESDP. The concepts ofroleconception and role expectation as

15 Authors have proposed concepts such as role-playing and role-taking (Biddle 1986), role examination, role

fulfilment (Faia 1980), role complementarity (Searing 1991, Faia 1980), role integration, covert roles andcontextualized roles (Searing 1991), role reciprocality and role conjunctivality (Bertrand 1972). For a list of

adapted concepts of role see, for instance, Biddle and Thomas ([1966]).


15/30


15

used here have been taken from Aggestam, although repurposed for the area of ESDP. For

Aggestam, role conception refers to the normative expectation that the role-beholder

expresses towards itself, i.e. the ego-parts own definition, whereas role expectation

pertains to those expectations that other actors (alter) prescribe and expect the role-

beholder (ego) to enact (Aggestam 2006: 19).

As Faia (1980: 37) warns, though, [r]ole expectations are subjectively held notions

as to how one should play a given role, [...] actual role playing may diverge sharply from

such ideals. This brings us to other role concepts. Though both broader and more

restricted definitions have been advanced, most of the time role performance is interpreted

as the actual behaviour of an actor, its decisions and actions16

(cf. Aggestam 2006: 20). It

seems important however to distinguish between actual behaviour and the outcomes of that

behaviour. This paper, therefore, adopts two distinct concepts: how and in what ways a

role is actually played (Elgstrm 2006: 172, cf. Elgstrm & Smith 2006: 6) is interpreted

as role-playing17

, while role performance is used in a more restricted sense as actual

policy outcomes, that is, the formal and informal decisions taken as a result of such

interactions to address the points at issue.

One other important distinction applicable to the role of the Presidency should also

be discussed here. Searing distinguishes between position roles those associated with

positions that require the performance of many specific duties and responsibilities and

preference roles which are instead associated with positions that require the

performance of few specific duties and responsibilities (Searing 1991: 1249). Thus,

position roles would be clearly defined and highly constrained by the institution, while

preference roles are comparatively unconstrained by the institution and are therefore more

easily shaped by the preferences of the role players (Searing 1991: 1249). This distinction

implies that it is a lot easier to establish the relation between behaviour and position roles,

than between behaviour and preference roles (Searing 1991: 1249). Since holding the

Presidency implies performing certain legally defined functions, it could be counted a

position role. Member States, however, have a considerable margin of manoeuvre when

16 Sarbin and Allen (1968) prefer the term role enactment. Aggestam (2006: 20) defines role performance as

actual [...] behaviour in terms of characteristic patterns of decisions and actions undertaken in specific

situational contexts.17 Elgstrm though, pressing more on a theatrical meaning, actually called it role performance. These

differences in interpretation illustrate how for instance role, role performance and role-playing can be easilyconfused in the literature and why some authors refer to the Presidency behaviour as an equivalent of its

performance.


16/30


16

holding the Presidency for engaging in other activities forming no part of the official

requirements of their temporary office. In this sense, then, Member States may also enact

the Presidency role as a preference role. One of the biggest interests in studying this actor

is precisely in attending to its middle-ground location between a preference and a position

role: the Presidency must discharge some clearly defined duties and responsibilities, while

otherwise operating in a grey area where certain activities and behaviours are not required

but may still be undertaken.

Aggestam summarized the relation between these different concepts of role in Figure

2 shown below.

Figure 2. Aggestams Analytical framework for role analysis

Source: Aggestam (2006: 26).

Some interactions, though, fail to feature in Aggestams figure. This motivates the

presentation of a revised (and still somewhat oversimplified) representation, Figure 3 (and

Figure 5 below), which seeks to improve on Aggestams scheme namely by including one

other moment: role assessment. Although outside the main scope of this paper, an

evaluation of each Presidencys overall role (particularly of their role-playing and role

performance) can be a vital element feeding back, through a process of social learning, to

both actor and structural levels: for instance, perceptions of the success of (previous)

interactions and outcomes inform not only the ongoing and future role of an individual

Member State while holding the Presidency but also following Presidency (different


17/30


Member-State) roles. This

expectations and conception

Figu

Figure 3 also tries to illustexpectations, which are to a

that role conceptions enco

expectations, and they prom

(Elgstrm & Smith 2006:

Certainly, our perceptions

have an impact on how we

of our own conceptions (w

others expectations of us.

continually created and recr

the other, and both are in tu

process and the actions an

constitute a policy field and

Figure 3 further illus

treated as independent varia

step back can be taken, as th

10

learning process therefore feeds back i

in every step of this role cycle.

e 3. Key role concepts and their interaction

ate the dynamic relation between role congreat degree mutually constitutive. Elgstr

pass both actors self-images and the effe

pt investigation of the interplay between th

6). A similar claim could be made for

f others expectations (what we think the

efine and conceive our own role; similarly,

at we show others we believe to be our r

ince both these concepts (conceptions and

eated over time, each adjusts iteratively to

n affected by actual (past) behaviour. It is t

d decisions it shapes that cumulatively o

efine the institutional culture associated wit

rates how role conceptions (and role exp

les affecting role-playing and role perform

se role conceptions and expectations are the

Natlia Leal

17

nto updated role

ceptions and roleand Smith note

ts of others role

se two elements

ole expectations.

expect from us)

he manifestations

le) will influence

expectations) are

manifestations of

is social learning

er time come to

it.

ectations) can be

nce. But a further

mselves the result


18/30


18

of different combinations of role sources at a specific moment in time, which then evolve

and adapt as these multiple sources change. The key in understanding a Presidency role

might then be in better analysing these distinct role sources.

V. An applied role theory framework: Presidency rolesources

Contrary to Holstis separation between the sources of role conceptions and the

sources of role expectations, this paper argues that, to a great extent, these sources (of role

conceptions and role expectations) are the same. These sources can have different impacts

in each of these role concepts, but all sources tend to influence how roles are constructed.

Further, because the process in question is dynamic, role concepts are in permanent

change, constantly adapting to new or different elements perceived as relevant. Thus, role

conceptions and role expectations influence each other continuously. According to this

reflexivity, what an alterexpects an actor to do is partially determined by what that alter

understands as that actors own role-conception (including the alters perception of the

actors role sources such as his capabilities or political needs, in Holstis language);

similarly, what that actors takes as his own role (his role conception) is partially

determined by what he thinks that others expect of him, including his perception of the

elements that constitute others role expectations. Figure 4 tries to illustrate this dynamic

interaction.

Figure 4. The interplay between roles and roles sources

Actor-level

Sources

Structural

Sources

Role

Conflict ?

Role

Conception(ego)

Role

Expectations(alter)


19/30


19

This means that other Member States expectations about the role of the Presidency

are constrained, for instance, by their perceptions of the Presidency-holders history,

culture and societal characteristics. At the same time, we need to caution that, in order to

form, role concepts need to maintain a certain stability over time. Any ongoing adaptation

is not supposed to bring about dramatic changes in an overall role. Whether a role change

is more or less significant depends more on the nature (structural or actor-level) of the role

source originating a change than on the degree of change itself.

Figure 4 also seeks to illustrate the potential for role conflict, which arises when an

actor perceives to have multiple roles imposing competing and sometimes incompatible

expectations (ego and/or alter) as to that actors actual behaviour. This aspect is

particularly important due to the boundary position occupied by the national policy-maker

working at the European level.

The previous sections have endeavoured at least to assemble the elements of an

improved role theory framework capable of explaining actors role variation. Though the

foreign policy literature noted offers some interesting insights into the main sources of role

conceptions, it does not address the specific subject under research in this paper. After all,

there is no such thing as a general role theory, and its framework works best when fitted to

specific contexts/actors. There is thus a need to site a calibrated role theory-based

framework within the specific policy context of ESDP, thus allowing for a systematic

analysis of the Presidencys roles within it.

It has been argued above that the (re)creation of role conceptions and role

expectations is affected by several elements and that, in order to understand what

constitutes them and makes them change, it is important to look at the (multiple) sources of

these role concepts. According to the literature (both on foreign policy and on the

Presidency), these sources include elements both at structural and actor levels (cf. Figure

4). This is, to a large extent, an artificial distinction in the sense that a mutual relation holds

between many (if not all) of these elements, which are anyway bounded by a mixed or grey

intermediate area. However, their separation remains useful for analytical purposes.

Building on all these bodies of literature, a comprehensive and applied framework

will strive parsimoniously to consolidate their contributions in framing a list of sources

better able to explain variations in Presidencys role in the realm of ESDP. That list is next

put forward here.


20/30


20

On the one hand, Presidency role conceptions and expectations are constrained by

factors that can be described as structural. These include those elements usually external

or given to the actor in question (that is, the Member State holding the Presidency),

which will mostly predate its time at the helm of the EU. These factors tend to be relatively

stable over time, changing either very gradually over long periods of timeor suddenly but

very rarely. Given the mutually constitutive nature of institutions and agents, though, this

means that these factors, as they are received by the Member State the moment it accedes

to the Presidency, will most likely reflect elements (perhaps previously negotiated by that

agent and/or other relevant policy actors) to a degree built into the process of European

integration and its institutions.

This paper suggests that in the case of the Presidencys role in ESDP, these structural

or institutional elements can pertain either to the nature of the policy field in question or to

the characteristics of the Presidencys role. Thus, the following structural variables at least

should be taken into consideration (see Table 1 below): at a broader level, the international

context and the EUs overall security ambitions in the global arena; regarding the ESDP

area, the EUs institutional architecture (especially the other relevant actors involved in the

area and their preferences and resources) and its legal framework relating to the sector,

namely in terms of applicable decision-making procedures and available policy

instruments and capabilities; and regarding the office of the Presidency, its main (legal)

features and resources as well as the formal and informal functions associated with the

chair.

On the other hand, the actor-level sources of roles are those that are specific to the

actor, being brought into play on account of its own nature and characteristics. For the

purposes of this project, these internal features are the characteristics of the Member

State holding the Presidency at any given moment (though this class could designate the

characteristics of any other entity holding this position). Building once more on the

literature and on the researchers personal experience, these should include the following:

that Member States international reputation and status, its national identity and culture, the

political priorities pursued by the Presidency, its material attributes or capabilities (both

from a financial and from a human-resources perspective), and its level of preparation,

experience and expertise in manipulating the Presidency and the main topics on its agenda.

There is one last source of roles that is relevant for this paper and to which none of

the authors who focus on the Presidency has explicitly referred to as an important factor in

determining Presidency roles. Schout and Vanhoonacker (2006) use the expression


21/30


contingent factors to refer

namely the EU context an

Though these authors spread

have probably categorised

area would likely concern

office at that moment in ti

contingent factors, an exp

thus relatively unpredictabl

arena falling within a Presi

above defined) nor actor-rel

analysis because such unfor

ESDP actions, the redefiniti

(and subsequently role-play

the area in question is mos

treated in categorical term

Presidency should expect to

Figure 5. General Analyti

The result, as represe

hand the interaction betwee

10

to a series of elements particular to a given

Presidency-holding Member States dome

their attention across policy spheres, the ele

s contingent factors conditioning Presiden

he particular characteristics of the ESDP a

e. This paper, however, assumes a differen

ession taken to refer in this work only to

events and crises in the international sec

encys term. These factors are neither exa

ated in their nature. They are nonetheless r

seen international events and crises could

on of ESDP activities or affect Presidency

ing and performance) regarding this field.

ly concern with crisis management, thoug

s as expected unforeseen events, in th

have to deal with some of these.

al framework for analysis of the EU Presidencys

ted by Figure 5, is a complex framework

n role sources located at different levels (

Natlia Leal

21

moment in time,

stic environment.

ments they would

cy actions in this

d the Presidency

t interpretation of

ircumstantial and

rity and political

ctly structural (as

elevant for a role

otentially prompt

role conceptions

Precisely because

, these should be

sense that any

roles in ESDP

ombining on one

the distinct green


22/30


22

circles) and, on the other hand, these sources influence in the construction and enactment

of roles (the white octagons and the squares).

In short and as suggested above, the factors that may explain variations in the

Presidencys role in the field of ESDP can be attributable mainly to three plus one levels

or origins: to the broader (international or EU) context, to features inherent to the office of

the Presidency, and to the characteristics of the Member State holding the office, in

addition to expected unforeseens. All can constrain and enable the possible roles that

each Presidency may play.Whereas the first type of sources of roles (structural) define (by

enabling and constraining) the context of possible actions, those resulting from the actor-

level may still impact on these by shaping actual role-playing and role performance.

This threefold perspective is also consistent with Aggestams ideas for a structuration

approach based on the elements of intention (agent), institution (structure) and interaction,

respectively. In translating appropriate versions of these concepts, the current framework

incorporates both rules and reason.

Table 1. Sources of Presidencys roles in ESDP

- Unforeseen events and crisis (expected contingencies) [cf. section 8.2]

Structural level [cf. section 8.1]:

[EU/]ESDP:

- [Broader international security context and] EUs (global) ambitions and goalsin ESDP + policy record

- Other EU ESDP actors, their competencies, functions and preferences(rivalries)

- ESDP policy instruments- ESDP decision-making procedures- ESDP resources

PRES:

- Main legal characteristics, formal functions, and resources of PRES- Other informal or traditional rules and functions- PRES policy-making tools- Topics inherited from preceding PRES

Actor-level [cf. sections 8.3 and 9.1]:

- International reputation and status- National attributes, namely related to its identity and culture (values and ideas,

history, type of society, domestic political context), and especially those

related to crisis management

- General approach to the EU context (e.g. pro-integration?) and to the PRES,especially preparation, experience (previous PRES?), and expertise

(knowledge of policy area/specific issues)

- Political priorities: national interests and PRES goals- Material attributes (or resources) for PRES, incl. financial and human

resources, namely the PRES team and especially individual chairpersons as

well as their distance from the capital (or margin of manoeuvre)


23/30


23

The framework proposed in this paper, and already suggested by previous figures, is

summarized in Table 1 above, which highlights the factors (that is, the sources of roles)

that contribute particularly to the definition of different role conceptions and expectations

for each specific Presidency.

Each of these sources of role conceptions and expectations lends itself to study by

researchers, and cumulatively they account for almost all Presidency policy behaviour and

performance. The role sources are intended to cover the spectrum of potential features

capable of shaping each individual Presidency. Researchers looking into Presidency

behaviour and performance can, thus, use this Table as a template to analyse (or compare)

in a rather comprehensive and theoretically more inclusive way different Member State

Presidencies. Role sources weighting and hierarchical order of importance in determining

a Presidencys enactment (and performance), however, will vary between Presidencies.

Most of the structural aspects proposed might equally apply in other EU policy areas,

given due adaptation to that new policy field. For example, the decision-making

procedures, available instruments and other actors in the field will always shape actors

role conceptions in any concrete policy area we may care to consider. As a general

framework, however, this particular role theory approach might at least begin to categorise

the role of other actors in other policy areas. The theoretical framework conceivably lends

itself to generalisation (or has a potential for replicability). Table 2 below schematises the

elements of a more general role theory approach that can be modified and applied to other

EU actors and policy areas.

What this table seeks to highlight is that any study of EU policy processes needs to

take into account the main characteristics that define the identity of the policy area and

actor(s) in question, as well as considering features of roles under investigation and other

case-specific elements. For example, this Table 13 could now be applied to the same ESDP

area and Presidential role but to the person of the HR for FASP as a new office-holder (and

to the European Council President at that level only), instead of a specific Member State.

In this sense, the paper suggests ways forward for research, through the

recalibration of its basic framework and role-theory assumptions to different actors,

different policy areas, or even simply different time-periods of analysis.


24/30


24

Table 2. Sources of EU policy actors roles

Structural level:

. Related to the EU and the policy area (CM or other):

- Broader international context in that sphere- EUs ambitions and goals related to policy area & record of activities/status of

play- Other relevant policy actors, their competencies, functions and preferences- Available policy instruments and resources related to policy area- Applicable decision-making procedures

. Related to the role under research:

- Main legal characteristics and formal functions required by role- Other informal or traditional rules and functions- Role-related resources and instruments- Other inherited topics and responsibilities from previous role-holders

Actor-level (collective or individual):

- Collective or personal reputation and status- Collective or personal attributes, namely related to agents identity and culture,and especially those that related to the policy area under consideration- General approach to EU integration and to the role in question (especially

preparation, previous experience, and expertise)

- (Political) priorities for policy area and ability to project individualpersonalities and goals

- Available material attributes (incl. financial and human resources)- (Process and topic) experience and expertise

Contingent factors (e.g. ongoing crises and events) and/or other elements specific

to that policy area

Furthermore, future research on the paper topic, now that the basic role sources have

been identified, should equally consider the option of comparative analysis, across any of

these dimensions (that is, policy area, actor or time). Such a project could bring to bear

several insights on the relative degree of importance of each role source in determining a

Presidencys behaviour in taking forward certain policies. The identification of different

policy outcomes in this realm may also be useful in generating better, more systematic

assessments of Presidencies role performance in the ESDP field.

VI. ConclusionAs an analytical and conceptual framework, role theory seems to offer interesting

tools to analyse Presidency roles and the factors shaping them. According to this approach,

roles (understood as role-playing and role performance, that is, as actual behaviour and its

subsequent policy outcomes) are formed from the constant interaction between ego role

conceptions and alterrole expectations. In turn, role conceptions and expectations derive

from an ever evolving combination of role sources, as these are spun out of features


25/30


25

particular to actors and to the context. Agent and structure come into play through the

mediating variable of role and its concepts. The nature of ESDP and its focus on crisis

management also requires the analysis of contingent factors.

Overall, the adapted role theory framework proposed seems to be adequate to

capturing variation in actors roles, especially in factoring in other relevant works

contributions and in making use of an exhaustive list of role sources set out on a systematic

basis. For instance, the adapted framework retains relevant notions both of structure and

agency and of their interplay (thus bearing comparison with some new institutionalist

approaches), as well as holding on to a conception of each policy area as a specific context

in which clusters of more or less expert actors interact to advance their interests in that

domain (as inspired by literature on policy networks).

As inadequate as the expression role theory may be in referring to the current

conceptual and analytical framework, this paper argues that it can have added-value in the

analysis of EU policy and actors, and can contribute towards a better understanding of the

role of the Presidency in ESDP. Much of what Walker (Walker 1987: 2-3) said back in

1987 about the usefulness of role theory for foreign policy analysis seems to hold true for

the subject of this paper also:

While it is still premature to reach any firm conclusions, the potential utility of roleanalysis for understanding foreign policy appears to be threefold: it has descriptive,

organizational, and explanatory value. Descriptively, the concepts associated with role

analysis provide a vocabulary of images which can focus upon foreign policy behavior at

the national level of analysis, shift down to the individual level of analysis, and also move

up to the systemic level of analysis [...]. The concepts of role analysis not only have

multilevel descriptive power; they also take on multidimensional scope in their application

to foreign policy behavior. The types of foreign policy roles identified by Holsti (1970),

Wish (1980), and M. Hermann et al. (1982b), for example, transcend the narrow

conceptualization of foreign policy behavior as a continuum of cooperative and conflictual

behavior.

Organizationally, in addition to multilevel and multidimensional capabilities, the

concepts associated with role analysis permit the analyst to adopt either a structure-oriented or a process-oriented perspective. [...]

One criticism of role theory has been that it tends to be conceptually rich but

methodologically poor [...], which makes its explanatory value questionable [...]

Consequently the explanatory value of role analysis appears to depend upon whether its

concepts are theoretically informed (a) by an appropriate set of self-contained propositions

and methods, or (b) by the specification of an appropriate set of auxiliary limiting

conditions and rules linking these conditions with role concepts. Propriety, in turn, would

appear to be a function of context defined as a particular domain of behavior. (Walker

1987: 2-3)

Role theory, therefore, may have its handicaps but is not devoid of utility: it can offeruseful insights for understanding the role of the Presidency in ESDP. A leading theoretical


26/30


26

proposition, for instance, is that role sources will shape ego role conceptions and alterrole

expectations, a claim that can be empirically verified with particular Presidency case-

studies. In addition, role theory and the framework proposed recognise the intrinsic

multiple nature of role conceptions and expectations (partly by virtue of a multiplicity of

role sources), their mutually constitutive character and their constant interaction through

processes of social learning. The framework therefore allows for the combination of role

source elements that other theories would have separated or even excluded from

consideration. In this regard, it is a more comprehensive and consolidated analytical

approach.

Even though not fully explored here, the proposed framework also acknowledges

that EU Presidential teams and their nominated Committee chairpersons especially occupy

a delicate (professional) position, having to balance national and European interests,

individual and collective preferences and a concern for both tangible results and

appropriate behaviour. These split interests will further have to dovetail with their other

life-roles not directly related to their professional performances. Role conflict is an

inherent feature of any European policy process and its actors, perhaps especially in the

CFSP sphere.

This paper sought to contribute to better understanding a generally neglected but

central actor in EU politics, specifically illuminating its behaviour in the ESDP area. The

author hopes that Carl Backmans (1970: 319) statement also holds true for this research:

[...] the question was raised as to whether role theory could aid in an understanding of

international relations, both in terms of organizing what is currently known and by

suggesting testable hypotheses that might extend our knowledge. Professor Hosltis work,

along with some of the extensions suggested [...], provides some basis for optimism. While

only more empirical research will provide a conclusive answer, this may well be an

instance where borrowing a theory has paid off.

VII. ReferencesAggestam, L. (1999). Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy.

ARENA Working Papers 99/8. Available from:

www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers1999/papers/wp99_8.htm.

Aggestam, L. (2006). Role theory and European foreign policy: a framework of analysis.

In: Elgstrm, O. and Smith, M. eds. The European Union's Roles in International

Politics. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science. London:

Routledge & ECPR, pp. 11-29.


27/30


27

Backman, C. W. (1970). Role Theory and International Relations: A Commentary and

Extension.International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), pp. 310-319.

Bertrand, A. L. (1972). Social Organization: A General Systems and Role Theory

Perspective. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co.

Biddle, B. J. (1961). The Present Status of Role Theory. Columbia, Missouri: University of

Missouri (Reprint).

Biddle, B. J. and Thomas, E. J. (1966). The Nature and History of Role Theory. In: Biddle,

B. J. and Thomas, E. J. eds.Role theory: concepts and research. New York: Wiley,

pp. 3-19.

Biddle, B. J. and Thomas, E. J. eds. ([1966]). Role theory: concepts and research. New

York: Wiley.

CEU (2006). Council Guide: The Presidency Handbook. Luxembourg: Office for OfficialPublications of the European Communities.

Drake, H. (2001). France on trial? The challenge of change and the French presidency of

the European Union, July-December 2000.Modern & Contemporary France, 9(4),

pp. 453-466.

Elgstrm, O. (2002). Dull but Successful the Swedish Presidency JCMS: Journal of

Common Market Studies, 40(Annual review), pp. 45-48.

Elgstrm, O. (2003). Introduction. In: Elgstrm, O. ed. European Union Council

Presidencies: A Comparative Analysis. Routledge Advances in European Politics.

London & New York: Routledge, an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books Ltd, pp. 1-

17.

Elgstrm, O. (2006). The Presidency: The Role(s) of the Chair in European Union

Negotiation. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1(2), pp. 171-195.

Elgstrm, O. and Smith, M. (2006). Introduction. In: Elgstrm, O. and Smith, M. eds. The

European Union's Roles in International Politics. Routledge/ECPR Studies in

European Political Science. London: Routledge & ECPR, pp. 1-10.

European Council (1999). Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the

Common European Policy on Security and Defence. Cologne European Council

Presidency Conclusions, 4 June 1999.

Faia, M. A. (1980). Teaching, Research, and Role Theory. Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, 448, The Academic Profession (Mar.,

1980), pp. 36-45.

Germany (2007?). What is the Presidency? [Online] German Presidency. Available from:

http://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.

html [Accessed 03-07-2010].


28/30


28

Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006a). The Council of Ministers. The European

Union series. 2nd

revised and updated edn. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006b). Taking Turns at the Wheel: the Presidency.

In: Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. eds. The Council of Ministers. 2nd

edn.Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hermann, M. G. and Hermann, C. F. (1989). Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and

How: An Empirical Inquiry.International Studies Quarterly, 33(4), pp. 361-387.

Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.

International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), pp. 233-309.

Hudson, V. M. (1999). Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nations' Foreign

Policy Action Templates. Political Psychology, 20(4), pp. 767-801.

ISS (2006). EU security and defence: Core documents 2005. Chaillot Paper 75. Vol. VI.

Paris: Institute for Security Studies - European Union.

ISS (2007).EU security and defence: Core documents 2006. Chaillot Paper 98. Vol. VII.

Paris: Institute for Security Studies - European Union.

Jackson, J. A. ed. (1972).Role. Sociological Studies 4.Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Kajn, S. (2009). The Slovenian Presidency: Meeting Symbolic and Substantive

Challenges.JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(1), pp. 89-98.

Kietz, D. (2008). The Presidency in the Council System: Functions, Scope for Manoeuvre

and Room for Improvement. In: Kietz, D. and Perthes, V. eds. The Potential of the

Council Presidency: An Analysis of Germanys Chairmanship of the EU, 2007.

SWP Research Paper. Berlin.

Kirchner, E. J. (1992). Decision-making in the European Community: the Council

Presidency and European integration. Manchester; New York Manchester

University Press.

Magid, A. (1980). Review: "Role Theory," Political Science, and African Studies. World

Politics, 32(2), pp. 311-330.

Metcalfe, D. (1998). Leadership in European Union Negotiations: The Presidency of the

Council.International Negotiation, 3, pp. 413434.

Ojanen, H. and Vuohula, E. (2007). The Finnish Presidency: Efficiency Before Eloquence?

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(Annual review), pp. 17-24.

Paasilehto, A. M. I. (2002). Does size Matter? Evaluating differential Member State

performance in the Council Presidency of the European Union. Politics andInternational Relations. Canterbury: University of Kent at Canterbury. MA.


29/30


29

Quaglia, L. and Moxon-Browne, E. (2006). What Makes a Good EU Presidency? Italy and

Ireland Compared.JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(2), pp. 349-368.

Sarbin, T. R. and Allen, V. L. (1968). Role Theory. In: Lindzey, G. and Aronson, E. eds.

Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. I. 2nd

ed. London: Addison-Wesley, pp. 488-567.

Schout, A. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2006). Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the

EU: Revisiting Nice.Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(5), pp. 1051-1077.

Searing, D. D. (1991). Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism. The

American Political Science Review, 85(4), pp. 1239-1260.

Shepherd, A. J. K. (2008). From Kosovo to Kosova? The Transformation of ESDP and its

Contribution to Global Conflict Management. Whitman, R. and Wolff, S. eds.

ECPR 2008 Joint Sessions, Rennes, France, 11-16 April 2008.

Singer, J. D. ed. (1965). Human Behavior and International Politics: Contributions from

the Social-Psychological Sciences. Rand McNally Political Science Series.

Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.

Slovenia (2008?). What is the EU Council Presidency? [Online] Slovenian Presidency of

the EU. Available from:

http://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.

html [Accessed 03-07-2010].

Tallberg, J. (2003). The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency.Journal of

European Public Policy, 10(1), pp. 1-19.

Tallberg, J. (2006). Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Tallberg, J. (2008). The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership by the Council Presidency.

In: Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. eds. Unveiling the Council of the European Union:

Games Governments Play in Brussels. Palgrave Studies in European Union

Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 187-202.

Thomson, R. (2008). The Council Presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with

Power.Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(3), pp. 593-617.

Walker, S. G. ed. (1987).Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.Durham [N.C.]: Duke

Press Policy Studies, Duke University Press.

Wallace, H. (1985). The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European

Community: Task and evolution. In: O'Nuallain, C. ed. The Presidency of the

European Council of Ministers: impacts and implications for national

governments. London, Sydney & Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm, pp. 1-22.

Westlake, M. (1999). The Council of the European Union. Rev. edn. London: John Harper.


30/30


Westlake, M. and Galloway, D. (2004). The Council of the European Union. 3rd

edn.

London: John Harper.

Wish, N. B. (1987). National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions. In:

Walker, S. G. ed. Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. Durham: DukeUniversity Press, pp. 94-108, plus appendix one.

Using role theory better to understand EU Presidencies (and their role in ESDP) [UACES Paper]

Documents

Transcript of Using role theory better to understand EU Presidencies (and their role in ESDP) [UACES Paper]