U.S. Racketeering & Extortion Trial

8/9/2019 U.S. Racketeering & Extortion Trial

1/18

KENNETH M. WILKINSON RECORD RACKETEERING & EXTORTION

$24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT ISSUED AS MANDATES JUNE 11, 2009

1. The publicly recorded $24.30 money judgment issued as mandate June 11, 2009. See

Doc. ## 365 (p. 1), 386-3 (p. 1).

$24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT UNDER FRAP 39, COSTS2. The $24.30money judgment was awarded pursuant to Rule 39, Fed.R.App.P.

COPY OF $24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT, DOC. # 386-33. A copy of the final$24.30 money judgment issued as mandate was included in Defendant

Appellees facially fraudulent motion for issuance of a writ of execution, Doc. # 386. Seepages 10 and 24.

4. Of the $29.70 requested in Racketeer Wilkinsons Bill of Costs, Doc. # 386, the 11th

Circuit

allowed $24.30 forCosts under FRAP 39:

$24.30 WERE THE ALLOWED ACTUAL AND NECESSARY COSTS

5. Here, $24.30 were the allowed actual and necessary costs.

$24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL ON JUNE 15, 20096. Pursuant to Doc. ## 365 (p. 1), 386-3 (p. 1), the U.S. District Court received and filed the

$24.30money judgment on June 15, 2009:

RACKETEERING: EXTORTION OF MONEY:

FRIVOLOUS APPEAL MOTION WAS ADMITTEDLY NEVERFILED

7. Defendant Racketeer Wilkinson extorted money, Doc. # 386, by fraudulently pretending

aRule 38 motion, which Wilkinson knew he had neverfiled:

The Judgment4. On August 22, 2008, Wilkinson filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Eleventh

Circuit Rule 27-4

Said Rule 27-4 motion could not havepossibly been for a frivolous appeal.


2/18

2

RACKETEERING & EXTORTION IN VIOLATION OF:

FED.R.CIV.P. 54; LOCAL RULE 4.18; 28 U.S.C. 1921-1924

LOCAL RULE 4.18 APPLICATIONS FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY'S FEES

(a) In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, all claims for costs or attorney's feespreserved by appropriate pleading or pretrial stipulation shall be asserted by separate

motion or petition filed not later than fourteen (14) days following the entry ofjudgment. The pendency of an appeal from the judgment shall not postpone the filingof a timely application pursuant to this rule.

REQUIREMENTS UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1920-1924

Itemization was for$24.30. No documentation for$24.30.

Bill of Costs was for$24.30.

Bill of Costs must be verifiedas required by 28 U.S.C. 1924. No known affidavit.

Plaintiff(s) objected to the $24.30.


3/18


4/18

4 - 2212/1/09

RULE 4.18 APPLICATIONS FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY'S FEES

(a) In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, all claims for costs or attorney's fees preservedby appropriate pleading or pretrial stipulation shall be asserted by separate motion or petition filednot later than fourteen (14) days following the entry of judgment. The pendency of an appeal fromthe judgment shall not postpone the filing of a timely application pursuant to this rule.


5/18


6/18

Search Law School Search Corne

LII / Legal Information Institutehome search find a lawyer donate

main page search | civi l procedure overv iew

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

VII. JUDGMENT > Rule 54. Prev | Nex

(a) Definition; Form.

Judgment as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which

an appeal lies. A judgment should not include recitals of pleadings, a master's

report, or a record of prior proceedings.

(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple

Parties.

When an action presents more than one claim for relief whether as a claim,

counterclaim, c rossclaim, or third-party c laim or when multiple parties are

involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,

but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that

there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision,

however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights

and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any

of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a

judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.

(c) Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted.

A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is

demanded in the pleadings. Every other f inal judgment should grant the relief

to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief

in its pleadings.

(d) Costs; Attorneys Fees.

(1) Costs Other than Attorneys Fees.

Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,

costs other than attorney's fees should be allowed to the prevailing

party. But c osts against the United States, its officers, and its agencies

may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs

on 14 days' notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the court may

review the clerk's action.

(2) Attorneys Fees.

(A) Claim to Be by Motion. A claim for attorney's fees and relatednontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law

requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.

(B) Timing and Contents of the Motion. Unless a statute or a court order

provides otherwise, the motion must:

(i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment;

(ii) specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling

the movant to the award;

(iii) state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it; and

(iv) disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about

fees for the services for which the claim is made.

Donations cover only

20% of our costs.

Notes

Law About ... Civil

Procedure

Attorneys: reach

interested c lients by

sponsoring an LII page

Rule 54. Judgments; Costs

Divorce Attorney

SW FLAMartin Law Firm,

P.L. Divorce

Attorney in Cape

Coralwww.mlg-legal.com

Adams &

Associates PAKnow your

Bankruptcy

Rights. Call for

Free Consultation.www.richardadamslaw.c

Don't Pay Debt

CollectorsSue Harassing

Debt Collectors.

Make Them PayYou. 100% Free &

Fast HelpWeStopDebtCollectors.

Divorce

Attorneys

Life is Better after

Divorce 30 years

combined

experiencewww.roberts-robold.com

7/30/2010 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule

www.law.cornell.edu//Rule54.htm 1


7/18


8/18


9/18

Buy Document Now

United States v. Lasteed

U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com

Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com

November 24, 1987

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

RONALD ALBERT LASTEED, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

F. Lee Bailey, Daniel Patrick Leonard Bailey & Fishman, for Appe llant.

Leon B. Kellner, U.S. Attorney, Samuel Rosenthal, Chief, Criminal Appe llate Section, Department o f Justice, Joel M. Gershowitz,

Department of Justice, for Appellee.

Hill and Vance, Circuit Judges, and Propst,*fn* District Judge.

Author: Vance

Vance, Circuit Judge:

This case presents an intricate timing issue involving a retrial, an interlocutory appea l followed by an intercircuit transfer, and an

uncertain period of excludable de lay under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161. The que stion is whe ther the 70 day period

following a mistrial within which a defendant must be tried again begins to run when the court of appeals issues its mandate, or

when the d istrict court receives the mandate. We affirm the district court's ruling in this case that the clock begins to run against the

government upon the d istrict court's receipt of the mandate .

I.

Appellant Ronald Lasteed was indicted along w ith Joseph Peeples for mail and w ire fraud, inducing interstate travel in execution of a

fraudulent scheme, and consp iracy to commit these offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1342, 1343, 2314, and 371. Appellant was

tried originally in October, 1984 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. On October 10, 1984 the district

court declared a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct. In August, 1985 the district court in Texas denied defendant's motion

to dismiss,*fn1 but granted defendant's motion to change venue to the Un ited States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida. Defendant took an interlocutory appeal of the Texas district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, refusing to d ismiss the indictment. The Fifth Circuit issued its mandate on March 13, 1986.

Appellant contends tha t the Speedy Trial Act's 70 day period commenced on that date .

The district court in Florida d id not receive the Fifth Circuit's mandate until May 19, 1986, more than two months after it was

issued.*fn2 The government contends tha t the Speedy Trial Act's 70 day period commenced on tha t date. On June 6 defendant filed

a motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, which the district court denied on June 23.

At the second trial, there was evidence that appellant had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain money from investors by

falsely representing that he had invented a process for transforming wate r into combustible fuel.*fn3 Appellant called the product of

this process "Ionagen," and claimed it was a gasoline substitute.*fn4 There w as evidence that appellant made numerous other

false statements and misrepresentations relating to his education, background, other investors in the Ionagen process, and

governmental interest in his work. The prosecution also produced various wire transmissions and recordings of meetings between

appe llant and Al Hill, Jr., a potential investor in the scheme.

II.

7/29/2010 FindACase | United States v. Lasteed

findacase.com//wfrmDocViewer.aspx 1


10/18

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 425 Filed 02/02/10 Page 1 of 1


11/18


12/18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER

FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN

PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT ASPRIVATE ATTORNEY(S) GENERAL,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 1-2010-cv-000_____

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES COURTS, UNITED STATES

CUSTOM & IMMIGRATION SERVICE, TONY WEST, BEVERLY B. MARTIN,JOHN EDWIN STEELE, RYAN BARRY, CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL,

SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, KENNETH M. WILKINSON, RICHARD A.

LAZZARA, JACK N. PETERSON, RYAN BARRY, DREW HEATHCOAT, BETTYEG. SAMUEL, STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR, GERALD B. TJOFLAT, SUSAN H. BLACK,JOEL F. DUBINA, SHERRI L. JOHNSON, EUGENE C. TURNER, LEE COUNTY,

FL, COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONERS, ED CARNES, JOHN E. MANNING,

U.S. RACKETEERING AGENTS, HUGH D. HAYES, JOHN LEY, RICHARDJESSUP, DIANE NIPPER, LYNN GERALD, JR., KENNETH L. RYSKAMP,

CHARLIE CRIST, CHARLES BARRY STEVENS, JOHNSON ENGINEERING,

INC., MARK ALLAN PIZZO, ANNE CONWAY, CHARLIE GREEN, REAGANKATHLEEN RUSSELL, RICHARD D. DEBOEST, II, CHENE M. THOMPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND $19,000,000.00__________________________________________________________________________/

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMPLAINT OF RACKETEERING, EXTORTION, PUBLIC CORRUPTION

IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,

20TH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEE & COLLIER COUNTIES, FL, AND OF

UNLAWFUL AND CRIMINAL ACTS BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS & OFFICIALS

IN THEIR PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES OUTSIDE ANY IMMUNITY

COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1964, 1961-1968

COMPLAINT OF GOVERNMENTS MALICIOUS CIRCULAR ARGUMENT

FOR PURPOSES OF RACKETEERING, EXTORTION, AND RETALIATION:

THE CONCLUSIVELY PROVEN ALLEGATIONS ARE FRIVOLOUS.

THEREFORE THE CASE IS FIXED AS FRIVOLOUS.

REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HAGUE

[PAGES TOTAL: 196 + 213 (Exhibits)]


13/18


14/18


15/18


16/18


17/18


18/18

U.S. Racketeering & Extortion Trial

Documents

Transcript of U.S. Racketeering & Extortion Trial