Understanding childbearing in Europe

ICS Conference “Problematics of natality in Portugal”, Lisbon, 15 January 2014

Tomáš SobotkaVienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Wittgenstein

Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital

European fertility ups and downs

Distinct period “waves” in European fertility after 1990 The 1990s: Fertility declines to record-low levels 2000s: Fertility reversal, increasing period TFRs (ex. In PT) After 2008: Mostly declining fertility after the onset of the recession,

especially in Southern Europe

Shift towards later childbearing: strong influence on fertility trends

Economic uncertainty closely linked to fertility

Interrelated changes in values, family, gender relations, education

Worries about too low birth rates, diverse policy responses

The return of pro-natalism in policy debates

Jacques Chirac (1984): “In demographic term, Europe is vanishing. Twenty years or so from now, our countries will be empty” (Teitelbaum, 2000).

Pritchett and Viarengo (2012: 55): Large parts of Europe committing “gradual demographic suicide”

Agenda

• European fertility trends and the shift to delayed childbearing• The “Great Recession” and fertility• Reproductive preferences• Government responses to low fertility & policy debates• Discussion: Low fertility in Portugal in a (Southern) European context

Data: Eurostat, Human Fertility Database, national statistical offices, VID, own computations, surveys (GGS, FFS, EVS, other)

Regions: following main geographic, cultural, economic, welfare and demographic divisions

- Western, Northern (Nordic), Southern Europe, “German-speaking” countries

- Central, South-eastern, Eastern Europe (EU regions in blue, except NO, ICE, CH)

European fertility trends and the shift to delayed childbearing

Period Total Fertility: North & West vs. South & Centre & East?

Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices Data

Period Total Fertility: Parallel trends in Portugal and Spain

Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices Data

The shift to a later childbearing: Mean age at first birth in selected countries

Source: Sobotka 2013; computations from the Human Fertility Database, Eurostat and data from national statistical offices

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Mea

n ag

e at

firs

t birt

h

Western & Northern EuropeSpainCentral EuropeEastern EuropeUnited StatesPortugal

Portugal

The „postponement transition“: Key driving factors and consequences

Key driving factors:

• Expansion of university education, especially among women– Enrollment in education not compatible with parenthood

– Women with tertiary education aged 30-34 in Portugal: 13% in 2001-> 31% in 2011 (OECD Education at a Glance 2014)

• Economic uncertainty: unemployment, job instability, low wages– Particularly prominent in Southern and Eastern Europe

• Unaffordable housing, limited rental market

• Efficient contraception, available abortion and “morning after” pill

• Delayed partnership formation

• Changed family values and preferences; higher acceptance of childlessness, preference for non-family lifestyles

Why does delayed childbearing affect period fertility?

The “tempo effect”:

• Shifting age at childbearing the most important factor influencing short-term shifts in period total fertility rate (TFR) in Europe

• Also “explaining” extreme low TFR levels (<1.3) (Sobotka 2004, Goldstein et al. 2009)

Why?

• Births “postponed” in 2010 are simply not realised in that year

• This may not affect generation’s (cohort) fertility rate

• However, late age at childbearing also increases the risk of infertility and of not realising the “delayed” birth later in life

Demographic analysis: Two ways to address tempo effects

1) Computing alternative fertility indicators aiming to control for it

2) Looking at the “real” (completed) fertility of women aged over 40

Fertility in selected European countries, 2009-11: conventional and tempo-adjusted TFR

Data Source: European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014)

1.37 1.38 1.39

1.39

1.54

1.79

1.92 1.

99 2.02

1.60

1.93

1.53

1.66

1.66

1.60 1.62

1.90

2.19

1.99

2.14

1.80

2.24

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2.40TFR 2010

adjusted TFRp* (2009-11)

Cohort fertility trends and variation

• Considerably higher completed fertility (CTFR) than the period TFR

• In most countries, a stabilisation or slight increases projected in the 1970s cohorts (Myrskylä et al. 2013, Prioux et al. 2013, European Demographic Data Sheet 2014)

• Earlier cohort fertility decline in Europe overshadowed by falling family size in East Asia

Expected European CTFR range, 1975 cohort:

1.4 in Spain, 1.46 in Italy vs. 2.1 in Ireland, 2.04 in Norway and 2.02 in France

• Portugal: shifting from a higher-ranking fertility to one of the lowest-fertility countries in Europe

• Trend Portugal, alongside Spain, resembles a fast fertility fall in East Asia

Cohort fertility trends and variation

Observed and projected completed cohort fertility in selected regions in Europe, East Asia and in the United States, women born 1960-79

Myrskylä, M., J. Goldstein, and Y. Alice Cheng. 2013. “New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises, Falls, and Reversals.” Popul. Dev. Rev. 39 (1): 31–56

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

Nordiccountries

WesternEurope

Central &EasternEurope

Germany,Austria,

Switzerland

SouthernEurope

Portugal UnitedStates

East Asia

Coho

rt fe

rtilit

y (c

hild

ren

per w

oman

)

1960

1970

1979

Contrasting patterns of family building, selected countries

Number of children ever born, female birth cohorts ca. 1968

Data based on Human Fertility Database and ONS (for England and Wales).

Share of women withCompleted fertility at 1.80 or higher Country No children 1 child 2 children 3+ children CTFR

Higher, 2 or 3 children model Norway 11.6 14.6 42.2 31.7 2.04Higher, polarised England & Wales 20 14 38 28 1.91Higher, 2-child model, low childlessnessCzech Republic 7.9 19.5 53.6 19.0 1.89Completed fertility below 1.70

Low, 1-child model Russia 7.9 40.2 39.4 12.5 1.62Low, polarised Austria 21.5 22.8 38.0 17.8 1.59Low, few large families model Spain 16.8 28.1 44.1 11.0 1.52

• no systematic difference in childlessness between the countries with higher and lower completed fertility

The “Great Recession” and fertility

COMMON PRECONDITIONS FOR FAMILY FORMATION in contemporary Europe

• Completing education

• Achieving relatively stable employment

• Accumulating resources (including sufficient housing)

• (Own housing: especially Southern Europe)

• Having a stable partner (marriage no longer necessary)

• Feeling ready for parenthood

– Not only support for families, but also living conditions and choices of young adults in pre-family stage matter

– >2008: Economic position of young adults deteriorating rapidly in most countries; potentially negative effects on family formation and fertility

The economic recession in Europe

Main pathways how the recession affected partnership formation and fertility

Unemployment, employment instability: loss of resources, inability to accumulate resources, uncertainty about future, inability to make binding long-term decisions

“Frozen” housing market, construction & mortgage lending Government cuts, also in social and family-related spending often affect

especially the young Stronger enrollment in university education & later home leaving? Wasted generation?

EU-27: 14% young adults (age 18-24) NEETs; (Not in Employment, Education or Training) in 2013; rapid increase across Southern Europe to 29% in IT+GR, 24% in ESP, 19% in PT

Strong effect of economic instability identified for first births and partnership formation (also indirect effect on first births); especially for men (Adsera 2005, 2009, 2011; Pailhe 2009; Neels et al 2012; Schmitt 2012; Sobotka et al. 2011)

Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 2000-2013 (Southern Europe, EU, France)

Source: Own computations based on Eurostat 2014 and national statistical offices data

Pre-recession: 2000-2008

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

France

EU

Italy

Greece

Portugal

Spain

Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 2000-2013 (Southern Europe, EU, France)

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

France

EU

Italy

Greece

Portugal

Spain

Which countries most affected? Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)

Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most affected

GDP UNEMPL. EMPLOYMENT HH INCOME NEETS young WORKLESS HHBuying FOOD TOTAL(<-3%) (>+5%) (<-3% or more) (<-3%) (>15%) (>2%) (>+3%) SCORE

Greece x x x x x x x 7Ireland x x x x x x x 7Italy x x x x x x 6Spain x x x x x x 6Portugal x x x x x 5Hungary x x x x 4Estonia x x x x 4Slovenia x x x x 4Iceland x x x 3Slovakia x x 2Denmark x x 2Finland x 1

USA x x x x 4

OECD countries

Which countries most affected? Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)

Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most affected

OECD countriesGDP UNEMPL. EMPLOYMENT HH INCOME NEETS young WORKLESS HHBuying FOOD TOTAL(<-3%) (>+5%) (<-3% or more) (<-3%) (>15%) (>2%) (>+3%) SCORE

Greece x x x x x x x 7Ireland x x x x x x x 7Italy x x x x x x 6Spain x x x x x x 6Portugal x x x x x 5Hungary x x x x 4Estonia x x x x 4Slovenia x x x x 4Iceland x x x 3Slovakia x x 2Denmark x x 2USA x x x x 4

Economically most stressed

Economically stressed

Declines in period TFR between 2008 and 2012

-15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0

RussiaEuropean Union

Slovenia

OECD: 12 otherOECD: 4 economically stressed + USOECD: 5 economically most stressed

PortugalDenmark

SpainUS

Greece

Change in period TFR 2008-12 (%)

Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines among young adults

Changes in fertility rates by age, 2008-12: EU, Portugal, and 5 economically most stressed countries

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

15 20 25 30 35 40

% c

hang

e in

ferti

lity

rate

Age

EU

Economically most stressed

Portugal

2008-12 SOURCE:Own computations based on Eurostat database (2014)

Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines among young adults

Changes in fertility rates by age, pre-recession (2004-2008) compared with the recession (2008-12) period

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

15 20 25 30 35 40

% c

hang

e in

ferti

lity

rate

Age

EU

Economically most stressed

Portugal

2008-12-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

15 20 25 30 35 40

% c

hang

e in

ferti

lity

rate

Age

EU

Economically most stressed

Portugal

2004-2008

First births most affected – except in Southern Europe

Changes in fertility rates by birth order, in % (2008-12)

-16.0

-14.0

-12.0

-10.0

-8.0

-6.0

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

25 countries Southern Europe(GRE, ESP, PT)

Portugal

Perc

ent d

eclin

e in

ferti

lity

rate

s

1st births

2nd births

3rd births

Reproductive preferences

(a joint research with Eva Beaujouan (VID))

Fertility intentions and ideals in Europe

• Remarkable lack of variation, two-child family norm almost universal

• Also no systematic variation by social status, very little difference between men and women

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00

Mean intended family size (Men)

Mea

n in

tend

ed fa

mily

siz

e (W

omen

)

FFS surveys (1990s)

GGS surveys (2000s)

Mean intended family size of men and women aged 25-29, selected European countries, 1990s (FFS survey) and 2000s (GGS survey)

Mean, women

1990s (15 countries): 2.18

2000s (10 countries): 2.16

Fertility intentions and ideals in Portugal

Mean intended family size of women aged 25-29 in 10 European countries in 2000s (GGS survey): 2.16

Portugal, 2013, women aged 18-29

• Mean desired family size: 2.20

• Mean expected family size: 1.94

(Source: Inquérito à Fecundidade 2013, INE 2014, Figure 2.9)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Shar

e of

resp

onde

nts

with

a tw

o-ch

ild id

eal (

%) Maximum

75% (upper quartile)

Mean

25% (Lower quartile)

Minimum

Portugal

A convergence in two-child family size ideal in Europe?

Share of women aged 15-49 stating that an ideal family size is two (%);Summary of different surveys across Europe

SOURCE:Sobotka, T. and É. Beaujouan. 2014. “Two is best? The persistence of a two-child family ideal in Europe.” Population and Development Review 40(3): 391-419.

Portugal: Increasing small family size ideal?

Ideal family size in Portugal and Spain, 1981-2011; women aged 15-49 (different surveys)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1981EVS

1990EVS

1994ISP

1995EVS

2000WVS

2001EB

2006EB

2011EB

Mea

n id

eal f

amily

size

Perc

ent w

ith a

give

n id

eal Ideal of 2 children (%)

Ideal of 3+ children (%)

Ideal of 1 or no children (%)

Mean Ideal Family Size

Spain

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1990 EVS 2001 EB 2006 EB 2011 EB

Mea

n id

eal f

amily

size

Perc

ent w

ith a

give

n id

eal

Portugal

Source: Sobotka & Beaujouan 2014

Government responses to low fertility & policy debates

Source:somatosphere.net

Family policy agenda in Europe

1990s and 2000s: Strong interest of governments in family policies and potential effects of policies on birth rates

• Also clear from the regular UN survey on government views

• Increased spending in most OECD countries

• European Commission 2005: return to “demographic growth” one of three essential priorities

• EU: policies aiming to support combination of employment and family life and realisation of reproductive desires

Also promoting gender equality

Explicit policy goals (e.g., public childcare coverage for children below age 3)

• Eastern Europe: explicitly pro-natalist policies, also linked to conservative agenda and nationalistic ideology

2008: cuts in government spending on families in some countries

Many governments think fertility is too low

Government view on fertility level and government policy on fertility in 22 countries ever reaching a period total fertility rate of 1.40 or below

Source: UN reports, UN World Population Policy Database; http://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/about_database.aspx

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

1996 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

Num

ber o

f co

untr

ies w

ith a

giv

en v

iew

Fertility too low

Policy to raise fertility

Public family policy discussions: different ideological underpinning (stylised versions)

The “gender equality” or “feminist” discourse• Gender inequality seen as an unfair obstacle for women, but also

to fam. life and fertility (accentuated by Green + Soc. Dem. Parties)

• Policies improving early childcare provision, employment of women, equal pay, equal opportunities, and stronger involvement of fathers (including dedicated paternity & parental leaves)

The “conservative” discourse• Family instability and pressure on women to engage with career

often seen as reasons for low fertility

• Policies supporting marriage and married families with children

The “traditional,” “nationalistic,” or “anti-establishment” discourse• Low birth rates seen as a threat to the long-term survival of the

nation; usually concerned with the dominant ethnic group, often anti-migrant.

• Explicitly pronatalist policies, often targeting 2nd or 3rd births

Public family policy discussions: different ideological underpinning (2)

The “equalization” (socialist/left) discourse• Lack of resources (incl. housing) and income inequalities seen as

the main obstacles to starting or enlarging a family

• Promoting redistribution through taxes and benefits

The “liberal” discourse• Perceived need to broaden the choices and options of different

population groups

• Promoting more work and lifestyle flexibility (part-time, flexible jobs, but also childcare availability), supporting non-traditional families (gay/lesbian couples, cohabiting couples, registered partnerships). Also wider access to assisted reproduction

In political reality, these discourses often mixed (also pragmatic “shopping around” for different ideas and concepts to appeal to the voters)

Examples of family policy trends

• Expanding public childcare coverage for children below age 3 (Germany, Austria many EU countries (EU target to achieve at least 33% coverage in each country)

• Shorter, but well-paid parental leave, with remuneration up to 100% of the previous wage (Estonia, Germany, Poland). Also stimulating earlier return to employment

• Flexible leave arrangements: more flexibility in selecting leave period, “multispeed leave” (Czech Republic, Austria, Germany), fathers and mothers can flexibly alternate (Norway)

• Stronger involvement of fathers, including extra parental leave for fathers only (Nordic countries, Germany, Austria)

• Cash support to newborns and children: baby bonus in Spain (2007-10), childcare allowances in Ukraine, “maternity capital” established at the time of child’s birth (second births in Russia)

• Tax rebates

Why and when are policy interventions justified?

Diverse policy motivations: Most family-related policies not motivated by pronatalist concerns• EU policies: also motivated by “enabling” people to fulfill their fertility

intentions; not explicitly pronatalist• Is explicit pronatalism justified? And when?• Is the goal of increasing intended family size justified?

Important considerations• No unintended consequences?• Increasing unwanted / unplanned / mistimed / teenage childbearing?• Financially sustainable? Examples: Maternal capital in Russia,

“maternity grants” in Ukraine, baby bonus in Spain (2007-10)• Causing more than a short-lived “tempo shift”?• Addressing the wishes and “needs” of the people desiring to have

children? (Good data & surveys needed!)

Discussion:

Low fertility in Portugal in a (Southern) European context

Institutional conditions: The family & policy trends prior to the recession (OECD 2011, 2014; OECD FP database)

Most shared with neighbouring Spain

Most contributing to lower and delayed fertility • Higher education expansion, especially among women

• Economic uncertainty, especially among young adults: high % of temporary employment (21% against 11% OECD average in 2007)

• Low government spending on families: Public spending on family benefits (1.7% in 2009) equal to Spain and below OECD average 2.6%

• The elderly-bias in social spending (Vanhuysse 2013)

• Relatively short parental leave (120 days with 100% income repl.)

• High income inequalities, rising social status stratification in fertility, lower access to childcare among low-income families?

• Unequal gender division of household labour: stronger disparities than PL, ESP, comparable to IT, MEX

The recession has accelerated some of the previous family trends

The “lost generation” of contemporary young adults?

• Sharp fall in fertility & marriage rates, esp. young adults

• Rapidly falling fertility in disadvantaged groups, including migrants (ESP)

• Birth postponement, declining 2nd and 3rd birth rates

• More uncertainty in intentions among the childless

• Longer stay in parental home? (evidenced in the US)

• More NEETS

Why so low fertility in Portugal?

• Period TFR in Portugal in 2013 (1.21) probably lowest in Europe

• Period TFR showing most rapid decline in Europe after 2000

• Also fast falls in cohort fertility, rapid increase in one-child families

Combination of temporary factors (education expansion, economic recession) with the long-lasting structural and institutional factors (employment insecurity, gender inequalities, limited social spending on families)

Many of these factors will not go away even if the economy recovers

Scope for policy action; should consider not only families, but especially young adults in pre-family stage

Worries about low fertility should not be overdone

• Societies can largely adapt to low fertility

• (Cohort) family size of women still well above the period TFR (ca. 1.55 in the mid-1970s cohorts)

• Migrants contribute to higher number of births and population replacement in most European countries (and in Portugal prior to 2010)

• “Optimal fertility” arguably below replacement due to increased productivity driven by highly educated workforce and high costs of education & training (Striessnig and Lutz 2014)

• Low fertility supports higher consumption and thus has a positive effect on material standard of living (Lee et al. 2014)

tomas.sobotka@oeaw.ac.at

Work on this presentation was funded by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Grant agreement n° 284238 (EURREP).

EURREP website: www.eurrep.org