Turkey’s Growing Energy Ties with Moscow

8/9/2019 Turkey’s Growing Energy Ties with Moscow

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1 Center for American Progress | Turkey ’s Growing Energy Ties with Moscow

Turkey’s Growing Energy Ties

with MoscowBy Alan Makovsky May 6, 2015

“When Putin visited urkey, they [the Russians] asked whether we’d prefer Russia or the EU.

We clearly explained that urkey does not give up on one or the other and said our roadmaps

with both Russia and the EU were ongoing.”

– Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız,

addressing the Turkish ambassadors’ conference in Ankara on January 8, 20151

“Russia is drawing urkey into its orbit, and if it’s not stopped now, then it may be too late.”

– Anonymous Western diplomat in Ankara, reported March 11, 20152

A a join press conerence wih urkish Presiden Recep ayyip Erdoğan in Ankara on

December 1, 2014, Russian Presiden Vladimir Puin made wo unexpeced announce-

mens ha could reshape energy markes and aler urkey’s relaionship wih he Wes.

Firs, Puin announced he cancellaion o he Souh Sream naural gas projec, which

had been envisioned o carry 63 billion cubic meers, or bcm, o Russian gas o Europe

across he Black Sea annually. Moscow’s primary goal in pursuing Souh Sream had been o reinorce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas while bypassing Ukraine, he

problemaic parner hrough which roughly hal o Russia’s gas expors o Europe now

pass.3 Bu Puin said ha resisance rom he European Union symied he projec and

ulimaely persuaded him o drop i.

Presiden Puin hen added a second surprise: Te gas inended or Souh Sream would

insead go o urkey and, “i deemed expedien” by he Europeans, onward o souhern

Europe.4 Moreover, he said, Russia’s sae-owned gas company Gazprom and urkey’s

sae-owned energy ransporaion company BOAŞ had signed a memorandum o

undersanding, or MOU, ha endorsed he projec ha very day.5

urkey’s decision o explore he new so-called urkish Sream6 projec highlighs an

imporan hread o pos-Cold War hisory: Te deepening ies beween ormer adver-

saries urkey and Russia. For years, convenional wisdom has held ha urkish-Russian

ies are sricly based on economic realiies, paricularly urkey’s dependence on Russia

or energy, which urkish officials have repeaedly and publicly said hey would like o


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decrease.7 Te announcemen o urkish Sream, however, suggess ha he urkish

governmen is growing more comorable wih Russia’s role as is primary energy sup-

plier and ha urkish-Russian relaions may be aking on a deeper poliical dimension.

Te urkish Sream projec also highlighs Ankara’s pos-Cold War ques o become

an imporan energy ransi sae, or even a hub, in order o enhance is global sraegic

imporance.8 Tis ques daes rom he early 1990s, shorly afer he collapse o heSovie Union, when he noion was hached o an Eas-Wes energy corridor or devel-

oping and ransporing Caspian Sea oil and gas hrough urkey insead o Russia. Te

Clinon adminisraion embraced he idea as a means o bringing non-Middle Easern

oil o world markes, srenghening he independence o ormer Sovie saes, and

enhancing he sraegic imporance o NAO ally urkey.9

I urkish Sream were ully implemened, including he European componen, urkey

would realize is goal o becoming an imporan energy ransi sae, ironically hanks

mainly o Russian gasa serious disorion o he Caspian-ocused energy corridor

concep. And urkey would be even more relian, a leas or a ime, on Russian gas ordomesic use. Tis would represen a sriking change o sraegy and raise he prospec

o greaer poliical cooperaion beween urkey and Russia. Tese possibiliies should

arouse more concern rom urkey’s Wesern allies han has been eviden o dae.

What is Turkish Stream?

As envisioned by Russia, urkish Sream would consis o our lines, each wih a 15.75

bcm capaciy or a oal o 63 bcm annuallyhe same capaciy planned or he now-

deunc Souh Sream projec.10

Te firs o hese our lines would be enirely dedicaedo he urkish domesic marke, wih he remaining hree inended o carry gas or he

European marke.

Te line inended or he urkish marke, wih a capaciy o up o 15.75 bcm, would

accoun or slighly more han he 14 bcm urkey can presenly receive annually

hrough he rans-Balkan Pipeline, a branch o Russia’s rans-Ukrainian esvériség, or

Broherhood, pipeline. However, Russian sae-owned Gazprom has said ha i inends

o phase ou he Broherhood pipeline due o he conflic in Ukraine. In ac, Gazprom

now claims ha i will cease all rans-Ukrainian gas expors when is conrac wih Kiev

ends in 2019.11 urkish Sream gas would presumably phase ino urkey’s marke as he

exising rans-Balkan Pipeline gas phases ou, hough ha has no been saed explic-

ily. A he aoremenioned December 1, 2014, press conerence, Puin also announced

ha Russia had agreed o a urkish reques o expand he capaciy o he exising Blue

Sream pipelinewhich sreches across he Black Sea rom Russia o urkeyrom 16

bcm o 19 bcm annually.12 Currenly, urkey receives all is Russian gas hrough he Blue

Sream and rans-Balkan linesup o 30 bcm annually, accouning or more han hal

o urkey’s oal gas usage.


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Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller says ha he firs line o urkish Sreamhe line dedi-

caed o urkish domesic usecould be buil by he end o 2016, wih he remain-

ing hree lines compleed by 2019 or 2020.13 However, urkish Energy and Naural

Resources Miniser Yıldız has suggesed ha his imeable is oo ambiious, a view

shared by mos energy expers.14

Prospects for Turkish Stream

I is imporan o remember ha no binding legal agreemens have ye been signed and

ha urkey or Russia could sill change course. Te aoremenioned MOU is, in effec,

jus a plan, raher han a binding insrumen wih legal effec and penalies or nonadher-

ence. Over he years, numerous pipeline projecswhich were much urher along in

planning han urkish Sream is nowhave been scrapped. In 2013, or example, he

Nabucco-Wes pipeline was canceled afer more han a decade o planning and discus-

sion a boh he poliical and commercial levels. Ta being said, Russia’s urkish Sream

proposal has clearly piqued urkey’s ineres.

In canceling Souh Sream, Presiden Puin was probably recognizing he ineviable. EU

leaders in Brussels were exering srong pressure on Bulgariawhere Souh Sream was

mean o ener Europeo abandon he projec.15 Moreover, i appeared ha Souh

Sream would run aoul o EU regulaions on energy compeiion and pipeline access

Romania

Ukraine

Russia

Turkey

Bulgaria

Annexed

by Russia

Georgia

Blue Stream

Gas from Russia Gas from Russia

Trans-Anatolian

Trans Adriatic

Trans-Balkan

South Stream(canceled)

(under construction)

Turkish Stream

FIGURE 1

Turkish pipeline politics

The gas pipelines shaping Turkey's energy future

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Turkey (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu; Stephen Bierman, Ilya Arkhipov, and Elena Mazneva,

“Putin Scraps South Stream Gas Pipeline After EU Pressure,” Bl oomberg Business, December 2, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-01/pu-

tin-halts-south-stream-gas-pipeline-after-pressure-from-eu; Gazprom; B OTAŞ Petroleum Pi peline Corporation.

Existing pipeline

Proposed pipeline


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esablished in 2009he so-called Tird Energy Packageand ha he European

Union would pursue he mater judicially i he projec proceeded. EU regulaions pro-

hibi a seller rom monopolizing boh produc and means o ransmission, which, in his

case, would have been he gas and he Souh Sream pipeline, respecively.16

I is plausible ha he European Union would have made an excepion o hese rules,

however, had i no been or he crisis in Ukraine. In ac, some skepics iniially believedha Russia was no serious abou acually building urkish Sream bu insead was using

he announcemen as a way o pressuring a gas-sarved European Union o lif is objec-

ions o Souh Sream. I ha was indeed Moscow’s moive, here is no evidence hus ar

ha he gambi is working.

Tere are several reasons o be skepical o urkish Sream and is prospecs o becoming

a realiy.17 Tere is currenly no inrasrucure o carry he gas rom urkey o Europe. I

he Europeans waned access, hey would have o build he pipelines o he Greek-urkish

border in order o ge he gas, as Presiden Puin declared a his press conerence.18 Ta

decision, in urn, would depend on acors such as he sae o Europe’s economy and isdesire and abiliy o break is addicion o Russian gas. In lae January 2015, he European

Union’s Vice Presiden or Energy Union Maroš Šečovič said his “firs assessmen” is

ha urkish Sream “won’ work.” He claimed ha he amoun o gas envisioned o flow

hrough urkish Sream ar ousrips demand in Souheas Europe and ha here are

more efficien ways o bring Russian gas o he res o Europe han by building pipelines

o a hub on he Greek-urkish border.19 Some analyss also quesion wheher Russia has

he unding o finance he enire our-pipeline, $20 billion projec, as i has pledged.20

Ohers poin ou ha urkey lacks he sorage capaciy and oher inrasrucure needed

o serve as a hub or Europe, as urkish Sream would require. 21

Ye oher observers believe ha Russia is pursuing urkish Sream primarily o derail

anoher pipeline planned o bring gas o Europe via urkeyhe rans-Anaolian

Naural Gas Pipeline, or ANAP. ANAP is slaed o deliver 6 bcm o Azerbaijani gas o

he urkish domesic marke annually saring in 2018, as well as 10 bcm o Europe via

Greece and Ialy saring in 2019, assuming ha he rans Adriaic Pipeline, or APo

which i is supposed o connecis compleed on ime. ANAP represens he firs

subsanive piece in he European Union’s vision o a Souhern Gas Corridor, or SGC,

ha, i was originally hoped, could bring up o 60 bcm o Caspian, Cenral Asian, and

Middle Easernha is, non-Russiangas o Europe. For Europe, ANAP is crucial

o is plan or diversiying is energy sources wih non-Russian gas, hereby reducing

Russia’s leverage over he European Union.

For Russia, he realizaion o ANAP and he European Union’s dream o an SGC

would be a sraegic seback. Tereore, Russia may be hoping o use urkish Sream o

undermine he viabiliy o ANAP, which hreaens Russia’s dominance o he European

gas marke. I urkey and Europe were o be flooded wih Russian gas rom urkish

Sream, his reasoning goes, ANAP would lose is economic viabiliy.22


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Tere are some small signs ha his pressure could be effecive. urkish Energy Miniser

Yıldız’s commen ha he wo pipelines, urkish Sream and ANAP, would “sar a

riendly compeiion” no doub raised eyebrows wihin he Azerbaijani governmen and

among ANAP invesors.23 However, urkish officials rom Presiden Erdoğan on down

have been unwavering in emphasizing heir commimen o seeing ANAP hrough

o compleion. A a March 17, 2015, groundbreaking ceremony or ANAP in Kars,

urkey, Erdoğan emphasized ha “ANAP has a special imporance. Tere is absoluelyno alernaive o i.”24 Overall, urkish Sream seems unlikely o cach up wih ANAP;

whereas urkish Sream is sill jus a proposal, ANAP is ully financed and even has gas

conracs in place o sell he produc upon compleion.25

One way in which Russia may ry o slow or derail ANAP is o persuade he lef-wing

governmen o Greece, wih which i enjoys riendly ies, o creae obsacles o he com-

pleion o AP. Wihou AP, ANAP gas canno connec o Europe. AP is privaely

owned and financed, bu i sars in Greece and canno ge off he ground wihou Greek

governmen acquiescence. I seems likely, however, ha he European Union will bring

is own pressure o bear on EU member Greece o ry o ensure ha AP ges buil.

Russia is also acively campaigning or suppor or urkish Sream among is European

riends, especially among he souhern and easern European saes ha i envisions

being serviced by urkish Sream gas. On April 7, 2015, oreign minisers rom EU

members Hungary and Greeceas well as rom Macedonia, Serbia, and urkey

signed a communiqué in Budapes, seemingly endorsing urkish Sream wihou

menioning i by name.26

Sill, urkey is playing is own game and may already be benefiing rom urkish Sream,

even beore he projec is ormalized. Playing off Moscow’s eagerness o pursue he proj-ec, Ankara has been bargaining hard or a price discoun on uure gas purchases rom

Russia. Puin pre-empively announced a 6 percen discoun or urkish Sream gas on

December 1, 2014, increasing ha discoun o 10.25 percen in February 2015. urkey

has no acceped hese offers, and is insead holding ou or an even beter deal, repor-

edly hoping o receive a 15 percen discoun on uure Russian gas impors. Te longer

urkey wais and he urher he rival ANAP progresses, he more leverage urkey

will have on Russian pricing. I is unlikely ha urkish Sream will move orward beore

urkey reaches an accepable deal on gas prices.27

urkey’s energy-relaed aciviy reflecs wo impulses: he need o saisy is growing

domesic energy needs and is desire o become an imporan hub or energy supplied

o Europe, hereby increasing is sraegic clou. While he later goal is merely useul or

urkish sraegic ineress, he ormer is criical or he urkish economy.


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From he sandpoin o urkish Sream’s impac on is energy securiy, urkey is prob-

ably mos concerned ha he firs leg o he pipeline, carrying 15.75 bcm o gas annu-

ally or is domesic marke, is compleed. I Russia is serious abou shuting down gas

ransi hrough Ukraine, ha firs leg o urkish Sream will be vial or urkey.

Te needs o he European Union will deermine he viabiliy o he oher hree lines.

I is clear ha Europe will coninue o need large quaniies o Russian gas or he nearuure, wheher ha gas raverses Ukraine or urkey. Te 10 bcm o naural gas ha he

European Union is scheduled o ake rom ANAP saring in 2019 will help i diversi y,

bu his amoun canno begin o replace he Ukraine-ransiing gas ha he European

Union currenly buys rom Gazpromapproximaely 60 bcm in 2014.28

From a sraegic sandpoin, urkey would benefi rom he compleion o eiher

urkish Sream or ANAP and is subsequen linkage o Europe. I only one can be

compleed and linked, ANAP probably carries more sraegic benefi or Ankara

because ha is he line mos desired by he Wes and because i likely would be

Azerbaijan’s only oule or is gas, enhancing urkey’s leverage wih boh Brussels andBaku. Some in urkey migh argue oherwise, however, since urkish Sream would

carry a ar greaer quaniy o gas han ANAP. Ankara would probably benefi mos i

boh projecs, urkish Sream and ANAP, were ully compleed and linked o Europe.

Turkey’s gas needs and potential suppliers

Naural gas is urkey’s mos imporan power resource, accouning or roughly one-

hird o is overall energy consumpion and nearly hal o is elecriciy generaion.29

Wih minimal domesic producion, urkey impors 99 percen o is gas, and or many years, he majoriy o ha gasroughly 60 percenhas come rom Russia.30

urkey’s overall gas demand more han ripled rom 15 bcm in 2000 o 46 bcm in

2012.31 Te Inernaional Energy Agency projecs ha overall urkish energy use will

grow a a rae o 4.5 percen annually over he nex 15 years, more han doubling during

ha period.32 Gas is likely o be a disproporionae par o ha increase in overall energy

use.33 Like much o he res o he world, urkey increasingly has made naural gas is

energy resource o choice based on is cos, accessibiliy, and low environmenal impac

compared wih oher ossil uels.34

urkey currenly has he capaciy o impor up o 46.6 bcm o gas annually hrough our

pipelines: rom Russia via Blue Sream a 30 bcm; rom Russia via he rans-Balkan

Pipeline a 14 bcm; rom Iran via he abriz-Ankara Pipeline a 10 bcm; and rom

Azerbaijan via he Souh Caucasus Pipeline a 6.6 bcm. I he urkish Sream deal goes

hrough as envisioned, urkey’s capaciy or gas impors rom Russia would increase

somewha. Te rans-Balkan Pipeline would be phased ou in avor o he firs leg o


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urkish Sreamwhich has a planned capaciy o 15.75 bcmand Blue Sream would

be expanded o a capaciy o 19 bcm. Tis means ha urkey could receive up o 34.75

bcm rom Russia, a roughly 15 percen increase rom he curren capaciy o 30 bcm.35

A he same ime, his poenially greaer near-erm dependence on Russian gas could

be miigaed by oher acors. For one, urkish Sream could enhance urkey’s srae-

gic imporance, making urkey a condui o Europe or up o 47 bcm o Russian gasannually, equivalen o roughly one-hird o Europe’s 2014 gas impors rom Russia.36

Second, his role as a condui could bring some needed balance o he urkish-Russian

gas equaion by providing urkey wih influence over a sizable porion o Russia’s key

expor. Tird, increases in gas inake rom oher sourcesquie likely, in he medium-

o long-erm, rom he Caspian Sea hrough, or example, expansion o ANAP and

rom he Iraqi Kurdisan Regional Governmen, or KRGwould diminish he overall

share o gas ha urkey impors rom Russia or domesic use, even as hose impors

increase in absolue erms. Tis, in urn, would give urkey he opion o decreasing is

gas dependence on Russia, and i would cerainly give urkey leverage in price bargain-

ing wih all is gas-exporing parners. Tus, a urkish official migh argue, he risk ogreaer near-erm dependence on Russian gas ha urkish Sream enails is jusified by

he longer-erm prospec o overall improvemen in urkey’s energy siuaion, namely,

more gas and more leverage over suppliers.

Alternate suppliers of gas

In he near erm, however, urkey is unlikely o escape is dependence on Russian gas

wheher i wans o or no. Tere are simply no viable, nearby alernaive sources ha

can replace urkey’s sizable impors rom Russia.

Iran has vas reserves o naural gashe second larges in he world afer Russia37bu

i has a poor ransporaion inrasrucure and is under inernaional sancions, which

means ha i is essenially unable o develop is vas gas fields beyond heir curren

capaciy.38 Even i sancions were lifed, i would probably ake several years or inves-

mens o come on-line and produce significan quaniies or expor. Moreover, as

scholar Simone agliapiera poins ou, even i Iran were reed rom sancions, i migh

be inclined o send is gas easward o Asia raher han wesward o urkey and Europe

based on he locaion o is gas fields.39 Under a special sancions exempion graned by

he U.S. Congress, urkey currenly receives up o 10 bcm o gas annually rom Iran, is

second-larges supplier afer Russia.40

Israel plans o expor as much as 20 bcm annually once is offshore fields are ully devel-

oped,41 and here have been urkish-Israeli discussions abou he possibiliy o building

a rans-Medierranean pipeline. Ta is very unlikely, however, given he deerioraion

in urkish-Israeli relaions in recen years. Even i Israel were o agree o send is naural

gas o urkey, he pipeline would have o raverse he economic exclusion zone, or EEZ,


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o he Greek Cyprio-conrolled Republic o Cyprus, or ROC, which almos cerainly

would deny he pipeline ransi righs absen a setlemen o he wider Cyprus problem.

Ta dispue has been essenially rozen since urkish roops invaded Norhern Cyprus

in 1974 ollowing a Greek Cyprio coup. I he Cyprus problem were resolved, however,

Cyprus’ own smaller deposis o gas could be added o a prospecive pipeline.

Anoher poenial source o gas or urkey is he Iraqi KRG, which could reporedlyproduce up o 10 bcm o 15 bcm o naural gas in he years o come. 42 However, he KRG

roue would require billions o dollars o invesmen o finance he consrucion o gas

processing plans and a pipeline in order o become viableand ha prospec, in urn, is

complicaed by he nearby presence o he Islamic Sae o Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, in

norhern Iraq. Ta being said, once on-line, KRG gas is likely o be cheaper han he gas

ha urkey now buys rom Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran.43 urkey should have consider-

able leverage in seting prices or KRG gas because he KRGor geographic, economic,

and sraegic reasonswill have litle opion bu o pipe is gas o or hrough urkey.

urkey’s bes be or imporing significan quaniies o non-Russian gas probablylies in he Caspian Sea. urkey already receives up o 6.6 bcm o gas each year rom

Azerbaijan.44 When ANAP is compleed, urkey will receive up o 6 bcm more gas

annually rom Azerbaijan’s gas-rich Shah Deniz II fields, or a oal capaciy o 12.6 bcm.

And here may be addiional quaniies o gas rom Azerbaijan in he years o come. An

expansion o ANAP’s capaciy rom 16 bcm o 31 bcm a some uure dae is repor-

edly under consideraionhough i is reasonable o assume ha a significan quaniy

o ha volume would be designaed or European consumpion.

urkmenisan, wih he world’s ourh-larges naural gas reserves, migh one day send

is gas wesward o urkey and possibly beyond via a rans-Caspian pipeline ha linksup wih one o he pipelines raversing Azerbaijan and Georgia, such as ANAP or he

Souh Caucasus Pipeline. However, Russian leverage over urkmenisan, as well as

longsanding legal dispues regarding erriorial righs in he Caspian Sea, have so ar

precluded his resul and are likely o coninue o do so.45 I urkmenisan were evenu-

ally able o ship is gas wesward, ha indeed could be a game-changer or urkey, allow-

ing Ankara, i inclined, o more easily diversi y away rom Russian gas and o enhance

is role as a condui or significan amouns o non-Russian gas o Europe. For now,

however, boh goals remain elusive.

Alternate types of energy

urkey could poenially ease is gas dependence on Russia hrough enhanced purchases

o liquefied naural gas, or LNG. Tis would be a less economical choice, however, as he

process o liqueacion, ransporaion, and regasificaion makes LNG more expensive

han pipeline gas in many cases, paricularly or counries such as urkey ha are rela-

ively close o large naural gas reserves accessible via less expensive pipeline ranspor.46


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Developmen o renewable energy sources also could address some o urkey’s

domesic energy needs and lessen is dependence on Russian gas. In 2010, he urkish

parliamen passed a law providing subsidies o privae companies ha produce hydro-

elecriciy, wind energy, geohermal energy, biomass energy, and solar energy.47 Since

hen, official urkish saisics show ha renewables, excluding hydropower, have

increased heir share o elecriciy generaion every year, reaching an all-ime high o

4.2 percen in 2013. Hydropower, which is beter developed han he oher renewablesources, has consiued more han 20 percen o urkey’s elecriciy generaion or he

pas several years.48 Renewables, excluding hydropower, consiue only 1 percen o

overall urkish energy use, while hydropower makes up 10 percen.49 Given he cos

consrains, renewable sources will remain insufficien o obviae urkey’s need or

Russian gas in he oreseeable uure.

Finally, urkey has conraced several oreign firms o build wo nuclear power plans:

Russian firms will build he firs a Akkuyu on he Medierranean, and a Japanese-

French consorium will build he second a Sinop on he Black Sea. Reporedly, up o

hree more nuclear power plans are planned or consrucion by 2030. In a presena-ion o he Inernaional Aomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, in 2013, urkey indicaed

ha is goal is o make nuclear energy approximaely 10 percen o is overall energy

mix by 2023. urkey also indicaed o he IAEA ha he firs o he our 1,200-mega-

wat unis a Akkuyu would come on-line in 2020, wih compleion o all our unis

scheduled or 2023.50 However, consrucion has no ye begun in earnes, and his

imeable is likely o slip.51

I is noeworhy ha urkey urned o Russia o build is firs nuclear reacora sensi-

ive projec ha urher underscores urkey’s relaive comor wih is close energy

relaionship wih Moscow. Furhermore, Russia also is supposed o supply he uraniumor he reacorresuling in more energy dependence on Moscow.52

By any reckoning, gas is likely o remain urkey’s leading energy source, and Russia is

likely o remain urkey’s leading source o gas or many years o come. No oher counry

in he region can provide as much gas as reliably as Russia can. And hus ar, Russia has

been a highly reliable provider o urkey.53 Perhaps hrough habi, i is a siuaion wih

which urkey seems o be increasingly comorable.

Turkish-Russian relations: Beyond economics?

urkey and Russiaand heir respecive predecessor saeswere once he biteres

o oes. Te Otoman and Russian empires ough roughly a dozen wars. urkey and

he Sovie Union were on opposing sides o he Cold War, wih urkey driven ino he

Wes’s arms by Russian leader Joseph Salin’s hreas agains urkish erriory.


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When he Cold War ended, however, he wo naions developed a hriving economic

relaionship. riggered firs by small-ime Russian radershe so-called suicase

radeollowing he collapse o he Sovie Union, bilaeral economic ies were paricu-

larly galvanized by he Blue Sream gas deal in he lae 1990s. oday, urkey buys more

goods rom Russia han rom any oher sae, as has been he case since 2006, mainly as

a resul o oil and gas purchases.54 Moreover, he imporance o he economic relaion-

ship is muual: urkey is one o Russia’s op five expor cusomers and is number-womarke or gas afer Germany. In 2014, urkey bough $25 billion worh o goods rom

Russia and sold i $6 billion worh.55

Addiionally, he urkey-Russia economic relaionship goes beyond impors and

expors. urkish consrucion firms are among he leading inernaional conracors in

Russia, having secured $39 billion in conracs beween 1972 and 2012, including $3.64

billion worh in 2012 alone.56 In 2014, 3.5 million Russian ouriss visied urkey, mak-

ing Russia he number-wo source o ourism o urkey, second only o Germany’s 4.4

million ouriss.57 urkish Sream could ake his economic cooperaion o a new level.

Te poliics o urkish Sream are probably more significan han he economics,

however. Wheher or no he pipelines are acually consruced, Ankara’s willingness o

enerain he concep suggess ha i has oped or cozier relaions wih Russia han i

generally acknowledges in public.

Turkey’s response to the invasion of Ukraine

Alhough urkey sided wih he Wes in ormally opposing Russian annexaion o

Crimea, i is he only NAO sae ha did no join he sancions regime agains Russiain response o is invasion o Ukraine. In ac, on Augus 6, when Russia announced ha

i would cease imporing more han $12 billion worh o agriculural and ood producs

rom he European Union in realiaion or sancions, urkey offered o pick up he

slack. urkish Miniser o Economic Affairs Niha Zeybekçi declared himsel “very glad

abou he new developmens, as urkey will benefi.”58

As long ago as April 2014while he European Union was rying o block Souh

Sream in response o he Ukrainian crisis and Russia was having second houghs

abou rouing Souh Sream hrough Ukraine’s mariime EEZurkey made clear ha

i was more han happy o hos he pipeline. “ We are open o assessing any reques or

he line o pass hrough urkey’s erriory,” said urkish Energy and Naural Resources

Miniser Yıldız a he ime.59 I is plausible o speculae ha Yıldız’s commen, made jus

days beore a major urkish-Russian energy meeing, marked he origin o he urkish

Sream concep.


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Bu perhaps nohing more clearly signaled urkey’s rejecion o he Wes’s Ukraine-

driven policies oward Russia han is simple willingness o hos Russian Presiden

Puin on December 1, 2014 a a ime when he Wes sough o isolae him. In doing so,

Presiden Erdoğan largely se aside he urkish public’s deep concern abou he aars, a

Crimean urkic people who suffered dispossession and exile under he Sovies and have

been openly earul abou he reurn o Russian rule.

urkey’s independen posiion regarding Ukraine was reminiscen o is reacion o

he Russian invasion o Georgia in 2008,60 when urkey joined is Wesern parners in

condemning he invasion bu quickly renormalized is relaions wih Moscow. In ac,

Presiden Erdoğan wen o Moscow one week afer he invasion o Georgia and sur-

prised he Unied Saes by proposing he Caucasus Sabiliy and Cooperaion Plaorm,

which excluded nonregional powers such as he Unied Saes.61 Te proposal was

subsanively meaningless, bu i underscored urkey’s deerminaion o pursue a quasi-

independen course in is relaions wih Russia.

Ankara could have responded o Russia’s urkish Sream proposal by showing solidariy wih he Wes and Ukraineand, or ha mater, wih he Crimean aarsby saying i

would only consider such a projec i Russia wihdrew rom Crimea and ceased is iner-

erence in Ukraine. Insead, urkey responded by signing an MOU wih Russia he very

day o Puin’s announcemen o urkish Sream and holding several high-level bilaeral

planning meeings over subsequen weeks, including a our-hour helicoper our aken

by urkish Energy and Naural Resources Miniser Yıldız and Gazprom CEO Miller o

assess poenial land-enry poins or urkish Sream.

Diplomatic ties

Perhaps counerinuiively, urkey acually appears eager o srenghen is ies wih Russia.

In 2010, jus wo years afer he Russian invasion o Georgia, he wo saes esablished he

High-Level Russian-urkish Cooperaion Council. Te council is mandaed o “ac as he

guiding body in seting he sraegy and main direcions or developing Russian-urkish

relaions” and o “coordinae implemenaion o imporan poliical, rade and economic

projecs, and culural and humaniarian cooperaion.”62 Presiden Puin’s December

1, 2014, urkish Sream announcemen came during he fifh such council meeing.

Meeings beween Russian and urkish presidens or prime minisers, once a rariy, have

now aken place every year since 2009, and ofen more han once per year. 63

In recen years, a press conerences ollowing hese bilaeral summis, Presiden Puin

reerred o urkey as a “sraegic parner” and praised urkey or is “independen”

oreign policy.64 A a summi on July 18, 2012, Presiden Erdoğan assered ha “during

hard imes, he Russian Federaion always assised when we had difficulies wih naural

gas supplies, provided us wih suppor and helped us overcome he crisis siuaion,


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supplying addiional gas.”65 A he nex summi, on December 3, 2012, Puin assured

Erdoğan ha “Russia is always ready o give our urkish parners a shoulder o rely on

a difficul imes, and i here are any gliches wih energy supplies rom oher counries,

we will increase our deliveries a he firs demand.”66 Te “difficulies” and “gliches” he

wo leaders reerred o were disrupions in gas deliveries hrough he rans-Balkan line

as a resul o Russian-Ukrainian dispues or Ukraine’s periodic decisions o ake more

han is alloted share o he gas.

A his December 1, 2014, Ankara press conerence, Presiden Puin also claimed ha

urkey and Russia are discussing a “ree rade zone agreemen,” an objecive ha

he said is “no easy, bu i is possible.” 67 I rue, he effor is more evidence o closer

urkish-Russian relaions bu will probably prove ruiless: A s a member o he EU

Cusoms Union, urkey can ener only ino ree rade agreemens approved by he

European Union.68

Addiionally, on our separae occasions in 2012 and 2013, Presiden Erdoğan spoke

o his willingness o end urkey’s bid or EU membership i he Shanghai CooperaionOrganizaion, or SCOwhich includes Russia, China, and our oher auhoriarian

Cenral Asian regimeswould gran urkey membership. Erdoğan acually compared

he SCO avorably wih he EU, calling i “beter and more powerul.”69 He also claimed

ha urkey and he SCO saes share “common values,” perhaps a disurbing reflecion

o an auhoriarian poliical vision o his own. Erdoğan’s consisen reques or admis-

sion o he SCO in lieu o EU membership is ofen assumed o be ongue-in-cheek,

since he SCO and EU are in no way analogous, bu his persisence and overall one

sugges he akes he idea seriously even i ohers do no.70

urkey’s posiive sance oward Russia persiss despie a number o imporan policydisagreemens. Moscow has provided srong miliary and diplomaic suppor or

Presiden Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Presiden Erdoğan’s chie inernaional

bee noire or he pas several years. Oher areas o conenion include Cyprus, Egyp,

Armenia, and he Caucasus and Cenral Asia, where urkey vies wih Russia or influ-

ence and access o hydrocarbon resources. urkey, however, chooses o comparmenal-

ize hese differences and ocus on he benefis o bilaeral ies.

Gas dependence and robus economic relaions explain much o he curren dynamic

in urkish-Russian relaions. Bu Presiden Erdoğan seems o have esablished a level o

comor in his relaions wih Presiden Puin ha goes beyond economic pragmaism.

Many analyss have speculaed ha he wo men are personally compaible, and some

sugges Erdoğan admires Puin’s personaliy and auhoriarian syle o governance.71

A a minimum, Erdoğan knows ha Russia, unlike he Wes, will remain silen regard-

ing urkey’s democraic ailings,72 which surely helps make cooperaion wih Russia an

atracive prospec or he urkish leader.


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Conflicts between Turkey and the West

urkey’s warming relaionship wih Russia is aking place agains a background o ofen

values-laden divergences rom he Wes, as refleced in oreign policy, domesic gover-

nance, and rheoric. Differences over oreign policy have been prolieraing, including in

Egyp, Israel, Libya, Palesine, and, mos prominenly, Syria. Moreover, urkey has been

unresponsive o U.S. requess o use Incirlik Air Base in souhern urkey in order o bombISIS in Iraq and Syriaor even in order o perorm search and rescue missions. Ankara

implies ha i is using permission o use Incirlik as leverage o persuade he Unied Saes

o make he al-Assad regime, raher han ISIS, is primary miliary arge in Syria.73

Over he nearly wo years since he 2013 Gezi Park demonsraions, he Unied Saes

and is European allies ofen have been criical o he deerioraing human righs siua-

ion in urkey, paricularly regarding resricions on he press and reedom o speech, as

well as effors o asser poliical conrol over he judiciary. Presiden Erdoğan has been

unbowed in he ace o his criicism, moving o resric social media; firing or reassign-

ing judges, prosecuors, and police officials who exercise oo much independence; andenhancing he domesic auhoriies o he securiy orces and he Naional Inelligence

Organizaion, or MI.74

Tese divergences have been refleced in Erdoğan’s requen ouburss agains he Wes,

which reached a crescendo on November 27, 2014, when he old a sanding commitee

o he Organizaion o Islamic Cooperaion, or OIC, ha Weserners “look like riends,

bu hey wan us [Muslims] dead, hey like seeing our children die.”75 I was a shocking

senimen coming rom he leader o a NAO member sae ha relies on a securiy alli-

ance wih 26 Wesern, Chrisian-majoriy allies.

aken in isolaion, Ankara’s approach oward Russia could be seen as merely pragmaic

energy poliics and discouned as less worrisome. Bu he moves ake place in he

conex o a widening gap in urkish-Wesern relaions and Presiden Erdoğan’s heigh-

ened ani-Wesern rheoric. Seen rom ha perspecive, urkey’s growing relaionship

wih Russia reinorces a sense o general urkish drif away rom adherence o Wesern

normsno a break rom he alliance bu an increasingly independen oreign policy

wihin i, and one ha especially presens problems o member saes prooundly con-

cerned abou Russian aggression.

U.S. interest in Turkey’s energy strategy

Te Unied Saes has no ineres in urkish-Russian enmiy and, o a cerain exen,

he inerdependence bred by a healhy economic relaionship beween he counries is

posiive, paricularly in ligh o heir bloody hisory. Given Russia’s increasingly aggres-

sive regional policies and is anagonism oward many U.S. posiions, however, i is


14/19


a clear U.S. ineres o limi NAO allies’ dependence on Russia or vial resources,

including urkey’s. Similarly, i is in he U.S. ineres o discourage developmen o a

bilaeral urkish-Russian relaionship ha could lead o any disancing o urkey rom

Washingon and NAO.

Accordingly, he Unied Saes has an ineres in he compleion o ANAP, which

would ease boh urkey’s and he European Union’s dependence on Russian gas. Recenurkish reassurances on ha score are encouraging, hough Russia may ye use is lever-

age on urkey o creae impedimens. I is likewise in he U.S. ineres o oppose urkish

Sream, which would reinorce Europe’s and urkey’s near-erm gas dependence on

Russia and could be used as leverage agains ANAP. I appears ha he Unied Saes

does indeed adhere o hese posiions, hough i has rarely said so publicly.

During a mid-March visi o Easern Europe and urkey, U.S. Sae Deparmen Special

Envoy and Coordinaor or Inernaional Energy Affairs Amos Hochsein publicly

criicized he urkish Sream concep. He assered ha i is essenially he same projec

as Souh Sream, wih he same objecive: ighening Europe’s dependence on Russiangas, which, he warned, Russia would use or poliical leverage. I marked he firs official

U.S. commen on urkish Sream o dae, nearly our monhs afer Puin announced he

projec. Hochsein also proposed alernaives o Russian gas or Souheasern Europe,

including LNG erminals and localized connecions o AP.76

Regarding U.S. and urkish atiudes oward urkish Sream, Hochsein said, “I hink

we share similar goals. We have o make sure ha we believe in he same acics abou

wha he procedures are going o be. Tis is a high sakes game o some degree and we

have o make sure ha we are on he same page.” Hochsein’s words made clear ha, a

leas in his view, he Unied Saes and urkey are no ye on he same page.77

Tis undersaed U.S. message o unhappiness wih Ankara belies he ac ha, regard-

ing urkish Sream, he economic and poliical ineress o he Unied Saes and

he European Union differ rom hose o heir ally urkey. Te Unied Saes and he

European Union generally share an ineres in he successul compleion o ANAP

and AP, he cancellaion o urkish Sream, and he coninuaion o he rans-Ukrai-

nian sysem o gas delivery. urkey shares he firs o hose hree goals bu probably

no he later wo.

Ulimaely, however, i will be he European Union’s decision, no urkey’s, wheher

urkish Sream becomes viable. urkey could kill urkish Sreamas he Unied Saes

apparenly wansbu urkey canno make he projec viable unless Europe is willing o

buy gas rom i. In principle, he European Union probably preers urkey o Ukraine as a

ransi sae bu no a he cos o building new pipeline inrasrucure o urkey, under-

mining Ukraine during is curren crisis wih Russia, or impeding ANAP and AP.


15/19


I he Obama adminisraion ruly wans o dissuade urkey rom pursuing urkish

Sream, i is criical ha he Whie House make his issue a prioriy in is bilaeral

agenda wih urkeya difficul calculus given he sraegic sakes and he range o

problems now beseting U.S.-urkish relaions, paricularly hose relaed o he figh

agains ISIS.78 However, he Obama adminisraion may ace a more serious problem

han merely persuading urkey ha is energy securiy can be ensured wihou urkish

Sream. Raher, i mus persuade Ankara ha close collaboraion wih Moscowassignified by Presiden Puin’s visi and he governmen’s openness o he urkish Sream

proposal in he mids o he Ukrainian crisisdoes no serve urkey’s long-erm iner-

ess. Ta problem, in urn, is sympomaic o a larger concern: he raying o urkey’s

once-firm bonds wih is Wesern allies. Given urkey’s growing sel-confidence and

more-independen oreign policy under Presiden Erdoğan’s leadership, concern abou

urkey’s solidariy wih is Wesern allies could well bedevil U.S. oreign policy or many

years o come.

Alan Makovsky is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Te Center for American Progress thanks United Minds for Progress for their support of our

policy programs and of this issue brief. Te views and opinions expressed in this issue brief are

those of the Center for American Progress and the author and do not necessarily reflect the

position of United Minds for Progress. Te Center for American Progress produces indepen-

dent research and policy ideas driven by solutions that we believe will create a more equitable

and just world.


16/19


Endnotes

1 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey does not have to choosebetween Russia and EU, Energy Mi nister says,” January8, 2015, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348.

2 Georgi Gotev, “Political concerns mar Turkish Stream

project,” EurActiv.com, March 11, 2015, available at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815.

3 Stanley Reed and James Kanter, “Putin’s Surprise Call toScrap South Stream Gas Pipeline Leaves Europe Reeling,”The New York Times, December 3, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0. A secondary butsignificant Russian objective was probably to enlarge Mos-cow’s already prominent political presence in former Sovietsocialist bloc nations—such as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hun-gary—that were expected to host the onshore, Europeanportion of the pipeline. See, for example, Jim Yardley andJo Becker, “How Putin Forged a Pipeline Deal That Derailed,”The New York Times, December 31, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.html.

4 Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, “News

conference following state visit to Turkey,” December 1,2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23322.

5 Ibid.

6 Turkish Stream is the name widely used in the media todescribe the project and serves, in effect, as the workingtitle. It is not the official name, however, at least not yet,according to an official from Russia’s state-owned Gazprom. The official said it reflects only the Turkish preference. SeeSputnik, “Launch date of Turkish Stream not to differ muchfrom South Stream schedule – Gazprom,” January 16, 2015,available at http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras reportedly, and notsurprisingly, objects to the use of that name for any portionof the pipeline that traverses Greek territory. EurActiv.com,“Tsipras: ‘Turkish Stream’ will have another name on Greekterritory,” April 9, 2015, available at http://www.euractiv.

com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636.

7 Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website says that, toachieve energy security, Turkey must, among other things,“diversify its energy supply routes and source countries.”See Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’sEnergy Strategy,” available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (last accessed April 2015).

8 The essential difference between a transit state and ahub is that the former simply serves as a conduit for oilor gas between two other entities and collects transitfees, whereas the latter takes ownership of the impor tedenergy resource and re-exports it for a profit. The twoterms are sometimes used loosely as synonyms, as is thecase in this issue brief. The reader should keep in mind,however, that Turkey’s current and envisioned pipelinesthus far qualify it as a transit state, not a hub. See MertBilgin, “Turkey’s Energy Strategy: What Difference DoesIt Make to Become an Energy Transit Corridor, Hub or

Center?” Working Paper 23 (Research Unit on InternationalSecurity and Cooperation, 2010), p. 114. Turkey is already atransit state of minor importance in oil. Roughly 7 percentof the world’s seaborne traded oil—4 million out of 56.5million barrels per day—flowed through Turkey in 2013,three-quarters of it mainly Russian oil shipped through the Turkish Straits and the rest Azerbaijani and Iraqi oil shipped,respectively, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, or BTC, andthe Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines and exported from Ceyhan. Bycomparison, 30 percent of seaborne traded oil was shippedthrough the Strait of Hormuz. See U.S. Energy InformationAdministration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” November

10, 2014, available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3. Turkey’s prospectsof achieving strategic energy importance are more likelyto be achieved as a gas transit state than as an oil transitstate, given Europe’s desire for non-Russian gas. I n general,as Brenda Shaffer points out, international relationshipsinvolving gas are more binding than those based on oil,since oil is “traded primarily on international markets as partof short-term deals and through flexible means of transport… [whereas] natural gas is supplied chiefly in pipelines andin the framework of long-term contracts, creating directlong-term linkages and permanent infrastructure betweensuppliers and consumers”—and, implicitly, transit states.See Brenda Shaffer, “Natural gas supply stability and foreignpolicy,” Energy Policy 56 (2013): 114–125, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035.

9 To date, the centerpieces of the East-West energy corridorare the BTC oil pipeline, which terminates at the TurkishMediterranean port of Ceyhan, and the South Cauc asus gaspipeline, which runs parallel to the BTC before terminatingat Erzurum in northern Turkey. Both began full operation in2006. Neither has a major impact on world markets. The BTCcarries 1 million barrels of oil daily for export, meeting littlemore than 1 percent of global demand. The South CaucasusPipeline serves only the Turkish domestic market. However,both were accomplished in the face of Russian oppositionand with significant thanks to U.S. leadership—particularly

the Clinton administration, which made the BTC a pol icypriority and provided the crucial initial momentum.

10 Barbara Lewis, Nina Chestney, and Katya Golubkova, “Evenwith Turkish Stream, Russia can’t avoid sending gas viaUkraine,” Reuters, February 13, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N-0VL3UY20150213.

11 Gazprom Ukraine Facts, “Ukraine, Gazprom and transitissues – Factsheet,” March 20, 2015, available at http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-–-factsheet. This is aGazprom-sponsored website. See also ibid.

12 Blue Stream is a natural gas pipeline that goes directly fromRussia to Turkey, traversing the Black Sea. The underwaterportion constitutes roughly one-third of the 750-mile pipe-line. Turkey and Russia agreed to the project in 1997, andgas began flowing in 2003, reaching its full capacity of 16

billion cubic meters only several years later. The project wasshrouded in mystery amid rumors of corruption, intensifiedby a final vote of approval in the Turkish parliament in 2000that required a closed session to discuss secret clauses of theagreement. It was generally assumed that Russia had initi-ated the project in order to pre-empt a potential Turkish dealon a trans-Caspian pipeline from gas-rich Turkmenistan; thelatter was envisioned as a first stage in a network that wouldbring Turkmenistani gas to Europe, alleviating Europe’sRussia dependency. The United States, a driving force behindthe trans-Caspian concept, was critical of Blue Stream.

13 Gazprom, “New Russia-Turkey gas pipeline route approvedat meeting in Ankara,” Press release, January 27, 2015, avail-able at http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/janu-ary/article213570/; Oil and Gas, Metals and Mining News,“Turkish Stream to start working by 2020,” March 24, 2015,available at http://www.rusmininfo.com/news/24-03-2015/turkish-stream-start-working-2020.

14 Georgi Gotev, “Political concerns mar Turkish Stream proj-

ect,” EurActiv.com with Reuters, March 11, 2015, availableat http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815; Hürriyet ,“Dogalgaz indiriminde ‘Turk Akimi’ rotari,” March 18, 2015,available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asp.

15 Andrew Roth, “In Diplomatic Defeat, Putin Diverts Pipelineto Turkey,”The New York Times, December 1, 2014, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/russian-gas-pipeline-turkey-south-stream.html.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23322http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfahttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfahttp://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/january/article213570/http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/january/article213570/http://www.rusmininfo.com/news/24-03-2015/turkish-stream-start-working-2020http://www.rusmininfo.com/news/24-03-2015/turkish-stream-start-working-2020http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/russian-gas-pipeline-turkey-south-stream.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/russian-gas-pipeline-turkey-south-stream.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/russian-gas-pipeline-turkey-south-stream.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/russian-gas-pipeline-turkey-south-stream.htmlhttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.rusmininfo.com/news/24-03-2015/turkish-stream-start-working-2020http://www.rusmininfo.com/news/24-03-2015/turkish-stream-start-working-2020http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/january/article213570/http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/january/article213570/http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheethttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/13/russia-gas-idUSL5N0VL3UY20150213http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.035http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfahttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfahttp://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tsipras-turkish-stream-will-have-another-name-greek-territory-313636http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://in.sputniknews.com/indian.ruvr.ru/news/2015_01_16/Launch-date-of-Turkish-Stream-not-to-differ-much-from-South-Stream-schedule-Gazprom-4284/http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23322http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipeline-deal-that-derailed-.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/south-stream-pipeline-cancellation-fallout.html?_r=0http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/political-concerns-mar-turkish-stream-project-312815http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-does-not-have-to-choose-between-russia-and-eu-energy-minister-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76689&NewsCatID=348


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16 Judy Dempsey, “Europe’s Energy Strategy andSouth Stream’s Demise,” Carnegie Europe, Decem-ber 4, 2014, available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57386.

17 For an informative, and generally skeptical, discussion of theprospects for Turkish Stream, see Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, “After South Stream: Turkish Stream?”,February 2, 2015, available at http://csis.org/event/after-south-stream-turkish-stream.

18 Turkish Stream is but the latest pipeline project that wouldlink former foes Turkey and Greece. The Turkish-Greek por-

tion of one the pipelines, the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy, was constructed nearly a decade ago, in 2007. It linksthe Turkish and Greek gas grids and currently carries smallamounts of gas from Turkey to Greece—currently the onlypipeline that links Turkey to an EU state. As discussed in thetext, a Trans Adriatic Pipeline—traversing Greece, Albania,and the Adriatic Sea and terminating in Italy—is plannedto link up with the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline,which will bring gas from Azerbaijan, through Georgia and Turkey, to Greece, part of the European Union’s SouthernGas Corridor plan to diversify away from Russia n gas. SuchGreek-Turkish cooperation re- enforces the rapprochementthat Athens and Ankara began in the mid-to late 1990s.

19 Stephen Fidler and Gabriele Steinhauser, “EU Energy ChiefPlays Down Practicality of Proposed Russia-Turkey Pipeline,”The Wall Street Journal , January 22, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735.

20 See, for example, the comments of Russia energy analystMikhail Krutikhin in Alexander Panin, “Russia’s South StreamAlternative Rests on Shaky Ground,” The Moscow Times, De-cember 7, 2014, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=512694. Hear also the comments of en-ergy analyst Edward C. Chow here: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, “After South Stream: Turkish Stream?”

21 See, for example, Edward C. Chow, “Russian Gas Streamor Dream?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies,February 2, 2015, available at http://csis.org/publication/russian-gas-stream-or-dream.

22 Bulent Aliriza, an expert on Turkey and energy politics,expressed concern about the likelihood o f growing Russianopposition to TANAP, its abilit y to pressure A zerbaijan, andits willingness to use force to attain regional goals. SeeCenter for Strategic and International Studies, “After SouthStream: Turkish Stream?”

23 Kama Mustafayeva, “Reaching the EU Gas Entry Point: Race

for Hitting Greece Border Speeds Up,” Natural Gas Europe,February 2, 2015, available at http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkish-stream-tanap-gas-race-for-greek-border.

24 Haberler.com, “Cumhurbaskanlari Erdoğan, Aliyev, Mar-gvelasvili, Kars’ta TANAP’in Temelini Atti,” March 17, 2015,available at http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanlari-Erdoğan-aliyev-margvelasvili-kars-7086525-haberi/; Reuters,“Turkey Starts $10B Project to Ship Azeri Gas to Europe,”Voice of America, March 17, 2015, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.html.

25 Personal communication from Brenda Shaffer, adjunctassistant professor and visiting researcher at GeorgetownUniversity’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East EuropeanStudies, that drew upon her scholarship on the subject,April 2015.

26 The parties “expressed … support to create a commercially

viable option of route and source diversification for deliver-ing natural gas from the Republic of Turkey through theterritories of our countries to the countries of Central andSouth Eastern Europe.” See Andrew Rettman, “Greece andHungary sign up to Russia gas pipeline,” EUobserver, April 8,2015, available at https://euobserver.com/energy/128261.Greece would obviously be critical to the implementation of Turkish Stream. Since the terminal would be on the Greek- Turkish border, Greece would be the first point of distribu-tion of Turkish Stream gas to elsewhere in Europe. Russia,however, has rejected reports that it will loan Athens up to 5billion euros in exchange for its formally joining the TurkishStream project. See EurActiv.com, “Speculation rife over Rus-sia’s Turkish Stream loan to Greece,” April 20, 2015, availableat http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/speculation-rife-over-russias-turkish-stream-loan-greece-313910.

27 Hürriyet , “Dogalgaz indiriminde ‘ Turk Akimi’ Rotari,” March18, 2015, available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekono-mi/28485547.asp. Gazprom is reportedly paying an Italiancompany “hundreds of thousands of euros per day” for twopipe-laying ships sitting idle in a Bulgarian port. Originallycontracted to lay pipes undersea for South Stream, the shipsare now simply awaiting word to begin work on TurkishStream—adding to the pressure on Gazprom to accedeto Turkey’s discount demands. See Elena Mazneva andMarco Bertacche, “Gazprom Said to Pay Saipem for Vesselsat Dropped Black Sea Link,” Bloomberg Business, March 6,2015, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-ticles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-

at-dropped-black-sea-link.

28 Lewis, Chestney, and Golubkova, “Even with Turkish Stream,Russia can’t avoid sending gas via Ukraine.”

29 International Energy Agency, “2013 Oil & Gas Security:Emergency Response of IEA Countries, Turkey” (2013), pp.4, 14, available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepub-lications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfi-nal_with_last_page.pdf .

30 Ibid., p. 4. Of the 46 bcm of natural gas that Turkey importedin 2012, 56 percent came from Russia via the Inter-Balkanand Blue Stream pipelines. The rest came from Iran andAzerbaijan—approximately 18 percent and 8 percent,respectively. Liquefied natural gas shipped from Algeria,Qatar, Nigeria, Egypt, and Norway constituted 16 percent.See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Turkey (U.S.Department of Energy, 2014), p. 10, available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu.

31 Simone Tagliapietra, “Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub:Myth or Reality?”, Turkish Policy Quarterly 12 (4): 87–98. Ac-cording to an undated Turkish foreign ministry website postwith complete statistics through 2011, Turkey is the secondcountry, after China, in terms of natural gas and electricitydemand increase. See Republic of Turkey Ministry of ForeignAffairs, “Turkey’s Energy Strategy.”

32 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Turkey , p. 1.

33 International Energy Agency, “2013 Oil & Gas Secu rity.”

34 Shaffer, “Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy,”p. 2. Turkey began using gas in the mid-1980s. By 2000, ithad surpassed coal as Turkey’s primary source of electricitygeneration. See Turkey Electricity Transmission Corporation,“Enerji kaynaklarina gore elektrik enerjisi uretimi ve paylari,”available at http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist (last accessed April 2015).

35 For capacity of pipelines, see Ozturk Selvitop, “Turkish Gas Network& Pipelines: Recent Developments”(2009), p. 9, available at https://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDF. It shouldbe noted that, for various reasons, importing nations—Turkey,in this case—do not normally take gas at the full capacity of thepipeline over the course of an entire year. Thus, according to aGazprom website post, Turkey took 26.7 bcm of gas—not the full 30bcm—from Russia in 2013 and 27 bcm in 2012. See Gazprom, “BlueStream,”available at http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/(last accessed April 2015). At theCenter for Strategic and International Studies panel, Bulent Aliriza,drawing on Turkish sources, gave figures that indicated the amountfor each year was roughly 0.5 bcm less than the Gazprom figures.According to Aliriza, Turkish gas imports from Azerbaijan for 2013and 2012 were 4.2 bcm and 3.35 bcm, respectively—well under the6.6 bcm capacity. See Center for Strategic and International Studies,“After South Stream: Turkish Stream?”

36 Lewis, Chestney, and Golubkova, “Even with Turkish Stream,Russia can’t avoid sending gas via Ukraine.”

37 Mert Bilgin, “Energy Policy in Turkey: Security, Markets, Sup-plies and Pipelines,” Turkish Studies 12 (3) (2011): 399–417.

38 Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s gas exports go to Turkey. SeeEnergy Information Administration, Natural Gas Exports fromIran: A report required by section 505(a) of the Iran Threat Re-duction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (U.S. Departmentof Energy, 2012), pp. 4, 5, available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdf . See pp. 6–9for a discussion and defense of Turkey’s need for Iranian gasunder current circumstances. After Russia, Iran is Turkey’ssecond-largest supplier of natural gas. In 2012, 18 percentof the 46 bcm of natural gas that Turks consumed camefrom Iran. See Energy Information Administration, Turkey .

http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57386http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57386http://csis.org/event/after-south-stream-turkish-streamhttp://csis.org/event/after-south-stream-turkish-streamhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=512694http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=512694http://csis.org/publication/russian-gas-stream-or-dreamhttp://csis.org/publication/russian-gas-stream-or-dreamhttp://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkish-stream-tanap-gas-race-for-greek-borderhttp://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkish-stream-tanap-gas-race-for-greek-borderhttp://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanlari-erdogan-aliyev-margvelasvili-kars-7086525-haberi/http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanlari-erdogan-aliyev-margvelasvili-kars-7086525-haberi/http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttps://euobserver.com/energy/128261http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/speculation-rife-over-russias-turkish-stream-loan-greece-313910http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/speculation-rife-over-russias-turkish-stream-loan-greece-313910http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tuhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tuhttp://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelisthttps://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDFhttps://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDFhttp://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdfhttp://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdfhttp://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdfhttp://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdfhttp://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/https://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDFhttps://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/406203.PDFhttp://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelisthttp://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tuhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tuhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdfhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/gazprom-said-to-pay-saipem-for-vessels-at-dropped-black-sea-linkhttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28485547.asphttp://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/speculation-rife-over-russias-turkish-stream-loan-greece-313910http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/speculation-rife-over-russias-turkish-stream-loan-greece-313910https://euobserver.com/energy/128261http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-starts-10-billion-project-to-ship-azeri-gas-to-europe/2683896.htmlhttp://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanlari-erdogan-aliyev-margvelasvili-kars-7086525-haberi/http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanlari-erdogan-aliyev-margvelasvili-kars-7086525-haberi/http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkish-stream-tanap-gas-race-for-greek-borderhttp://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkish-stream-tanap-gas-race-for-greek-borderhttp://csis.org/publication/russian-gas-stream-or-dreamhttp://csis.org/publication/russian-gas-stream-or-dreamhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=512694http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=512694http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-official-plays-down-practicality-of-proposed-russia-turkey-pipeline-1421951735http://csis.org/event/after-south-stream-turkish-streamhttp://csis.org/event/after-south-stream-turkish-streamhttp://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57386http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57386


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39 Tagliapietra, “Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth orReality?”, pp. 94–95.

40 Turkey’s unhappiness with Iran as a supplier is well known. Tehran has frequently failed to provide promised amountsof gas, particularly in winters when Iran’s own domesticneeds are great. Turkey recently rejected an Iranian offerto double its gas exports, with a price discount, accordingto Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as repor tedin Hürriyet Daily News. It is unclear when Iran will have thatamount of gas ready for export. According to the HürriyetDaily News article, Turkey has long been insisting that Irancut the price of the gas it currently sells to Ankara and, in

fact, has filed two complaints in the International Court ofArbitration accusing Iran of overcharging. The same articleclaims, “unofficially,” that Turkey pays $490 per 1,000 cubicmeters of Iranian gas, compared with $425 for Russiangas and $335 for Azerbaijani gas. See Merve Erdil, “Turkeyrejects Iran’s gas export proposal,” Hürriyet Daily News, April17, 2015, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-rejects-irans-gas-export-proposal.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81214&NewsCatID=348.

41 Laura El-Katiri, “The Eastern Mediterranean: the MiddleEast’s final gas frontier,” Oxford Energy Forum 93 (2013): 7,available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-con-tent/uploads/2013/10/OEF-93.pdf . The Israeli governmentdecided in June 2013 to export up to 40 percent of itsrecently discovered gas reserves. The precise amount thatwill be available is not known yet, but 50 bcm, with 20 bcmfor export, has become a widely used estimate.

42 Tagliapietra, “Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth or

Reality?”, p. 94; Bilgin, “Energy Polic y in Turkey,” p. 409. SeeMehmet Cetingulec, “In natural gas, all pipelines go through Turkey,” Al-Monitor, December 10, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/turkey-rus-sia-natural-gas-blue-stream-tanap.html. See the followingfor the more extravagant claim of 20 bc m to 30 bcm: Ener- jiajansi , “Irak dogalgazi 2017’de yuzde 50 indirimli gelecek,” November 6, 2014, available at http://www.enerjiajansi.net/icerik/496/irak-dogalgazi-2017de-yuzde-50-indirimli-gelecek.html. People within the industry who have spokento the author say 10 bcm to 15 bcm is probably the moreaccurate projection.

43 Humeyra Pamuk and Orhan Coskun, “Exclusive: Turkey,Iraqi Kurdistan i nk landmark energy contracts,” Reuters,November 29, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-turkey-iraq-oil-idUSBRE9AS-0BO20131129; Enerjiajansi , “Irak dogalgazi 2017’de yuzde 50indirimli gelecek.”

44 Selvitop, “Turkish Gas Network & Pipelines.”

45 Indeed, late last year, the Turkmenistani state-owned gascompany Turkmengas and a private Turkish companyAtagas signed a so-called framework agreement thatforesees Turkmenistan exporting gas through TANAP fordelivery to Europe. Addressing the problem of pi ping thegas across the Caspian Sea, the Atagas CEO cryptically saidthey are “working on all alternative routes.” See Marat Gurt,“Turkmenistan inks deal with Turkey to supply gas to TANAPpipeline,” Reuters, November 7, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/07/turkmenistan-turkey-tanap-idUSL6N0SX2QK20141107. For an elaboration of theimpediments to piping Turkmenistani gas across the Cas-pian Sea, see Bilgin, “Energy Policy in Turkey,” pp. 408–409; Tagliapietra, “Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth orReality?”, p. 93.

46 Center for Energy Economics, “Is LNG a Competitive Sourceof Natural Gas?”, available at http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/lng/LNG_introduction_05.php (last accessed

April 2015).

47 Bilgin, “Energy Polic y in Turkey,” p. 402.

48 Sevil Acar, Lucy Kitson, and Richard Bridle, “Subsidies to Coaland Renewable Energy in Turkey” (Geneva, Switzerland:International Institute for Sustainable Development andGlobal Subsidies Initiative, 2015), available at http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffsandrens_turkey_coal_eng.pdf. See also Mehmet Melikoglu, “Hydropower in Turkey:Analysis in the view of Vision 2023,” Renewable andSustainable Energy Reviews 25 (2014): 503–510, availableat http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032113003286.

49 The Turkish foreign ministry website declares it officialpolicy to seek to increase the share of renewables and addnuclear energy to its overall energy mix. Even as subsidized,renewable energy remains an expensive method of energyproduction. See Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs, “Turkey’s Energy Strategy.”

50 Salih Sari, “Current Nuclear Power Situation in Turkey,IAEA Technical Meeting on CNPP, Vienna, Austria, 18-21March 2013” (2013), p. 8, available at https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-18-03-21-TM-NPE/22.sari.pdf; David O’Byrne, “Turkey aiming forfive nuclear power plants by 2030: ministry,” Platts, February

2, 2011, available at http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/istanbul/turkey-aiming-for-five-nuclear-power-plants-by-8488525.

51 The pro-nuclear energy World Nuclear Association recentlyassessed that the Akkuyu reactor will begin operation in2022 and be completed in 2025, with Sinop likely to run acouple of years behind that sc hedule. See World NuclearAssociation, “Nuclear Power in Turkey,” available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Turkey/ (last accessed April 2015).

52 Personal communication from Shaffer.

53 Shaffer, “Natural gas supply stability a nd foreign policy,” p. 5,table 1.

54 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Ulkelere gore yillik ithalat (encok ithalat yapilan 20 ulke),” available at http://www.turk-stat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist (last accessed April

2015). Chart includes the years 2005 through 2014.

55 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Exports by Country and Year(Top 20 Countries in Exports),” available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist (last accessedApril 2015).

56 Habibe Ozdal and others, “Turkey-Russia Relations in thePost-Cold War Era: Current Dynamics, Future Prospects”(Ankara, Turkey: USAK Center for Eurasian Studies, 2013),pp. 41–42, available at http://usak.org.tr/images_upload/files/türkiye%20rusya%20ing%20nete.pdf. At a February 7,2014, Olympics summit with President Erdoğan in Sochi,President Putin told the assembled media that “[s]ince theearly 1990s, Turkish construction companies have carriedout work in Russia wor th a total of more than $50 b illion.”Perhaps this claim is an exaggeration, but it is neverthelessgenuinely indicative of the level o f Turkish constructionactivity in Russia. See Official Internet Resources of thePresident of Russia, “Meeting with Prime Minister of TurkeyRecep Tayyip Erdoğan,” February 7, 2014, available at http://

eng.kremlin.ru/news/6621.

57 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Education, Culture, Sport and Tourism: Number of Persons by Nationality,” available athttp://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist (last accessed April 2015). President Putin seems to havebeen exaggerating at his December 1, 2014, Ankara pressconference when he said that 4.5 million Russi ans visit Turkey “every year,” putting Russia in “first place” among visi-tors to Turkey. Official Internet Resources of the President ofRussia, “News conference following state visit to Turkey.”

58 Hazal Ates, “First step toward setting free trade zone withRussia,” Daily Sabah, August 23, 2014, available at http://www.dailysabah.com/money/2014/08/23/first-step-toward-setting-free-trade-zone-with-russia. According toRussia’s trade representative in Turkey, export of Turkishfoodstuffs to Russia did indeed increase significantly inthe wake of the sanctions. See Sputnik, “Sanctions AidPotential Expansion of Russian-Turkish Trade Ties: Offic ial,”

January 5, 2015, available at http://sputniknews.com/interviews/20150105/1016542134.html.

59 Orhan Coskun and Evrim Ergin, “UPDATE 3 – Ankarasays Russia’s South Stream pip eline could run to Turkey,”Reuters, April 16, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/turkey-southstream-idUSL6N0N-81LY20140416.

60 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “After SouthStream: Turkish Stream?”; Ozdal and others, “Turkey-RussiaRelations in the Post-Cold War Era,” p. 22.

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Turkey’s Growing Energy Ties with Moscow

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