TUF: Secure Software Updates Justin Cappos NYU Poly Computer Science and Engineering

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TUF: Secure Software Updates Justin Cappos NYU Poly Computer Science and Engineering. Introduction. You need to update software Software update systems are widely insecure [Bellissimo HotSec 06, Cappos CCS 08, Samuel CCS 10] You don’t want to think about security. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of TUF: Secure Software Updates Justin Cappos NYU Poly Computer Science and Engineering

Credentials & Capabilities

TUF: Secure Software Updates

Justin Cappos NYU PolyComputer Science and Engineering

IntroductionYou need to update software

Software update systems are widely insecure [Bellissimo HotSec 06, Cappos CCS 08, Samuel CCS 10]

You dont want to think about securityIs there a practical risk?Trivial to become an official mirror [Cappos 08]

Often can even target specific nodes [Samuel login 09]

Example attack that is fixed in modern package managers due to our work

Find existing exploit code for an old version of a package that isn't installed

Change the package metadata so the old version of the package is installed with any update

After the computer does an update, remotely exploit it

A knowledgeable attacker can root any system on PlanetLab today!But security is simple, right?Just use HTTPS Common errors in how certificates are handled Online data becomes single point of weakness ... and add signatures to the software updates Attackers can perform a replay attack... and add version numbers to the software updates

Attackers can launch freeze attacksBut security is simple, right? (cont.)...... and add a quorum of keys signature system for the root of trust, add signing by different compartmentalized key types, use online keys only to provide freeze attack protection and bound their trust window, etc. [Thandy software updater for Tor]

We still found 8 design or implementation flaws

The median Windows machine has ~24 updaters [Secunia]

GENI -> MITM

Having each developer build their own "secure" software update system will failOur approach for new systems

Our approach for legacy systemsIntercept traffic

Project roadmapBuild an artifact early, add security mechanisms graduallyPortability of the client library is keyWork with Raven, Tor, PrimoGENI, PlanetLab, nmap, etc. Many pairs of eyes uncover bugs more easily

Focus on supporting the developer / repository interface(s) used by GENI develsTUF ConclusionSoftware update systems are extremely vulnerable

Building a secure software update system is very hard

We have the solution!

We will:

Securing legacy systems by exploiting their insecurity

Working with different communities to ensure quality

Research Methodology

Seattle TestbedCheckAPIShimsLind

The Update Framework (TUF)UPPIR

Outline

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