Mar. 2018

SKY Perfecｔ JSAT Corporation

RADM (Ret.) Hitoshi TAKAHASHI

Trend in Military Satellite Communications

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Today's content

Space asset HEO,GEO,MEO,LEO

Communication, Earth observation, Navigation, Reconnaissance, ・・・・・

Military Communication

Satellite

Resiliency (Mission Assurance)

SSA (identify, characterize and attribute

all threatening actions in space)

Sanctuary

Congested Contested

Competitive

Deterrence theory

(by punishment) (by denial)

Disaggregation Distribution

Diversification Proliferation Protection Deception

Trend in MILSATCOM LASER JAMMING

THREAT

ASAT

EMP CYBER

・PROTECTED : secure, survivable(nuclear resistant) , anti-jam and low probability of detection / interception (LPD/LPI) (EHF) communications for high priority strategic and tactical users. The president and the national command authority to communicate and direct strategic operations in a nuclear. ・WIDEBAND : High Capacity, High Data Rates, Rain resilience and governmental use(X). Used for mission critical, sensitive command and control, Information sharing. ・BROADCAST : High-capacity product dissemination (Imagery, UAS full-motion video, large data files) for mission- essential situational awareness ・NARROWBAND : Main for mobile users, High availability for jungle foliage, extreme weather and urban terrain. 3

Classification of military satellite communications

https://afcea-la.org/afceala-wp/wp-content/uploads/201605120-AFCEA-20-May-16_FINAL.pdf

UNPROTECTED

WIDEBAND DSCS/WGS + Commercial

Command & Control ,Information sharing Predator/Reaper/Global Hawk

Air ISR relay

Tactical Protected Required

Depending on the mission and characteristics of the military, the core part of satellite communication is developed and operated on its own, but the others are supplemented by utilizing commercial and international cooperation. Considerations: Sovereignty, autonomy, Security Keyword: Resiliency, Affordability, Flexibility, Availability, PPP/PFI, International Partnership. U.K.: Skynet 5A,5B,5C,5D (X,UHF) [PFI], AEHF(EHF)[US Partner] France : Syracuse 3A, 3B (X,EHF), Athena-Fidus (Ka, EHF) ,Sicral 2(X,UHF) [French-Italian Coop] Italy : Sicral 1A, 1B(X,UHF,EHF), Athena-Fidus (Ka, EHF) ,Sicral 2(X,UHF) [Italian-French Coop] Germany : COMSAT Bw1,Bw2 (X,UHF) Spain : XTAR-EUR(X), Spanisat(X, Ka) Luxembourg : GovSat-1(X, Ka), WGS(X,Ka)[US Partner] Australia : Optus C1(UHF, X, Ka), Intelsat22(UHF), WGS(X, Ka)[US Partner] Canada : WGS(X, Ka), AEHF(EHF)[US Partner] 4

Situation of the Major countries (Except U.S.)

Japan SUPERBIRD-B2(X) Kirameki 1(PFI) SUPERBIRD-D (X) Kirameki 2（PFI) SUPERBIRD-C2(X)

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International Partnerships

Sicral2 Athena-Fidus

WGS

AEHF

Build geopolitical Partnership

Achieve economy of scale

Promote interoperability

Share technologies and best practice’s

Heightened resilience

Strengthens stability, safety and security in space

Definition：Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. An architecture is “more resilient” if it can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.

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Current space environment and Resilience

・The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends – space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Congested : testing of China’s destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system Contested : space systems face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets. ・ As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we will include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures.

Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China,either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military,civil, or commercial space systems. Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years.

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U.S. Effort （Examples of the major things）

○ Space debris , Solar flare etc. ○ kinetic Physical Attack ・direct-ascent ASAT ・co-orbital ASAT ・Ground stations ○ Non-kinetic Physical attack ・high-powered laser ・high-powered microwave ・EMP ○ELECTRONIC ATTACKS ・uplink jammer ・downlink jammer ・Spoofing ○CYBER ATTACKS ・Data Intercept/Monitoring ・Data Corruption ・Seizure of control

・Coverage ・Capacity ・Availability ・Flexibility ・Protection Anti-Jam LPD/LPI （EMP） ・Resiliency ・Affordability ・Interoperability

Protected Tactical Waveform Development

Commercial Pathfinder

Risks & Threats Requirments U.S. Effort

Build resilient and affordable architecture

Improve anti-jamming and LPD/LPI feature of Wideband satellite communication

Efficient and flexible use of commercial satellite communication

Determine the best mix of military and commercial SATCOM and allies/international partners

Wideband Communication Services（WCS） Analysis of Alternatives（AoA）

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Protected Tactical Waveform（PTW）Development

http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/fall-2014/2025-and-beyond-the-next-generation-of-protected-tactical-communications/

2025 and Beyond: The Next Generation of Protected Tactical Communications Developing affordable, protected, and interoperable satellite communications systems are goals of tomorrow’s space and ground architectures. by Jo-Chieh Chuang, Joseph Han, and Bomey Yang

The PTW is designed with frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) to provide greater anti jamming capability, featuring a mix of the current protected waveform and the commercial waveform. ・PTW provides secure, anti-jam, low-probability-of-intercept capabilities.

2010： forecasted the 2020-2025 timeframe Requirements 2012 ：developed prototypes for a new protected tactical communications system. 2016： contracted for Protected Tactical Service Field Demonstration (PTSFD). PTSFD will demonstrate the ability to provide wideband anti-jam communications to tactical users using WGS constellation and commercial SATCOM. 2018：PTW Remote Modems field testing with WGS terminals. 2023：Early fielding over WGS satellites. 2025：Fielding over Commercial satellite. 2028：Fielding Protected Tactical Satellite(PTS)

Protected Tactical Service（with PTW) provide affordable, resilient and flexible communication against harsh operating environments. It is possible to integrate WGS, commercial satellite, and future new satellite (PTS) , construct resilient global wideband satellite communication system.

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Commercial Pathfinder

The United States Government (USG) is pursuing a series of five (5) Pathfinders in support of future Commercial Satellite Communication (COMSATCOM) procurements. The COMSATCOM Pathfinder series is developing the business and technical capabilities necessary for the USG to more effectively access available satellite communication (SATCOM) resources for the warfighter worldwide.

http://www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/News/Conference/2016/AFCEA-Symposium/1-Miller_SATCOM.pdf

Commercial pathfinder’s goal Stabilize the price of satellite communication , Secure the flexibility of communication operation, ・Build a hybrid architecture that shares satellite communication capacity of US dedicated satellite, commercial and international partners. ・Build capacity pool structure in which the US, allies, coalition partners share capacity ・Provide capacity according to mission needs under centralized resource pooling and aggregated situational awareness. ・The choice of satellite to use greatly expands. ・Access to robust global satellite communication capacity is possible. As a result, not only affordable, flexibility but also resilience would be greatly improved.

International Invitation Our vision for this effort includes, to the extent our partners which to participate, interoperability with allies and international partners. ・・・ We will soon begin an Analysis of Alternatives(AoA) to guide our future Wideband SATCOM program. The AoA will assess a combination of architecture options including purpose-built platforms, commercial SATCOM services, hosted payloads, and contributions from international partners. Our aim is to balance capability, resiliency, and affordability.・・・

Areas of Specific Interest (RFI) 1) Wideband Transport (Space and Air) Segment 2) Operations Management 3) End-User Equipment and Platform Capability 4) Ground Infrastructure 5) Resiliency, Mission Assurance and Cybersecurity

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Wideband Communication Services（WCS） Analysis of Alternatives（AoA）

The AoA to determine the best mix of military and commercial SATCOM and allies/international partners to ensure the SATCOM architecture is resilient in a future contested environment. The AoA provide an analytical comparison of operational effectiveness, resiliency, suitability, and life-cycle costs to enable the full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, performance, and schedule for each alternative examined.

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WCS AoA International Partnerships

WGS

WCS AoA 15 Nations + NATO

accepted participation in the AoA

unknown unknown unknown

Resiliency Affordability

Operational Flexibility Operational Superiority

Interoperability

CURRENT

FUTURE

Aerial Layer Network 12

CONCLUSION

Ways to achieve resiliency

Commercial pathfinder

Wideband AoA

Quantum communications

LEO,MEO constellation

PFI/PPP

High-altitude platform

The best mix of ・・・？

Disaggregation

Distribution

Diversification

Proliferation

Protection

Deception

Laser communications

Small SAT

LEO/MEO

Hosted Payload

commercial

International Partners

Multi Domain

Solution e.g.

New Technologies

FHSS Waveform

GEO,HTS

Protected Tactical Waveform