Transitional Justice Processesiussp.org/.../silva-et-al-Working-Paper-2012.pdf · 2012-11-07 ·...

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Challenges and Opportunities in Incorporating

Demographic Analyses of Displacement into

Transitional Justice Processes

Romesh Silva∗, Daniel Guzmán & Tamy Guberek

November 7, 2012

Abstract

Armed conflict situations often involve mass displacement of civil-ians. This paper reviews the measurement challenges involved in in-corporating quantitative analyses of conflict-related displacement phe-nomena when characterizing the nature, magnitude and pattern oflarge-scale human rights violations. We present two recent case studies,from Timor-Leste and Kosovo, where quantitative analysis of conflict-related displacement was integrated into a truth commission’s workand statistical evidence was used by an international criminal tribunal,respectively. In these case studies we examine how the integration ofanalysis of civilian displacement phenomena strengthened our under-standing of ”what happened” during these two conflict. Using thesetwo case studies, we also contextualize how conflict-related displace-ment and other forms of violence were employed in these particular con-flict situations. We then conclude by noting useful lessons-learned fromthese case-studies: (i) in terms of the use of diverse data sources (thatdraw from both traditional demographic and non-traditional sources)and adaptation of classical demographic methods, and (ii) discussingthe challenges of presenting demographic estimates and analysis onconflict-related displacement in international justice settings.

∗Corresponding Author: [email protected].

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[email protected]

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1 Introduction

Mass displacement of civilian populations has been a feature of many re-cent armed conflicts and episodes of political violence (Schmeidl 2001). Asconflicts increasingly take the form of guerrilla and counter-insurgency styleoperations, these “new wars” affect civilians more than traditional armedconflicts between national armies (Kaldor 2007). Such displacement phe-nomena undermine basic human rights.1 As the legal and political struc-tures to redress human rights violations have advanced, there has also beenan increased demand to address the plight of war-affected civilians. There isa growing concern that people who have been displaced during war shouldbe considered in efforts towards justice, truth and reparations.

Transitional justice is a general framework that aims to redress the legacyof past human rights violations in the aftermath of armed conflict or author-itarian regimes (de Greiff Forthcoming 2012). Such initiatives endeavor tolink societal and political transition to principles of justice and accountabil-ity. In their efforts to facilitate peaceful and just transitions, the relativelynew field of transitional justice has drawn on an array of strategies includinghistorical clarification, prosecutions, reparations processes, memorialization,institutional reform, and lustration (Arthur 2009). Some authors have ar-gued that such transitional justice initiatives play an important role in deter-ring future violence, ending impunity, facilitating reconciliation and leadingto individual and society healing (Orr 2000; Villa-Vicencio 2000; Orrentlicher1995). Vinjamuri and Snyder (2004) have warned about the dangers of suchclaims without strong evidence and careful analysis and called for moreempirically-based investigations into transitional justice mechanisms.

In this article, we draw on our expertise in demography and appliedstatistics, to explore the role of quantification of conflict-related displace-ment in informing transitional justice processes, such as truth commissionsand international tribunals. Without a solid empirical foundation that helpsto clarify “what happened,” other transitional justice objectives risk alien-ating those most affected by conflict and leaving key human rights issuesunaddressed. We draw on lessons learned from some recent quantitativeanalyses of mass displacement phenomenon in Timor-Leste and Kosovo,

1Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights explicitly recognize the individual’s right to freedom of movement(United Nations 1948, 1966).

November 7, 2012 2 of 30 Silva, Guzmán & Guberek

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and describe how these analyses contributed to specific transitional justicemechanisms. We conclude by considering the contemporary challenges andopportunities related to measuring displacement for transitional justice inColombia and Sri Lanka.

2 Empirical Analysis of Displacement: The Needfor its Inclusion

We believe empirical analyses of displacement should be included in transi-tional justice for at least three reasons. First, displacement is often centralto the conflict experience and is often a direct violation itself. It also isoften a precursor to other forms of suffering. Second, given the centrality ofdisplacement in recent conflicts, transitional justice mechanisms that ignoreconflict-related displacement risk producing a decontextualized history thatobscures key components of past violence. We provide examples in this re-gard below. Third, we note that in several recent conflicts, conflict-relateddisplacement has been the most commonly experienced violation. Exclud-ing it from transitional justice processes means that many victims are leftout, and thus the experience of a large proportion of victims will remain un-acknowledged. Also, excluding conflict-related displacement from historicalclarification facilitates the failure to address its human rights consequencesthrough reparations, institutional reform and community reconciliation pro-cesses.

Conflict-related displacement involves human suffering, dislocation and,at times, a threat to one’s basic livelihood. As a result, it is recognized as aviolation of basic human rights and directly linked to questions of responsi-bility and accountability. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsand the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly rec-ognize the individual’s right to freedom of movement (United Nations 1948,1966). The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacementprovide that every person has the right to be protected against arbitrarydisplacement from his or her home, including in situations of armed con-flict, except where the security of civilians or imperative military reasons sodemand (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1998). The RomeStatute, which resulted in the establishment of a permanent internationalcriminal court, recognizes deportation or forcible transfer of population as


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an act constituting crimes against humanity when it is perpetrated as partof a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population (UnitedNations 1998).

Recently, scholarly writings have emphasized the importance of conflict-related displacement and its central role in recent conflicts. Greenhill (2010),when reviewing a collection of diverse armed conflict situations since thesecond world war, has argued that combatants have increasingly used mi-gration as a strategic political and military weapon. She notes how, in theseconflicts, warring parties have employed forms of coercive displacement toexploit competing political interests and groups, and then manipulated theassociated costs and risks imposed on affected populations. This evidence isconsistent with Steele (2010)’s conclusion that conflict-related displacementis not just an unfortunate by-product of armed violence, but is often usedby warring parties as a deliberate tool for strategic reasons. Transitionaljustice initiatives that ignore displacement and its effects risk developing anarbitrarily narrow and selective account of crimes of policy and their humanrights consequences.

However, some transitional justice mechanisms have deemed that ques-tions relating to forced relocation of individuals and curtailment of freedomof movement do not constitute “gross violations of human rights” and werethus beyond the scope of their mandate. The South African Truth & Rec-onciliation Commission (TRC) was heavily criticized in this regard. TheSouth African TRC limited its mandate to specific modalities of violence.2

Mamdani (2002) has argued that the South African TRC produced a “di-minished truth” by narrowly defining the scope of its mandate and the no-tion of victimhood in the context of South African apartheid. The narrowfocus was born out of a ‘modality bias,’ whereby the commission focusedon individual victims and violations that were considered more severe andless difficult to document. The South African TRC prioritized violations of“bodily integrity rights” over violations of “subsistence rights.” As a result,such pervasive and instrumental policies and practices as forced removals of“any tribe or native” from their land “whenever it expedient or in the gen-eral public interest” and the use of the pass laws to monitor the non-white

2According to its mandate, the TRC outlined ‘gross violations of human rights’ as“the violation of human rights through - (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, commandor procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a) [...]” (South African Truthand Reconciliation Commission 1999).


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population and intimidate the political opposition were not considered to bepolitically-motivated by the TRC and within its mandate (Mamdani 2002).This, in turn, obscured the victimization of entire communities and theinstrumental role of laws that limited freedom of movement for particularsubpopulations. Such a modality bias resulted in an incomplete historicalaccounting and skewed foundation for other transitional justice efforts.

In contrast, other recent transitional justice mechanisms have more suc-cessfully integrated conflict-related displacement into their historical clarifi-cation and accountability proceedings. For example, Tabeau et al. (2009),in their expert report for the Demographic Unit of the International Crim-inal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case against Jardanko Prlicet al. (IT-04-74-PT), presented a demographic analysis of the ethnic com-position as well as minimum numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)and refugees from eight selected municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovinain 1991 and 1997-98. By using official population data and demographic re-construction methods, they found that (i) significant population movementstook place during the 1991-94 conflict in eight particular municipalities ofBosnia and (ii) changes in the ethnic composition in the region resultedfrom massive population movements and thousands of internally displacedpersons and refugees from this territory. These quantitative analyses wereused by the Office of the Prosecutor as evidence that the defendants’ actionswere part of a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Substantial numbers of people have been displaced in recent conflictssuch as Guatemala, Peru, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Darfur. InTimor-Leste, approximately 55% of all households (i.e. approximately 108,200households) in Timor-Leste in 2004 had experienced conflict-related dis-placement between 1974 and 1999 (Silva and Ball 2006). Drawing on house-hold survey data, Guberek et al. (2006) found that conflict-related displace-ment was the most commonly experienced violation amongst Sierra Leoneanhouseholds during the 1991-2002 civil war. They estimated that SierraLeoneans experienced approximately 1.47 million acts of conflict-related dis-placement throughout the war. In August, 2005 the United Nations Officefor the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that therewere more than 1.8 million internally-displaced persons in Darfur (UnitedNations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2005). TheUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in August 2005,noted that 200,000 Darfuris were registered as refugees across the border inEastern Chad (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2005). The


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sheer size of conflict-related displacement in these recent conflicts speaks di-rectly to its centrality in understanding victims’ experiences and accountingfor the actions of (or inaction by) perpetrators, bystanders and beneficiaries.

Perhaps one of the most pressing reasons of why conflict-related dis-placement has sometimes been omitted from historical clarification and ac-countability processes is due to the associated empirical measurement chal-lenges. For example, the official truth commission in Peru did not developquantitative findings about internal displacement during the conflict, citingthe inadequacy of available data, considerable measurement challenges andtight deadline for the commission’s final report.3 The exposition of suchmeasurement challenges and the description of methodological solutions tosuch challenges is one of the central themes of this paper.

The human rights consequences of conflict-related displacement, its sheermagnitude in recent conflicts, and its centrality in understanding the natureof violence and responsibility for crimes of policy all underline the needfor transitional justice mechanisms to carefully consider conflict-related dis-placement. Empirical quantitative methods from the fields of demographyand applied statistics offer researchers useful ways to measure the natureof mass displacement. In the following sections, we discuss lessons learnedfrom applying quantitative methods for transitional justice mechanisms inTimor-Leste and Kosovo.

3 Quantification of Conflict-Related Displacementfor Transitional Justice: Lessons from Timor-Leste & Kosovo

The field of transitional justice focuses on crimes of policy - such as warcrimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. By their very nature suchcrimes are massive and are systemic. Thus, historical clarification processesand accountability mechanisms ultimately need to address questions of factabout whether such crimes were “widespread,” “systematic” in pattern,“targeted” at a particular subpopulation, or were likely the result of policy

3Email correspondence between Romesh Silva and Daniel Manrique (Former Statisti-cian, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) on November 9, 2011.


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or planning. Complete information about all human rights violations andtheir causal pathways are almost never immediately available. Data are usu-ally incomplete. Periods of mass violence are, by their very nature, chaoticand dangerous. Also some data collection is convened around a specific pur-pose. Therefore, data about violence often only cover specific time-periods,subpopulations or regions that are not necessarily representative (for exam-ple, humanitarian data often is specifically focused on the most vulnerable).So there are substantial challenges for empirical researchers when trying toreliably clarify the total magnitude, pattern and proportional levels of re-sponsibility for “what happened” during a period of large-scale violence, asavailable data may not be representative of broad displacement dynamicsand the entire population that experienced conflict-related displacement.

The tools of demography and statistics provide a useful theoretical basisand methodological toolkit to make population-level generalizations aboutmagnitude and pattern when data on only a fraction of the population areavailable. Social scientists have increasingly used quantitative methods whentrying to answer basic questions of magnitude, pattern and responsibility intransitional justice settings.4 Rigorous quantitative analysis also has theability to go beyond general, aggregate description of conflict dynamics.Well-framed quantitative analyses can test hypotheses about the explana-tions of adverse human rights outcomes and uncover how certain conflictdynamics can result in specific population-level outcomes.

Furthermore, the literature on quantitative methods in transitional jus-tice settings has been largely focused on two areas: (i) the accurate quan-tification of conflict-related mortality during armed conflict and politicalviolence and (ii) survey-based measurement of attitudes of conflict affectedsocieties about post-conflict social reconstruction and justice. In this sec-tion, we seek to address this gap in the literature by presenting lessonslearned from quantitative analyses on displacement during conflict.

The remainder of this section focuses on presenting some of the concep-tual lessons from integrating quantitative analysis into processes of transi-tional justice. We draw the lessons from two examples - Timor-Leste andKosovo- where quantitative analysis (i) complemented other data sourcesand contributed to public understanding of displacement during conflict in

4For a general overview of the use of quantitative methods in transitional justice set-tings, see Silva and Klingner (In Press - 2012).


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an official truth commission in Timor-Leste and (ii) was used to build a legalcase against former top state officials at the ICTY in the Hague.

We also focus on the cases of Timor-Leste and Kosovo for specific, con-trasting reasons. The Timor-Leste case involved a closed territory, over aprotracted 25-year conflict during which contemporaneous documentationwas limited and difficult. Whereas, displacement during conflict in Kosovowas concentrated over a 3-month period in mid-1999 during which therewere multiple local and international organizations carrying out contempo-raneous investigations and documentation work. These differences allows usto draw broader lessons about working with empirical data on displacementand developing effective analyses to inform transitional justice processes.

3.1 Quantitative Analysis on Displacement in Kosovo andTimor-Leste

Between March and May 1999, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albaniansfled from Kosovo. Associated with this mass exodus were an array of humanrights violations. American Association for the Advancement of Science(2000), Spiegel and Salama (2000) and Physicians for Human Rights (1999)all estimated that more than 9,000 Kosovars were killed as part of thisviolence.5

In August 2007, the ICTY began the trial of Milutinovic and colleaguesfor crimes that included genocide, unlawful deportation, and attacks oncivilians. As part of the building their case for war crimes, the prosecutionneeded to answer the following questions:

• did Kosovar Albanians flee in response to an ethnically targeted policyof killing and forced displacement, or for some other reason?

• If the killings and migration were the result of policy, who was respon-sible for these orders? Did the defendants direct this policy or at least

5American Association for the Advancement of Science (2000), using multiple systemsestimation, estimated that approximately 10,500 (95% confidence interval - (7,449,13627)).Physicians for Human Rights (1999) and Spiegel and Salama (2000), both used survey-based methods, estimated that 9,269 (95% confidence interval - (6,911,11,627)) and 12,000(95% confidence interval - (5,500,18,300)), respectively.


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know of it?

Ball et al. (2002) contributed empirical analysis to help the prosecution.In their study using multiple data sources, they found that killings andrefugee flow occurred in a regular and similar pattern. This pattern wascharacterized by three distinct phases in which a peak in both refugee flowand killings was followed by notably lower levels of refugee flow and killings.As refugee flow and killings generally occurred in the same places at thesame times, Ball et al. (2002) concluded that this implied a common causeof both phenomena. Their data and the associated statistical modelingwas tested against the competing hypotheses about the cause of the killingand the mass migration. The results proved to be inconsistent with thehypothesis that NATO air attacks or actions by the Kosovar LiberationArmy were determinants for the mass killings and refugee flow. Their resultswere consistent, however, with the hypothesis that Yugoslav forces wereresponsible for a systematic campaign of killings and expulsions. Thesefindings are relevant for explaining the cause of large-scale human rightsviolations and probable responsibility for such acts.

In Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999, the local population suffered asustained period of conflict-related violence. Authors such as Taylor (2002)and Robinson (2009) have noted how this period was marked by famine-related deaths, killings, disappearances, torture and the mass displacementof civilians.

In 2002, the Commissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação deTimor-Leste (CAVR) was established as an independent statutory author-ity to inquire into human rights violations committed by all armed actorsbetween April 1974 and October 1999. Another goal of the commission wasalso to facilitate community reconciliation processes for those who commit-ted less serious offenses.6

6The CAVR was set up by the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor,tasked with administering the territory during Timor-Leste’s transition to self-government,established an official truth commission named the (United Nations 2001).The mandateof the CAVR included: establishing the truth regarding the human rights violations thatoccurred in the context of political conflicts in Timor Leste between 1974 and October 25,1999; assisting in restoring the dignity of victims; promoting reconciliation, and supportingthe reintegration of individuals who committed harmful acts through community-basedreconciliation mechanisms; identifying practices and policies that should be addressedto prevent future human rights violations and to promote human rights; and referring


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One of the historical research tasks for the CAVR was to investigateand explain the impact of conflict-related violence on the Timorese civilianpopulation. Therefore, a central question was for the CAVR staff was, “Howmany Timorese died due to the conflict between 1974 and 1999?”. To answerthis question, the CAVR needed to estimate the magnitude and pattern ofmortality during the conflict, identify likely mortality causes and examinewhether there was a connection between these deaths and the actions ofparties to the conflict. This research direction led the CAVR to incorporatequantitative analysis, along with qualitative research, to examine the linkbetween mortality and displacement during the conflict.

Silva and Ball (2006) implemented a post-conflict household survey inpartnership with the CAVR. Using the survey data, they found that conflict-related displacement in Timor-Leste was widespread. These findings wereconsistent with the hypothesis that conflict-related mortality, which in-cluded killings, disappearances, and famine-related deaths, tended to occurat around the same times and in the same geographic locations as mass mi-gration flows. Based on this empirical inference, they concluded that boththe Indonesian military and Timorese resistance movement were responsi-ble for mass displacement of civilians. They also estimated approximately84,200 famine deaths in during the invasion and occupation period the 1970soccurred while people were in a state of displacement.7 Similar to the studyby Ball et al. (2002) in Kosovo, the quantitative patterns in the study bySilva and Ball (2006) helped to make evident the strong connections betweendifferent modalities of violence in Timor-Leste: namely conflict-related dis-placement, killings, famine-related deaths.

3.2 Conceptual Lessons Learned from Analyses in Timor-Leste and Kosovo

In the next subsections we discuss the conceptual lessons learned from thequantitative analysis of displacement in Kosovo and Timor-Leste within

human rights violations to the Office of the General Prosecutor with recommendations forprosecution.

7Silva and Ball (2006), by drawing on three individual data sources, also estimatedan upper bound as high as 183,000 civilian deaths during the conflict. This estimatewas consistent with Staveteig (2007)’s estimate of 204,000 as a conservative upper-boundestimate of excess mortality.


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their respective transitional justice settings.

3.2.1 Need for a Broad and Inclusive Mandate and Flexible An-alytical Framework

We have noted earlier in Section 2 how a limited and narrow mandate led toa ‘modality bias’ in the South African TRC’s historical clarification work.In the cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, both the ICTY and the CAVR hadrelatively broad and inclusive mandates and thus gave ample provision forthe inclusion of displacement.

The ICTY, and subsequently the International Criminal Court, explicitlyrecognized deportation and forcible transfer as examples of crimes againsthumanity.8 The Kristic ruling and relevant parts of the Rome Statute havestipulated that the notion of ‘forcible’ does not necessitate the use of phys-ical force, but does include the threat of force or coercion or other meansof inducing involuntary displacement. The CAVR’s mandate specified thata key component of the Commission’s role was to make broad findings offact about the antecedents, causes, patterns, trends, perpetrators’ motives,and impact on victims (United Nations 2001, Article 2).. It didn’t limitedits focus to a specific class of human rights violations or typology of humanrights violations. In fact, the CAVR’s mandate called for its investigationinto “violations of a broad range of human rights standards,” including “therange of rights relevant to displacement, resettlement and famine (the rightto adequate food, freedom from hunger, water and adequate housing, free-dom of movement, freedom to choose a residence)” (United Nations 2001, p.5). In its final report, the CAVR defined displacement as a situation wherepeople leave their place of residence “either under some form of compulsionor because they themselves have decided that circumstances are such thatit would be dangerous not to move” Commissão de Acolhimento, Verdadee Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (nda). The CAVR noted that this does notencompass all situations where civilians flee to escape hostilities betweenparties to a conflict, but instead involves either some form of coercion or“reasonable grounds to fear death or violence” if civilians refused to flee.

8See Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute and Kristic ICTY ch.I.2.8.2001. para 528.‘Deportation’ is generally defined as displacement across an international border, whereas‘forcible transfer’ refers to internal displacement.


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The ICTY and the CAVR had mandates which allowed them to considerconflict-related displacement as a fundamental violation of human rights.But a broad mandate is insufficient by itself to avoid ‘modality bias.’ Inaddition to their broad mandates, researchers who contributed to findingson displacement in Kosovo and Timor-Leste used flexible analytical frame-works.

The term “forced displacement” attempts to embed the implied causalmechanism – of being forced by someone else or at the very least the in-voluntary nature of the movement – into its definition. Steele (2010) hascautioned that, since there is variation in displacement across areas withviolence, this term should be avoided unless the relationship between causeand migration has already been adequately established.

We focus our discussion around the concept of conflict-related displace-ment instead of the term forced displacement.9 In particular, we defineconflict-related displacement as population movements that would not haveoccurred in the absence of armed conflict or political violence. We havechosen this term for a five reasons. Firstly, we regard the term conflict-related displacement to fully encompass the notion of forced displacement.Thus, this term covers forms of displacement that are obviously the resultof direct coercion and those that are more difficult to identify as directlycoercive, but nevertheless directly connected to armed conflict or politi-cal violence. Secondly, by focusing on conflict-related displacement we arenot constrained by the narrow dichotomization between refugees and IDPs,which is strictly tied to whether or not individuals cross international bor-ders (Mooney 2005). Thirdly, by considering the broader concept of conflict-related displacement our focus more completely encompasses the effects oflarge-scale human rights violations and armed conflict. 10 Fourthly, explic-itly identifying and characterizing types of displacement is challenging both

9The term forced migration is regularly used by human rights advocates, transitionaljustice experts and academics in both policy-related forums and scholarly writings. How-ever, Helton and Jacobs (1999) have noted that the term is not well understood as it lacksa universally-recognized and consistent definition. International human rights norms andhumanitarian law, that address questions associated with migration during armed conflictor from repressive government regimes, are mostly framed around legal concepts such asthe refugee or internally displaced person.

10This is partly because the concept of conflict-related displacement essentially relies oncounterfactually-based logic by implicit comparison with what could be seen as ”regular”or ”normal” patterns before and after conflict.


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during and in the aftermath of a period of large-scale violence.11 Lastly, byemploying such counterfactual logic the analyst does not a-priori need todetermine its causal nature.

Directly establishing that combatants employed coercive means to dis-place populations can be difficult. Ball et al. (2002) employed a flexible an-alytical framework in Kosovo through the synthesis of administrative datasources (in the form of Albanian border records) and available survey data.Whereas, Silva and Ball (2006) drew heavily on qualitative research by fel-low CAVR researchers when developing a household survey that did notnecessarily assume all acts of displacement were necessarily ‘forced.’ Inboth cases, inferences about the involuntary nature of mass displacementwas made at the analytical stage by systematically analyzing the estimatedmagnitude and pattern of displacement in the context of key local eventsand information about the political and military actions of parties to theconflict.

This kind of analytical flexibility implicitly recognizes the wide spectrumof conflict-related migration practices and phenomena. Further such flexibil-ity helps to avoid dichotomies that may be theoretically useful but imprac-tical in terms of data collection and measurement. Such dichotomies, thathave been extensively written about in the academic literature on conflict-related migration, include the following contrasting dichotomies:

• impelled migration versus forced migration (Petersen 1958),

• anticipatory and acute movements (Kunz 1973), and

• preventive and reactive migration (Williams and Pradhan 2009; Ibáñezand Vélez 2008). 12

11Steele (2010) has noted that observable migration is only an indicator of displacement,as even when armed actors intend to displace civilians, civilians may exert some autonomyand choose to migrate or to remain where they are. Thus observed (or observable) migra-tion flows are, at best, an indirect indicator of coercive migration, rather than a definitivedirect measure of coercive migration.

12The purpose of these classifications is to delineate the different motivations that leadto population movements during conflict, including the nature of the conflict, the perceivedrisks to basic safety and livelihoods of civilians and the level or type of coercion involved.Petersen (1958) draws a distinction between ‘impelled’ migration and ‘forced’ migration(p.261). He defines ‘impelled’ migration as resulting from threats to a population thatstrongly encourage them to leave. Petersen (1958) regards ‘forced migration’ as movements


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The quantitative analyses used in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, as well as thedemographic analysis on Bosnia by Tabeau et al. (2009) at the ICTY, em-ployed flexible analytic frameworks. They made findings of “forced displace-ment” or “coercive migration” by indirect means. They did this throughinference from the large-scale nature of population flows and identifyinghow the nature, magnitude and pattern of such flows related to actions bycombatants and signature local events.

3.2.2 Limitations of Open-Ended Narrative Testimonies

Official truth commissions and non governmental organizations often col-lect narrative testimonies from victims and witnesses to advance their re-search on the nature, magnitude and pattern of large-scale human rightsviolations.13 The size of such narrative testimony data collection has var-ied: for example, Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission collected2,129 testimonies whereas South Africa’s TRC collected testimonies from21,000 victims and witnesses. Some official truth commissions, like those inSouth Africa, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia, Haiti and Argentina, have evenrelied exclusively on their databases of open-ended narrative testimonies

in which individuals have no choice, such as the Nazi’s rounding up and deportationof Jews to concentration camps during World War II. Kunz (1973) has distinguishedbetween ‘anticipatory’ and ‘acute’ population movements: noting that those who becomedisplaced ‘anticipate’ the need to leave, and make necessary arrangements for their exit.He contrasts such ‘anticipatory’ movements with ‘acute’ movements motivated by “greatpolitical changes or movement of armies” (p.132), that are an effective “push” to escape.

Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) consider ‘preventative’ migration during conflict, as migrationdue to “fear despite not being threatened” (p.669). Williams and Pradhan (2009) the-orize that individuals have different perceptions of risk which, in turn, result in variouspreventative and reactive actions in the face of threats to safety and basic livelihoods.Thus, Williams and Pradhan (2009) recognize that some civilians migrate as a preventa-tive action, while others take other precautionary measures (in terms of political or socialallegiances or economic payments) that don’t necessarily result in migration.

However these dichotomies, while sometimes useful in characterizing different moti-vations and modalities, may potentially obscure other characteristics of conflict-relateddisplacement. Williams and Pradhan (2009), when examining displacement and violenceduring the 1996-2006 Maoist insurrection in Nepal, has noted how the commonly-usedterm forced displacement sets up dichotomies between those who are forced and thosewho appear to move voluntarily.

13For example, official truth commissions in Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,South Africa, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Peru, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenyacollected thousands of open-ended narrative testimonies as a means to advance their his-torical clarification mission.


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when making quantitative findings about large-scale human rights viola-tions. Whereas other commissions, like those in Guatemala, Timor-Leste,and Peru used multiple, independent databases to inform their quantitativefindings.

Ball and Spirer (2000) have noted the flexibility and power of open-endednarrative testimony collection in eliciting detailed information about certainviolations, particularly killings, disappearances, sexual violence and acts oftorture and ill treatment. They are particularly useful for documentingrich information about the contexts in which violations occurred.14 Yetdata based on narrative testimony have notable limitations when quantifyingdisplacement within conflict.15

Testimony data have two fundamental limitations – a structural limita-tion and an inferential limitation. A displacement event occurs across timeand space. The event starts at one point in time and at a specific location,and often ends in a different location at a time that may be days, weeks ormonths later. The displacement may be experienced by an entire householden-masse uniformly or the household may be dissolved or even expandedduring the event. Such structural complexity is difficult to systematicallycapture in thousands of open-ended narratives. This is also a structuralchallenge not seen for other types of violations such as killing, torture, andrape.

The second limitation associated with databases of narrative testimoniesis an inferential one. Narrative testimonies are collected from victims andwitnesses willing to report to a truth commission or human rights project.16

As a result, such collections of testimonies record an unknown subset of allvictims’ experiences. They may be biased in that they are more representa-tive of people who are easily accessible (eg urban residents), or well-knowncommunity leaders (eg trade union leaders or priests), or whose politicalbeliefs are closely aligned to those of the human rights project or truth com-

14For a detailed presentation of consideration in designing and implementing databasesof human rights violations constructed from open-ended narrative testimonies, see Ball(1996).

15Silva and Ball (2008) have also noted their weakness in documenting and quantifyingviolations that result from acts of omission, such as famine-related deaths.

16citetpopkin-roht-arriaza-LSI-1995 has noted that the approach by official truth com-mission of listening and recording testimony from all willing to participate in the commis-sion’s truthseeking work is central to a commission’s orientation of being victim-centricand participatory.


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mission. As they are not collected using a probabilistic method of selectingrespondents, generalizations and inferences from such convenience samplesabout the nature, magnitude and pattern of all violations may produce bi-ased results (Kruger et al. In Press - 2012).

Table 1: Comparison of Estimated Displacement Statistics with ReportedCounts from Narrative Testimony Databases

Reported EstimatedActs Victims Acts Victims

Timor-Leste 14,198 10,170 1,272,600 486,900(95% C.I.) - - (1,132,339-1,412,550) (454,559-519,334)

Kosovo - 4,485 - 769,619(95% C.I.) - - - -

Sierra Leone 7,893 6,241 1,473,475 -(95% C.I.) - - (1,328,159-1,618,791) -

Sources: For Timor-Leste: (i) reported counts of acts and victims are calculated

using the CAVR’s database of narrative testimony database, and (ii) estimated

number of acts and victims are derived by Silva and Ball (2006) using the CAVR’s

Retrospective Mortality Survey. For Sierra Leone: (i) reported counts of acts

and victims are calculated using the Sierra Leonean Truth & Reconciliation Com-

mission’s database of narrative testimony database, and (ii) estimated number of

acts is derived by Guberek et al. (2006) using a household survey conducted by

the American Bar Association & Benetech. For Kosovo: (i) reported counts of

displacement acts are from a Human Rights Watch documentation project (Human

Rights Watch 2001), (ii) estimated number of displacement is derived by Ball (2000,

Appendix A5).

Table 1 presents the severity of the under-reporting of conflict-relateddisplacement in narrative testimony projects by comparing counts of dis-placement from narrative testimony descriptive statistics with estimates de-rived from survey data (from Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone) and bordercrossing records (in Kosovo). We observe that testimony-based data col-lection in all three conflicts substantially under-estimates the magnitude ofconflict-related displacement in all three conflicts. This systematic bias sug-gests the notable limitations of testimony-based data on displacement, whenmaking population-level generalizations.


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In the context of historical clarification and accountability processes,such structural and inferential limitations point to the need for alternativeand more appropriate data collection and quantitative analysis methodswhen measuring conflict-related displacement. Such data and methods areneeded to more reliably clarify the magnitude of displacement in conflict anddescribe its structural complexity. Erroneous conclusions about the magni-tude of displacement and the characteristics of the displaced population canlead to an incomplete truth and a flawed empirical basis for accountability,reparations and institutional reform processes. Simplistic descriptions, thatare a product of methods that ignore the structural complexity of displace-ment, are unlikely to lead to increased understanding about the nature ofthe displacement experienced and the attributable responsibility associatedwith such injustice.

3.2.3 Using Complementary and Additional Data Sources & Meth-ods

Population-based surveys and systematically maintained registers offer anumber of possible ways to circumvent the structural and inferential limi-tations of open-ended narratives. In this section, we note the importanceof these complementary data sources and methods in addition to describinghow they were used in official truth and accountability processes in Timor-Leste and Kosovo.

The Indonesian government severely restricted access to Timor-Lestebetween 1975 and 1989, effectively making Timor a closed country. Thismade comprehensive monitoring and documentation by international hu-manitarian agencies, the United Nations agencies, the international pressand human rights advocates difficult. As such, comprehensive analyses ofthe total impact of armed conflict, including civilian displacement, was onlyreally possible after the conclusion of the 25-year armed conflict.

Given the limitations of its narrative testimony database to clarify the to-tal magnitude and pattern of displacement (and conflict-related mortality),the CAVR developed a household survey. The survey drew a representativesample of Timorese households, using probability-based random samplingmethods, and retrospectively documented displacement event histories ex-perienced by each head of household. Customized interview probes, within a


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structured survey questionnaire, grounded displacement events in temporaland geographical space.17 Even though the data on the late 1970s and early1980s is likely to be an under-estimate of total displacement,18 they pro-vided the CAVR with an improved population-level overview of the broadmagnitude and pattern of displacement at the national and regional levelacross time (year by year). These survey-based findings were the basis ofsome of CAVR’s key findings about the centrality of displacement duringthe conflict, including:

• Displacement was widespread: 55.5% of surveyed households reportedone or more displacement events,

• displacement was particularly frequent during the initial years of in-vasion and occupation by the Indonesian military between 195 and1980,

• 70% of displacements were local - occurring within a household’s owndistrict or subdistrict, and

• displacement events often occurred in rapid succession and were oftenshort in duration: 22.2% of displacement events lasted one month orless, and 50.1% lasted one year or less.

This broad quantitative picture informed the CAVR’s research and find-ings on how conflict-related displacement in Timor-Leste between 1975 and1982 was closely associated with conflict-related deaths (in the form offamine deaths).

In Kosovo, Ball et al. (2002) drew on both administrative records andsurvey data to understand why Kosovars fled their homes. The borderguards in Morina documented the flow of refugees into Albania, recordingin the border registries the date people crossed the border, the numberof individuals in their party, and their home town. These official borderrecords were not compiled specifically for a human rights or transitional

17Although, the lengthy survey recall period (stretching back to the thirty years) meantthat the precision of reported dates and locations associated with events during the late1970s and early 1980s was low. Many dates and locations associated with the start andend of displacement events in these years only being reported down to the month andadministrative district (as opposed to exact days and village locations).

18As these data are likely to be subject to recall errors.


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justice purpose, but rather for routine bureuacratic purposes. Yet, thesedata were effectively used to uncover the nature of displacement and itsunderlying causal mechanism.

Although relatively complete, these administrative data still had bothcoverage and structural limitations in an analagous way to convenience sam-ple data. First, the border guards only recorded information about whenrefugees crossed the border. But in order to make causal inferences aboutwhy people fled their homes, Ball et al. (2002) needed detailed informa-tion about the times they fled their homes (or, alternatively, the time spentin transit between home and the border) not the times they crossed theborder. Second, at times when refugee flow was particularly dense borderguards were unable to register everybody coming across the border. Third,for almost half of the estimated border crossings the researchers lacked infor-mation about the location of origin for refugees. Fourth, the border recordsfrom Morina only documented refugee flow from Kosovo into Albania. Thus,these records did not contain information about refugee flow into Macedo-nia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro nor did they contain informationabout displacement flows that never resulted in a border crossing.

Ball et al. (2002) used statistical inference to manage missing data andto transform border crossing data into home leaving data.19 Statisticalinference is the science of drawing conclusions from data that are subject toobservational errors or sampling variation. In order to impute the missinginformation in the border records, Ball et al. (2002, Appendix, p.37) drewon a number of other complementary data sources including daily refugeeestimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and theAlbanian government, a probability-based random sample survey conductedin refugee camps and centers in Albania and Macedonia, two other randomsamples of much smaller size and two additional convenience samples.20

Then the data on displacement flows were overlaid with time and locationinformation on NATO bombing, KLA activity and killings by the Yugoslavforces.

The triangulation of multiple, independently-collected data sources re-

19They also tested the sensitivity of their results to weaknesses in the data and assump-tions in their modeling and estimation techniques.

20Ball et al. (2002) also used multiple incomplete data sources from Bosnia, Montenegro,and Macedonia to verify that these data were consistent with generalizations made fromthe Albanian border data alone.


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sulted in data that went beyond what was observed and documented and wasrepresentative of ‘what happened.’ The use of statistical hypothesis testingand sensitivity testing facilitated the systematic examination of competingcausal explanations. Thus the combination of administrative border data,supplementary data sources (including population-based surveys and con-venience samples), and statistical modeling resulted in an evidence-basedexplanation of the massive flows of conflict-related migration.

3.2.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Integration

Quantitative methods can never stand alone. They are an important part ofunderstanding the truth of past events considered collectively, but successfulhistorical clarification and accountability processes depend on an interdisci-plinary approach that integrates other forms of evidence from ethnography,qualitative sociology, history and public health.

Although quantitative analyses were important in understanding themagnitude and pattern of human rights violations in Timor-Leste, particu-larly during the early years of Indonesian invasion and occupation, they werenot sufficient by themselves in answering key questions about the nature ofviolence, perpetrator intent and responsibility. The data on population dis-placement and conflict deaths, collected more than 20-years later, lackedtemporal and geographic specificity. This lack of detail made it difficult toconclusively discern between particular displacement episodes that were theresult of the Indonesian military and those that resulted from the Timoreseresistance movement’s attempts. Both sides were allegedly responsible forconstraining the civilian population’s freedom of movement.21 Since quan-titative data and statistical analysis alone was insufficient to clarify theoverall responsibility for mass migration and population-level displacementoutcomes, the CAVR had to rely on multiple forms of evidence and bothquantitative and qualitative methods to broadly clarify that the majority ofthe responsibility for these acts was attributable to the Indonesian military

21Survivors have reported how the Indonesian military destroyed livestock and vegetableplots and separated Timorese civilians from their available food sources (Commissão deAcolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste nda). In response to these attemptsby the Indonesian military to force Timorese into low-lying hamlets which were easier tocontrol, the resistance movement encouraged the civilian population to remain in themountains despite the deteriorating health and livelihoods situation.


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(Commissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste nda).

The integration of qualitative evidence with quantitative data and re-search underpinned the CAVR’s finding that the actions of the Indone-sian military, during its invasion and occupation of Timor-Leste, resultedin crimes against humanity against the Timorese people. The quantitativeevidence established that conflict-related civilian deaths were widespread, inthat they amounted to at least 102, 800(±12, 000) Timorese deaths, and thatthe pattern of this violence was systematic, in that the spatial and temporaldistribution of these deaths was strongly positively associated with Indone-sian military activity that resulted in mass civilian displacement. Further,the qualitative and historical research by the CAVR and subsequent indepen-dent researchers identified the nature and relevance of these patterns. Thisqualitative and historical research explained how both the Indonesian mili-tary and Timorese resistance fighters coercively displaced civilians to furthertheir respective political and military strategies and how the Indonesian gov-ernment severely restricted access to international humanitarian assistancein the late 1970s. Together, these complementary forms of evidence andepistemological inquiry clarified both the underlying nature and resultingimpact of conflict-related displacement during the early years of Indonesianoccupation of Timor-Leste.

3.2.5 Difficulty of Direct Identification of Responsibility

Deducing direct responsibility for conflict-related displacement is difficult.Administrative data, like the Albanian border records, by their very naturedon’t tell us the reason why people fled or, in particular, who was directlyresponsible for their displacement. Whereas, survey responses about as-cribed perpetrator responsibility may be unreliable. Given the complexityand volatility of armed conflict situations, the ‘fog of war’ (or lack of clearinformation or situational awareness) may result in divergence between whatactually happens and what individuals perceive. During the conflict a dearthof information, information characterized by a distorted representation of re-ality, or information overload all have the potential to affect an individual’sperception. Responses about perpetrator responsibility in post conflict sur-veys may also suffer from social desirability error or acquiescent behavior by


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survey respondents.22

Therefore there is a need to examine causality and attribution of respon-sibility through indirect means. In Kosovo, as discussed in Section 3.2.3,identifying responsibility required the triangulation of complementary datasources along with formal statistical hypothesis testing to examine plausibil-ity of different causal explanations of the migration flows. In Timor-Leste,this involved integration of quantitative and qualitative evidence to reachfindings about responsibility for conflict-related displacement (Commissãode Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste nda,n). This un-derscores the epistemological challenges associated with clarifying respon-sibility for large-scale displacement phenomena during protracted conflictswhen only retrospectively-collected information is available.

4 Conclusion

Transitional justice involves a range of measures that seek to assist a so-ciety in clarifying the past, enhancing accountability, serving justice andadvancing reconciliation in the aftermath of mass human rights violations.In this paper, we have argued that transitional justice would be well-servedby carefully considering conflict-related displacement. Underpinning thisargument are three primary reasons: that conflict-related displacement it-self is a human rights violation and a source of much human suffering, itssheer magnitude in recent conflicts, and its centrality for understanding thenature of violence and responsibility for past injustices.

Transitional justice processes that ignore displacement and its conse-quences run the risk of misrepresenting history and advancing a limitedaccountability. A renewed focus on conflict-related displacement is likely toreduce what we see as a ‘modality bias’ that has limited some transitionaljustice processes to date. By ‘modality bias,’ we mean that trials and truthcommissions have focused more on human rights violation outcomes thatare less difficult to document, or are most often the direct consequence of

22Social desirability error, which leads to systematic error, occurs frequently in the col-lection of sensitive data such as socially unacceptable behaviors (eg drug use, tax avoid-ance, and other illegal activity). Acquiescent behavior is a potential problem that canoccur in survey responses, when respondents report as they believe the survey designer orsurvey interviewer wants them to rather than what is actually true.


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acts of commission by the state or another party to the conflict.

One of the principal reasons why transitional justice processes have notsystematically researched conflict-related displacement is one of difficulty.Conflict-related displacement is neither easy to document nor is it easily at-tributable to a perpetrator. Data on displacement are routinely incompleteon multiple dimensions. Somewhat paradoxically, although transitional jus-tice is intended to address mass violence, as the scope and scale of suchviolence overwhelms for regular justice processes, transitional justice mech-anisms have often ignored or inadequately address the modality of violencethat often affects the largest proportion of the population: displacement.

Demographic methods offer a rigorous and scientifically transparent meansto engage the massive nature and structurally complexity of displacement inconflict. Statistical inference and demographic analysis provide a measure-ment framework and repertoire of methodological tools to move beyond whatcan simply be directly observed. Recent experiences and lessons learnedfrom Timor-Leste and Kosovo, which we reviewed in this article, provide in-sight to how multiple data sources (such as border registries and population-based surveys) can be combined with powerful quantitative methods to re-construct complex conflict dynamics and associated migration flows. How-ever, when considering different transitional justice contexts, variation inthe motivations for conflict (ranging from control of land to identity poli-tics) and conflict dynamics (such as insurgency and counterinsurgency) arelikely to influence both the availability of displacement data and applica-bility of different measurement methods. These cases also suggested (i) theneed to draw on multiple independent data sources on migration and (ii)the need for multiple, complementary analytical methods for clarification ofthe magnitude of, pattern of and associated levels of responsibility for massconflict-related displacement.

Demographic reconstruction of conflict dynamics and associated dis-placement flows can address questions of fact that are central to transitionaljustice processes, including whether such crimes were “widespread,” “sys-tematic” in pattern, “targeted” at a particular subpopulation, or were likelythe result of policy and planning. Well-framed quantitative analyses cantest hypotheses about the explanations of adverse human rights outcomes(such as displacement) and uncover how certain conflict dynamics are likelyto result in particular population-level outcomes. Thus, by drawing on largeamounts of data and established practices from fields like demography and


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statistics, the evidentiary basis of transitional justice mechanisms can bestrengthened.


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5 Acknowledgements

We wish to thank Roger Duthie of the International Center for TransitionalJustice for constructive suggestions and helpful logistical support throughoutthis research project. We are also grateful to Jeff Klingner,Patrick Ball, NoliBrazil, and Alma Vega for careful review of an earlier draft of this paper.Of course, any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.


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6 About the Authors

Romesh Silva

Romesh Silva, is a Fellow at the Human Rights Center, University of Cal-ifornia, Berkeley. Since 2001, he has led demographic analysis projects onarmed conflict situations in India, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Chad, Somalia,and Bangladesh. He has also contributed to studies on the demography ofarmed conflict in Colombia, Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Liberia. He hasalso served on the National Academies of Sciences’ expert panel to evaluatemortality estimates associated with conflict in Darfur. He currently serveson the American Statistical Association’s Committee on Scientific Freedom& Human Rights and the editorial board of the journal Conflict & Health.

Romesh previously served as a Statistical Consultant to the United Na-tions Development Programme (UNDP) in Laos, where he provided quanti-tative analysis for the 2001 Lao National Human Development Report andserved as a technical advisor to the Lao Ministry of Finance in the upgradeof its international trade statistics system. He holds a B.Sc. (Hons, Class1) in Statistics and a B.A. in German Studies from the University of NewSouth Wales (Sydney, Australia), a Masters of International Affairs fromColumbia University in New York, and a Masters of Arts in Demographyfrom the University of California, Berkeley. In addition to his work withHRDAG, Romesh is completing his Ph.D. in Demography at the Universityof California, Berkeley.

Daniel Guzmán

Daniel Guzmán is a graduate student at the Survey Research Center, Uni-versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor and a statistical consultant at the HumanRights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG) at Benetech. He has contributed todata analysis and documentation projects in Colombia, Guatemala, Liberiaand Sierra Leone. His work in Colombia, in partnership with several Colom-bian non governmental organizations, has focused on clarifying the magni-tude and pattern of forced disappearances and violent deaths. In Guatemala,he led HRDAG’s quantitative analysis of official records recovered from theNational Police Archive. Drawing on this analysis, he provided expert sta-


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tistical testimony in a trial that resulted in landmark convictions and estab-lishing forced disappearance as a crime in the Guatemalan judicial system.Daniel holds a B.S. in Statistics from the National University of Colombia.

Tamy Guberek

Tamy Guberek is a historian. Her research draws on multiple qualitative andquantitative sources – archival, administrative, survey-based and testimonial– into historical and contemporary explanations about conflict and politicalviolence. Tamy’s field experience is in Latin America and the Balkans. Asa consultant to Benetech’s Human Rights Program, she led human rightsdata analysis projects in Colombia with a diverse array of partners, includ-ing government agencies, diplomatic, forensic, human rights advocacy andvictims organizations. Her work in Guatemala, with the Historical Archiveof the National Police, combined quantitative methods and historical anal-ysis to uncover insights into the bureaucratic practices of state violence.Tamy also developed one of the first survey assessments of local perceptionsof the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Bosniaand Herzegovina.

Tamy received her M.A. (Hons) in World History from Columbia Uni-versity and her M.Sc. in International History from the London School ofEconomics. She has a B.A. in International Relations and Peace and JusticeStudies from Tufts University.


1 Introduction2 Empirical Analysis of Displacement: The Need for its Inclusion3 Quantification of Conflict-Related Displacement for Transitional Justice: Lessons from Timor-Leste & Kosovo3.1 Quantitative Analysis on Displacement in Kosovo and Timor-Leste3.2 Conceptual Lessons Learned from Analyses in Timor-Leste and Kosovo3.2.1 Need for a Broad and Inclusive Mandate and Flexible Analytical Framework3.2.2 Limitations of Open-Ended Narrative Testimonies3.2.3 Using Complementary and Additional Data Sources & Methods3.2.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Integration3.2.5 Difficulty of Direct Identification of Responsibility

4 ConclusionReferences5 Acknowledgements6 About the Authors

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