TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: The Intellectual … · 2017. 10. 3. · email: [email protected]...

15 Apr 2005 15:41 AR AR244-PL08-12.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: JRX10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104843

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:271–96doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104843

Copyright c© 2005 by Annual Reviews. All rights reservedFirst published online as a Review in Advance on Dec. 16, 2004

TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS:The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas∗

John Gerard Ruggie,1 Peter J. Katzenstein,2

Robert O. Keohane,3 and Philippe C. Schmitter4

1John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts02138; email: [email protected] of Political Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853;email: [email protected] of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708;email: [email protected] of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute,Florence 50016, Italy; email: [email protected]

Key Words international transformation, European integration, globalgovernance, nationalism, constructivism in international relations theory

■ Abstract For half a century, Ernst B. Haas was an extraordinarily prolific contrib-utor to theoretical debates in international relations. His work focused on the questionof continuity and transformation in the system of states. His substantive writings areextremely diverse and can be difficult, so no overall appreciation has ever been at-tempted. This essay pulls together the major strands of Haas’ theoretical work into acoherent whole and seeks to make it accessible to the broadest possible audience of IRscholars. The first section locates Haas in the overall theoretical milieu in which histhinking evolved, and it identifies some core intellectual choices he made. The nextthree sections summarize Haas’ main theoretical contributions to the fields of Europeanintegration, the study of change at the level of the world polity, and nationalism.

If there were a Nobel Prize for contributions to the study of international relations,Ernst B. Haas surely would have won it. He was a giant in the IR field, almost fromthe day he arrived on the Berkeley campus as an Instructor in 1951 to his death52 years later, at the age of 79—still writing, and still teaching his immensely

∗This article is based on the authors’ presentations at the Roundtable on “The Contribu-tions of Ernst B. Haas to the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Association,Philadelphia, August 30, 2003. Ruggie and Schmitter were students of and coauthors withHaas; Ruggie went on to become Haas’ junior colleague on the Berkeley faculty, where theycodirected a research project on international cooperation in scientific and technologicaldomains. Katzenstein and Keohane did not study with Haas formally but were drawn intohis invisible college early in their careers and consider him to have been a close mentor.

1094-2939/05/0615-0271$20.00 271

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272 RUGGIE ET AL.

popular and demanding course, Political Science 220: Theories of InternationalRelations. Within a decade of entering the profession, Haas had accomplished thefollowing:

� written two widely reprinted critiques of the wooliness, internal incoherence,and contradictory policy implications of balance-of-power theory, to whichonly Waltz (1979), more than a quarter century later, provided an adequateresponse;

� helped invent the study of European integration and devised a novel theo-retical framework, termed neofunctionalism, for understanding its dynamicsand consequences;

� helped place the field of international organization on a more sound so-cial scientific footing, rescuing it from legal prescriptions and institutionaldescriptions; and

� coauthored a moderately successful textbook.

Needless to say, he got tenure. Subsequently, Haas was deeply engaged in ev-ery major debate in the IR field well into the 1990s, including transnationalism,interdependence theory, regime theory, the role of ideas and knowledge in inter-national policy making, and the ascendancy of neorealism and neoliberalism aswell as the social constructivist rejoinder to them. He advanced our understandingof epistemological and ontological issues in IR theory. And he topped it all offwith a two-volume study of nationalism, culminating more than half a century ofteaching and research on that subject.

Yet, beyond the field of regional integration studies, Haas’ work is not wellknown in the United States and is barely known at all elsewhere. This neglect ofsuch immense contributions is a great pity. But it is also an interesting chapter inthe sociology of knowledge in our discipline. Part of the problem is that Haas’work is difficult. His writing can be quite opaque; here, for example, is his pre-ferred selection from the menu of systems theories that he surveyed as possibleframeworks for analysis in Beyond the Nation State: “A dynamic system capableof linking Functionalism with integration studies is a concrete, actor-oriented ab-straction on recurrent relationships that can explain its own transformation into anew set of relationships” (Haas 1964, p. 77). He also had a habit of sharing withthe reader his step-by-step assessment of every one of the voluminous literatureshe drew upon in formulating his own thinking, even when they had led him tointellectual dead ends. But he was hardly alone in either of these practices.

The bigger part of the problem, we suspect, is that Haas swam against somany currents in the field while constructing his own intellectual terrain, includingrealism, idealism, the penchant for grand theory, neorealism and neoliberalism,most forms of rational choice theory, and positivism. As a result, he had relativelyfew natural allies in the discipline beyond the circle of his students and others whowere drawn into personal contact with him. All within that circle were transformedby the experience of engaging with a truly learned, disciplined yet imaginative

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CONTRIBUTIONS OF ERNST B. HAAS 273

scholar of the highest intellectual caliber and integrity—and a deeply caring personwith an infectious laugh.1

Thus, our objective in this article, as honored members of that circle, is simpleyet challenging: not so much to praise Haas’ work or to assess it critically as tomake it accessible to the broadest possible audience of IR scholars. We do so infour parts. The first section locates Haas in the overall theoretical milieu in whichhis thinking evolved, and it identifies some core intellectual choices he made. Thenext three sections summarize Haas’ main theoretical contributions to the fieldsof European integration, the study of change at the level of the world polity, andnationalism. A brief reprise concludes the article.

INTELLECTUAL ORIENTATION

When Haas entered the discipline, the reigning approaches to international rela-tions were realism and idealism, though idealism—for example, the movement toachieve world peace through world law, divorced from power—was being slain byrealism. The brutal reality of World War II and the growing recognition that lifehinged on a balance of nuclear terror saw to that. Haas, it goes without saying, wasno idealist. As his students well remember, of all intellectual frailties, none earnedgreater disdain than being “a mush head”—and idealists topped this category forhim.2 Realists were another matter. They never thought much (if at all) aboutHaas’ work, but Haas did think about theirs. As already noted, he wrote trenchantcritiques of balance-of-power theory early in his career (Haas 1953b,c). And hestated explicitly that his own theoretical work “takes for granted—even capitalizeson—certain Hobbesian aspects of international life” (Haas 1970, p. viii). So whatwas the problem?

For one thing, Haas questioned the core assumption of realism. A democraticand pluralistic society, he wrote, simply “is not keyed to external dangers on a

1Haas’ lack of interest in coalition building within the discipline is best illustrated by aletter he wrote to Peter Katzenstein, in which he chastised him for going too easy, in arecent paper, on intellectual currents dissenting from the IR mainstream. In this letter, datedJuly 10, 1995, Haas wrote: “I don’t share your tolerance for anyone who is disgusted—aswe both are—with the primitivism of our rationalist colleagues, economists, IR people,and (in my case) the ‘new institutionalists’ in sociology. Just because we have a commonenemy, do we have to be in bed with each other? In fact, the common enemy is also elusivebecause I have considerable tolerance for positivism (in nuances) even while detesting itsmanifestations in neorealism and neoliberalism in our profession. I guess what I am tellingmyself, in arguing with you, is not to trim my own work as counterpunching against thework of our friends and colleagues, but to tell our tales as plausibly as we can just to makethe point that the same story can be told plausibly in a number of ways.”2Although Haas strongly supported the promotion and protection of human rights, he re-mained cautious throughout his career about the best means by which to pursue these goals(see Haas 1986, 1993).

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274 RUGGIE ET AL.

full-time basis and. . .is not organized so as to make one single conception of thenational interest assert itself vigorously and consistently” (Haas 1953c, p. 398).Therefore, assuming the existence of a singular national interest, as realists do,becomes a matter of analytical choice. But analytical choices are driven by researchagendas—not by existential necessity, as many realists claimed. So Haas made hischoice based on his research priorities. More serious for Haas was his perceptionthat realists’ analytical choices lead them to recapitulate endlessly why change ininternational politics is impossible, whereas the puzzle that interested him was howand why it happens. Indeed, he described neofunctionalism as a theoretical tool“to get us beyond the blind alley” and to “break away from the cliches” of realistanalysis (Haas 1964, p. 24). The stakes were high, Haas maintained, because thecost of the realists’ choices is spent not only in theoretical coin. For example, noneof the major realists of his day believed that the project of European unificationcould succeed, so if political leaders and policy makers had acted on the basis ofthose realist analyses, they would not have undertaken what turned out to be oneof the most significant initiatives in the history of the modern system of states.Indeed, roads theoretically proscribed by realists are many, and others, too, haveled to profound change in the actual practice of international politics.3 Haas hadthat hunch early and pursued it for half a century.

But if neither realist nor idealist, who was Haas, intellectually speaking? Thisarticle aims to answer that question. The present section concerns the fundamentaltenets of Haas’ thinking that shaped all of his work, leaving it to later sectionsto address the specific theoretical orientations he brought to his major strands ofresearch.

Haas’ most enduring premises and approaches are essentially Weberian. Wesay “essentially” because some of these postures were adopted not directly fromthe grand master himself but through the writings of contemporary sociologists,including Reinhard Bendix, Philip Selznick, Peter Blau, and Daniel Bell, severalof whom were Berkeley colleagues. Be that as it may, the following core elementsof Haas’ overall theoretical orientation may be described as Weberian.4

First, as the following three sections demonstrate, the meta-trend or axial prin-ciple around which Haas’ theoretical reflections revolved was the process ofrationalization—that is to say, the gradual elimination of such traditional fac-tors as status, passions and prejudices from the organization of public life anddeterminants of public policy, coupled with an ever expanding role of systematiccalculation and evidence-based reflection (Weber 1947, ch. 1). As seen in Weber’s

3Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides an example. Leading realists, in-cluding George Kennan, who first defined and helped formulate the postwar strategy ofcontaining the Soviet Union, opposed framing NATO around indivisible security guaran-tees (Article 5 of the treaty), which arguably turned out to be the very foundation of NATO’sdurability through and beyond the Cold War (see Ruggie 1995).4The following discussion of Weber’s approach to the social sciences and its implicationsfor IR theorizing draws in part on Ruggie (1998).

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analysis of the evolving bases of legitimate authority toward the legal and bureau-cratic, this development had profound effects on the structure and functioning ofinstitutions—including, Haas took for granted, international institutions and themodern system of states itself. Over time, Haas came to ascribe to human agencyconsiderably greater control over the unfolding of rationalization than Weber haddone, especially over the construction of shared meanings and consensus-basedtruth through social learning. Thus, in direct contrast to realism, a driver of changewas at the very core of Haas’ work—not linear, not immutable, but ever-presentas a force to be reckoned with.

Second, Haas believed deeply in the possibility of a social science but, like We-ber, only in one that expressed the distinctive attributes of social action and socialorder. For Weber, none was more foundational than the human capacity and will “totake a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance” (Weber 1949,p. 81, emphasis in original). Ernst and Peter Haas put it more simply. In the natu-ral sciences, they quipped, units of analysis “don’t talk back” and they “lack freewill; at least, none has been empirically demonstrated in atoms, molecules andcells” (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 583). A viable social science, Haas believed, mustaccommodate—indeed, thrive on—the reflective and reflexive nature of humanbeings.

Third, despite being one of the most sophisticated theorists in the field, Haasprotested throughout his career that none of his intellectual formulations consti-tuted a theory as such. This was no mere quirk, fetish, or false humility. It followeddirectly from the Weberian understanding of the differences in concept formationand explanation between the natural and social sciences. Because human beingsare reflective and reflexive, concepts in the social sciences must aid in uncoveringthe meaning of specific actions and in demonstrating their significance within aparticular social context, or risk becoming mere reifications. In Weber’s words,“We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural signifi-cance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations, and on the otherthe causes of their being historically so and not otherwise” (Weber 1949, p. 56,emphasis in original). Haas described his objective in The Uniting of Europe insimilar terms: “My aim is merely the dissection of the actual ‘integration pro-cess’ in order to derive propositions about its nature” (Haas 1958, p. xii, emphasisadded). If the purpose of social science is to demonstrate why things are histor-ically so and not otherwise, then it follows that the appropriate cruising altitudeis middle-range theory—a term Haas borrowed from Merton (1957)—groundedin actor-oriented processes, both intentional and unintended. Grand theory was achimera, or worse.

Fourth, like Weber, Haas adhered to an ontology that included not only mate-rial but also ideational factors, and he paid particular attention to the interactionbetween the two. Here is how Haas (2004) summarized his understanding in 2004:

[S]ocial actors, in seeking to realize their value-derived interests, will choosewhatever means are made available by the prevailing democratic order. Ifthwarted they will rethink their values, redefine their interests, and choose

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276 RUGGIE ET AL.

new means to realize them. The alleged primordial force of nationalism willbe trumped by the utilitarian-instrumental human desire to better oneself inlife, materially and in terms of status, as well as normative satisfaction. Itbears repeating that the ontology is not materialistic: values shape interests,and values include many nonmaterial elements. (p. xv)

Haas also drew from Weber his extensive use of typologies, explicitly conceivedas ideal types, to illuminate possible modes of behavior, against which actualbehavior could be assessed. An ideal type of political community is at the centerof the analysis in The Uniting of Europe (Haas 1958, pp. 5–6). In Beyond the NationState he uses a method he terms “contextual analysis” and states that it belongs tothe same family as Weberian ideal types, “more ambitious than historical narrationand more modest than the effort at deductive ‘science.’ It seeks the general withinthe more confined context of a given historical, regional, or functional setting.”The investigator selects and arranges the facts of actor conduct by using his owncapacity “to identify himself with human motives that all of us accept as ‘real’ andrelevant to the study of politics” (Haas 1964, pp. viii–ix). In an influential articleon “issue linkages and international regimes,” Haas (1980) elaborates a fourfoldideal type of regimes, organized according to the capabilities that organizers of aregime might seek to create (p. 397). Haas never viewed ideal types as generatingtestable generalizations. That simply was not their purpose. “The best service tobe expected from an ideal-typical discussion of regimes,” he declared, “is to makepeople pause and think” (Haas 1980, p. 405).

It follows that Haas had grave doubts about the entire positivist project in inter-national relations—and political science as a whole. He was not data-shy and waswilling to use quantitative indicators. Although his statistical skills were limited, hecoded and updated thousands of labor standards issued by the International LaborOrganization (ILO) since its origin in 1919 (Haas 1964, 1970); he constructed andmaintained a data base of United Nations peacekeeping missions (Haas 1972, 1983,1986); and he coded indicators of the evolution of various forms of nationalismin five industrialized countries over two centuries (Haas 1997). So quantificationwas not the issue; it was ontology and epistemology.

The covering law model of explanation, to which the mainstream of the dis-cipline aspires, is ruled out by Haas’ Weberian commitment. Causality remainsconcrete and is anchored in historically contingent meaning. The purpose of thevarious analytical tools that Weber used was not to subsume specific social ac-tions or events under putative deductive laws, of which he believed few existedin the social world, but to establish links between them and concrete antecedentsthat most plausibly had causal relevance for real social actors within the socialcollectivity at hand. And so it was with Haas: “It is difficult to formulate universalclaims over time and across cultures because of the mutable nature of institutionsand the potential role of free will (that is, of actors’ ability to change their mindsand pursue new goals)” (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 584). Or, as Ernst Haas wrote toPeter Katzenstein in 1995, “You cannot ‘test’ theories in such a way as to discardthe worse for the better as our colleagues seek to do. Not even real scientists do

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it that way very often.”5 Let us be clear: Haas did not reject rigor; his own workwas a very model of it. But he insisted on a rigor that was relevant to the objectunder study, and thus he contested the claim that a valid social science must passpositivism’s natural-science-based truth tests.

Besides adhering to positivist fallacies, neorealism and neoliberalism premisedtheir approach on the notion of exogenous and fixed interests—adding insult toinjury, as far as Haas’ entire research agenda was concerned. Haas consideredthese assumptions not only implausible but also of little use to him, as a scholarwho had spent a lifetime studying the processes whereby actors come to defineand redefine the ends they pursue in international politics, not just the means ofpursuit. But, contrary to his admonition to Katzenstein in 1995 (see footnote 1),Haas did go relatively easy, at least in print, on neorealism and (even more so)neoliberalism, counting several of their leading practitioners among his closestprofessional friends.

One of Haas’ last publications, coauthored with his son Peter Haas (who hascontributed significantly to the study of social learning in the area of environmentalpolicy and governance), describes the Haases’ preferred methodological postureas “pragmatic constructivism” (Haas & Haas 2002).6 This approach emphasizesthe role of human consciousness in the social reality that we study and relies ona consensus theory of truth to support interpretations and explanations. Its practi-tioners believe that progress in achieving a shared understanding of internationalinstitutions is possible, but only through “interparadigm mid-level discussions thattry to resolve different interpretations of similar phenomena and conceptual ap-plications that may lead, ultimately, to some degree of provisional closure anddispute resolution between paradigms” (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 595).

Having established Haas’ overall point of departure, let us turn now to thesubfields of the discipline in which he made his most important theoretical contri-butions, beginning with the study of European unification.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

“Two events of great importance in the history of European integration happened in1958,” writes Dinan (2004). “One was the launch of the European Economic Com-munity (EEC); the other was the publication of Ernst Haas’ The Uniting of Europe”(p. ix). As far-fetched as it may seem to put the two on par, Dinan continues, theywere in fact inextricably linked. Not only did Haas help to invent the academic fieldof integration studies, but practitioners also frequently invoked his work as theydevised their strategies for advancing this historic project. Haas’ students, whenconducting interviews in Brussels, often heard responses to their questions framedin Haas’ analytical categories. In 1997, Foreign Affairs selected The Uniting ofEurope as one of the most important IR books of the twentieth century.

5The same letter cited in footnote 1.6Adler (1991) had earlier described Haas’ thinking in terms of “evolutionary epistemology.”

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Haas was among the first to realize that by liberalizing flows of trade, investment,and persons across previously well-protected borders, regional integration mighttransform the traditional interstate system that had characterized European politicsfor three centuries—the system whose failure had caused two world wars in asingle generation. But he departed significantly from classical liberalism in hisunderstanding of how this transformation could occur. He was the founder ofneofunctionalism as an approach to the study of integration—insisting vigorouslythat it was not a “theory.” This represented a novel synthesis of Mitrany’s theory offunctionalism and Monnet’s pragmatic strategy for operating the European Coaland Steel Community and developing it into the EEC—both forerunners of thepresent European Union.

Mitrany (1943, 1966) believed that an expanding system of functionally spe-cialized international organizations run by experts could become a transformativeforce in world politics. Haas reformulated this technocratic vision into a more po-litical conception in which international cooperation was based on competing andcolluding subnational interests that might be reconciled by the creative interven-tions of supranational technocratic actors. Jean Monnet, a leading French economicplanner, was devoted to eliminating the risk of war in Europe, and that meant defus-ing the antagonism between France and Germany above all else.7 After trying andfailing to promote direct routes to this end—federalism and military unification—he hit upon a second-best indirect solution: integrate the coal and steel sectors.These would be necessary to fuel any future conflict. And they had the additional“virtue” (given Monnet’s objective) of being in decline, thus imposing economicas well as political adjustment costs on national political systems that internationalcollaboration might help reduce. With the Marshall Plan and the Organization forEuropean Economic Cooperation (the OECD’s precursor) behind him, and the U.S.government beside him, Monnet managed to cajole six countries into forming theEuropean Coal and Steel Community, and also endowing its Secretary-General (aposition he subsequently occupied) with modest supranational powers. What Haasdid in The Uniting of Europe was to explore the dynamics, unanticipated conse-quences, and limits of this second-best strategy—nicely summarized in Monnet’sphrase “petits pas, grand effets.”

It has always been difficult to classify neofunctionalism in disciplinary termsbecause it intersects the usual assumptions of international relations and com-parative politics. Neofunctionalism recognizes the importance of national states,especially in the foundation of regional organizations and at subsequent momentsof formal refoundation by treaty. Yet it also emphasizes the roles of two sets ofnonstate actors in providing the dynamic for further integration: (a) the interestassociations and social movements that form at the regional level, and (b) the sec-retariat of the organization involved. Member states may set the terms of the initial

7Monnet’s (1978) memoirs were published two decades after The Uniting of Europe; Haasrelied on the public record and interviews.

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agreement and strive to control subsequent events, but they do not exclusivelydetermine the direction, extent, and pace of change. Rather, regional bureaucratsin league with actors whose interests and values are advanced by a regional so-lution to a concrete task at hand seek to exploit the inevitable “spillover” andunintended consequences that occur when states agree to some degree of supra-national responsibility for accomplishing that task but then discover that successalso requires addressing related activities.

According to this approach, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic andconflictual process. But under conditions of democracy and pluralistic interestrepresentation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangledin regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts of interest by concedinga wider scope, and devolving more authority, to the regional organizations theyhave created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of theirexpectations to the region, and satisfying them will increase the likelihood thateconomic-social integration will spill over into political integration.

Neofunctionalism as articulated by Haas had no specific temporal component.How long it would take for these functional interdependencies to become mani-fest, for affected interests to organize themselves across national borders, and forofficials in the regional secretariats to come up with projects that would expandtheir tasks and authority was left undetermined. Unfortunately for the academic re-ception of neofunctionalism, many scholars presumed that spillovers would occur“automatically” and “in close, linear sequence to each other” (Saeter 1993). Even acursory reading of Haas, however, especially of his more systematic presentationin Beyond the Nation State, demonstrates these to be fallacious inferences. Butwhen the integration process in Europe proved to be more controversial and tomake less continuous progress than expected, the theory was repeatedly declared“disconfirmed.”

The irony of this tale is that Haas himself contributed substantially to the demiseof interest in his own theory. By declaring in print on two separate occasions (Haas1971, 1975b) that neofunctionalism had become “obsolescent,” he made it virtuallyimpossible for any other scholar to take the approach seriously. Who would dareto contradict its founder? Moreover, in the early 1970s, the process of Europeanintegration itself seemed stagnant, if not moribund. Lindberg & Scheingold (1970)concluded that although the (then) EEC had accomplished much, by the end of the1960s it had settled into a sluggish equilibrium from which it was unlikely to escapefor some time. Indeed, of the 10 contributors to a magnum opus of theorizing aboutregional integration (Lindberg & Scheingold 1971), only one (Donald Puchala)was still writing on the subject 10 years later.

Why did Haas lose faith in neofunctionalism? The simple answer was CharlesDe Gaulle—a living embodiment of the realpolitik backlash against integration.Not only did De Gaulle put a sudden stop to the gradual expansion of tasks andauthority by the Commission and to the prospective shift to majority voting inthe Council, but he also made a full-scale effort to convert the EEC/EC into aninstrument of French foreign policy. By the time it became clear that, however much

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280 RUGGIE ET AL.

De Gaulle and his successors desired these outcomes, they were not to happen,Haas was deeply engaged in research on transformation at the global level.

But, to borrow Adler’s (2000) characterization, Haas turned out to be wrongabout being wrong. When interest in European integration picked up smartly inthe mid-1980s, with the unanticipated breakthrough of the signature and easy rati-fication of the Single European Act, interest in neofunctionalism also revived andblossomed in Europe—although not in the United States, where scholarly work onEuropean integration as a whole has lagged seriously behind (one obvious excep-tion being Moravcsik 1998). Indeed, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the endof the Cold War, American realists declared that the entire raison d’etre of Euro-pean integration had collapsed and that its nation-states would inexorably restoretheir previous interstate system (Mearsheimer 1990). But thus far the opposite hashappened. The calculation that German reunification made it more urgent thanever to bind Germany firmly to the rest of Western Europe undoubtedly playeda major role in ensuring agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. But ratherthan confirming realism, this move demonstrates Haas’ argument that even corerealist imperatives can be resolved through broader integrative measures, oncethe process of integration has reached a certain level. Maastricht committed itssignatories to establishing a common currency, the Euro, an idea that had beenproposed on several occasions but always rejected as intruding too far, materiallyand symbolically, into the sovereignty of member states. To the surprise of almosteveryone, the introduction of the new common currency produced relatively littleresistance, and this “mother of all spillovers,” as it became known, has been a quietyet historic success.

Haas was quite skeptical about broadening the analysis of integration to otherregions. In 1961 he concluded that integration is a “discontinuous process,” and hedeclared that “if regional integration continues to go forward in these areas [outsideof Europe], it will obey impulses peculiar to them and thus fail to demonstrate anyuniversal ‘law of integration’ deduced from the European example” (Haas 1961).

So what is Ernst Haas’ European legacy? His work on regional integrationcontinues to be read and cited—with increasing frequency since the 1990s. At thesame time, by now almost everyone recognizes that no single theory or approachcan explain everything one would like to know or predict about the EU. Theprocess has already generated the world’s most complex polity, and despite theConvention’s “Constitutional Treaty,” there is every indication that it will becomeeven more complex now that it has 10 new members and has been taking on newtasks.8

8A very important limitation of neofunctionalism should be noted. It focuses exclusivelyon the extension of the integrative process to new tasks and on the expansion of commonauthority. It says nothing about the incorporation of new members, which has been a ma-jor dynamic feature of the EU. How, when, why, and under what conditions a regionalorganization will expand territorially is simply not contemplated by the neofunctionalistapproach.

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Moreover, the entire logic of spillover based on underlying and unanticipatedfunctional interdependencies may have exhausted itself. On the one hand, the EU isalready involved in some fashion in almost all policy domains. On the other hand,if monetary union is any indication of the future, the designers of the EuropeanCentral Bank were very careful to insulate it from any relation with the Commissionor with organized interests. The same seems likely to occur in the cases of policecooperation and foreign policy coordination. Only a common energy policy andcertain aspects of transport infrastructure seem capable of igniting latent functionallinkages and generating the unintended consequences on which neofunctionalismthrived. Moreover, the expansion to 25 members of much greater heterogeneityof interests and values means that it will become much more difficult to respondwith an expansive package deal that will have something in it for everyone. Givensuch diversity, it is much less likely that actors will recognize a common need,that experts will agree on what to do, that lessons will be transferred from oneexperience to another, and that citizens will mobilize in order to demand that thegood, service, or regulation they desire be supplied by the EU rather than theirnational state or subnational region.

But the real impediment to a revived neofunctionalist dynamic comes fromsomething Haas long ago anticipated yet which was slow in coming to the Europeanintegration process: its growing politicization (Schmitter 1971). When citizensbegin to pay attention to how the EU affects their daily lives, when political partiesand large social movements begin to include “Europe” in their platforms, andwhen politicians begin to realize that they can win or lose votes by addressingpolicy issues at the regional level, then the entire neofunctionalist strategy becomesmuch less viable. Discreet regional officials and invisible interest representatives inleague with national civil servants can no longer monopolize the decision-makingprocess in Brussels (known in Euro-speak as “comitology”). Integration starts togenerate winners and losers within member states, and its aura of being an all-winners game fades. Haas (1976) had an idiosyncratic term for this: he called it“turbulence.” There is no question that the process of integration in Europe hasbecome turbulent and that neofunctionalism, therefore, no longer captures manyof its main drivers.

Yet in his last published work, an introduction to a reissue of The Uniting ofEurope, Haas (2004) began to sort through the many bodies of institutionalisttheory that now seek to explain European integration. His aim was to identify howneofunctionalism itself needed to be updated and modified. Nothing conveys Haas’enduring commitment to scholarship more clearly than this effort, completed onlyweeks before his death.

INTERNATIONAL CHANGE

When Haas (temporarily, as it turned out) abandoned European integration studiesin the 1970s, he turned his attention full-time to exploring processes of changeat the level of the world polity. Beyond the Nation State, published in 1964, had

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set the stage but also altered it permanently. It was Haas’ only sustained studyof integration at the global level. However, he found that the record of morethan 40 years of ILO conventions on labor standards, which he coded carefully,yielded few of the predicted consequences. As a result, he expanded his analyticalfocus considerably beyond integration to examine different patterns of internationalcooperation and their potential long-term effects on the structure and conduct ofinternational politics.

At this point, we encounter a problem. Whereas Haas’ contributions to the studyof European integration comprise a coherent whole and are readily assessed againstactual developments, it is far more difficult even to summarize, let alone evaluate,his work on global cooperation and its transformative potential. One impedimentis that the subject matter itself is so vast, and Haas’ voluminous writings leftvirtually no aspect of it untouched. At the same time, though, he produced no single,definitive piece of work in this area, but rather a series of plausibility probes—some in hefty book form, to be sure—that comprise successive approximations ofthe reality he was trying to grasp and elucidate.

Nevertheless, a good place to begin is with the realization that, although Haasviewed the European integration experience as unique, it was for him but a specialor extreme case of a more general phenomenon. “The study of integration is astep toward a theory of international change at the macrolevel” (Haas 2004, p. xv).So the puzzles that animated his curiosity and drove his research in the two areaswere in some ways similar, but the processes and forms of cooperation at the globallevel would differ because the world polity differed from the European regionalsystem. Therefore, his analytical apparatus would have to be modified accordinglyand parts jettisoned entirely. Haas’ work in this area is a moving target becauseit represents an ongoing, systematic effort at reflection and reformulation. Hisquest reached closure of any sort only in 2002, when Haas endorsed what hecalled “pragmatic constructivism” as the theoretical orientation best equipped tocapture international change at the macro level, and acknowledged that he had beenspeaking its prose all along (Haas & Haas 2002). In his introduction to the reissuedUniting of Europe (Haas 2004), he reached the same conclusion with regard to thestudy of European integration. At least in overall approach, then—including theirontology and epistemology—his “special theory” and “general theory” (to use theterms metaphorically) had become unified.

Thus, rather than engaging individual pieces of Haas’ work that often weresuperseded in their specifics by subsequent writings, we take a twofold tack. First,we identify and discuss briefly the distinctive and enduring questions that droveHaas’ inquiries into the processes of change in the world polity, wherever possibleusing his own words. Then we offer our own synthesis of his endeavor in thisdomain, which we believe to be consistent with his thinking.9

9Some of Haas’ former students and collaborators contributed to a Festschrift dedicated toHaas, building on his insights on progress in international policy and politics; see Adler &Crawford (1991).

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Strategic Questions

What were the core questions that drove Haas’ studies of international change?Without claiming to be exhaustive, we have selected five questions that seemcentral to his evolving research program.

HOW DOES VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OCCUR? The first and most general ques-tion Haas addressed was: How does voluntary cooperation, not involving the useof force, take place in international politics (Haas 1970, p. 608)?

He did not take the easy way out by assuming altruism or commitment toprinciple on the part of the major actors. On the contrary, he insisted consistentlythat states act “on their perceived interests” (Haas 1990, p. 6). “Major interestgroups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, newcentral institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage” (Haas1958, p. xiv). Indeed, he held that even “learning is based on the perception ofself-interest displayed by the actors” (Haas 1964, p. 48).

Moreover, he rejected the idea that formal structures or treaty texts were a goodguide to what international organizations end up doing or making possible. Evenin The Uniting of Europe, he argued that cooperation depends more on people’sperceptions and attitudes than on formal structures. Contrary to some advocatesof supranationalism, for example, Haas did not assume that “an intergovernmentalstructure automatically guarantees the prevalence of diplomatic decision-makingtechniques and thereby controls [in the sense of limiting] integration.” Instead, hebelieved (Haas 1964, p. 487):

It is impossible to assess the role of the Council in European integrationmerely. . .on the basis of treaty texts. If the operational code habitually em-ployed by the people who compose the Council can be demonstrated to resultin further integration, then plainly the general level of argumentation described[in treaty texts] is beside the point. The corollary would be that institutionsof a federal type do not necessarily guarantee integration, while organs ofa diplomatic character may actually aid it, depending on the techniques ofdecision-making used.

Haas’ approach to resolving the puzzle of cooperation was sociological, be-havioral, and cognitive. Broadly speaking, cooperation occurs in situations wheredomestic welfare concerns dominate considerations of national power, and wheregroups exist that can articulate those welfare concerns within national decision-making structures. Thus, capitalist social democracies and pluralism are fertilegrounds for cooperation, but functional equivalents can exist in other political sys-tems. Beyond that background condition, cooperation requires some convergenceof actors’ interests, which can be helped along by international institutional actorswith appropriate problem-solving orientations. Success in meeting initial interestson one round may produce incremental shifts in expectations among the actors,and begin to create habits of practice that reinforce cooperation. By employing

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creative bargaining styles, key elites can upgrade conceptions of individual inter-ests into some acceptable formulation of a common interest, thereby leading atleast to a partial redefinition of the separate self-interests (Haas 1958, pp. xv, xvi;1964, p. 111). A second question followed closely on the first.

WHAT KINDS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOSTER COOPERATION? Underwhat conditions is cooperation fostered by institutional arrangements focusedon specific tasks that do not directly involve the interstate politics of peace andsecurity?

All of Haas’ work was based on the premise that “international organizationsare designed by their founders to ‘solve problems’ that require collaborative ac-tion” (1990: 2)—and not for their own sake. But not all such efforts were equallysuccessful. The ability to solve problems, he believed, was related to the “func-tional specificity” of tasks the organization was assigned, or their “separability”from core issues related to national power and status (Haas 1964, pp. 47–52).

Again, European integration represented one end of the spectrum. There, certainkinds of organizational tasks most intimately related to functionally specific groupand national aspirations—beginning with rationalizing the coal and steel sectors—resulted in integration, even though the actors responsible for this developmentmay not have deliberately worked toward it (Haas 1964, p. 35). In contrast, whenHaas (1983) examined the evolution of UN peacekeeping, he saw “regime decay”occurring over time. In a superficial sense, the neofunctionalist expectation is borneout: Functionally specific tasks promote intense cooperation, whereas matters morecentrally related to national security exhibit the limits imposed on it. However, mostareas of international cooperation examined by Haas fell in between those twoextremes and remained “encapsulated,” showing few if any signs of contributingto learning or to an overall expansion of cooperation. This puzzle led to still anotherquestion.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ACTOR COGNITION? In successful instances of interna-tional cooperation, when and how do actors’ key cognitions change to reinforcecooperation? Haas kept asking this question—almost alone among students ofworld politics—for 40 years. But the types of cognition he focused on changedover time.

He began by considering possible shifts in loyalty, which was central to the pro-cess of political integration as explored in The Uniting of Europe and subsequentarticles. Shifts in loyalty did not travel beyond the European context, however, andproduced complex results even there. Haas also was critically attuned to changingactor expectations about who can best deliver the goods, a concern that foreshad-owed the emphasis on expectations both in the literature on regimes and moregenerally in contemporary game theory (Haas 1961, 367). In Beyond the NationState, he examined different bargaining styles that promote or limit cooperation,as well as actor learning, particularly whether lessons learned in one functionalcontext are transferred to others (Haas 1964, p. 48).

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In his long and complex essay, “Is there a Hole in the Whole” (1975a), Haasfirst addressed in some depth the issue that would become the hallmark of hissubsequent intellectual agenda: the role of consensual knowledge in organizationallearning that results in expanding the domain of cooperative action. By 1990 heconsidered such knowledge, or self-consciousness, to involve questioning “basicbeliefs underlying the selection of ends,” and not merely of means (Haas 1990,p. 36). In this line of research, he sought to elaborate “a notion of organizationaldecision making in which knowledge, consensual or not, deflects raw interest.I am not here interested,” he declared, “in goals based on interests uninformedby knowledge” (Haas 1990, p. 75), because such conventional cases would entailnone of the potential for international change that he sought to discern.

In his contribution to the famous International Organization special issue oninternational regimes, Haas (1982) emphasized the differences between the me-chanical metaphors of mercantilism and liberalism, on the one hand, and the or-ganic metaphors of ecologically minded analysts, on the other, and suggested thatthe latter held far greater potential to expand cooperation. In When Knowledge isPower (Haas 1990), self-reflective learning took center stage: learning based onconsensual causal knowledge—in other words, on physical and social science—and its ability to inform the definition of the means and ends of policy.

IS ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PROMOTED BY SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND BY

THE INVOLVEMENT OF EXPERTS? In key articles of the 1970s and 1980s, culmi-nating in When Knowledge is Power, Haas answered, “It can be.” He differentiatedlearning, which involves changes in causal beliefs, from mere adaptation, whichdoes not. Adopting a concept introduced by Ruggie (1975) in a special issue ofInternational Organization they coedited, Haas articulated the idea of “epistemiccommunities” of professionals “who shared a commitment to a common causalmodel and a common set of political values” (Haas 1990, p. 41)—the epistemiccommunity comprised of practitioners of Keynesian economics, for example, orof various branches of ecology. He expressed the belief that “the language of sci-ence is becoming a world view that penetrates politics everywhere” (p. 46), andtherefore would affect the way in which states’ interests are defined.

This proposition seemed truer in some areas than others. “The more dependentan issue area becomes on technical information, the greater the likelihood thatepistemic communities gain in influence” (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 592). At thesame time, there must be a growing demand for such knowledge on the part ofpolicy makers: “Consensual knowledge that is not acknowledged by governmentremains irrelevant, though the demand can sometimes be stimulated by enterprisingknowledge brokers”—international institutional actors being key among them.

Haas’ emphasis on epistemic communities and socially influenced learningmade him identify, during his last decade, with constructivism as an approach tounderstanding international relations. “Pragmatic constructivism” was the label heand Peter Haas applied to their favored approach to social science, in particularthe study of international institutions.

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ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO REALISM AND IDEALISM? Finally, from the start,Haas asked different versions of a fundamental normative question: Are there“other ways to peace than either power [realism] or law [idealism]?” (Haas 2004,p. xiv). He saw his own work as providing a tentative “yes” for an answer. Neo-functionalism, he wrote in 2004, “was developed explicitly to challenge the twotheories of IR dominant in the 1950s, classical realism and idealism” (Haas 2004,p. xiv).

Haas sometimes seemed reticent about addressing normative issues explicitly;indeed, on occasion he wrote as if he studied international cooperation merelyout of intellectual curiosity. This comes as little surprise when we recall that,when Haas started his long scholarly career, the mere accusation of being an “ide-alist” could marginalize a scholar within the discipline. And so, in the originalUniting of Europe, he disclaimed interest in evaluating whether a United Europewould be good or bad and said he saw it as akin to a laboratory experiment involuntary cooperation (Haas 1958, p. xi). In Beyond the Nation State he wrotethat “even chaos becomes bearable when its constituents and their movementsare understood” (Haas 1964, p. 497). And in When Knowledge is Power he de-clared, “states, not scholars writing books, are the architects that will design theinternational organizations of the future” (Haas 1990, p. 6).

But he let the cat out of the bag in 1970 when he admitted that “the mainreason for studying regional integration is normative”—the opportunity to “studythe peaceful creation of possible new types of human community” (Haas 1970,p. 608). One of his most explicit normative statements came in “Is there a Hole in theWhole?” (Haas 1975a), where he grappled with the role of science in politics. Haaswas deeply committed to the proposition that scientific knowledge could contributeto a social learning, which in turn could generate better-informed conceptions of thepublic interest. Yet he was resolutely opposed to deterministic or totalizing notionsof science, in which scientific knowledge would provide moral purposes as well asthe means of their realization. For Haas, human purposes had to remain primary,and they had to be determined through political participation. In using knowledge,“all groups making a claim to having studied the issue must be included” (Haas1975a, p. 850), and conceptions of knowledge must remain open-ended, subjectto debate and change. In that article, he declared his commitment to “informedincrementalism as a way to approach the construction of wholes, as resulting froma better understanding of the parts and their linkages” (p. 851).

In his later work, Haas became interested in deliberate learning strategies,through consensual knowledge and epistemic communities. He cited as one exam-ple the UN Global Compact’s efforts to develop and apply consensual knowledgeabout best corporate practices in promoting human rights, labor standards, andenvironmental sustainability at the global level (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 597). Con-sensual knowledge and the raising of consciousness had the potential, he thought,for helping to transform political life. Throughout his career, Haas used his method-ology of ideal types to imagine transformative possibilities, rather than simply toanalyze world politics as it is. But he never permitted his normative interests or

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commitments to get in the way of the evidence, frequently reaching conclusions—as with the entire integration project in the 1970s—that were uncongenial to hisown preferences.

The last chapter of When Knowledge is Power is a profession of Haas’ per-sonal commitment to progress, defined in terms of more holistic, but still human-centered, ways to manage interdependence better. His normative view is expressedon the last page: “One can think about human progress as an open-ended gropingfor self-improvement, without a final goal, without a transcendent faith, but withfrequent reverses and sporadic self-questioning about the trajectory of change”(Haas 1990, p. 212).

A Synthesis

If we combine these core animating questions and Haas’ evolving answers intoa coherent whole, what is the resulting model—or ideal type, to be precise—ofinternational change at the macro level?

It is important to stress again that he assumed “certain Hobbesian aspects ofinternational life” (Haas 1970, p. viii). But he also assumed domestic pluralismand interest group competition, or some functional equivalents. And he stipulatedthat international actors—typically leaders of international institutions—served asnorm entrepreneurs as well as potential allies of domestic groups who saw thattheir interests could be, or even must be, pursued beyond the confines of their ownnational state. So to the “certain Hobbesian aspects” Haas added both push andpull factors inclined toward some measure of internationalizing policy processes.

Next, Haas expected that certain kinds of issues would bias the process in fa-vor of actors who perceived internationalization to be in their interest, because ithelped them meet their objectives. Over the years, as we have seen, he explored anumber of such “strategic items,” as he once called them (Haas 1964, p. 83), whichmight have this “expansive” potential: (a) the emergence of domestic economicand social welfare as the universal measures of political legitimacy, so that nationaldecision makers faced higher costs if they opposed internationalization of policyprocesses when it advanced those goals; (b) the emerging concept of human rights,which by definition claims universality and addresses the most intimate of rela-tions between citizens and their state; (c) the human environment, which embodiesintrinsic natural connectivities that respect no political boundaries; and more gen-erally, (d) what we might call the growing demand-capacity gap that results fromthe increased complexity and mobilization of modern society, coupled with theproliferation and escalation of diverse objectives that policy makers consequentlymust consider—which Haas (1976) described as “turbulent fields.”

Haas’ research suggested that greater international cooperation, at least on earlyiterations, did not necessarily trigger transformation. There was just more of it: inthe forms of international regimes, institutions, and norms. And so, as a second-order question, he explored how the growing role of scientific knowledge and sci-entists in policy making changed the picture. Why would it? Because, he presumed,

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natural scientists would be more likely than politicians or bureaucrats to push con-sensual knowledge about, say, environmental degradation, and social scientistswould add both a reflective and a reflexive element to the policy-making mix.10

Along the way, Haas also gradually modified what he meant by internationalchange. His first inclination was to extend into the global arena his original templatefor regional integration: “the process whereby political actors in several distinct na-tional settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties toward a new center, whose insti-tutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas1958, p. 16; 1961). He quickly abandoned this model of supranationality even forthe case of Europe and realized that it had no relevance globally. In Beyond the Na-tion State, the definition of international transformation was modified to “the pro-cess of increasing the interaction and the mingling [between states and internationalorganizations] so as to obscure the boundaries [between them]” (Haas 1964, p. 29).But it was still expected to involve a shift from unit to system. By the time he gotto “Is there a Hole in the Whole?” (Haas 1975a), that notion, too, was abandoned,and transformation itself was transformed. In that essay, “transformation” refersto state actors learning to manage problems collectively that exceed the grasp ofany one, by constantly aggregating and reaggregating issue bundles into temporarywholes that they agree to govern collectively. In this account, successive rounds ofthat process, over the long term, come to approximate more closely the consensualknowledge about underlying cause/effect relations in the issue areas in question, aswell as the substantive values at stake in them—be they human rights, environmen-tal sustainability, or a measure of distributive justice via development assistance.Judging from the 2002 article Ernst Haas coauthored with Peter Haas, he seems tohave concluded that the empirical processes of international cooperation that hehad studied for so long at least modestly conformed to and explained this outcome.

But by the 1990s Haas also seems to have concluded that, in terms of funda-mental international transformation, at least outside the EU, the transformativepotential of action at the international level would continue to be both modest andincremental, as his most recent work had recorded. And so he turned his attentionback to the source where, in a certain sense, the challenge had begun: back to thephenomenon of nationalism.

ON NATIONALISM

As a Jew, Haas was forced to leave Germany with his parents in 1938, at theage of 14, having experienced first-hand a virulent and intolerant nationalism thatdetested difference in the German Volk. In the United States, in contrast, he found

10Thus, it was a moment of professional pride for Haas when UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001 for “bringing new life to the organiza-tion,” in the words of the Nobel citation. Although he and Annan never met, for Haas it wasenough that Ruggie was Annan’s chief advisor for strategic planning, and that, as a formerHaas student, Ruggie was attempting to practice what Haas had long preached.

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a liberal nationalism that was tolerant of a great variety of differences. His work onnationalism undoubtedly had emotional roots in these early personal experiences.But there is nothing emotional or personal about the work itself.

Haas’ two-volume study on nationalism, published in 1997 and 2000, totalsover 800 pages. Whatever else critics may say of these books, they are not “schol-arship lite” parading stylized facts. They exude the signs of elbow grease and manyyears of hard yet joyous research informed by an evolving, open-ended intellectualagenda. At the end of an illustrious career exploring patterns of transformation inthe traditional conduct of international politics, Haas returned to liberal national-ism as the political force that he thought still promised the greatest potential forcreating human progress at the outset of the twenty-first century—more than re-gional integration, more than international organizations and global regimes, andmore than expert knowledge; more, that is, than all the other preoccupations of hisrich intellectual life. In 1964, in Part III of Beyond the Nation State Haas had laidout a typology of different kinds of nationalism. After 40 years (like Goethe’s longhiatus between the first and second parts of Faust), Haas articulated his positionfully and magisterially. The first and last chapters of the two volumes are in factnothing less than the summation of a lifetime of learning.11

Volume 1, Nationalism, Liberalism and Progress (Haas 1997), analyzes thefive major advanced industrial states: Great Britain, the United States, France,Germany, and Japan. Haas argues that nationalism, liberalism, and progress can gohand in hand. Nationalism is neither historically regressive nor morally misleading.It is an instrument, not a structure. It is political, not primordial. It is behavioral,not imaginary. And it is designed to make life better for societies that have to copewith the consequences of modernization. Race, religion, and language are culturalbuilding blocks of national identity. They permit leaders to articulate a collectivenational vision.

Haas rejected the distinction between good, Western, civic nationalism andbad, Eastern, ethnic nationalism, which from Kohn (1944) to Greenfeld (1992)has been a staple in the scholarship on nationalism. He also rejected imbalancedconceptions of nationalism that focus too much on elites (intellectuals in Kohn’smassive study) or too much on mass publics [as in Deutsch’s (1953) theory of socialmobilization and cultural assimilation]. Haas saw little merit in overly structuralmacrohistorical arguments of state building, such as those by Tilly (1975) andRokkan (Flora et al. 1999). At the same time, he had little patience for overlyvoluntaristic accounts that conceive of nations as imagined communities, likethe work of Anderson (1983). As in the story of the three bears, Haas’ con-ceptual schemes and taxonomic distinctions aim for the “just right” balance inbetween.

11Haas taught a course on nationalism and imperialism throughout his academic careerat Berkeley. But with the exception of one section of Beyond the Nation State, he wroterelatively little on nationalism until late in life. Privately he described the two-volume studyas his retirement project, though he never fully retired even from teaching.

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The story of liberal nationalism starts in the eighteenth century, with the riseof the idea of progress and the very possibility for a public policy that incor-porates scientific reasoning and evidence. Liberal nationalism could be defeatedtemporarily by other types of nationalism—for example, the integral nationalismthat Haas experienced as a boy in Nazi Germany. Whereas liberal, progressivenationalism is affirming and open to change, Nazi-style integral nationalism lacksself-examination and acts out only one political repertoire of action. More thanhalf of the songs in the Horst Wessel songbook, for example, sung by millionsof young Germans in the 1930s, reportedly dealt with death. It was a nationalismthat celebrated the prospect of marching itself and tens of millions into the grave.Among all the different kinds of nationalism, over the long term, liberal nation-alism alone holds forth the promise of bringing about reciprocal exchanges insociety, of sustaining formal rationality and self-examination based on adaptationor learning.

For each of the five societies, Haas collected systematic data on 16 indicators,such as official language, conscription rules, popular acceptance of state taxation,and the like. The consensual degree of acceptance of each indicator was ranked inordinal terms and the scores were summed for each of seven years over the courseof two centuries. Across the seven data points, the acceptance scores increase forall five societies, indicating that over time substantial social learning occurred. Butthey also reflect movement at different speeds and temporary reversals. The Anglo-Saxon countries evolved differently from France and Germany, for example, notonly until World War II but also between 1950 and 1990. France and Germanyappear to have attained in the recent past a higher degree of internal reciprocity andprocedural liberalism, as well as a greater awareness of the inevitability of nestingtheir liberal nationalism in Europe-wide political arrangements, than Britain has.The United States, like Britain, shows signs of growing social divisions in recentdecades, and a growing resistance to governance beyond the nation-state. In thelong run, however, liberal nationalism clearly is progressive. Indeed, Haas antic-ipated that it eventually will transform itself, at least in part, into new forms ofmultilateral cosmopolitanism.

The analysis of eight latecomers to nationalism is the subject of the secondvolume, subtitled The Dismal Fate of New Nations (Haas 2000). The analysisincludes China, India, Iran, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and the Ukraine. Nation-building leaders in the Third World and transition states use nationalism as arationalizing and progressive formula. Modernization can occur under the bannersof different syncretist nationalisms in which religion continues to play a largerole. Even among latecomers to nationalism, strategy and choice matter more tooutcomes than structure does, and they reflect the different pressures of ideology,adaptation (the choice of new means), and, occasionally, social learning (the choiceof new ends). Yet only four of the eight countries—Brazil, China, Mexico, andRussia (until 1991)—have experienced successful rationalization.

Haas concluded that only social learning leads to lasting societal integration andthat this outcome is due to the self-examination that it permits. So here, too, liberal

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nationalism is found to be the most progressive type of nationalism. It alone is opento continuous compromise between changing perceptions of interest and values,on the one hand, and newly acquired knowledge, on the other. It should be notedthat for Haas the triumph of liberalism is procedural rather than substantive. Herejected fixed liberal dogmas in favor of liberal rules that remain devoid of moralcontent and that permit vigorous debate and conflict among competing interestsand values, none of which can claim inherent superiority. Diffuse reciprocity andcompromise, not moral ends, are at the core of his procedural understanding ofliberal, progressive nationalism.

Haas’ theory of nationalism is distinctive and yet deeply influenced by the workof Karl Deutsch, a fact freely acknowledged in the preface of the first volume, wherehe wrote that Deutsch’s work persuaded him “at the very beginning of my academiclife that history can be formally analyzed, not merely told as stories” (Haas 1997,p. ix). For both Deutsch and Haas, modernization and social mobilization arecrucial forces driving the spread of nationalism. And these processes are amenableto quantitative estimates: in Haas’ case to measurements of the degree of consensualrationalization, and in Deutsch’s to measurements of the balance between thenationally assimilated and unassimilated shares of the population. Haas saw andhoped for an open-ended process in which liberal nationalism would eventuallyprevail and then transform itself into variants of multilateral cosmopolitanism;Deutsch, in contrast, predicted a century or more of fragmenting empires andpolities, accompanied only in a few instances by the emergence of pluralisticsecurity communities. Still, there exists a remarkable similarity in their overallassessment of the future of nationalism and in the empirical methods they used forcoming to a reasoned assessment of trend lines that connect the past to the future.Moreover, their scholarship stands up extremely well in comparison to the bestclassical work of scholars like Kohn, who preceded them during the interwar years,and to the most recent scholarship on the subject, such as Anderson’s. Haas andDeutsch were frequently on opposite sides of arguments about the future of regionalintegration. But on the question of nationalism they shared intellectual orientationsand were politically committed to a somewhat technocratic, progressive notion ofachieving social change.

This is not to argue that Haas was propounding the message of modernizationtheory 1960s- or 1990s-style. No End of History here. The data in Volume 2 sug-gest that the continued salience of religion is the main reason why modernizationdoes not automatically yield a progressive liberal nationalism. Significant ratio-nalization can be achieved through nonliberal forms of nationalism that mobilizereligion in support of governance. Indeed, integral—not liberal—nationalism is themost effective modernizer, although sustainable progress thereafter is best servedby liberal nationalism.

Volume 2 thus links directly to a line of reasoning developed in the 1990sby Eisenstadt and historians working under the label of “multiple modernities.”Like Haas, these scholars think in long time periods and put religion at a centralplace. Modern societies are not converging around common patterns of capitalist

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industrialization, political democratization, and secularism. Rather, “the idea ofmultiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporaryworld. . .is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of amultiplicity of cultural programs” (Eisenstadt 2000, p. 2). Different civilizational orreligious cores continuously reinfuse culturally different programs in creating theantinomies of modernity. Modernizing non-Western societies and modern Westernsocieties thus display different patterns of modernity. The cultural core of WestEuropean modernity offers a specific “bundle of moral-cognitive imperatives underthe premises of the rationalization of the world” (Spohn 2001, p. 501), and asecularizing reconstruction of religious traditions that radiates outward to otherparts of Europe as well as North and South America through imposition, emulation,and incorporation.

Because Western modernity is adopted selectively and transformed in widelydiffering political and cultural contexts, however, it does not create a commonglobal standard. Indeed, Western modernity is sufficiently broad to allow for ten-sions, even contradictions, between orthodox and heterodox orientations and iden-tities, and ineluctable conflicts between geographic and socioeconomic centersand peripheries. Even among advanced industrial societies, such as Germany andJapan, the ability of modernity to accommodate the vast differences in religioustraditions confirms its political plasticity and institutional plurality (Eisenstadt1986, 1996, 1998). Yet Haas and Eisenstadt did part company on the crucial caseof Japan. For Haas, Japan ends up in the liberal nationalist camp, whereas Eisen-stadt would code it as a case of syncretist nationalism. That disagreement cutsto a question at the very core of Haas’ enterprise: Does liberal nationalism winout in his formulation simply because of his prior, strong ontological commitmentto open-ended learning that, by the author’s fiat, only liberal (not syncretist) na-tionalism can embody? Going well beyond the Japanese case, the answer to thisquestion is of fundamental importance to the political evolution of nationalismin this century. While Eisenstadt’s work is rooted in Weber on world religions,Haas’ draws from Weber on bureaucratic rationality. And whereas Eisenstadt iswilling to accept antinomies that are perpetually recreated and that make eventraditional fundamentalism modern, Haas held with determination to the idea thatin the long term the self-reflexivity, open-endedness, and procedural thinness ofliberal nationalism give it a decisive edge over all other forms of nationalism.

Finally, at least on the surface, there is nothing that connects Haas’ work to therecent and highly innovative combinations of rational choice and anthropology,and of computer simulation based on agent-based modeling, which have begun tomake important inroads in the analysis of national identity. Because of his profoundinterest in social learning and knowledge rather than mere interest and informa-tion, Haas kept his distance from strong—he might even have said “dogmatic”—versions of rational choice. But surface appearances can be somewhat misleading.The boost that complexity theory is getting from the microelectronic revolutionmight have tempted Haas were he to start his academic career now. For him, wordsalways were imperfect instruments for catching deeper theoretical insights. He

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always struggled to express holistic thinking in analytical language. Whereas ana-lytic thought dissects the world into a limited number of discrete objects that can becaptured by language, holistic thought responds to a much wider array of objectsand their complex relations, and is less well suited to linguistic representation.Haas’ taxonomies, piled on top of each other in dizzying cascades, were an ef-fort to recreate holistic thought out of atomistic categories and concepts. Thus, hesurely would explore the relevance of computer simulations based on complexitytheory.

There is also a deeper connection between Haas’ work on nationalism and recentapproaches that take us into entirely new realms of theory and data. Importantadvances at the intersection of rational choice and anthropology, as well as inagent-based modeling, have been made by some of Haas’ former students, Laitin(1998) and Lustick (2000) being among the best known. Haas’ two-volume studyresulted from decades of teaching, but in turn also learning from, students inhis ever-popular seminar on nationalism and imperialism. Though solitary at themoment of creation, the production of all knowledge was for Haas an inherentlysocial enterprise. Indeed, he encouraged his students to explore frontiers of learningthat he was eager to hear about, even though for his own good reasons he did notchoose to visit all those places himself.

CONCLUSION

Haas was preparing for his professional career at one of those rare foundationalmoments in the history of world politics: the reconstruction of the internationalorder after World War II. While he was studying at Columbia University on theGI Bill, the UN General Assembly and Security Council began to meet at nearbyLake Success, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund got under way, theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was established, NATO was founded—and the European Coal and Steel Community was created. He also witnessed,and wrote his dissertation on, early moves towards decolonization and the roleof the UN in facilitating the process (Haas 1952, 1953a). For Haas, these wereall clear signals of a world being remade, potentially offering new possibilitiesfor reordering the relations among states that had not existed in the past. And hewanted better to understand them.

Others in that same period—and at the same graduate school—developed differ-ent professional preoccupations, including Kenneth Waltz, Haas’ future Berkeleycolleague, who was a few years behind him but overlapped briefly with him atColumbia. (The two even had the same dissertation adviser, William T.R. Fox, butnever met.) For Waltz, the emerging bipolarity and the nuclear balance of terrorstood out as the most distinctive features of the new era, drawing his professionalattention and theoretical acumen. Who could argue that they did not both makesound choices? But the interparadigmatic dialogue for which Haas pleaded at theend of his career never came. It is our hope that a new generation of young scholars

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will advance that cause. We have sought to contribute to it by summarizing Haas’voluminous and sometimes difficult work, making it more readily accessible andclarifying why he took the analytical positions he did.

Haas’ special contribution was to push us beyond the limits of the mundane,observable, contemporary realities of world politics, including “certain Hobbesianaspects.” He presented us with enduring questions about, and brilliant insights into,the relationships among the universal desire for human betterment, the unintendedconsequences of self-interested behavior on the part of states and other actors,and social learning and transformations in the practices and institutions of worldpolitics. Those who believe in the possibility of progress in the relations amongstates without succumbing to illusions about its immanence—or imminence—arepermanently in his debt.

The Annual Review of Political Science is online athttp://polisci.annualreviews.org

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P1: KUV

April 15, 2005 17:4 Annual Reviews AR244-FM

Annual Review of Political ScienceVolume 8, 2005

CONTENTS

PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Jonathan Mercer 1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND POLICY ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Stephen M. Walt 23

DOES DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY WORK?, David M. Ryfe 49

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN BRITAIN: THE QUIET REVOLUTION,Vernon Bogdanor 73

IMMIGRATION AND POLITICS, Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum 99

MAKING SENSE OF RELIGION IN POLITICAL LIFE, Kenneth D. Wald,Adam L. Silverman, and Kevin S. Fridy 121

STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, Daniel Byman 145

UNPACKING “TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP,” Jonathan Fox 171

THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS,Gary J. Miller 203

CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse andJohn R. Hibbing 227

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA:BEYOND THE CONCEITS OF MODERN TIMES, Daniel J. Tichenor andRichard A. Harris 251

TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: THE INTELLECTUALCONTRIBUTIONS OF ERNST B. HAAS, John Gerard Ruggie,Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Philippe C. Schmitter 271

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, Anthony Heath,Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith 297

RISK, SECURITY, AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT, Louise K. Comfort 335

THEORIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,DOMESTIC POLITY, OR EXPERIMENT IN NEW GOVERNANCE?,Mark A. Pollack 357

THE GLOBALIZATION RORSCHACH TEST: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICINTEGRATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT,Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett 399

CONSTRUCTING JUDICIAL REVIEW, Mark A. Graber 425

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April 15, 2005 17:4 Annual Reviews AR244-FM

viii CONTENTS

INDEXESSubject Index 453Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–8 477Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–8 479

ERRATAAn online log of corrections Annual Review of Political Sciencechapters may be found at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

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