Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent

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OFFICER CORPS STRATEGY SERIES

TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPSSTRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:EMPLOYING TALENT

Casey WardynskiDavid S. Lyle

Michael J. Colarusso

May 2010

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3 - Towards a U.S. Army Of cer Corps Strategy for Success: RetainingTalent, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, January 2010.

4 - Accessing Talent: The Foundation Of A U.S. Army Of cer CorpsStrategy, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, February 2010.

5 - Towards A U.S. Army Of cer Corps Strategy for Success: Develop-ing Talent, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle,and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, March 2010.

ISBN 1-58487-445-7



FOREWORD

Towards a U.S. Army Of cer Corps Strategy for Suc-cess: Employing Talent is the last of six monographs fo-cused upon of cer talent management in the U.S. Army.Here, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso arguethat the Army’s current of cer employment paradigmis unequal to the needs of a professional, volunteerArmy facing the twin challenges of a competitive la-bor market and an increasingly complex global oper-ating environment. The authors then explain the waysin which optimal employment theories, informationage tools, and well-regulated market mechanisms cangenerate better talent matches, making the Of cerCorps far more productive.

As the employment of talented of cers is a neces-

sary component of any future Of cer Corps strategy,the theories discussed in this monograph merit closeattention.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute



ABOUT THE AUTHORS

CASEY WARDYNSKI is Director of the Of ce ofEconomic and Manpower Analysis and an AssociateProfessor of Economics at the United States MilitaryAcademy, West Point, NY. In addition to creatingthe concepts for the “America’s Army” game andthe Army’s pre-commissioning retention incentives,Colonel Wardynski has published in the area ofmilitary compensation policy and manpower. ColonelWardynski earned a B.S. at West Point, a Masters inPublic Policy at Harvard, and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysisfrom the Rand Graduate School.

DAVID S. LYLE is an Associate Professor of Economicsand Deputy Director of the Of ce of Economic andManpower Analysis at the United States Military

Academy, West Point, NY. He has publications inthe Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of LaborEconomics, the Review of Economics and Statistics,the American Economic Journal: Applied, and theEconomics of Education Review. Major Lyle earned aB.S. at West Point and a Ph.D. in Economics from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

MICHAEL J. COLARUSSO is a research analyst inthe Of ce of Economic and Manpower Analysis atthe United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and hasserved in a variety of military positions, to include asan Assistant Professor of History at West Point. Mr.Colarusso earned a B.A. in History from Saint John’s

University and a M.A. in History from the PennsylvaniaState University.



SUMMARY

In the Information Age, jobs are becoming morecomplex, requiring employees who are agile, inven-tive, and empathetic. Work is increasingly charac-terized by high levels of task interdependence, skillspeci city, and uncertainty. In addition, today’senormously competitive labor market gives educatedprofessionals the option of seeking new employmentwhenever a company fails to give them suf cientvoice in their work. In short, the industrial era, duringwhich “bosses” unilaterally made employment deci-sions, is over.

Today, the most successful enterprises unleash thetalents of their workers by collaborating with themrather than dictating to them. In this more equitableenvironment, prospective employees and employers

seek information about each other. Ideally, they willenter into mutually bene cial relationships character-ized by high productivity and the initiative, innova-tion, and tenure born of true job satisfaction.

Unfortunately, the Army’s current of cer employ-ment paradigm is not talent driven. Instead, it is in-dustrial (almost feudal) in nature, running counter tobest practices. The Army unduly prioritizes “fairness”when making assignments, has a narrowly de nedpathway to senior leadership ranks, cannot see thetalent it possesses, and suffers from severe principal-agent problems.

The Army must move beyond these industrialera employment practices and adopt information agetalent management. However, creating better talent

matches requires a signi cant change in its feudal em-ployment culture. Sound theories, inovative technolo-gies, and controlled market mechanisms can help the



Army match individual of cer talents with speci cwork requirements.

A carefully controlled talent market driven by astate-of-the-art information technology system canhelp create employment practices equal to our times.It will allow commanders to seek the talent they need,screen job candidates, and interact with both of cersand Human Resources Command (HRC) personnelto achieve good matches. In turn, of cers will betterknow what talents are in demand. This can positivelyshape their developmental decisions, future assign-ment aspirations, and professional networks.

Most importantly, the Army will bene t on severallevels. First, it will nally be able to “see” the talent itpossesses and the talent that is actually in demand.As talent gaps are revealed, it will be empowered toallocate of cer developmental resources far more ef -

ciently and rapidly. Second, the Army’s Of cer Corpswill work in increasingly networked fashion, buildingtechnology-enabled, problem solving relationships.Finally, optimal talent matches will improve talentdevelopment, enhance productivity, reduce risk andensure the Of cer Corps has the depth and breadth oftalent it needs, both now and in the future.



TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPSSTRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:

EMPLOYING TALENT

INTRODUCTION

In 1911, Frederick Winslow Taylor, a mechanicalengineer, published The Principles of Scienti c Man-agement. His premise was that, in general, workersperformed at the slowest rate that goes unpunished,something he (ironically) referred to as “soldiering.” 1

To rectify this, Taylor devised a method for improvingworker productivity. First, the employer would breakskilled labor requirements down into smaller, lessskilled labor tasks. Next, the employer would “scien-ti cally” identify the “one best way” to perform thesesmaller tasks to save time and costs. Workers would

then be selected, trained and employed to exactingtask standards.In an era worshipful of science and in the throes

of industrialization, scienti c management, or “Tay-lorism” as it came to be called, was a tremendous hit.Bethlehem Steel, Henry Ford, and other manufactur-ers employed it in their factories, sometimes doublingor tripling output. Even today, this sort of task-orient-ed work optimization continues in several industries.

The drawbacks of Taylor’s program, however,were signi cant. Chief among them, it failed to rec-ognize that the most ef cient way of working for oneperson might be inef cient for another. It made workrepetitive, tedious, and uninteresting. It sti ed self-development and smothered employee decisionmak-

ing or innovation. Lastly, it treated people like inter-changeable parts, employing just a fraction of theirunique talents.



In the Information Age, jobs are becoming morecomplex, not less so, requiring employees who are

agile, inventive, and empathetic. Work is increasinglycharacterized by high levels of task interdependence,skill speci city, and uncertainty. In addition, today’senormously competitive labor market gives educatedprofessionals the option of seeking new employmentwhenever a company fails to give them suf cientvoice in their work. In short, the industrial era, duringwhich “bosses” unilaterally made employment deci-sions, is over.

Today, the most successful enterprises unleash thefull potential of their workers by collaborating withthem rather than dictating to them. In this more eq-uitable environment, prospective employees and em-ployers seek information about each other. Ideally,they will enter into mutually bene cial relationships

characterized by high productivity and the initiative,innovation, and tenure born of true job satisfaction.Employing people optimally is not easy, however.

It requires the ability to access the talent in demand, todevelop it to meet both current and future demands,and to retain it in an extremely competitive Ameri-can labor market. If that were not dif cult enough,optimal employment engages the critical componentof timing—getting an employee in position as he ap-proaches the apex of his productive capability in that

position. By this, we mean that both work requirementsand individual talents are always changing—the tal-ent match that may have been optimal 2 or 3 years agomay become less so over time, either because the re-quirements have changed, the employee has, or both.

Organizations therefore cannot become complacent—they must continuously evaluate their talent and theirrequirements, ensuring that when warranted, people



are afforded new opportunities to make optimal workcontributions.

Effective talent employment is at the core of theArmy Of cer Human Capital Model—to provide op-timally performing of cers in all areas (see Figure 1).Getting it right directly supports talent development.It improves job satisfaction, simultaneously increas-ing talent retention. Moreover, highly productive andsatis ed employees are the ultimate recruiting tool,making future talent accessionseasier.

Figure 1. Army Of cer Human Capital Model.

In sum, optimal talent employment expands theArmy’s production possibility frontier—it can domore with existing resources. It also helps ensure thatthe Of cer Corps possesses the depth and breadth of

talent needed to meet the twin challenges of a com-petitive labor market and an increasingly uncertainoperating environment.



OFFICER EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES:OUR BIGGEST AREA OF CONCERN

Throughout this monograph series, we have ex-plored several talent management challenges withimplications for the future well-being of the Of cerCorps. In Volume 3, we discussed the harm causedby low junior of cer retention, a challenge now beingredressed via the Of cer Career Satisfaction Program(OCSP). In Volume 4, we identi ed accessions practic-es that not only stunt Army efforts to acquire the of -cer talent it truly needs, but also rob it of talent neededelsewhere. In Volume 5, we argued that Army of cerdevelopment practices, which for years have receivedhigh marks from most quarters, must keep pace withemerging challenges via changes in its developmentalculture, education, and evaluation practices.

All of these talent management challenges are causefor concern, thought, and action. In our opinion, how-ever, the greatest challenge is the one we are focusedupon here—the way the Army employs its of cers. Itscurrent employment paradigm is industrial (almostfeudal) in nature, running counter to best practices.The Army unduly prioritizes “fairness” when mak-ing assignments, has a narrowly de ned pathway tosenior leadership ranks, cannot see the talent it pos-sesses, and suffers from severe principal-agent prob-lems. We will explore each of these challenges in turn.

Fairness.

When an of cer hears from Human Resources

Command (HRC) about a potential assignment, his orher pulse quickens. It is an understandable response.Assignments dictate where the of cer will serve for



the next 2-4 years, whom he will serve with, and whathe will do. Assignments have an outsized impact upon

an of cer’s future advancement opportunities, as wellas upon his or her family and quality of life. Workingthrough it all can be an emotional process.

For the Army, of course, assignments shouldhave no emotional component—they are simply themechanism through which it derives production fromeach of cer. Yet, in a well-meaning effort to take careof its people, the Army’s current of cer assignmentprocess focuses much more upon “fairness” than itdoes upon coolly optimizing of cer productivity. In-stead of talent considerations, each of cer’s “dwell”(nondeployed) time, “boots-on-the-ground” (“BOG”or deployed) time, number of deployments, and thenumber of overseas postings dominate future assign-ment decisions.

In fact, an HRC branch representative may well be-gin an of cer’s assignment interview with this type ofa comment: Let’s see, you’ve been in CONUS [in thecontinental United States] for 3 years—time to get youback in the ght, or: We need to get you an assign-ment where you can ‘take a knee’—you’ve had twooverseas deployments in the last 4 years. However,this way of doing business is problematic, becauseit short-circuits talent matching, leads to suboptimalproductivity, increases risks of mission failure, anddemonstrates a skewed notion of fairness.

To be very clear—we support efforts to rest peopleafter challenging or hazardous assignments, to reunitefamilies after extended separations, and to provideequitable deployment exposure. We also wholeheart-

edly support Army efforts to broaden people (or aswe say, extend their talent advantage) by providingthem with challenging assignments across a variety ofenvironments. It is necessary to do these things.



However, the practice of weighting deploymentexposure more heavily than talent matching when

making assignments is terribly shortsighted. It pre-sumes that of cers are interchangeable widgets andcan therefore be treated identically. As we have arguedthroughout this monograph series, nothing could befurther from the truth. Each of cer is a unique indi-vidual, possessing a talent set that aligns far betterwith some assignments than with others.

This is why the Army must recalibrate its notionsof fairness. While it must afford equal opportunitiesto all, the fairest employment behavior it can engagein is to assign of cers where their talents help defeatthreats at the lowest cost in American lives and tax-payer dollars. This is true fairness—to the taxpayer,to the Soldiers serving with the of cers, and to theArmy’s joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and

multinational partners.

Narrow, Tradition-bound Pathways to Success.

A feudal employment culture can prevent an orga-nization from liberating the talent of its people, partic-ularly in emerging threat or technology areas. DuringWorld War I, for example, Brigadier General William“Billy” Mitchell brilliantly commanded all Americanair combat units in France. At war’s end, many ex-pected that General John Pershing would championMitchell as the rst military director of the Army’sAir Service—he was undoubtedly the most talentedsenior aviation of cer in the Army. Instead, Pershingchose Major General Charles Menoher, who had capa-

bly commanded the 42nd Infantry Division in France.Some assume Pershing passed over Mitchell due

to his caustic personality. 4 But other factors con-



strained Pershing’s options, chie y the Army’s well-entrenched seniority system. Menoher was an artil-

lery of cer and an 1886 West Point graduate, whileMitchell was a “mustang” Signal Corps of cer whohad received a direct commission 20 years later. 5 Inshort, General Menoher’s source of commission, suc-cess as a ground combat branch of cer, and far greaterseniority all t the narrow and traditional pathways tosenior of cership that predominated at the time, eventhough he had no air service experience. 6 As a result,his assignment was a poor talent match, and Menoherwas relieved as Air Service director in 1921. He even-tually returned to division and later corps command,where he performed honorably and well. 7

Pershing’s “Mitchell or Menoher” dilemma high-lights what can happen when seniority, traditionalpersonnel management techniques, and misplaced

notions of fairness supplant talent in the employmentprocess. Such practices can have negative implica-tions at all levels. In this instance, both individualand organizational performance were suboptimized.The Army’s Air Service experienced a tumultuous 2years, during which its director and deputy were con-tinuously at loggerheads. Over the same period, theArmy failed to fully bene t from Menoher’s talent asa ground forces commander or Mitchell’s as an air-power innovator.

Unfortunately, remnants of this century-old em-ployment culture remain in the Army today, restrict-ing its ability to effectively employ of cers. As wehighlighted in our previous monograph, nearly 80percent of the Army’s senior leader assignments re-

quire talent in more than just the operational art. 8

Despite this, the Army’s relatively narrow, tradition-bound paths to enterprise leadership heavily transit



operational assignments and draw almost exclusivelyupon “maneuver, res, and effects” of cers (primarily

combat arms).This is appropriate in some instances, of course,but less so in others. As the range of national securitythreats becomes increasingly asymmetric and nonki-netic, winnowing talent by shunting it down narrowcareer paths will deny the Army the talent needed tomeet those challenges. Success in war ghting, nation-building, disaster relief, and myriad other contingen-cies requires an organizational breadth of talent thatcan be sustained only by creating more pathways toenterprise leadership.

An uncertain threat environment also demands acertain depth of talent. The Army’s existing of cer em-ployment practices, however, frustrate the develop-ment of depth, particularly for its more senior of cers.

As of cers achieve greater rank and responsibility,their formal development time is increasingly sparse. 9

To redress this, on the job training and experience—tenure—becomes critical. This is standard practice inmost successful enterprises. Optimally performingemployees remain in position long enough to extendtheir talents and become true innovators. Army cul-ture generally frowns upon tenure, however, charac-terizing it as “homesteading.” This “up and out” em-ployment mindset sti es innovation and hampers theArmy’s ability to develop deeply talented people.

The Army Cannot See its Talent.

Even if the Army acknowledges that every of cer is

unique, it will be unable to manage their individual tal-ents until it knows what they are and what talents areneeded. Currently, it has little information in this area.



Make no mistake—the Army knows plenty aboutits of cers: their home of record, gender, race, marital

status, colleges attended, blood type, and religion. Ittracks his health and tness levels, months deployed,awards, and decorations. It knows many other thingsas well—the number and type of training coursescompleted, positions held, dates of promotion, andsecurity clearance levels. All of this information, andmore, is found in each of cer’s record brief (ORB).

Unfortunately, this is simple accounting data. Tomanage of cer talent, however, the Army needs de-cision support data, information that reveals what makeseach of cer tick.What does he value? What opportuni-ties does he desire? What incentives will he respondto? What does he know that the Army has not taughthim? Where has he been that the Army has not senthim? What does he enjoy? How does he see the fu-

ture? How does he learn? In other words, what are his(or her) talents?Ironically, web applications such as Plaxo, Monster,

or LinkedIn often know more about participating of-cers’ talents than the Army does. These networks areourishing because they motivate people to volunteer

vast amounts of professional information via friendlyand intuitive user interfaces. As a result, that informa-tion is usually current, relevant, and fully searchable,a key advantage over Army personnel informationmanagement systems. “Web 2.0” sites are also light-ning fast relative to most Army web applications,another advantage. Additionally, they incorpo rateinference technology—the ability to learn about usersthrough continuous interaction and to provide them

with increasingly useful and personalized service.With these tools, civilian employers have gained areal advantage over the Army in the talent wars. Not



only can they see each participating of cer’s talents,but they can attract them to their organizations via

detailed job postings. Today’s Army of cers can usenimble online search tools to nd thousands of pri-vate sector jobs demanding their talents. This markettransparency is in stark contrast to the Army’s highlyopaque, top-down employment approach, a likelycontributor to talent leakage from the Of cer Corps.

The “Principal-Agent” Problem.

In addition to knowing which talents it has onhand, the Army must also understand which talentsare in demand across its organizations. Command-ers know which talents they need and of cers knowwhich talents they can provide. Unfortunately, neithermakes assignments—the Army’s HRC does, creating

a signi cant principal-agent problem. This arises whentwo parties do not share the same information andalso have differing interests. 10

In this case, commanders (the principals), arecharged with leading their organizations to successfuloutcomes. They desire “ace” job candidates—of cerswho can dramatically exceed minimal performancerequirements because there is a high correlation be-tween their talents and work requirements. Whenmaking assignments, however, HRC’s branch manag-ers (the agents) have no real mechanism for determin-ing which speci c talents commanders are seeking, orhow large a supply of it exists in the Of cer Corps.

To make matters worse, HRC’s interests often lieoutside those of commanders. Talented, dedicated,

and extremely hard working, HRC’s branch managersand assignment of cers administer a system seekinga fair distribution of of cers, ensuring that each unit



shares the same burden of shortages or overages in of-cer inventory. Under this system, commanders must

build their teams with whatever talent HRC assignsto them.Meanwhile, of cers (who are also principals in the

assignment process) must do their best to performwherever HRC employs them, whether the job match-es their talents or not. Again, we see differing interests.Of cers are seeking assignments that liberate their tal-ent and allow them to make an optimal contribution tothe Army, while HRC is focused upon a fair distribu-tion of overseas assignments and deployment expo-sure across the Of cer Corps. In a recent survey, how-ever, 44 percent of young of cers identi ed “the job”as their most important consideration when seekingtheir next assignment. By comparison, only 6 percentof them consider deployment schedules important. 11

Solving principal-agent problems requires align-ing incentives and reducing information asymme-tries. Essentially, assignment managers need a wayof knowing what talents commanders need and whattalents are possessed by the of cers they manage. As-signment managers must also be motivated to increaseboth individual and organizational productivity viainformation-driven talent matches. Until these issuesare resolved, the Army will continue to treat of cersas interchangeable parts, suffer low of cer retention,endure unnecessarily high developmental costs, andperform suboptimally. Understanding some funda-mental theories, however, can help the Army breakfree of this industrial era employment paradigm andmove toward genuine talent management practices.



THEORY-TALENT MATCHING REQUIRESBOTH DATA AND INCENTIVES

The theory of optimal job matching rests uponthree key assumptions. First, there is a heterogeneousdistribution of both employee talent and employerrequirements. Second, there is imperfect informationon both sides of any job transaction—neither the em-ployer nor the employee knows whether a good tal-ent match is at hand. And third, there is an incentivemechanism that encourages talent matching for boththe employer and the employee. 12

In our view, these assumptions hold when con-sidering the possibility of a talent-focused Army of-

cer employment system. First, all of cers possessvaried and unique talent distributions, just as all of-

cer requirements are varied and unique. In fact, the

uniqueness of both of cers and requirements tends toincrease with rank. 13 Second, asymmetric informationproblems abound—of cers have little visibility overthe preponderance of jobs for which they might be agreat talent match, and the Army knows very littleabout the talent of each of cer. Finally, it is in the bestinterest of both the Army and individual of cers tomatch talents against requirements. The organizationincreases its productivity without increased costs, andthe of cer experiences enhanced productivity and jobsatisfaction without compromising his or her career.

We can conceptualize the methods for achiev-ing talent matches as lying along a continuum, from“command directed” to “market driven” in nature. Inour daily lives, we are surrounded by evidence that

the operation of markets (with appropriate safeguardsin place) engender far more ef cient and productiveoutcomes than command directed processes do.



Recent world history reinforces the point. Comparethe U.S. and Soviet economies, for example. In 1945,

these two global superpowers both possessed signi -cant quantities of heavy industry, natural resources,labor, etc. By 1990, however, the Soviet Union’s state-planned economy was barely one-third the size ofthe American economy. In fact, the gap between thetwo had been growing wider for years, despite Sovietpredictions that their industrial production and percapita income would eclipse that of the United Statesby 1980.14

Like the old Soviet economy, a rigid, centrallymanaged approach to employing of cers is woefullyinef cient and unequal to the needs of today’s volun-teer force. It requires the Army to know exactly whatits future talent requirements will be—an impossibletask. Nearly as impossible, it tells people what they

will do and expects them to perform optimally in anyassignment they receive. This approach puts a pre-mium on having adaptable (interchangeable) of cers.

At the other end of the continuum is a regulated,market-driven employment approach that would cre-ate incentives for of cers (the labor supply) to volun-teer talent information and for commanders (the la-bor demand) to identify talent requirements. In thisway, the Army could wean itself from reliance uponerror-prone requirements forecasts. Instead, it couldbecome a truly agile enterprise, better employing peo-ple within their unique talent sets. The Army’s Of cerCorps might then achieve genuine breadth and depthof capability without requiring every of cer to mastereverything (the pentathlete paradigm).

To illustrate the way in which market forces canhelp organizations meet unforeseen and rapidlyemerging talent requirements, consider Figure 2,



which compares undergraduate Middle Eastern stud-ies by West Point cadets with graduate-level Middle

Eastern studies by Army of cers.

Figure 2. Individuals in a Free MarketRespond More Rapidly to Changing Demand

than Command-Directed Enterprises Can.

Just as at any American university, West Point ca-dets can choose their programs of study. The solid lineshows how quickly they responded to the events ofSeptember 11, 2001 (9/11). Almost immediately, thenumber of cadets choosing Middle Eastern studies in-creased dramatically. An incentive is in play—youngmen and women embarking on an Army career wantto bring relevant talents to their profession. The Army

(via West Point) affords these young people with theopportunity to extend their talents. In return, it gainsmuch needed capability from people with both the tal-



ent and the desire to provide it. Both parties to thisexchange bene t rapidly and tremendously.

If every cadet wanted to major in Middle Easternstudies, West Point would have to regulate this marketbecause the Army still requires engineers, economists,historians, and experts in other regional studies. Todate, however, there has been no need for interven-tion in the selection of majors by cadets—the marketclears optimally.

In stark contrast to the example cited above, grad-uate level programs of study for Army of cers arecentrally controlled and allocated. The dotted line inFigure 2 tells the story. During almost a decade of per-sistent con ict in the Middle East, the Army did notincrease the number of of cers enrolled in graduate-level Middle Eastern studies. Perhaps this was due tointernal debate over the wisdom of doing so: Which

program study areas do we curtail if we allow moreof cers to study the Middle East? Regardless, theArmy did not react, and an opportunity to increase itscultural uency in a critical area was lost. 15

Top-down, centrally managed human capitalpractices may have been suf cient during the relativeequilibrium of the Cold War era, with its industrialeconomies, conscript armies, and clear adversaries.They are unequal, however, to the needs of a volun-teer force facing the twin challenges of a competitivelabor market and an increasingly complex global op-erating environment. Moreover, they are unnecessary.

Information age tools make it possible to capture agreat deal of information regarding individual talentsand unique work requirements, while market mecha-

nisms can help the Army use that information withtelling effect. Instead of trying to forecast, for exam-ple, how many electrical engineers the Of cer Corps



needs, the Army will know based upon the actual de-mand for that talent set. 16

In addition, as Army talent demands become clear,of cers will be better able to develop the skills to meetthem. In cases where jobs require particular depth orspecialization, the Army may also consider extendingtenure to of cers, both to increase their on-the-job de-velopment and to reap the highest rate of return fromextremely productive individuals with rare talents.

Market mechanisms incentivize employees andemployers to provide granular data on their respec-tive talents and requirements. This is critical to cre-ating optimal job matches. The more granular theinformation, the greater the advantage one potentialemployee has over another for a particular job. Ac-curacy is encouraged as well—careless mistakes ordeliberate falsi cation of information can lead to poor

job matches that effectively end an of cer’s career.This level of detailed information can introduce anentirely new component to of cer evaluations. Cur-rently, all of cers, regardless of rank, position, branch,location, tenure, span of responsibilities, etc., are eval-uated against identical performance measures via theOf cer Evaluation Report (OER). However, futureevaluations will be able to go much further.

Using detailed information about an of cer’s talentand the job’s speci c requirements, commanders andpersonnel managers will assess not just performancebut the strength of the talent match . Was the job a good

t? If not, why not? How was the of cer selected forthis position? What information was used to make thisassignment? What credentials are needed to succeed

at this job in the future?Today, when an of cer fails to perform optimally,

the Army holds the of cer responsible, and the im-



plications for his or her career can be serious. In thefuture, however, the assessment might read, “We put

him in the wrong job, now let’s get it right.” TOWARDS A TALENT MANAGEMENTAPPROACH: GREEN PAGES

To test the theories described above, an innovativenew web application is currently being piloted on asmall scale among Engineer of cers. Called simply“Green Pages,” it is more than just a talent-matchingor employment tool. 17 Green Pages proceeds from anunderstanding of how markets work, why they fail,and how they can be regulated. It also draws uponbehavioral economic theory—how people behave ina marketplace and which incentives will move themto action.

Currently, there is no market for of cer talent inthe Army—no way for organizational strength man-agers and individual of cers to make ef cient talenttransactions. This represents a market failure—an inef-

cient use of resources when better results are pos-sible. In other words, assignment transactions still oc-cur, but there is a signi cant misalignment of talentsupply and demand, making the Of cer Corps lessproductive than it can be. Green Pages can rectify this,providing the Army with its rst market-driven of -cer talent management system.

Operating Concept.

Figure 3 graphically depicts the Green Pages

operating concept, simple in design but potentiallyquite powerful in implementation:



Figure 3. Green Pages Reveals Boththe Talents the Army Possesses

and the Talents It Demands.

Each person’s collective life experiences representtremendous capital in the Army talent market. Whenof cers participate actively in Green Pages (Figure 3,

point a), they will create detailed pro les summariz-ing all of their expertise, experiences, and accomplish-ments. More than just a listing of Army training andskill identi ers, these include talents gained in college,through leisure pursuits and hobbies, in their commu-nities, in the civilian job market, and even from rela-tionships with friends and family.

The Engineer pilot currently underway providesexcellent examples of the new of cer information thatGreen Pages is revealing, everything from what of-

cers can do to what they hope to do. 18 Examples of



actual information already entered into the systeminclude:

• A captain who wishes to obtain his professionalengineering and Leadership in Energy andEnvironmental Design (LEED) certi cations,and plans on taking the Fundamentals ofEngineering Exam (FEE) this summer whilepursuing his masters degree in environmentalengineering.

• A lieutenant who interned throughout collegewith an engineering rm building light railsystems in the Southwest. As a civilian, he alsoowned and ran a “green” business.

• A lieutenant who has extensive prior experienceas a project design and construction managerin the Baltimore, MD, and Washington, DC,metropolitan areas, as well as abroad.

These of cers are sharing talents and goals in a pro-fessional setting, information which has tremendousassignment utility and is not available to the Armyelsewhere. As you can imagine, a ood of other of-

cer data, all searchable, will continue to enter GreenPages, such as professional journal articles written,heritage languages learned in childhood, productivehobbies, publications, contingency experience, etc.

Simultaneously, commanders and strength man-agers at organizations across the Army will post ro-bust job pro les, detailing not just required talents, butdesired talents. Just as individuals are unique, so arework requirements. Even seemingly identical jobs candiffer based upon a variety of factors. These include

leadership styles, talent gaps, unit mission, other con-tingencies, geography, equipment, operating theater,rules of engagement, etc.



The Green Pages Engineer pilot is making thisabundantly clear. For example, a captain’s position at

Camp Zama, Japan, previously identi ed only by title,rank, and branch, now includes desired civilian edu-cational levels and academic disciplines. It describesthe work to be performed and the mission of the or-ganization. It identi es professional certi cations thatwill help an of cer excel in the assignment. It providesa point of contact and a website where a job candidatecan learn more. Perhaps most importantly, of cerscan consider their suitability for this job, whereas pre-viously they may not have known it existed.

Once detailed personal pro les and job pro lesare entered into Green Pages, they will form the ba-sis for a talent marketplace (Figure 3, point b). As of-

cers and organizations search against one another,the bulk of the talent market will “clear” optimally.

In other words, less intervention will be required byactors outside of the talent transaction. HRC will stillbe the assignments arbiter but will hopefully nd it-self more in the role of advocating for and approvingtalent matches rather than balancing of cer shortagesand deployment exposure.

Workforce talent matching will make the Armymore productive as of cer talents are liberated by as-signments that t better than previously possible. Thiswill enhance relational coordination through team-work and collaboration via information networks andface-to face interaction. It will increase job satisfaction,which has direct implications for retention. It will alsoprovide greater organizational agility as units gain thebreadth and depth of talent required to succeed in an

increasingly complex operating environment (Figure3, point c). Green Pages will also allow of cers to lookbeyond their next assignment, to know what talents



are in demand, align this information with their per-sonal career preferences, and make the developmen-

tal choices that will posture them for the assignmentsthey desire in the future.The talent market created by Green Pages will be

dynamic, both iterative and continuous, as new tal-ents and new requirements are continuously fed intothe marketplace (Figure 3, point d). As granular in-formation on the Army’s talent supply and demandemerges, the Army can abandon static forecasting.Instead, it will see in real time where its talent sur-pluses and shortfalls are and can rapidly adjust itsaccessions, development, retention and employmentpractices (Figure 3, point e).

Core Capabilities.

Green Pages is a “Web 2.0” application, and func-tionality is benchmarked from the best commercialprofessional networking applications. It moves be-yond those applications, however, which rely almostexclusively upon user input (“how I see and representmyself”) rather than of cial records (“how others seeme”). Green Pages combines both user entry informa-tion and of cial le information into a comprehensiveand searchable pro le.

Green Pages also allows users to: manage the in-formation that is publicly available about them asprofessionals; search against every of cer position inthe Army inventory; contact organization personnelstrength managers for more information; be found byArmy organizations conducting talent searches; col-

laborate with fellow experts from across the Army togather data, share les and solve problems; gain newinsights from discussions with like-minded profes-



sionals in private group settings; build professionalnetworks that can help them land the jobs they want

in the places the Army wants them; and, at the organi-zation level, post and distribute job listings to nd andattract the best talent available.

Importantly, Green Pages is a relational databasetool, currently fed by several Army data sources. Overtime, it can easily draw upon additional data sourcesto expand its searchable talent information, becomingan increasingly more powerful tool in the process.

Changing Culture and Practice.

While we have described the more immediate ben-e ts of Green Pages, those bene ts will likely deepenas the Army’s employment paradigm gradually shiftsfrom feudal to collaborative, from exclusively com-

mand-directed to increasingly market-driven. Overtime, Green Pages can usher in bene cial changes inthe Army’s work culture and practices.

By giving commanders greater voice in who is as-signed to their organizations, for example, a regulatedtalent market supported by Green Pages can help theArmy truly make Soldiers its centerpiece. Considerthat today’s commanders do not bear the cost of la-bor because it is “loaned” to them by an outside agent(HRC). They take what they get and make do. As aresult, in today’s Army culture, commanders are heldmore accountable for the operational readiness of theirpacing items than they are for the long-term career vi-ability of their of cers.

If a battalion commander averaged a 70 percent

operational rate for his tank eet, he would leave com-mand with his career in tatters. However, if 70 percentof his junior of cers left the Army at the end of their



active duty service obligation (ADSO), there wouldbe no career repercussions for him at all. Why should

there be? It is entirely possible that these of cers ar-rived to his unit fully intending to leave the service,or perhaps were terrible matches for his organization.If the bulk of these junior of cers, however, were as-signed to a unit because of their desires and the com-mander’s wishes, the equation (and the Army’s cul-ture) would change. A moral contract is created, andthe commander is now responsible for developingand employing young people that are serving withhim at his request. He has personally built the team,and his investment in its success on a human as wellas operational level rises dramatically.

Green Pages may also change work practices byengendering far greater relational coordination—fre-quent, timely, accurate, problem solving communica-

tion, connecting Soldiers around the world and acrosstime zones and operating theaters. Green Pages pro-vides secure For Of cial Use Only (FOUO) commu-nications tools: an internal email client, a professional“Answers” module, and the ability to join “Groups”and build a trusted network of associates.

Imagine serving as an engineer construction of -cer in Mosul, Iraq where you must drill several wells.You have PDC bits, but due to unanticipated soil con-ditions you need a steady supply of roller cone bits.Several local contractors sell them but they are of poorquality and wear rapidly. Via Green Pages, however,you are able to quickly locate an of cer at Fort Lewiswho faced a similar challenge two years ago. He in-forms you of a great local supplier, one you were un-

aware of. You make contact, secure high quality rollercone bits and triple your drilling speed, all because asimple web application provided you with a rapidly



searchable knowledge network to fall back upon. Youalso become acquainted with an of cer you never

would have known—his assistance is just the begin-ning of years of professional collaboration betweenthe two of you. Networked problem solving bringsremarkable organizational agility to the Army.

When natural disasters strike, such as the recentearthquake in Haiti, Green Pages can help the Armyassemble the most talented response team possible.A commander can immediately search for people bycultural uency, law enforcement, engineering, or anyother work requirements. He or she can search not just of cial records, but of cer-provided informationrevealing relevant talents gained via leisure travel, areligious mission, a Peace Corps stint, a Habitat forHumanity project, advanced civil study, training withindustry, civilian employment, etc.

Perhaps more importantly, Green Pages may even-tually span branch and component boundaries thatcan be barriers to talent employment. Imagine that theArmy is responding to another Katrina-like hurricanein the Gulf of Mexico. Unlike 2005, this time GreenPages immediately identi es all engineers with leveebuilding and reconstruction experience. The Armypromptly dispatches these of cers to the New OrleansCorps of Engineers district. However, a talent gapemerges—there are more of cers needed than avail-able. Another Green Pages search takes place, thistime focused upon speci c engineering talents andexperience, rather than just Active Component “engi-neer branch” of cers. The search reveals several certi-

ed engineers with the required geotechnical experi-

ence and credentials, to include one in the MississippiNational Guard (an Infantry of cer), another in theArmy Reserve who lives in Maryland (an MP of cer),



and several others. All are mobilized and deployed tothe crisis zone.

Potentially, Green Pages can reach all the way backinto new accessions to ensure the Army fully leveragesthe talents of its junior of cers and places them uponthe most productive and rewarding career paths pos-sible. For example, via Green Pages the Army couldmake of cer branching decisions based upon far moreinformation than is available today (and on both sidesof the market—talent and requirements). Just as col-lege graduates prepare resumes and interview withcivilian employers, prospective of cers could engagein a similar process with the basic branch they feelbest matches their talents.

CONCLUSIONS

Talent employment is at the core of the Army Of cerHuman Capital Model. The Army’s current employ-ment paradigm, however, is unequal to the needs ofa professional volunteer Army facing the twin chal-lenges of a competitive labor market and an increas-ingly complex global operating environment. It un-duly prioritizes “fairness” when making assignments,has a narrowly de ned pathway to senior leadershipranks, cannot see the talent it possesses, and suffersfrom severe principal-agent problems.

The Army must move beyond industrial era em-ployment practices and adopt information age talentmanagement. However, creating better talent matchesrequires a signi cant change in its feudal employ-ment culture. Sound theories, information age tools,

and controlled market mechanisms can help the Armymatch individual of cer talents with speci c work re-quirements.



A carefully controlled talent market driven byGreen Pages is a win-win proposition. Commanders

win because they can seek the talent they need, screen job candidates, and interact with both of cers andHRC personnel to achieve good matches. Of cers winbecause they will better know what talents are in de-mand. This can positively shape their developmentaldecisions, future assignment aspirations, and profes-sional networks.

The Army wins as well, and on several levels. First,it can nally see the talent it possesses and the tal-ent that is actually in demand. As talent gaps are re-vealed, it can allocate of cer developmental resourcesfar more ef ciently and rapidly. Second, the Army’sOf cer Corps will work in increasingly networkedfashion via Green Pages, building technology-enabledproblem solving relationships. Lastly, optimal talent

matches will improve talent development, enhanceproductivity, reduce risk, and ensure the Of cer Corpshas the depth and breadth of talent it needs, both nowand in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scienti c Man-agement, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911, p. 19.

2. See “Frederick Taylor and Scienti c Management,” NetMBA Business Knowledge Center, available from www.netmba.com/mgmt/scienti c/.

3. See Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Col-orusso, Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Of cer Corps Strategy,

Vol. 2 of this monograph series, Carlisle, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute, U.S. Army War College, November 2009, p. 13, avail-able from www.officer-strategy.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ sessions.php?catid=2.



4. While beloved by his subordinates, Mitchell had littletolerance for superiors who did not share his airpower vision.He could be thorny to the point of insubordination (a factor thatwould result in his court-martial several years later). He was also

amboyant, viewed by many senior of cers as too free-speakingand self-promoting.

5. A “mustang” of cer is one commissioned directly fromthe enlisted ranks.

6. Challenging the Army’s heavily entrenched seniority

system was not something Pershing was likely to take on, par-ticularly as his own career had bene tted from such a challenge,creating deep resentments within the Army that endured acrosshis career. In 1903, Pershing was a 43-year-old captain who hadcaught the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt as a vig-orous and enterprising of cer. Roosevelt petitioned the Army’sGeneral Staff to advance Pershing to eld grade rank, but theArmy refused to upset its seniority system. Roosevelt overcamethis by exercising presidential prerogative, nominating Persh-

ing as a brigadier general. Congress approved the nominationin 1906. This catapulted Pershing over more than 800 senior of -cers, shocking the Army establishment. Many of cers consideredthe promotion the result of timely political patronage rather thanmerit. In addition to Roosevelt’s support, Senator Francis War-ren, Chair of the Senate’s Military Appropriations Committee,had become Pershing’s father-in-law in 1905. See Matthew M.Oyos, “Theodore Roosevelt, Congress and the Military: US Civil-Military Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” Presidential

Studies Quarterly , Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 312-330, availablefrom www.jstor.org/pss/27552096.

7. To his credit, Major General Menoher fully recognizedthat he was unprepared to serve as Air Service chief, which iswhy he had requested Brigadier General Mitchell’s appointmentas his deputy. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_T._Menoher.

8. See Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J.Colorusso, Towards a U.S. Army Of cer Corps Strategy for Success:Developing Talent, Vol. 5 in this monograph series, Carlisle, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2010,p. 13.



9. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

10. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal-agent_problem.

11. Source: “Army Green Pages Pilot Program, Survey ofBOLC B and Captains Career Course Students”, Fort LeonardWood, MO, March 2010. In addition, 97 percent of respondentsbelieve that the creation of detailed of cer job pro les withinunits is “very important” or “somewhat important.”

12. Boyan Jovanovic, “Job Matching and the Theory of Turn-over,” Journal of Political Economy,Vol 87, 1979, p. 974.

13. In our view, the depth and breadth of individual talentgrows during a career. Correspondingly, positions of greater re-sponsibility generally require increasingly speci c talents. Thismeans that the utility of talent matching rises for mid to senior-ranking of cers, although it is bene cial at all levels.

14. All Business, “How Big was the Soviet GDP?” availablefrom www.allbusiness.com/government/630097-1.html. Also seeGordon M. Hahn, “An Autopsy of the Soviet Economy,” Stan-ford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, available fromwww.hoover.org/publications/digest/3540681.html.

15. The Army Education Requirements System (AERS) isgoverned by Army Regulation 621-108. This regulation calls foran annual review and validation of all positions requiring an ad-vanced degree, with approval granted by HRC and the Army G1.

16. Hedonic demand theory suggests that the market willreveal information about the true object of demand through thesupply and demand mechanism. It disaggregates talent into itsconstituent characteristics in an effort to determine the contribu-tory value of each characteristic. In other words, it is the demandfor the characteristic, not the demand for the individual possessing the characteristic, which reveals the valuable information. Seewww.probertencyclopaedia.com/cgi-bin/res.pl?keyword=Demand+Theory&offset=0.



17. Green Pages was chosen as the name for this applicationbecause it evokes the Army while also harkening back to yellowand white pages, sources of information on organizations andindividuals.

18. Green Pages is being piloted with the Engineers becausethe Chief of Engineers requested it. Over the last decade, thebranch has been sorely tested not just by war, but by simultane-ous crises and humanitarian relief missions resulting from natu-ral disasters in the U.S., Asia, the Caribbean, etc. As demand forengineer of cer talent has surged, the Engineers realized that thecurrent way of managing of cers has not allowed them to re-spond as effectively as possible.



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert M. WilliamsCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

AuthorsColonel Casey WardynskiMajor David S. Lyle

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso

Director of PublicationsDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent

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