TOWARDA BETTER BOX

By Andrew Moon

TOWARDA BETTER BOXAN EXAMINATION OF WALMART’S VALUE-DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

TOWARD A BETTER BOX: AN EXAMINATION OF WALMART'S VALUE-DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

Publishing HistoryOriginal thesis version for The University of Texas at Arlington / May 2011Electronic Book for Columns Magazine / November 2011

Copyright © 2011 by Andrew P. Moon Cover and interior book design by Jacob Spence, Graphic Designer

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, scanned, or distributed in any printed or electronic form without permission in writing from the Author. Please do not participate in or encourage piracy of copyrighted materials in violation of the Author's rights.

Every reasonable attempt has been made to identify owners of copyright. Errors or omissions will be corrected in subsequent editions.

Contact the Author at: towardabetterbox@gmail.com

To my wife, Bethany. Your support has been unrelenting, your encouragement is al-ways timely, and your help greatly valued. There have been times when your energy alone has sustained me. You truly make me a better person. Your resilience as a wife, mother, and friend is admirable.

To my son, Ethan. This journey has also been about you. Everything I have done has been to make a better life for our family. Remember, with hard work and determina-tion, you can accomplish more than you can imagine.

Amongthemanyresponsible fortheculminationofthisfinalacademicwork,Imust first recognizemyparents fornotonlycultivatingmyambition toexcel,butalso instilling in me a passion for writing. Each of you has taught me the art of com-munication through the written word. For everything you two have done, I am forever indebted. My committee members have expended much effort to bring this work to frui-tion. Without the support and supervision from Dr. Madan Mehta, Wanda Dye, and Dr.DonalddelCid, the followingpagesmight still be formless andunrefined. Theguidance and counsel I have received over the years from my graduate advisor David Jones and Ana Peredo-Manor has been invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank the Faculty of the School of Architecture for the last four and a half years of architectural education. Myeditorshavealsoplayedasignificant role in thecompletionof thiswork.For many years, the straightforward feedback and honest critique from my father has always been welcome. Linda Mastaglio, a dear friend from my time with Columns Magazine, has been a great source of motivation. MyfirstbossRaymondHarrishasbeentheinspirationbehinddecidingtouseWalmartasthetopicofmyfinalgraduatework.Oneofourfirm’sprincipals,ShadeO’Quinn,helpedtowatertheseedofthisworkbackinJune2010,whenhesharedwith me a great article about Walmart. The enduring encouragement from my close colleagues, co-workers, and friends at Raymond Harris & Associates Architects (RHA) has collectively served as a motivator along the way. The support received from my RHA team for this work has

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

vii

been greatly appreciated. I would like to express my utmost gratitude to the individuals at Walmart who have graciously and willingly offered insight into the inner workings of their company. I thank the following for their time: Don Soderquist, Charles Zimmerman, Doug Bryant, Don Moseley, Mike Webb, Vicki Ingram, and Dana Morrison. I am especially grateful to Russ Owens for his assistance in this process. It has been my experience with count-lessothersattheBentonvilleHomeOfficethathashelpedmetobetterunderstandtheircompany,culture,andultimately,the‘WalmartWay.’

April 15, 2011

viii

With an investigatory approach, this work is an examination of the architecture of Walmart.• By exploring its history and identifying the principles and philosophies thathavemotivatedthecompanyfromitsinception,thisworkwillconfirmthatthesevalueshavecontributedtotheprogressionofWalmart’sArchitecturalTypology.Thiswork will also focus on the future of Walmart in terms of its architectural potential and the challenges it will face as the company continues to expand internationally and shift intourbanareasthroughouttheU.S. ItwilldiscussthecriticismsofWalmart’sarchitecture and explore ways the company has sought to mitigate the negative per-ceptions.Afteracritiqueofitsarchitecture,itisapparentthatWalmart’scorevalueshave led to the development of what can only be described as the prototype for ‘value-drivenarchitecture.’

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree ofMaster of Architecture

Supervising Faculty: Dr. Madan L. Mehta, P.E. Wanda Dye Donald del Cid

•Overtheyears,thefirmhasgonethroughvar-ious name iterations and the current common name is Walmart and will be shown as such throughout this work, unless used in the title of a published work, such as a book or article. Theparentnameofacompanyisverydifficultto change for legal and disclosure reasons, so it will remain as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

ABSTRACT

xi

During his architectural graduate studies at The University of Texas at Arlington, the author has had the fortunate opportunity to work with Raymond Harris & Associ-atesArchitects,anarchitecturefirminDallaswhoseprimaryclientforthelastdecadehas been Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The working relationship with this client is precisely the reason why the author has selected to undertake this area of retail architecture as hisfinalgraduatework. WorkingwithWalmart’s own architectural, design, and construction depart-mentshasaffordedtheauthortherareexperienceofdiscoveringfirsthandtheunique-ness of its architectural processes. It is this experience that has driven the author to examinefurtherthecomplexprocessesbehindWalmart’svalue-drivenarchitecture. BecauseofthesignificantimpactthatWalmarthashadthroughtheyears,bothintermsofitssizeanditsinfluenceontheretailindustry,manyfacetsofitsbusinessmodel and philosophies have been examined and critiqued by academia and activ-ists. Existing research on Walmart has explored varied topics including the poten-tialadaptivereuseopportunitiesofits‘big-box’stores,itseconomicimpactsinruralcommunities, and its sustainable architectural initiatives.• Discussions about Walmart are knowingly sometimes controversial, political, and perhaps divisive among many circles. The challenge for this work is to answer the question: What are the driv-ing forcesbehindWalmart’s architecture thatmake it sounique?TheexaminationofWalmart’svalue-drivenarchitecturehasthepotentialtobenefitboththearchitec-turalpracticeandacademia.ThroughrevealingtheforcesbehindWalmart’sdesign

•JuliaChristensen’sbookBigBoxReuse,Ken-nethStone’sthesison“ImpactofTheWal-MartPhenomenon on Rural Communities,” and Justin Cole’s thesis “Everyday Low Impact:Wal-Mart, LEED, and The Future of the Retail Industry.”

WHY WALMART?

PREFACE

xiii

decision-making process, both practitioners and educators will become more aware of the complexities involved in working for one of the largest corporations in the world, as well as its impact on our built environment. Prototypical architecture such as that used by Walmart is what makes up much of the American built and newly constructed everyday landscape. Therefore, it is critical to understand the inner workings of this retailgiant,orwhatmightbecalledthe‘WalmartWay’ofArchitecture. As with other branded buildings within the retail sector, the Architecture of Walmart is considered trademarked commercial architecture and details of its pro-cess are protected. While the author has an understanding of, and access to, the company’sarchitecturalconstructiondocuments,floorplans,andotherdata,thesetypesofspecificdocumentationandproprietaryinformationwillnotbediscussedaspart of this work.

xiv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

WALMART’S BEGINNINGS

WALMART’S REAL ESTATE

WALMART’S ARCHITECTURE

WALMART’S FUTURE

(MIS)PERCEPTIONS AND CRITICISMS

CONCLUSION

RECOMMENDATIONS

REFERENCES

ENDNOTES

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CONTENTS

xvii

InhisbookTheWal-MartWay,DonSoderquist,thecompany’sretiredSeniorViceChairman,formerChiefOperatingOfficer,andproclaimed‘keeperoftheculture,’intimately describes the way Walmart does business. From the importance of com-pany culture to dealing with suppliers, from its merchandising to customer service, he explains that Walmart has always been compelled by its core values and strong be-liefs.1Despitethecompany’sabilitytoimplementchangequickly,itistheadherencetoitsprinciplesthatdemonstratesthe‘WalmartWay’ofarchitecture. Unlike most companies, Walmart takes a unique approach to architecture. The sheer size of the giant retailer, as well as the business principles behind its architec-turalphilosophy,arguablymakesWalmartthemostinfluentialpowerintoday’sretailsector of the architecture and construction industry. More than any other company, the ideas, strategies, and processes utilized by Walmart continue to revolutionize retail architecture. It is imperative to understand how Walmart does architecture in order toapplythebenefits(aswellasdiscoverthedrawbacks)ofthisprototypeforvalue-driven architecture to other retail design models. Walmart has continued to adapt through the continual development and imple-mentation of its store prototype program and its unwavering commitment to sus-tainabilityandinternationalexpansion.InexaminingtheevolutionofWalmart’sarchi-tecturalphilosophy,thisworkwillsuggestthatthecompany’ssuccessisnotonlyatestament to the integral role its architectural model has played in its rise to dominance in the market, but will also offer evidence that there is something profound behind its architectural decisions.

INTRODUCTION: WALMART AS A COMPANY

xix

Figure 0.1 Areas within 20 miles of a Walmart store in the U.S.2

Asillustratedhere,ZookandGrahaminformthat:“fully60percentoftheentireU.S.populationliveswithin5milesofaWalmartlocationand96percentarewithin20miles.”3 It can be stated that almost every reader of this work has been inside Walmart Architecture.IfWalmartwereacountry,itwouldbetheworld’s26thlargesteconomy,just behind Austria.4 According to the 2008 Census Bureau data, the U.S. government employs 2,518,101 total full- time workers.5 In contrast, the Arkansas-based company is the largest private-sector employer in the world, with nearly 2 million workers; 1.4 million of who are in the United States.6 In terms of sales revenue, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.doesmorebusiness than thenextsix topU.S. retailers–Kroger,Target,Wal-greens, The Home Depot, Costco, and CVS – combined.7Walmart’stwodatacenterslocatednearitsBentonvilleHomeOfficecollectenoughinformationtorivalthatoftheU.S. Department of Defense.8

According to its corporate website, at press time Walmart presently operates 8,986totalunitsintheUnitedStates,PuertoRico,and15othercountries.Thatisanaverage of more than 182 new stores each year since the founding nearly 50 years ago.Thecompany’s2010AnnualReport listsoverall retailsalesreached$405bil-lion,whiletheWalmart InternationalDivision“exceeded$100billion innetsalesforthefirsttimeincompanyhistory,growing11.2%onaconstantcurrencybasis.”9 This translatestotheastonishingstatisticthatthecompany’srevenueseffectivelyexceedtheGrossDomesticProductof160oftheworld’scountries.10 As a company, Walmart holdsthedistinctionofbeingChina’s8th largesttradingpartner.11 According to the studybyZookandGraham,thecompany’sgrosssaleswerelargerthanallbuttwen-ty-threecountries’economies–biggerthanSaudiArabia,Norway,andPoland.12

On a weekly basis, Walmart stores serve more than 200 million customers,13 almosttwo-thirdsofthecurrentU.S.population.“Aleaderinsustainability,corporatephilanthropyandemploymentopportunity,”Walmart rankedfirstamongretailers inFortunemagazine’s2010MostAdmiredCompaniessurvey.14 In 2010, the company rankedfirst in the retail industryandninthoverall,andwasconsideredamong themost innovative companies in the United States by Fast Company magazine.15

HOW BIG IS WALMART?

xx

TOWARDA BETTER BOX

Figure 1.1 Sam Walton, founder of Walmart.1

3

To understand the evolution of Walmart’s Architectural Philosophy, it is impor-tant the reader know the history, the story, and the life of Walmart’s founder, Sam Wal-ton. This contextual historical introduction into what Sam called the “Walmart World”2 is crucial in fully understanding the factors that have driven its architecture. It is also important for the reader to set aside preconceived notions of what they think Walmart is and stands for, and how they think the company has affected the lives of Ameri-cans. Good or bad, positive or negative, it is not the sole intent of this work to discuss the politics behind Walmart. It is an examination of how this retail corporation does architecture, how its business model and values drive that process, and what one can learn from Walmart’s unique model. In1962,SamWaltonopenedthefirstWal-MartinRogers,Arkansas.BecauseofWalton’shardworkandvision,his‘Five-and-Dime’BenFranklinfranchisedstoreshad grown into a successful discount chain. With visions of increased expansion, Walton’sfirststorewouldsoonbecomeoneofthelargestretailchainsintheworld. In his autobiographical book, Walton gives the details of the early beginnings of this American retail icon. In describing what drove the founding of the company, he explains:

As I do look back though, I realize that ours is a story about the kinds of tradi-tional principles that made America great in the first place. It is a story about entrepreneurship, and risk, and hard work, and knowing where you want to go and being willing to do what it takes to get there. It’s a story about believing

1 WALMART’S BEGINNINGS

A HISTORY OF VALUES

4

in your idea even when maybe some other folks don’t, and about sticking to your guns. But I think more than anything it proves there’s absolutely no limit to what plain, ordinary working people can accomplish if they’re given the op-portunity and the encouragement and the incentive to do their best.3

Walmart’s story is unique, an anomaly in the history of retailing, an anomaly is the historyofbusiness,and,ultimately,ananomalythathasgreatly influencedthewayAmericanRetailArchitectureisdesigned. Several books describe the effects Walmart has had on society in general or how the company developed its merchandising scheme – insider accounts of its price modeling, logistics, culture, etc. Walton himself espoused the company’s perception ofhowitsarchitecture–thestoreitself–could,anddoes,reflectthesecorevalues.Walton’s view of his company and in many ways its architecture, focused around three core principles tied closely to the company’s mission:

·RespectfortheIndividual · Service to the Customer · Striving for Excellence4

Each of these three principles, in its own way, has impacted various aspects of Walmart’sarchitecture,butultimatelytheyhavealwayscomebacktothefulfillmentofone goal: the needs of the customer. It has been the utilization of the ‘big-boxes’ that allowsWalmarttoefficientlyserveitsshoppers. According to Walmart’s corporate history, by 1962, Sam “became convinced that American consumers wanted a new type of store.”5 During his experience work-ing for JC Penney, Walton cultivated his fascination and love of the retailing busi-ness.By1945,hehadopened,owned,andoperatedtheBenFranklinvarietystoreinNewport, Arkansas. The ongoing process of generating revenue, store development, fixturing,merchandising,andday-to-dayoperationsforcedWaltontobecomeanex-pertineveryareaofretailing.Evenadversityhaditsbenefits,asWaltonrespondedtothe constraints placed on him by his franchisor by developing his own retail strategies. For example, seeking independent suppliers and developing a revolutionary pricing philosophy became critical parts of Walton’s reinventing the retail experience for cus-tomers. Atthetime,RuralAmericawasseekingwaystolivemorefrugally.Yet,inlivingmore economically, people still wanted ways to live better. Therefore, his approach

5

filledavoidinthemarketandprovidedadifferentpricingandprofitmethodologythatbecameknownasdiscounting.Ratherthanexaminingpricemargin,Waltonlookedatquantity,orvolume,asameasureofpotentialprofitability.Ifhecouldsellmoreata lower price margin, he would ultimately make more. That price difference could be passed to the customer, rather than inflate the company’s profits.Waltonwasnot alone in experimenting with this pricing strategy. Three other companies start-eddiscountchains thesameyearWaltonopenedhis firstWalmartstore. In1962,F.W.WoolworthopeneditsWoolcochain,S.S.KresgeestablishedK-Mart,andtheDayton-Hudson Corporation (formerly known as Dayton Dry Goods) began its Target chain.Thisyear isknownasthebirthoftheModernAmericanRetail Industry.Fewcould argue, given the fact that these retail powerhouses have profoundly affected this sectoroverthepastfiftyyears. AccordingtoWalton,“thatlittleBenFranklinstore”6starteditall.Becauseofanoversightintheleasecontract,helostthestoreafterfiveyears.Butultimatelythatlossresulted in teaching Walton a valuable lesson. He now understood the importance of controlling his own real estate. This realization would later become a basic tenet in how Walmart handles its portfolio. In his book, Walton explains how he overcame this setback when, in 1950, he became aware that a neighboring town needed a discount store. Walton’s wife, Helen, describesherfirstimpressionsofthesmalltownthatwouldsoonbecometheMeccaof the discount retailing industry and home of ‘Walmart World’:

Bentonville really was just a sad-looking country town, even though it had a railroad track to it... I remember I couldn’t believe this was where we were going to live. It only had 3,000 people, compared to Newport, which was a thriving cotton and railroad town of 7,000 people. The store was a small old country town store with cans of lace, boxes of hats, sewing patterns, every-thing you can imagine just stored around everywhere.7

NamedWalton’sFive-and-Dime,thestorewasactuallyaBenFranklinfranchise,andreceived the majority of merchandise through its franchise system. This frustrated Walton, so he always looked for ways to get around the mandates and restrictions placed on him by the larger parent company. He wanted to take control of the pro-cess, placing orders directly with the suppliers in order to negotiate all prices. The frustration with lack of control was one factor that fueled Walton’s desire to start up

Figure 1.2 Walton’s Five-and-Dime variety store in Bentonville, Arkansas.8

6

his own company and network of doing business his way. It is important to note that Walton’s stores were always unconventional. He merchandised differently, held promotions differently, and above all, conducted busi-ness very differently than other retail stores of his day. His focus was the practical shopping experience for rural America, not the extravagant downtown experience of bigdepartmentstoresincitieslikeNewYork,Chicago,orDallas.Asnoted,itwasthis“small-town strategy that got Walmart going two decades later.”9

Earlyon,duringtheday-to-dayoperationsofWalton’sBentonvillestore(asseenin Figure 1.2), he would test various retail strategies to see how the customer reacted, andwhatwouldultimatelyaffectthebottomline.Hisprofitabilitywasdeterminedbyhow the merchandise looked, how the customer was treated, and how well groomed his Associates (employees) were. All of this mattered to Walton, but in the end it was about the customer’s experience while they shopped. By1952,Waltonexpandedtoneighboringtownstotesthisideas.Manyyearslater,helookedbacktoWalton’sFive-and-DimeinBentonvilleasoneofthoseadven-tures in expanding his newfound approach to retailing:

This store was ahead of its time too, self-service all the way, unlike the com-petition. This was the beginning of our way of operating for a long while to come. We were innovating, experimenting, and expanding. Somehow over the years, folks have gotten the impression that Walmart was something I dreamed up out of the blue as a middle-aged man, and that it was just this great idea that turned into an overnight success. It’s true that I was forty-four when we opened our first Walmart in 1962, but the store was totally an out-growth of everything we’d been doing since Newport – another case of me being unable to leave well enough alone, another experiment. And like most other overnight successes, it was about twenty years in the making.10

Overthenextdecade,Waltonrefinedhisretailstrategies.Herecallsthatasheopened eachlocationfortheFive-and-Dimestores,theywouldtakeoff“likeahousefire.”11 This success encouraged expansion to more regional locations. Walton states: “I was drivingtoomuchtohavetimeforanythingelse.SoIbegantowonderifmaybeflyingwouldn’t be the way to go.”12 This was the beginning of the legendary Walton aviation storiesandperhapsasignificantfactorthatexplainssomeofWalmart’searlyquickgrowtharoundtheOzarkRegion.Inhisbook,Waltonrecountshowhewasableto

Figure 1.3 Walmart store opening, 1976.16

7

study the movement of cities and the growth of rural towns from an aerial view. This top down view allowed Walton to see where growth was happening in his region. Although one could also refer to demographic studies and the census, this immedi-ate witnessing of growth was tactical and strategic in that Walton could respond and expand immediately.13ThisexercisegreatlybenefitedWalmartinthelongrun.Waltonused what could be compared to an early city-planning exercise to predict and cap-turegrowthtrends.StudyingtheflightaerialsallowedWaltontoforecastwheretobuyreal estate for the company’s next location. As Walton later explained, “Once I took to the air, I caught store fever.”14 At this time, there were countless retailers doing similar things. Walton longed to learn as much as possible about his potential competition. He recalls this in his book:

I began to hear talk of the early discounters – companies like Ann & Hope, whose founder, Marty Chase, is generally considered the father of discount-ing. Spartan’s and Mammoth Mart and Two Guys from the Northeast... So I started running all over the country, studying the concept from the mill stores in the East to California, where Sol Price started his Fed-Mart in 1955.15

This early concept of discounting was on the forefront of Walton’s mind as he moved forward with his idea of one day starting his own chain of stores. He was mindful of the bottom line, trying to cut costs in any way possible. Walton found a way to cut costs in the naming of his company. He realized that the less letters to purchase and light for signage, the less material and power the company would have to pay, and ultimately the savings could be passed on to the customer. Therefore Walton’s Five-and-Dime wasshortenedtoW-A-L-M-A-R-T. After many years of trial-and-error and experimentation in Walton’s discount retailstrategies,thefirstWalmartstorewasopenedonJuly2,1962inRogers,Arkan-sas.Waltonrecountsthat“nobodywantedtogambleonthatfirstWalmart,”17 so he personallyfinanced95percenttolaunchthefirststoreinRogers.WhileWalmartasWalton recalls, swam “upstream”18duringthefirstfewyears,manybelieveditwouldeventually meet its demise. However, with the traction in the market he had gained from opening two other stores in nearby locations, Springdale and Harrison, Wal-ton was convinced he was onto something. He later recalls an important lesson he learnedfromthefirststores:

Table 1.1 Walmart U.S. Store Growth and Revenue, 1970 – 1980.20

YEAR

197019721974197619781980

STORES

325178125195276

STATES

55891011

$

REVENUE(IN THOUSANDS)

30,86278,014

167,561340,331678,456

1,248,176

8

After a lifetime of swimming upstream, I am convinced that one of the real se-crets to Walmart’s phenomenal success has been that very tendency. Many of our best opportunities were created out of necessity. The things that we were forced to learn and do, because we started out underfinanced and un-dercapitalized in these remote, small communities, contributed mightily to the way we’ve grown as a company. Had we been capitalized, or had we been the offshoot of a large corporation the way I wanted to be, we might not ever have tried the Harrisons or the Rogers or the Springdales and all those other little towns we went into in the early days. It turned out that the first big lesson we learned was that there was much, much more business out there in small-town America than anybody, including me, had ever dreamed of.19

Over the next decade, Walmart continued to grow, and by 1969 Walton returned to Newport and opened Store Number 18. The 1970s brought tremendous growth for Walmart. In hindsight, one can see this was by far one of the company’s strongest periods. Under Walton’s leadership, Walmart grew exponentially during this time:

In 1971, to fuel this unprecedented expansion, Walton implemented the next major stepinhiscommunity-basedretailingstrategy–theopeningofthefirstWalmartdis-tribution center. The success of this source-and-supply strategy made a huge con-tribution that would not only fuel continued growth, but also feed on it. This concept of Walmart’s network of distribution centers and logistics-driven architecture can be seenlaterasapivotalforceinitsarchitecturaldevelopmentandoperationalefficiency. In 1972, just two years after the publicly held company began selling shares over-the-counter;WalmartbegantradingontheNewYorkStockExchange.Walton

9

had access to the resource he had worked for all along – a seemingly endless supply of inexpensive capital to continue growth. According to accounts in his book, “the Walton family only held 61 percent of Walmart after that day.”21 Other retailers during this time were astounded by such growth. Walton recalls, “Wewouldbeputtinginfiftystoresayear,whenmostofourgroupwouldbetryingtostartthree,four,five,orsixayear.”22 As the company began to approach the end of the 1970s, Walton began to assemble a team of individuals that would spur the company into a new decade of more unprecedented growth. The1980ssawthecontinued refinementof the inventorymodel through thegrowth of the sophisticated network of distribution centers, merchandising, and technology-based areas of the company. During this decade Walmart Architecture evolved from the small-format discount store to the ‘big-box,’ culminating into the openingof the larger ‘supercenter’model in1988 inWashington,Missouri.Duringthis time Walmart also completed the implementation of the largest private satellite communication system in the world, which ultimately linked all stores back to the company’sHomeOfficeinBentonville,Arkansas.23 This system also allowed further monitoringofthestores’sales,profitability,andshipping,aswellascoordinationofallstores for company-wide training and meetings. In his article on the logistics side of Walmart, Jesse LeCavalier describes the process in detail.24 It is important to realize that Walmart was not necessarily the pioneering prototype in the discounting distribu-tion system; it just may be the only company that truly mastered the process. Walton notesthatbythelate-seventies,“mostoftheseguys[Kuhn’sBigK,Sterling’sMagicMart,andDuckwall]alreadyhaddistributioncentersandsystemsinplace.”25MorewillbedescribedinsubsequentchaptersonhowthiswasspecificallyexecutedthroughWalmart’s value-driven architecture. In April 1992, Sam Walton passed away, leaving many to suspect that, without Walton’s leadership, the success and future of the company would diminish. However, Walton did not just leave a legacy for the discount retail industry; he left a competent managementteam,astrongfinancialbase,andastrongcompanyculturethatwouldcontinuetocarrytheresilientcompanyforward.By1995,Walmarthadenteredallfiftystates and was continuing to experience tremendous growth, especially with the new-est grocery supercenter prototype. Additionally, the mid-90s saw an increase of the architectural stock not only at home, but also abroad. While 1991 marked the start of Walmart’sfirststoreoutsidetheUnitedStates,bytheendofthemillennium,Walmart

Table 1.2 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Store Growth and Revenue, 1980-2011.27

YEAR

19801985199019952000200520102011

STORES

276756

1,5252,7843,9835,2898,4168,986

$

REVENUE(IN THOUSANDS)

1,248,1766,400,861

25,810,65682,494,000

165,000,000285,222,000405,046,000419,000,000 28•

•

10

Therecently-released2011fiscalyear-endfiguresshowWalmartcurrentlyop-erates 4,573 international stores under numerous names and brands, while Walmart U.S. stores total 3,805 units and 608 Sam’s Clubs.29

This historic perspective serves as the pathway to bring clarity to the architec-tural decisions and directions that will be examined in the following chapters.

was operating facilities in Germany and the United Kingdom.26

In2005,Walmartlaiddownasignificantchallengetotheretailsectorofthein-dustrywithitsfirstpubliccommitmenttosustainableinitiativesinallareasofthecom-pany. This commitment had a profound effect on its architectural division. With CEO H. Lee Scott, Jr. leading the way, a pledge of sustainability thrust the world’s largest procurer of architectural services to the forefront. This period marked a milestone in theindustryasWalmartcommittedtosharealltechnologicalandresearchfindingswith all architectural practices.

• Figures given include all formats (Walmart stores, Sam’s Club, and International stores).

•Detailedfiscalyeardataisduetobereleasedon June 3, 2011. Preliminary figure given oncorporate website.

Figure 1.4 One of the original Five-and-Dime variety stores, circa 1950 (left). Later, it was converted to Walton’s Family Center. Opening day at Store Number 1 in Rogers, Arkansas, 1962 (right). 30

11

Figure 1.5 Walmart store, 1980. 31

The feeling our customers have when they leave our stores determines how soon they will be back. —Sam Walton

A PICTORAL GUIDE TO WALMART’S ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY

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Figure 1.6 Walmart store, 1984.32

Figure 1.7 Walmart store, 1984.33

Figure 1.8 Sam’s Wholesale Club, late 1980s.34

13

Figure 1.9 Walmart ‘Division 1’ store in Martell, California.35 •

Figure 1.10 Typical Walmart discount store from the early-1990s.36

Figure 1.11 Typical Walmart Supercenter from the 1990s.37

• The term Division 1 (or Div 1) began in 1962 when Walmart’s first stores were discountstores. As of today, there are 709 units through-out the U.S., utilizing an average of 108,000 square feet of shopping space, and employing approximately 225 associates at each location.

14

Figure 1.12 Walmart store in Los Angles, California, a converted Macy’s store. 38 •

Figure 1.13 Walmart Supercenter in Longmont, Colorado, 2007.39

Figure 1.14 Walmart Supercenter in Dallas, Texas, 2007.40

•LocatedintheBaldwinHills,thisuniquemulti-story Walmart serves a vibrant community within the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

15

Figure 1.15 Walmart in Indiana, 2010.41

Figure 1.16 Sam’s Club in Rapid City, South Dakota, 2011.42

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Figure 1.17 Walmart Store, 2011.43

Figure 1.18 Walmart in College Station, Texas – an expansion of a smaller ‘Division 1’ store.44

Figure 1.19 Walmart in Leavensworth, Kansas – 2011 prototypical store.45

19

Understanding Walmart’s architecture requires knowledge of the real estate and property management aspects of the company’s business model. Questions to be addressed are:

· How does such a large commercial real estate owner in the U.S. operate? · How does its ownership of buildings affect their view of architecture? · How do they deal with surplus sites?

Before examining Walmart’s architecture, it is important to understand the large quan-tity of Walmart’s real estate holdings, how they deal with these properties, and how the company’s philosophies and strategies on ownership use and management have evolved over the years.

InWalmart’sfirstannualreportasapubliccompanyin1972,Waltonoutlinedthesignificantaccomplishmentsoftheyear.1 It was in that year that Walmart estab-lishedaRealEstateandConstructionDivision.Thisdivisionoversaw thefinancingand construction of building projects, with the addition of 14 new stores that year, bringing the company’s store total to 51. This division was tasked with laying the groundworkforWalmart,adding14newstoresin1972andexpandingthecompany’s

[Walmart’s] business involves more than just kitchen appliances, apparel, and electronics – it involves real estate. — Leah Garris

BY THE NUMBERS

2 WALMART’S REAL ESTATE

Figure 2.1 Walmart stores opening on ‘target,’ 1977.6

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presence into the four-state Ozark region, referred to as the “magic circle” – Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma.2 This new store development program within the newly formed Walmart Properties, Inc. became the foundation that allowed for the significantgrowthWalmartexperiencedearlyon. Significantgroundworkwasalso laidduringthattimeto implementthebasictenets of the company’s growth philosophy of expanding concentrically from the Ben-tonville,Arkansashomeoffice.Walton’soriginalconceptwastoonlyexpandwithin300milesofitsBentonvilledistributioncenter.3 It was this early concentric growth that gaveWalmartasignificantadvantageoveritscompetitorsasitallowedmorefocusina concentrated region, rather than spreading the business too thin. Perhaps more out of business practicality than guiding architectural principle, the concept of concentric growthplayedasignificantroleinthefutureexpansionofitsstores.InaninterviewwithSoderquist,theformerChiefOperatingOfficerexplains:

This isn’t much architecture strategy at all, but our growth philosophy if you looked at it through the years – Bentonville was the center of our universe and we would build out from where we were, and then we would go fill in and as we filled in we would build a warehouse to service customers there, and then build out and fill in with a new warehouse. So, that was our strategy all the way to the east coast and the west coast, whereas the Targets and the K-Marts started in Minneapolis then went to Denver, then Chicago. [They] tended to focus more on larger cities. And part of that is customer service, as we wanted our warehouse to be as close to our stores as they could be and we wanted our stores as close as possible for the convenience of our customer.4

As Soderquist describes, Walmart focused its growth on the area it knew best, the areadirectlyneighboringitsHomeOffice.5 This also allowed the company to serve the original market of small, rural towns as part of its business philosophy. As Walmart grew, this concentrated growth around a single hub was critical in terms of networking allofthestores.Theconceptofconcentricgrowthwasevidentasearlyas1977inthecompany’sAnnualReportasseeninFigure2.1.ThroughthisnetworkingstrategyeveryWalmartiscontrolledandmonitoredbythecentralofficesinBentonville.Fromthis central hub in northern Arkansas, the company is able to observe and control virtually every aspect its stores’ operations, from energy consumption and usage, to inventorycontrol,fromsalestracking,tothenotificationofstoremanagementifadairy

Figure 2.2 Total area of Manhattan (Central Park shown highlighted) com-pared to sales floor area of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.8

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cooler door is accidentally left open. In a presentation entitled, “The Big Green Box,” principal Shade O’Quinn of Raymond Harris & Associates Architect describes Walmart’s size in terms of how big the company is compared to the competitors. Making up approximately one-third of the entire retail industry, Walmart is undoubtedly the world’s largest retailer. In terms of the total square footage, Walmart stores collectively exceed the entire landmass of Manhattan Island.7 New York’s most densely populated island has a land massof640,088,084ft2(22.96mi2),whileWalmart’sU.S.storestotal695,824,614ft2

(24.96mi2) and combined with its Walmart International stores, total almost 1 billion ft2 of building space. By the shear number of stores and land it now owns, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., or the Walmart Real Estate Business Trust is one of the largest commer-cial real estate owners in the country.9

In examining and analyzing the methodology of how Walmart manages its storesandrealestate,atrendbegantoappear,whichhasbeenconfirmedbyfurtherresearch and in talking with individuals within the current Walmart Realty Division (onceknownasWalmartProperties, Inc.). Thereare three stagesof evolution forWalmartRealEstate:first,Walmartasatenant,Walmartasanownerandoperator,and Walmart as a real estate development company.

WALMART AS TENANT

Mainly due to lack of initial capital as a start-up company, Walmart was forced in the beginning to work with investment groups to raise enough capital for growth opportunities. As Walmart expanded, it was imperative to be mindful of costs. “Being extremely control and expense conscious starting with our construction program all the way through our entire operating structure,” Sam Walton explained.10 Therefore, Walmarthadtoestablishauniquefinancingmechanismtofuelitsdevelopment. Again,by1972,thecompanymaintainedonedistributioncenterinBentonvilleand32stores, comprisedof14ofWalton’soriginal variety storesnow functioningunder Walmart’s control. In the following year, Walton outlined the company’s inten-tiontoconstruct14newstoreswithsomebeingfinancedusingwhatwouldbecomea successful program by which Walmart could raise the capital to fund its building

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WALMART REAL ESTATE

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projects. Six of those 14 stores were constructed using the sale and lease-back ar-rangement. Mike Webb, Real Estate Manager for Walmart Realty, explains:

Up until the 1980s, we probably leased 90% of our stores. We used any avail-able capital to purchase merchandise for the stores that we leased. In the 1980s, we transitioned from being a lessee into buying our sites, and building our own buildings. It also gave us more control in getting our stores [opened] quicker. Then, we would sell a block of our stores in a sale lease-back pro-gram to an investment group like Ohio Teachers Retirement. They owned more of our stores than anyone in the 1980s.11

As summarized by Mr. Webb, Walmart continued leasing the buildings through the 1970s. Thispracticeallowedthegrowingcompanythe freedomto focusonotherpriorities such as serving customers and building supplier relationships. At this pe-riod in Walmart’s history, the company was not interested in owning the buildings or developing a large collection of real estate. However, as time went on, Walmart grew significantlyandwaslookingforawaytohavecontroloverthegrowth.Theimpactof owning real estate would also provide the company the freedom to create its own architectural identity.

WALMART AS OWNER

By1980,Walmarthadbecomeabillion-dollarcompany.Thissignificantmile-stone affectedWalmart’s approach to both real estate and architecture. In 1983,Sam’s Club was established and Walmart Realty assumed control of its real estate. Throughout the1990suntil themid-2000s,Walmartcontinuedthesaleand lease-back program with great success. It was the period of explosive growth during the early1990sthatencouragedanewstrategy,atransitiontopositionsofpropertyown-ership. Understanding its own success at running the operations and logistics side of the company, Walmart now had the capacity to run the business side of its architec-ture; that is its real estate. It also viewed ownership as the best long-term approach to handling its building portfolio. Duringthisstageofgrowth,Walmart’stotalstorenumberwentfrom276storesatyear-end1980to1,402operatingunitsby1990. Exponentialgrowth, fueledbythe success and viability of its ‘supercenter’ concept, added to Walmart’s interest in seeking ownership over tenancy in terms of its real estate. Tony Fuller, Senior Vice-

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President of Walmart Realty explains:

As we were growing our new-store program, we became a company that wanted to own the real estate, and we weren’t as involved in lease arrange-ments. So, the real estate component became more significant for us as a company.12

ThiswasthekeyfactorthatdroveWalmarttorefinetheentireapproachtorealestate.

WALMART AS REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

While Walmart is most notably known as a discount retailer, it has continued with the internal operation of the real estate and asset management divisions of the company. Currently, according to a source within Walmart Realty, the company owns approximately 90 percent of its U.S. stores and no longer participates in the saleand lease-back arrangement with investors.13 Walmart had transitioned from lessee to owner to a complete real estate development company. It had taken years to distill a process that has evolved to assure total control over the construction and land dispo-sition programs. One of the key components in this process was developing a cohesive phi-losophy as to how to deal with its surplus sites and excess property adjacent to the stores. The division responsible for these properties is now known as Walmart Realty. Itsprimaryfunction“concentratesonthedisposition(throughsale,lease,and/orsub-lease) and management of soon-to-be-vacated Walmart and Sam’s Club facilities.”14 WalmartRealty’s coremission is twofold – first, through its buildingdevelopment,this organization seeks to repurpose the buildings left vacant primarily from store relocation; and second, through its land development. Walmart Realty seeks both lo-calandnationalestablishmentstopurchaseits‘outlots’(pad-sites)fordevelopment.Essentially, “WalmartRealtydealswith excess space, findingnewuses for formerWalmart stores.”15 According to its website, the Walmart Realty team and Store Plan-ning Group, the departments responsible for opening and renovating stores, are part of one of the world’s largest real estate companies.16 One of Walmart’s greatest chal-lenges is to strike a balance between being a good neighbor to the community and the perception that the giant retailer will ultimately drive many of the ‘mom-and-pop’ shops out of business.

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Over the years, the Real Estate and Construction Division, Walmart Realty, once known as Walmart Properties, Inc., has evolved into a powerful real estate organiza-tion.Inthe1990s,executiveTonyFullerfurtherdescribedWalmart’sdesiretostudyother organizations to determine the best management practices of other real estate development companies. By 1995, Walmart formulated and assembled what became the current structure of its real estate development company. According to Garris, “by bringing in economic development and ‘alternative-use’ experts, the division came to life.”17 Understanding the need to convert and repurpose many of the stores, con-structionexpertsineveryfieldwerebroughtintosite-adaptstoresforfuturetenants.In addition, a marketing team was assembled to ‘position [Walmart Realty] to grow as a company,’ Fuller explains.18 Currently, the Walmart Realty team has grown to more than2,500 individualsand includesaccountants, architectsandotherdesignpro-fessionals,realestatemanagers,attorneys,maintenancecrews,engineers,financialanalysts, HVAC and refrigeration technicians, and store planning experts. This inter-disciplinary approach can take the ‘dark stores’ from purchase or lease all the way to completion of a renovation for a new tenant or owner by streamlining the process in-house. The Walmart Realty team transformed from a smaller team of property man-agement personnel to a large team of various industry experts, thus succeeding in having total control over the financial outcomesof its real estate investments. TheWalmart value-driven approach, as explained by Garris, is executed, “by establishing a procedure and knowing that procedure inside and out [and] real estate transactions movesmoothlyandefficiently–aqualitythatcustomersappreciate.”19 Essentially, the real estate is just another discounted product Walmart offers to the cus-tomers and financial success for its investors. According to Carole Baker, Director of Land Development at Walmart Realty:

We’re always looking for additional service and retail concepts that would be complementary and would create a convenient shopping experience for our customers... If we can create complementary uses that reflect the needs of our customers and bring quality developments into the communities where we are growing, then that’s why we exist.20

WalmartRealtyundoubtedlyexiststofulfillauniqueroleinthecompanyasithandles its most vital public image – the buildings, the architecture – this is Walmart’s iden-

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tity. Since the ‘big- box’ retail concept, as well as the perception of driving out small privately-owned retailers, is what incites some of the disdain for what Walmart stands for, this key division continues to work through highly politicized incidents in jurisdic-tions around the U.S. In recent years, Walmart and its divisions have taken concerted action to repurpose the ‘dark stores,’ establish more sustainable design practices, and give back to the communities through service. Walmart has developed a highly sophisticated organization to manage its growing portfolio of real estate. Fuller is con-fidentishisteam’sabilities,saying“WalmartRealtyiscertainitwillbeabletohandlewhatever the future may hold – whether it involves new ways of marketing available properties, acquiring more square footage to sell and lease, or becoming even more enmeshed in the commercial real estate industry.”21

Walmart Realty’s network of people outside the company extends well beyond many local and regional brokers enlisted to sell, lease, and develop the surplus sites for repurposing of existing structures. The division is involved in countless national real estateaffiliatedorganizationsincludingtheInternationalCouncilofShoppingCenters,the Urban Land Institute, and the International Economic Development Council, the Southern Economic Development Council, local and state jurisdictional authorities and economic development agencies, CoreNet Global, the International Association of Corporate Real Estate Executives, and local utility providers.22 Fuller explains that approximately three-fourths ofWalmart’s excess property (land) and buildings arelisted with local brokers, since they are more familiar with local markets and con-nected to the region. Walmart embraces the accomplishments of the outside broker-age community and forms the team of experts every successful real estate company must possess. The fact that one of Walmart’s basic principles is growth, leads this divisiontohavesignificantrealestateprospects.Fulleraccentuatesthispointbysay-ing, “We’re a tremendous growth company...this [philosophy] created opportunities for us.”23

Figure 3.1 Walmart’s current prototypi-cal store entry, 2011.1

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What is the Architecture of Walmart? What drives the decisions behind the value- driven architecture prototype? There are many prejudices and preconceptions among architects, citizens, academics and activists about Walmart’s ‘Big-Box Archi-tecture’ and its ‘big company monopolizing’ business practices. In this work, these prejudices and preconceptions about Walmart’s architecture will be reevaluated and, where lacking in credible supporting data, questioned as legitimate criticisms. It is Walmart’s tenet that every store is designed, planned, funded, and eventually built based upon, and to fulfill, the core values and desires of its customers and its inves-tors. Walmart, through its value-driven architecture, must be financially successful for the company to continue to grow and serve its customers. Walmart’s architec-tural strategies, practices, and goals are set to achieve value to its shoppers and to the company, as well as value to the community and environment. The architectural practices of Walmart are what drive its design decisions. It is the critical examination of these decisions, in their successes and failures, and the repercussions of each result, which will serve as compelling information for both architectural practices and academic understanding. For Walmart, the need for a building emanates from the basic function of serv-

Each Walmart store should reflect the values of its customers and support the vision they hold for their community. —Sam Walton

THE ‘WALMART WAY’

3 WALMART’S ARCHITECTURE

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ing its customers. Because of Walmart’s commitment to its founding and guiding values and principles as laid out within its business model, its architecture is dictated by the need to house the object of its customer relationship: its merchandise. This is essentially the goal of every retailer, whether a giant national franchise or small inde-pendently owned business. A basic tenet of retail architecture is to have a place to store, display, and promote the product. There are varied degrees of how a company employs an architect to visualize, conceptualize, and construct buildings. All retail architecture must serve the purpose of successfully moving merchandise efficiently and effectively. In order to provide financial savings to the customer and financial success to the investors, Walmart’s strategies behind value-driven architecture are implemented to keep the structures simple, functional, flexible, and above all, economical. This may override the way the structure affects the quality of the built environment. Successful retail companies must adapt to changes in trends, new products, new merchandise, etc. As its founder Walton understood that in order to be successful and meet the company’s financial goals as well as pass the savings to the customers, the buildings would have to be stripped down to the most functional form. Walmart never desired to have great buildings, just as the hypermarchés of Eu-rope were never intended to create an iconic statement. The buildings, however, were functional and sought to meet the client’s desire and the need for saving money. It has been these on-going efforts, driven by core principles of cost savings, which has made Walmart one of the most successful companies in the world. Through the use of multiple strategies in increasing value to the customer and the investors, it is this process of doing architecture that has come to be called value-driven architecture.

Significant milestones make up Walmart’s nearly fifty years of architectural his-tory. These include influences resulting from the company’s overall growth, gener-ic retailing trends, and competitors’ experiments. While there is also evidence that Walmart has benefited from the seemingly natural gravitation toward the ‘one-stop

Walmart has built its empire by deploying a selection of pre-designed, pro-prietary building types and adapting these to local requirements. —Jesse Cavalier

WALMART’S ARCHITECTURAL EVOLUTION

DIV 1 51

DIV 1 80

DIV 1 114

DIV 1 116

DIV 1 120

DIV 1 138

Figure 3.2 Walmart ‘Division 1’ store prototypes. 3

• LED (light-emitting diode) is a semiconductor light source. Originally introducted as a practi-cal electronic component in 1962, LEDs can be found in many common household electronics. LEDs present many advantages over incan-descent light sources including lower energy consumption, longer lifetime, improved robust-ness, smaller size, faster switching, and greater durability and reliability. (Source: Wikipedia).

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shopping’ experience over the last two decades, it has always been the attitude of its founder to never give up on making the company better. Whether it be the continual development of its architectural prototype or research into the latest LED technology,•

Walmart can be seen striving to refine not only its image, but also re-defining itself in the areas of operational efficiency and leadership in sustainable design. In his book, Sam Walton speaks of his desire to create an environment that embraces change, “to ensure that constant change is a vital part of the Walmart culture.”2 Today, Walmart is among the best in the industry in adapting to change, each year embarking into uncharted territory, expanding its own business, and in the end, pushing the entire industry forward. Surprisingly, Walmart has been able to adapt quickly to change in its business model. But as discussed earlier, the company always sticks to its founding values and principles, the greatest being an unswerving devotion to save the custom-ers money by decreasing overhead. In doing so, Walmart has sought to maintain a simple edifice within the architecture of its stores. At times, critics say the ‘big box’ lacks the architectural sophistication, or responsiveness to site and environment. However, by understanding Walmart, one begins to comprehend the very reason for its architectural design decisions. Each stage of Walmart’s architectural history can be clearly defined. The follow-ing is a visual history through the transformation of a prototypical Walmart store:

SC 98

SC 107

SC 139

SC 116

SC 142

SC 136

SC 143

SC 144

SC 145

SC 150

SC 173

SC 176

SC 183

SC 188

SC 189 EXP

SC 176

SC 195

SC 192 / 208

Figure 3.3 Walmart ‘Supercenter’ prototypes. 4

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• In Learning fron Las Vegas: the Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form (1977), Rob-ert Venturi intriduces the terms “duck” and “decorated shed” - descriptions of the two pre-dominant ways of embodying iconography in buildings. The term “duck” is used to describe a building in which the architecture is subor-dinate to the overall symbolic form, whereas “decorated shed” is meant to describe the simple structures such as commercial strip buildings. (Source: Wikipedia)

• This 62,400-square-foot store was planned, not as a prototype, but to be an experiment in physcial plant design, fixture composition and merchandise presentation.

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Since the opening of its first store in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962, Walmart has had distinct reasons behind its outward appearance and form. More than any retail typology Walmart’s form is solely dictated by the operations within – a classical case of ‘form follows function.’ For example, the shipping/receiving and stockroom areas in a typical Walmart, as with most retailers, are located in the rear of the store. Back-of-house offices and non-customer areas are left to the back rooms allowing the store to efficiently receive, stock, palletize, sort, and prep merchandise displays prior to mak-ing way to the sales floor. As noted above, in the beginning Walmart was typically a tenant and the build-ings were small general merchandise stores averaging from 20,000 to no more than 40,000 square feet. The stores were geographically concentric to its Bentonville Home Office with the intention of serving small rural communities. Unlike the other department stores of its day, the typical Walmart of the ‘60s and ‘70s focused on sim-ple functionality and architectural articulation (see example of store design in Figure 3.4). The most elaborate element was commonly the exterior signage of the building. Similar to today’s IKEA store design, the building was clean and simple in its aesthet-ics, devoid of the distracting signage and embellishments seen in many of the later Walmart stores, a pastiche hodge-podge of derivative styles (see Figure 3.5) versus the simple iconic or symbolic “decorated shed.” •

Figure 3.4 Walmart’s “Project ‘79” store in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.5 •

Figure 3.5 Walmart Supercenter in Naples, Florida, 2007.6

• ‘Dot Pharmacy’ stores were eventually closed when Walmart added the pharmacy compo-nent to its own prototype stores after success during the late-1970s.

• ‘Helen’s Arts and Crafts’ stores, named for Sam Walton’s wife were later sold to Michael’s.

• During the interview with Don Soderquist, he mentioned that Tractor Supply Co. was later re-sponsible for leasing many of the stores aban-doned by Walmart.

• Deep discounting refers to operating at even lower gross margins - usually a maximum of 18 percent - than those of typical discount opera-tions.

• Later known simply as Sam’s Club, due to a lawsuit involving the use of the term ‘wholesale’ in a business name that sold merchandise for individual consumption.

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For many decades following the opening of Store Number 1 in Rogers, Arkan-sas, Walmart continued with the medium-sized format discount stores. This facility predominantly sold general merchandise items that Walton was familiar with since the early Five-and-Dime variety stores. Throughout the 1970s, the interior of Walmart stores continued to reflect the origins of Walton’s small town variety stores (see Figure 3.6). However, the 1980s proved to be a pivotal decade for the growing retail giant. With Walmart’s continued growth, “Sam Walton had become anxious to diversify the firm’s standard discount format to allow expansion at an even faster pace.”8 Under his direction, Walmart sought out alternative store formats and new avenues that would assist in increasing market presence. Some distinctly different and new concepts began to emerge during the early 1980s: a discount drugstore,• a craft store,• and the idea of superstore retailing. Walmart tested the home improvement store concept with the experimental Save Mor brand, housed in the first Walmart building in Rogers, Arkansas. In 1992, Walmart experimented in rural Missouri with a new concept called the ‘Farm and Ranch’ store,9 whose demise gave way to the success of the Tractor Supply Company.• In the book, Wal-Mart: A History of Sam Walton’s Retail Phenom-enon, Sandra Vance and Roy Scott identify two key drivers in these new ventures. First, Walton believed that such diversification would allow Walmart to expand into more urban areas, second, the desire to take discount merchandising to the next level, i.e., into the area of ‘deep discounting.’• All of this drove the company to risk experimenting with the new concepts. The willingness to test innovative ideas guided Walmart’s growth over the next two decades and continues to this day to influence the U.S. retailing industry. By 1983, Walmart opened its new retailing concept, the warehouse store chain, Sam’s Wholesale Club.• The Sam’s Club model was part of the ever-expanding, large-format category that dominated Walmart’s extreme growth over the next two de-cades. According to David Glass, former Chief Executive Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Walmart and Sam’s were initially designed for different markets – Walmart for small towns and Sam’s for urban cities.10 Financial figures at the time showed sig-nificant influence by Sam’s Club on its parent company, so this new Walmart format expanded quite rapidly over the next decade. Sam’s Club continues to be a profitable format store for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with currently 608 units in existence.11 Fueled by the success of the Sam’s Club format, Walton and other top execu-

Figure 3.6 Interior of Walmart store in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma.7

Figure 3.7 Typical Carrefour store.15

Figure 3.8 Tesco store at Kingston Park, Newcastle upon Tyne, England.16

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tives at Walmart finally began to envision the possibilities offered by new concept and formats. The addition of a grocery component combined with general merchandise store model offered a potential for unparalleled future growth. In an interview with Don Soderquist, he recalls:

David’s [David Glass] background was supermarket and mine was Ben Frank-lin, where I met Sam. We supplied general merchandise to a number of gro-cers, so I was familiar with the grocery business, but not like David, he knew it backward and forward...And we studied what they had done in Europe and South America, where they put these hypermarchés together, hyper-marts, big combination stores, and no one was really doing that effectively in the United States.12

Soderquist states that two companies were experimenting with the concept of combining groceries with general merchandise – Meijer and Fred Meyer. Both operations had become experienced discounting merchandise chains and eventu-al regional competitors to Walmart. In 1962, the same year Walton opened the first Walmart, Meijer first experimented with combining a supermarket and a general mer-chandise discount store. At 180,000 square feet, a facility much larger than the typical 40,000-square-foot supermarket of the day, Meijer Thrifty Acres was an American-style adaptation of the superstore concept. Because such ‘superstores’ were typically in excess of 200,000 square feet, Meijer’s store did not quite compare to international examples. As such, Meijer’s new concept was considered by many to not be a genu-ine Hypermarket. The first Hypermarket Concept originated in France by the second largest re-tailer in the world, Carrefour.13 Considered by many retail historians as the true pioneer of this new shopping experience, Carrefour opened its first Hypermarket in Sainte-Geneviéve-des-Bois near Paris in 1963. Over the next two decades, the large single-store model spread throughout France and into other parts of Europe. By 1988, Car-refour was operating more than 70 hypermarkets in France with more than 780 total hypermarkets operating in Europe.14 See Figure 3.7 for example of current Carrefour hypermarket in operation. At the same time, according to the Paris-based International Association of Chain Stores, nearly half of all food purchases within the country were made at a hypermarket.17 Many believed it was only a matter of time before the United States be-

34

gan to adapt such a concept into its own retail evolution. Historians Vance and Scott summarize this time of American retail history in their book Wal-Mart: A History of Sam Walton’s Retail Phenomenon:

In the United States, some analysts viewed the hypermarket as the apotheo-sis of the retail progression that had begun a century earlier with the depart-ment store and then evolved into the general variety store, the supermarket, and the discount chain. Many Americans retailers, however, were skeptical of the European concept from the outset. They stressed that the difference be-tween American and European markets was the prior existence in the United States of the large supermarket. Since most European cities contained mainly small food stores, outlying areas were ideal for the hypermarket. Europe, in effect, had jumped from the 1930s to the 1960s with the hypermarket, while in America during this period the size and scope of the supermarket gradually had been enlarged to meet customer needs, and discount merchandising also had been born. Most American retailers believed the nation was too saturated with supermarkets and discount stores for the hypermarket to have much appeal. They also believed that, since the amount of retail space dedi-cated to each person in the nation had more than doubled between 1972 and 1990, there already were far too many stores for the available business.18

During the 1970s, endeavors by discount chains such as FedMart and Gemco, and former chains Modell’s, and Laval’s, were unsuccessful in bringing the concept to fruition. By the early 1980s, the idea of a hypermarket in North America continued to lie dormant.19 In 1984, Bigg’s opened its 200,000-square-foot store in a Cincin-nati suburb, becoming the first American hypermarket of its kind and built under the direction of its parent company Euromarché. Another notable attempt by European Carrefour to establish the hypermarket as a viable retail prototype in the United States, the Philadelphia hypermarket, was built in 1988, and topped out at 330,000 square feet, more than 7 1⁄2 acres of sales area.20

At the time, Walmart made its move forward with the hypermarket concept for many reasons. For one, it seemed the next most natural progression in the evolution of the retail typology - the move toward the superstore. It also offered a significant op-portunity to develop a favorable business model to move forward with its growth strat-egy. If refined properly, Walmart believed that the hypermarket model could catalyze

Figure 3.9 Hypermart USA, 1998.22

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its expansion into more urban areas. The hypermarket concept fulfilled Walton’s de-sire to get into the food business. According to accounts by Walton, he had “travelled all over the world looking at global competition in retailing...Germany, France, Italy, South Africa, Great Britain, Australia, and South America, and saw several concepts which interested [him]. [He] was impressed with the giant Carrefour stores in Brazil.”21

Ready to take this next critical step in its merchandising evolution, Walmart opened its first experimental hypermarket in December 1987 under the name Hyper-mart USA in Garland, Texas (similar to Figure 3.9). In 1988, two other store locations quickly followed, one in the Dallas-Fort Worth suburb of Arlington, Texas, and the other in Topeka, Kansas. However, by 1990, when Walmart opened its fourth and final hypermarket in Kansas City, management began to quickly realize that the con-cept was quickly unsuccessful. All four hypermarkets were modeled after the stores Walton had seen in France and Brazil. The 220,000-square-foot prototype ultimately proved to be one of Walmart’s great lessons learned. The demise of the hypermarket concept in the United States signaled to Walmart and other national chains, like Target and Kmart, to look for potential alternatives to the massive store format. These early examples of hypermarkets proved to be unsuccessful: the stores were simply too big. The large format also required too many employees to make the store a practi-cal, lucrative prototype. “Although the hypermarket was envisioned as a time-saving panacea for busy shoppers, paradoxically, the stores’ size worked against the very convenience they were designed to provide.”23

At the same time Walmart was finessing its hypermarket format, plans were al-ready underway to test another large-format store. This alternative large-store concept combined the ‘one-stop shopping’ approach of a hypermarket with Walmart’s inher-ent discounting price structure, and the relatively new idea of offering general mer-chandise and the grocery component. The concept of its ‘supercenter’ first opened in Washington, Missouri in March 1988, just months after the first hypermarket was opened.25 The concept of the supercenter is believed to be proprietary to Walmart. Having seen its development in the appropriate historical context, it is apparent that Walmart’s utilization of the supercenter concept was anything but original. Walmart has perhaps been the best at communicating and distilling its own supercenter arche-

THE BIRTH OF THE ‘SUPERCENTER’

Figure 3.10 Hypermart in Arlington, TX.24 One of the four orginal Hy-permart USA concepts, this store is presently still operating as a 'Walmart Supercenter'

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type in a way that is both useful and acceptable to the public. According to then-Chief Operating Officer Don Soderquist, the ‘hypermart’ ex-ample taught Walmart a valuable lesson: as a discount retailer, they could not sink too much into the initial fixed costs of constructing a store.26 In addition to the extremely high initial construction costs, the on-going operating costs of the hypermarket stores were simply not sustainable. As Soderquist explains, “we really didn’t have a favor-able profit model.”27 The supercenter finally succeeded in developing a new prototype for Walmart that was both an effective and profitable retail model. By 1989, Walmart had opened two other supercenters of varied sizes – a 96,000- square-foot store in Wagoner, Oklahoma closer to the larger metropolitan area of Tulsa and a larger 186,000-square-foot store in Farmington, Missouri, southwest of St. Louis.28

Early reports and customer surveys published at the time in Discount Store News showed that consumers felt these early supercenters were simply architectural mutations of a proven Walmart prototype.29 The new concept stores combined the traditional discount store with the supermarket, a typology with which Walmart was increasingly becoming familiar. The new supercenter was essentially one of its original discount store designs with a supermarket appendage on one side. This model also kept the customers at ease, since they were also accustomed to the typical mer-chandising layout and experience in the traditional Walmart store. The scaled-down version of its new concept ranged in size from 91,000 square feet to approximately 156,000 square feet. Such size variations allowed Walmart to tailor the size of the ‘box’ by adapting the building to a specific site and in accordance with local land restrictions. This flexibility within its prototypes allowed for the ability to cater to the location’s market demand and geographic position within a more rural or urban area. Such versatility of this store model would greatly benefit the articulation of the exterior façade, allowing Walmart to comply with varied jurisdictional ordinances and site-adapt the structure to meet the needs of surrounding developments, adjacent ten-ants, or pre-established architectural motifs and styles. Too much flexibility in archi-tectural form and style can be the demise of Walmart’s identity and design integrity. It is important to have freedom within design, but there must be uncompromised, fixed principles that dictate the ‘Walmart Way.’ As with any business risk, re-defining or re-shaping the icon of a company’s image – its facility – can result in a range of prospective outcomes. Sometimes it suc-ceeds with little to no refinements, and other times it is extremely unsuccessful. For

Table 3.1 Growth of Walmart Stores, 1988-2004.31

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Walton, his distinctive entrepreneurial spirit, fostered by a desire for experimentation with new concepts, has left an indelible mark on the American Retail Industry. The ‘Big-Box’ concept in the United States, primarily popularized by Walton’s company, has truly transformed the way in which ordinary individuals view their shopping experi-ence. The supercenter model proved over time to have caused one major drawback, a perception by the public that it was too easy for Walmart to simply replace many of its existing aging stores. David Glass, Walmart President and CEO by 1988, stated that, “the Walmart Supercenters will replace older and smaller discount stores in mar-kets that can support this expanded discount store/supermarket operation.”30 The company’s strategy at this time was to consider expansion or relocation prospects within the small towns and cities that already had a proven and profitable Walmart operation. The upgrade to a full service retail facility that merged both groceries and general merchandise under the umbrella of its ‘everyday low price’ policy had become a powerful shift in the company’s outlook on growth.

THE ‘DARK STORE’ DILEMMA

Perhaps one of the most perplexing, and sometimes controversial dilemmas faced byWalmart on a regular basis is the disposition, repurposing, or demolition of once-occupied Walmart stores. During the early 1990s, the company shifted from constructing mostly smaller discount, often referred to as ‘Division 1’ stores, which were approximately 50,000 to 75,000 square feet, to the larger ‘box’ that would mix both general merchandise and the grocery component into a ‘supercenter’ ranging from 150,000 to over 200,000 square feet (as illustrated in Table 3.1). In many markets, this move was also prompted by customer demand.At many locations, Walmart was able to expand many of the smaller Division 1 for-mats to supercenters. Larry Craighead, architect for Walmart for nearly two decades, estimates nearly 600 stores have been expanded within the last 15 years to include a grocery component. There are many reasons why Walmart is sometimes unable to expand: land availability, non- compete agreements with grocery stores located in the same development, insurmountable entitlement issues with cities, including re-strictive ‘big-box’ ordinances, traffic and parking. Therefore, many stores were simply forced to relocate. Tony Fuller with Walmart Realty explains the impetus behind this

Figure 3.11 His Hands Church in Wood-stock, Georgia. Featured on Imagine publication by The Beck Group, 2010. This church retrofit project is now home to what was once an abandoned Kmart store.

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phenomenon:

We realized that putting a Supercenter into a market resulted in a relocation of our discount store. We had relocated stores prior to that, but as we saw the [need for] Supercenters to grow, we realized that we were going to be relocat-ing a lot of stores. We had done some things to market space in the past, but we realized that we needed to take this to a whole different level.32

As a result, management quickly moved toward a commitment for Walmart Realty to work with the affected communities to repurpose these ‘dark stores’ as quickly as possible, sometimes working years before the store would be relocated to find a new tenant. This program of transitioning old stores also aided Walmart’s public image to make deals quickly with new tenants or owners to avoid the perceived negative con-sequences of an abandoned building. As Scott Greear, Director of Building Development explains the sensibility of these decisions, “We’ve got a good product and a proven retail site... we’ve got high visibility and established traffic patterns: Our infrastructure is already there, and all the improvements are in place.”33 Around the country, the large buildings that once housed aisles of merchandise have now been turned into community centers, munici-pal buildings, industrial warehouse space, and roller-skating rinks or bumper car race-ways. The creative solutions for these old stores are seemingly limitless. In her book Big-Box Reuse, Julia Christensen highlights successful case studies from around the country, where clients have adapted old retail stores and repurposed it or a new use. An old K-Mart conversion into Hormel’s Spam Museum or a church, and the remodel-ing of an old Walmart building into a charter school are examples of where adaptive reuse has been successful in communities that had a need and embraced the pos-sibilities.34 Walmart Realty’s unique approach to repurposing the ‘dark stores’ has become increasingly successful. To date, Walmart has seen its roster of abandoned buildings diminish significantly over the course of the past decade from nearly 600 stores to less than a quarter of that figure today.• With Walmart’s shift during this time to a larger ar-chitectural prototype and away from the smaller format stores, its portfolio of discount stores needing to be relocated has continually diminished. By 2006, with the on-going expansion of its stores, Walmart’s real estate division has been able to return more than 50 million square feet of space back over to productive use. Recent postings on

•According to the 'Building Disposition' portion of the Walmart Realty website, as of April 12, 2011, there were 146 vacated Walmart build-ings available for sale or lease

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its corporate website show these numbers continuing as Walmart’s stock of excess buildings decreases. During a span of only one year, the realty team turned over more than 20 million square feet into useful space again.35 It is important to note that, in circumstances where Walmart was a tenant, the company still maintains the buildings and utilities through the length of the lease. Despite criticism, Walmart representatives say that it is not their intent to turn over a building to the landlord without an aggressive effort to first market the building for reuse. In some instances, the company is inac-curately perceived to have owned a site simply because they occupied the site. In many lease situations, there is significant evidence that Walmart, along with many of its other big-box chains, will oftentimes include use restrictions in the contract agreement to prevent future competition.36 In “Big-Box Blight: The Spread of Dark Stores,” the article explains that such legal constraints forbid the landlord from leasing the building to a competing retail establishment. The article also cites many damaging problems related to the derelict sites. These stores often:

· Become magnets for crime and vandalism· Lower property values nearby· Undermine the vitality of nearby businesses· Create a negative image of the town that deters new businesses and investment

In order to combat the vacancies of large retail centers, cities are finding ways to prevent not only the architectural eyesore, but also the potential harmful economic impact on the community. Some cities simply limit the zoned area available for new retail businesses, while others adopt ‘big-box ordinances’ and laws dictating maxi-mum stores sizes, or create an “Economic Impact Review standard” procedure prior to the project’s permitting approval. Several examples can be found of cities requiring developers to post a demolition bond that allows the jurisdiction to tear down the building should it become vacated.37

Despite much of the criticism focusing on the negative consequences sur-rounding the ‘dark stores,’ Walmart maintains a proactive approach and efficient pro-cess when a store has been vacated. In her article 38 about Walmart’s real estate pro-cess, Garris outlines this four-step method: First, a team conducts a site evaluation. The area’s demographics and market potential are assessed, property appraisals are completed, and plans are retrieved for the site’s profile. Second, local and com-munity officials are contacted to determine the potential needs or municipal solutions

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for the existing site. To Walmart’s real estate managers, this is viewed as a critical step and crucial in the success of transitioning the building to its new occupant. It is at this time that the community’s needs are evaluated and where the value of being a ‘good neighbor’ is put into action. Third, Walmart then steps up its marketing efforts to reach a potential deal.39 The team’s network consists of thousands of local and re-gional brokers, national establishments and other retailers, developers, investors and real estate professionals. Fourth, in a sub-lease situation, once a tenant is secured, the organization’s internal group of designers, architects, and engineers, and its con-struction team moves forward with modifying the space to suit the new occupant. Walmart Realty has a reputation for completing this process very quickly once a deal is struck, sometimes completing a build-to-suit arrangement in half the time of the typical project schedule. According to Greear, “the challenge is to make sure we put the right use – the right fit – into that building. What we don’t want to do is just stick the first possible use – or even necessarily the highest-rent payer – in the building. We want to put in the right fit for that community.”40 Consequently, the realty team relies heavily on its nationwide network of local agents to attempt to make sure every site is a success. The primary criticism is that the ‘big-box’ chains like Walmart, Target, and Lowe’s, in the quest for larger market share, have fueled the increase in abandoned retail centers across the U.S. Many say the United States is over-stored. Figures pub-lished in the 2007 Economic Census prior to the recent recession support this state-ment. According to the report, there are approximately 1.1 million retail establishments in the U.S. with a total of 14.2 billion square feet of space; this is just over 46.6 square feet per capita. Compared to other parts of the world, this could well support the argument that the United States is grossly “over-stored” – India has 1.5 square feet per capita, Mexico, 2.3 square feet, the United Kingdom, 23 square feet, Canada, 13 square feet, and Australia, approximately 6.5 square feet.41

“Big-Box Blight: The Spread of Dark Stores,” claims that large U.S. cities are littered with sometimes dozens of abandoned ‘big-box’ outlets.42 A report listed from 2005 asserts that Columbus, Ohio had nearly 70 empty stores. The book Big-Box Swindle estimated that perhaps empty retail space in the United States could be approaching 1 billion square feet.43 By 2008, before the latest economic downturn, estimates showed more than 1.2 billion square feet of retail space are vacant.44 Yet, for Walmart, the number of derelict sites continues to decrease. In 2005, an article

Figure 3.12 Vacant Walmart stores, 2007.47 Frown faces indecate locai-tons of vacant or soon-to-be-vacant Walmart stores listed as available for sale or lease on Walmart Realty’s web-site as of June 2007.

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posted on Sprawl-Busters website reported that Walmart Realty had an inventory of 356 buildings for sale or lease.45 By June 2007, Walmart Realty confirmed its list of vacant or soon-to-be-vacant stores to be 246 (see Figure 3.12 on next page). As of today, the website lists 146 buildings either for sale, lease or sublease.46 Since its first store opened in 1962, Walmart has grown organically over the years, building stores as the market and its business structure could handle them. It grew concentrically starting in the center of the Walmart world – Bentonville, Arkansas – and expanding outward. Walmart would only expand with enough stores that could be supported by its logistics network and distribution centers, strategically placed throughout the U.S.

THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY

The 1980s brought about a rapid growth in the area of technology and com-panies began to take advantage of its benefits. It did not take long for the growing retail chains such as Walmart, Target, and Kmart to emerge as industry technology leaders, using computers and related electronic technology to maximize “operational efficiency.”48 Two of these major technological advances were the use of computers for inventory management and stock replenishment, and the automated distribution center. Walmart, unlike the others, had the advantage of established distribution cen-ters all over the U.S. Walmart’s proprietary intranet known as RetailLink, and its own satellite network linked all of the stores to a central control and monitoring station in Bentonville offered further market advantage.49 The entire system started as a project under David Glass in 1978. It was under his aegis that the vision of an automated, or mechanized, distribution became realized. Walton later explained the benefits to the company’s network and the impact of maintaining control from the home office:

What I like about it is the kind of information we can pull out of it on a mo-ment’s notice – all those numbers...I can walk into that satellite room, where our technicians sit in front of their computer screens...Up on the screen I can

Though Walmart and the other mass retailers seem low-tech, these big-box stores may actually be the most consequential and effective users of com-puter processing power in our time. —Nelson Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution

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see the total of the day’s bank credit card sales adding up as they occur... If we have something really important or urgent to communicate to the stores and distribution centers – something important enough to warrant a personal visit – I, or any other Walmart executive, can walk back to our TV studio and get on that satellite transmission and get it right out there.50

While Walton remained somewhat cautious to the investment in technology, he later explained, “that the efficiencies and economies of scale we realize from our distribu-tion system give us one of our greatest competitive advantages.”51 As one author has said, “it is, in fact, the company’s specialization in logistics – borne out through obsessions with efficiency, information and distribution – that has made it the sophis-ticated corporation.”52 It is the sophisticated technology of distribution and logistics systems that has mandated the establishment of systems like the Universal Product Code (UPC) and Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) item control, which have reshaped the retail market’s efficiency in tracking consumer data and streamlining the supply chain. Nelson Lichtenstein describes it by stating, “Sam Walton made the lowly bar code sing.” He adds that “this [system] enabled Walmart, as opposed to the manufacturer, wholesaler, or distributor, to capture, manipulate, and respond to the raw sales data generated by billions of individual transactions each week.”53

Whether it was the early establishment of its satellite network to the recent introduction of RFID (radio frequency identification) in the early 2000s to better man-age its distribution, Walmart has always remained one of the foremost experts in retail technology. Since the opening of his first variety stores, it has been its founder Sam Walton, a true innovator, who established the company as a leader in this area of retail proficiency. Walmart has a long history of pushing forward toward innovation in the area of its architecture. By exploring new concepts, technologies, formats, layouts, etc. at test stores, Walmart can assess the outcome through empirical data, response from the consumers, and through the most critical test, meeting the economic benefit ex-pectations. The metrics from a trial are scrutinized by a variety of divisional executives and departmental decision-makers before the concept is approved for execution. Part of its own in-house team responsible for testing the retail environment with-in a store is Walmart’s three-dimensional design specialists. The small group within the Store Layout Proto Team known as the 3-D Visualization Team is given the task of creating virtual environments to “test-drive.”54 Concepts are tested in a series of visual

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walkthroughs allowing the company to make decisions on potential ideas for new and remodeled stores, or special merchandising projects. This practice is an increasingly useful way to test concepts without investing the time and resources for full mock-ups within a store.55

The terms logistics and territory both have their origins in military procedures and maneuvering. However, these two key concepts are deeply rooted in the begin-nings of Walmart’s architectural model. Jesse LeCavalier states that these two com-ponents of Walmart’s distribution are critical in the organization’s ever-reaching hold within the retail world. Each of the elements can also be directly linked to Walton’s fas-cination and even obsession with ‘all those numbers.’ Having once attempted the use of a third-party distribution company, Walton and the other Walmart execs realized early on that, if the company could control its own distribution and logistics,• it could experience the benefit of a more efficient, yet less expensive, system. As a result, the company spends significant capital and time developing, maintaining, refining, and synchronizing its distribution network. The ultimate capturing of information about the ebb and flow of product sales allows Walmart to “monitor consumer behavior and develop predictive purchasing and distribution models.”56

Just as Walmart’s distribution and logistics model is distinctive among other competitors in the business world, so is its view of the use of its value-driven ar-chitecture. Walmart’s stores make up a larger network of infrastructure that allows the flow of goods from distribution center to store, and ultimately to customer. The thousands of discount stores and supercenters across the nation function as part of a ‘well-oiled machine.’ In a sense, Walmart’s architecture is merely used as a tool to provide a defined space from which to sell products at a discounted price. According to LeCavalier’s findings:

The misconception is that we’re in the retail business, but in reality we’re in the distribution business. —Jay Fitzsimmons, Former Senior Vice President and Treasurer, Wal-mart Stores, Inc.

LOGISTICS AND TERRITORY

• Logistics can be defined as the branch of management concerned with moving upplies, or in this case, goods or merchandise, from point to point.

Figure 3.13 Map of U.S. Interstate Highways and Walmart Distribution Centers.60

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Walmart executives thus abstract territory much as barcodes abstract mer-chandise. In other words, the nation’s largest company sees its territory es-sentially as a data field over which ‘all those numbers’ are monitored, tracked, allocated and redirected in pursuit of market coverage.57

These stores are quite literally the tangible consequence of Walmart’s underlying lo-gistical concept. While some may argue its architecture is ‘under-designed, under-scrutinized,’ and simply generic ‘boxes,’ one must realize that the formula calls for each part of the system to be modular, to adapt to an ever-changing model.58 Stores are constantly being added, removed, relocated, expanded, and vacated. For the system to survive, and for that matter succeed, it relies on the standards of each architectural prototype for not only operational efficiency as aforementioned, but also for logistical support. It has been said, “For Walmart, real estate too is a logistical practice.”59 Territory is the second and inherent attribute in Walmart’s value-driven system. Given the company’s ownership of property is equivalent to a landmass larger than Manhattan Island, distribution centers must be strategically dispersed throughout the country to serve the stores’ supply chain. Under Walmart’s guidelines, it is preferable that none of its stores are located outside of a 250-mile radius of the nearest distribu-tion center, and most are ideally placed along a major interstate highway (see Figure 3.13). To Walmart, its distribution centers are equally valuable to its stores. According to recent Walmart figures, the organization’s domestic distribution outfit is made up of more than 100,000 suppliers, 93,000 workers (including drivers), 152 distribution centers (including 40 of its larger regional logistics centers), 7,200 tractors, 53,000 trailers, and approximately 40 million square feet of distribution warehouse space. The distribution centers are positioned as ‘colonizers’ in an area of future store growth for the company.61

The numbers from a certain Walmart store, rather than its geographic position, more often are the measure of true profitability and performance, and are most im-portant to Walmart’s overall corporate goals. Performance could then be measured in terms of a certain store prototype, or certain type of valve or gear, so to speak, within the complex system. Modifications to the separate yet connected parts could be ma-nipulated to yield differing results. The design of each store consists of homogenous components, a kit-of-parts with each prototypical piece constantly and fastidiously being tested, improved, changed, and fine-tuned to maximize the operational effi-

Figure 3.14 The schematics of an automated distribution center similar to Walmart’s.62

Figure 3.15 Walmart’s sophisticated distribution technology at work.63

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ciency. The leaders within Walmart view this not as an random operation of plopping down stores here and there simply to gather up more market share, but as a calcu-lated effort to expand its network in the highest-value locations. Since Walmart’s model essentially deals with territory and its proficiency in lo-gistics, Jesse LeCavalier adds when “examining [it] closely yields insight into some of the mechanisms now at work shaping cities.”64 He poses the challenge “to investi-gate the design possibilities latent not only in Walmart’s building types but also in the organizational practices,” which is the basic tenet of Walmart’s creed and business structure.

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With the development of its sophisticated Information Technology System, a streamlined and efficient way of tracking all the information regarding its merchandise, and a refined logistics network, Walmart’s architectural prototyping became more important than ever. For many years, the company has maintained an in-house archi-tectural and construction team responsible for overseeing the development of its pro-totype. Computer technology was key in equipping Walmart with the ability to develop a repeatable design template for its stores. Raymond Harris, one of Walmart’s longest serving outside architects, gives an early account of Walmart’s method of prototyping:

Prior to the use of computer-aided drafting [CAD], hand-drawn plans were copied to mylar and the title block was simply changed. These plans provided a very schematic design for construction drawings. Depending on the ‘hand-edness’ [layout] of the store, two sets were given to the contractor, so that the detail and notes could be read.65

It is surmised that the widespread use of computer-aided drafting by the early 1980s helped fuel Walmart’s growth by giving the ability to mass-produce and replicate de-sign documents through sharing of common drawing templates, construction details, and floor plans. Such drafting technology impacted the entire industry, allowing the client, in this case Walmart, the ability to exploit its potential and capabilities of mass repro-duction of its architectural drawings. The company also avoided the ‘redesigning of wheel’ approach – which reduced the time constraints of designing, detailing and executing truly site-specific projects. Walmart used the method of site-adapting each new project using a common template. Useful to the growth-minded company, the architectural prototype has given Walmart the tools to standardize the architectural components and procedures within the kit-of-parts. Walmart’s architectural store prototype can be categorized into three areas: the architectural components that make up its kit-of-parts, the architectural elements that define its identity, and architectural processes, the on-going evolution of its design templates. When implemented in harmony, this defines the company’s approach to its prototype the pursuit of cost savings, operational efficiency and its quest toward sustainable design and a unified brand.

THE PROTOTYPE

God is in the details. —Ludwig Mies van der Rohe

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ARCHITECTURAL COMPONENTS

By components, it means the individual parts and pieces used in the construc-tion of a store. Examples include common systems requirements such as lighting, electrical, plumbing, fire protection, and HVAC systems, skylights, and finishes like carpet, VCT flooring, plastic laminate for millwork, protective wall surfacing, and pro-prietary paint mixes. Building materials like roof decking, joists and girders for struc-tural components are types of prototypical components found in most of Walmart’s stores. Additionally, in order to not only install uniform materials in its stores, but also implement common construction practices and product procurement, Walmart main-tains a prototype project manual that is used on all new stores, expansions and re-models. Typical of most project manuals, these specifications provide the detailed procedures, methods, and standards of construction. The prototype specifications have also include stringent sustainable practices of recycling acoustical ceiling tile and VCT flooring, low-VOC content paints and coatings, mandatory construction waste management and reclamation of materials. Unique to Walmart’s construction process is the fact that many of its building components, or products, are procured by the owner itself in a ‘direct buy’ process. For many years, Walmart’s own global procurement network, known as GIS, acquires building materials for its stores and provides the products directly to the contractor awarded the project. Walmart is one of a few companies, if not the only, to do this on such a large scale. For the same reasons Walmart is able to provide low-cost mer-chandise, purchasing building materials directly from suppliers, vendors, and manu-facturers gives Walmart the advantages of cost, consistency and ultimately construc-tion efficiency.

ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS

Similar to the undertone of economic benefit that is the driving factor behind the consistency of its architectural components, Walmart’s architectural elements have helped to define its stores’ operational efficiency. Through standardized merchandis-ing layout and same store-handedness, Walmart stores have become “easy to navi-gate.” 66 In his article “Big-Box Museums,” Aaron Betsky, the director at the Cincinnati Art Museum, compares the average Walmart to the “fancy” museums of today, saying the company “excel[s] at displaying thousands of objects in as accessible a manner as possible.” 67 Distinguishable features within a store give its customers a sense of

Figure 3.17 Walmart Supercenter in Gun Barrel City, Texas, 2010.69

Figure 3.16 Walmart discount store in Knightdale, North Carolina, 2010.68

Figure 3.18 Walmart Supercenter in Austin, Texas, 2009.70

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familiarity allowing them to optimize their time spent shopping. Essentially the same from store to store, the Associates with a common understanding of the ‘Walmart Way’ carry out the practices of receiving and stocking. The architectural elements would also be defined as exterior prototype features of a typical Walmart. While sources within the company have admittedly struggled with the consistency of Walmart’s image, nearly all of its stores have common char-acteristics. The typical ‘supercenter’ prototype layout is divided into two-thirds of the store being General Merchandise (GM) and the other one-third is the Grocery (GR) side. The large identifiable vestibule entrances mark the stores’ entry portals. Most stores also have a Garden Center, an area for ‘Outdoor Living’ merchandise like plants and flowers, typically opposite of the ‘Market,’ or grocery, side of the store. The Au-tomotive Center, once referred to as the ‘Tire and Lube Express,’ are adjacent to the Garden Center on the GM side. Much of these prototypical elements have their origins in logistics, the company’s ability to optimize its operations within a store.

ARCHITECTURAL PROCESSES

Many areas within the company influence the continual process of Walmart’s architectural prototype development. As part of Walmart’s Real Estate and Store Planning Group, the in-house architectural team consists of design managers, archi-tects, engineers, estimators, and construction professionals. It is one of this division’s responsibilities to oversee prototype development. Over the years, many outside con-sulting firms have worked with Walmart’s in-house team to maintain its architectural prototypes. Today, a relatively small group of architecture firms produce and maintain the electronic database of prototype drawings, known as the ‘Design Collective.’ • Table 3.2 (opposite page) shows a chronological list of the most significant architec-ture and engineering firms for Walmart. Currently, design template changes, requested by Walmart’s in-house team, are initiated in a process in which ‘design initiatives’ are created. Through these de-sign initiatives, consultants begin research and work into implementing changes to the prototype construction drawings. These changes are heavily based on input from operational departments within Walmart’s in- house merchandising design team, known as ‘Store Layout.’ Once approved, a ‘construction initiative’ is distributed to the hired architects to implement in current store designs. The existing basic prototypes for Walmart’s U.S. stores can be sorted into

• The Design Collective is only a portion of Walmart's proprietary online database system managed by Evoco. This web-based system allows not only for the storage of Walmart prototype drawings, but has extensive interac-tive functions to track the typical architectural processes of delivery, distribution, bidding, and construction administration of each active project.

Table 3.2 Architects & Engineers of Significance, 1960s – Present.71

YEAR

1960s-19781978-early 1980s1978-present1981-present19841984-early 2000s1984-present1990-present1988-present1990s-present1990s-present1990s-presentmid-2000s-present

FIRM

Patterson (Joplin, MO)Omniplan (Dallas, TX)Benchmark Group (Rogers, AR)PB2 Architecture & Engineering (Rogers, AR)Benham-Blair (Oklahoma City, OK)BSW International (Tulsa, OK)Raymond Harris & Associates Architects (Dallas, TX)Harrison French & Associates Ltd. (Bentonville, AR)Henderson Engineers Inc. (Lenexa, KS)Cynergy (Tulsa, OK)BRR Architecture (Merriam, KS)Scott&Goble Architects (Tulsa, OK)WD Partners (Dublin, OH)

Figure 3.20 Walmart Market prototype store, 2011.74

Figure 3.19 Neighborhood Market by Walmart in Horn Lake, Mississippi, 2010.73

Figure 3.21 Walmart Market in Dallas, Texas, 2011.75

Figure 3.23 Marketside store in Phoenix.77

Figure 3.22 Walmart Market, Interior.76

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six distinct formats: Figure 3.16 - the traditional Walmart discount stores (709 units), which are no longer being built; Figures 3.17 and 3.18 - Supercenters (2,907); Figures 3.19 and 3.20 - Neighborhood Markets (183), which have been more recently re-branded as ‘Walmart Market’ (see Figures 3.21 and 3.22); Figure 3.23 - Marketside concept stores (4); Figure 3.24 - Supermercado de Walmart (2); and Figure 3.25 - Sam’s Clubs (608).72 Two newer formats, recently announced are the smaller-format stores: Walmart Express and Walmart on Campus. In addition to the Supermercado prototype and in an effort to further reach its customer base, Walmart has experi-mented with ‘segment stores’ such as the Hispanic Supercenter and Más Club (see Figure 3.26), the special prototype counterpart to the typical Sam’s club. By the early 1990s with the onset of its success with the supercenter proto-type, Walmart’s architectural team was in place to tackle the ongoing exploration and development of its newest prototype. For many years, Walmart’s knowledge of retail architecture was limited to the seemingly straightforward operation of a typical discount store. By adding the grocery component, the organization was forced to employ experts familiar with operating a full-line supermarket. The need to develop a collection of similar prototypes was essential in rolling out a format quickly to keep up

Figure 3.25 Sam’s Club in Albuquer-que, New Mexico.79

Figure 3.26 Más Club in Houston, Texas. Opened in 2009.80

Figure 3.24 Supermercado de Walmart in Houston, Texas. Opened in 2009.78

• Started by former Sierra Club president Adam Werbach, this internal Walmart program for its 1.4 million U.S. Associates is perhaps one of the largest personal sustainability initiatives by any company for its employees. According to an article in the September 2007 issue of Fast Company, this project's voluntary participants choose an "unsustainable" area in their life and develop a plan to fix it. At the time the article was published, nearly 12,000 Associates had stopped smoking because of its efforts.

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with the growth forecasts during the mid- to late-1990s. Walmart continues to employ a myriad of consultants to continually refine its prototype – refrigeration consultants, lighting designers, engineers, architects, vendors, interior designers, trade special-ists, concrete consultants, construction managers, signing, branding and marketing teams, accessibility experts, etc. `Typical practices consist of the prototype being divided among several consult-ing architectural firms with oversight from Walmart’s in-house architectural depart-

ment. The client- owner relationship is somewhat blurred, since the architect’s design is subordinate to the will of the client. Walmart’s system of prototype development is a unique process of internal proprietary experimentation among many operational divi-sions within Walmart. Oftentimes, these types of experiments are tested for possible future implementation into other stores. Arguably the chief guiding principle of its company culture, Walmart’s way of sustainability has become a mainstay to the retailer’s public image architectural pro-totype and design philosophy. The fruits of its work are not just the experimental stores or the organic cotton clothes sold on its shelves, it has become a way of life for many of the company’s leaders – executives, management, and Associates alike. Action toward designing more ecologically responsive stores was not only the correct path for effective corporate environmentalism, but it could also be what the Director of Sustainable Facilities Don Moseley calls “a good business decision.” 81 While many still believe that some of its action is the ultimate game of corporate ‘greenwashing,’ the standards of environmental prudence echo Walmart’s core values of ‘Respect for the Individual,’ ‘Service to the Customer,’ and ‘Striving for Excellence.’ The com-pany’s goals seek to cultivate a more responsible culture of sustainability – whether by shrinking its greenhouse-gas footprint by implementing measures to reduce energy consumption, eliminating the use of harmful refrigerants in its grocery applications, or encouraging healthier living for the Associates through its Personal Sustainability Project (PSP).•

Sustainability helped us develop the skills to listen to people who criticize us and to change where it’s appropriate. —H. Lee Scott, Jr., Former CEO, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

SUSTAINABILITY

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Many within Walmart’s organization point to the ‘Twenty-First Century Leader-ship’ speech by then-CEO H. Lee Scott, Jr. as perhaps the pivotal moment in the company’s recent goal toward a more sustainable business operation. It was during this historic proclamation that its chief executive declared Walmart would begin ac-tively pursuing ways in which it could use its sheer size to make change. Never before had such a prominent corporate leader, not to mention the man at the helm of For-tune’s No. 1 company, taken such a risk to state its goal toward making a substantial positive difference. Scott communicated three succinct environmental goals for his company:

1. To be supplied 100 percent by renewable energy.2. To create zero waste.3. To sell products that sustain our resources and environment.82

While simple in concept, the execution of each of these targets would translate to specific challenges within the area of Walmart’s architecture – the reduction of energy consumption by 30% in its new stores and shrinking the carbon footprint of its current stores by 20% through extensive retrofitting of existing lighting and HVAC systems with more efficient LED technology and integrated refrigeration components. Such an extensive and overarching task would require that the in-house architectural team begin testing systems that would operate at optimal efficiency to achieve these goals. While most agree the ‘Twenty-First Century’ speech was the first public com-mitment to the company’s newfound passion, Marc Gunther explains in his 2006 article “The Green Machine” that its roots began long before Scott took the stage that day in October 2005.83 According to the article, it was during a scuba-diving excur-sion off an island near Costa Rica that renown conservationist Peter Seligmann sug-gested to Rob Walton, son of the company’s founder and longtime Walmart executive and now Board member, that Walmart “could be a driver of tremendous change.”84 It was realized that incremental changes by this “Behemoth of Bentonville”85 could have enormous results simply because of the company’s size and influence within the marketplace. Having spent time among the biologically rich habitat of this area, Walton was fascinated with this opportunity and by June 2004 had re-convened back in Bentonville meeting with Scott, Seligmann, and Jib Ellison, owner of management consulting firm BluSkye. “Their argument was simple: Walmart could improve its im-age, motivate employees, and save money by going green,” Gunther writes. From

Figure 3.27 Walmart store in City of Industry, California.93

Figure 3.28 Skylights at Walmart store in City of Industry, California.94

Figure 3.29 Solar-tracking skylights at Walmart store in City of Industry, California.95

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that informal presentation, the Walmart executive employed Seligmann and Ellison’s team to research Walmart’s potential impact on the environment. Not only could the company affect its own practices, but Walmart’s unique position as the world’s larg-est retailer could impact the entire supply chains by spurring suppliers to “an army of suppliers to clean up their acts, too.”86 Nearly a year later, BluSkye delivered a report that unquestionably showed Walmart’s potential was far beyond what Scott had expected. In the process, the retail giant could not only affect its own economic performance, but also enhance its reputation. Gunther cites that Walmart’s past envi-ronmental record was anything but a passing grade as “it had paid millions of dollars to state and federal regulators for violating air- and water-pollution laws.”87

Walmart’s initiatives are now organized into twelve areas of its company called Sustainable Value Networks (SVNs). According to its corporate website, the SVNs:

are a tool to help integrate sustainable practices into all parts of our business, developing solutions – together. SVNs bring together leaders from our com-pany, supplier companies, academia, government, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together, we explore challenges develop solutions that benefit our business and our local and global communities.88

According to its corporate website, Walmart’s SVNs include: Greenhouse Gas, Sus-tainable Buildings, Alternative Fuels, Logistics, Waste, Packaging, Wood and Paper, Agriculture and Seafood, Textiles, Jewelry, Electronics, and Chemical Intensive Prod-ucts. Arguably it is its architecture, or ‘Sustainable Buildings’ SVN, that is the primary face of Walmart’s commitment. Don Moseley, a 21-year veteran within Walmart’s in-house architectural and construction team, recounts that the impetus of the company’s sustainability journey has its beginnings nearly two decades ago. When topics of sustainable design were confined to the academic field and hard-core environmentalists, it was Walmart’s business decision to implement ‘eco-friendly’ initiatives that have only recently been labeled under the umbrella of sustainability. As far back as the early 1990s, Moseley remembers, “challenging why [Walmart] did not do a better job of saving trees... or other natural attributes of [its] sites.”89 Several projects in Florida and one near Hous-ton, Texas presented the opportunity to use sustainable principles to save trees – in Oldsmar, Florida nearly four acres of trees, which formed a “cypress dome,” were saved or relocated because of Walmart’s efforts.90 Moseley recalls:

Figure 3.30 Experimental store in Au-rora, Colorado.96

Figure 3.31 Vestibule Entrance at Ex-perimental store in Aurora, Colorado.97

Figure 3.32 Store interior at Experi-mental store in Aurora, Colorado.98

Figure 3.33 View down “Action Alley” at Experimental store in Aurora, Colo-rado.99

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Through our credibility with the Water Management District and the other jurisdictional institutes, we were successful in getting a permit to develop on a piece of land [that] no one else had been able to permit. Because of what we had learned and illustrated [through] our integrity and credibility with what we would do and the efforts we would go to build in a sustainable manor specific to our site.91

Moseley and the Walmart team went on to win several awards from the Texas Forestry Service, National Arbor Day Foundation, and Trees Florida. In 2005 to further conser-vation efforts, Walmart teamed up with The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to establish “Acres for America,” a program devoted to conserve critical wildlife habitats for future generations. According to information found its corporate website:

Wal-Mart has committed $35 million for the next 10 years to conserve at least one acre of priority wildlife habitat for every acre developed for company use. This new program is one of the largest ever public-private partnerships and the first time a company has tied its footprint to land conservation. Acres for America will permanently conserve at least one acre of priority wildlife habitat for every developed acre of Wal-Mart’s current footprint, as well as the com-pany’s future development... Lands conserved will benefit a wide variety of wildlife, including large and small mammals, freshwater and saltwater fish, migratory and neo- tropical birds and native plants.92

Much of the company’s current strategies regarding its sustainable architectural design have come about through lessons learned over the years on test stores. It was the company’s Lawrence, Kansas ‘Eco-Mart,’ designed by William McDonough and built in 1993 that led the way for Walmart’s test stores. Other stores in City of Industry, California (see Figures 3.27, 3.28, and 3.29) and Moore, Oklahoma were part of an early group of experimental projects for Walmart that led to the successful examples of daylight harvesting. Now more than 2,000 of its stores have skylights with a sophis-ticated, integrated dimmable ballast system monitored from Bentonville. This sustain-able component is an example where continual performance monitoring and growing LED technology may prove that there is a better, more efficient way of lighting a store. Moseley discusses:

Daylight harvesting has been for over a decade a core component of how we

Figure 3.34 Experimental store in McK-inney, Texas.101

Figure 3.35 Photovoltaics on exterior of Experimental store in McKinney, Texas.102

Figure 3.36 Vestibule Entrance at Ex-perimental store in McKinney, Texas.103

Figure 3.37 Clerestory at Checkouts in Experimental store in McKinney, Texas.104

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build our stores – to allow the daylight to supplement, or completely replace, the need for artificial light. That may change. When LED technology gets to the point that we put it in our stores, the efficiency that it can provide and the reduced amount of heat it will generate, we will have to re-run the whole eco-nomic model. Because the heat gain or heat loss that is associated with the skylights when we are using T-8 lights are such that it is good business deci-sion to do daylight harvesting from the energy stand point because the energy we save is more than the energy we lose. But, when we save less energy with a technology like LED we may need to completely, and we will, re-evaluate the skylight question. So, it is important to remind yourself why you made the de-cisions you made in the past that skylights, daylight harvesting, and dimming technologies evolved from testing we did at City of Industry.100

In 2003, the Walmart executive leadership, led by then-CEO H. Lee Scott, Jr., presented Moseley with a mission statement that became the company’s well-known experimental stores located in Aurora, Colorado (see Figures 3.30, 3.31, 3.32, and 3.33 on previoius page) and McKinney, Texas (see Figures 3.34, 3.35, 3.36, and 3.37). Both stores opened in 2005 to much media fanfare. With the assistance of numerous industry experts and consulting professionals in all disciplines, Walmart employed many environmental initiatives in the designs of these two ‘one-of-kind’ stores. These stores, described as “living laboratories,”105 implemented the use of photovoltaics, wind-power generation, LED technology in the merchandise display cases, draught-tolerant and native landscaping, reduced overall building height in the structure, and tested eco-friendly building materials, fabric HVAC ductwork, and integrated refrigera-tion systems. Each of these stores, positioned in different climates, was also meant to test regional sustainability goals. In Aurora, Moseley discusses one ofsuccessful initiatives for a colder climate:

The back wall of the Aurora store is product called Solarwall, a metal panel that is perforated dark in color with a 4-inch plenum behind it and that air is being sucked out of that wall cavity at the top through the parapet into pipes that feeds the HVAC system. In the winter we are using that wall as a pre-heat component for the air, so that the air breathed in by the rooftop units is warmer then the outside air to reduce the amount of energy it takes to heat that air to the temperature we need it to go into the store.106

Figure 3.38 Rainwater collection cisterns at Sam’s Club in Fayetteville, Arkansas.109

• Building commissioning is the process of verifying, in new construction, that all the sub-systems for HVAC, Plumbing, Electrical, Fire/Life safety, Building Envelopes, Interior Sys-tems, cogeneration, utility plants, sustainable systems, Lighting, Wastewater, Controls, and Building Security achieve the owner's project requirements as intended by the building own-er and as designed by the building architects and engineers. (Source: Wikipedia)

• Bioswales are landscape elements designed to remove silt and pollution from surface runoff water. (Source: Wikipedia)

• Xeriscaping refers to landscaping and gar-denning in ways that reduce or eliminate the need for supplemental water from irrigation. (Source: Wikipedia)

• Siphonic roof drains are a relatively new drain-age system developed in the 1960s. It utilizes hydrostatic pressure to drain water instead of gravity. It has numerous advantages over grav-ity drainage. Pipe sizes are usually much small-er than typical gravity drainage. Siphonnic systems are engineered on the concept of full bore flow (a fill rate of 100%) of uncompress-ible fluid. The rainwater is transferred at high velocities through pipe networks that are small, flexible, and generally of zero gradient by har-nessing the energy derived from the hydraulic head which is created due to natural difference in elevations of roof outlet and the discharge points in a building.

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As Moseley explains, both designs at McKinney and Aurora utilized building commissioning• during the design process, a key component overlooked on the early ‘eco- stores,’ which did not involve such preliminary testing of the designs. Now, every store has some sort of commissioning as a core component to its design elements and systems. In August 2007, the new Sam’s Club in Fayetteville, Arkansas became the first Walmart facility to implement extensive rainwater harvesting technique on a site near one of the state’s designated wetlands with protected aquatic wildlife reserve. The project’s architect, Raymond Harris and Associates Architects, worked with the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the University of Arkansas to incorporate bioswales,•

continuous deflective separation inlets, water quality stormwater inlets, wet retention pond, and wet meadow discharge basin. Xeriscaping• and drip irrigation were also employed to curb water consumption; both of which are now prototypical on all new Sam’s Clubs. The overall intent of the design was to clean the water before it leaves the site. In the area of water conservation, Moseley explains Walmart’s ultimate goal:

To get beyond rainwater harvesting to not need to harvest rainwater for the purposes of irrigation at least, but to eliminate the need for irrigation by de-signing sites that send the water to the plants when it rains and plant plants that can survive based on the amount of rainwater what exists on the site.107

The entire system at the Fayetteville facility would not have been possible without the ability of siphonic roof drains• directing all run-off water to a single point for collection in on-site storage cisterns (see Figure 3.38). In the end, Moseley describes the area of water conservation and rainwater harvesting as a “huge opportunity” for Walmart’s future development.108 Recent discoveries and experiments in Walmart’s series of nearly a dozen High Efficiency (HE) stores placed around the U.S. have broadened the company’s under-standing of what is possible in terms of sustainable buildings. In working with govern-mental entities, Walmart has been able to further much of the forefront research in the area of retail architecture. One example is the Leavensworth, Kansas store that has the “first full supercenter size domestic program project to have LED lights in the park-ing lot.” Much of the research was part of a partnership with the Retailer Energy Alli-

• Originally used in Europe for more than 20 years, the secondary closed-loop refrigeration system was first installed at Sam's Club at Sa-vannah, Georgia by Raymond Harris & Asso-ciates Architects. Followed by applications at the Sam's Club in Fayeetteville, Arkansas and more recently in the High Efficiency (HE) stores, this system was first tested at the Aurora, Colo-rado experimental store. Some of the sustain-able benefits include: uses less refrigerant (400 lbs compared to 1000 lbs), which helps to re-duce 'carbon footprint' and eliminates the use of harmful CFCs, most of which are slowly bein phased out by the EPA. It also reduces copper piping for refrigerant run between the cases on the sales floor and the rackhouse (compressor and condensers), typically located on the exte-rior wall or rooftop. In contrast, the system uti-lized for many years by Walmart used individ-ual refrigeration circuits 'pumping' refrigerant to the rackhouse and back to cases, wheras the secondary-loop system store no refriger-ant within the store - all refrigerant is stored in the rackhouse - and CO2 (for low temp/frozen food) and glycol (medium temp/coolers) are used as secondary coolants. If leaks occur in the system, CO2 or glycol will not harm the building occupants or the environment.

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ance in conjunction with the Department of Energy.110 One major success came from the Savannah, Georgia store, where Walmart executed the world’s first secondary closed-loop refrigeration system.• Many of its competitors were invited to the opening of the store, illustrating the fact that the giant retailer is quite transparent about sharing its findings. In fact, Walmart hosts an annual Sustainability Summit, where industry experts can share the latest on what is going on in the world of sustainable design. “We have a good relationship with our competitors;” Moseley says, “this sustainability effort would not truly be sustainable if we kept it all a secret.”

Figure 4.1 ASDA store (Walmart sub-sidy) in the United Kingdom. A new and unique form of natural ventila-tion for supermarkets is set to make ASDA’s latest store at Langley Mill in Derbyshire, a sustainability showpiece for retailers.1

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It is important to note that outside of Walmart sources, little documentation can be found regarding its current position within the global market. Because of its rapidly evolving position abroad, the practices at Walmart International are in a sense a moving target. Such evidence speaks of the volume of retail opportunities that the world’s largest company could realize over the next decade in the dynamic area of international business. With 4,573 units in 15 countries around the world, the international division op-erates more stores than its domestic counterpart. See Table 4.1 on the next page for current figures including unit count, square footage, and average store size of interna-tional stores.

The growth is not determined by architecture, nor the architecture by growth. —Charles Zimmerman, Vice-President, International Design and Construction, Walmart International

BY THE NUMBERS

4 WALMART’S FUTURE

Figure 4.4 Walmart Supercenter in Mexico.4

Figure 4.3 Walmart Supercenter in Beijing, China.3

Figure 4.5 Walmart International stores.6

Figure 4.2 Walmart Supercentre in Vaughan, Ontario, Canada, 2008.2

Table 4.1 Walmart International Stores as of January 31, 2011.5

COUNTRY

ArgentinaBrazilCanadaCentral AmericaChileChinaIndiaJapanMexicoUnited Kingdom

TOTAL

TOTAL UNITS

6348032555128232954141,739385

4,573

TOTAL SQ. FOOTAGE

6,210,31930,273,32442,004,6638,739,46511,114,98356,377,660269,00024,624,67876,197,30130,996,464

286,807,857

AVERAGE STORE SIZE(IN SQUARE FEET)

98,57663,069129,24515,86139,415171,36153,80059,48043,81780,510

62,718

60

Figure 4.6 Various store formats and logos for Walmart International stores.7

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While controlled by the parent company, the majority of stores abroad still oper-ate under other banners (see Figure 4.6 below).

Although the other major retail divisions within Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Walmart U.S. and Sam’s Clubs, have continued to experience significant growth within recent years, it has been Walmart International that has experienced exponential expansion. This rapidly growing division of the company is expected to maintain such growth over the next decade because of the ever-increasing appetite abroad for consumer products and the demand for affordable, commodities. Through acquisition, merger, or by what is referred to by Walmart as “organic” growth within existing markets, Walmart International has the capacity to add between 700 and 800 stores this year alone, according to Charles Zimmerman, Vice-President of International Design and Construction for Walmart’s International division.8

It is important in the examination of Walmart and its architecture that a portion of this work be devoted to explaining how its quest to secure a permanent place in the international retail market will influence the company as a whole. In our ever-shrinking world, the global economy is touching everyone – when one of the major international players suffers an economic crisis, other national economies will undoubtedly be af-fected. For Walmart, the international scene presents a new unconquered frontier to spread its mission and colonize new territory. Walmart’s existence in the global

Figure 4.7 Store formats for Walmart International stores.9

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economic and architectural landscape is arguably the most powerful corporate force seen today. Walmart’s mission, values, and practices being carried abroad are the same as its domestic corporate goals. Zimmerman explains:

Save money. Live better... we are trying to figure out the most efficient way to design and build our buildings to serve our customers and depending on who that is, that mission changes a bit... [Walmart looks] within each market to see how do we invest our customers’ money to reach those goals to save them money, so they can live better.10

Operating from its Home Office in Arkansas, the Walmart International Team serves as support for its markets abroad. Zimmerman explains that, “Bentonville is just the mother ship, the one to try to put some framework to keep everyone headed in the same direction.”11 All activities, including store operations, merchandising, asset protection, human resources, and marketing, occur inside the countries with support from the Bentonville team. In terms of Walmart’s operational oversight and control

Figure 4.8 Store formats for Walmart International Stores.12

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through the satellite network of monitoring, each country is set up to operate a sys-tem that is similar to the one used in Bentonville to observe the flow of data from its domestic stores. Energy management systems like Novar and CPC, comparable to the setup used in the U.S., have been established in every country. In some countries, where commodities are scarce, systems like these are critical. Consulting architects, engineers, and construction experts native to the region are employed to design and build the projects. The people involved in executing the project are exclusively re-cruited from the country in which the store will be built. Prototype development is also maintained within the specific country and, in most cases is unique to the region. For example, in Mexico, Walmart has eight differ-ent formats, ranging from small stock discount stores to apparel department stores, and supercenters, which look very similar to those in the U.S. Compared to Walmart’s three basic formats in the U.S., the supermarket, supercenter (hypermarket), and warehouse clubs, its international equivalent has ten formats used across all markets (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8). In terms of distinctive examples within each market, proto-

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type development accommodates the growth in that market. Zimmerman clarifies:

In Argentina, where [Walmart] may only build two supercenters this year, [we] aren’t going to have a sophisticated supercenter proto like the U.S., who builds like 140 supercenters. It all varies primarily based on how many times that proto will be site-adapted, so [we can] invest accordingly.13

Conversely, if needed within a market, variations of one format can be developed to meet the needs. Construction materials, utility availability, skilled labor, and acceptable work-manship are all resources that are often less accessible outside the United States. Therefore, Walmart’s sustainable practices and initiatives become progressively more important in areas with prohibitively expensive utility costs and occasionally more stringent environmental regulations. This explains why more than 400 Walmart park-ing lots in Central America have been retrofitted with LED technology, while only a dozen have been completed in the U.S. When asked about the long-term goals of his department, Zimmerman revealed that the consideration of life-cycle costs is of utmost importance to the sustainability of its ever-expanding stock of international architecture. He explains further:

We have been notorious for always trying to reduce the first cost of our build-ings without taking into [account] the life-cycle impact of those decisions... so, now it’s my job to go back to those markets and say, ‘I know we just told you to do this; however, do it intelligently. Do not negatively impact your life-cycle costs.’14

The real estate ownership varies between markets and is often dependent on the government regulations within that country for multi-national corporations. In China, all stores are leased due to restrictions on Walmart ownership of the stores. In India, because of the joint venture with BestPrice, all 5 stores are leased. However, the company’s international division owns the majority of its stores. As Zimmerman explains, “We like to be in control of our own destiny.”15

Part of Zimmerman’s global responsibilities is to investigate opportunities to expand, complete the necessary due diligence for potential acquisitions, and analyze the competition. With the same scrutiny and curiosity exhibited by Walton while he was visiting Kmart’s ‘laboratories’16 of the 1960s, Zimmerman has carried the legacy

Table 4.2 Walmart International growth, 1992 – 2010.18

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10

Acquisition

Organic

Source: Public company filings, Walmart website, Factiva. Walmart acquired D&S Chile in January 29 2009

Mexico

Puerto Rico

Woolco Canada

Argentina and

Brazil

China

Cifra Mexico

Interspar Germany ASDA U.K.

Bompreco Brazil

Sonae Brazil CARHCO Central

America Seiyu Japan

Trust-Mart China JV Bharti India

Wertkauf Germany Makro

S. Korea

Sold S. Korea and Germany

Amigo Puerto Rico

5

Acquisitions have created a platform for new markets and formats – which we have then grown organically

D&S Chile

Learn the Business in 60 Minutes or Less – International Business Development

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of Walmart by constantly examining the competition. Having visited more than 35 countries as head of the Walmart’s International Architecture division, Zimmerman explains, “I have seen all the major players, and a lot of the minors as well.”17

According to most estimates, the future for Walmart International will be one of perhaps unparalleled growth. While Brazil and China are currently its two ‘hot spots,’ Walmart is aggressively growing in nearly all its markets. Recent publicity surrounding the company’s acquisition of South African-based Massmart, the continent’s largest retailer of general merchandise and third largest distributor of consumer goods, would add nearly 300 more stores to its conglomerate. If the proposal is confirmed and the deal executed, Walmart will have presence in yet another continent with operations in 14 Sub-Saharan countries. Another strategic fit has come with the recent pur-chase of Netto UK, the 194-unit, Danish-owned, limited assortment discounter and supermarket hybrid chain. This acquisition was significant for a number of reasons. It allowed Walmart to build scale in an existing market, as well as expand the com-pany’s knowledge and experience in operating smaller format stores, most of which are about 7,800 square feet. Walmart will also capture an existing base in a sector that is experiencing half of the total grocery retail growth within the small store seg-ments. Additionally, the Netto Stores will offer a strong addition to Walmart’s growing real estate portfolio. By mid-2011, most stores will have been rebranded as “Asda”, Walmart’s operating name in the UK, while the rest have been sold to comply with competition laws. As Walmart looks forward to the next decade’s growth, Zimmerman has out-lined the company’s international growth strategy as a three-part approach. FIrst, in

Figure 4.9 Netto store in the United Kingdom 20

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Latin America, Walmart seeks to build on its existing presence in the region. Second, the company hopes to accelerate growth throughout Asia, primarily concentrating on the markets in China and India. Thirdly, Walmart will continue exploring opportunities within Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The method by which Walmart plans to achieve this expansion is by growing organically, building on existing markets (i.e., the Netto stores, see Figure 4.9), and by becoming a ‘major in the majors.’19 This is ac-complished by focusing on large, high-growth markets.

Since 2000, Walmart’s expansive growth has met some resistance in the larger metropolitan areas across the country. With other retailers also targeting the denser locales, like the German-owned Aldi discount supermarket chain, much of the com-petition should continue through the next decade. Walmart has committed to its in-vestors and the public to explore a new format to roll out its brand. It may be as soon as 2011 that two of the leading ‘big-box’ retailers will battle it out for market share in cities like Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, Washington DC, and New York City (see Figure 4.10).21 Walmart, as seen in its international stock of stores, is no stranger to the smaller format stores, and the company is quickly becoming more adept at operating the ‘small-box’ stores. An interesting paradox exists now that Walmart’s diversification into the smaller format stores appears to be a return to its roots. Sam Walton’s early variety stores were only about 5,000 square feet23 and similar in format and concept to Walmart’s latest concept stores, the Walmart Express and Walmart on Campus. In 2008, Walmart embarked on a test concept in which four small community grocery stores were opened in the Phoenix, Arizona suburbs of Chandler, Gilbert, Mesa, and Tempe. The 15,000- to 20,000-square-foot ‘Marketside’ supermarkets were part of Walmart’s strategy to test the small-format stores before possibly ex-panding to other areas on the West Coast, particularly in Northern and Southern California, where the company has struggled to successfully expand its supercenter prototype. “Walmart has wanted a stronger food and grocery retailing presence in the Bay Area for years,” one article mentions.24 In deploying the small store concept, Walmart had hoped to enjoy the success of one of its major competitors, Tesco. This global grocery and general merchandis-ing retailer and third largest retailer behind Walmart and Carrefour, is testing its small

SMALL FORMAT AND THE URBAN CHALLENGE

Figure 4.10 “Mini-(Wal)mart vs. Micro-Target” 22

Figure 4.11 First Walmart on Campus at the University of Arkansas in Fayette-ville.26

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grocery store concept in California. There are now at least 168 of Tesco’s ‘Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market’ stores located in major metropolitan suburbs of Cali-fornia, Nevada, and Arizona. First opened in late 2007, these small format stores are approximately 12,000 square feet. It is surmised that each of the Walmart and Tesco concepts are in direct response to the apparent growing demand for the smaller for-mat supermarkets. Many outside the organization have viewed the concept of the ‘Marketside by Walmart’ as a complete failure. In March 2011, Walmart U.S. CEO Bill Simon unveiled the company’s latest concept, signaling that possibly the retailer has learned from the Phoenix stores. The ‘Walmart Express’ will be a completely separate format for the retailer. Many common elements will be incorporated from the company’s Neighbor-hood Market prototype, more recently rebranded as ‘Walmart Market.’ The first three 15,000-square-foot small-box stores, due to open by summer 2011, will be located in small towns each within 35 miles of the Bentonville Home Office. The new format will range from 5,000 to 30,000 square feet depending on the application. “The ‘Walmart Express’ format is positioned as both an urban and rural, and in some cases subur-ban, format.”25

Another interesting project is the ‘Walmart on Campus’ store. The first location opened in January 2011 at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville (see Figure 4.11). This first-of-its- kind prototype is expected to become the model for other colleges and universities around the country. Now dubbed as “the smallest Walmart store in the world,” this 3,500-square-foot concept format is a small, limited assortment general merchandise and grocery convenience-type store. Plans for future locations include a pharmacy with over-the-counter drugs and health and beauty products. H&W and Pharmacy Information released on the corporate website announced that Walmart is posi-tioned to begin construction on several Walmart Express stores in Chicago within the next two years.27 The first will open in summer 2011, followed by two Walmart Markets and two Supercenters in 2012 and 2013. Walmart has pursued these sites since 2006 with initial resistance from community groups.28 A Wall Street Journal article purports that the eventual concession has come in the wake of depressed economic times for Chicago and job creation is definitely on the minds of most local leaders.29 All of these locations are within a few miles of the downtown center and show that Walmart’s strategy to these small-box stores will be two-pronged, both in rural and urban areas.

Figure 4.12 Walmart on Campus, interior.30

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Bill Simon revealed in his presentation that hundreds of these small- format stores would be built over the next few years. By the end of 2011, the company is expected to complete 30-40 small-box projects in both rural and urban environments. As noted by several editorial pieces, the move by Walmart to smaller format stores has also raised suspicion that the retailer is looking for possible acquisition of stores like Rite Aid, a national drug store chain. For many years, the organization has exerted a great deal of force in the larger cities in an effort to capture and expand its presence in the heavily populated areas. Walmart has realized that these areas represent a huge untapped source of both rev-enue and potential expansion. Many jurisdictions, however, have remained resistant to Walmart’s existence in their community, and the ‘big-box’ that invariably follows. However, with a variable architectural prototype line-up that will now include several ‘small-box’ options; the company is expected to be successful in many of the once-thought untouchable cities. How profitable the endeavor is will, without a doubt, affect whether Walmart continues its urban expansion beyond what some conclude to be a short-term entree into high-density settings. Whether these experimental stores were part of a larger effort to move into uncharted territory, or simply another Walmart idea, only time will tell. As with many of the company’s experimental projects, “if it doesn’t work, Walmart plans to just close the stores and move on to something else.”31

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Walmart does not continue to hold the number one spot on the Fortune 500 list without a bit of criticism. Vocal activist groups frequently malign the company over its policies, its practices, and its architecture. Some of these organizations have the sole mission to cripple the giant retailer through incremental assaults around the country and are effective at organizing whole communities and city councils against what they call the ‘evils’ of Walmart. In a recent Wall Street Journal article, it was revealed that competitors have hired “Walmart killers” to fund opposition to expansion by the retail giant.1 Labor unions, most prominently the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), based in Washington, D.C., organize much of the anti- Walmart movement.2 Scores of books, articles, editorials, online forums, and blogs continue to be written discussing the details and impact of the world’s largest company in areas of eco-nomics, history, culture, U.S. consumerism, and globalization. It is not just commu-nity organizers that question the retailer’s approach; many architectural scholars and practitioners are vehemently critical of the effects of ‘big-box’ architecture. It is part of the focus of this thesis to examine some of the criticisms received and perception of Walmart’s architecture and related topics.

Walmart is carefully disguised as something ordinary, familiar, even prosaic... But in fact, Walmart is a completely new kind of institution: modern, ad-vanced, potent in ways we’ve never seen before. —Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart Effect

A CRITIQUE OF WALMART’S MODEL

5 (MIS)PERCEPTIONS AND CRITICISMS

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InsearchingforcritiquesofWalmart,itisnotdifficulttofindaplethoraofcom-plaints,arguments,andevaluationsofhowtheybuildbuildings.Themoredifficulttaskis trying to analyze the Walmart approach to design in a nonbiased manner. Some argumentsaresimplyamatteroffactversusfiction.Othermisconceptionsarebasedon more subjective opinions in which neither side could support its line of reasoning with empirical data. Many observations are near-sighted or narrowly focused and at-tempt to impute the problems experienced in isolated situations to the whole system. The following are the most widespread perceptions and criticisms of Walmart’s architecture,alongwithevidenceanddiscussion fromresearchfindings thateithervalidate or nullify the claim:

Criticism: “The stores are dowdy. The aisles are ugly. There’s nothing exciting or different or even colorful at Walmart. It feels almost Soviet in its selection and presentation.”3

Charles Zimmerman, Walmart Vice-President of International Design and Construc-tion, admits that one of Walmart’s constant challenges and struggles is the exterior lookofitsstores.“Wedon’twantuglybuildings,”hesays,“wewantbuildingsthatfitthe community, but at the same time, we do not want to spend our customers’ [and investors] money unwisely.”4 Zimmerman concedes that, when shoppers are given the choice between a more elaborate building and a fairly plain façade, most will select the more elaborate. However, when told that they must pay for it through increased merchandise prices, many will select the other example. This realization by the con-sumer is what has made Walmart’s inimitable value-driven approach to architecture a successful design template for its stores. This practical architectural archetype works. IfWalmartwerenotfixatedonthenumbers,andwerenotmastersof logisticsandterritory, then Walmart would not be Walmart. The giant retailer is the major player, or trendsetter,inestablishingthenewnorminoperationalefficiencywithitsownstockof retail architecture. The question that should be asked is: How can Walmart’s value-driven architecture change for the better?

Criticism: “Walmart’s repeatable, but nimble prototypes suggest an approach to architecture that favors the generic and performance-based over the singu-lar and formal: what-it-does rather than how-it-looks.”5

Stan Davis’ 1987 book Future Perfect introduced the idea of mass customiza-

Figure 5.1 OfficeMax. 9

Figure 5.2 Home Depot.10

Figure 5.3 Big Kmart.11

Figure 5.4 Kohl’s.12

Figure 5.5 Target.13

Figure 5.6 Best Buy.14

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tion, a concept in which a business can have a “tremendous increase in variety and customization without a corresponding increase in costs.”6 The definition ofmasscustomizationwasrefinedto“producinggoodsandservicestomeetindividualcus-tomer’s needswith nearmass production efficiency.”7 While typically intended for applications within the manufacturing and service industries, this core notion of cus-tomization could easily apply to the realm of architecture. When implemented effec-tively, this concept could enhance both the competitive and economic advantages the companyalreadymaintains. Increased site specificity andenhanced individualperformanceandefficiencyateachlocationcouldbeachieved. The so-called Mass Production of Architecture is the notion that many retail-ersaresimplycreatinglargevolumesofstandardizedbuildingsthroughafigurativeassemblylinewithoutmuchthoughttothesite-specificneeds.Walmart’sperceived‘onesizefitsall’approachmustbecomeanobsoletedesignpractice.“Thenumbers-driven, logistics-focused company sees territory in terms not of place, but of per-formance; the individual site – singular and unique to locals – is to Walmart more or less interchangeable.”8 The creation of homogenous retail boxes must no longer be the industry’s standard. Figures 5.1 through 5.6 illustrate this type of big-box re-tail monotony prevalent in today’s everyday landscape. Walmart’s use of prototyping standardsisnotonlyausefulandnecessarytoolforoperationalefficacy,economicbenefit,butcouldalsoassistintheestablishmentofefficientconstructionmethods.The opportunity lies not in the abandonment of such practices, but in the integration and execution of mass customization within the boundaries of a design template. Oneexampleofaretailcompanyimplementingthisconceptwithapparentsuc-cess is the Austria-based regional chain of mostly small-format supermarkets called MPREIS (photos on next page). According to the corporate website:

Responsible building that considers the local environment makes a sustain-able contribution to a high-quality building culture in Tyrol. One trademark is a varied architectural design vocabulary that creates interiors with a pleasant ambience. Places with demanding architecture create an identity for the re-gion and its people. High value is placed on the responsibility for the charac-teristics of the regional landscape and its cultural traditions.15

Undeniably, the adoption of ‘high design’ architecture with its expensive price tag is not the ‘Walmart Way’ of designing architecture, nor constructive for its corpo-

Figure 5.7 MPREIS store in Wattens, Austria.17

Figure 5.10 MPREIS store in Zirl, Austria.20

Figure 5.8 MPREIS store interior (top)Figure 5.9 Exterior parking courtyard in Wattens, Austria (bottom).18

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rate model. As Walmart progresses as a company and continues to develop the ar-chitectural forms, it will be faced with a new class of challenges. The majority of these challenges will come as the company embarks on the urban expansion into some of America’s metropolises. As Jesse LeCavalier has noted:

As the retailer has been learning, cities pose new challenges: they are often more complicated politically; land, labor and construction costs are higher; the logistics of accessing sites and moving merchandise are tricky. Designed for the greenfield parcels of suburbia, Walmart’s logistical operations quickly break down when confronted with the scale and density of urban spaces.16

The giant retailer, with its characteristic zeal, astute business sense, and innova-tion,coulddistilltheconceptsofsitespecificityandcustomizationintoaviableandprofitabletemplateforitsfuturestores. Walmart executive Charles Zimmerman, fully experienced in Walmart’s domes-ticoperationofarchitecturaldesign,makesitclearthathighdesignwillsimplyneverfitinto its business model. “Just because someone is winning awards and getting press,” hesays,“unless[Walmartbelieves]ittricklesdownandbenefitsourcustomersandour mission to ‘save money, live better,’ then I applaud them from an artistic and ar-chitectural standpoint, but we are not going to do it.” 19 For Walmart, no matter how the architectural critics try to redesign the ‘box,’ the reformulation of a proven concept would not only be incompatible with Walmart’s values, but would completely break down the fundamental nature of this type of retail architecture.

Criticism: “The architecture of Walmart, if you can call it that, is at once under- designed and ubiquitous. The company’s approach to its built products also represents the apotheosis of an increasingly common development model that remains somewhat under-scrutinized.” 21 Essentially, some believe Walmart’s ‘Big-Box’ concept needs to be redesigned altogether.

In many instances, the community activists, journalists, historians, politicians, andcityofficialshaveeffectivelyshunnedtheentire‘Big-Box’communitywithminimalinvolvement or research into the topic. Surprisingly, however, design industry profes-sionals in their unsupported condemnation of the Walmart architectural typology have joinedthesegroups.Arguably,itisthistypeofarchitecturethatcouldbenefitthemostfromtheinfluenceofwell-respectedandwell-intentionedacademiciansandpracti-

Figure 5.11 Student work from UACDC studios.2675

tioners. Yet, professionals within the academic and private business sectors continue tofuelthedebateoverthereformulationofa‘BetterBox’concept. OutofalltheSchoolsofArchitectureintheUnitedStates,fewdesignstudioshavebroachedthediscussionofdealingwithlargeretailcenters.Oneofthefewwhohas provided some focus has been the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. Per-haps,becauseoftheschool’slocationjust30milesfromtheWalmartHomeOffice,the school’s architectural department has produced at least two notable projects on whattheycall‘Big-BoxUrbanism.’22 In conjunction with the school’s Community De-signCenter(UACDC),architecturalstudentsin‘TheBig-BoxStudio’investigatedthe‘urbanism’ unique to big-box retail. According to the project’s website:

The challenge was to design the interface between the public realm and the algorithms by which the discount retail industry has become a dominant eco-nomic force... The goal is to develop viable civic expressions within the ge-neric development protocols of these non-place landscapes.23

Whilethefindingsanddesignsolutionsarebothofacademicnature,theinvestigatory experience proved successful in dissecting the issues these large-scale projects face. It was also concluded that in many ways, “Walmart is an ‘urbanism’ all its own.” 24 While this project was a “typological investigation of a Walmart store,” 25 another UACDC studio dealt primarily with a more urban design concept of ‘stacking the big-box.’ The 12-student studio investigated the emerging building type of ‘The Vertical Power Center,’ the idea of combining (stacking) multiple big-box stores to form one

Figure 5.12 ‘Stacking the Big-Box’ project by UACDC students.27

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architectural mass (see Figure 5.12). The studio cites an actual project built in Miami in1998that integratedfivemajor‘Big-Box’storestoformthenation’sfirstVerticalPower Center. The study ultimately proved to be “more infrastructural than architec-tural,asindependentbuildings,ratherthanfloors,arestacked.”

Another noteworthy project, by Los Angeles-based architect and urban de-signer Roger Sherman, explores the potential of big-box architecture to create new andexcitingurbanforms.His“ThinkingOutoftheBig-Box:DuckandCover”project,he says, “explores how the well-developed brand of one retailer in particular – Target – may be strategically deployed towards the creation of new forms of collective life.” Sherman explains some of the challenges that he and others expect as big-box retail encroach on the metropolitan environment:

Big-Box retailers are eager to capture the urban market, faced with statistical data that shows a population shift away from the suburbs and exurbs back to the urban core. However with the steady increase in the value of urban real estate, the suburban, ‘stand-alone’ doctrine of those retailers does not make efficient enough use of land to justify its cost.28

Perhaps these three examples of academic studies into the opportunities of big-box architecturedonotseempracticalorrefinedenoughforreal-worldexecution.Eachproject, however, presents stimulating thought that adds to the dialogue of what may bepossibleforWalmartintermsofrefiningor,insomecasesre-defining,thebigbox.

Figure 5.14 Evolution of Walmart’s exterior brand logo, 1962 to present.31

Figure 5.13 ‘Neo-Colonial’ design for store in Centerville, Ohio.30

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Criticism: “[Walmart] has tended to resort to superficial alterations – cosmetic changes in the appearance of stores – to placate resistant communities... the company has become adept at cosmetically modifying its prototypes, and can do so with minimal disruption.”29

These observations are true for many of the supercenter prototype stores built by Walmart throughout the late-1990s through today (See Figure 5.13). What became increasingly evident was that during this time Walmart did not have guidelines to con-vey a consistent brand image for its stores. When it did implement certain ‘Walmart-specific’elements, itdidsovery inconsistently.Therewasaperiod in the retailer’sarchitectural history in which it tailored elements of the exterior elevations of its stores to jurisdictional demands. It was during this time, the company was beginning to lose sight of what they wanted in the image of its buildings. These ‘stores of the com-munity,’sought tobring regionalarchitectural influences intoeachprototype.WhatWalmart lost, though some claim they never had it, was its own corporate identity. Through the evolution of its exterior brand, Figure 5.14 demonstrates Walmart’s trans-formation from the rural Arkansas-based company to arguably the world’s most so-phisticated and powerful retail power. By2009,withtheadoptionofanewcorporatebranding,thein-housearchitec-turalteam,alongwithoutsidedesignconsultants,developeditsbrandfilter,atoolbywhich each store can be measured to ensure the Walmart brand is met. According to this method, a new, relocated, or expanded store, and even its remodel projects, are

Figure 5.15 Walmart store in Oroville, California.33

Figure 5.16 Rendering of Walmart urban prototype.34

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evaluatedagainstpre-establishedcriteriaanddesignguidelines.For thefirst time,Walmart could emanate a consistent architectural look steeped in the company’s inherent values. According to the branding guidelines, Walmart Architecture must be “CRISP”:

Caring (compassionate, not cold)Real (approachable, not phony) Innovative (smart, not complacent) Innovative (smart, not complacent)Straightforward (simple, not complicated) Positive (motivating, not pessimistic)32

Walmart continues to follow the standards rigorously and the implementation of these architectural requirements can be seen throughout its latest store prototypes.

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Typical of most retail architecture, Walmart prototypes put the greatest design emphasis on the front of the store. A component of Walmart’s new architectural brand establishes three distinct visual zones of the façade. The “customer zone,”35definedas the area up to 8 feet above the ground level, is reserved for architectural elements and local materials that tie the store to its community. The “approachable zone,” 35

from 8 to 16 feet, delineates the functional elements such as awnings and signage to denote the entrances, or vestibules. The remaining space of the façade above 16 feet is dedicated to Walmart’s brand elements, which are to compose the store’s overall image and visibility at a farther distance. In the end, the new clearly articulated brand and the corresponding implementation guidelines demonstrate that the company is adapting to a new directions for its value-driven architecture.

Criticism: Walmart stores are simply too big. After the building of the first hy-permarket stores, one customer complained, “I won’t be back until it shrinks.” 36

Since experimenting with the hypermarket concept in the late 1980s, Walmart has struggled with the appropriate sizing of its stores, searching for an effective retail concept,while alsoproducing aprofitablemodel.37 Early on, Walmart realized the larger ‘hypermart’ stores were not economically feasible, nor desired by its custom-ers. While the company’s growth has continued to be fueled primarily by the larger supercenter models, Walmart is currently in an architectural re-evaluation in its quest to expand into more urban areas. In its challenge to develop adaptable prototypes of allsizesandforms,thecompanyhopestoofferbothversatilityandflexibilitywithinallthe formats. Ironically, Walmart, who is well-known for placing pressure on its vendors and suppliers to ‘right-size’ the packaging of merchandise, may need to heed its own advice and continue to investigate ways to ‘right-size’ its own buildings.

Criticism: “Walmart remains heavily reliant on personal automobile use – the assumption is that customers will be motorists.” 39

Presumptive criticisms such as these cannot simply be answered by the architecture, but are part of the greater issue of American life. Architecture is not transformative enough to modify an entire society’s reliance on the automobile. Urban projects, like the multi-story Walmart/Sam’s Club project currently under construction near the ur-ban core of downtown Dallas (see Figure 5.17 on next page), are examples where the consideration of the vehicle has impacted the overall design and development more than the typical project.

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Criticism: Walmart’s building model perpetuates sprawl.

Simply put, Walmart reacts to the market. The company does not build with expec-tations thatcustomersfind itsstores; rather, itssophisticated realty team identifiesdevelopment patterns in cities across the nation and deliberately targets areas that are ripe for growth. In response to the announcement of Walmart’s expansion to more urban areas, one article read, “no corporation has been more emblematic of the worst of suburban sprawl than this one.”41 The notion that Walmart does in fact contribute to an ever-sprawling American suburban landscape would be an insurmountable task to substantiate. There is evidence for an argument, however, that the impact of large national homebuilders like DR Horton, Pulte, and Centex, with their ‘cookie-cutter’ tracthomesaresignificantcontributorsinthespreadofsuburbansprawl.42 Walmart’s building model does not perpetuate suburban sprawl; it merely takes advantage of it. Walmart generally relies on having the type of density afforded by the types of ‘American-dream’ communities before it looks at a location for a new store.

Criticism: The ‘Dark Store’ Dilemma: Revisited – In an article entitled “Walmart Plans to Grow by Shrinking,” the author predicts that Walmart’s new strategy to build more smaller-format stores will lead to the abandonment of even more of their older discount stores.43

Walmart as a company does not, in image or action, represent regression. While thecompanymaystillstrugglewithrepurposingits‘darkstores,’ithasmadesignifi-cant progress in recent years. Walmart can learn better practices from the principles espoused by smart growth advocates, preservationists, and professionals within the

Figure 5.17 Walmart-Sam’s Club multi-story store in Dallas, Texas.40

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urban design community. How can Walmart’s architecture help to reshape our every-day city and our commercial landscape? In the book Retrofitting Suburbia: Urban Design Solutions for Redesigning Suburbs, Ellen Dunham-Jones and June Williamson offer case study analyses with some best practice scenarios when it comes to opportunities of site repurposing, infillprojects,andpossibleturnaroundstrategiesforabandonedbig-boxes.Throughincremental adaptive reuses of abandoned ‘big-box’ stores or large retail centers, the ability to revitalize and urbanize a depressed suburban area is possible. The two authors primarily advocate using the over-sized structures for communal activities. Many repurposed Walmart stores have become churches, civic buildings, or com-munity recreational facilities. The goal is “’thinking outside the box’ and creative re-programming where adaptive reuse enriches communities’ social infrastructure in the process.”44

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An examination of Walmart’s role in both the retail industry and architectural sector reveals that, in spite of the public’s frequent harsh criticism of the retail giant, this company has done more in the past fifty years to innovate and progress modern retail architecture than any other single driving force. It was quite literally the idea of one man that created a company. This company has formulated a way of architecture so infused with the ideals of its business practices that the two are inseparable. It is not only the principles which symbolize the company, but also the processes by which such architecture is constructed, operated and constantly refined, that repre-sent Walmart’s value-driven architectural model. In his article, Jesse Cavalier asks, “What might the field of architecture learn from Walmart? What new research avenues, urban forms, building types and spa-tial conditions might emerge?”1 Clearly, it may be that in continuing to explore such questions that the Walmart model may be given certain legitimacy. The insights into Walmart’s strategies and tactics of reorganization, reformulation, and adaptation that are so ingrained in its corporate culture can serve as a comprehensive source of in-formation when designing repeatable prototypical architecture within our continually evolving everyday landscape.

All fine architectural values are human values, else not valuable. —Frank Lloyd Wright

We shape our buildings; thereafter they shape us. —Winston Churchill

SAVED MONEY; DESIGNED BETTER

6 CONCLUSION

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LeCavalier also aptly challenges Walmart by stating that, “the company’s prag-matic approach to territory — its use of buildings as political tools to circumvent nar-row legislative constraints — suggests that architecture can acquire a new potency when coordinated skillfully, and in sufficient quantity... serious research into Walmart’s architecture could yield more than better boxes: all those numbers could add up to real change.” 2 Walmart’s architectural growth potential is unrestrained and should not be bridled by seemingly simplistic methodological approach, but released to flourish with technology as its aid and advancement at its core. To remain a thriving company, Walmart must not only continue to innovate, but also protect the integrity of its most tangible embodiment of its values, that is, its architecture. One may ask: What has become the real value of Walmart Architecture for the world? There are attributes of its architectural process that contribute not only real data and research, but also offer some “best practices” applicable at a larger scale to the entire sector of retail architecture. Perhaps, it is the company’s sustain-able practices, its low-cost business model, its utilitarian architecture, its constant drive for innovation and improvement, its ability to manage change, and its perfection of methodology that form the basics of Walmart’s way of architecture. It may be a combination of these characteristics that define this unique process of value-driven architecture.

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In recent decades, prototypical retail and commercial architecture has becomecommonplace throughout our everyday landscape. In “Seventy-five Percent: The Next Big Architectural Project,” Ellen Dunham-Jones states that, “With blithe inconsis-tency, architects and architectural scholars point to the seemingly undesigned sprawl of suburbia and say, ‘Don’t blame us, we had nothing to do with it.’ This avoidance is precisely the problem.”1 Arguably, for most, Walmart is the most predominant icon of suburbia. Perhaps more than any other company, Walmart represents both the core values and way of life of more than half of Americans who live out in the peripheries of cities.2 • After all, its founder Sam Walton unabashedly focused much of the early growth in ‘small town America,’ where his message of ‘everyday low prices’ resonated with the rural residents. Some may see this observation as a clear admission of the absence of real design in Walmart’s stores. Dunham-Jones explains that some within the design community believe that the “overwhelmingly formulaic, market-driven, un-imaginative designs [are] unworthy of the designation ‘architecture.’”3 The article can be summarized that “Architects design only a small percentage of what gets built in the United States.” Ultimately, it is a challenge for architects and industry professionals

We will not be measured by our aspirations, we will be measured by our actions. —H. Lee Scott, Jr., Former CEO, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

TOWARD A ‘BETTER BOX’

• First reported in the 1995 Census American Housing Survey, it showed that 47 percent of American households were in suburbs. This figure is reasonably presumbed to have re-mained on a steady increase. According to a CNN article, American suburbs have seen steady growth - between 1970 and 2000, the percentage of the total population living in sub-urbs grew from 38 percent to 50 percent.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

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alike to embrace this terrain vague 4 with a new passion of design. It is also surmised that, with the increasing influence on younger generation from companies like Apple and IKEA, and with the boom of technology shrinking the globe, an abundance of items such as electronics, furniture, and packaging on food products embrace what many might call great design. The accessibility of design in our society is becoming more apparent each day. Because of Walmart’s size, it too has the opportunity to not only influence purchasing habits, but also provide a pleas-ant and enjoyable shopping experience for its customers. Sam Walton said, “The feeling our customers have when they leave our stores determines how soon they will be back.” This inherent belief ought to be the driving force in what shapes the future of Walmart’s value-driven architecture. Walmart’s challenge will be to evolve with its customers’ growing sense of de-sign in the world in which they live, the products they purchase and the architecture they admire. Recent years have shown that Walmart has a tremendous ability to adapt and transform as a company. For Walmart’s customers, and ultimately its investors, now is the time to embrace the new culture of design. Inevitably, one must ask how is this to be done. There are two areas of considerations that will assist in the design of a ‘Bet-ter Box’: First consideration: the realm of sustainability. Walmart has undoubtedly demonstrated its commitment to researching, testing, developing, and monitoring the most efficient and least environmentally damaging systems for its stores to operate. However, perhaps most important in its urban expansion, the company must not for-sake re-thinking how its stores can integrate into existing sites with not only minimal disruption, but also the most economic and sustainable impact on the community. Many parts of the U.S. still experiencing depressed times could actually profit from the economic ‘disruption’ of a Walmart, provided the store serves as the community’s economic driver in the revitalization of an area. Can one envision a Walmart at the core of a thriving mixed-use, New Urbanistic neighborhood? One in which the build-ings, site, and economic viability are examined during the redevelopment or retrofit-ting stage. This new form of living, where retail shops, office spaces, restaurants, a bookstore, and schools are not only within walking distance, but the design of each component is integrated in the life fabric of a community. The second consideration is in the area of design. Most critics, and some within Walmart’s organization, have testified to its architecture being devoid of logi-

Figures 7.1 Sam’s Club prototype development.5

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cal, purposeful, and responsible design decision-making. As discussed, there was a period in which the company’s stores represented a hodge-podge of styles, ele-ments, and exterior articulation. Walmart’s architectural brand identity at times has been muddled, gaudy, overstated, clunky, and above all, inconsistent. A simplified, consistent design could offer brand clarity, reduced costs in terms of detailing and construction, and customer enjoyment within the space. Tom Peters, American busi-nessman and writer of In Search of Excellence, has been quoted saying, “almost all quality improvement comes via simplification of design, manufacturing... layout, pro-cesses, and procedures.”6 When Walmart’s caters to the whims of jurisdictional man-dates and out-of- context design recommendations, it devalues its own architectural integrity. The agglomeration of exterior elements can begin to resemble the neighbor bank, school, or municipal building. As explained earlier, remedial action against such homogeneity can be achieved by the use of mass customization as illustrated in the Walmart store in Avon, Colorado (see Figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4). Walmart’s ability to harness the architectural application of this idea could lead to greater site specificity and overall better design. It is important to realize that the requisite of low cost does not preclude design. Perhaps the start of a new era is for Walmart to encourage fresh ideas through an open-to-all design competition for its future prototypes. This work’s goal has been to shed light on the operations of Walmart and en-lighten the reader on its architectural design model. Yet, it is the desire of the author that this work will become a call-to-action for those within the academic and design disciplines to get more involved in the design of everyday architecture. Equally, as one of the world’s largest procurers of architectural services, Walmart, and the profession-als and academicians that work with this retail industry icon, have an extraordinary opportunity to continue reshaping and redefining the retail sector of architecture. By utilizing its size and the magnitude of its actions, Walmart has not only an opportunity, but arguably a responsibility to be the leader in the journey toward a better box.

Figure 7.2 Exterior of Walmart store in Avon, Colorado.7

Figure 7.3 Site-specific design dem-onstrated at Walmart store in Avon, Colorado.8

Figure 7.4 Walmart store in Avon, Colorado, a unique connection to its surroundings.9

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Dunham-Jones, Ellen. “Seventy-five Percent: The Nest Big Architectural Project.”(2000) in Harvard Design Magazine, Fall 2000 Issue Number 12.Cole, Justin R. “Everyday Low Impact: Wal-Mart, LEED, and the Future of the Retail Industry,” The University of Georgia, 2008.University of Arkansas Community Design Center, Big Box Studio Volume 1 “The Vertical Power Center: Stacking Big Box Retail. 12 Project Investigations into an Emerging Building Type” Spring 2003, Available at http://uacdc.uark.edu/books/excerpts/17The_Vertical_Power_Center.pdf. Accessed on February 11, 2011.Zook, Matthew A. and Mark Graham, “Wal-Mart Nation: Mapping the Reach of a Retail Colossus.” Published in Wal-Mart World: The World’s Biggest Corporation in the Global Economy edited by Stanley D. Brunn.

Walmart Annual Reports, 1972 – 2010. Available at http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-reportsannual

Brunn, Stanley D. (2006) Wal-Mart World: The World’s Biggest Corporation in the Global Economy, New York, Routledge.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH

ANNUAL CORPORATE REPORTS

BOOKS

REFERENCES

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Christensen, Julia (2008) Big-Box Reuse, Cambridge: MIT Press. Dunham-Jones, Ellen and June Williamson (2009) Retrofitting Suburbia: Urban Design Solutions for Redesigning Suburbs, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Fishman, Charles (2007 paperback edition) The Wal-Mart Effect: How the World’s Most Powerful Company Really Works – And How It’s Transforming the American Economy, New York: Penguin Books.Garris, Leah (2006) “Real Estate According to Wal-Mart” in Buildings magazine, March 2006. Available at http://www.buildings.com/ArticleDetails/tabid/3321/ArticleID/2980/Default. aspx. Accessed March 10, 2011.Kowinski, William (1985) The Malling of America: An Inside Look at the Great Consumer Paradise. New York: William Morrow.LeCavalier, Jesse (2010) “All Those Numbers: Logistics, Territory and Walmart”, in The Design Observer Group. May 24, 2010. Available at http://places.designobserver.com/entryprint.html?entry=13598, accessed August 21, 2010.Lichtenstein, Nelson (2006) Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, New York, The New Press.Lichtenstein, Nelson (2009) The Retail Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New World of Business, New York: Metropolitan Books.Rome, Adam (2001) The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism, New York: Cambridge University Press.Soderquist, Don (2005) The Wal-Mart Way: The Inside Story of the Success of the World’s Largest Company. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Inc.Vance, Sandra S. and Roy V. Scott (2004) Wal-Mart: A History of Sam Walton’s Retail Phenomenon. New York: Twayne Publishers.Walton, Sam with John Huey (1993 paperback edition) Sam Walton Made in America My Story, New York: Bantam Books.

Carrefour, http://www.carrefour.com/ Massmart, http://www.massmart.co.za/Miejer, http://www.meijer.com/MPREIS, http://www.mpreis.com/Sam’s Club, http://www.samsclub.com/

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Bryant, Doug, AIA, NCARB – retired Senior Architect, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. In-person interview, Bentonville, Arkansas on January 7, 2011.Harris, Raymond, AIA – Founder and Principal, Raymond Harris & Associates Architects. Moseley, Don – Director of Sustainable Facilities, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Telephone interview on March 31, 2011.O’Quinn, Shade, AIA – Principal, Raymond Harris & Associates Architects.Soderquist, Don – retired Senior Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. In-person interview, Bentonville, Arkansas on January 7, 2011.Webb, Mike – Real Estate Manager, Realty Sales & Leasing for Walmart Realty. In-person interview, Bentonville, Arkansas on January 7, 2011.Zimmerman, Charles – Vice President of International Design & Construction, Walmart International. Telephone interview on February 22, 2011.

Armborst, Tobias, Daniel D’Oca and Georgeen Theodore. “Community: The American Way of Living” September 7, 2009. Available at http://places.designobserver.com/feature/com munity- the-american-way-of-living/10647/. Accessed on April 10, 2011.Armen, “Less Hyphen, More Burst for Walmart” June 30, 2008. Available at http://www.underconsideration.com/brandnew/archives/less_hyphen_more_burst_for_ wal.php. Accessed on February 11, 2011.Benfield, Kaid, “Walmart goes urban: be careful what we wish for?” September 23, 2010. Available at http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kbenfield/walmart_goes_urban_be_ careful.html. Accessed on April 10, 2011.Big-Box Toolkit, A Project of the Institute for Local Self-Reliance (2007) “Big-Box Blight: The Spread of Dark Stores.” Available at http://www.bigboxtoolkit.com/images/pdf/bigboxblight.pdf.Bickers, James “GlobalShop: Walmart on the return of retail architecture.” March 17, 2010. Available at http://www.retailcustomerexperience.com/article_print /21520/GlobalShop- Walmart-on-the-return-of-retail-architecture. Accessed on February 5, 2011.

Tesco, http://www.tesco.com/Walmart, http://walmartstores.com/Walmart Realty, http://www.walmartrealty.com/

INTERVIEWS

ONLINE ARTICLES

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Bustillo, Miguel. “Wal-Mart Figures Time Is Ripe for Chicago Push” in The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2009. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123429120871869301. html. Accessed on February 5, 2011.“Carrefour Plans 1.5 bln Eur Hypermarket Revamp,” September 16, 2010. Available at http://www.foodwinenet.com/carrefour-plans-1-5-bln-eur-hypermarket-revamp/. Accessed April 24, 2011.Chaban, Matt. “Warding Off Walmart: Can the Mega-Chain Break into Chicago?” April 19, 2010. Available at http://www.archpaper.com/e-board_rev.asp?News_ID =4419. Accessed on February 10, 2011.Dillow, Clay. “Wal-Mart Plans to Grow by Shrinking” October 22, 2009. Available at http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/clay-dillow/culture-buffet/wal-marts-new-strategy- grow-shrinking. Accessed on February 20, 2011.Farfan, Barbara “2010 Retail Store Closings: U.S. Retailers Downsizing or Going Out of Business” (2010) Available at http://retailindustry.about.com/od/ storeclosingsandopenings/a/Store_Closings_list_2010_us_retail_chains.htm. Accessed on February 20, 2011. Garris, Leah, “Real Estate According to Wal-Mart; Wal-mart makes repurposing unoccupied buildings and organization-wide priority by defining philosophies that work.” (2006) Available at http://www.buildings.com/ArticleDetails/tabid/3321/ArticleID/2980/Default. aspx. Accessed on September 18,2010.Gills, Todd “Now Open: Walmart on Campus” (2011) Available at http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2011/01/14/now-open-walmart-on-campus/. Accessed on February 10, 2011.“Going Rural: First Three Smaller-Format ‘Walmart Express’ Stores Will Be in Small Town Arkansas”. (2011) Available at http://freshneasybuzz.blogspot.com/2011/03/going-rural- first-three-smaller-format.html. Accessed on March 9, 2011.Hunt, Harold D. and John Ginder, “Lights Out: When Wal-Marts Go Dark” (2005) Tierra Grande, April 2005, Publication 1720.Longo, Donald “Wal-Mart gambles that Hypermart will pay off in small town, USA” in Discount Store News, February 15, 1988. Available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ m3092/is_n4_v27/ai_6352731/. Accessed on February 12, 2011.Markowitz, Arthur “Hypermart USA units get SuperCenter- type facelift – Wal-Mart Supercenter combination stores; Hypermart USA hypermarkets.” In Discount Store News. April 9, 1990. Available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_n7_v29/ ai_8967611. Accessed on February 12, 2011.

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Martin, Timothy W., “Chicago Council Approves Wal-Mart Expansion” in The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2010. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703426004575339183042383648. html. Accessed on February 5, 2011.“Most Innovative Companies,” Fast Company. Available at http://www.fastcompany.com/mic/2010Misonzhnik, Elaine. “Big-Box Giants Downsize to Dive Productivity with Smaller, Urban Stores” March 30, 2011. Available at http://retailtrafficmag.com/retailing/analysis/big_box_gi ants_downsize_03302011/. Accessed on April 4, 2011.Mitchell, Stacy “Sharp Rise in Shopping Center Vacancies” (2008) Available at http://www.newrules.org/retail/news/sharp-rise-shopping-center-vacancies . Accessed on February 20, 2011.Rhodes, Margaret. “Mini-(Wal)Mart vs. Micro-Target: Inside the Battle for the Next Frontier of Big-Box Retail.” (2011) Available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/152/mini- walmart-vs-micro-target.html. Accessed on February 10, 2011.“Simon Says: Walmart U.S. Chief Unveils ‘Walmart Express’ Logo; Says Hundreds of Smaller- Format Stores On the Way” March 10, 2011. Available at http://freshneasybuzz. blogspot.com/search?q=simon+says. Accessed on March 10, 2011.“Wal-Mart has 356 ‘Dark Stores’ available for Sale or Lease” (2005) Available at http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.php?readstory=1757. Accessed on September 19, 2010.“Wal-Mart hatches a ‘Super’ winner – Wal-Mart SuperCenters- company profile” in Discount Store News. December 19, 1988. Available at http://finarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ m3092/is_n24_v27/ai_6917732/ . Accessed on February 12, 2011.“Wal-Mart launches Hypermart USA; 1st hypermarket places discounter on leading edge of retailing in the U.S.” in Discount Store News, January 18, 1988. Available at http://find articles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_n2_v27/ai_6286955/. Accessed on February 12, 2011.“Walmart Moves Back to Core Pricing Message; But Some Consumers May Be Finding Needs Better Met Elsewhere.” March 20, 2011. Available at http://adage.com/print/149494. Accessed on April 4, 2011.“Walmart on Pace to Create 10,000 Jobs in Chicago by 2015.” Available at Walmart’s Corporate Website. Accessed March 16, 2011.

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“Wal-Mart’s Small-Format Marketside Strategy is Currently Neither A 1,500 Store, $10 Billion A Year Mega Plan, Nor A Mere Four Store Test.” August 11, 2008. Available at http:// freshneasybuzz.blogspot.com/2008/08/wal-mart-incs-marketside-store- format.html. Accessed on February 11, 2011.“Wal-Mart tests similar hypermarkets – Hypermarket USA, Wal-Mart SuperCenter” in Nationwide DSN Report. March 28, 1988. Available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m3092/is_n7_v27/ai_6524175/. Accessed on February 12, 2011.

Betsky, Aaron. “Big Box Museums: Considering the much touted and costly new museum structures in Boston, Los Angeles and Chicago, a critic and museum director asks if the money has been well spent.” (2011) in Art in America, February 2011 Issue.Bustillo, Miguel. “With Sales Flabby, Wal-Mart Turns to Its Core.” In The Wall Street Journal March 21, 2011.Gunther, Marc. “The Green Machine,” Fortune, August 7, 2006.Walmart World, Issue 1, 2011.Werbach, Adam. “Working with the Enemy,” Fast Company, September 2007.

O’Quinn, Shade. “The Big Green Box” for AIA Dallas Chapter meeting, March 15, 2010. Simon, Bill. Bank of America Merrill Lynch Consumer Conference, March 10, 2011

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2005.

“Carrefour,” Creative Commons License, Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrefour. Accessed on February 10, 2011.“Hypermarket,” Creative Commons License, Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypermarket. Accessed on February 10, 2011.“Hypermart USA,” Creative Commons License, Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypermart_USA. Accessed on Febuary 10, 2011.“Meijer,” Creative Commons License, Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meijer. Accessed on February 10, 2011.

WIKIPEDIA RESOURCES

PERIODICALS

PRESENTATIONS

REPORTS

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1 Don Soderquist, The Wal-Mart Way: The Inside Story of the Success of the World’s Largest Company, Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2005.2 Matthew A. Zook and Mark Graham, “Wal-Mart Nation: Mapping the Reach of a Retail Colossus.” Published in Wal-Mart World: The World’s Biggest Corporation in the Global Economy edited by Stanley D. Brunn.3 Zook and Graham, loc.cit.4 Jesse LeCavalier, “All Those Numbers: Logistics, Territory and Walmart,” in The Design Observer Group. May 24, 2010. Available at http://places.designobserver.com/en tryprint.html?entry=13598, accessed August 21, 2010.5 U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2008.6 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New World of Business, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009, p. 5.7 Top 100 Retailers, article posted on Stores.org. Available at http://www.stores.org/top- 100-retailers-08 LeCavalier, loc.cit.9 Walmart Annual Report, 2010, p. 9.10 Shade O’Quinn, “The Big Green Box” presentation.11 Zook and Graham, loc.cit.12 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2005.13 Walmart corporate website, 2011.14 Ibid.15 “Most Innovative Companies,” Fast Company. Available at http://www.fastcompany. com/mic/2010.

1 Ce!ebrate Arkansas magazine, June 2010.2 Wal-Mart Annual Report, 1972, p. 4.3 Sam Walton with John Huey, Sam Walton Made in America My Story, New York: Ban- tam Books, 1993, p. XI, XIII.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 01: WALMART’S BEGINNING

ENDNOTES

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4 Walmart corporate website. Available at http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/321.aspx.5 Walmart corporate website. Available at http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/297.aspx.6 Walton, op.cit., p. 38.7 Ibid., p. 42.8 Photo courtesy of Timothy Gilliam, Creative Commons license. Photo taken May 14, 2010.9 Walton, op.cit., p.27.10 Ibid., p. 44 – 45.11 Ibid., p. 49.12 Ibid., p. 51.13 Reference text from Michel de Certeau (1984), The Practice of Everyday Life, Chapter 3: “Making Do”: Uses and Tactics.14 Walton, op.cit., p. 52.15 Ibid., p. 54.16 Walmart Annual Report, 1976, p.15.17 Walton, op.cit., p. 55.18 Ibid., p. 61.19 Ibid., p. 63-64.20 Data provided from Walmart Annual Reports.21 Walton, op.cit., p. 127.22 Ibid., p. 153.23 Walmart corporate website. Available at http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/297.aspx.24 LeCavalier, loc.cit.25 Walton, op.cit., p. 160.26 Walmart corporate website. Available at http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/321.aspx.27 Data provided from Walmart Annual Reports, information available for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. since incorporation date of October 31, 1969.28 DetailedfiscalyeardataisduetobereleasedonJune3,2011.Preliminaryfig ure given on corporate website. Available at http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoe nix.zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-irhome29 Walmart corporate website. Available at http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoenix. zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-unitcount.30 Walmart Annual Report, 1975, p. 5.31 Walmart Annual Report, 1980.32 Walmart Annual Report, 1984, p. 5.33 Ibid.34 Photo courtesy of Discount Merchandiser from Vance and Scott, op.cit.35 Information provided by Russ Owens, Walmart Remodel Design Manager. Photo cour- tesy of RHA Architects.36 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.37 Ibid.38 Photo courtesy of Doug Bryant.39 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.40 Ibid.41 Photo courtesy of Walmart corporate website.42 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.43 Photo courtesy of Walmart corporate website.44 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.45 Photo available at Walmart Realty corporate website by BRR Architecture.

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1 Walmart Annual Report, 1972, Available at http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoenix. zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-reportsannual, p. 4.2 Walmart Annual Report, 1972.3 There are digital mapping programs, courtesy of FlowingData, that have tracked Walmart’sandSam’sgrowth.Availableathttp://projects.flowingdata.com/walmart/.4 Don Soderquist interview. Bentonville, Arkansas, January 7, 2011.5 Ibid.6 Walmart Annual Report, 1977.7 LeCavalier,loc.cit.8 Ibid.9 Walmart Realty corporate website.10 Walmart Annual Report, 1972.11 Mike Webb interview. Bentonville, Arkansas, January 7, 2011.12 Leah Garris, “Real Estate According to Wal-Mart” in Buildings magazine, March 2006. Available at http://www.buildings.com/ArticleDetails/tabid/3321/ArticleID/2980/Default. aspx.13 Webb interview, loc.cit.14 Garris, loc.cit.15 Ibid.16 Walmart Realty corporate website. Available at http://www.walmartrealty.com/Build ings/Default.aspx. Accessed March 20, 2011.17 Ibid.18 Garris, loc.cit.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Ibid.

1 Rendering courtesy of RHA Architects.2 Walton, op.cit., p. 216.3 Courtesy of the Walmart Design Collective.4 Courtesy of the Walmart Design Collective.5 Walmart Annual Report, 1980.6 Rendering courtesy of RHA Architects.7 Photo courtesy of Discount Merchandiser from Vance and Scott, op.cit.8 Ibid., p. 1199 Information provided by Raymond Harris, architect of record for the ‘Farm and Ranch’ store concept.11 Walmart Annual Report, 2010.12 Soderquist interview, loc.cit.13 Wikipedia resource. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrefour.14 Ibid.15 Image from online article, “Carrefour Plans 1.5 bln Eur Hypermarket Revamp,” Septem- ber 16, 2010. Available at http://www.foodwinenet.com/carrefour-plans-1-5-bln-eur- hypermarket-revamp/. Accessed April 24, 2011.

CHAPTER 02: WALMART’S REAL ESTATE

CHAPTER 03: WALMART’S ARCHITECTURE

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16 Wikimedia Commons license. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tesco_Kings ton_Park.jpg17 Vance and Scott, op.cit., p.124.18 Ibid., p. 125.19 Idem.20 Idem.21 Walton, op.cit., p. 254.22 Walmart Annual Report, 1988, p. 6.23 Vance and Scott, op.cit., p.126.24 Photos by Andrew Moon, April 11, 2011.25 Walmart corporate website.26 Soderquist interview, loc.cit.27 Ibid.28 Vance and Scott, op.cit., p.133.29 Discount Store News articles circa 1988 to 1990. See References.30 “Wal-Mart launches Hypermart USA; 1st hypermarket places discounter on leading edge of retailing in the U.S.” in Discount Store News, January 18, 1988. Available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_n2_v27/ai_6286955/.Accessedon February 12, 2011.31 Nelson Lichtenstein (2006) Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, New York, The New Press. Source: Walmart Annual Reports, various years.32 Garris, loc.cit.33 Garris, loc.cit.34 Julia Christensen (2008) Big-Box Reuse, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 122-143.35 Garris, loc.cit.36 Big-Box Toolkit, A Project of the Institute for Local Self-Reliance “Big-Box Blight: The Spread of Dark Stores,” 2007. Available at http://www.bigboxtoolkit.com/images/pdf/ bigboxblight.pdf.37 Ibid.38 Garris, loc.cit.39 Marketing packages are available for public view and download through the ‘Building Disposition’ portion of Walmart Realty’s corporate website. Available at http://www. walmartrealty.com/.40 Garris, loc.cit.41 Barbara Farfan, “2010 Retail Store Closings: U.S. Retailers Downsizing or Going Out of Business.” Available at http://retailindustry.about.com/od/storeclosingsandopenings/a/ Store_Closings_list_2010_us_retail_chains. htm. Accessed February 20, 2011.42 “Big-Box Blight,” loc.cit.43 Stacy Mitchell, Big-Box Swindle: The True Cost of Mega-Retailers and the Fight for America’s Independent Businesses, Boston: Beacon Press, 2006.44 Stacy Mitchell “Sharp Rise in Shopping Center Vacancies,” June 19, 2008. Available at http://www.newrules.org/retail/news/sharp-rise-shopping-center-vacancies. Accessed February 20, 2011.45 “Wal-Mart has 356 ‘Dark Stores’ available for Sale or Lease,” 2005. Available at http:// www.sprawl- busters.com/search.php?readstory=1757. Accessed on September 19, 2010.46 Walmart Realty corporate website. Available at http://www.walmartrealty.com/Build ings/Default.aspx. Accessed March 20, 2011.47 Institute for Local Self-Reliance. Available at http://www.newrules.org/retail48 “Making Global Markets” essay in Stanley Brunn’s Wal-Mart World, op.cit. p. 113.

103

49 Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart Effect: How the World’s Most Powerful Company Re- ally Works – And How It’s Transforming the American Economy, 2007.50 Walton, op.cit., p. 272-273.51 Walton, op.cit., p. 6.52 LeCavalier, loc.cit.53 Ibid.54 “A New Reality” in Walmart World, corporate magazine. Issue 1, 2011.55 Ibid.56 LeCavalier, loc.cit.57 Ibid.58 Ibid.59 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 Ibid.62 “Supply Chain Management, Inc. System Overview,” Brochure, Dematic Corporation, 2008.63 Walmart corporate website.64 LeCavalier, loc.cit.65 Harris interview, loc.cit.66 Aaron Betsky (2011), “Big-Box Museums,” Art in America magazine, February 2011.67 Ibid.68 Harris interview, loc.cit.69 Walmart corporate website.70 Image courtesy of RHA Architects.71 Photo by Andrew Moon, July 2010.72 Image courtesy of RHA Architects.73 Photo by Andrew Moon, August 2010.74 Image courtesy of RHA Architects.75 Photo by Andrew Moon, April 2011.76 Photo by Andrew Moon, April 2011.77 Image from online article, “Walmart’s Marketside Disappears from the Web but May Rise from Phoenix,” January 8, 2010. Available at http://www.bnet.com/blog/retail/ walmarts-marketside-disappears-from-the-web-but-may-rise-from- phoenix/6281. Accessed April 25, 2011.78 Image available at http://www.whatsthebeef.net/post/522609883/supermercado-de- walmart. Accessed April 24, 2011. The Supermercado de Walmart concept is to: “con- vertanexistingWalmartneighborhoodmarketstoreintoahigh-efficiencyhispanic- focused retail grocery format.”79 Image courtesy of RHA Architects.80 Image by Retailnet Group, 2009. Available at http://archive.constantcontact.com/ fs028/1102142477435/archive/1102673259308.html. Accessed April 24, 2011.81 Don Moseley interview, March 31, 2011.82 Transcript from “Walmart: Twenty-First Century Leadership” presented by CEO H. Lee Scott, Jr., October 24, 2005.83 Marc Gunther (2006), “The Green Machine” Fortune magazine, August 7, 2006.84 Ibid.85 Danielle Sacks (2007) “Working with the Enemy,” Fast Company, September 2007.86 Gunther, loc.cit.87 Ibid.88 Walmart corporate website.

104

89 Moseley interview, loc.cit.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.92 Walmart corporate website. News release available at http://www.walmartstores.com/ download/2967.pdf.93 Moseley interview, loc.cit.94 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.95 Ibid.96 Ibid.97 Walmart corporate website, ‘Sustainable Buildings’ SVN tab.98 Moseley interview, loc.cit.99 Photo by Andrew Moon, June 2010.100 Ibid.101 Ibid.102 Ibid.103 Photo by Andrew Moon, April 2011.104 Ibid.105 Ibid.106 Ibid.107 Moseley interview, loc.cit.108 Moseley interview, loc.cit.109 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.110 Moseley interview, loc.cit.

1 “ASDA adopts ultra low-energy ventilation at Langley Mill,” online article. November 5, 2010. Available at http://www.breathingbuildings.com/default.asp?pnav=7&id=71. Ac cessed April 19, 2011.2 Wikimedia Commons license. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wal- Mart_ Supercenter_in_Vaughan,_Ontario,_Canada,_Jan_2008.jpg. Accessed on April 24, 2011.3 Image from online article “Walmart Wants the U.S. Government to Muscle It Into India,” June 4, 2010. Available at http://www.bnet.com/blog/retail-stores/walmart-wants-the- us-government-to-muscle-it-into- india/623. Accessed April 24, 2011.4 Image available at http://www.mexico.vg/mexicos-economy/wal-mart-mexico-registers- record-sales-in- 2010/1600/attachment/mexico-wal-mart. Accessed April 24, 2011.5 Graphics provided by Charles Zimmerman and Walmart corporate website.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Charles Zimmerman, telephone interview. February 22, 2011.9 Walmart Annual Report, 2006.10 Zimmerman interview, loc.cit.11 Ibid.12 Walmart Annual Report, 2006.13 Zimmerman interview, loc.cit.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Walton, op.cit., p. 243.

CHAPTER 04: WALMART’S FUTURE

105

17 Zimmerman interview, loc.cit.18 GraphicsprovidedbyCharlesZimmerman.Informationsource:Publiccompanyfilings, Walmart corporate website, and Factiva.19 Information from presentations provided by Charles Zimmerman.20 Photo available at http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/articles.aspx?page=articles&ID=216489.21 Margaret Rhodes (2011), “Mini-(Wal)Mart vs. Micro-Target: Inside the Battle for the Next Frontier of Big-Box Retail,” Fast Company. February 1, 2011.22 Ibid.23 Walton, op.cit., p. 29.24 Fresh & Easy article, August 11, 2008. See Reference.25 “Going Rural” article, March 9, 201126 Photo by Todd Gill from article “Now Open: Walmart on Campus,” Fayetteville Flyer, January 14, 2011.27 Walmart corporate website article, “Walmart on Pace to Create 10,000 Jobs in Chicago by 2015,” March 16, 2011. Available at http://investors.walmartstores.com/ phoenix.zhtml?c=112761&p=irol- newsArticle&ID=1539962&highlight. Accessed March 16, 2011.28 “Warding off Walmart” article.29 Miguel Bustillo, “Walmart Figures Time is Right for Chicago Push,” February 11, 2009.30 Bill Simon presentation, March 10, 2011.31 Bustillo, loc.cit.

1 Ann Zimmerman, “Rival Chains Secretly Fund Opposition to Wal-Mart.” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2010.2 Walmart Watch (www.walmartwatch.com) is now controlled by the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). Wake Up Walmart is also a campaign group organized by the UFCW.3 James Cramer, 2004. “Walmart Gives False Economic Tell.”4 Zimmerman interview, loc.cit.5 LeCavalier, loc.cit.6 DefinitiongivenbyWikipedia.7 Tseng, M.M.; Jiao, J. (2001). Mass Customization, in: Handbook of Industrial Engineer - ing, Technology and Operation Management (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley.2001, p. 685.8 LeCavalier, loc.cit.9 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 MPRIES corporate website.16 LeCavalier, loc.cit.17 Image from MPREIS corporate website.18 Ibid.19 Zimmerman interview, loc.cit.20 Image from MPREIS corporate website.

CHAPTER 05: (MIS)PERCEPTIONS AND CRITICISMS

106

21 LeCavalier, loc.cit.22 UACDC website.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 RSAUD corporate website, www.rsaud.com29 LeCavalier, loc.cit.30 Rendering courtesy of RHA Architects.31 Walmart corporate website.32 James Bickers (2010) “Walmart on the Return of Retail Architecture,” March 17, 2010.33 Rendering by Perkowitz+Ruth Architects, 2009.34 Proposed store located in Glenpool, OK. Author unknown.35 Bickers, loc.cit.36 Ibid.37 Vance and Scott, op.cit., p. 132.38 Soderquist interview, loc.cit.39 LeCavalier, loc.cit.40 Rendering courtesy of RHA Architects.41 “Walmart goes urban: be careful what we wish for?” September 23, 2010.42 Alexander von Hoffman’s “Home Building Patterns in Metropolitan Areas,” Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University (1999). Adam Rome’s The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (2001).43 Fast Company article by Clay Dillow, October 22, 2009.44 Ellen Dunham-Jones and June Williamson (2009) Retrofitting Suburbia: Urban Design Solutions for Redesigning Suburbs, p.67.

1 LeCavalier, loc.cit.2 Ibid.

1 EllenDunham-Jones(2000),“Seventy-fivePercent:TheNextBigArchitecturalProject,” Harvard Design Magazine, Fall 2000, Number 12.2 Available at http://articles.cnn.com/2006-10-17/us/300.million.over_1_total-population- households-census- bureau?_s=PM:US3 Dunham-Jones, loc.cit.4 Ibid.5. Courtesy of RHA Architects, sketches by Ty Holcomb and Shade O’Quinn.6 Tom Peters. Available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/t/tom peters131221.html7 Photo courtesy of RHA Architects.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.

CHAPTER 06: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 07: RECOMMENDATIONS

109

Andrew P. Moon is presently an Intern Architect at Raymond Harris & Associates (RHA) Architects in Dallas, Texas, and a graduate student at The University of Texas at Arlington (UTA). During his undergraduate studies at Texas A&M University, spent a semester abroad studying architecture at the Santa Chiara Center in Castiglion Fiorentino, Italy in 2004. In 2005, after graduating with a Bachelor of Environmental Design, took the full-time internship position with RHA Architects. As a part of the remodel team at RHA, he has worked on more than 80 remodel projects across the nation for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the firm’s pri-mary client. The experience, working relationship, and perhaps fascination with Walmart have served as the impetus to this work. While completing his Master of Architecture at UTA, he began taking the Architect Registration Exam (ARE). Following graduation in May 2011 and completing the ARE, plans to seek National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB) certification to practice full- time as a licensed architect. The author has served as a member of the Publications Committee for the Dallas Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, where he combines his writings with the Com-mittee’s primary function to create the editorial content of the chapter’s official publication, Columns Magazine. Future projects include publishing books on architecture, leadership, or Walmart, or on all three topics. The author lives in Red Oak, Texas with his wife Bethany and 4-year-old son Ethan. He enjoys reading, photography, watching and critiquing independent films, water coloring, cook-ing, playing with his son, and spending time with his wife.