There’s Nothing Fair about the Illinois Map: An Examination of the Reapportionment Process in...

7/28/2019 Theres Nothing Fair about the Illinois Map: An Examination of the Reapportionment Process in Illinois

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Theres Nothing Fair about the Illinois Map:An Examination of the Reapportionment Process in Illinois

Craig Curtis, Associate Professor of Political ScienceBradley University

Peoria, IL

Brad McMillan, DirectorInstitute for Principled Leadership in Public Service

Bradley University

Peoria IL

Don Racheter, President

Public Interest InstituteMount Pleasant, Iowa

A paperprepared for submission to the Paul Simon Public Policy Institutes Spring 2013 Conference on

Redistricting in Illinois.

The order of the authors is alphabetical. Their contributions are equal.


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Theres Nothing Fair about the Illinois Map:An Examination of the Reapportionment Process in Illinois

Abstract: Despite repeated reform efforts by a variety of activists and groups, the process by which

reapportionment is accomplished in Illinois falls far short of the ideal. A set of cosmetic reforms wasenacted at the end of the last decade, but the process is not transparent and still easily high jacked for

partisan and incumbent advantage by the leadership of the General Assembly. The system falls evenfarther short of the ideal when compared to the relatively apolitical and efficient system employed inneighboring Iowa. This paper demonstrates the anti-democratic nature of the current process and

examines the mechanisms by which reform efforts have been thwarted in the recent past. The continued

abuse of the apportionment process serves to perpetuate the control of a power elite in Illinois, which, in

turn, prevents consideration of policy proposals that hold the potential to alleviate the host of other

problems that plague the state.


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Introduction: What is Democracy?

Just what is democracy? Renowned political theorist Bernard Crick stated uncategorically that there is no

one clear definition of the term (Crick 2002, 11-13). He argued that the term democracy has its origins in

four historical usages, one of which is the American Constitution. That tradition is one that relies on anactively involved citizenry and upon certain limiting principles that constrain government from behaving

in a way that tramples the rights of individuals in the society (Crick 2002, 91). Other writers in this area

agree that there is no agreement on a single, precise definition (Haerpfer et al 2009, 12), but commonlymentioned is the idea that the citizens must have a meaningful opportunity to influence political

outcomes. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 71) defined democracy as a political system which suppliesregular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials.

The power of government, under the idea of a social contract as John Locke conceived it, derives from the

consent of the governed. Crick argued that even modern authoritarian or totalitarian governments need

the important symbolic label democratic to maintain control of their societies:

But in the modern industrial and globalizing world all governments seeking to manage such social

transformation need mass consentwhich is why so many military dictatorships claim to bedemocratic and . . . depend on an active mass support in a way that no despot or autocrat in olderpeasant societies needed to (Crick 2002, 92).

That consent comes in the form of participation in elections whereby the people who exercise the powerof the government are selected. That selection process, consisting of free and honest elections, has a

powerful symbolic importance, as witnessed by the emotional responses that people in newly

democratizing nations experience when they vote (e.g., Gilligan 2012; Ifill, 2012). The legitimacy of ourown national government rests in large part on our belief that candidates and political parties do not

attempt to win elections via means of controlling the rules of the game as has been alleged so often in

recent elections in places like Mexico (Miroff 2012), Iraq (Araf 2010), Afghanistan (Abdul-Ahad 2009),

and Egypt (CNN 2012). Rather, candidates win elections because they have convinced a majority of

those voting that they are best suited to serve.

While political theorists might disagree about the precise definition of democracy, for purposes of thispaper, we start with the following propositions: 1) it is a fundamental tenet of democratic theory that all

citizens have the opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in their government; 2) this participation

should have the potential to actually affect the policy output of a government; and, 3) this participation

should also be distributed in a roughly equal fashionno one person or group should have significantlygreater access to the system than any other.

Inherent in the American version of democracy is the right to vote. Schumpeters (1943, 271) famousminimalist definition of democracy is that there is free competition for a free vote. In numerous

decisions by the United States Supreme court, the fundamental nature of the right to vote is extolled. Thelist of cases is well known to scholars. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) marks a key beginning when Justice

Matthews opined that the right to vote, is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservativeof all rights (118 US 370). From the cases outlawing the White Primary (Smith v. Allright1944) to the

cases establishing the one person, one vote rule (Baker v. Carr1962; Wesberry v. Sanders 1964;Reynolds v. Sims 1964), the language of the Justices of the Supreme Court has made it clear that the rightto vote is one of the most essential rights in our democracy. InKramer v. Union Free School District,

(1969, 626), Chief Justice Warren said, Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may


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participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of

representative government. There is also ample precedent for the principle that abuse of theapportionment process violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment to theConstitution (Gomillion v. Lightfoot1960).

Despite the broad agreement in our society that voting is an essential element of democracy, the processfor redrawing electoral districts every ten years is self-consciously manipulated for partisan advantage by

both parties whenever they have the chance to do so. Redistricting is one of the most conflictivepolitical activities in the United States (Engstrom 2002, 51). Attempts to control the redistricting processoccur in virtually every state, and even attempts to use a non-partisan commission can backfire as the

Parties seek advantage. The recent experience in Arizona where the efforts of an independent

redistricting commission were initially blocked and Chairwoman Colleen Coyle Mathis was fired and

then reinstated by the Arizona Supreme Court (see, Pitzl 2011a; 2011b;Mathis v. Brewer2012) isdisappointing to those who would argue for attempts to remove partisanship from this vital process.

Ultimately, a map emerged that was approved by the United States Department of Justice (Prescott News

2012) and, despite continuing challenges, was used in the 2012 elections (Associated Press 2012; Sanders

2012). Texas, under the leadership of Tom DeLay, even went so far as to redistrict mid-decade in the2000s in an unapologetic attempt to increase the control of the Republican Party (Bickerstaff 2007).

DeLays efforts led to increased scrutiny of his behavior and ultimately to his downfall. The unabashedefforts by the leadership of the Illinois General Assembly to make sure that the process of apportionmentstays under their personal control and its use to achieve personal and partisan goals was compared

unfavorably to the mid-decade redistricting in Texas (Blake 2011) and arguably undermines the very

legitimacy of Illinois government.

Robert Dahl in his famous 1998 book, On Democracy, opined that effective participation and equality in

voting were two of the five conditions for an ideal democracy to exist. Lipset and Lakin (2004, 27)

wrote, Generally, there must be a realistic chance that the party in power will lose. Our preference fordemocracy, though only imperfectly realized, is that competition yields some degree of candidate

responsiveness to the electorate. Huntington (1991, 7) defined democracy in terms of leaders being

elected in fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes . Whenthe system of apportionment creates districts wherein the outcome is predetermined, effective

participation, free competition for votes, and equality in voting is not present. This point can be well

illustrated by the history of redistricting during the Civil Rights Era.

Once the Supreme Court had made it clear that every state had to redraw its legislative districts (Baker v.

Carr1962) and laid out the basic standard of one person, one vote (Gray v. Sanders 1963, 381)theactual process of drawing the districts in the Deep South commenced. It was a process in which the ideaof massive resistance led those who controlled the process to focus their efforts on drawing district lines

so that the votes of minorities were diluted. The tactics, as always shrouded in unstated goals and hidden

behind code phrases, involved the use of at-large districts, combinations of multi-member districts and

single-member districts, and drawing single member districts in such a way so as to divide minorityneighborhoods between districts.

The tool box available to those who would subvert the process and dilute the votes of sections of thesociety is well known (American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 2010; Southern Coalition for Social

Justice, 2010).

Three techniques frequently used to dilute minority voting strength are cracking, stacking, andpacking. Cracking refers to fragmenting concentrations of minority population and dispersing


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them among other districts to ensure that all districts are majority white. Stacking refers tocombining concentrations of minority population with greater concentrations of white population,

again to ensure that districts are majority white. Packing refers to concentrating as manyminorities as possible in as few districts as possible to minimize the number of majority-minority

districts (ACLU 2010, 11).

Lets look at a few examples of how this can work. Take the example of a simple city as illustrated in

Figure 1. Lets say that the city has a three member city council, all elected from single member districts.Lets also say that the city has a minority population of about 30%, and that the minority population islargely concentrated in readily identifiable neighborhoods. Logic might suggest that one of the three

members of the council should represent the interests of the minority community. The literature on the

implementation and impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has often been based on the idea that

success can best be defined by the election of minority candidates (see, e.g., Grofman 1993; Grofman andHandley 1991) and efforts have been made to remedy past discrimination by creating so called majority

minority districts (see, Shaw v. Reno 1993; Shaw v. Hunt1996). If we assume that the minority and

majority voters will both vote as blocks, creating one minority district containing the identifiable minority

neighborhoods and two districts dominated by majority voters would logically virtually guarantee twomajority representatives and one minority representative on the council. This scenario would be

illustrated in Figure 1 if the district boundaries followed the red lines with each of the neighborhoodsconstituting a council district.

Figure1: A Hypothetical City

If the powers in the city prior to the Supreme Court rulings mandating redistricting were all members of

the majority group, and wanted to keep that power to themselves, they have two obvious choices. Thefirst is to employ a cracking or stacking technique to draw three single member districts so that the

Neighborhood A -

minority

Neighborhood B

-- majority

Neighborhood

C - majority

District 1

District 2

District 3


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minority neighborhoods are divided between the three districts. Each district would consist of a

population that is approximately 30% minority. This would be illustrated by the dotted lines in figure 1

demarcating three districts. The odds of electing a member of the minority group are greatly lessenedunder this map. Dividing the minority population would seem a logical goal of the existing powers if they

want to retain total control of the council.

A second strategy is to move away from single member districts entirely. If all voting citizens of the city

are charged with voting for three candidates, and cumulative voting is not allowed, then moving awayfrom single member districts would logically make it harder for the minority voters to elect one of theirown to office when compared to a situation wherein single member districts are employed and wherein

neighborhood boundaries are respected. This second strategy was used by the City of Mobile, Alabama

and was upheld by the Supreme Court inMobile v. Bolden (1980) despite its effectiveness in preventing

the election of minority groups to the city council.

Let us consider the situation wherein the hypothetical city is majority African American or Latino. This

scenario is illustrated in figure 2. Once again, the city has a three member city council, all elected from

single member districts. Our hypothetical city is divided into two main neighborhoods, with a minoritypopulation that is 55% of the city. If the power structure in the city is dominated by Whites, then the

stacking technique can be used to ensure that no more than one member of our three member citycouncil is beholden to minority voters.

Figure 2: A Hypothetical Majority Minority City

All of these strategies can be pursued based on facially benign criteria. If a federal court has evidence that

invidious discriminatory intent exists, then the law mandates that the jurisdiction be redistricted according

Neighborhood A -

minorityNeighborhood

B -- White

District 1

District 2

District 3


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to legitimate criteria (Gomillion v. Lightfoot1960;Hunter v. Underwood1985). The leaders of the

massive resistance movement in the Deep South in the aftermath ofBrown v. Board of Education (1954)

very quickly established code words to make sure that their allies knew the purpose of any action theytook, and that their enemies could not prove invidious intent in the court. It is far more difficult for

opponents of redistricting to win a court battle when there is only evidence of disparate impact on racial

groups (Shaw v. Reno 1993, 641;Mobile v. Bolden 1980, 62).

While it is easy for a court to decide in favor of a disadvantaged group when presented with clearevidence of intent to dilute minority votes, the situation wherein partisan advantage is alleged is muchharder for those alleging disadvantage. The pursuit of partisan advantage is a pervasive aspect of

reapportionment every decade (Bullock 2010; Windburn 2008). While the Supreme Court has stated that

a cause of action may arise when partisan gerrymandering takes place (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986; Vieth v.

Jubelirer2004), the justices have not been able to come to any agreement on how to decide cases inwhich partisan advantage is alleged, even though they do not particularly like its use (Vieth v. Jubelirer

2004;League ofUnitedLatin American Citizens v.Perry 2006).

The issue is not just one of legality. It is one of the most basic of democratic theoriesthat citizens get ameaningful role in the process whereby public decisions are made. If the leaders of a legislative body get

to determine the boundaries of the maps used to run elections, those leaders get to protect themselves inoffice. This is exactly what has been done for decades in many states, and it is a violation of democratictheory. It is time for it to stop.

Illinois has had some of the most blatant and nasty reapportionment battles in its recent history. Noexample is more disturbing than the profanity-laced tirades unleashed by a Democratic member of the

Madison County Board during the dispute over redistricting after the 2000 census and quoted in the

decision of a federal court in the case ofHulme v. Madison County (2001, 1050-1051). The comment

made in direct response to a claim of partisanship by a Republican on the redistricting committee isespecially foul and embarrassing: We are going to shove it [the map] up your f_____ ass and you aregoing to like it, and I'll f____ any Republican I can. (Hulme v. Madison County 2001, 1051). While this

extreme example is likely not typical, the experience of one of the authors of this paper is that theleadership of the General Assembly will resort to almost any step to avoid an open and non-partisan

redistricting process.

The battles over redistricting that rage in almost every state in the union every ten years are a clearindication that political leaders firmly believe that it matters how the districts are drawn (Bullock 2010,

127). The huge advantage that incumbents enjoy in elections in virtually all legislative bodies at the state

and federal level provides further evidence that our current system is not offering voters a real choice inmost states. Bullock (2010, 126-127) documents the decline in district competitiveness in races for seats

in the House of Representatives since World War II, but it should be noted that 58 incumbents lost seats

in 2010 (Left and Right News 2010). Hirsh (2003, 179) even went so far as to open his analysis of the

redistricting after the 2000 census with the comment that The 2001-2002 round of Congressionalredistricting was the most incumbent friendly in modern American history, as many pundits have noted.Turnover in state legislatures is lower now than in the past and much of the turnover can be attributed to

term limits and retirements (Storey 2003).1

Even though redistricting does normally produce higherturnover numbers in state legislatures in the first election after redistricting, especially where the

redistricting process is non-partisan, in 2002, only 4 percent of all incumbents lost their seat to anopponent of the opposite party (Storey 2003, 7). Windburn (2008) argues convincingly that the types ofredistricting rules in place play a large role in preventing one party from protecting its own members

through gerrymandering. Notably, Windburn (2008, 199) found in his research that the two most


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egregious gerrymanders occurred in those states where the controlling party had complete control of the

process .

The problems with redistricting in Illinois are even worse than in most states and hold the key to real

reform. So long as the legislative leaders get to design the maps, they have no real chance of losing their

leadership position. They have every reason to avoid reform. They have every reason to keep the processsecret and under their control. The main reason to change this state of affairs is that is it not democratic,

and that reason is more than enough to do so.

Illinois Reform Commission (IRC) Recommends Comprehensive Redistricting

Reform

In his first executive order as Illinois governor, Pat Quinn established the Illinois Reform Commission

stating that there has become a crisis of integrity and giving the new advisory body 100 days to issue areport recommending necessary and urgent governmental reforms (Executive Order 09-01). The IRC

held eight hearings and seven town hall meetings throughout the state, receiving testimony in favor ofmeaningful reforms from national experts and thousands of Illinois citizens. On April 29, 2009, the IRCpresented its final 100-day report to Governor Quinn with one of the key recommendations being a call

for comprehensive redistricting reform.

The IRC report found:

The current system in Illinois for drawing congressional and state legislative

districts following a decennial census places Illinois voters in direct conflict withthe legislators who are supposed to represent them. Behind closed doors, political

operatives scrutinize the voting history of constituents to draw boundaries intended

to protect incumbents or draw safe districts for either the Democratic orRepublican parties. The results are gerrymandered districts that are neither

compact nor competitive and do not serve the best interests of the people of Illinois(IRC 2009, 48)

At the Rock Island IRC town hall meeting, a retired citizen poignantly stated Im an engineer bytrainingwhy is it that Illinois doesnt know how to draw rectangles (Collins 2010, 77).

Indeed, as a look at Figure 3 shows, the former 17th

District is the poster child for gerrymandered

districts in the country. One look at the map shows it is neither compact nor contiguous. Cleary,

the 17th

Congressional district was drawn for political purposes and not for good governmentpurposes.

Likewise, former Illinois Senate District 51, shown in Figure 4, was clearly not compact (110 miles longand eight miles wide in parts) and was drawn by the Democrats in power to pit two Republicanincumbents against each other. Former Illinois Senate District 38 had an unusual tail on the end to take in

the residence of the incumbents fiance. These districts are an affront to democracy. And, in the past,when Republicans were in charge of the redistricting process, the same shenanigans were played (Jackson

and Prozesky 2005, 10).


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Figure 3: Illinois Congressional District 17, 2002 - 2012

Figure 4: Illinois Senate Districts 38 and 51, 2002 - 2012


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In researching redistricting reform recently taking place in other states like California and New Jersey and

closely examining the Iowa model, the IRC recommended that the Illinois redistricting process be placedin hands of a five member independent, bipartisan Temporary Redistricting Advisory Committee

(TRAC). The TRAC would appoint an independent, non-partisan Redistricting Consulting Firm that

would use qualified computer software technicians to provide advice and guidance similar to theLegislative Service Bureau utilized in Iowa.

Importantly, the TRAC would have to hold at least five public hearings in different geographic regions ofthe state on the proposed maps and the commission could not consider residency of incumbent legislators,

political affiliations of registered voters, or previous election results. Additionally, the IRC, recognizing

the great diversity in Illinois, recommended that the redistricting process maximize the number ofmajority-minority districts consistent with the Constitution and the 1965 Voting Rights Actto ensurethat the interests of racial minorities are protected (IRC 2009, 56). The TRAC maps would need twothirds majority approval of the relevant legislative voting body.

Additionally, the IRC report recommended getting rid of the crazy tie-breaker system that is currentlybeing used. When the current redistricting process called for in the Illinois Constitution does not result in

an agreed-upon map by a majority of the legislature (3 out of the last 5 times) then the Illinois Secretaryof State draws a political name out of a hat. If the Republican name is drawn they control the redistrictingprocess and if the Democratic name is drawn they determine the legislative boundaries for the next ten

years. Illinois is the only state in America that has a winner-take-all lottery system. Indeed, the IllinoisSupreme Court has criticized this process stating the rights of voters should not be part of a game ofchance (People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan 1992, 295). To alleviate this ludicrous tie-breaker system, the IRCreport recommended adopting the plan proposed by Southern Illinois Universitys Paul Simon PublicPolicy Institute wherein the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court and a Justice from the opposing

political party would appoint a Special Master to oversee the redistricting process and serve as the finalarbiter if the legislature failed to approve a map (IRC 2009, 54).

To change the redistricting process in Illinois it will take either a legislative constitutional amendment or acitizen led petition driven constitutional amendment. The IRC redistricting recommendations were, in

large part, codified into Senate Joint Constitutional Amendment 69, which was never voted on by the

Illinois General Assembly. For nearly six months, the IRC in good faith attempted to work with the

Illinois legislature on a legislative constitutional amendment. IRC members discussed with GovernorQuinn his intention to call a special legislative session on redistricting constitutional amendments which

never materialized.

Illinois Fair Map Amendment

Since the Illinois legislature failed to address redistricting reform during the fall of 2009, the citizen ledIllinois Fair Map Amendment spearheaded by the League of Women Voters of Illinois was launched in

December 2009. The framework for the Fair Map Amendment came from the IRC recommendations butalso included input from statewide reform groups and the Brennan Center for Justice, a national leader in

redistricting reform and the protection of minority voting rights. In order to place the citizen led

constitutional amendment on the November 2010 ballot, the coalition needed to get the signatures of282,000 registered voters on petitions by May 2, 2010. For five months, the League of Women Voters of

Illinois, the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, the Illinois Farm Bureau, United Power for Action and


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Justice, and a host of other reform groups and hundreds of Illinois citizens gathered petition signatures. In

the end, however, the Fair Map Amendment coalition did not gather enough valid signatures to place the

question before the voters.

The Fair Map Amendment constitutional amendment language expanded the IRCs TemporaryRedistricting Advisory Commission (TRAC) to nine members. All meetings of the TRAC would bemade open to the public with 24 hours public notice, thus ensuring full transparency in the redistricting

process. The TRAC would be required to hold at least five public hearings around the State prior to votingon any maps and would be required to hold at least three public hearings after its preliminary approval ofmaps to be considered by the legislature. The TRAC would be guided by stringent, established criteria:

Echoing the verbatim language of the Voting Rights Act, Districts must comply with all federallaws, and shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunityof racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to

elect representatives of their choice

Districts shall be contiguous Districts shall be substantially equal in population Districts shall be compact District boundaries shall follow visible geographic and municipal boundaries, to the extent

practical

The map shall not be drawn to favor one political party Party registration, voting history or incumbency cannot be used to draw the maps except to ensure

minority voting rights are protected

Allows de-nestingHouse districts need not be contained within a single Senate districtSimilar to the IRC recommendations, the Fair Map Amendment required a 2/3 majority for legislative

approval of the maps and provided for the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court and a Justice of the

opposing party to appoint a Special Master if the legislature failed to approve maps. Republicanlegislative leaders introduced the Fair Map Amendment in the Illinois General Assembly, but the

Democratic leaders did not allow a vote on it (The Illinois Campaign for Political Reform 2012).

Senate Joint Constitutional Amendment 121

Nearly four months after the Fair Map Amendment was launched, Illinois Senate Democrats introducedtheir own plan for redistricting reform in the form of Senate Joint Resolution Constitutional Amendment

121 (SJRCA 121). Under the proposed plan, the legislature would still directly control the map drawing

process and maps would need to be approved by a simple majority. Voter history and the residence ofincumbents could be considered. Thus, the plan did not attempt to take away the partisan political portion

of the Illinois redistricting process. The plan did, however, contain further transparency provisions

requiring the Illinois General Assembly to hold four or five regional public hearings before voting on amap. SJRCA 121 passed in the Senate but died in the House on April 29, 2010 when it failed to gain the3/5 majority needed for passage by one vote. Ironically, before the House vote on SJRCA 121, Governor

Quinn made public comments that the plan did not constitute true redistricting reform.

The 2012 Maps and Election Results

For the first time since the redistricting process was created in the 1970 Constitution, one party, the

Democratic Party, was able to control the process without Republican support. Not surprisingly, the 2012


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Figure 5: 2012 Chicago-Area United States Congressional Districts

state legislative and congressional maps heavily favored the Democrats and resulted in the Democrats

winning a historic 40-19 seat super majority in the Senate, a super majority in the House 71-48, and

flipping four United States Congressional seats to the Democrats. Both the State legislative district mapsand Congressional district maps were approved without any opportunity for meaningful public input. A

quick review of the boundaries of the Chicago area congressional districts shown in Figure 5 reveals the

extent to which the lines were contorted to ensure safe Democratic congressional seats.


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The Path Forward on Redistricting Reform

Reforming Illinois seriously flawed redistricting process has to remain a top priority until the job is finally

accomplished. As stated by David Yepsen (2009) of the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute The singlemost important ethical reform Illinois could undertake is to eliminate the system that allows statelawmakers to draw their own legislative district linesbecause redistricting problems sit at the core ofevery other reform and ethical issue facing the state. A similar sentiment was shared by Patrick Collinswho chaired the IRC I must admit that it took some time for me to come around to the conclusion thatredistricting reform was a critical, game-changing issueI have moved redistricting reform to the top ofthe reform agenda (Collins 2010, 69).

At the time of this writing, in April of 2013, a group of advocates for redistricting reform, CHANGE

Illinois, is preparing to lead the charge on a new citizen led constitutional amendment on redistrictingreform. For over a year, reformers have been revising the language of the Fair Map Amendment and are

close to launching the new petition drive. The hope is that the coalition will have a year and not just five

months to get the necessary signatures to get this critical issue before the voters in November 2014.

The Miracle of Iowa

Given that the state of Illinois, despite widespread agreement that the system is purposely manipulated forpartisan advantage, cant seem to accomplish meaningful reform, how did it come to pass that its nearneighbor to the west was able to do so? Many of those who were in government service at the time the

current system was put in place have some very interesting insights into that history. It was not alwaysthe case that Iowa drew its legislative districts in a non-partisan fashion. For much of its history, the

Republican Party controlled the redistricting process. The early history of the state is instructive.

After a false start in 1844-45 with a constitutional convention, a congressional resolution, and a

negative vote of the people, a second try resulted in Iowa coming into the Union as the 29th State on 28December 1846 (Racheter 2012, 3). The Constitution was revised in 1857 and the state divided into 99

counties so that anyone could ride a horse-drawn buggy or wagon to the county seat, do business, andreturn home in daylight (Racheter 2012, 73). This Constitution provided for a House of Representatives

of no more than 100 members, with a maximum of four counties per district, and a Senate of no more

than 50 members (Knapp 2008).

Early elections for both state and federal officers were dominated by the Democrats, but the slavery issue

and the Civil War turned the state solidly Republican. Population was first concentrated on the eastern

side of the state as people flowed into Iowa from the east and south on rivers like the Ohio andMississippi, and eventually on railroads which crossed the state from east to west. As the population

shifted to the western portions of the state, the Capitol was moved from Burlington to Iowa City, and thento its current location in Des Moines (Racheter 2012, 3).

At the federal level, the Iowa delegation to the House of Representatives consisted of two from admission

in 1846 until after the census of 1860 which increased Iowas congressmen to six, with another bump tonine after the 1870 census (Iowa Highway Ends 2013). Word was spreading fast about the superiorquality of Iowa farmland, just as waves of immigrants from Holland, Norway, Sweden, Germany,

Denmark, and other parts of Europe were seeking freedom and personal improvement by coming to the


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new land. Another increase to eleven representatives followed the 1880 census. That number persisted

until very slow population growth in Iowa combined with faster growth in other states, and a fixed

number of 435 members in the House of Representatives, resulted in decreases in the Iowa Housedelegation to nine (after 1930 census), eight (after 1940 census), seven (after 1960 census), six (after 1970

census), five (after 1990 census), and four (after the most recent census in 2010) (Iowa Highway Ends

2013).

As had been the case with the original thirteen colonies, towns and cities along the coast were advantagedin representation in the legislative bodies when district lines were not redrawn as quickly, if at all, aspopulations shifted westward. During the time Iowa was a territory and during the early period under the

Constitutions of 1846 and 1857, the House and Senate were reapportioned every two years until a

gerrymander in 1886 by the dominant Republicans shaped control of the state, with minor modifications,

until the postBaker v. Carrera of the 1970s and 80s (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978). Everytwo years until 1904, the Iowa General Assembly merely re-passed the 1886 apportionment without

change, despite the rapidly shifting population within Iowa. The Constitution was amended in 1904 to

increase the number of House seats to 108 from 99, by giving the largest nine counties a second

Representative (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978). Legislation passed in 1928 specified that nocounty could be represented by more than one Senator, so representation in both houses was more based

on geography than population (League of Women voters of Iowa 1978).

As was the case in many of the states, this inaction on Iowa reapportionment was occurring

simultaneously with a vast migration of population off the farms and out of the small towns into the

growing urban areas. Mechanization reduced the number of people needed to produce as much, or more,from the land and industrialization created factory jobs concentrated in the cities. This resulted in rural

domination of the Iowa General Assembly and agitation by people suffering from mal-apportionment for

redress. In 1941 there was a partial reapportionment which only affected five of the Senates 50 districts,and in 1953 four additional Senate districts were reapportioned (League of Women voters of Iowa 1978).

In spite of the Colegrove v. Green (1946) case in which the United States Supreme Court declared that

mal-apportionment was a political question not to be decided by the courts, the Iowa Farm Bureau andits rural allies saw the handwriting on the wall and decided to try to prolong their dominance of the

political scene by proposing a Constitutional Amendment which would continue one county, oneRepresentative in a smaller 99 member Iowa House, but create a Senate of 58 members based on area --plus population -- in hopes of appeasing the restive urban groups. As required in Article X, section 1 ofthe Iowa Constitution, this amendment (referred to as the Shaff Plan) was introduced and passed in both

houses of the Iowa General Assembly in 1961 and again in identical form in 1963 after the intervention of

a general election in the fall of 1962. It was sent to the public for ratification in a special election on 3December 1963, but in response to vigorous opposition from the Democrats, led by their popular

Governor Harold Hughes and their labor-union allies, it lost overall, even though it passed in 64 of the 99

counties (Knapp 2008, 34).

In 1960 in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court invalidated a gerrymander of the city of Tuskegee,

Alabama and in 1962, inBaker v. Carr, they reversed Colegrove, and declared that courts should address

mal-apportionment in the states. In the 1963 case ofGray v. Sanders, Justice William Douglas first usedthe phrase one person, one vote in striking down Georgias County Unit system. In May of 1963, theUnited States District Court for the Southern district of Iowa (Davis v. Synhorst 1963) agreed with the

Iowa Federation of Labor that the 1904 and 1928 plans for apportionment of the Iowa House and Senatewere unconstitutional, but they did not stay the December vote on the Shaff plan.


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In February 1964 the Supreme Court struck down Georgias congressional district plan (Wesberry v.Sanders 1964), and in June ruled that both houses of the Alabama Legislature must be apportioned based

on population (Reynolds v. Sims 1964). Writing for the majority in theReynolds case, Chief Justice EarlWarren said legislatures represent people, not trees or acres (Reynolds v. Sims 1964, 562). Atremendous backlash swept the states, especially the more rural ones. Congressmen introduced bills to

deny the courts jurisdiction in apportionment cases, and a Constitutional Amendment to allow states toapportion one house of their legislatures based on geographical area, as is the case in the U. S. Senate,

was proposed. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois led a six-week filibuster to stop this effort, and so SenateMinority Leader Everett Dirksen, also of Illinois, asked the states to call for a Constitutional Conventionto be held for this purpose (Knapp 2008). Of the required 34 states for such a procedure, 32 agreed, but

that was the high-water mark of the effort (Knapp 2008, 7-8).

Because of the subsequent redistricting in all the states between 1964 and 1994, along with the Goldwaterand McGovern challenges to the old guard in the Republican and Democrat parties respectively, thewhole landscape of American politics was turned on its head. The Solid South shifted fromDemocrat to Republican, New England shifted from Republican to Democrat, and urban areas gained

power at the expense of the formerly dominant conservative coalition.

On January 14, 1964, a federal district court in Iowa directed that a special session of the Legislature becalled to deal with the unconstitutional apportionment issue, with the threat that the Court would draw thedistricts themselves if the political branches failed to act in a timely fashion (Davis v. Synhorst1964).

Governor Hughes promptly called a special session, and the Iowa General Assembly provided for two

plans to deal with the problem. Plan 1 was to govern only the 1964 election, in which 59 members wouldbe elected to the Senate based on population plus area considerations, and 124 to the House from districts

each based on equal population (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978, 6).

Plan 2 was a Constitutional Amendment to go into effect for the election of 1966 and subsequent years,but it was not re-passed in the 1965 session because of theReynolds decision and the certainty it would be

stuck down if challenged (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978, 6). In April 1966, the Republicans

sued on the basis that the election of 1964 had used multi-member instead of single districts and the courtagreed with them inKrudienier v. McCulloch (1966) that multi-member districts violated the

Constitution. This was codified in a Constitutional Amendment adopted in 1970 (League of Women

Voters of Iowa 1978, 8). The Iowa General Assembly authorized a bipartisan commission to come up

with recommendations for the 1966 election, and the seven Democrats and seven Republicans produced aplan which was subsequently amended in horse-trading between the parties in the Iowa GeneralAssembly, mostly to protect incumbents in each party.

2

Under the plan, the Republicans maintained control of the House after the 1966 general election, but for

the first time since the depression, the Iowa General Assembly was split with the Senate controlled by the

Democrats who won a majority of the 61 seats from 49 districts under the plan (League of Women Voters

of Iowa 1978, 7). Since either party could now veto an attempted long-term gerrymander, the IowaGeneral Assembly again created a 14-member bipartisan commission to draft a plan for a 100 member

House and a 50 member Senate for the 1968 election (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978, 8).

Also in the 1968 general election a Constitutional Amendment was passed establishing that the Iowa

General Assembly would apportion itself on the basis of population in the first year following every

decennial census, and if they failed to do so, the job would fall to the Iowa Supreme Court. Compact andcontiguous districts were required, and for the first time in Iowa history, crossing county lines in drawing


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legislative districts was allowed (League of Women Voters of Iowa 1978, 8). Citizens were given

standing to sue if they thought a plan was deficient (Knapp 2008, 34).

The plan recommended by the commission was again subject to lots of horse-trading amendments toprotect incumbents before it was adopted in 1969 by the Republicans who again controlled both Houses

after re-taking the Senate majority in the 1968 general election, and signed into law by newly electedRepublican Governor Robert Ray. Clifton Larson, the Chairman of the Iowa State Democrat Party,

brought suit alleging it was unconstitutional and in early 1970 the Iowa Supreme Court agreed (Cook,2007, 2; In the matter of the Legislative Districting of the General Assembly of Iowa as Enacted by the

64th

General Assembly 1972), but they allowed the election of 1970 to take place under the plan anyway!

Remaining in control after the 1970 election, the Republicans asked the well-regarded Legislative Service

Bureau (LSB) to come up with new plans taking into account the 1970 census data and the variousapplicable court decisions, and Phil Burks, the Senior Research Analyst who was the LSB expert in the

area again asked University of Iowa Professor of Systems Engineering John M. Liittschwager, who had

assisted in drawing up the 1969 plan, for help (Burks 1979). At the time, the University was the only one

in the State with a powerful enough mainframe computer to handle the computational load necessary todo the districting according the criteria laid down by the courts (Liittschwager1978; 2013). They came up

with 12 plans, and the majority Republicans picked the one which they thought would give them the mostadvantage in the 1972 election. Governor Ray signed it into law on March 8, 1971 (Knapp 2008, 40).

The Iowa Civil Liberties Union (ICLU), the Iowa League of Women Voters (ILWV), the Iowa Federation

of Labor (IFL), the United Auto Workers Union (UAW), and the Iowa Democrat Party (IDP) jointly suedto have the new plan declared unconstitutional, since the changes to the original plans were designed to

protect incumbents rather than improve the equality of the districts populations (Lloyd-Jones 2013). OnJanuary 14, 1972, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously declared the 1971 plan void and took it upon

itself, with the assistance of Burks, the LSB, and Liittschwager and his team at the University of Iowa tocome up with a better plan. This was accomplished by April 1, and the plan had a variance between the

largest and smallest districts of .009 versus the variance of 3.8 in the former Iowa General Assembly plan

(In the matter of the Legislative Districting of the General Assembly of Iowa as Enacted by the 64th

General Assembly 1972).

The districts might have been nearly equal, but they werent pretty. One representative had his house inone district, but his barn in another. Don Avenson, who went on to become the Leader of the Democratsin the House, then Speaker, and who now is a lobbyist, angrily whipped out a pen and paper upon being

asked about his district under the courts plan, drew the outline of his district, and pointed out that he hadparts of four counties, had a single town from one county, had a town whose township was in anotherdistrict, had half of another town (Avenson 2013).

The Iowa legislators did not like the courts encroachment on their institutional autonomy, and

determined to come up with an apportionment plan that would not be struck down according to formerRepresentative and former Senator David M. Stanley (2013). The legislators thought the courts did a

terrible job in the plan they imposed for the 1972 election (Schroeder 2013). The implication was that the

Iowa General Assembly could do a much better job without the courts interfering (Horn 2013). Mostlegislators also at least paid lip service to the idea that fair apportionment was the right thing to do andthat something needed to be done to address the one man, one vote edict of the Supreme Court (Neu2013).


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The Democrats had the added incentive that they believed they would gain seats under a fairer

apportionment which gave more seats to urban districts where their supporters were concentrated, and

taking them from rural districts which traditionally in Iowa had supported Republicans (Avenson 2013).Indeed this proved to be the case, as the number of Democrats in the House increased to 45 under the

court ordered plan, and once the subsequent non-partisan LSB plan was adopted, they took control

(Avenson 2013). Which gives rise to the $64,000 question of why the dominant Republicans gave uptheir ability to gerrymander and adopted a long-range plan for non-partisan redistricting, creating the

Miracle of Iowa.

Many, Republicans and Democrats alike, were of the opinion, to the victor go the spoils. Whileacknowledging the necessity for any Iowa reapportionment plan to meet population standards delineatedby the United States Constitution, they attempted to create wiggle room for factors in addition topopulation if they were allowed by the Supreme Court in other states (Burks 1977, 3-4). SenatorsElizabeth Shaw, Philip Hill, Richard Ramsey, Richard Drake, and David Readinger introduced Senate

Joint Resolution (SJR) 10 in 1977 which would have pushed back the deadline for coming up with a plan

from September 1st

of the first year of each decade to January 15th

of the second year as well as allowing

more population variation (Burks 1977, 1).

One can speculate that the Iowa Republicans were encouraged by the replacement of Earl Warren byWilliam Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and by the evolving reapportionment standards

in cases likeMahan v. Powell(1973), Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), and White v. Regester(1973) inwhich variance from strict equality was allowed if it may reasonably be said to advance the rational statepolicy of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions (Wollock 1980, 11-14). However, HJR 10did not pass, and after the 1978 election Reid W. Crawford, Chairman of the House State GovernmentCommittee appointed a sub-committee composed of Republicans James Anderson and Nancy Shimanek

(Chairman), and Democrat Jean Lloyd-Jones (who as President of the ILWV had been a party to the suit

invalidating the 1971 plan) (Crawford 1979; Lloyd-Jones, 2013; Shimanek, 2013).

The plan they produced specified that the Legislative Service Bureau was to provide plans for both

congressional and Iowa General Assembly redistricting by April 1st

of the first year after each decennialcensus; the Iowa General Assembly must vote on the plan -- without amendment -- within seven days. Ifdefeated, the LSB must produce a second plan by May 1

st. Again the Iowa General Assembly has seven

days to act and may only vote the plan up or down, not amend it. If defeated, the LSB must produce a

third plan by June 1st

and this plan can be amended. If a plan is not adopted by the Iowa General

Assembly by September 1st, the Iowa Supreme Court was to again draw up a plan in time for the elections

in the second year after the census (Cook 2007). Both congressional and legislative districts would have

to be as equal in population and as compact and contiguous as possible.

More importantly for preventing gerrymandering, the LSB is forbidden to take into account previous

election results, current voting registration figures, or the residences of any incumbent representatives

(Garrison and Kaufman 1981). In order to make the job more manageable, according to ProfessorLiittschwager, they would first draw the number of congressional districts to which Iowa was entitled,then fit (an equal number if possible) the state Senate seats within those districts, and finally divide each

Senate district into two House districts. The task was very labor intensive, because while the computer

could crunch the census numbers, there were no computerized mapping programs available, and the

results had to be transferred to maps by hand (Liittschwager 2013).

In her notes prepared for the debate on the bill which she ran on the floor of the House, Representative

Shimanek characterized the plan as Fair, Efficient, & Workable, Constitutionally Valid, and


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Politically Feasible (Shimanek n.d.). She went on to emphasize that the elected legislature, not anappointed court or administrative body, should make districting decisions. Further, while the legislative

process would be a political one, gerrymandering and horse-trading to protect incumbents could bediscouraged under this bill because of the objective, strict standards for population equality, compactness,

and contiguousness, and because the burden would be on the Iowa General Assembly to defend any

deviations if an adopted plan was subject to court challenge (Shimanek n.d.).

In reporting the outcome, the Cedar Rapids Gazette (Editorial Board, 1979b) said on Sunday April 8,1979:

The Iowa House, composed of 56 Republicans and 44 Democrats, voted 97-0 the other day for a

bill assigning the initial task of drawing new legislative and congressional Districts, based on the

1980 census, to the Legislative Service Bureau. Any time the House votes unanimously foranything other than non-controversial measures, it is news. And any time the vote is 97-0 (it

probably would have been 100-0 if three members hadnt missed the roll call) for a bill containingthe word reapportionment, it borders on earth-shaking news.

In its discussion of the process, theDes Moines Register(Editorial board 1979a) reported on March 19,

1979, that Jean Lloyd-Jones and Reid Crawford who had initially favored a bi-partisan commissionapproach pushed by Common Cause and supported by Governor Ray, had switched to the LSB non-partisan plan as superior. Crawford was cited as fearing that the commission system left the door open to

district trade-offs to protect incumbents and the parties at the expense of the people. They especially

approved of the first two plans put forward by the LSB being unamendable as a bulwark againstgerrymandering.

The Senate fell in line and this approach became law in Iowa. There have been some minor amendments,

for example, the number of days the LSB has to prepare a plan is pushed back by the same number ofdays the US Census Bureau is late in delivering the data required. But nothing has changed the main

thrust of the non-partisan miracle (Cook 2007). In the times it has been used it has never gone to the

amendable third plan. When popular Republican Congressmen Tom Tauke and Jim Leach were put intothe same district by the first plan, the first plan was rejected, but the second adopted (Knapp 2008, 12).

There have been as many as 20 of the 100 House members in a district with another incumbent, but that

still leaves 80 who are not, and as much as they might want to vote no on the first plan to help thesefriends out, they want to vote yes on plan one even more in hopes of avoiding being one of thosethrown in with another incumbent in the subsequent planbetter the Devil you know, than the Devil youdont.

So what can we conclude are the reasons the majority Republicans gave up the power to gerrymander?

One of us, Don Racheter, has had extensive contact with members of the Iowa legislature and based on

his conversations with these affected legislators, it appears to be a combination of the following four

factors. Even within a majority party, there are those members close to the leadership, and those who areback-benchers, who might be gerrymandered out of a seat if they cross the leaders. Voting for a non-partisan plan minimizes this risk. Much more significant was the resentment of the Court stepping in, at

the request of the Democrats and their allies, and infringing on the institutional autonomy of the GeneralAssembly. Closely tied to this was the belief that the Court had botched the job, and the Iowa General

Assembly acting through the LSB could do a much better job. Finally, there were a significant number of

upstanding Republican members of the Iowa General Assembly who, like Representative Shimanek, justthought it was the right thing to do (Shimanek 2013).


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Is it possible that these conditions can be replicated in other states like Illinois to move them from

gerrymandering to non-partisan redistricting? It seems very unlikely. We have seen both Democrats and

Republicans carve up congressional and legislative districts for partisan advantage in Texas, California,and other states even while carefully meeting the court imposed population equality criteria throughusage of ever more powerful and convenient computer programs. There no longer is a cadre of moderate

Ray Republicans in Iowa or other states, and the moderate Blue Dog Democrats also seem to be avanishing species. Congressmen and legislators are more afraid of a primary challenge from the left or

the right if they are seen as insufficiently liberal or conservative respectively than worried aboutprevailing in the general election. Incumbency has replaced other factors in most easily explainingelection outcomes in America.

What Must Be Done in Illinois to Guarantee Meaningful Participation by Our

Citizens

Noted scholars in the area of democratic theory Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and Samuel Huntington

(1991) both have argued forcefully that in order for democracy to thrive, the incumbents must have a

realistic chance of losing an election. So long as the state of Illinois purposefully gerrymanders its

legislative districts to favor incumbents and the political party in power, many legislators have no chanceof losing an election. The current process allows for packing, cracking, and stacking, and that must

change.

The comparison between the miserable failure of the State of Illinois to address citizen demands for

reform in the reapportionment process with the miracle in Iowa could not be more stark. While theleaders of the Illinois General Assembly maneuvered to avoid meaningful reform, the citizens of Iowaenjoyed a fair reapportionment process once again. As a result of a map drawn by the Democratic

leadership of the Illinois General Assembly, three incumbent Republicans were pitted against each other

in the 2012 election.

The leaders of the Illinois General Assembly had ample opportunity to study the success in Iowa becauseGovernor Quinns Reform Commission presented them with a well researched proposal based on amodified Iowa model. Experts told them in open hearings how it could work and the benefits it couldbring. The treatment of the experts who testified was, in the view of two of the authors, shabby and

disrespectful. If that were not enough, the Fair Map initiative presented an opportunity to improve the

process, based on a proposal drafted with the assistance of the Brennan Institute, hardly known as abastion of Republicanism, but the Democratic leadership of the Illinois General Assembly went out of

their way to attack the Fair Map proposal, falsely claiming it did not protect minority voting rights.

While the exact process used in Iowa may not translate perfectly to Illinois, creating a redistrictingprocess that ignores the way that precincts voted in the last presidential election, the residences of

incumbents, and that respects existing city and county political boundaries would be a huge step forward.

Having boundaries that are compact and contiguous would be nice as well. In Iowa, they still know how

to draw a rectangle. If only Illinois political leaders could learn that skill, it would be an improvement.One of the authors of this paper is actively involved in the CHANGE Illinois effort which will attempt to

bypass the legislative leadership via a citizen-led redistricting constitutional amendment. Indeed, a recent

Paul Simon Public Policy Institute (2012, 11) poll of registered voters found that 70% of respondentsfavored taking the map making power away from the General Assembly and giving it to an independent

commission.


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In California, the adoption of two different reforms, including a non-partisan mechanism for drawing

legislative districts, has resulted in districts that are more compact and slightly more contiguous (Cain

2012, 1828). In addition, the Public Policy Institute of California (McGhee and Krimm, 2012) reportedthat the 2012 election had more competitive races for both state legislative seats and United States House

seats than had been the case under previous maps drawn with an eye towards partisan or incumbent

advantage. Turnover was also greater than in past election cycles (McGhee and Krimm, 2012), animportant fact given that one of the criteria for democracy is that incumbents have a realistic chance to

lose an election. In Arizona, several congressional races were very close and not finally decided for daysafter the 2012 election (Sanders 2012). There was also substantial turnover at both the state and nationallevel (Sanders 2012). The experience of these two states provides evidence in support of the idea that a

non-partisan commission can do a better job of drawing competitive, compact, and contiguous districts.

There are numerous ways to measure the effects of reform efforts. The relative competitiveness of races,the number of existing political boundaries that are crossed by legislative districts, the degree to which

minority populations have a realistic chance to elected members of their communities to leadership

positions, are all valuable things to know, but one criterion stands above all these in a state racked by

political corruption and scandal. That criterion is legitimacy. When the citizens perceive that the processis rigged, they do not accord legitimacy to the results of the election. The lack of legitimacy percolates

throughout the system. Citizens become fed up with an unfair system that is more focused on keepingpolitical power than serving the publics best interests.

In addition, there is a lack of legislative accountability that results in a lack of leadership to tackle the

critical issues facing Illinois. Following the 2000 remapping process, 98% of state legislative incumbentswon re-election in 2002 (Collins 2010, 73). By drawing safe legislative districts incumbents havestacked the deck in favor of their re-election. And, they continue to avoid addressing the financial mess

and pension debacle that makes Illinois one of the worst states in the nation on these issues. Since their re-

elections are virtually assured, state legislators can keep kicking the can down the road.

The legislative leaders in Illinois have no incentive to allow real reform. A popular movement must be

started and nurtured to overcome their resistance. This cant be done by proposing a new legislativeconstitutional amendment. That effort would fail. It has to be done by demanding, in a loud and

unmistakable chorus, that the citizens of Illinois will not accept the status quo. Mobilization efforts must

be grass roots based and persistent. We cannot wait until 2019 to do anything. Two of the authors of this

paper (Curtis and Racheter) argued in March of 2006 that the effort to reform redistricting needed to startthen. Despite the best efforts of some very dedicated people, the process ended with no real reform. Itstoo important to leave it to the Illinois General Assembly. If we want fundamental reform in Illinois,

ordinary citizens will have to rise up and turn Illinois in a better direction by signing petitions to place acitizen-led constitutional amendment on the November 2014 ballot. It will take people power toovercome entrenched political power. After all, Illinois is the land of Lincoln, Paul Simon, and other

dedicated public servants who knew that serving the publics best interests, not preserving their own

power, should be priority number one in a thriving democracy.


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